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
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
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
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
THE
BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST
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AND
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PREFACE.

Men have not only to learn, but to unlearn. To do either aright, the critical faculties must be trained. Reflective thought has been of much use to society. It has corrected mistakes and removed misjudgments; it has reformed codes and creeds; it has suggested change and advocated progress; it has confirmed sciences and aided philosophy; it has affected states and improved human life. Every new truth on which men's minds have been excited to inquiry has loomed out upon the horizon of investigation like the Cape to the Portuguese navigator, shrouded in storms; but, as steady approaches have been made towards it, calm settles where the former agitation raged; and when the resolute adventurer has passed round to the other side, and so seen both, he can say,—

“Cape of Storms! thy spectre's fled,
And the angel Hope, instead,
Lights, from heaven, upon thy head.”

We become wiser by pressing experience into new regions, and putting the good ship “Investigation” under the charge of Captain Intellect. We may under his guidance explore new seas of thought, and re-survey some of the old ones, so as to rectify our charts and make sure of the soundings. In a world of changes, opinion too must change; or, at least, must watch and register the changes which take place around it, and keep a critical look-out on the highways and byways of speculative research, in order that where necessary it may re-map the territory and adapt its charts to the combined results of time, thought, and truth.

Plato thought that the search after truth was not only the noblest occupation, but the highest delight of life. Some modern thinkers, in their care only for results, or from experience of the fatigue and difficulty of the truth-seeker's task, have thought that dogmatic beliefs received on authority constitute a better furnishing for actual life than the culture of a critical, or, as they term it, a sceptical activity of intellect. The mind is mastered, not by what it receives on authority as right, but by what it perceives by reason as true. The search for truth is in man's power, the attainment of it may be beyond his reach; but if it is to be gained at all, it must be found more certainly after examination than upon mere authority; for faith in authority is entirely different from faith in truth, and man's soul is enriched and ennobled by the truth he believes in, not by the authority on which he accepts it. Man may be conquered, not converted, by dogmatic authority; reasoned thought alone can convince him.

“Doubt,” as double thought, said Aristotle, is “the beginning of truth;” “a good beginning” enough, as Locke says, “but a bad end.” Inquiry implies doubt, because it is a search for certainty which may succeed or may be disappointed, but it seeks certainty, not scepticism. The more we think for ourselves, the less inclined we feel to accept the thoughts of others; for we then know the power and pleasure of thought as well as gain its profit. Truth can challenge doubt; falsehood cannot.

The *Debates* on which we have been engaged have had, for the most part, not only a special, but a perennial interest; and though they have been few, they have been treated from points of view widely different, and in methods of much variety. To the contributors of those papers which give this serial its unique character, and impart to this volume so much of its worth and importance, the conductors, fully alive to their merits, owe "the recompence of thanks" for their aid in maintaining the culture of critical thought as a valuable element in the republic of letters. Old names they recognise with new feelings of delight in their associated work, and new ones with the fresh joy of seeing "the torch of thought" taken up by others, to be shaken and passed on. Our *Topics* have called out terse and telling suggestions, which will be perused with profit as examples of condensed thinking and concise expression. The *Essayist* has been varied and attractive; and the *Inquirer* has been, if less multifarious, much more informing than of late. Our *Collegiate Course* holds on much in its old way, being at once interpreting and informing. Our *Societies' Section* has somewhat improved in interest; and our *Reviewer* has been concise and varied, if he has not found occasion to be full and subtle. The *Literary Notes* have been extended and increased, as we hope, both to the pleasure and profit of the reader; and the *Leading Papers* are due to the laborious thinker who has, with few exceptions, furnished them for upwards of nineteen years.

Nineteen years! Yes, even so; our serial has stood the test of time—may we not say well? Among the multitudes of magazines projected and produced in the first year of the half-century, how few survive unto this day! How many perished in their early days! how few, like us, have survived their teens! We made no vast professions, and offered no attraction except honest thought impartially presented; we have been able to make no startling announcements of striking novelties calculated to catch the popular taste of the times; but have been contented to pursue our course of earnest endeavour to promote reflective self-culture. Ours has not been a course of seeking for pecuniary profit. In this regard we have had to sacrifice much. But our efforts have been of profit to many in a far higher sense than money can represent. Are we wrong in believing that after such testing, such labours, and such patient pursuit of human good, we should find our readers more willing to farther our ends by increasing our circulation and aiding our efforts by sympathy and active co-operation in our work, our progress and prosperity? Old friends must pass away; but a little effort on the part of those who love our aim and appreciate our endeavours might bring to rally round us, new men and true men, who love truth, goodness, and reflective thought, who seek improvement and cultivate the faculties of investigation. We begin our twentieth year in hope and faith. Let our readers second our efforts, and we shall soon attain a valued majority.

Made wiser by our years, and by the experience we have gained, aided by the wider circle of friends which has gathered around us, quickened by the interest felt in our efforts, and growing more anxious as time passes to perform our duty efficaciously, we hope with increased acceptancy to provide for our readers a supply of thoughtfully impartial controversy, of well-chosen and original information, of carefully selected inducements to and advice regarding self-culture, a life devoted to high purposes and thought, likely to lead to nobler aims and efforts.

THE BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST.

Modern Historians.

GEORGE GROTE, F.R.S., D.C.L. Oxon., and L.L.D. Camb.
author of *The History of Greece; Plato and the other
Companions of Socrates, &c.*

"A decided liberal, perhaps even a republican, in politics, Mr. Grote has laboured to counteract the influence of Mitford in Grecian history, and to construct a history of Greece from authentic materials, which should illustrate the animating influence of democratic freedom upon the exertions of the human mind. In the prosecution of this attempt he has displayed an extent of learning, a variety of research, a power of combination, which are worthy of the very highest praise, and have secured for him a lasting place among the historians of modern Europe."—*Sir Archibald Alison.*

GREECE was once almost a synonym for glory. It was the birth-land of reflective thought. To it we owe the polite and liberal arts; and, to it, our minds instantly recur when we think of what is grand in intellect, perfect in beauty, or exalted in heroism. It is a region of ennobling associations, because it has been the scene of noble deeds and the native country of exquisite thoughts. The special office or mission of the Hellenic people seems to have been the complete realization of manly excellence (*καλοκάγαθία*). Greece is to literature what Palestine is to religion: the former sought to embody the admirable as the latter aimed at developing the adorable. A generous magnificence of life animated the Greeks in every effort of their activity and enterprise. Everything they touched they intellectualized, inspirited with thought, and endued with artistic form. Marble took personality by their chisel, and thought took outwardness to their minds in a splendid concourse of divinities. Poetry, sculpture, painting, and architecture passed with them from being mere formal arts and became essential elements of human life, while philosophy, science, history, and statesmanship, though but the inner forces of individual or national vitality, received the charm of formal beauty from the intensely cosmic

spirituality, which they imparted to every conception which arose in their intelligence. Greece was the land of formative individual life. Hence, as John Stuart Mill says, "The interest of Grecian history is unexhausted and inexhaustible," though it were taken but as a part of the history of mind. The Greeks have made good an inalienable claim to a mastery over the admiration of thoughtful men. "No poetry will rob their Homer of our love; no philosophy (silent of Christian teachings) can ever breathe with sereener truth than that of Socrates [from the spirit of Plato]. Heathen history owes its best pages to Thucydides; heathen justice still takes the life of Aristides for its best example. Eloquence, so far as it depends on language, cannot rise higher than Demosthenes; and art, so far as it consists in form and execution, has never even equalled the long-lived creations of Phidias and the nameless sculptor of the Apollo. It would be vain to enumerate these names were they not sufficiently familiar to represent the ideality and the effort of a people in love with beauty. There are others suggesting different associations, yet readily associated with these. The love of beauty is not alone the love of things material or even intellectual, but of things moral, the most beautiful of all. Imperfectly as these could be known in Greece, they were not neglected in the abundance of other objects of cultivation and exertion. The dangers and the sacrifices of Aristomenes for the sake of Messenia, the death of Leonidas and his three hundred faithful to iron-hearted Sparta, the devotion and the triumph of Thrasybulus over his evil-minded countrymen at Athens, are all illustrations of the love of home and law and liberty, which are more truly parts of the one great principle of beauty than poetry, or policy, or art—they are the human ground-work of a divine morality.*

If we look with a diligent eye over the surface of the ancient world we shall find no country that appears to be comparable with Greece, and the islands which lie between it and the western coast of Asia Minor, in the conditions of site, climate, and the articulation of contrasts within a limited compass in such a manner as to be favourable for variety of existence, effort, and progress. It was a land of ever changing, yet continual, loveliness—one in which every power benign

"Conspired to blow the flower of human kind."

Those who diligently study the careful sketch of the "Geography and Limits of Greece" in Grote's History (vol. II., pp. 281—314) will find that its fruitful valleys were interspersed with mountain peaks towering skywards, that a vast extent of its coast was fondled by the sea, that its scattered islands had splendid interspaces of ocean lying round them, and that these conditions of life excited to the varied industries of husbandry and pasturage, mercantile traffic and the sea-faring adventurousness to which commerce induces. The grateful alternations of sea-air and mountain-

* *The Liberty of Rome: a History.* By Samuel Eliot; vol. I., p. 105.

breezes, and the pleasing changes of landscape and ocean communicated no less delight than they excited to strenuous activity and varied exertion—so that the Greeks were neither oppressed by toil nor enervated to languor. The singular disunion of its component parts introduced emulation and rivalry; while their pride of race prevented their ardent zeal for home from degenerating into localism, and their national feasts and international games kept up the fervency of patriotism and the interests of public life. Different ideals of existence thus became possible, and yet were brought so closely into competition with others that experiments were varied as the need and the hour changed. Despotism, which had been the bane of the mighty civilizations of the ancient world, could effect but little in a land which was itself so strangely dissociated in space, yet associated in race, and whose inhabitants consequently could be so little subdued to any one scheme or form of life. The old empires had afforded no scope for history; governmental changes and dynastic revolutions constitute almost the only record of the long periods during which they existed—we dare scarcely say flourished. The individual formed but a part of the mighty enginery of State in them; but in Greece social existence demanded the proper exercise of individuality, for civilization depended on each man's doing his best in the situation wherein his lot was cast, by adapting himself to the circumstances in which he was placed, and doing the duty which lay nearest to his hand with all possible energy. This is the secret of the manly excellence that made Greece a land of men, heroes, and thinkers. That the history of such a nation should be full of interest to those who dwell in a land where personality is regarded as precious is scarcely to be wondered at, and hence we find that the incidents of Greek history have always been favourite illustrations with those who desired to inculcate and encourage individual energy or national independence. At every era in modern history in which the freedom of man has been felt to require extension and security, Greek literature has been a peculiarly popular study, and Hellenic records have been appealed to in behalf of the movements made for the furtherance of human independence. We know how great a stir and ferment of spirit seized the western nations when Greek letters, in the fifteenth century, carried the treasures of thought from Constantinople to the universities of Germany, France, and England. At the reformation Greek literature had again sprung into favour and was studied with loving diligence. A classical revival preceded the French revolution, and, in fact, the echo of Greek imperialism, alternating with the republican impulses of Hellenic history are not inactive in Germany and France to this day. After the stormiest period of the revolution had passed, men began to seek a more complete and trustworthy knowledge of Hellenistic life, letters and philosophy, and this revival of interest in the history of Greece has affected our own land to such a degree that we have now in our literature one of the noblest and best histories of Greece which has yet been produced

in any land. Of this history and its author we now proceed to give some account.

George Grote, eldest son of Geo. Grote, Esq., of Badgmoor, Oxon, was born in 1794, at Clayhill, near Beckingham, in the county of Kent. His grandfather, a gentleman of German descent, was, along with Geo. Prescott, one of the founders of the private banking establishment, still extant, under the designation of Prescott, Grote, Cave & Co., at 62, Threadneedle Street, London. His father was an assiduous and thoughtful man of business, and he determined to bring up his eldest son, as he had himself been trained, from his youth up, to a business career. After acquiring, under home and private tuition, the earlier rudiments of education, George Grote, in his tenth year, became a pupil in Charter House School, as a boarder with the head master. As a Carthusian he was a contemporary with and schoolfellow of Connop C. Thirlwall (subsequently Historian of Greece, and now Bishop of St. David's), with whom he has ever since maintained relations of intimate friendship. The old Chartreuse had the reputation of being one of the best schools in the metropolis; and here, during six years, George Grote received the elements of a first-rate education, within precincts intended at one time to be sacred to monkery as the Priory of the Salutation of the Mother of God. In the sixteenth year of his age he began his business life, being then indentured as a junior clerk in the banking-house of which his father was one of the principals, and of which he is himself now one of the heads. Through all the grades of clerkly service in the bank he regularly progressed, taking his promotion and pay on the same terms as others, and being as thoroughly held bound to the proper performance of his departmental duties as any other sub-official in the service of the firm. He combined with business talent and zeal a scholar's tastes, aptitudes, and ambitions, and though debarred from that University career which was opened to his brother John Grote (afterwards B.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy at Cambridge, author of "Exploratio Philosophica," &c.), he determined to pursue a course of intellectual culture such as would place him on a level, as to results at least, with those who had spent their years amid the scholastic advantages to be found on the banks of the Isis or the Cam. Accordingly, he employed all his leisure in study, and with the resolute enthusiasm for erudition which characterizes the Teutonic race, to which his ancestors belonged, he rose early in the morning and sat late at night poring over the pages of the ancient writers, and making himself familiar with the best productions of the greatest thinkers of modern times in his own land and on the Continent. He succeeded in mastering the literatures of Greece and of Rome, and having attained a practical knowledge of the languages of France, Italy, and Germany, he was able to avail himself of all the aids to his favourite studies furnished by the research and scholarship of the best writers and thinkers of these nations.

In 1820, Mr. Grote married Harriet Lewin (daughter of Thomas

Lewin, Esq., the head of an old Kentish family), a lady who has subsequently become known in literature as a contributor to the *Spectator*, authoress of "Collected Papers," and biographer of "Ary Scheffer, the Franco-Flemish painter," who won his earliest artistic fame by his pictures of "The Defence of Missolonghi," the "Souliote Women," &c., founded on incidents in modern Greek history.

At the period when he was zealously pursuing the self-selected course of studies to which his mind was given he was brought into contact with some of the most influential minds then in our land. Mr. James Mill, who was carefully training his son to profound thought and thorough research, and who had already won a high reputation as the Historian of India, delighted to stimulate young men to reflection and considerate reading, and he was instrumental in bringing many of the hopeful and earnest to the point of forming a society for the study of logic, political economy, and psychology. These young men, among whom were we believe John Austin, Edwin Chadwick, John Stuart Mill, George Grote, &c., met twice a week in a room near Charing Cross, belonging to Francis Place, the political economist, and discussed every question of these sciences with the best text-books before them, and not unfrequently with the opportunity of consulting the highest living authorities upon such subjects among the liberal politicians of the day—Bentham, Cartwright, James Mill, Southwood Smith, Sir John Bowring, Colonel [now General] Perronet Thompson, Dr. James Brown, and all the leading Westminster Reviewers, who were willing to aid the inquiring, at least, to a knowledge of their views and opinions. These early associations impressed upon his mind a love of political speculation, an enthusiasm for the prevalence of popular enfranchisement which he has never seen cause to relax or disavow.

One of the earliest—and not one of the least important—outcomes of this associated effort after self-culture was, we believe, the foundation, in 1821, of the Political Economy Club, a society instituted for the investigative consideration and discussion of all questions relating to the wholesome and safe, systematic and trustworthy, management of the business of a State,—the investigation of the laws which regulate the prosperity of communities of men, and the criticism of the several fiscal and financial proposals by which taxation has been or may be beneficially regulated. It is interesting to remark how naturally and eagerly those who were earnest in endeavouring to improve their minds formed themselves into associations to accomplish by united effort that which they could not otherwise effect, that so they might provide for themselves the best substitute they could for the collegiate training which circumstance denied them, and it is no less pleasing to know that those who have had the advantage of working together in this way have almost invariably been the firmest friends and the warmest advocates of such institutions. Mr. Grote has been no exception to this general rule, for we find that he was for some

time President of The City of London Literary and Scientific Institution, 165, Aldersgate Street, and in that position has not only been interested in all its business concerns, but also an interesting speaker on public occasions.

Out of that Young Men's Self-improvement meeting, too, in a great measure, sprang the idea of the London University. Its existence proved that there was a want felt for enlarged mental cultivation by many who from various constraining causes were deprived of an opportunity of study at the old universities, and the suggestion fell into minds well fitted to give shape and form to their ideas. "The Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge" proposed in one way to provide for and supply the means of self-culture for adults, but there seemed to be wanting as well the means of a complete and generous course of instruction for those who, while engaged in business or professional pursuits, were anxious to proceed with their education beyond the reach available in boyhood, and under superior academical conditions than schools afford. To this, of course, many collateral ideas became attached, such as the need of having an institution where members of dissenting bodies, who were, to a considerable extent, excluded from the benefit of training at Oxford or Cambridge, might receive university culture, and where, the education being brought as it were to the door, home life and parental control could be combined with high culture and professional training. In 1825 University College was projected, in 1828 it was opened, and in 1836 it was first chartered, but in 1837 it was reconstituted as the University of London. Of University College, George Grote has always been, we believe, Treasurer. Of the University of London he was one of the first Fellows—constituted and incorporated by Royal charter into a Senate. In each subsequent charter his name has had a place, and in the Royal charter, granted January 6th, 1863, he is not only designated "Our trusty and well-beloved George Grote, Esq., Doctor of Civil Law, Fellow of the Royal Society," but he is therein constituted and appointed as "the said George Grote to be the first Vice-Chancellor" under that act of incorporation. This office and dignity he now holds, and that his connection with University College is not less real and earnest than it was in the beginning, may be regarded as attested by his recent elevation to the position of President, in room of the earliest occupant of that dignity—Lord Brougham.

Mr. Grote's interest in education led him also to take office in the committee of management of the Central Society of Education which was instituted "to collect, to classify, and to diffuse information concerning the education of all classes, in every department, in order to learn by what means individuals may be best fitted in health, in mind, and in morals, to fill the stations which they are destined to occupy in society,"—which issued several excellent publications, and holding its meetings simultaneously with the British Association, attracted considerable attention to education by its transactions and its prize essays.

During the boyhood and youth of George Grote, Greek history had been made the subject of authorship by John Gillies, LL.D., a Scotchman, born in Breechin in 1747, and William Mitford, born in London in 1744. Both of these authors issued the earlier volumes of their respective histories of Greece in or about the same year, 1786, and both were brought to a conclusion during the years when George Grote was pursuing his course of historic self-culture most earnestly. Gillies' work had reached a sixth edition in 1820, while Mitford's had been reprinted in octavo in 1815, and was re-issued under the editorship of the author's brother, Lord Redesdale, in 1820. While Grote was but a young man a regenerated Greece began to be hoped for, and this lent the charm of immediate interest to the records of that famous race. In 1820 there broke out in Greece that rebellion against the domination of the Turks (to which they had been long subjected) which excited the admiration and gained the friendly aid of the chief countries in Christian Europe, while it proved that the heroism and determination of the sires of the Hellenes had not wholly expired in the spirits of their children. This rebellion ended in the establishment of Greece as an independent member of the confederation of nations in 1829, under the presidency of Capo d'Istria, but in the meanwhile it had roused the poetic sensibilities and the slumbering might of the soul of Lord Byron to devote his genius and to sacrifice his life in the cause of Grecian freedom—making him willing even to cede his poetic renown could he have gained in exchange the epitaph "*Siste Viator, herosa calceas!*" Halt, traveller, thou treadest on a hero! The passages in "*Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*" (1812—1818) which speak of Greece, must have awakened sympathy in susceptible minds; the news which contained details of the deeds of Ypsilanti, Riga, and the Hampden of Greece—Marco Botzaris—were full of interest and excitement, while the horrible massacres at Scio, Paros, &c., and the wholesale exposure of the virgins of Greece in the slave markets of Asia must have revolted the conscience of those who recognized the rights of humanity, and enlisted the earnest and thoughtful in the cause of the Panhellenic confederation.

In 1823 Philhellenism took form and a name; and simultaneously with this uprising in the hearts of men of love for the Greeks, and sympathy with their endeavours to secure independence, Mr. Grote formed the resolution to write the "*History of Greece*" and to make that his great life-work. "The first idea," he says, "of this history was conceived many years ago, at a time when ancient Hellas was known to the English public chiefly through the pages of Mitford; and my purpose in writing it was to rectify the erroneous statements as to matters of fact which that history contained, as well as to present the general phenomena of the Grecian world under what I thought a juster and more comprehensive point of view; but between the formation of the purpose and the definite commencement of the task, there was to intervene an interval of

hard labour and political experience." Hence, writing in 1846, he observes, "My leisure, however, was not at that time equal to the execution of any large literary undertaking; nor is it until within the last three or four years that I have been able to devote to the work that continuous and exclusive labour, without which, though much may be done to illustrate detached points, no entire or complicated subject can ever be set forth in a manner worthy to meet the public eye."

The new turn given to banking by the Act of 1823, the difficulties of conducting business in the transition period, the paper panic of 1825-6, the Joint-Stock Bank Act of 1827, and the financial intricacies of the period immediately preceding the passing of the Reform Bill in 1832, form sufficient grounds for supposing that professional life would have special claims upon him, and may perhaps be regarded as main reasons for determining Mr. Grote's public action for some time thereafter towards politics—especially the politics of the economist or philosophical radicals. It is, however, certain that his purpose was well known in intellectual circles, and that his special fitness for the execution of the historic task he had undertaken was acknowledged. Thus, in 1827, we find Niebuhr, the eminent historian of Rome, writing to Francis Lieber, a Philhellene, who had been tutor in his family, and subsequently settled down in the United States as a Professor of History in the College of Columbia, South Carolina, and editor of the *Encyclopædia Americana*:—"Endeavour to become acquainted with Mr. Grote, who is engaged on a Greek history; he, too, will receive you well, if you take him my regards. If you become better acquainted with him it is worth your while to obtain the proof-sheets of his work in order to translate it. I expect a great deal from this production, and I will get you a publisher here." Early indications of his purpose, and of the spirit in which it was formed, may be seen in a paper he contributed to the *Westminster Review* in 1826. In that article he brings the following objections against his predecessor. "He contracts the strongest individual partialities, and according as these lead he is credulous or mistrustful; he exaggerates or he qualifies; he expands or he cuts down the documents on which he has to proceed. With regard to the bright side of almost every king whom he has to describe, Mr. Mitford is more than credulous: for a credulous man believes all that he is told, Mr. Mitford believes more than he is told. With regard to the dark side of the same individuals, his habits of estimating evidence are precisely in the opposite extreme. In treating of the democracies, or of the democratical leaders, his statements are not less partial or exaggerated." Hints, too, of the temper in which he would look upon and criticise the mythic portions of Hellenic history were given in a paper on H. F. Clinton's *Fæsti Hellenical*, and another on Niebuhr's *Heroic Legends of Greece*, in the *London and Westminster Review*, May, 1843—an article of which he acknowledges the authorship in a note to his *History*, Vol. I., p. 478. We have been led to reckon among the articles in the

Westminster Review the following as being papers by the same writer, though without any conscious external authority:—*Niebuhr's History of Rome*, Oct., 1829; *Niebuhr's Geography of Herodotus*, Oct., 1830; *Colonial Policy of the Ancients*, Oct., 1835; and *Restrictions on the Diffusion of Opinion among the Ancients*, Jan., 1836. These articles gave indication of the turn his mind was taking, and it early became known among his associates that he was diligently engaged in perusing in the original languages all the works in which the Greeks had inscribed their history, or enshrined their theory of life; that the poetry, the oratory, the philosophy, and the drama of Greece had become earnest studies with him, and that he was engaged in collecting from all authentic sources everything which could aid him in realizing to himself the life, events, influences, and effects of the Hellenic races. It was known, too, that he had been stimulated to this ardour of study and long-lasting toil by a sense of the importance of the political experiments which had been made in Greece, and a persuasion that in his own country at least these had been misrepresented in the interests of party to such an extent as to be untrustworthy records of the real events of Hellenic history, and to be equally fallacious as interpretations of the lessons which that history affords.

In the earliest production by which Mr. Grote endeavoured to influence the public mind, a pamphlet on "Parliamentary Reform," being a review of a celebrated paper by Sir James Mackintosh, published in the *Edinburgh Review*, he declared himself on the people's side by advocating a wide measure for the extension of the franchise. This pamphlet, which was issued anonymously, in 1821, gave him a place almost immediately among those who firmly insisted on the policy and advantage of granting to the people such rights as they might fairly claim, and brought him into active participancy in the earnest excitement which during the decade 1820—1830 preluded the Reform Bill. Nor as the time advanced for more immediate action did he restrain his efforts or relax his energies. In 1831 he issued a work on "The Essentials of Parliamentary Reform," which gained the attention of thinkers, and won for him the recognition (as we shall afterwards see) of the managers of the political movements of the metropolis. In this exciting time he took, we understand, an interest in the establishment of the *Westminster Review* as the organ of Benthamism and Reform, and of the *Spectator* as a weekly exponent of the views of radical thinkers on the special points of interest which arose in the varying circumstances of that period of active thought and political transition, of multiplex advocacy and of importunate assertion of the need for reform.

During the important year, 1830, Mr. and Mrs. Grote were in France, and saw the actualities of history taking place around them in that stirring time, when the arbitrary ordinances levelled against the constitution were stubbornly resisted by the deputies under the leadership of the courageous General Lafayette, who called out the

National Guards and set himself at their head to defend freedom against the king. At this grand hour of political vitality, when the liberal party in France was engaged in daily consultations as to how the ministry of Villèle could be defeated, and the constitution could be preserved, and during the "three glorious days" of July, when Charles X. was dethroned and Louis Philippe was chosen to be sovereign of France, Mr. and Mrs. Grote were at the headquarters of the liberal party—the Chateau de La Grange, the country residence of Lafayette. Of the scenes of these times Mrs. Grote has produced most vivid and vigorous sketches in her life of Ary Scheffer, the distinguished Batavian-born French artist, who, along with M. Thiers, then *Reducteur en chef* of "The National," was deputed to offer the crown to the citizen-king, who stepped from the Chateau de Neuilly to the Tuilleries in 1830, and who in 1848, under the same artist's guidance, escaped from the uneasy throne of France—to die at Claremont in 1850—before a revolution more stormy than that to which he owed his elevation. The lively interest in liberal politics taken by Mr. Grote in England, had doubtless made him welcome to the chiefs of the liberalists of France.

When the Reform Bill of 1832 was passed, and the old Parliament was dissolved in order that a new one should be elected by the extended constituencies; and when the mysterious machinery of electioneering had got a wider range to work in and a lower level to reach, the liberal party in London, being desirous of so arranging matters that they should have a potential voice in the legislation of the country, looked round among the more enterprising and ambitious of the city magnates for fit and proper persons to represent the wealthy and important community of the metropolis, and fixed upon Sir John Key, Lord Mayor of London for that year, and George Grote, the eminent banker and able review writer, as those on whom they wished to confer that dignity. The organization which the liberal party in London kept up, enabled them to carry their purpose into effect, and George Grote, M.P., became the distinguishing title of the subject of our sketch.

During his parliamentary career, Mr. Grote spoke occasionally at considerable length and with a good deal of effect on the more important questions which came before the house. His profound reach of thought, his powerful reasoning, and his apt manner of statement, secured him, usually, the attention of the house. The speciality to which he devoted himself during his tenure of office as a member of the House of Commons was the Ballot. He had been deeply impressed with the reasoning contained in a paper on that subject from the pen of James Mill, which had appeared in July, 1830, in the *Westminster Review*, and on 25th April, 1833, with the desire of testing the honesty of Parliament in regard to purity of election, he made a motion in the House in these terms, "That it is expedient that in future elections of members to serve in Parliament the votes be taken in the way of ballot." In a house of 317 members this motion was defeated by a majority of almost two

to one, the numbers on the division being: *Ayes*, 106; *Noes*, 211. His non-success did not depress him into quiescence. Every year thereafter, with renewed energy, fresh arguments, new facts, well chosen illustrations, and greater earnestness, he tabled a similar motion, dealing out on each occasion fresh elaborations of the argument in favour of secret voting, as a means of securing honesty of enfranchisement. He was one of the representative men of philosophical radicalism, or those who admired and advocated the tenets of Bentham, Mill, &c., and he strove hard to imbue the reformed Parliament with a higher morality, and a loftier patriotism than its predecessors, by constantly maintaining that representative government only attains its proper end when it secures an entire correspondence in thought, feeling, interest, and intention between the people who choose the legislature and those who make and administer the law. Mr. Grote was re-elected to the new Parliament of 1835, when the king, taking occasion, on the elevation of Lord Althorpe as Earl Spencer to the Upper House, to dismiss the ministry, called Sir Robert Peel, at the suggestion of the Duke of Wellington, to occupy the Premiership. He had the same honour re-conferred on him in that House of Commons which, in 1837, welcomed the young Queen of England to the sovereignty she has so well adorned, the first Parliament of Victoria.

The philosophical radicals, or democratic doctrinaires, who took their places in the reformed Parliament, were men of a very different stamp from those destructive demagogues whose advent to legislative predominance had been so lugubriously foreboded. They were for the most part men of independent fortune, or at least competent means, sober-minded, earnest, intellectual, and skilful in the management of business, occupying good social positions, and remarkable for moral energy. They were not men of showy, shallow, and superficial qualities, mere popular mediocrities. They believed in fixed principles, which the mass of the people did not comprehend, and which the aristocracy would not acknowledge, and their steady adherence to these philosophical principles made them less influential even with the mob than the tenacity with which they strove to found and base every legislative proposal on well-reasoned grounds, as premises made them ineffective with the higher classes. The lower classes looked with apathy on them as theorists, and the upper ten thousand and their friends despised them as crotchety and impracticable closet-politicians and pamphleteering statesmen, who could manufacture waste-paper constitutions with fluent self-satisfaction, but who could not stoop to the proper duty of managing men as they are and smoothing the way gradually to things as they should be, because they never took to themselves the cohesion of party. Miss Martineau has said:

"There was no other party which, in 1837, was known to include such men as Grote, and Molesworth, and Roebuck, and Colonel Thompson, and Joseph Hume, and William Ewart; and Charles Butler, and Ward, and

Villiers, and Bulwer, and Strutt; such a phalanx of strength as these men with their philosophy, their science, their reading, their experience—the acuteness of some, the doggedness of others; the seriousness of most, and the mirth of a few—might have become, if they could have become a phalanx at all. But nothing was more remarkable about these men than their individuality. Colonel Thompson and Mr. Roebuck could never be conceived as combined with any number of individuals for any object whatever; and they have so much to do, each in his individual function, that it would perhaps be an injury to the public service to withdraw them from that function. And when we look at the names of the rest, reasons seem to rise up why they, too, could not enter into a party organization. Whether they could or not, they did not, conspicuously and effectively. They were called upon, before the opening of a new Parliament, to prove betimes that they were not single-subject men, as reformers are pretty sure to be considered before they are compacted into a body, but to show that the principles which animated their prosecution of single reforms were applicable to the whole legislation. If Mr. Hume took charge of finance, and Mr. Grote of the ballot, and Mr. Roebuck of Canada, and Sir W. Molesworth of colonization, and Mr. Ward of the appropriation principle, they must show that they were as competent to the enterprizes of their friends and of their enemies as to their own. Many of them did this, but the association of their names with their particular measures might be too strong. They were never more regarded as a party during the period under our notice; and it may be observed now, though it was not then, that their failing to become a party in such a crisis as the last struggles of the Melbourne ministry was a prophecy of the disintegration of parties which was at hand, and which is, in its turn, a prophecy of a new age in the political history of England.”

It may be noted that in this Parliament, 18th June, 1839, Mr. Grote made his motion on the ballot, and so great was the progress he had made in forming a public opinion on the subject that his motion was affirmed by 216, and negatived by 333; he had thus more than doubled his supporters, while the opposition had only gained one for each two he had conciliated. At the general election in 1841, chagrined in some measure by the slow progress of the popular cause, and grudging the sacrifice of so many years precious for the accomplishment of a life's ambition, Mr. Grote announced to his constituents his determination to retire from public political life to devote his active energies to the completion, if possible, of his long-cherished aim in regard to the history of Greece. In his intention, which was stated to be inflexible, the citizens of London acquiesced, and he has ceased since then to take any active public part in the general politics of the day.

He did not, however, cease to interest himself in political and social questions. He took a special interest in speculations having for their object the benefit of man; and among modern speculations of this sort, none impressed and fascinated him so much as the splendid Sociology of Auguste Comte. He read the *Cours de Philosophie Positive* as it was issued from the press, 1830—1842, and when the great crisis in Comte's life came, in his being stripped of his tutorial dignity and income, Mr. Grote had already

given such indications of his goodwill to the French Sociologist that in his hour of distress M. Comte thought of him at once as a helper. In a letter written to J. S. Mill, 22nd July, 1844, Comte says:—"The recent relations which I have had with Mr. Grote have led me to think of him; for I know that his fortune is considerable, at least for Paris. He seems to me to be of a character so noble that I should never have to repent of having allowed him to take over me that sort of superiority [which a benefactor has over a beneficiary] of which I have always been able to recognize the true worth and the legitimate rights." "My first intention was to have written to Mr. Grote at the same time as to yourself, but I have at last decided that it is right to leave you alone to determine on the whole of my conduct in a matter so delicate."

In relation to this affair, Emile Littré records that "the friendship of J. S. Mill, which had in 1843 taken the first steps, did not remain inoperative in 1844, and he was soon able to announce to M. Comte that the loss of his 5000 francs would be made up to him by the concurrent gifts of three gentlemen who were sufficiently stricken with the excellence of the positive Philosophy as thus to bear witness of their gratitude to its founder. These three gentlemen were Mr. Grote, the celebrated Historian of Greece; Sir William Molesworth, famous in literature and politics; and Mr. Raikes-Currie." On 15th August, M. Comte writes to J. S. Mill, "I have just time to tell you that I yesterday received, from the banker named, the 3000 francs advanced by Mr. Grote;" he also thanked Sir W. Molesworth "for his noble co-operation in this tutelary intervention." On 1st February, 1845, he received a second 3000 francs, but he was disappointed that the subsidy was not continued after his non-election in 1845, so as to avert "the pressing financial difficulties inseparable from the iniquitous temporary spoliation" thus brought upon him. "This time," says M. Littré, "the intervention of Mr. Mill failed, and the three Englishmen did not wish to renew the subvention. Mr. Grote alone sent a supplementary sum of 600 francs. M. Comte resented the withdrawal of this temporary aid, as an affront to the high priest of Philosophy, and grew cold towards his eminent English disciples."

None of these great English thinkers relinquished their faith in Comte: Sir William Molesworth devoted himself to adapt his views to the reform of our Colonies; Mr. Mill endeavoured to colligate them with English opinions on Political Economy, on Representation, and on Philosophy; while Mr. Grote carried back to the ages of ancient Greece the guiding light he believed he had gained from Comte, and tested his views in his immortal work. The two first volumes of "The History of Greece" were published in the spring of 1846, and before the year was out it had been made the theme of articles in all the chief literary organs of the time. It treats (1) of "Legendary Greece," and (2) of "Grecian

History to the reign of Pisistratus at Athens." It is designed "to set forth the history of a people by whom the first spark was set to the dormant intellectual capacities of our nature,—Hellenic phenomena as illustrative of the Hellenic mind and character," but not "to substitute a pleasing romance in place of half-known and perplexing realities;"—"to set down all that can be ascertained, together with such conjectures and inferences as can be reasonably deduced from it, but nothing more." Its author justly affirms "that conscious and confessed ignorance is a better state of mind than the fancy without the reality of knowledge," and of the period of "epic poetry and legend," he professed to give a narrative, not to write a history,—*"I describe the earlier times by themselves, as conceived by the faith and feeling of the first Greeks, and known only through their legends, without presuming to measure how much or how little of historical matter these legends may contain. If the reader blame me for not assisting him to determine this—if he ask me why I do not undraw the curtain and disclose the picture—I reply in the words of the painter Zeuxis, when the same question was addressed to him on exhibiting his masterpiece of imitative art: "The curtain is the picture,"—"the curtain conceals nothing behind, and cannot by any ingenuity be withdrawn. I undertake only to show it as it stands, not to efface, still less to repaint it."* The remainder of these two volumes "is destined to elucidate this age of historical faith, as distinguished from the latter age of historical reason: to exhibit its basis in the human mind—an omnipresent religious and personal interpretation of nature; to illustrate it by comparison with the like mental habit in early modern Europe; to show its immense abundance and variety of narrative matter, with little care for consistency between one story and another; lastly, to set forth the causes which overgrew and partially supplanted the old epical sentiment, and introduced, in the room of literal faith, a variety of compromises and interpretations." The legendary poems of Greece—especially the Homeric ones—next receive attention, and the controversy regarding the personality of Homer, the original structure of the poems attributed to him, and the questions which German criticism has raised respecting these matters occupy considerable space. Grote commences the Historic age at 776 B.C., but prior to entering into details he supplies a full and ample geography of Greece. Of the extent of his entire design, and of the divisions into which he thinks it best to regard it, he presents the following concise outline:—

"The history of Greece falls most naturally into six compartments, of which the first may be looked at as a preparation for the five following, which exhaust the free life of collective Hellas. I. Period from 776 B.C. to 560 B.C., the accession of Pisistratus at Athens and of Croesus in Lydia. II. From the accession of Pisistratus and Croesus to the repulse of Xerxes from Greece. III. From the repulse of Xerxes at the close of the Peloponnesian war and the overthrow of Athens. IV. From the close of the

Peloponnesian war to the battle of Leuktra. V. From the battle of Leuktra to that of Chæroneia. VI. From the battle of Chæroneia to the end of the generation of Alexander. The five periods, from Pisistratus down to the death of Alexander and of his generation, present the acts of an historical drama capable of being recounted in perspicuous succession and connected by a sensible thread of unity."—(*Preface* xiv., xv).

What a noble theme unfolds itself in this programme! How large and vigorous was the life of the Greeks! Well are they worthy of the character thus penned of them by J. S. Mill:—

"They were the beginners of nearly everything, Christianity excepted, of which the modern world makes its boast. If in several things they were but few removes from barbarism, they only among nations—so far as is known to us—emerged from barbarism by their own efforts, not following in the track of any more advanced people. If with them, as in all antiquity, slavery existed as an institution, they were not the less the originators of political freedom, and the grand exemplars and sources of it to modern Europe. If their discords, jealousies, and wars between city and city caused the ruin of their national independence, yet the arts of war and government evolved in those intestine contests made them the first who united great empires under civilized rule—the first who broke down those barriers of petty nationality which had been so fatal to themselves—and by making ideas and language common to large regions of the earth, commenced that general fusion of races and nations, which, followed up by the Romans, prepared the way for the cosmopolitanism of modern times. They were the first people who had an historical literature; as perfect of its kind (though not the highest kind) as their oratory, their poetry, their sculpture, and their architecture. They were the founders of mathematics; of physics; of the inductive study of politics, so early exemplified in Aristotle; of the philosophy of human nature and life. In each they made the indispensable first steps which are the foundation of all the rest—steps such as could only have been made by minds intrinsically capable of everything which has since been accomplished. With a religious creed eminently unfavourable to speculation, because affording a ready supernatural solution of all natural phenomena, they yet originated freedom of thought. They, the first, questioned nature and the universe by their rational faculties, and brought forth answers not suggested by any established system of priestcraft; and their free and bold spirit of speculation it was, which, surviving in its results, broke the yoke of another enthralling system of popular religion, sixteen hundred years after they had ceased to exist as a people. These things were effected in two centuries of national existence: twenty and upwards have since elapsed, and it is sad to think how little comparatively has been accomplished."—*J. S. Mill's Dissertations and Discussions*, Vol. II. p. 284, 285.

Mr. Grote, in telling the story of the Greeks, departs from the usual and hackneyed method, by beginning with the mythology, cosmogony, and theology of the Hellenic races, as the earliest shadows cast from the divine foretime upon the historic canvas—as the proscenium of the life-drama of which the Hellenistic cities formed the scenes. The synopsis given is masterly, the grouping is exquisite as well as instructive, and the form in which this all-per-

sonifying religious faith is given, affords excellent facilities for felicitous sketches, finely-arranged pictures, and suggestive interpretations. In this Grote at once boldly adopts the philosophy of history, of which Comte claimed the honour of being the discoverer and expositor, and this world-environment of deities and demi-gods he considers as the outcome and presentment of the theological age. This adoption of the Comtean theory of myths—

“The intelligible forms of ancient poets,
The fair humanities of old Religion.”

—as merely the results of an imaginative contemplation, as Wordsworth describes it in the fourth book of the “Excursion,”* so projected from a subjective impression as to become an objective form and accepted reality, while it admirably answers the purposes of the historian who seeks to gain a background for his realistic scenes, can scarcely be held as satisfactory to the philosopher, who sees in these myths the irresistible strivings of human nature to comprehend the relation of the supernatural to daily life, and the proof of the reality of a feeling inherent in man, that the positive is not the whole of man’s knowledge and does not include all his relations. Fetichism is a witness to man’s need of a religion, and does not necessarily imply the entire falsity of the religion as a sentiment and a fact which is founded upon it. Fetichism is religious symbolism, and myth is the legendary form which the realizing faculty imparts to the explanatory ideals on which men fixed, as picturing to themselves the changeful facts of the Cosmos, as manifestations of the changeless powers by which the facts occurred. Science and life demanded these myths as initiatory elements on which they might stay themselves, in act or inquiry, as the starting-ground of duty and observation. Science, as criticism, accepted the multiform personifications of Polytheism, and endeavoured to explain, not the feeling in the soul out of which they grew, but the appearances of nature over which they were said to be effective; but it left the subjective origin of them unexamined and unexplained. Religion held them as dogmas, and by so doing deprived the philosopher of the opportunity of showing the same powers underlying all appearances and all science, and a divorce was proclaimed between science and religion. This divariation still continues, but it is the labour of a genuine philosophy, by a true comprehension of the mind on the one hand and of nature on the other, to reconcile the erring pair, and again to unite science and religion as the guides and guardians of human life. The happy form in which Mr. Grote relates, and the felicitous method in which he employs the legends of Greece, as an introductory prelude, is an innovation in history which commends itself to the reader; but the peculiar bearing which this part of his work is made to exercise on the philosophy of history merits notice and specialization as, perhaps, too readily adopted from the convenience

* The passage is quoted B.C. p. 47; July, 1867.

which it afforded for illustrating "the invariable law of human progress," which the great French sociologist propounds and Grote advocates. We are quite prepared, while excepting to the philosophical application to commend the philosophical exposition of the myth, and to express our agreement in the main with J. S. Mill's opinion, that—

"He has overcome the difficulty, so great to a modern imagination, of entering intelligently into the polytheistic frame of mind and conception of nature. In no treatise which we could mention, certainly in no work connected with Grecian history, do we find so thorough a comprehension of that state of the human intellect in which the directly religious interpretation of nature is paramount—in which every explanation of phenomena, that refers them to the personal agency of a hidden supernatural power, appears natural and probable, and every other mode of accounting for them incredible—where miracles are alone plausible, and explanation by natural causes is not offensive to the reverential feelings of the hearer, but actually repugnant to his reason, so contrary is it to the habitual mode of interpreting phenomena."*

On the "application of chronology to Grecian legend," Mr. Grote discusses in a masterly manner the principles of historical evidence, and examines the value of genealogies and etymologies as grounds for inferential history. On Grecian epic and the Homeric poems an able and erudite chapter is given, and the different theories regarding the authorship of the "Iliad" and the "Odyssey" are succinctly considered. On this question we hope to bestow some labour, and to throw some light in a paper under the projected heading of "Greek Days and Roman Nights," in a future issue. On the philosophy of Geography there is much matter for thought supplied, and in the notices of "the Hellenic people generally in the early historical times," a vast amount of recondite reading is summed up; but we dare not linger over these debate-exciting and precious volumes, and it must suffice here to quote the following lines of epitome:—

"In the six concluding chapters of the second volume, Mr. Grote comprises the sum of what is known respecting the early condition of those Grecian states which have properly no history prior to the Persian invasion, and brings down the history of the Peloponnesian Greeks to the age of Croesus and Pisistratus. The fragmentary nature of the information, and the conscientious integrity of the author, who scruples to supply the deficiency of certified facts by theory and conjecture, render these chapters with one exception somewhat meagre. The exception is the chapter which treats of the legislation of Lycurgus, the earliest Grecian event of first-rate historical importance."†

These chapters on the Spartan legislator, and on the statecraft

* J. S. Mill's "Dissertations and Discussions," vol. ii. p. 810.

† *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 326.

of which he was the originator, contain striking arguments against the Johnsonian lines added to Goldsmith's "Traveller"—

"How small, of all that human hearts endure,
That part which laws or kings can cause or cure!"

—and give a wonderful exhibition of the formative power of legislation to overcome Will by Law, and inure men to regard submission as patriotism—a power attained by persistent severity and rigorous constraint. By Law Sparta became a brotherhood rather than a political community—a brotherhood which overmastered all private affection and all personality.

These two volumes of history, though they contain a great amount of dissertation, may be read with a pleasure, we think, excelling that of a continuous narrative of incident. They are filled with splendid specimens of reasoning applied to social, legal, and historic questions of interest and importance, and the author carefully distinguishes proof from assertion, and evidence from inference. In them we have, as we think, more a chapter of the history of the human mind than of Greek history, so thorough is the philosophy of man involved in the text, though the special illustrations used are based on Greek legends and records. Few books could have been received with more ardent enthusiasm by the critics, and general readers vied with professional students in the eagerness with which they praised its vividness, originality, power, sweep, and scope. The *Quarterly Review* affirmed that its author had "incontestably won for himself the title not merely of a historian, but of the historian of Greece;" while the *Edinburgh Review* asserted that "these two volumes give assurance that he will be remembered, not only as the first who has seriously undertaken the work, but as one who will have made great steps towards accomplishing it;" and *The Examiner* says that "poetry and philosophy attend the historian on either hand, and do not impede or misguide his steps."

Those who have not read the dreary, ill-translated volumes of Rollin, the dull and verbose reproductions of the Greek historians of which Gillies' work so largely consists, or the laborious disquisitions of Mitford, which are all written under the lurid light of the French Revolution, and in the presence of spectres of anarchy and social desolation, seen in the glare that light cast, are quite unable to appreciate to the full the clear, terse, calm judiciousness of Thirlwall, and far less the candid, courteous, ingenious, and reflective history of Mr. Grote. As an adequate and satisfying representation of Hellenic life, eventfulness, and progress, it seems to us unsurpassable. One reason for this is that our modern historian took his first stimulation to recompose the Greek narrative from his perception of the similarity (amidst differences) of the life of the seafaring, adventurous, commercial, free thoughtful and consciously powerful Greek peoples, with the business communities which were

in his youth stirred by politics and practical life. He was educated in the world's centre of commercial transactions, amid the freedom-seeking agitations of an active age; he had the training of a thoroughly practical business life, and was himself a member of the most practical and powerful, the most cautious and thoughtful, the most independent and discriminating legislature in the world. He was no closet theorist, or mere bookish student; he understood the world of men and life, of business and legislation, of letters and philosophy. He could grasp details within the grip of principles, and see all their meaning as well as decide upon their proper order. Master of multifarious reading, conscious of the results of diligently acquired scholarship, and full of the power of a skilfully trained mind, he not only knows facts, but can illustrate and explain them, see their relations to each other, and infer, as may be necessary in each specific case, their causes or their consequences. The practised ability of managing to keep a variety of facts vividly within the immediate ken and reach of the intellect, and of threading the interrelations of one with another, so needful in business, is equally requisite in a Greek historian; for Greek history is a narrative of varied and progressive life, of differing interests and the intricate action of special personal desires and ambitions with general necessities. It is also pre-eminently a record of municipalities possessed of the right of independent action, subdued to national reciprocities and combined life, by the force of events and the social wants of the period.

(To be continued.)

PEACE AND HARMONY OF TRUE CHRISTIANITY.—He who reigns within will never be vanquished by anything external. This is an essential part of the meaning of doing God's will on earth as the angels in heaven; for though they do it ardently, they do it calmly. . . . The cherubim "ran and returned," as the appearance of a flash of lightning, yet with all this rapidity, there was no perturbation. In all their movements there was nothing vertiginous; and there was also the exactest harmony. They kept their position without the slightest irregularity, and because they were thus exquisitely regular themselves, the attendant machinery of Providence as strictly kept time with them. "As the living creatures went, so the wheels went," &c. There is sublime instruction in this intrinsically grand and glorious representation. . . . But even this falls short of what we are elsewhere taught on the same subject—I mean by the example of Incarnate Deity. There is nothing more uniformly conspicuous in our Redeemer than his majestic composure. A glorious serenity, like that of the sun in the western heaven, marks His whole blessed and adorable course. Be the movement what it may, whether He feeds thousands in the wilderness, or walks in Solomon's porch, like one who loved contemplative leisure, and liked to enjoy it interchangeably, in perfect retirement and in more frequented scenes, still He is the consummate contrast, the infinitely impressive and engaging counter-example to that dissipation and distraction which he so emphatically reproved in His friend Martha.

Politics.

OUGHT WE NOW TO HAVE THE BALLOT?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THE Reform Act recently passed having conferred the elective franchise to the extent of household suffrage upon the different classes of this country, it follows as a necessary result that the parties to whom this privilege or right is granted should be protected from all undue influences in the exercise of their votes. This protection can only be secured by the operation of the ballot; as it alone can adequately meet the wants of the case, and protect the voter from all influences, either direct or indirect, that may be brought to bear upon him.

The object of the ballot is to ascertain the true mind of the constituencies by preventing intimidation, corruption, &c.; and, above all, to shield the poor, dependent voter from the displeasure of his employer or superior in the event of voting contrary to his wishes. It matters little to a man placed in an independent position whether he votes in a public or a private manner, but it is entirely different with one who depends upon another for subsistence. In the former instance the voter need fear no consequences, vote as he may; while in the latter, the voter runs the risk of losing his employment or his farm, should he vote against his employer or his landlord. The only point of difference that the ballot would make in the present system of voting is that it would allow the voters to record their votes in secret instead of openly. This system, it will be seen, would enable the electors to give full scope to their own opinions and convictions. It would neutralize the baneful effects of corruption and coercion, and prevent them from having any influence upon the voter's mind. Besides, it would go far to do away with canvassing and the many evils that are connected with it.

If the franchise is to be of any benefit to those to whom it has recently been given, it is manifest that the elector must be placed in an entirely independent position, so far as voting is concerned; he must be able to exercise the privilege without fear of future consequences. Nay, more, he must occupy such a position that his political conduct will be above the suspicion of influences of any kind; for when the smallest pressure is put upon an individual, it has a tendency to withhold, to a certain extent at least, the full expression of his own mind. It thus becomes one of the highest duties of the State to see that the powers which it grants to the people are properly and freely exercised. In the present system of voting the dependent voter is wholly unprotected from the

influences that may be, and too often are, brought against him; and this undoubtedly will continue to be the case so long as open voting remains the law of the land. In fact, open voting is a powerful lever in the hands of the rich and influential, whereby the opinions of the weak are suppressed, and their political action is nullified by intimidation. On the other hand, the ballot would enable a man, poor as well as rich, to do as he thought proper; it would enable him to act according to his own ideas of right, and to give effect to his own opinions.

Indeed, the main argument for the ballot lies in this—that it constitutes a protection to the voter from the pressure of external influences. There is evidently a distinction to be drawn between those who employ and those who are employed, and there is a still greater distinction in the relative positions of landlord and tenant, —more particularly when the latter is a mere tenant at will. As a general rule, all the tenants take the side of their landlord, and it cannot possibly be conceived that they are all of one mind, or of the same mind as he is. But, then, they are controlled by him, and made to do as he does. Now the only means (so long as society is constituted as it is) that can do away with the landlord's influence, or at least render it powerless, is the introduction of the ballot. It is certainly unnatural to expect that, where a voter is a mere tenant at will, he would thwart the wishes of his landlord, thereby incurring the danger of being removed from his farm, and so be deprived of his means of subsistence. Even taking the mildest view of the subject, it has been found that where a landlord has a delicacy in asking the votes of his tenant, or is high principled enough to abstain from such a course, his very example goes a great length in deciding the suffrages of those who hold his land. The tenants know well that the landlord would be better pleased with those who took the same side as himself than with those who went against him; and this knowledge has a natural tendency to keep them from acting in the manner they otherwise might have done. There cannot, therefore, be any doubt that all these influences, direct and indirect, prove a formidable barrier to the expression of individual sentiments and convictions. The same rule applies to the employer of labour, such as a large manufacturer or mill-owner. Thus a man with four or five hundred hands under him must have a considerable influence over them; and if he choose to use it, he can doubtless induce a large number to vote according to his inclinations, regardless of their own convictions. The ballot in this, as in the former case, appears to be the only remedy. It may, however, be urged that the working classes themselves have sufficient power to become independent of their employers. That may be true in the great centres of labour, where trades' unions and co-operative societies exist, but it is wholly inapplicable to the provinces and small towns. Taken all in all, we submit that the only way in which sufficient protection can be afforded to the working classes, farmers, servants, &c., is to make them superior to all the influences

already enumerated, and incident to their situation; and this, we maintain, can only be effectually secured by the introduction of the ballot.

It would make no difference to the legislature whether its members were returned by open or secret voting; for it is easier for a voter to select the best man and give him his support in private than it is for him to be the minion of those who may rule over him in public, creating jealousy, ill-feeling, and evil consequences, which never would have arisen had the due exercise of the franchise been withheld from the gaze of the public. And if it is easier, it certainly is far more likely to be productive of public good; for in the one case the voice of the nation is allowed to speak, while in the other it is the voice of a few interested and selfish, though powerful parties. A voter of pure political principle can have as much effect given to his vote by voting privately as if he had given it before the eyes of the assembled constituency, and he will give it just as conscientiously in the one case as in the other. The ballot is not intended for the strong, although it can do them no harm, but rather as a security for the weak. It is designed to stamp out bribery, corruption, and intimidation; to destroy the tyranny of the selfish on the one hand, and to give freedom of thought and action, with morality of purpose and independence, on the other.

The principal argument brought forward by the opponents of the ballot is its injurious moral effects, but this can be readily answered by maintaining that it is just as moral for a conscientious man to act rightly in secret as in public, and that such a man will require neither inducements nor checks to carry out his convictions. Nay, it is at once apparent that it is far more moral to place poor dependent men in a position in which they can act according to their own sense of right and duty than it is to lay a man open to all the influences that may be used against him by unscrupulous persons, who themselves require no protection.

The only motive that should guide the elector in the exercise of the franchise is the public weal, but it is no less evident that motives spring from a variety of circumstances. All men are quite able to distinguish personal from public duties, and electors have a double set of motives in determining their conduct. A voter, on the one hand, has his own individual advancement, which would induce him to vote from selfish principles; while, on the other, he is aware that he has a public duty to perform apart from his own interests. These interests may purely relate to self, or be exercised for the public good. John Stuart Mill, the eminent Utilitarian philosopher, conceives ("Representative Government," page 31) that a much greater evil than coercion by landlords or employers "is the selfishness or the selfish partialities of the voter himself." This requires little comment, for if the practice of human beings be taken into consideration, it will be found that a selfish man is as likely to be selfish in public as in private; and that a man who is both selfish and independent will look after his own interest in

preference to all others, as public opinion will have little or no influence upon his mind. It is chimerical to imagine that the majority of voters can be trained to such a pitch that nice moral distinctions will shape their career. A voter's interest is that which has relation to himself, either mentally or morally, and it cannot be supposed that in expressing his own political principles he would represent any other interest save his own. Mr. Mill, in the work before referred to, says that "People will give dishonest or mean votes from lucre, from malice, from pique, from personal rivalry, from the interests or prejudices of class or sect, far more readily in secret than in public." Mr. Mill adduces this as an argument against the ballot, but common sense would tell a different tale. He ought to have remembered that dishonest or mean votes are generally given when seduced by bribery and corruption. Bribery can only exist or be carried out while voting is public, for no one would attempt bribery when the party who bribed would have no means of knowing whether the bribe had any effect or not. It would immediately cease on the introduction of the ballot, for it would have no field on which to operate; as a person would have no security that the bribe would have any effect when the vote of the seduced is beyond the knowledge of the seducer. Instead of the influence of lucre being an argument against the ballot, as stated by Mr. Mill, it is exactly the reverse; for it is lucre that constitutes bribery. No candidate or agent would ever dream of buying a vote, directly or indirectly, when the action of the voter was beyond his knowledge. It is only in public voting that lucre has any influence. And with regard to the other interests enumerated by Mr. Mill, such as those of trade and class, it is clear enough that in open voting the members of a trade generally take the one side, while a few who adopt a different view are coerced by the great majority of their brethren, so that secret voting is the only medium through which liberty can be given to individual thought in large trades and unions. Mr. Mill has laid too much stress on the selfishness of the voter, and the argument can cut in two ways. It may be granted that the employed and those who employ are possessed of this principle of selfishness. In open voting those who have power can carry out their selfishness in a far greater degree than if voting were secret; while in the latter case every one would have an opportunity of representing his own opinion, and, it may be, his own individual selfishness.

Mr. Mill contends that a man's own preferences may lead him wrong, but a man of sound principle has no other preferences than his own convictions. A man's opinion, though right in his own estimation, may be viewed differently by another; but, in any event, one has no higher standard of that which he should do other than what his judgment tells him he ought to do. Mr. Mill further maintains that secret voting would withdraw a feeling of responsibility which the voter owes to the public; and in his work on "Representative Government" (page 96) lays it down that "Pub-

licity is inappreciable, even when it does no more than prevent that which can by no possibility be plausibly defended—than compel deliberation, and force every one to determine, before he acts, what he shall say if called to account for his actions." He believes that there is a certain class who want all moral principle for whom open voting is absolutely required to prevent them from giving votes in the wrong direction. This class may be termed the "doubtful," in whom no party can place confidence at contested elections. But Mr. Mill assumes a false position when he imagines that mere open voting will compel them to do what is right. If Mr. Mill had any practical experience, he would find it rather difficult to force every one of this class "to determine, before he acts, what he shall say if called to account for his actions." It is wholly inapplicable, for they have no one to call them to account, and they therefore simply watch the tide of events in order that they may discover which side will blow them any advantage. Having no higher authority than their own inclinations or fancies, they acknowledge no human responsibility. It may be asked, how can this state of moral depravity be remedied? Simply by the withdrawal of all inducements, and this can never be done through the agency of open voting. Publicity is a virtue or a quality of which a great deal may be said, but any virtue that could possibly arise from it would be outbalanced in a greater degree by the independence of those protected by the ballot. But it may as often happen that protection is even required from public opinion, and experience has taught that the voice of the public is not always on the safe side. Public opinion may be the product of ignorance, and is it natural to suppose that the intelligent are to be coerced by Lynch law and violence? If the ballot is a protection to the voter from intimidation, it will also be a safeguard from the clamour of popular ignorance.

Legislators should always frame laws for society *as it exists*, but theorists and moralists form a code of ethics in their own minds that cannot be applied, or prove of any practical benefit to the present condition of society. They argue upon society as it should be, and not what it actually is. Mr. Mill has a *beau idéal* standard, and he assumes that society should be of a like moral character. His theory is that society must act up to certain imaginary excellencies, instead of what modern statesmen apply as real and practicable. It certainly is the part of a wise statesman to be guided by the circumstances in which he may be placed, but Mr. Mill's standard cannot be measured by this gauge. Mr. Bright, in his speech at the Corn Exchange, Edinburgh, thus refers to Mill's theory:—"For my own part, I am not able to accept of those glowing pictures of the immediately improved morality of the people. If it be wise not to grant the ballot because men without it will become strong enough not to need it, I know not why we may not dispense with judge and jury and police; for who knows but that at some time—it may be remote—men will become strong

enough in virtue, and honest enough, so that there would be no violations of any written or of the moral law, and judges and juries and courts of justice may no longer be required? I look abroad over all the great constituencies of the kingdom, and I believe, as a mere machinery of electing, it will soon be proved to every man who is in favour of public order at our great contests that the ballot is absolutely indispensable to secure that order." It will be thus seen that Mr. Mill has assumed an impossibility. He anticipates, I doubt not, that voters will yet become so virtuous and pure that such a thing as secret voting will not be even spoken about as required. But in the meantime, therefore, on Mr. Mill's own theory, while our morals are being developed for a more virtuous hereafter, let the ballot be granted; but whenever we attain to that state of virtuous perfection which is so much sought after, then by all means let the ballot be no longer continued, but dispensed with as unnecessary. Mr. Mill's objection to the ballot is theoretical, not practical.

But he cannot understand how it can be defended other than as a necessary evil. It is impossible to ascertain how he has arrived at this conclusion. All the laws that have been passed for the good of society may suffer the same general condemnation; but society requires certain channels through which its representative duties may flow, without the taint of impurity. Desperate cases require desperate remedies, and it is the entire necessity for protection from intimidation that has caused so much to be said on the ballot.

Many maintain if the elector is to vote by ballot that a similar principle on the same ground ought to be extended to the House of Commons. But the members of that house stand in a different position from electors. A member of Parliament is understood to represent the sentiments of his constituency, and publicity is therefore highly necessary to let the electors know that their desires are carried out. A check is required in case the member does not represent his constituents in a faithful manner. But the elector, on the other hand, is placed on a different footing, and requires protection from coercion and intimidation. The discharge of the duties of a trust is involved in the one according to expressed ideas, while in the other protection is required for the voter so that he may vote according to his own views. Influence is required in the one case, but not in the other.

But although voting is proposed to be conducted secretly, it does not follow that any voter should treat it as such unless he thinks proper to do so himself. One can give his vote to any side he chooses, and at the same time let the public know how he voted. Secrecy is not indispensable to the voter of independent means and position, who has no reason to fear the consequences of his vote. The ballot was never intended for voters of this description, but for those in poor circumstances, who are likely to be compelled to submit to influences. It admittedly can do very little harm in the one case, but much good in the other.

Among the other beneficial measures which the ballot would secure is the total abolition of private canvassing—a system as dishonourable as it is impolitic. Had the ballot been in operation at the last general election, there would have been fewer English counties wrested from the Liberals by pernicious influences; and there would have been still greater satisfaction and contentment had the voters the security of being defended from the entreaties and requests of those who spared neither coercion nor influence to secure votes. There was never a greater necessity for the ballot than at present. Let the people have the machinery whereby they can vote according to their own sense of duty, even though insulted by statements that the ballot is unmanly and un-British. The very class who say so have had it in operation in their great societies of science, geography, and art. If the ballot is required in their small circles for the expression of their own minds, how much more is it required for the elector? It is the only manner by which poor men can do their duty to the State; and even now the principal statesmen of our country are aware that it is of the utmost importance, and the sooner that it will be introduced the better.

G. M. S.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"Tis certain that general principles, however intricate they may seem, must always, if they are just and sound, prevail in the general course of things, though they may fail in particular cases; and it is the chief business of philosophers to regard the general course of things. I may add that it is also the chief business of politicians, especially in the domestic government of the State, when the public good, which is or ought to be their object, depends on the concurrence of a multitude of causes."—*David Hume*.

SECRECY is suspicious. Honesty is the highest form of morality as between man and man. He who would act nobly, must act honestly and openly. Truth does not slink in the dark, nor do honest men seek to hide their light under a bushel. A full front ought to be set to every duty, and men should show that in the performance of life's proper duties they act from proper motives, and therefore with fearless publicity and due responsibility. The State recognizes the individuality of the individual, by placing in his hands the individual right to vote; and the individual ought to do his share in all State offices, as an individual responsible to the State for the right performance of the duties which citizenship implies. It has never been found that secret societies have long remained free from serious objections, and to grant the ballot to voters for members of Parliament, would be to transform the constituencies into vast secret societies, in the secrecy of which, not only the sense of individual responsibility would be lost, but even the sense of personal honesty. Publicity is the true safeguard of political liberty; and rather than consent to the legal institution of secrecy, I should prefer to see the franchise limited

to men of independent means and independent minds, to whom a personal responsibility would attach for the proper employment of the suffrage.

Political life is a public and general interest, and it is above all requisite to keep the whole of our political life open to investigative discussion. Nothing is more prejudicial to honest and upright, to pure-hearted and straightforward action, than secrecy. Everything having virtue in it becomes depraved, when darkness is allowed to shield its deeds from the public eye. The responsibility of the electoral suffrage is a public one, and ought to be exercised in the very light of the sun. I do not contend that secret voting is un-English, though that might be maintained. I assert, of all secrecy, that it is depraving and disastrous to a high and noble personality. The man who slinks or shrinks, is already half-way to debasement. There can, in our opinion, be no question of the principle, that men love darkness rather than light, because their deeds are evil; "for every one that doeth evil hateth the light, neither cometh to the light lest his deeds should be reproved. But he that doeth truth cometh to the light, that his deeds may be made manifest." It is an essential principle of honesty, that all a man's actions may be able to stand investigation and scrutiny of the most searching sort, and that he should so conduct himself in all circumstances as to fear no other thing than wrong-doing, and so to live as to make suspicion, if not impossible, yet easily disproved.

It is one of the most common experiences of ordinary life, "that men will, in the majority of cases, prefer their own interest to that of others, when the two are placed in competition." All who have the opportunity of acting in their own favour, do so in the management of what they are engaged in. As this is the ordinary course people take when they have any interest at stake, it must be the interest of the community to lend no countenance to this desire, if it shall be likely to tend to the injury of the community. To secure itself against the over-activity of the selfish interests in man, it ought to see and know how every man acquits himself of his share of the business of the State. Thus only will the State be able to see the source and primary origin of any evil, and become possessed of the opportunity of putting to rights what has had a likelihood of going wrong. Publicity of voting is the State's security from the selfishness of men; and is the safeguard of the elector's honesty, because, that knowing his responsibility and accountability to the public for the manner in which he performs his trust, he cannot yield to the temptations of selfishness, as he might be inclined to do, could he contravene the laws of right conduct without the likelihood of being discovered.

The way to secure fidelity in the execution of any duty, is to impress the person to which the performance of it is delegated with a full sense of his responsibility, and as far as possible, to bring his interest into harmony with his duty. If you take away the sense of responsibility, you have no guarantee for the faithful

performance of the duty, no security against fraud in regard to that duty. Hence society must insist on the laying open to public animadversion and public investigation, if need be, of every act of public duty and of political requisiteness. Public opinion is always more virtuous than private action, and is, too, always censorious. On these accounts, the State entrusts to it the supervision of every public functionary, and a voter, as a voter, is a public functionary. Here the maxim, that a man may do what he likes with his own, has no place. His vote is not a man's own. It is a portion of the power of the commonwealth, entrusted to him for use for behoof of the State, and it is not only at his own peril, but to the peril of the State, if he misuse it. The State demands a scrutiny of the use to which this trust has been put, and will not consent to the secret traffic in the primary shares in the Governmental stock.

We shall be very much surprised indeed to find any of the contributors of the *British Controversialist*, the organ for the culture of a truly honest and impartial public opinion, advocating secrecy of voting, which seems to me a scheme for branding the expression of a genuine public opinion with disgrace. If, as Byron says, opinion is an omnipotence, there can be no doubt that it is only so when it appears in the might of its moral force. If we had vote by ballot we should have no public opinion, we should have only a dark and secret consistory issuing its edicts as to the persons who are to conduct public business, form opinion, and carry into effect what is thus determined. When every voter should go to the poll masked and visored, like an ancient inquisitor, what force will public opinion have? and how shall we know that those even who boast most loudly of their Liberalism may not most considerably aid in the conquest of Conservatism, by a secret vote in favour of those against whom they have inveighed? To invest hypocrisy with sanctity, and to make political tergiversation more common than it is; to throw aside the protection against the misuse of power which publicity affords, seems to be a strange way of cultivating care in the formation, honesty in the expression, and effectiveness in the use of a genuinely free and impartial public opinion.

Is it not an inversion of moral advocacy in these days, when the abolition of the anonymous in journalism is proposed, to ask as a boon for anonymous voting? We know that publicity in our courts of law, in our parliaments, in our meetings, cultures carefulness, honesty, and impartiality, and hinders many things from being done which might otherwise be attempted. Scarcely any greater slur can be thrown on any public business than to say that it is a hole and corner affair. What, then, shall we think of the proposal to transform our entire elections into a hole and corner proceeding, a huge hypocrisy, in which the foundations of the State might be undermined in the dark, and no means of checking the evil could be adopted, because its agents worked in secret and had acquired the irresponsibility of being unknown? Practically the ballot could not fail to lead to evil consequences by making that possible.

"Opportunity," says an old author, "creates a sinner." . . .
 "To avoid occasions, and to be above accidents is one of the greatest masteries of man." To supply opportunity to hypocrisy and playing falsely with the duties of life is unwise; and secret voting would have a direct tendency to do so; hence we oppose ourselves to the having of the ballot, especially now when the need of publicity is increased not lessened.

I am quite aware that the tyranny of landlords, and the intimidation, coercion, and corruption of factors, agents, masters, foremen, &c., will be pleaded as a good reason for the adoption of the ballot. It will be affirmed that the new voters are a class peculiarly susceptible of having the screw put on, and that they require the protection of the ballot. It will be said that we have enfranchised them to their hurt if we make it necessary that martyrdom should be accepted along with the rights of suffrage. But I do not think this will stand debate. It is the duty of the State to provide a corrective such as will conserve individual liberty at the same time that it does not expose the entire State to serious peril. There must be in the armoury of the law some bow able to hit the mark against undue interference with the proper exercise of a public right, and Statecraft ought not to act on the principle of doing evil that good may come of it. General principles must hold good in the main, and the general principles which we have enunciated, if they have any truth at all, must hold out, despite particulars; and this especially must hold true that if we wish to have a bold, free, magnanimous, honest people, we must have every act of public life performed in the light of open day, and subject to the scrutiny of public opinion for approbation or reprobation. Least of all can a great state thrive by the culture of moral cowardice. There is nothing that disqualifies a man like cowardice and a base fear of danger. It makes the smooth very difficult and the difficult inaccessible. "A coward is unfit to be a friend or an umpire in any affair." *Degeneres animus timor arguit.* (Cowardice gives evidence of a worthless spirit.) "He that hath a coward in his bosom will never do anything well." "He that in everything fears to do well, will at length do ill in all."

Besides the ballot would really only be a patch over an eating ulcer. It would be no cure, it would only conceal the diseased part. We wish the reverence for public opinion to grow so strong that even tyrants shall not dare to meddle with its growth, nor their agents interfere with its development. The ballot would leave us without any index of the public mind. We could have boastings about Liberal sentiments and votings in behalf of Conservative candidates, and *vice versa*, yet we would have no means of checking off the traitors in either camp. Let public opinion and public law grow strong to smite and punish oppressors; let there be no shrinking before wealth or state, but let it be known that the State regards as an enemy any one who interferes with the action of the divine law, "let every one be fully persuaded in his own mind."

Literature.

ARE PROVERBS WORTH STUDYING?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

PROVERB-WISDOM has in our day got rather to a discount. Men are becoming so superior in everything, that they can afford to despise "the wisdom of their ancestors." All that is old is false or foolish, only that which is new is true. The precious fruits of reflection and experience preserved in the amber of a proverb by the witty and wise of past generations, are matters of contempt in our day, and it is considered excessively clever among a certain class to have what is called "a fling" at proverbial philosophy. We do not share in this sentiment. We recollect that in the Divine Book, *Proverbs*, as the words of the wise, have been gathered together under the sanction and inspiration of the Spirit, into a book of wisdom. In this book, by simile, by gnomic phrase, by enigma, by comparison, by thesis, and antithesis, practical piety is presented to the human mind in the tersest of crystallization. No one can forget the use made of proverbs by Jesus, and how he sanctified the pithy homely sagacity of the experiences of the earth by employing them to illustrate his heavenly mission. The early philosophy of Greece began with proverbs. The Jews have a large collection of the sayings of the fathers in their Talmud and in their Midrash. The early Greeks made much use of proverbs, so did the Romans. The shrewd and cautious Scots make much use of proverbs, so do the stately Spaniards, the lively Italians, the brisk French, and the stolid Germans. Nor are the English second in this walk of intellectual activity.

Among authors noted for their appropriate and instructive method of using proverbs, we may name the great reformer Luther, whose works abound in choice and felicitous instances of their power to clench an argument. Erasmus made an elaborate collection of adages. Rabelais, the French humourist, Cervantes, the mightiest wit in Spain, and the versatile Montaigne, have given quite a glory to proverbs by the frequency with which they use them. Shakespeare is quite an adept at making a proverb fit in pat to the occasion, and is excellently well provided with a store of them of which he never hesitates to make use. Holy George Herbert, in his *Jacula Prudentium*, arrows of the wise, has taken a hint from Plato and shown the value of proverbs. Pope is exceedingly happy in his employment of these "short sentences enshrining long experience." Samuel Butler's *Hudibras* is quite a mine of these compact treasures of thought. Lord Bacon not only collected

them assiduously but quoted them freely. Benjamin Franklin applied them to the promotion of earthly prudence as exquisitely as Jeremy Taylor employed them to further Christian doctrine. Dean Swift made a far better use of proverbs than La Rochefoucauld did of his stilted maxims, though the latter were such favourites with Lord Chesterfield, the gentlemanly rake.

The "sense, shortness, and salt" of a proverb take fast hold on the mind, and impress it; and there can be no doubt that much of the English raciness and spirit of sententiousness and moderation came from the common use of proverbs by the common people. I would refer, at present for brevity's sake, to the admirable lectures on proverbs which the present Archbishop of Dublin (R. C. Trench) has issued, for a full and appreciative consideration of the merits and worth of these "wise saws." This reminds me that his predecessor (R. Whately) had a similar taste, and expended a good deal of pains on the production of a series of proverbs for the use of the Irish people, even going the length of issuing proverb copies for National schools, that he might ingrain these pithy and terse forms of wisdom into the very souls of the inhabitants of that country, where so much individual smartness of intelligence is so little balanced by those hoarded stores of popular wisdom which proverbs hand down from age to age.

Here it strikes me that I could not better illustrate the worth of the study of proverbs than by quoting an amusing letter consisting of a string of these adages, which, though written as a sort of *jeu d'esprit* more than 30 years ago, is as applicable to our times as if it had been written since the latest change of ministry.

Letter from the Archbishop of Dublin to a Lady who requested his opinion on the present state of Ireland.

"May, 1837.

"The occasion is now arrived when all who wish to deliver this country from its troubles, and ward off its impending dangers ought to exert themselves, and, as the proverb says, 'Take time by the forelock.' We may regret that so many opportunities have been already lost, but as the proverb says, 'The miller cannot grind the mill with the water that is past.' If we would not be worse than the fools, whom, as the proverb says, 'experience teaches,' we should consider how to avoid losing another opportunity, which may be the last, and then we shall repent it, since as the proverb says, 'Bien perdu, bien connu.' Standing still and waiting never did any good, for, as the proverb says, 'Though the sun stood still time never did.' 'To-morrow,' as the proverb says, 'comes never.' It is in vain to wish that things were in a different state from what they are. 'I never fared worse,' as the proverb says, 'than when I had a wish for my supper,' and it is no less to talk of what we would do if the case were different, for as the proverb says, 'If my aunt had been a man she would have been my uncle,' and 'If the sky should fall,' as the proverb says, 'we should catch larks.' It is idle to look for a change of ministers and hope great things from a different party in power, for, as the proverb says, 'To a leaky ship all winds are contrary;' and it is more idle to waste our spirits in anger against another's fault, for, as the proverb says, 'There are two

things which a man should never get angry at: what he can't help and what he can.' A wise man will never be driven desperate, and, as the proverb says, 'Throw the horse away after the saddle.' But if we do exert ourselves to help the church and the nation, others who are now lost in apathy may follow the example, for, as the proverb says, 'Two dry sticks will kindle a green one.' This is much better than fretting ourselves with grief and indignation, since, as the proverb says, 'What is the use of patience if we cannot find it when we want it?' 'He who gives way to anger punishes himself for the fault of another.' The state of things is now such as calls for a fundamental and permanent remedy that shall remove the cause of existing evils. To look merely for a palliation of each evil as it arrives is, as the proverb says, 'To work at the pump and leave the leak open.' If we leave things alone we shall find them indeed as the proverb says, 'Like sour ale in summer;' and to grudge any sacrifice, inconvenience, or trouble, for a greater and more lasting advantage is to be, as the proverb says, 'Penny wise and pound foolish.' 'No pains, no gains,' as the proverb says; and again, as the proverb says, 'If you will not take pains, pains will take you.' We had better, as the proverb says, 'Wear out shoes than sheets.' We must not be merely satisfied with pleading rights which we cannot defend, when, as the proverb says, 'Might overcomes right.' 'No man can live on an income of which he gets,' as the proverb says, 'no pence in the pound.' Besides, we should remember that, as the proverb says, 'He buys honey too dear who licks it off thorns.' It is indeed not to be wondered at that those who have suffered much should easily be alarmed, and always, as the proverb says, 'misgive that they may not mistake.' But they should guard against imaginary dangers, as 'The scalded cat,' says the the proverb, 'fears cold water,' and 'He that is bitten by a serpent,' as the proverb says, 'is afraid of a rope.' But as the proverb says, 'to run away is to run a risk.' I do not mean to say that anything can be proposed which is not open to objection. 'A fool,' as the proverb says, 'can easily find faults which a wise man cannot easily mend.' But the question is to find out what course is open to the least objection, for we should remember, as the proverb says, 'Half a loaf is better than no bread;' and again, as the proverb says, 'A man with a wooden leg goes the better for it.' We must not seek for the best thing we could imagine, but for the best that is practicable, and, as the proverb says, 'Drive the nail that will go.' 'If we cannot alter the wind,' as the proverb says, 'we must turn the mill sails.' We have found by experience what can be expected from those who express great regard for us. Many of them are, as the proverb says, 'Good friends at a sneeze; one can get nothing but God bless you!' and some of them have given us good reason to say, according to the proverb, 'Save me from my friends, I care not for my enemies.' Some of them are, as the proverb says, 'As honest as any man in the cards when the kings are out.' It is time, therefore, that we look with less distrust towards those who do not make such high professions, for, as the proverb says, 'An ass that will carry me is better than a horse that will throw me,' and again, as the proverb says, 'Better an ass that speaks right than a prophet that speaks wrong.' And if we will not learn this in time we shall find, as the proverb says, 'As we brew so must we bake.' But though all this, to me, seems very much to the purpose, you will, perhaps, think it tedious and rapid, because, as the proverb says, 'Wise men make proverbs and fools repeat them.' Remember, however, that, as the proverb says, 'Though fools learn nothing from wise men, wise men learn much from fools.'—The Life of Archbishop Whately, vol. I., pp. 385—388.

This characteristic letter shows how many-sided, pithy, facetious, shrewd, and wisely cautious the wisdom of proverbs is; how we have in them the largest quantity of sense in the fewest possible words, and in the most terse and telling form. I am quite sure that proverbs are worth studying, not only for their weighty wisdom but for their excellence as forms of composition suited to popular tastes; not only as models of well-packed thought, but of expressive phraseology. They form at the same time a key to the human mind, showing what lies near the heart of man, and give us an idea of what worldly-mindedness means. On all these points I think proverbs are worth studying with much care, patience, and application.

E. A.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

COMMONPLACE vulgarity is abominable; and proverbs are only commonplaces told and re-told ten thousand times, and so made vulgar. On the lip of every arrant numskull a proverb starts whenever, through sheer vacuity of mind, he can manage to batter no semi-significant sentence out of his own muddled pate. As Lord Chesterfield truly says:—"every fool who slatterns away his whole time in nothings, utters some trite commonplace sentence to prove the value and fleetness of time." Proverbs have become the mere counterfeits of wisdom, they have been repeated so often that they have ceased to have any definite meaning. All the grain has been threshed out of it by frequency of beating. The words come trippingly to the tongue, and go trippingly off it, but they are mere sounds and contain no sense—at least they convey none. At the very most they are small follies to smile at—a sort of rags of wisdom handed down from the early ages to cover the nakedness of thought of those who use them. We have fallen into misfortune let us suppose, and the Job's comforters who use proverbs will shake their sagacious heads in sadness and sorrow and seek to console us with something as satisfactory to the distressed soul as snuffing the east wind, namely the quotation of the proverb—"Man is born to trouble!" with as much sanctimonious seriousness, as if the fact had just flashed on their souls like an angel newly stepping forth from the palace gate of Eternity.

Or let it have happened that our dearest friend has made some small false step in life, and we dying not "of a rose in aromatic pain," but of a chance of communicating a tasty bit of scandal or slander, seize the button of a dear friend of that dearest friend and pour into his ear the mighty secret which was almost working like magic in our brain, and then we beseech him for heaven's sake not to reveal the terrible fact for friendship's sake and for mercy to the poor deluded sinner whose transgression has given us "the terrible joy" of exposing his folly and our own eagerness to calumniate, by saying, "Tell it not in Gath; let it not be heard in the streets of Askelon"! Perhaps this is wise, perhaps it is witty perhaps it is good sense and a smart saying—but really we fail to see it.

It may be said that we are "stirring the wrong fire with a broken poker" to denote that we are not very able to expatiate on the question and have mistaken the point in dispute. This may be so, but surely this roundabout, would-be poetical, sarcastical, clever and cynical saw, is not a whit more readily understood and expressive than to say that we have not taken up the subject right, and do not understand the gist of the question. *Proverbs* are in fact forms of speech used in place of common-sense statements and ideas.

I am quite well aware, of course, that grand and sounding definitions of proverbs are common. They are "words of wisdom," "the wit of one and the wisdom of many," "the essence and extract of intelligence," &c., and I am not unacquainted with the proverbs-and-water which A. K. H. B. has diluted in the proportion of one proverb to a pint of liquid A. K. H. B.-ism in prose, and his equally worthy and wordy versifier of and predecessor in the utterance of Proverbial Philosophy. I have even run the risk of water in the brain by reading such mellifluous strains as these:—

"Few and precious are the words which the lips of Wisdom utter:
To what shall their rarity be likened? What price shall count their
worth?"

Perfect and much to be desired, and giving joy with riches,

No lovely thing on earth can picture all their beauty.

They be chance pearls, flung among the rocks by the sullen waters of
Oblivion

Which Diligence loveth to gather and hang around the neck of Memory;
They be white-winged seeds of Happiness, wafted from the islands of the
blessed,

Which Thought carefully tendeth in the kindly garden of the heart;

They be sproutings of an harvest for Eternity bursting through the tilth
of Time,

Green promise of the golden wheat, that yieldeth angels' food;

They be drops of the crystal dew, which the wings of Seraphs scatter,

When on some brighter Sabbath, their plumes quiver most with delight;

Such and so precious are the words which the lips of Wisdom utter."

"Few and precious" are they? I am told that in the countries of Europe nearly thirty thousand proverbs are current; in Asia and Africa there are in all probability a great many more, and America has invented a few, while there are some indigenous to the tribes of the western continent—so few are they! As for their preciousness, let this be enough—the Spaniards, the laziest, most thoughtless, and least respectable of the nations of Europe, employ the largest number of proverbs in their ordinary speech; indeed! it is almost a proverb amongst travellers in Spain—that proverbs are as plentiful in the speech of the Spaniards as fleas in their beds. The Italians rank next as proverbialists in Europe, and they can scarcely be credited with being excessively wise, enterprising, or intellectually exalted. Thus, the two nations which contribute least to the intelligence of Europe supply the largest quantity of proverbs; and yet we shall venture to say that in the two countries

together there is not a new proverb produced as frequently as an original book is published in Germany. As to the wit in proverbs, it is quite conclusive to remark that the wittiest nations employ them least. Ireland has no indigenous proverbial literature at all as compared with Spain and Italy, because there is in the racy intellects of the children of Erin a quickness and brilliancy which enables them to produce original good sayings with their first gloss on, with the very mint-mark on them in proof of their freshness. Similarly the French though a nation of maximists, is not peculiarly a proverb-making country. Epigram and terse point in speech are so natural to the Gaul that they can always produce on demand, whenever the occasion is worthy, a fresh and new supply of wit-fringed phrases. The cautious Scotch—who, according to Sydney Smith, who ought to be a good authority, have no appreciation of wit, have in the lowlands alone about three thousand proverbs, but when they are most nearly allied to witty they are only, it is said, wutty, and not infrequently smutty. This is no commendation. Another fact not without significance in regard to proverbs is this,—that almost every book that has been written on proverbial literature is terribly dull and spiritless, and the prefaces, which proverb-collectors have prefixed to their heaps of sayings, are insufferably inane, jejune, and trivial, are, indeed, procy, prolix, and tedious as a thrice-told tale.

If facts can prove anything, they prove beyond the possibility of doubt the worthlessness of the study of proverbs. Proverbs have ceased to be studied, and this would not have happened if they had been thought worth the trouble. Proverbs have ceased to be employed in conversation. They are even less frequently to be heard in common talk among the intelligent classes than Latin quotations. Yet we know that Latin is studied, and therefore ought to be familiar. Hence, we infer that proverbs are not nearly so familiar in ordinary circles as Latin is—though proverbs are always strongly vernacular. Even the popularity of the more recent books on the subject proves this,—for had the use of proverbs been habitual, there could have been little or no novelty imported into a consideration of their nature and peculiarities. That they used to be the ornaments of speech in former times is perhaps true, but in our age of books we have got beyond adages with their slippery duplicity and inconsistent morality; for where is the proverb to which you cannot get a contradictory? Proverbs and sayed-saws are like those among whom they arise or are popular—the fickle vulgar—they can be applied to anything, yet suit nothing. Proverbs are the scum of the intellect, not its choicest fruit.

ANTI-P.

Religion.

IS PROTESTANTISM FAILING AND ROMANISM GAINING?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"Not only has the Papacy survived the Reformation, and not only has a superstition so congenial with the human mind perpetuated itself in countries where it has not been exposed to the ordeal of open inquiry; but dogmatic Romanism, embracing the doctrinal, liturgical, and hierarchical system which was defined by the Council of Trent holds its place firmly on controversial ground, in this free country, and in other countries, where it stands unsustained by the secular arm. Let us distinctly state, and consider the fact, that, indefensible as we may consider Tridentine Romanism to be (and it is indefensible), nevertheless it does assert and maintain itself with some success, as *opposed to our Protestantism*, by mere argument, on the arena of public discussion; and that, by means which must be called legitimate, it supports itself and makes converts; and this not merely among the ignorant, but among the well-instructed."—*Isaac Taylor*.

No one with his eyes open to what is passing around him can doubt that Protestantism is failing. Its foundations are being sapped on the one hand by a godless rationalism, and on the other by a worse than godless Romanism. The former empties the throne of the Most High to the eye of faith, while the latter places an idol and a falsity in the place which the living God should occupy in the soul of man.

The word of God is the Ark of the Covenant. In that the mercy of Jehovah towards sinners is revealed; the sacrifice of Christ is made known, and the influences of the Holy Ghost are promised. On the eternal rock of this blessed word the Church is built. When "holy men of old spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost," they spake for our learning; and "all Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, and for instruction in righteousness, that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works." The fundamental principle and first truth of Protestantism is that the Bible is the sole rule of faith and practice, that it contains and is the whole word of God in regard to man's salvation—that the Bible is its own interpreter, that by a comparison of Scripture with Scripture, the truth of God is discoverable by human reason when the word of God is read with diligence, preparation, and prayer,

and the injunction of Jesus has been followed, "Search the Scriptures, for in them ye think ye have eternal life, and they are they which testify of me." The true faith of a Protestant is, that God, by his grace, bestows salvation on believers in his Son, that belief in His Son is made possible by the diligent perusal of His word, and the opening of the heart to receive His Spirit. Can any one doubt in the present day that this humble, pure, reliant, childlike faith in God's word and Son is failing in our land and age, and that the time of great Apostacy is advancing?

We see the spirit of Scepticism invading the very high places of the Church. Hampden and Hinds and Whately were early advocates of rationalistic interpretations of the Scriptures, but Bishop Colenso has outstripped them in developing rationalism into doubt; and now not a few of the clergy, not only of the Church of England, but of several of the dissenting communities, contend that though the Bible contains the word of God, it is not altogether the word of God; nor is all the word of God to be found comprised in its pages. Some assert that human traditions have been mingled with the true and holy Word, others that myths have accumulated and gathered not only around it but within it, and that indefensible statements and dubious sentiments have a place in the book which Protestantism avers is the stainless fountain of eternal life.

Moses is declared to have had little or no hand in the composition of the Pentateuch, and it is all but said right out, that Samuel, or some later writer palmed them off upon the credulity of the Jews, as the genuine works of Moses. Isaiah is robbed of the glory of being a Messianic prophet, and is suspected of being a modern antique. The very books which contain the revelation of the Lord Jesus Christ, and profess to inform us what things were most surely believed regarding Him by the early Christians—those who lived in his own age—are decried as erroneous, and denied to be authentic. Some people even go the length of suggesting that the Hebrew advocate, who is commonly called St. Paul—though he did not really compose the epistles attributed to him—did yet invent the story of Jesus. Strauss has denied the historic reality of our Lord as the Saviour and the founder of the faith in which we most truly believe. Renan, too, has striven to make it appear that the Christ of the Gospels is not a historic character, is not an essentially true and veritable divine being, who domiciled among men and tabernacled on earth, but is a suppositious product of superstitious reverence for a good and beloved character who dreamed a dream of human regeneration in the lonely places of Galilee, and came to grief in Jerusalem when he endeavoured to work out his day-dream under the standard of Rome.

Even in the very pages of this magazine the subject is being discussed whether the Gospels can be harmonized. Now this debate could not take place with the concurrence of our editors unless there was a difference of opinion on the subject, such as justified them in thinking that the controversy would have an interest for some

readers, if not for the majority. All these are and show departures from the true orthodox Protestant faith, which took the Bible as the standard of faith and the rule of practice.

Then there is the progress of positivism—that dimming and obscuring of all the Heavenly light which used to be thought to irradiate the world, which denies that the sky is even so trustworthy as a cathedral window, which, if it shows fantastic figures which are burned into the glass, yet shows these figures by a light coming from without, while the sky is only an immense opaque through which no sign of the divinity penetrates, and beyond which no prayer can wing itself to the ear of a heavenly Father. It is a sad and doleful departure this from the blessed teaching of the Protestant faith, that God's eye rests on every human soul in love, and reciprocates every feeling which arises in the spirit after goodness or glory—every repentant thought and every holy endeavour.

What shall we say of the defections of the churches from the unity and love and peace of the gospel, from being witnesses for Christ, instead of being clubs for fellowship in hearing sermons and partaking of sacraments, as they too often are; of being contented to keep up ordinances within themselves, rather than being animated with the holy missionary zeal which the holders of great truths always feel! Look at the masses of the home-heathen; look at our jails, hospitals and workhouses; look at our army of police and of magistrates, look at the poor and destitute, and say where is the Protestant feeling of responsibility of man for his neighbour; where is the interest for man's welfare and the glory of God which Protestantism describes as being the principal purposes for which God has awarded being to man. Christian charity with all this misery and crime around us! Christian missionary zeal exemplified in the support of a Bible-woman and a tract distributor per congregation, or one person acting as agent and substitute for five hundred, and that at most inadequate allowances, either for their own wants or the wants of the poor. No, Protestantism was earnest with a holy zeal for God, to endeavour to make God's kingdom come, and His will be done on earth as it is done in heaven—what we do is mere pseudo-protestantism.

Then again we are asked is Romanism gaining. Every year's statistics tells us that. Priests increase in number, churches are multiplied, nunneries rise, and monasteries are instituted, Romanists get into power and place, an Hierarchy has been established in England, and another is proposed to be inaugurated even in Scotland, the land which chased its queen from the throne to a scaffold rather than permit her to practise or encourage Romanism. Romanists propose to make terms even with government, claim grants for the education of priests and people in the tenets of Rome and the opening of the Protestant universities of England to their children under priestly superintendence, and now demand that the great witness-church of Protestantism should be swept away from Ireland as a State institution, and a practical abrogation of the

Coronation oath of our Protestant sovereign. Romanism even seizes upon our pauper and criminal classes, and makes an endowment for itself by finessing for the chaplaincy of poor-houses and prisons. Perverts multiply, and a careful chronicle is kept of waverers in the faith; Jesuits are abroad among our university students and our titled and monied classes, and they exert their usual missionary work with tack, grace, and effect.

Then see how the bastard-Romanism of the English church is progressing. Ritualism is invading almost every parish, and is setting at defiance the most earnest and acute bishops. This spurious illegitimate Romanism is creeping into homes and hearths and is gaining an ascendancy over the Protestant independence of thought and the right of private judgment; vestments and censings and sacramentarianism and confessionalism are becoming common, and the priest is claiming a place which intercepts the mediatorial work of the Redeemer, and makes, forsooth, the intervention of man essential to the efficacy of the grace of God. While these things are going on in the church of England, Ritualism is jesuitically getting into other churches under the name of taste, decency, order, decoration, æsthetics, &c.; altar-pieces and altars, sacramentary tables, and baptismal fonts, crosses and croziers, bowings and choirings, liturgies and various forms of blessing are being introduced—while the ministry by separating more and more from the laity are gradually elevating themselves to a priesthood—even dissenting ministers are wearing clerical habits for distinction sake and are reviving, not religion, alas, but Romanistic forms of abasement of the laity before the clergy.

It is acknowledged on all hands that Romanism has never been so ably represented to the English mind as under Dr. Manning and Dr. Newman, and that two men more acute—in different ways—in getting acceptance for their faith could not be found. These directors of the Papal proceedings are intimate with all the peculiarities of the English mind, and all the weak points of their articles and confessions, ceremonies and liturgy. They avail themselves of every avenue to the soul they can find, and make even the manufacture of toys, ornaments of dress, illustrations for books, house decorations, ecclesiastical millinery, subserve their purpose, so that beads and crosses are worn without dispraise even in dissenting chapels, the cross is exposed to view in the Bibles in the pew, in the carvings of the pulpit, and the decorations of the walls. All this is lamentable in itself, but it is far more lamentable in its consequences. It is, indeed, a most important question we are called on to discuss. May we be fully sensible of the value of knowing the truth on this matter. Chiefly let us each one examine his own heart and endeavour to find if, directly or indirectly, within our own spirits
 protestantism is failing and Romanism is gaining. Blessed shall we be if we can honestly give forth, in that reference, an earnest
 NO!
 D. ENG.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"In like manner I cannot, nor dare but commend, reverence, and honour the see of Rome, as long as it continued in the promotion and setting forth of God's glory, and its due preaching of the gospel, as it did many years after Christ. But after that the bishops of that see, seeking their own pride and not God's honour, began to set themselves above kings and emperors, challenging to them the title of God's vicars, the dominion and supremacy over all the world, I cannot but with St. Gregory, a bishop of Rome, also confess that place is the very true Antichrist; where St. John speaketh by name of the whore of Babylon, and say with the said St. Gregory, 'He that maketh himself a bishop over all the world is worse than Antichrist.'"—*Bishop Ridley*.

In order to understand the ground on which this subject is to be discussed, it may be as well to define the light in which the terms "Protestantism" and "Romanism" are to be regarded.

Protestantism means, in point of fact, civil and religious liberty; while the very essence of Romanism is ecclesiastical supremacy!

A Diet was held at Spire in 1526, at which a resolution was arrived at, by which all the German states were left free to act in conformity with their consciences. The Romanists afterwards discovered that the proper action of this resolution would be to advance the principles of the reformation and gradually to dethrone Romanism.

Therefore, another Diet was held at Spire, in 1529, at which it was announced to the assembled princes, that, contrary to the resolution of 1526, the emperor had unprecedentedly annulled this resolution, merely by virtue of his "imperial power."

The history of the proceedings at this Diet, given by Dr. D'Aubigne in his "History of the Reformation," is exceedingly interesting. The emperor's brother, who presided, allowed no discussion, and at last left the Diet without waiting for the answer of the reformed princes to his proposals. What was now to be done? The reform princes determined on their only alternative, and drew up their celebrated PROTEST on the 19th April, 1529.

The principles contained in this world-famed document constitute Protestantism. These principles are not confined to any sect, such as the Church of England or any other church, but all who hold them are Protestants notwithstanding their sect.

What then are the principles of the protest? On this point Dr. D'Aubigne (than whom I presume a better authority could not be adduced) says:

"The principles contained in this celebrated protest of the 19th of April, 1529, constitute the very essence of Protestantism. Now, this protest opposes two abuses of man in matters of faith: the first is the intrusion of the civil magistrate, and the second the arbitrary authority of the church. Instead of these abuses Protestantism sets the power of conscience above the magistrate, and the authority of the word of God above the visible church. In the first place it rejects the civil power in divine

things, and says with the prophets and apostles, *we must obey God rather than man*. In presence of the crown of Charles V., it uplifts the crown of Jesus Christ. But it goes farther: that all human teaching should be subordinate to the oracles of God. Even the Primitive Church, by recognizing the writings of the apostles had performed an act of submission to this supreme authority, and not an act of authority as Rome maintains, and the establishment of a tribunal charged with the interpretation of the Bible, had terminated only in slavishly subjecting man to man in what should be most unfettered. In this celebrated act of Spiers no doctor appears, and the word of God reigns alone. Never has man exalted himself like the Pope; never have men kept in the background like the reformers."

Protestantism can never fail, from the simple fact that it announces the only principles on which states and peoples can prosper, viz., civil liberty and unfettered freedom of conscience.

Ireland may possibly be cited against me as an instance of the alleged failure of Protestantism, but the history of that unfortunate country proves nothing of the kind, but in fact directly the reverse, for the utmost it demonstrates is, that Church of Englandism, and all other sectarianisms have failed (which it is to be hoped they will do, not only here but everywhere else). Protestantism never having been tried there (except in Cromwell's protectorate, when he allowed the Catholics to practise their own religion), and a body of paid men having been put there to do a specified work in which it has grievously failed. We now, as a country, are about to practice the protestantism, which we have not even as yet *preached*, and still less practised, for we are about to give to the different sects there—Church of England, Roman Catholic, and others—that freedom by which they shall all bear liberty to act according to the dictates of their own consciences, and each support that church with whose avowed principles he may coincide.

I hope before long England will have said to Ireland in effect, "We have ill-treated you hitherto, but now we are determined no longer to make you Catholics pay for the support of a system with which you disagree, and we now restore you that freedom of which we have so long, up to the present time, robbed you." By this means Protestantism will have a chance of obtaining and maintaining a position in that country which it has never yet held.

The present insignificant position of the Irish Church cannot in any way be regarded as a failure of Protestantism, but it may be taken only as the failure of a system which would keep true Protestantism out of the country. And what else has it done? It has given Romanism the best possible opportunity to gain and retain obedience from its followers, viz., it has proved their plea that they are oppressed, and are suffering from a political persecution. A recent writer on the subject—a Catholic—begs his countrymen not to follow and support the policy of disestablishment and disendowment, because it would deprive the Catholics of one of their chief supports, viz., that the policy mentioned would remove

the oppression now inflicted on them, leaving them less chance of making proselytes and obtaining support.

Coming from Ireland to England, I ask, is Protestantism failing there? Certainly not. It may be said, and with truth, that the Church of England is to a great extent failing in England, but why is this? Because it is not really a Protestant church. It is confined in a loathsome prison by allowing itself to be tied to the state. This connection not only renders it impossible for the Church of England to gain ground, but it puts sincere Protestants who may be in its community into a wrong position, by allowing, or rather forcing them, into connection with those who look upon the Church merely as a means of support, or in other words as a trade. But some of her anti-protestantism has been worked out of her, and it is to be hoped that before long will come that which must ultimately take place, viz., her separation from the state, which would place her firmly on her own feet and enable her to prove whether she have any vitality or not.

But notwithstanding the short-comings of Church of Englandism, Protestantism advances with rapid strides. This is shown by the enormous and rapidly-increasing body of Nonconformists in the land, and who—nine-tenths of them at least—both preach and practice Protestantism.

Protestantism must gain. It embodies sound principles, as I have endeavoured to show; it has had to pass through trying times, but has always emerged unconquered, and my belief in the invincibility of truth enables me to believe that it will always do so. At times deep darkness has enveloped it, but ultimately the darkness has turned into sunshine, and Protestantism has benefited by its experience.

There is also another reason why Protestantism *cannot* fail, and that is that its doctrines are doctrines of enlightenment, and the more enlightenment adorns the world the brighter shines Protestantism. Instead of failing it is spreading its roots even into Austria, Italy, and Spain. The more science is developed, the more education is spread, the greater is the power of Protestantism. For instead of forbidding investigation it invites it; instead of saying you must depend upon and agree with my interpretation of the book, it says go to the book yourself; and it will explain and interpret itself.

But Romanism will not even allow the book on which all Christian religions are founded to be read. For proof that this is so, I refer to a despatch from Mr. Odo Russell, from Rome, to the Earl of Clarendon, dated February 8, 1866:

"Travellers visiting the Pope's dominions should be very careful not to bring *forbidden books*, or Colt's revolvers with them, the Custom House officers having strict orders to confiscate them; *above all*, travellers should be careful not to bring English, Italian, or other Bibles with them, *the Bible being strictly prohibited.*"

Romanism cannot thrive except in the darkness, and it cannot

be supposed that any man of reason, of any education, of any scientific, of any Biblical knowledge, can submit to surrender all the knowledge and enlightenment he may possess to the dictation of a few priests.

It may be said,—Yes, but Romanism is constantly gaining converts from the Protestants, and in answer to this I admit that converts to Rome are made, but only from the Church of England-ists, not from pure Protestants, but only from such as inherit their professed faith, who have never taken the trouble to think about it at all, and have accordingly fallen victims to the false splendour of Romanism.

But when has Romanism gained converts from true Protestants, either conformists or non-conformists? I do not believe that any instances can be brought forward, and this can only be attributed to the fact that they *really* and not only *nominally* believe the faith they profess, and are consequently Protestants at heart.

I hope it may be clearly understood that in thus speaking of Romanism, that term does not include the Primitive Catholic Christian Church, the Divinity of whose writings and speakings has continued to enlighten the world for hundreds of years. The Romanism to which this article refers is that founded on usurpation and tyranny, continued therein, and which can only maintain itself by the exercise of those two diabolical qualities. If the successive Bishops of Rome had continued to exercise their spiritual functions as did those other bishops of the Primitive Church, there would have been no Protestantism, that would have been entirely unnecessary, because the Primitive Church included in its belief the doctrines afterwards reasserted by the Protestants.

In the Primitive Christian Church there were four patriarchates :—viz., Alexandria, Constantinople, Antioch, and Rome. Each of these was equal in power and duties, but in the course of time Rome began to assume to herself a power over the other sees, which she did not possess, but to which the other sees ultimately and slavishly succumbed. This is amply proved by the writings of the best of the divines of the Primitive Church, for instance, St. Augustine, St. Gregory, and others.

Thus we see that the ascendancy of Romanism was gained by fraud. With the increase of her power, her villanies multiplied themselves, and the Reformation was forced on. Not only were the doctrines of Romanism repudiated, but the crimes and practices of the officers of that so-called "Church," from the Pope himself to the lowest of the priests in his employ, were denounced.

Wycliffe, and other heroes, of whom we have the highest reasons to be proud, from time to time gave notice of their utter repudiation of Rome. Luther gave the final stroke.

Those states (England amongst them), which, rejecting the yoke of Romanism, and embraced the Protest, have continually advanced. If ever of them relapsed into Popery, it declined, but when again brought to its senses became revived. And so it is at the

present time. Wherever Protestantism is the faith of the people, the nation prospers in all respects.

Those nations which are still under the thumb of Rome, at the best, do not advance, but in most instances they are the subjects of retrogression, and deservedly so, for what man or nation has the right to allow his conscience to be subject to the dictation of priest or king?

But in what is Romanism gaining? It may possibly be said in making converts. But let the number of converts to Romanism and the number of converts to Protestantism be taken and compared, and it will be found that the larger proportion will be on the side of Protestantism.

I long to see my opponent's paper. Possibly he may cite that hybrid creature, "that thing of monstrous, nay, of adulterous birth," called Ritualism, to his aid. Protestantism certainly repudiates and despises Ritualism. Let the latter complete its journey to Rome with all due speed.

The doctrines of Romanism are incapable of belief by any man of reason, while those of Protestantism are plain and invulnerable. If it be thought that Rome is gaining merely because there are discords between the Church of England and some of its refractory flock, the falsity of such a proposition will be evident, because it only in fact illustrates the strength of Protestantism, one of whose chief doctrines is, that no man's conscience shall be bound.

The late elections show also the rapid advance of Protestantism. Protestantism wants to free Ireland from priestly domination of all kinds. It wishes to give to Ireland an open Bible and a free conscience: Church of Englandism and Popery try ineffectually to prevent it.

I entirely dissociate Protestantism from any sect. A man may be—nay many are—soundly Protestant and yet not be connected with any religious body.

The faith enunciated long since by Wycliffe and others, that proclaimed by Luther at Worms, the faith comprised in the noble protest of the Reformed princes at Spire, and afterwards by other equally eminent men there and here, is the creed of the Protestant; and to my mind this creed never can fail, because it has in it truth, and I have so much faith in truth itself (whether political, moral, or religious) as to believe that reasoning and thinking men cannot but accept its precepts.

Protestantism is individual, but Romanism is as hereditary as our Peerage.

H. K.

The Essayist.

GODWARD:

A NEW YEAR'S ADDRESS TO A YOUNG MEN'S LITERARY ASSOCIATION.

ALREADY, on three previous occasions, we have endeavoured to present you with one word which might hold condensed for you lessons of guidance, encouragement, and spiritual energy, suitable for entering upon a new year with. Every new year that dawns upon us is, as it were, the uplifting of a curtain behind which the unknown—to us—is strictly hidden, though gradually to be evolved and revealed. Amid the circumstances of the present as they arise in and issue from the past, we have to play our part, and by our thoughts, words, and actions we must help on and realize the *denouement* of the future. Each, at least, must work out his own future if he does nothing else or more, and surely with such a task before us we may well ask if there is not vouchsafed to us any guidance for our lives, any encouragement to take a particular course, any means of bracing our spiritual energies to the toil and endeavour to which we are called. In the sense of uncertainty which comes upon the mind thus outlooking on the dim and formless future, as it seems to us, we are apt to fall into supineness, or to be stricken with fear. When such a state of mind supervenes upon the contemplation of life and its forthly fields of time-effort, some word of quickening and upstarting effectiveness is required; and we gave you, if you remember, the stirring and strong term of fearless progressiveness "forward!" But we know that as the hopeful heart hastens on in its course obstacles arise, difficulties present themselves, doubts insinuate their weakness, and distrust induces nervelessness. Then, when the outward forces threaten the inward spirit with disaster and suggest dismay, when the heart feels faint and the energies become relaxed, when the soul quails at the suggestions of sorrow and suffering with which cowardice seeks to harrow it, another and a more masterful vocable is needed—one which shall hold in it the resonance of strong endeavour, the propelling might of a hearty resolve, the nobility of a shrinkless courageousness, and the forthflashing energy of moral life, and the persistent hardihood of a determination not to be daunted by threatened difficulties. This word we found, as we thought and said, in "onward!" To effort there is always opposed the passivity of the supine, the cautiousness of the fearful, and the sloth of those who study their own ease and indulgence. Life is no dead level of smoothness to the earnest and striving. There rises ever before the effortful the need of aspiration. The slope of

progress is uphill, of disaster downhill. The ascents of life must be dared however, many the hollow clefts that may lie between our path and the sun-gilded cliffs that tower attractively to the enthusiastic eye, and the earnest eager spirit of the adventurous. Rough and uneven as the steepes of intent may seem to be, they can only be mounted and surmounted by the nerving of the heart, the bracing of the soul, the fixing of the resolve, and the devotedness of the zeal of endeavour to realize the purpose of aspiration. The word for the heart's life in the midst of uprising difficulties we selected was, last year, "upward!" To what new term can we attach hortation now? What noble-souled vocable is left us so surcharged with meaning as to imply the proper employment of the forces of life, the right and holy use of intellectual capacity, and the co-adaptation of desire and duty, in the performance of such acts as we are called upon to do in the course of our present existence. We want some word which shall denote something pure, noble, worthy; something that will lift the soul above the earth, and the mere pleasures of the earth, above selfishness and the gratifications of selfishness, above the influences which bind us to low-thoughted cares and ignoble purposes, something that will elevate the eye of hope, brighten the vision of faith, quicken the pulses of love, and invigorate every faculty with a glowing zeal and a rapturous perseverance, something that will induce courage, hope, endurance, aspirative effort and holy accomplishment. What word of words is that, so multi-continant, so many-messaged, and so vividly emotive! Is there, in the language of earth, a term which shall imply the loftiest reach of human endeavour, the holiest aspiration of the earnest heart, the purest aim to which the hopes of man may be directed, and in which the supreme good of the soul may be ultimately and certainly found? If there is, that word is the one required to fit our present thought, and to form the climax in the scale of progress to which we would incite you; if there is, that is the term on which we would fix as that which should be our new year's word to you at this time. Where and what is the word which gives this topmost height of meaning, this first and farthest outshaping of the greatest idea of which the soul of man is capable, and capable only in the choicest hours of its activity, in those transcendent moments of life and mystical predominance, when man is possessed by an energy so outwying ordinary might of mind, that it seems a moment of enthusiasm, and is truly a time—

"Of visitation from the living God."

Comes there not from that last expressive term the suggestion fitted to supply our need—and is not that vocable of which we have been in search, "*Godward?*"

Yes, Godward! towards God and all that is Godlike! God is the name of the supreme. He is Self-existent, and All-wise; he is essentially Law and Power, Justice and Mercy, Truth and Holiness. He is the Living Spirit of Creation, and the Superintending Ordainer.

of Providence; out of His fulness have we all received, and in Him, let us hope, we have all found the Saving Grace which He alone can give, so truly that we can say, "such trust have we through Christ to Godward." That word visions forth to the soul the highest, holiest, mightiest, and best of beings, and of thoughts. It encompasses within itself all that is good, glorious, beneficent, and wise; it contains, as if in one single essence, the whole unity of Life, it swells with the vastest and most momentous of significations; and all virtue, grace, glory, greatness, efficacy, and dominion constellate in this one word, as if an entire heaven of stars were fused into a unity of brightness, and had but one sign by which to show themselves.

God is the loftiest reach of human thought. To see God in all nature, to recognize God in all science, to acknowledge God in all that pertains to man, and to strive after likeness to God in our own souls, must make our lives exalted, powerful, and progressive. Godward let us direct our thoughts in all our out-looking upon the landscapes which greet our eyes in this beautiful world—wherein only the shadow of the marvellously excelling beauty of God is seen in the wonders of earth, and sea and sky. Let the whole panorama of nature be to us as the visible presence of the Most High, and how reverential and holy must each thought become! If in the sea we saw the glorious mirror of the Almighty's power; if in the sky we beheld the copious variety of God's glory streaming upon us from ten thousand worlds, whose pathway he knoweth, whose number he reckoneth, and whose progressive history he superintendeth; if in the earth we considered the multifarious workmanship God had expended upon and enclosed within every flower and plant, bird and beast, for reproductive fruitfulness, usefulness and beauty; and if in ourselves we felt the very image of God resting upon our hearts, and the very influences of His spirit working within us both to will and to do of his good pleasure, what a mysterious transformation would all these things attain, and how ten times folded in mystery would all that carried our thoughts Godward seem! Godward let us turn our thoughts when we study the lessons of history in the glowing march of time. Did we see in all the evolutions of the human race, the finger of the omniscient God sowing the seed germs of events in the human souls who worked them out into acts, and felt that all the records of time prove that—

"There's a divinity doth shape our ends,
Rough-hew them as we will."

What a transfiguration of the individuals who illumine the history of the past with the glory of reforms, improvements, discoveries, inventions, heroic deeds, and splendid thoughts, would occur as a consequence! How transcendently heightened would be our conceptions of battles, sieges, treaties, laws, revolutions, conquests, emigrations and explorations! How exalted above the ordinary standard of common-place life would we know our own co-equals in

the possession of human souls to be, and hence how much more grandeur and excellency would we perceive lying latent in our own glory-neglecting spirits! Could we read in the very configuration of the earth and the disposition of its rivers, the elevation of its hills, and the form of its coasts, the texture of its soil, and the products of its surface, the very elements out of which man's life-thoughts and efforts, and even history itself, is woven, what a supremacy of interest would the mere crust of the globe acquire!

Science is not Godless. It seeks to know the central thought by which God worked when he formed, arranged, and set in pre-ordained efficiency the whole mechanism of nature into motion, activity, life, and historic evolution. In the very core of things it reads the divine intent. It watches the divine mathematics of the vision, the supreme chemistry of growth, the wondrous dynamics of the Stellar spheres, the glorious architecture of mountains, the sublime statics of the solar system, the strange chrystalography of mines and quarries, the restless miracles of optics and physiology, and the monumented miracles of geology, with an eye bent on perceiving the very point in which the primary touch of the thought of God makes itself manifest. Science irradiates the whole immensity of the cosmic theatre with the name of God, and traces the light of the glory of The Mightiest in atom and world, in element and combination. Science translates the illuminated manuscripts of Jehovah into human speech, and reads off to us the secrets of the Eternal. Godward in all our scientific inquiries let us ever turn; for only in perusing in nature the mind of God can we rehearse true science to man. Godward let every effort of the spirit to know go forth, and He who gave the soul its insatiate craving will satisfy and gratify the longings He has excited within our thoughtful being.

If there is charm and interest in life, if there is sweetness in sympathy and deathless delight in friendship; if memory is a treasure-house of experience, and the activities of thought are joys; if in the glow of success there is unspeakable ecstasy, and in the perception of truth a sense of glory, then should every sentiment, aspiration, and ambition of our souls go Godward; for these facts of our nature unsanction atheistic doubt, and affirm that the Supreme Thinker has bestowed on created beings this overplus of impressiveness and vitality. Godward let our spirits go in sympathetic search for Our Father—in desire to know our duty, and in intense earnest love of the holy activity to which He calls us. Godward let our spirits go, that we, knowing Him as our Father, may feel the suffusion of brotherly affection for all the race, and aim at working, in our sphere, to bring all to be the subjects of His kingdom, and to lead restored prodigals to his banqueting-house. Godward let our aspirations go, that we may feel the glow of a love divine, and the efficacy of an energy issuing from the Spirit of Power. Godward let our efforts tend, to work His will and promote His glory. Godward let our being

grow, that we, growing daily in the light of His countenance during life, may at death be transplanted into another and brighter vineyard, and be thus taken Godward.

"Strive to live well, tread in the 'upward' ways,
And rather count thine actions than thy days,—
Live well, and then how soon so'er thou die,
Thou art of age to claim Eternity!"

"Forward" from day to day in our course of duty; "onward" from effort to effort in our life-career; "upward" in aim, life, tendency, spirit, and being; and "Godward" in hope, energy, outlook, and thought, in yearning of mind and heart, in the thronging of the pulses to activity, in the passionate endeavour to fill up the scope of our capacities, and to show that—

"All
Life needs for life is possible to Will."

Godward in every pulsation of "the two-celled heart" within us, in every throb of the dual brain, in every power of our duplex nature; in every idea which quickens, and gladdens, or solemnizes, and saddens us, throughout the infinite flow of ceaseless change that make up our time-life—

"That restless sea of life whose waves are years."

Do we wish a word to nerve us to endurance and progress, to helpful effort, or to holy sympathy—to recall to us the ultimate aim and end of life, the direction in which duty lies,—then let it be Godward!

"What is our duty here?—To tend
From good to better, thence to Best."

And all that is supremest, most excellent, and best, is summed up in that core-word of all—God.

A new year is an era of hope, a time of expectancy, and we all seek in it the mysterious "sequel of to-day." How many bright hopes have faded! how many glorious visions of the past are all unrealized! how much that was planned to be accomplished now has issued in failure, and brings to us a tale of schemes unworked at and neglected! Our "forward" steps have been but few, our "onward" ones irresolute, our "upward" ones hesitant and timorous. The new year has caught us unawares, with the purpose of its predecessor lying like a tangled skein before us, with little that was to be worked out with it done, much of it unbegun, and now impossible as a labour within the limits of its appointed period. The past has become the irrevocable and the irrecoverable; the present is evanescent, as the shape of a cloud at sunset; and the future is never ours but always God's. It is imperative on us,

therefore, out of the wreck of the past, and from the narrow standpoint of the present, to look Godward for future life, future powers, opportunities, and hopes—Godward, for forgiveness of that past of shipwrecked being, for strength to resolve now to take action to good purpose and with fair plan, and for space to redeem the time. Godward alone is the light of hope, ahead and overhead: then let us look Godward, and work on.

ARTHUR H. HALLAM AND "IN MEMORIAM."

(Continued from page 294.)

WEAKNESS, and its accompanying low spirits, combined with ceaseless activity of speculation and force of intellectual power, to induce a religious melancholy, in which all belief, except in the everlasting principles of honourable virtue, was for a time unsettled;

"But in that sadness was such essence fine,
So keen a sense of life's mysterious name,
And high conceit of natures more divine,
That breath and sorrow seemed no more the same."

He was earnestly struggling to lay hold upon eternal verities. This phase of Arthur's experience is referred to in "In Memoriam,"

"You tell me doubt is devil-born—

"I know not: one, indeed, I knew,
In many a subtle question versed,
Who touched a jarring lyre at first,
But ever strove to make it true:

"Perplex in faith, *but pure in deeds,*
At last he beat his music out.
There lives more faith in honest doubt,
Believe me, than in half the creeds.

"He fought his doubts and gather'd strength,
He would not make his judgment blind;
He faced the spectres of the mind,
And laid them: thus he came at length,

"To find a stronger faith his own."

A group of poems indicates that the summer vacation of 1829 was, partially at least, spent in Scotland; and by them we can trace him in the neighbourhood of Ben Lomond, at Loch Katrine, Gallander, and Glenarbac, on the banks of the Tay at Edinburgh, and visiting Melrose Abbey in company with Sir Walter Scott. Most of them are pervaded by a spirit of intense sadness, but of

yearning for human sympathy and love, strange and painful in the history of one so young.

Thus from an otherwise tender and beautiful address to his sister on her birthday, written at Callander, we read as an unmistakeable reference to himself—

“ Oh, pray for them, thou happy child,
Whose souls are in that silent woe;
For once, like thee, they gaily smiled,
And hoped, and feared, and trusted so!
Pray for them in thy birthday mood;
They may not pass that awful bar,
Which separates the early good
From spirits with themselves at war.
Their mind is now on loves grown cold,
On friendships falling slow away,
On life lived fast, and heart made old,
Before a single hair was grey.
Or should they be one thought less sad,
Their dream is still of things foregone;
Sweet scenes that once had made them glad,
Dim faces seen, and never known.”

In a higher and calmer strain are the lines written on the banks of the Tay, suggested by a child singing Gaelic songs and playing with the heather, unconscious of the presence of strangers from the South. The first thought is that he should like again to be a child.

“ Then a stern knowledge woke along my soul,
And sudden I was sadly made aware
That childish joy is now a folded scroll,
And new ordainments have their several fair:
*When evening lights press the ripe greening knoll,
True hearts will never wish the morning there,
Where arched boughs enlase the golden light,
Did ever poet pray for franchised sight?*
When we were children, we did sigh to reach
The eminence of a man; yet in our thought
And in the prattled fancies of our speech,
It was a baby man we fashioned out;
And now that childhood seems the only leech
For all the heart-aches of a rough world caught,
Sooth is, we wish to be a twofold thing,
And keep our present self to watch within.”

A sonnet composed in Edinburgh, while, like that on “ The Three Fates,” somewhat wanting in perfect harmony of diction, such as he later on attained, is free from this absorbing self-consciousness, and equals in majesty of idea and completeness of expression anything he ever wrote.

"Even thus, methinks, a city reared should be;
 Yea, an imperial city, that might hold
 Five times a hundred noble towns in fee,
 And either with their might of Babel old,
 Or the rich Roman pomp of empery,
 Might stand compare, highest in arts enrolled,
 Highest in arms; brave tenement for the free,
 Who never crouch to thrones, or sin for gold.
 Thus should her towers be raised—with vicinage
 Of clear, bold hills, that curve her very streets,
 As if to vindicate 'mid choicest seats
 Of art, abiding nature's majesty,
 And the broad sea beyond, in calm or rage
 Chainless alike, and teaching liberty."

The following fragment is quoted at length, as doubtless belonging to this journey, and forcibly revealing the depths of mental agony and questioning which he sounded. It may have been addressed to "Malek," as a former utterance which has been cited; it was certainly intended for a companion of sufficient intimacy to have accompanied him on part, at least, of his continental travels, and to have been made the confidant of his most hidden thoughts and sorrows. Noble as was Arthur's character, he yet seems to have been deeply conscious of the distance between his own soul and the divine nature, and to have intensely realized the fact of human evil and imperfection.

"My bosom friend, 'tis long since we have looked
 Upon each other's face; and God may will
 It shall be longer ere we meet again.
 Awhile it seemed most strange unto my heart
 That I should mourn, and thou not nigh to cheer;
 That I should shrink 'mid perils, and thy spirit
 Far away, far, powerless to brave them with me.
 Now am I used to wear a lonesome heart
 About me; now the agencies of ill
 Have so oppressed my inward, absolute self
 That feelings shared, and fully answered, scarce
 Would seem my own. Like a bright, singular dream,
 Is parted from me that strong sense of love
 Which, as one indivisible glory, lay
 On both our souls, and dwelt in us so far
 As we did dwell in it. A mighty presence!
 Almighty, had our wills but been confirmed
 In consciousness of their immortal strength
 Given by that inconceivable will eterne
 For a pure birthright, when the blank of things
 First owned a motive power that was not God.
 But thou—thy brow has ta'en no brand of grief,
 Thine eyes look cheerful, even as when we stood
 By Arno, talking of the maid we loved.
 In sooth I envy thee; thou seemest pure:

But I am scarred : He in whom lies the world
 Is coiled round the fibres of my heart,
 And with his serpentine, thought-withering gaze
 Doth fascinate the sovran rational eye.
 There is another world : and some have deemed
 It is a world of music and of light,
 And human voices, and delightful forms,
 Where the material shall be no more cursed
 By dominance of evil, but become
 A beauteous evolution of pure spirit,
 Opposite, but not warring, rather yielding
 New grace, and evidence of liberty.
 Oh, may we recognise each other there,
 My bosom friend ! May we cleave to each other,
 And love once more together ! Pray for me,
 That such may be the glory of our end."

We have the testimony of intimate associates that these seasons of melancholy were not allowed to overcome the kindness and general amiability of manner and spirit for which, among many other qualities, he was distinguished. One writes, "Perhaps I ought to mention that when I first knew him he was subject to occasional fits of mental depression, which gradually grew fewer and fainter, and had at length, I thought, disappeared, or merged in a peaceful Christian faith. I seldom saw him under these influences, and never talked with him on the subject. With me he was all summer, always cheerful, always kind, pleasant in all his moods, brilliant in all companies, 'a pard-like spirit, beautiful and swift.'"

His diligence in the regular studies of the university was much interfered with by the state of his health, but he was also disposed to set little store upon them for himself, as his own thoughts were directed to far other topics than the technical niceties of Greek and Latin composition. He was indifferent to mathematics, and indeed to almost everything which did not truly connect itself with the throbbing life which was in past generations, or actively at work in the world around him. One friend says that his memory on ordinary topics was far from good, but that he could remember anything which was directly or indirectly connected with an *idea*.

Thus the months went on, during which, with occasional fits of reformation and settled attention to systematic work, he was usually to be found conversing or reading in the rooms of one or another of his companions. And yet he seemed to lose but little, for his mind was always active, and performed all necessary duties with comparatively little effort.

At Cambridge, as at Eton, he seems to have been an active member of a debating society, or of a literary circle, in which essays were read for purposes of criticism and free discussion.

This was the origin of two papers, one "On Sympathy," the other entitled, "Theodicea Novissima ; or, Hints towards a Reconstruc-

tion of the Higher Philosophy on the basis of Revealed Truth." Both show a marvellous faculty for analysis, for tracing home ideas to their very source. Both exemplify enthusiastic longing for essential truth. The first endeavours to prove that the feeling of sympathy—unselfish and disinterested pleasure in another's pleasure, and pain for another's pain—is originated and developed through the associative faculties; that, in fact, it arises in the experience of infancy, in which pain or pleasure to ourselves followed upon the corresponding expressions in the countenance of parent or of nurse. The effect of the theory is chilling, it seems to render virtue an artificially induced product of human nature, instead of an original attribute of the soul belonging to the inspiring breath of Deity. But of the power with which it is presented and defended there can be no dispute.

As to the other, let me quote the eloquent and appreciative language of Dr. Brown, "In the essay, entitled *Theodicea Novissima*, he sets himself to the task of doing his utmost to clear up the mystery of the existence of such things as sin and suffering in the universe of a being like God. He does it fearlessly, but like a child. It is in the spirit of his friend's words:—

"An infant crying in the night,
An infant crying for the light,
And with no language but a cry."

"Then was I as a child that cries,
But, crying, knows his father near."

"It is not a mere exertion of the intellect, it is an endeavour to get nearer God—to assert his eternal providence, and vindicate his ways to men. We know no performance more wonderful for such a boy. Pascal might have written it. As was to be expected the tremendous subject remained where he found it, his glowing love and genius cast a gleam here and there across its gloom; but it is as brief as the lightning in the cellied night—the jaws of darkness to devour it up—this secret belongs to God. Across its deep and dazzling darkness, and from out its abyss of thick cloud 'all dark, dark, irrecoverably dark,' no steady ray has ever, or will ever, come over its face—its own darkness must brood till He to whom the darkness and the light are both alike, to whom the night shineth as the day, says, "Let there be light."

This is not the place to examine its arguments and course of thought; suffice it to say, that the paper attempts to prove that the existence of evil is designed—is absolutely necessary—for the fulfilment of God's essential love for Christ. In developing this idea he seems to pierce into the very counsels of eternity, and the most hidden recesses of the divine nature. And yet, as must ever be the case—such knowledge being too wonderful for us, so high that we cannot attain unto it—the final result leaves a strong feeling of dissatisfaction, a shrinking from the belief that any scheme

which involves evil as a necessity, or which is in any wise based upon the predetermined corruption and eternal loss of souls, can proceed from the universal Father, or be justified even by the highest ends.

The essay abounds with passages of ardent devotion and majestic thought. I give a few extracts, because this is the most characteristic of his productions, so that it may be truly said Arthur Henry Hallam is manifested here.

They will also show that his escape from the doubts and fears which had formerly darkened his course and perplexed his spirit, was permanent and complete.

"I hesitate not to say that I derive from Revelation a conviction of Theism, which without that assistance would have been but a dark and ambiguous hope. I see that the Bible fits into every fold of the human heart. I am a man, and I believe it to be God's book because it is man's book. It is true that the Bible affords me no additional means of demonstrating the falsity of Atheism; if mind had nothing to do with the formation of the universe, doubtless whatever had was competent to make the Bible. But I have gained this advantage, that my feelings and thoughts can no longer refuse their assent to what is evidently framed to engage their assent; and what is it to me that I cannot disprove the bare logical possibility of my whole nature being fallacious? To seek for a certainty above certainty, an evidence beyond necessary belief, is the very lunacy of scepticism. We must trust our own faculties, or we can put no trust in anything, save that moment we call the present, which escapes us while we articulate its name. I am determined, therefore, to receive the Bible as divinely authorized, and the scheme of human and divine things which it contains, as essentially true."

"In the Supreme nature, those two capacities of perfect love and perfect joy are indivisible. Holiness and happiness, says an old divine, are two several notions of one thing. Equally inseparable are the notions of opposition to love and opposition to bliss. Unless, therefore, the heart of a created being is at one with the heart of God, it cannot but be miserable. Moreover, there is no possibility of continuing for ever partly with God and partly against Him: we must either be capable, by our nature, of entire accordance with His will, or we must be incapable of anything but misery; further than He may for awhile 'not impute our trespasses to us,' that is, He may interpose some temporary barrier between sin and its attendant pain. For in the eternal idea of God, a created spirit is perhaps not seen as a series of successive states, of which some that are evil might be compensated by others that are good, but as one indivisible object of these almost infinitely divisible modes, and that either in accordance with His own nature or in opposition to it."

"The tendency of love is towards a union so intimate as virtually to amount to identification; when then, by affection towards

Christ, we have become blended with His being, the beams of eternal love, falling as ever on the one beloved object, will include in Him, and their returning flashes of love out of his personality, will carry along with them some from our own, since ours has become confused with His, and so shall be one with Christ, and through Christ with God. Thus, then, we see the great effect of the Incarnation, as far as our nature is concerned, was to render human love for the Most High a possible thing."

"The doctrine of personal love for a personal God, is assuredly no novelty, but has in all times been the vital principle of the Church. Many are the forms of antichristian heresy, which for a season have depressed and obscured that principle of life; but its nature is conflictive and resurgent, and neither the papal hierarchy, with its pomp of systematized errors, nor the worst apostasy of latitudinarian Protestantism, have ever so far prevailed, but that many from age to age have proclaimed and vindicated the eternal gospel of love, believing, as I also firmly believe, that any opinion which tends to keep out of sight the living and loving God, whether it substitute for Him an idol, an occult agency, or a formal creed, can be nothing better than a vain and portentous shadow projected from the selfish darkness of unregenerate man."

"Revelation is a voluntary approximation of the Infinite Being to the ways and thoughts of finite humanity. But until this step has been taken by Almighty Grace, how should man have a warrant for loving with all his heart and mind and strength? Without the gospel, nature exhibits a want of harmony between our intrinsic constitution and the system in which it is placed. But Christianity has made up the difference. It is possible and natural to love the Father, who has made us His children by the spirit of adoption. It is possible and natural to love the Elder Brother, who was in all things like as we are, except sin, and can succour those in temptation, having been Himself tempted. Thus the Christian faith is the necessary complement of a sound ethical system."

"What is the distinguishing character of Hebrew literature which separates it by so broad a line of demarcation from that of every ancient people? Undoubtedly the sentiment of erotic devotion which pervades it. Their poets never represent the Deity as an impassive principle, a mere organizing intellect, removed at infinite distance from human hopes and fears. He is for them a being of like passions with themselves, requiring heart for heart, and capable of inspiring affection because capable of feeling and returning it. Awful, indeed, are the thunders of his utterance, and the clouds that surround his dwelling-place; very terrible is the vengeance he executes on the nations that forget him; but to his chosen people, and especially to the men 'after his own heart,' whom he anoints from the midst of them, his 'still small voice' speaks in sympathy and lovingkindness. Every Hebrew, while his breast glowed with patriotic enthusiasm at those promises which

he shared as one of the favoured race, had a yet deeper source of emotion, from which gushed perpetually the aspirations of prayer and thanksgiving. He might consider himself alone in the presence of his God, the single being to whom a great revelation had been made, and over whose head an 'exceeding weight of glory' was suspended. For him the rocks of Horeb had trembled, and the waters of the Red Sea were parted in their course. The word given on Sinai with such solemn pomp of ministration was given to his own individual soul, and brought him into immediate communion with his Creator. That awful Being could never be put away from him. He was about his path, and about his bed, and knew all his thoughts long before. Yet this tremendous enclosing presence was a presence of love. It was a manifold everlasting manifestation of one deep feeling, a desire for human affection."

It has been said that this essay and the former one were evidently written for a debating society or social club. From the letter of a companion we learn that at Cambridge, Arthur "moved chiefly in a set of men of literary habits, remarkable for free and friendly intercourse, whose characters, talents, and opinions of every complexion were brought into continual collision—all license of discussion permitted, and no offence taken. And he was looked up to by all as the life and grace of the party." Tennyson, in one of the later portions of "In Memoriam," speaks of revisiting the rooms,—

"Where once we held debate, a band
Of youthful friends, on mind and art,
And labour, and the changing mart,
And all the framework of the land ;

"When one would send an arrow fair,
But send it slackly from the string ;
And one would pierce an outer ring,
And one an inner, here and there.

"And last the master-bowman, he
Would cleave the mark. A willing ear
We lent him. Who but hung to hear
The rapt oration flowing free

"From point to point, with power and grace,
And music in the bounds of law,
To those conclusions when we saw
The God within him light his face,

"And seem to lift the form, and glow
In azure orbits heavenly-wise ;
And over those ethereal eyes
The bar of Michael Angelo."

In another, he recalls Arthur's—

"Seraphic intellect and force
To seize and throw the doubts of man
Impassion'd logic which outran
The heaven in its fiery course."

Rare meetings of the choicest young spirits of the time are thus brought before us—spirits many of them destined afterwards to exercise a wide-spread and powerful influence upon the nation, while one, alas! the best and brightest of all, was to lie in his silent grave.

Cremetry.

W.

(To be continued.)

The Reviewer.

Words of Comfort to Parents bereaved of Little Children. Edited by WILLIAM LOGAN. London: J. Nisbet & Co.

THIS is a casket of affection, full of gems of heart value, and precious to the soul. It is an anthology of parental love and sorrow, and an encyclopædia of pure and holy consolation. This monument has been raised to the memory of a twelve years' immortal daughter, whom the editor lost when she was an earthling of less than five years' space. What a power there is in fervour of passion and purity of soul! The echoes of this father's sorrow have gone into many hearts, and the joy of his hope has lighted the grief of bereavement. It is unique in any literature as the tribute of age to infancy, and of worldly carewornness to the innocence of childhood. Never has grave been more richly decked, and nor has any death-cairn been ever heaped up by nobler spirits. It consists of an historical sketch of opinion on the salvation of deceased infants, 52 pp.; a brief notice of a short life, 6 pp.; letters to the father on the death of his babe, 10 pp.; words of comfort selected from many prose authors concerning those who die in infancy, 330 pp.; and poems of great beauty and moral power, selected and original, on dead children, and the feelings and memories they have excited, p. 162. The prefatory matter occupies 26 pages, and a beautiful frontispiece—"passing into light"—completes a book of piety, hope, and consolation; and a commentary on the divine saying, "Suffer the little children to come unto me, and forbid them not, for of such is the kingdom of heaven."

Sure of Heaven: a book for the doubting and anxious. By THOMAS MILLS. London: Elliot Stock.

Is the full assurance of "faith" possible to the sorrow-laden and penitent who lifts his eyes to Jesus as the author and finisher of man's salvation? Those who wish to see the affirmative of this

question argued with force, pertinence, earnestness, and talent, with zeal, unction, and conviction, and with an open hearted largeness of sympathy and feeling, which must secure attention if it does not effect persuasion should read this work. It is a book to do the soul good, and to quicken any holy affection that is in it. We commend it to the spiritually-minded, and particularly to those who are of desponding temperament, and diffident of themselves. Its great object is to bring its readers to "look to Jesus."

View of the State of Europe during the Middle Ages. By HANRY HALLAM. London: A. Murray & Son.

THIS work is a boon to students. It is a reprint of one of "classic" Hallam's great works, revised and corrected by the late learned author. This compact treatise of 900 pages for six shillings will find its way into many a library where a copy at thirty shillings cannot be easily got. We believe the publisher has issued a school edition at two-thirds of that sum. The reputation of the work is established beyond all cavil; and students ought to show that if good books are published at low prices, purchasers will not be wanting.

The Scattered Nation. Edited by C. SCHWARTZ, D.D. London: Elliot Stock.

"THE Scattered Nation," though it has, as a special mission, to explain the relations of Christianity to Judaism, and to impress the minds of Jews with a sense of the worth of the Messiah, presents its readers with many interesting explanations of Bible difficulties, supplies a great deal of original matter concerning the meaning of Scripture, and communicates much information regarding the state of the Jews in various parts of the world. It is also the advocate of several charities, of which the editor is the administrator. All who are interested in the past, present, and future of Israel will find matter of interest and importance in its pages. It is a cheap monthly, addressed to this class especially.

The British Workman. London: S. W. Partridge.
Old Jonathan. London: Collingridge.

THE former of these periodicals has long held a high place in the regard of those who endeavour to promote the moral and intellectual elevation of the classes who labour. Its illustrations are excellent, and its literary matter well adapted to its end. The latter is a more distinctly religious periodical, well illustrated and filled with judicious and useful matter. Both must be welcome visitants to many a household, and wherever they are read they should tell on the welfare of the home and heart. We commend them gladly as having the uplifting of the soul and the habits for their practical end.

Topics for Teachers. By JAMES COWPER GRAY. London: Elliot Stock.

"TOPICS for Teachers" is a new work intended for ministers, Sunday school teachers, and others. Its author is favourably known for his work on the "Class and the Desk," and as the editor of an admirable serial for Sabbath school teachers, entitled "The Hive," which we have previously commended highly, but would now reiterate more strongly, if we were able, our sense of its value and fitness. These *Topics* seem to be intended to form a sort of classified cyclopædia of scripture facts, illustrations, doctrines and peculiarities, so arranged that all that is known on any subject may be seen at a glance, and so be at once available. The letter-press seems to us excellent in arrangement and suggestiveness, but the wood-cuts do not impress us as up to the mark. The condensed summaries to a thoughtful teacher or Bible student cannot but be useful and improving.

The Sunday School Teacher's Magazine.

Notes on the Scripture Lessons.

The Biblical Treasury. London: Sunday School Union.

The Hive. London: Elliot Stock.

The first-named magazine is admirably conducted, and contains excellent matter; and the last named is most ably got up in material and in systematic style. Both are worthy of careful study and extensive circulation. The *Notes* are clear, clever, concise and unsectarianly Christian. The *Treasury* is replete with good things, old and new.

ONE great distinction between the great and the half-great is, we think, this:—the half-great man is, in his own age fully commented on and thoroughly appreciated; his character is faithfully inscribed in a multitude of reviews; his career is reflected in a wall of mirrors, which image his every step, and, "now in glimmer, and now in gloom," trace out his history ere he be dead, and leave very little for posterity to add or to take away. The great man, on the other hand, while seldom quite overlooked or ignored, is as seldom, during his lifetime, fully recognised; a shade of doubt hangs about his form, like mist around a half-seen Alp; his motions are all tracked, indeed, but tracked in terror and in suspicion; his character, when drawn, is drawn in *chiaro-scuro*; his faults are chronicled more fully than his virtues; the general sigh which arises at the tidings of his death is as much that of relief as of sorrow; and not till the dangerous and infinite seeming man has been committed safely to the grave, does the world awake to feel that it has hid one of its richest treasures in the field of death.—REV. G. GILFILLAN'S "*Third Gallery of Portraits*," p. 278.

The Topic.

HAVE THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS BEEN SATISFACTORY?

AFFIRMATIVE.

THE question to be decided is eminently a party one. I think it will require but little hesitation to come to a sound conclusion on the matter. It is a well-known fact that the cause of the recent parliamentary contests is to be traced to the course pursued by Mr. Gladstone last session with respect to the Irish Church question. The resolutions which he then laid before the House met with such unanimous approval from his supporters, that Mr. Disraeli determined at once to wind up the business of the House and advise Her Majesty to appeal to the country in the matter. This appeal has been made, and I think with no uncertain sound, for the elections have clearly shown that the sympathies of the people are with Ireland, and all hope to see her receive that fair play which is granted to all other subjects of Her Majesty. The elections have proved beyond doubt that the people have strong faith in the wisdom and policy of Mr. Gladstone. The contests were in reality staked on the relative merits of the two great leaders, Gladstone and Disraeli, and the country has spoken out unmistakably in the decision which it has given. I think, too, the elections have convinced us that the country is thoroughly liberal. We had no suspicions about this before, but with the large majority which Mr. Gladstone now has, it is quite evident that with the growth of intelligence liberalism advances. It has struck terror into the Tory ranks, and its

leader seeing what was before him has resigned. Now the way is clear for Gladstone and his party to take the lead, and I venture to predict a future that will be sunny and glorious, and such as will cause no regret to those who have taken so admirable a part in furthering the cause of progress and reform.—
R. H.

Very satisfactory, I think. These are days of progress, and, it is hoped, of improvement also. Justice will be done to Ireland, and we look forward to the accomplishment of many other good things. We can now boast of a Gladstone at the head of our national affairs, and—who would have thought it—a “John Bright” holding a responsible position in the new government; these are among the results of the elections, which have been, or rather, have turned out to be, satisfactory.—R. D. ROBERT, *Bristol*.

The question to be considered revolves itself to this:—1. Are the different branches of industry fairly represented by men who thoroughly understand what they have to represent? 2. Are the different classes of the people fairly represented by men who know their wants, and are determined to make it their duty to be the exponents of those wants? 3. Are the men returned to constitute this parliament the best able to look into the future, to guide the state ship, to be watchful in calm weather, and collected in rough, to husband resources and abolish extravagance, to educate the people, to develop the kindly feelings of the component parts of

the empire, and to make the world feel that Britain is well and wisely governed? If these questions are answered by "aye," then our answer must also be "aye." Such is my answer. Glance but at the long roll of able men who have secured seats, and deny if you can that each branch of industry is ably represented. But say some, the working class, those whose industry make England what it is, whose sweat is transmuted into gold, they are not adequately represented. No, not by working men of their own grade 'tis true, but they are represented by *fellow-workers*, whose hearts throb with theirs, who see with their eyes, and who act and speak as working men *ought* to act and speak; instance Hughes, Fawcett, &c. On the last point, that the intellect of England has its abiding place at Westminster is very clear. The cabinet which has just been formed (especially in those whose places are in the Commons) is full of administrative ability. Cardwell, Childers, Lowe, Bright, Forster, have shown that they are capable of leading the way in retrenching where retrenchment is necessary, and developing where development is possible. With Lowe and Bright in one and the same cabinet, and that cabinet presided over by the man whom England loves, whom England delights to honour, what brilliant management may we not expect. I may remark that since the days of Newton, I think no natural philosopher of any eminence has been sent to Parliament, until Edinburgh, St. Andrew's, have honoured themselves by returning Playfair. Justice will not permit to say that this is the best possible collection of statesmen that might have been assembled to form the two rival armies in the House of Commons, seeing Mill, Freeman, Labouchere (useful on account of his diplo-

matic knowledge), Osborne, Lubbock, Broderick, &c., are absent, but it will allow me to maintain that this Parliament so well represents the country that future ages will entitle it "the Parliament."—A. J. G.

To all liberal-minded politicians the results of the elections just closed must be pre-eminently satisfactory. As a Lancashire man I am compelled to deplore the result of our respective home contests; as a whole, nevertheless, when I remember the issue upon which such have been waged throughout the country, viz., the disestablishment and disendowment of an *alien* church, the result is cheering almost beyond expression. Furthermore, the late Tory government in their weakness, were prompted, through adverse votes, to appeal to the enlarged and new constituencies, with a belief that the response would be in every way satisfactory for them. We find such has been quite the reverse; the Premier has very judiciously resigned, and Gladstone, Bright, and other true friends of the people, are entrusted with the nation's care. This to me is a sufficient proof that the results of the elections have been satisfactory.—THOS. MORTIMER.

No right-thinking man, no man anxious to increase the welfare of his country can hesitate to say that the result is in the highest degree successful. Even Mr. Disraeli himself cannot but believe that the people have by their voice, and at his request, doomed the Irish Church, and placed that great and good man, Mr. Gladstone, in power again, with a brilliant and talented array of assistants, backed with a majority in the House of 117, a majority unparalleled in history. The result of the election will be the removing of that curse and burthen to Ireland the State church, the adoption of a na-

tional suborn of education, the reduction of taxation, and other measures fraught with good to all. And do not these measures, which without doubt will be passed, prove that the election is a success, and has gained the desired end? Mr. Disraeli says, "I will appeal to the country." He asks, "Is the Irish Church to be disestablished or not?" The answer is plain to every one, notwithstanding that in some places, by undue influences and a powerful application of the screw, Tories have been returned.—A. O. W.

If we consider the elections that have just closed as the battle-ground of the two great contending parties, in which a great and decisive victory has been won for the Liberal cause—the winning of which has brought all the honour and the responsibility that belongs to those who wear the victor's crown—the result of the "leap in the dark" has proved fatal to those who sought to benefit the legislation of this country by a direct means, but who adopted an indirect method of doing what they intended. Had the Conservatives given the country a reform bill without the fine, the result would have been different. As it is, they have only reaped what they have sown. One of the reasons why the results of the elections have proved so satisfactory to the Liberal cause is the following:—The justice of the disestablishment of the Irish Church was raised at a time when the Government were in disgrace through their advocacy of the "levelling up" system, the propounding of which raised such a feeling of antagonism to them and their cause that the House was ready to listen to any well-digested plan by means of which the endowment of Catholicism could be placed out of the reach of harm. W. E. Gladstone, like a wise statesman, saw the course things were taking by choosing the hour to bring in a

bill, the subject of which he had pondered over for years. And what is the result of one of the noblest and most daring acts that has ever graced the page of history? This: it has placed him in the proudest position it is possible to occupy, namely, that of Premier of England, "the august mother of free nations." Mr. Gladstone appealed to the justice of Englishmen, and the result, as given through the unanimous voice of the people, proves that he did not appeal in vain. Taking the result of the elections as a victory over ignorance, religious animosity, and the base fears that were aroused by the "No Popery" cry, I think we must say that it is so satisfactory that it carries with it an augury of good results yet to come.—D. W. R.

In estimating the satisfactoriness or the unsatisfactoriness of the result of any proceeding, it is imperative to consider the object of that proceeding. An election has just taken place, the more immediate aim of which was to ascertain the reply of the country to the question, Shall the Irish Church be disestablished or not? The people, by returning a large majority of representatives desirous of doing their utmost to attain that end, have replied, that in their opinion it is desirable that the Church in Ireland be freed from the control of the British Parliament; and believing that anything short of that step would be unjust and inexpedient, I regard the result of the late election as satisfactory. I also regard it as satisfactory, because I conceive the spirit of legislation and government that is best adapted to the requirements of an advancing age to be a spirit of liberalism, progression, and expansion. Life requires room and provision for growth. Further, the religion of any country cannot be in a truly healthful condition whilst one particular sect is

unduly elevated at the expense of the depression of the rest, and as I believe the Liberal party will exert a greater influence in the direction of a religious equalization than the Conservative party, I cannot but consider the results of the election to be satisfactory. "By their fruits shall ye know them." We have often tasted of the fruits of Liberal growth ere this, and trust that the orchards of 1869 will be even more plentiful than their predecessors have been.—H. SCOTT.

The answer to this question will depend almost entirely upon the political position and preferences of the writer. To me the result of the late elections has been eminently satisfactory:—1. Because it has converted a somewhat disorganized and unreliable Liberal party into one compact, strong, of definite pronounced opinions, and pledged to the support of Mr. Gladstone. 2. Because it has given us an overwhelming Liberal majority in the House of Commons, which no tricks of the Conservative tactician will be able to destroy. 3. Because this majority is from all parts of the United Kingdom—England, Wales, Ireland, and Scotland—each contributing a part, thus showing that notwithstanding an apparent Murphite reaction in one section of England, the heart of the people generally is sound upon the great issue of progress and life, versus retrogression and death. 4. Because of the prominence given to the Irish Question, and the great response upon the side of righteousness and equality, and against the perpetration of injustice to secure the supposed safety of religion, which has been so emphatically made, proving the faith of the nation to be that truth is mightier in her own strength than in the armour and with the cumbrous weapons of the State, and that in a fair

and open encounter she is certain, in the long run, to gloriously triumph. 5. Because it has shown so plainly that Tory influence, and unscrupulousness in the use of agencies to return their candidates, are of little avail when the people are fairly roused upon an issue which their own hearts tell them is of right against injustice. In Wales, in Scotland, and in many parts of England, the domination of the landowners has been completely broken. 6. A greater spirit of determination has been shown, on one side more especially, to secure the purity of elections, and this has met with cheering success, and its influence will grow wider with every year until bribery and coercion become unknown. 7. To insure this, it is a pleasing sign that so many eminent men are giving in their adhesion to the ballot. Even the untoward influences at work, in many cases most shamefully and openly employed, are having the beneficial effect of leading many formerly opposed, or indifferent thereto, to advocate its adoption, or at least that it be tried. 8. One great and satisfactory result has already been to remove a time-serving political juggler from the helm of State, with all his partizans, and to replace him and them by a man of transcendent intellectual power, but above all, of unstained honour and Christian devotedness, with a band of life-minded supporters, animated by one spirit of adherence to the right and just. The influence of such a cabinet, with its friends of similar spirit in the private ranks of the House of Commons, will prove of incalculable good in raising the political, moral, and religious tone of the entire nation.—W.

No Tory—and therefore satisfactory—is our verdict. The appeal was made to the constituencies, and the answer is now notorious. So

complete was the humiliation experienced at the reply, that even the chief director of Tory strategies felt it to be a thorough and crushing defeat. It is no less satisfactory in its moderation than in its completeness this victory; for whereas all sorts of evil augury were afloat about labour swamping capital, and capital estates, and filling the House of Commons with common tradesmen, who had been too well acquainted with short commons, there is no real fall in the status of our statesmen, and the estates stand much as before. For my own part I am glad that the triumph, though gratifying, is not greater, because it has still preserved to us a good houseful of Tories, who will criticise legislation keenly, and be powerful enough to keep the machinery from going at full [or fool] speed. Gladstone, it is true, did not win the Derby prize he sought, but Greenwich set him to rights with regard to this time. By this time Disraeli knows enough of French to know *c'est le premier pas qui coûte*. He took, as he thought, the first step to victory, but he has brought it about that Gladstone has taken the *premier pas* to Victoria. The elections have not only turned out admirably themselves, but they have admirably turned Disraeli out.—F. A. S.

Very satisfactory indeed. Notwithstanding the political jugglery of the new Reform Bill, in the division of counties, the redistribution of seats, and the minority clause, all of which were scrupulously adapted to benefit Conservatism, and notwithstanding the strenuous exertion of the parson-power of the clergy of the Church, the Liberal party has, at the lowest calculation, gained four votes in its interest in England, nine in Wales, seventeen in Ireland, and in Radical and Free Church Scotland, the people have gone far ahead of all anticipatory

calculations in favour of the modern policy of Liberalism. The clear majority which the Liberal party takes the reins of government with, is most satisfactory, and gives good hope of a thorough carrying out of the programme of Irish Church and Irish land-tenure reform, to which Gladstone and Bright are pledged, the educational progress to which Mr. Lowe has devoted himself, and the army and navy retrenchment, the limitation of taxation, the revision of local rates, and the free breakfast-table movement to which the Liberal party are, on the whole, pledged, and for which they are prepared. Such a consummation of the Disraelitish dissolution was "devoutly to be wished," it has been accomplished, and it has been very satisfactory to all but the Frankenstein of Toryism.—J. M.

The result of the late general election has been highly satisfactory, though of course many will mourn the loss of those who represented their opinions. The freethinkers or atheists will be sorry that their best man did not get a seat, so that he might have more influence in spreading their soul-destroying opinions. The Sunday League has reason to grieve that Lord Amberley was rejected in Devon, and cannot now bring in their bill to open the museums on Sundays; and all who know anything of the great philosopher who was defeated at York will grieve, he was a very near relative of the great statesman who has been called to the highest office in the State. But viewing the late election apart from personal motives, we have all cause to rejoice. 1st. It has shown that the whole people are willing to do their best towards satisfying Ireland. Although we have often been told before that even though we abolish the Irish Church we shall not remove the discontent under which Ireland labours, we

may readily grant it will not cure all grievances; but if it removes one source of complaint let us thank God and take courage to do our nearest duty thus far. 2nd. The people have shown without mistake that they would not honour a ministry who, when defeated more than once by a large majority, yet still clung to office, thus bringing contempt on the constitution they wished to uphold. 3rd. Although much fear and alarm was manifest in some quarters about working men having votes, and might not use them well, I think, upon the whole, they have. 4th. Although many of the Reform League and Hyde Park orators run the preliminary race, they were left behind at the great contest, and did not win the prize. And although many of the vulgar and unlettered were on the platform, yet the train has started to Westminster without them, and the electors have chosen men of learning and standing in the political world. For these reasons I think the elections have been highly satisfactory. —A. S.

NEGATIVE.

Some of the facts of the recent elections are truly distressing, far worse in reality than unsatisfactory. Middlesex has returned a Conservative member by the ousting of a Liberal. Lancashire, which in 1865 sent but three Conservatives, at this election sends eight. New seats have been gained for Conservatives in York, Surrey, Somerset, Norfolk, Lincoln, Kent, Devonshire, Derbyshire, and Cheshire. There is only a single county in England which has totally abjured Conservatism — Cornwall, and on the entire county representation the number of Conservative members has been increased from 94 to 126. This shows that the Disraelite enfranchisement in counties has reached the level

sought for, and that having handed the franchise to the *dependent* classes we cannot get *independent* suffrages. Over the whole of England, the Constitutionalists, as they now denominate themselves, have managed to preserve their numbers intact, while the cause of freedom, reform, retrenchment, peace, and low taxation, has lost ground, not only numerically, but influentially. As instances of the latter sort of loss, we reckon the rejection of Gladstone in South Lancashire, of J. S. Mill in Westminster, of Roebuck in Sheffield, Miall in Bradford, and the wholesale refusal of the constituencies to give the working-men candidates a chance. These facts seem to me to make the results of the elections unsatisfactory. —P. C.

The personal results of the elections do not appear to me so unsatisfactory as some general ones which I would take leave to mention, as they form considerations which are apt to be overlooked, I think, when indulging in the glorification of parties. The candidates now elected as representatives have, in almost every instance, gone to the poll pledged to the teeth to carry out foregone conclusions, and are not sent free to deliberate when all the known and available facts concerning the matters to be legislated upon are made known to them. The greater part of the members are delegates, not representatives; for they have agreed to vote in a given way, whatever may be facts and arguments laid before them in the course of legislative consultation. Hence we have got together a House of Commons which, by the very conditions of its existence, is not a deliberative assembly. Worse even than this, the majority of the members are pledged to men rather than measures—to men even in preference to party. They are mostly either Disraelites or Gladstonians,

and they are thus not free to accept the best possible form of political government, but to a narrow personal partisanship. I cannot but look with regret on these results of an extended representation. When shall we have men sent to the House pledged to honest deliberation and responsible thoughtfulness?—**ROBERTS.**

The result of the elections has been eminently unsatisfactory, because the cry raised as the guiding principle in the elections was on a side issue. Parliament is primarily a political body, and has to do with the purposes and plans of secular life; but the present Parliament has been chosen on the side issue of a special religious organization. Hence England has belied its former tendencies, and renounced, in appearance, its Liberalism for love of the Church—has misled many constituencies, who ought to have returned Liberals, to send Conservative members to the House of Commons. Hence arises the fact, that England, which in 1865 returned 253 Liberals, has in 1868 only sent up 241, while the Conservative interest, instead of losing ground, as it had been regularly doing since 1832, has kept up its numbers—returning 221 members in 1868, as in 1865. Thus gaining a real, as well as a relative triumph, because, though a great many seats usually occupied by Conservatives were abolished by the new Reform Bill, they have so managed as to cause a less equivalent to the whole of the abolished seats to fall on the Liberal party. The election, vitiated *ab initio* by a Church cry, has turned out results, in a political sense, unsatisfactory, and has given an apparent though accidental victory to the Conservatives. The Conservative gains, too, have been in the large centres of population. This is of itself a very unsatisfactory symptom.—A. A. P.

It surely cannot be satisfactory to England to think that returns 221 Conservatives to 241 Liberals, yielding only a majority of 20; while Scotland returns 9 Conservatives at most as opposed to 51 Liberals, yielding a majority of 42, or more than double that provided by England, which has more than four times the number of representatives. Wales, too, has reduced its Conservative returns, from 10 in 1865, to 8 in 1868, and increased its Liberal returns from 18 in 1865, to 22 in 1868; and Ireland has reduced its Conservative members by 7, and increased its Liberal representatives by that number. In fact, England has retrograded so far as almost to have rendered unavailing the Liberal majorities of Wales, Ireland, and Scotland. In 1865, in the entire United Kingdom, there were 288 Conservative returns, and of this number they have only lost 10 in 1868, while at the election in 1865 there were 370 Liberal members chosen, and on this total only 6 has been gained. It is so far, of course, satisfactory, that Liberalism has not been seriously imperilled, but it is not satisfactory that Scotland alone should hold the van in Liberalism, and should have to make up the defections of England. Where has the determination, energy, pluck, and passion for freedom vanished to in England, that Liberalism should have actually lost eleven members! I cannot consent to a verdict of satisfactory. Quite the contrary.—**W. K.**

At the moment of this present writing there are fifty-one petitions presented against the return of members of Parliament for different places. There is one double return, so that dissatisfaction is felt with one out of a dozen of returns to such an extent as have resulted in action; and the cry is, Still they come. There is still greater dissatis-

faction in some seats where by a narrow majority the party gaining the seat has exposed itself to suspicions of foul play. The results have not been satisfactory for the Conservative party, for they hoped to win by the dissolution, and they have been disappointed. Neither have the results been satisfactory to the Liberal party, for they have made no progress, but rather the reverse, in numbers; while there are about 220 new men whose political education has to be begun brought into the arena instead of the known men—as friends or foes—who have disappeared from the present Parliament. Reflective politicians cannot be satisfied at seeing how many thinking and independent Liberals have been cast out to let in inexperienced men, whose willingness to take up the momentary cry of the day has secured a triumph for the time, but has not for certain procured a triumph for the principles of peace, order, and progress of the people, which outvalue all State-Church questions.—T. J. Q.

The results of the parliamentary elections have not been satisfactory. A majority of unprecedented strength has been returned, pledged not to a principle but to the miserable short-sighted course of expediency. The leading cry of these erratic visionaries is, "Justice to Ireland." This, the pet project of these trucklers, is to be accomplished by sapping the foundation of civil and religious liberty in Ireland. The success of such consummate madness will be a

national disgrace. With such mobocratic subserviency we cannot view the electoral returns with satisfaction.—MACK.

The Irish Church question was made the main one at the elections, and hence we have a religious convention rather than a political assembly. This has had a disastrous effect on Parliament as a civil institution. Men have been sent there on account of their "soundness"—whatever idea each constituency attached to that term—of their views on the Irish Church, and without almost any reference to the interesting and exciting political questions which must emerge into debate. The whole machinery of the Church on one hand, and of Dissent on the other, was to get "right-minded" men on this one topic, and the people have consented to this wild false cry so far as to send to the House of Commons a set of the worst possible men, namely, such as are noted for what they call the earnestness of their religious convictions. Representatives go to Parliament to manage the State, and if they touch the Church, it is as a State agent. The men returned are pledged to eager conflict against each other on religious points, and the Liberal statecraft of the last half-century has been exposed to danger by a Conservative reaction in which the Church has been falsely placed in opposition to the people. Our present Parliament is rather a convention of lay evangelists, Churchmen, and Dissenters than a Parliament of statesmen.—D. A. G.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

803. Did Addison die drunk?—
 QUERIST.

804. Would any of your readers be kind enough to favour me, through the medium of your valuable periodical, with a complete list of the best works on Benefit Building Societies, with their prices, authors, and publishers? I should be very thankful if you will mention good works on book-keeping, with their prices, authors, and publishers.—
 J. J.

805. What was the *rota* in Commonwealth times?—T. A.

806. Who is the author of that familiar, melodious, and much-meaning line,—

"Time shakes the stable tyranny of thrones"?—Q. E. D.

807. Can any of your readers tell me the principles of the Evangelical Unionists (or Morrosonianians)?—
 ABIEL.

808. Would any of your readers kindly inform me the best and easiest-learned system of short-hand?—
 ABIEL.

809. I recently bought, at an old book-stall, a "Life of Luther," which stated to be "the third of the series issued by the Society for the Promotion of Popular Instruction." I have heard something of "the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge," and that "for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge," but of this one I know nothing. Can any of your readers enlighten me? The date of the book is 1840.—M. A. R.

810. A book, dated 1824, entitled "The Life of Shakspeare," by Augustine Skottowe, has lately come into

my possession. I am no Shaksperian, and I would gladly learn, if any of your contributors can tell me, the value of the book as an authority, and how it stands with reference to more modern biographies of the dramatist.—M. A. R.

811. Could you inform me how to improve in writing—not in composition, but in the mere art of expressing words by signs,—penmanship? I have completely forgotten, for want of exercise, all I once knew of that art, and I would like to recover what I have lost—if you can possibly make out my scrawl. I am a young man who has a way of life opened up to him if I could properly keep accounts in a fair hand. Any hint on above, and on the study of accounts, would greatly oblige one willing to make up now for schoolboy carelessness and the too early leaving off of school studies.—
 POST OBIT.

812. Is "the Book of Job" fact or fiction?—D. L.

813. Will any of your subscribers kindly inform me what books to read (their prices and publishers) in order to obtain a good sound knowledge of political economy?—
 SAXO.

814. Could you inform me who is the author of the following patriotic lines?—

"Mankind shall boast one nation free;

One monarch truly great;
 Whose title speaks a people's choice,
 Whose sovereign will a people's voice,

Whose strength a prosperous State."—SEMPER QUEERNS.

815. I have just come across a

book whose title is "Forbidden Books." Its title-page is "The Suppressed Gospels and Epistles of the original New Testament of Jesus Christ, &c. Forbidden by the Bishops of the Nicene Council, &c. Translated, &c., by Archbishop Wake, &c. Publishers—London: E. Hancock and Co. 1863." Can any one inform me if this edition is genuine?—R. J.

816. I wish to know what the "Percy Anecdotes" are; who are the editors or compilers of the work bearing that title? Is the work of any value as a standard work? What are its features of merit and usefulness?—M. B.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

797. I have now lying before me a work of the nature and character as I suppose "Joseph" is inquiring after. It is entitled "The Reference Shakspeare," a memorial edition of Shakspeare's plays, containing 11,600 references, compiled by John B. Marsh, Manchester. London: Simpkin, Marshall, and Co. Manchester: John Heywood. 1864. The design of its author—who is, we believe, a clergyman in Manchester, and known favourably as the compiler of the "Book of Bible Prayers;" "Prayers for the Sick and the Sorrowful, framed out of the Psalms;" "Familiar, Proverbial, and Select Sayings from Shakspeare," containing 1,535 choice sentences, &c.—has been "to make Shakspeare self-interpretative." It contains an index of 372 subjects, which are illustrated by 6,504 separate passages, and are connected by a total of 11,600 references. The work is useful to those who are not expressly familiar with the contents of the works of the great dramatist; though to students of Shakspeare all the notable passages are engrossed on the memory and in the heart; and it might be made serviceable in education. But we have an opinion that Shakspeare and

Milton cannot be studied lexicographically and grammatically till Mary Cowden Clarke's Concordance to Shakspeare, and Cleveland's Concordance to Milton, are incorporated in the margins as Marsh's references are; then they would be suitable for inductive study, and colleges and schools could usefully train scholars to comprehend the art of comparative philology, as applied to the study of English. We give this hint to publishers and editors with our best wishes.—S. N.

812. Many characteristics of the Book of Job—such as references to him as a real person by Ezekiel (xiv. 16), James (v. 11), &c., the circumstantiality of the narrative, and the suitability of the language to the contents, age, and locality of the work—tend to show that it is a real history. Other peculiarities, such as the poetical justice provided for in the prologue and epilogue, the specific parts assigned to the characters, and the general tenor of the work, induce some to believe that it is an early dramatico-epic. A few authors, considering the end proposed in the production, and the course pursued in the course of the book, hold themselves bound to regard it as a philosophical colloquy, and a precursor of the Platonic dialogues. It would scarcely be prudent in a note such as this to give any verdict on this disputed question, though it is conceivable that all these views might be reconcilable in some measure by the hypothesis that the material facts were true; that seeing the adaptation of the original to induce philosophical thought, under the inspiration of a divine influence, some author composed the work in an epical and dramatic form, that it might be read for its poetry, esteemed for its wisdom, and revered for its truth. This seems to me the most feasible solution of the question proposed

by D. L. I subjoin a few of the best books on this subject which are known to me—not reckoning myself responsible as recommending them for their orthodoxy, but for their informingness. “An Exposition of the Book of Job,” by Joseph Caryl (1602—1673), an eminent Nonconformist divine, who has entombed in his work (twelve 4to. vols.) a great deal of spiritual, practical, and evangelical divinity; a translation of the Book of Job from the original Hebrew issued by the American Bible Union, under the editorship of D. T. J. Conant, with critical, philological, and explanatory notes; Barnes’s “Notes on Job,” with illustrations; Dr. Mason Good’s “Translation of the Book of Job,” with a preliminary dissertation; Umbreit’s “Version of the Book of Job,” issued in the *Biblical Cabinet*; Eichhorn’s “Introduction to the Book of Job.” “The Scriptures of the Old Testament,” translated and explained by Dr. E. Meier, is useful to readers of German; as are also the “Commentary on the Book of Job,” by the licentiate H. A. Hahn; “The Book of Job,” translated and explained by licentiate Constantine Schlottman. In the “Hebrew Scriptures,” by Samuel Sharpe, there is a version which brings out the poetical form of the production pretty well. In Lowth’s “Sacred Poetry of the Hebrews,” lectures 32 and 33 treat of Job. A paper on Job, attributed at the time to J. A. Froude, appeared in the *Westminster Review*, and has been republished. An article on the orthodox side in the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review* (July, 1857) should be read along with the last-mentioned paper. Maurice, in his “Mental and Moral Philosophy,” deals with Job as a metaphysical treatise. A whole library of treatises and tractates have been written on the subject, but most

of them are mentioned in one or other of the foregoing references.—
B. M. A.

813. I would recommend “Saxo” to begin his studies in political economy with the “Elements of Political Economy,” by James Mill, which was written for the use of his now celebrated son. Then he should pass on to “Definitions in Political Economy,” by Rev. R. T. Malthus. Samuel Bailey’s “Essay on Value” would be a suitable sequel to that work. Having tested his tastes by these works, he should revert to Adam Smith’s “Wealth of Nations,” which he should read in MacCulloch’s edition. The “Theory of Rent,” by Ricardo, Thornton, and Col. P. Thompson, would fittingly follow; and De Quincey’s “Logic of Political Economy” would thereafter lead to the style of thought prevalent in that science. The greatest book on the subject is J. S. Mill’s “Principles of Political Economy,” of which Messrs. Longman issue a people’s edition at 5s. The same author’s “Essays on some Unsettled Questions on Political Economy” ought to be carefully read. A good general work on this subject is N. W. Senior’s treatise on “Political Economy,” in the “Encyclopædia Metropolitana,” cabinet edition (Griffin, 3s. 6d.); Whately’s lectures on “Political Economy.” Dr. Chalmers’ prelections on the same subject may be profitably read. Doubleday’s treatise on Population should be perused, along with those of Malthus, Thornton, and Alison. Many articles in the *Edinburgh, Quarterly*, and *Westminster Reviews*, *Blackwood’s Magazine*, &c., should also be studied. Modern works on the topic are legion.—R. M. A.

814. The lines are the product of the pen of Robert Craggs, Earl Nugent, a descendant of the Nugents of Carlanstown, in Westmeath, Ireland, born about 1709. He was a member

of Parliament and a courtier. His second wife, whose name he took along with herself and an ample fortune, was sister and heiress to Addison's friend Secretary Craggs. He was no patriot, or if he was, it was very weakly ingrained into him. He was a convert from Popery, and a revert to it. The lines quoted close an "Ode to Mankind," about 1739, at the close of that dawn of his talents which Lord Orford said was "the brightest moment of a long life."

Almost every man of that age thought it a becoming piece of skill to be able to cast his *sentiments*, or the sentiments popular at the time, into something like verse; and Craggs followed the multitude in its customary privilege of doing what it thought "properest and best."—But Craggs!—

Heavens, what a name
To fill the trump of everlasting fame!
S. N.

Our Collegiate Course.

LITERATURE OF ENGLAND;

BIOGRAPHICAL, CHRONOLOGICAL, CRITICAL, ETC.

TABLE V.—HISTORIC WRITERS (1600—1700).

Names and Dates.

Events and Works.

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|---|---|
| <p>30. THOMAS FULLER,
1608—1661.</p> | <p>} Born at Aldwinkle, Northamptonshire; entered Queen's College, Cambridge; took degree of A.B. in 1624, A.M. 1628, and became Fellow of Sidney College and prebendary of Salisbury 1631. After officiating in St. Bennet's, Cambridge, and Broad Windsor, in Dorset, he became minister of Savoy, London; joined the royal army enthusiastically. Again got to London as lecturer of St. Clement's, then of St. Bride's, which he left for Waltham, in Essex, 1648, and that in 1658 for Crauford, Middlesex; regained his prebendary at the Restoration, as well as the Savoy lectureship. "David's Heinous Sinne, Hearty Repentance, Heavy Punishment, a poem," 1631; "History of the Holy Warre," 1639; "The Holy and Profane State, Characters, Essays and Lives," 1642; "Andronicus, or the Unfortunate Politician," 1645; "A Pisgah Sight of Palestine," 1650; "The Church History of Britain from the Birth of Christ to 1648," 1655; "History of the Worthies of England," 1662, &c.</p> |
| <p>31. SIR JOHN HAYWARD,
1560—1627.</p> | <p>} Born at Felixstow, Suffolk; educated at Cambridge, of which he was an LL.D. His <i>Life of Henry IV.</i>, 1599, was dedicated to Essex, and excited the ire of Elizabeth, and he was imprisoned; he replied to the Jesuit, Parsons, on the succession of James I., 1603; acquired favour, was made a historiographer of Chelsea College, and was knighted 1609. For Prince Henry he wrote "<i>Lives of the Three Norman Kings of England—William I.,</i></p> |

William II., and "Henry I.," 1613. He wrote besides a "Complete History of Edward IV.," issued posthumously, 1630, and a portion of a "Chronicle of Elizabeth's Reign," as well as some works of Devotion, and a treatise on the "Royal Supremacy in Matters of Religion," 1624.

32. LORD EDWARD HERBERT, 1581—1648. } Born in Montgomery Castle, Wales; educated at University College, Oxford; won the favour of Elizabeth and James; the latter of whom made him Knight of the Bath and Sheriff

of Montgomery. Went to Paris 1608, and acquired the friendship of the philosophers there; served as a volunteer in the English contingent under the Prince of Orange, visited Rome, narrowly escaped the Inquisition, appointed ambassador to Paris 1616, to negotiate in favour of the Protestants with Louis XIII., which he did successfully. Charles I. made him Baron of Cherbury, but Herbert subsequently deserted the king, and the cavaliers demolished Montgomery Castle. He revisited Paris 1647, and died in London 20th August, the following year. "The Expedition of the Duke of Buckingham," in Latin, 1630; and a "History of the Life and Reign of Henry VIII.," 1649. His treatise concerning truth ("De Veritate") was the first endeavour to reduce Deism to a system. It was supplemented by two tracts on "The Causes of Terror," and "On the Religion of the Laity," the former of which, expanded, appeared posthumously in 1663, under the title, in Latin, "Concerning the Religion of the Gentiles, and the Causes of Errors among them." Among those who controverted the speculative writings of Herbert of Cherbury may be mentioned Gas-sendi, Richard Baxter, Locke, Whitly, and Halyburton.

33. LUCY HUTCHINSON, 1620— } Daughter of Sir Allen Apsley, lieutenant of the Tower; married in her eighteenth year to John Hutchinson, who, after deep study, chiefly

from the religious side of the question, became attached to Puritanism, and joined the Parliamentary forces as colonel. By Parliament he was chosen governor of Nottingham, to withstand the Royal party; was one of the judges of the king; lived retired during the Protectorate; was sadly treated under the Restoration. He died of a fever caught in prison, in Sandown Castle, Kent. His wife accompanied him and sympathized with him in all his changes of fortune, and wrote "Memoirs," which, however, were not published till 1806.

34. WM. PRYNN, 1600—1669. } A native of Swainswick, near Bath; and educated at the grammar school of Bath, Oriel College, Oxford, and Lincoln's Inn.

Called to the bar he became benchers and reader, but was more remarkable for his devotion to controversial divinity than for extent of practice. He exasperated Laud and the clergy against him. In 1632 he produced "Histrio Mastrix, or a Scourge for Stage Players," and was prosecuted for it in the Star Chamber. He was fined £3,000, ordered to be expelled from Oxford and the Society of Lincoln's Inn, to be degraded from the bar, set in the pillory twice, to lose his ears, to be imprisoned for life, and to have his back burned by the common hangman—for it was held to have reflected on the Queen, who loved the stage, and had performed at a pastoral in Somerset House. While in prison he wrote "News from Ipswich," against the higher clergy, and was sentenced to pay £5,000 as fine, to be pilloried, to be branded on one cheek with S., and on the other with L., as a "Seditious Libeller," and to be closely confined in Carnarvon Castle. He was

illegally removed thence, because the Puritans sympathized with him, to Mount Orgueil, in the island. In 1641, during the Long Parliament, he was, upon petition, released, and his condemnation was pronounced to have been illegal. He sat as M.P. for Newport, in Cornwall, was chosen Recorder of Bath, 1647. But he offended the Parliamentary party, was imprisoned, and declared incapable of holding any office. After being M.P. for Bath, he was appointed keeper of the Records in the Tower, where he made "Calendars of Parliamentary Writs," "Records," &c. He issued about two hundred productions of various sorts. He died in Lincoln's Inn.

Epitome of Critical Opinions.

30. "Quaint and witty, but sensible, pious, candid, and useful; an invaluable body of information."—*Bickersteth*. "The writings of Fuller are usually designated by the title of quaint, and with sufficient reason; for such was his natural bias to conceits, that I doubt not, upon most occasions, it would have been going out of his way to have expressed himself out of them. But his wit is not always *lumen siccum*, a dry faculty of surprising; on the contrary, his conceits are oftentimes deeply steeped in human feeling and passion. Above all, his way of telling a story, for its eager liveliness, and the perpetual running commentary of the narrator happily blended with the narration, is perhaps unequalled."—*Charles Lamb*. "Next to Shakspeare, I am not certain whether Thomas Fuller, beyond all other writers, does not excite in me the sense and emotion of the marvellous, the degree in which any given faculty, or combination of faculties, is possessed and manifested, so far surpassing what we would have thought possible in a single mind, as to give one's admiration the flavour and quality of wonder. Fuller was incomparably the most sensible, the least prejudiced great man of an age that boasted of a galaxy of great men."—*S. T. Coleridge*. "Fuller overflowed with fun, and no presence, nor any circumstances, could restrain his mirthful propensity. . . . His theology was essentially sound, his heart was right, and, amongst all his coevals, few maintained a spirit so fair, and a temper so calm. . . . It is only justice to add that his wit was as inoffensive as it appears to have been irrepressible. With their frank and familiar style, their curious fancies, their amusing incidents, and their odd way of narrating graver matters, Fuller's larger works are the most readable folios of the seventeenth century."—*Dr. James Hamilton*. "He is a most singular writer, full of verbal quibbling and quaintness of all kinds, but by far the most amusing and engaging of all the rhetoricians of this school, inasmuch as his conceits are rarely mere elaborate feats of ingenuity, but are usually informed, either by a strong spirit of very peculiar humour and drollery, or sometimes even by a warmth and depth of feeling of which to a stranger, as it may appear, the oddity of his phraseology is often a not ineffective exponent. He was certainly one of the greatest and truest wits that ever lived; he is witty not by any sort of effort at all, but as it were in spite of himself, or because he cannot help it. But wit, or the faculty of looking at and presenting things in their less obvious relations, is accompanied in him, not only by humour and heart, but by a considerable endowment of the irradiating powers of fancy. Accordingly, what he writes is always lively and interesting, and sometimes even eloquent and poetical; eccentricities of his characteristic manner are not favourable, it must be confessed, to dignity or solemnity of style when attempted to be long sustained."—*G. L. Craik*.

31. "He adopted the dramatic style of making his characters deliver speeches, in which they express their policy."—*Dr. Angus*. "Hayward dedicated his *Reign of Henry IV.* to the Earl of Essex, which, together with some of the historian's remarks, displeased Queen Elizabeth, who ordered Lord Bacon to search the book for treasons. Bacon reported that there was not *treason*, but that there were many *felonies*, for the author had stolen many of his sentences and conceits out of Cornelius Tacitus."—*Alibone*.

32. "His reign of Henry VIII. is allowed to be a masterpiece of historic biography."—*Horace Walpole*. "A book of good authority, relatively at least to any that preceded, and written in a manly and judicious spirit."—*Hallam*. "Lord Herbert's '*Henry VIII.*' well deserves reading; he was a free thinker and a free writer, his information was good, and the era particularly interesting."—*Richard Farmer, D.D.* "Above all, Edward Lord Herbert, or Cherbury, may be truly said to have written the Life and Reign of King Henry VIII.; having acquitted himself with the like reputation as the Lord Chancellor Bacon gained by that of '*Henry VII.*' For in the politic and martial part this honourable author has been admirably particular and exact from the best records that were extant; though, as to the ecclesiastical, he seems to have looked upon it as a thing out of his province, and an undertaking more proper for men of another profession."—*Bishop Nicolson*. "Lord Herbert wrote a '*History of the Life and Reign of King Henry VIII.*,' which was not printed till 1649, the year after his death. It is termed by Lord Orford a masterpiece of historic biography. . . . He has been accused, however, of partiality to the tyrannical monarch whose actions he relates, and of having produced rather a panegyric or an apology, than a fair and judicious representation. As to style, the work is considered one of the best old specimens of historical composition in the language, being manly and vigorous, and unsullied by the quaintness and pedantry of the age. Lord Herbert is remarkable also as the earliest of our autobiographers. The memoirs which he left of his own life were first printed in 1764, and have ever since been popular."—*Chambers*.

33. "Mrs. Hutchinson's '*Memoirs of the Colonel*' delighted every curious reader."—*Disraeli*. "We have not often met with anything more interesting and curious than this volume."—*Lord Jeffrey*. "I have seldom been so deeply interested by any book as this."—*Southey*. "Great is the praise due to the fluent and *saïve* style of the author of the '*Memoirs of Colonel Hutchinson*.' The author was the wife and widow of the colonel—a woman of equal spirit, talent, and virtue."—*Dilkin*.

34. "Prynne has written a library, amounting, I think, to nearly two hundred books. Our unlucky author, whose life was involved in authorship, and his happiness, no doubt, in the habitual exuberance of his pen, seems to have considered the being debarred from pen, ink, and books, during his imprisonment, as an act more barbarous than the loss of his ears."—*Disraeli*. "Well read in English law, and full of zeal for gospel doctrine and morality. He, struck by certain flagrant scandals of the time, especially by that of playacting and masking, saw good to set forth his '*Histriomastix*, or *Player's Scourge*,' a book still extant, but never more to be read by mortal. For which Mr. William Prynne himself, before long, paid rather dear."—*Carlyle*.

The Societies' Section.

COLLEGE HISTORICAL SOCIETY: DUBLIN UNIVERSITY.

ON the evening of Dec. 2nd, in the Dining Hall of the University of Dublin, the opening Meeting of this Society, for Session 1868-9, took place. The Hall was densely as well as fashionably crowded. The Right Hon. Sir Joseph Napier occupied the chair.

Mr. Henry O'Hea, A.B., Auditor, rose, and proceeded to deliver the opening address. We publish some of his concluding remarks:—In addition to the practice of oratory in the new channel, in which proficiency is not the less difficult to acquire, because it is more widely useful in its after application, discussions have a powerful influence, as I believe, for good, because they create a school of thought in which social questions may be considered without the prejudice of self-interest or the rancour of party politics; they afford a common platform where earnest men, anxious only to see on which side the balance of truth lies, and careless of the consequences of following it, may meet, and weigh with almost scientific accuracy and calmness, the arguments and the facts, the consequences and the relations which give to one view or to the other the greater appearance of utility and justice. Surely, there never was more need of a free school of thought in such matters than at present. Each one of us every day is pressed to form an opinion upon some social or political question, and if we have not thought it out independently for ourselves, we can but adopt the views of the set or party

with which we happen to be placed, and repeat their watchword as if it were a conviction of our own. It is here that this society chiefly exerts an influence, still analogous, yet supplemental, to that of the University, and extending beyond its body. As the University generates an atmosphere of intellectual thought, so does this society create one of political opinion. In its debates many a young member has heard, perhaps for the first time, the expression of sentiments directly opposite to his own, and when the first feeling of astonishment wore away he began to understand that it is possible for honest minds to differ on the same subject—and at that moment his political education was begun. For before the effort to understand there was tolerance required to listen, and then came the investigation of the grounds of his own opinion, and the consideration of whatever arguments were put forward on the other side; and this involves an exercise of patience, and of judgment, and of reasoning, which cannot be without result—above all, when the motive which inspires it is a pure motive, and when it is purely done. Is it not our bane in this country that we are so often banded into hostile camps, and seldom meet on neutral ground; that our opinions are formed for us, and are associated with old rancours, and old grievances, and old crimes; that we are made to fight under banners which were hostile once, but which need not be so longer, and to shout angry war-cries which in our hearts we

loathe—that the spectre of a guilty past should haunt us thus at every step, and check our efforts towards hearty union, thronging the brain with the memory of wrongs long since abandoned—tearing the heart by the agony of a dire mistrust—palsying the energies by the thought of old injustice, and clenching in anger, or paralyzing in fear, the hands which should be joined in work and clasped in friendship? And is it not good for this country that there should be here, in her University, a school, though it be only for the purpose of debate, in which every point in Irish policy may be canvassed, and yet no angry word is spoken—no sentiment of bigotry uttered—no party cry raised—no tie of friendship broken? And the men who discuss these things are young men, and they differ widely in politics and religion, and each is ardent for his own view, and uncompromising in support of it—but they have resolved to try, at least, to understand each other—to listen to argument, to weigh it, and to answer it—and they find that, in the process, the anger, if there was any, has died away, and the bigotry, if such there was, has gone, and for ever, and the opinion, if not frankly altered, is raised into 'intelligent conviction, and the friendship is, perhaps, closer than before. It is to this I point—and I can but do so hastily—as a healthy influence exerted on the national life of Ireland, in the toleration of sentiment, the broadening of the political intellect, and the culture of mind to which it leads, and which, united here in a sound public opinion, cannot fail to spread its influence outside. If the spirit which pervades all our debates were spread widely abroad, how many a man would find that the narrow views—which antiquated error, or long accustomed habit, or strong party feeling had made him regard as

the utterances of a god—were really but the promptings of his own ignorance, and that the thing which he consulted was, indeed, no god, but only an idol which could not think or speak, and which gave back, instead of answer, the stupid echo of his own prejudices and passion! But let us, at least, who have breathed a clearer atmosphere, carry with us, from this hall, and from this society, a habit of calmer judgment, and of more tolerant consideration, of larger view, and more liberal compromise, remembering that, as we all seek after the same noble end, in the greatest happiness of our country, we ought not, if we be sincere, to differ angrily upon the special means by which that good is to be worked out. Above all, let us remember, from our experiences in this society, that men may be emulous, yet not hostile; rivals, yet not enemies; and that differences of opinion, of politics, and of creed, are not natural barriers ordained to keep men apart, but are rather placed between us to evoke that small effort of sympathy which is all it takes to overleap them. The founders of this College Historical Society disdained the partial and exclusive idea that it was established for themselves alone. They laboured to raise it into a system of national utility. From them, along with an illustrious name, a high title, and untarnished honours, we have inherited the responsibilities of an almost sacred trust. We shall have no right to claim kinship with the great men of the past if we be slow in obeying their behests and carrying out their purposes. Let us then unite to make this school of Irish eloquence a school of national thought; not by adopting extreme views, or spreading novel theories; not by disputes or insubordination; not by violence; not by tumult; but by cultivating ourselves, and communicating to all

within our sphere of influence that moderation which bears the stamp of power, that integrity which is too noble to suspect evil in another, that serenity which is calm though others become troubled, that patriotism which is ever constant and ever hopeful—which watches patiently, yet confidently, through the darkness and the gloom—well knowing that, after the long night, there will come an inevitable day. (He resumed his seat amid loud cheers.)

The Honourable Judge Harrison moved a vote of thanks to the auditor, and the Rev. H. H. Dickenson, D.D., who had himself been eighth auditor of the (revived) Historical Society, seconded the motion. Sir Dominic Corrigan, Bart., moved that the address be printed at the expense of the society, and this was seconded by the Hon. D. R. Plunkett. In the course of his remarks the following interesting details of previous members of the society were given:—There sits upon this platform this night one whom I had the honour to meet as a fellow member of the Historical Society, and that is William H. Leckie, who has written a book which the *Edinburgh Review* has spoken of as “the greatest philosophical work since the days of Edmund Burke” (cheers). That is something to be proud of (cheers). I go a few years further back, and whom have we? The Bishop of Peterborough (cheers)—a man who has reversed the order of English ascendancy, and planted an Irishman in one of the greatest bishoprics in England (cheers). He has done that by his genius and eloquence, and educated where? In the Irish University—in the Irish College Historical Society (great cheering). Is not that something to be proud of? (Cheers.) Going one step further back, whom have we? Of you, Mr. President, I dare not speak as I could wish. We have

one who I regret is not here to-night—Chief Justice Whiteside (cheers)—one of the greatest of our Irish orators. I will tell you why. I am old enough to recollect that after that glorious burst of eloquence in the Yelverton trial, the English House of Commons rose uncovered to receive him when he returned to their walls. Never before in these countries was such an honour accorded to a public man. Is not that a man to be proud of? Then we have our present Solicitor-General, and a host of others. Go further back, and you get into troubled times. There has been an allusion made to-night to history. I am for all history. I am not afraid of any page of history (applause). There was a time in the society when some men went forth—the Tones and the Emmetts—misguided in their aims, wrong in their plans, injurious in their effects upon the country that they loved; yet we must give them their honest due, for though they were wrong and did wrong, and inflicted injury, yet their purpose was high and their hearts were true, and their story was heroic and immortal (cheers). They failed in their efforts, and I am glad they did fail; but it was not for the want of courage on their part, for they were the “forlorn hope” of Irish patriots (cheers). Though you disagree with these men, was there not something in them to be proud of? (cheers). Go further back, and a name arises—that of Henry Grattan—never mentioned in an Irish audience without eliciting a cheer (cheers). Other names, too, some of whom it is not for me to mention (cheers), but, that I may not spin out the story too long, I point to the founder and the head of our society—the greatest name for English statesmanship and for Irish oratory—the immortal name of Edmund Burke (great cheering). Thus, fellow-members, I trace back

our society from Mr. Leckie to the man with whom that great reviewer compared him—Edmund Burke—and I ask is not your society one of which you may well be proud? (cheers). The Auditor in the most magnificent passage in his glorious essay symbolized the University as being the temple and cathedral under whose cupola were joined all the various ingredients of the learning of the University. There were the friendly intimacies formed—there were the honours won—there were the different classes, and parties, and religious creeds taken together—there were, too, the graves with their votive tablets—there were all these things to raise your enthusiasm, and to make you proud of your University (cheers). But remember this, that even above that pleasure and that advantage, and even above the glory and the patriotism, and the ambition to be a true and a great patriot, and a true and a great Irishman, there arises the higher and godlier ambition to pass from this cathedral, which is but the portico or entrance into that other wondrous temple that lies within—the grand Pantheon of the intellects of all times. There, too, are walls hewn out by the Titan intellects of the past—there, too, are domes that have been spread and studded with the starry thoughts of glorious minds; the whole of its vast area is filled with the agglome-

rated thought of all time. But there are no graves. No; for the intellect is immortal—it never dies (loud cheers). Then, oh! my fellow-members of the College Historical Society, and oh! young men, who stand around me here to-night in the fulness of your physical strength and the glory of your intellectual energies and enthusiasm, make the most of it while you have it. You know not what grand and glorious work lies before you if you will but do it. There never was a time in the history of this country when those efforts on your part were more required. Young men must do some of the work now-a-days. Old Carlyle says, with touching pathos:—“Old men are as they are, and cannot alter.” It is in you, young men, the hope of England and Ireland lies. Will you disappoint that hope, or will you rather be worthy of your ancestry—of your past—of your present possibilities—of your future prospects? (Cheers.) Be not cast down; be not discouraged; go forth with determination to win—to climb the lofty mountain which now may seem snow-capped and impassable, but which will not be so as you approach it. Go forth, therefore, boldly to the fight—never lose your hope; and let it be, as has been described, the hope of every young man—

“That brave wave-wrestler, Hope, for ever battling on.”

Literary Notes.

J. P. COLLIER has ready Part III. of “The Rock of Regard by Whetstone.”

“A Book of Studies,” by W. H. Dixon, a collection of papers from the *Athenæum*, &c., is in the press.

To the third edition of Professor A. Bain’s “The Senses and the Intellect,” George Grote, the historian of Greece and the expositor of Plato, has supplied an appendix on “The Psychology of Aristotle.”

H. W. Longfellow has in the press "New England Tragedies," the issue of which he is now superintending.

A Holbein Society, for the publication of photo-lithographic reprints of old illustrated works, has been projected.

"Shakspere and the Emblem Writers," by the Rev. Henry Green, M.A., is in the press.

A new poem, by Robert Browning, is to be issued in four monthly vols., and it will then, we presume, appear as Vol. VII. of his collected works.

A new poem, by Tennyson, is spoken of as likely to appear about Christmas.

J. McKie, who issued a fac-simile of the Kilmarrack edition of Burns' "Poems," proposed to complete the undertaking by issuing the poems in the Edinburgh edition, and those which have been published posthumously.

J. C. Hatton is preparing Mary Lamb's (Elia's sister) "Poems and Letters."

Victor Hugo's "By Order of the King" is to appear in English in *Once a Week*.

The writings of the La Fontaine of Russia, I. A. Krulof, 1768—1844, are to appear in a translation with notes, memoir, and woodcuts, under the editorship of W. R. S. Ralston, one of the writers in the monthly *Fortnightly Review*.

While reprints of Chaucer are to be provided for by the society bearing the charmed name of our early poet, "Chaucer Modernized," which had been attempted by Dryden, and, again, Wordsworth, Leigh Hunt, &c., is to be re-attempted by Mr. F. Clarke, of Taunton.

It is said that a volume of the "Memoirs of M. Berreyer," the celebrated French advocate and orator, is ready for publication, edited by M. Paul Andral.

R. W. Jameson, critic, journalist, &c., author of "Nimrod," a poem, "Timoleon," a tragedy, &c., died 10th December, aged sixty-nine.

Sir Henry Bulwer is engaged in writing a "Biography of Lord Palmerston."

Charles Bray has issued a tract on "The Science of Man."

Pierre F. A. Carmouche, born at Lyons, 1797, successively painter, goldsmith, clerk, actor, dramatist, and possessor of the best library of the drama in France, died 12th of December.

S. Manning is the editor of the issue of "Cowper's Table-talk," and other poems, recently published by the Religious Tract Society.

Dr. F. W. Krummacher, author of "Elijah the Tishbite," "David, King of Israel," &c., died 10th of December.

"Her Majesty's Tower" is to have its history written by W. H. Dixon.

Wm. Carleton, born 1798, author of "Traits and Stories of the Irish Peasantry," &c., died 23rd December.

The object with which the Cobden Club was founded, in 1866, was the encouragement of the growth and diffusion of those commercial and political principles with which Mr. Cobden's name is inseparably connected. A gold medal is to be given by the club annually for the best essay on a specified subject; and this year the essay will be "On the best way of developing improved political and commercial relations between Great Britain and the United States of America." The medal bears an admirable profile, in fine, bold relief, of Richard Cobden, with the years of his birth and death, 1804 and 1865; and on the reverse is the name of the club, with the date of its foundation, in a wreath of corn, encircled by the words, "Free Trade, Peace, Good-will among Nations."

Modern Metaphysicians.

REV. JOHN GIBSON MACVICAR, A.M., D.D.,

Author of "An Inquiry into Human Nature ;"

"A Sketch of a Philosophy ;" "The Economy of Nature," &c.

PHILOSOPHY differs from science in being *reasoned*. A system of truth, an exact counterpart, in thought of nature, and reality as they exist, might constitute science—were man's observation only a mirror of facts as they are in themselves, and did phenomena reveal in the very act of presentation, at once their appearance, causes, sequences, and consequences. Though it has been said that "*all we know* of objects is the sensation which they give us, and the order of the occurrence of these sensations ;" yet it cannot be affirmed that this is all we *think* of in connection with them. Science aims at the interpretation of the appearances which sense presents ; and philosophy endeavours to represent as a single whole in thought such an explanation of the phenomena of the universe as shall bring insight into the soul. Even if the universe is only a huge kaleidoscope of fair-seeming forms, changed and interchanged by unknowable forces, there must be more in the system of nature than the appearances can give out. Amid the complications of things there must be implications of thought : were they only those of the thoughts with which we strive to comprehend the realities of things, and had we nought else to explain in physics, we should still have this to interpret of physics—the reasoned system by which sense is translated into science,—that is, metaphysics ; and to this we might also add the reason of the being by whom any explanatory system is constructed. Is it not a fact, then, that the farther we proceed in investigation the more need have we of some science, not only of investigation, but of the investigator ? for self-hood continually separates itself from the things of sense.

Science continually transcends sense. Reason and understanding cannot restrain themselves within the experienced and the palpable ; they thirst to know and yearn to comprehend. A knowledge of what is has never yet satisfied the human spirit. *Why is it so ?* has ever been man's question of questions. Much indeed lies within the limits of creation and the circle of the visible ; but is there not also beyond these the invisible, eternal, creative prime Mover of the universe, and He by whose will nature subsists ? In the wonderful issues and tissues of reality, in the varying tendencies and workings of the living powers in and around man, is there

nought else than chance and change—transition from unintelligibility to intelligence—begetting and forgetting? If so, how comes it that each new discovery only opens up a new and deeper inquiry, and leads us only to the entrance of a fresh labyrinth of research? and whence arises the joy excited in the soul, as the multiplex pathways of investigation are explored, to find that the mystery of things increases rather than lessens? Is it not that there are in the soul longings after the infinite, and aspirations towards the true, which sense cannot satisfy, and science alone can gratify, but dare not offer to appease? Philosophy seeks that truth which can bring into harmonious co-activity, soul, sense, and science—reason, revelation, and religion; and such an effort of speculative thought and reasonable reflectiveness we are now about to introduce to the notice of our readers: but let us first say a few words regarding the personal life of its author.

John Gibson MacVicar, the second son of Patrick MacVicar, D.D., minister of St. Paul's Parish, Dundee, a living in the gift of the Town Council of that Tay-washed Forfarshire seaport, was born in the seventh year of his father's incumbency, March, 1801; so that, according to an idea which pleases the imagination and is very old, which attributes great possibilities of celebrity to those whose birth dates from an eminent epoch, he has a good chance of becoming widely famous, and may not only literally but really be regarded as "one of the foremost men of the nineteenth century." Dundee, though principally known as a chief seat of the linen manufacture, for its shipbuilding, machinery, and carpets, is not without its warlike, historic, and literary memories. Sir William Wallace, the national hero of Scotland, was educated there, and there commenced his redoubtable career as a patriot; the Earl of Mar, who led the rebellion of 1715, was a native of Dundee; and Admiral Duncan, victor of Camperdown, was born in what is now the Blue Bell Inn. Hector Boece, the Scottish historian, who "knew not to lie," is a Dundee celebrity, and it has been affirmed that Greek was first taught as a school-study in this old Angus burgh.

The son of the minister of St. Paul's was educated at home during his early days, but after having been for some time under the care of the Rev. William Craik (father of the late G. L. Craik, of Belfast, and Henry Craik, of Bristol), schoolmaster of Kennoway, in Fifeshire, a man of great tact and teaching power; he was carried farther on in his curriculum at the grammar school of his native town, then a separate institution. Here he advanced with commendable industry in the branches of knowledge required to fit him for attending the University of St. Andrew's, which he entered as a student in the winter of 1814. Few of the professors of Scotland's oldest university at that period have become known to fame. From this remark we must except Dr. John Hunter, Professor of Humanity, whose editions of Horace, Virgil, and Juvenal brought him a reputation as a Latin scholar, second only to that of Heyne; Dr. Haldane, Professor of Mathematics, and Dr. Thomas

Jackson, Professor of Natural Philosophy. In the mathematical class the young student gained a prize, and in the Natural Philosophy class he won a medal, and many compliments from his professor, whose admirable method of treating mechanical questions by algebraic methods had awakened in his pupil a sense of the power of symbols in the working out of severe processes of thought, and whose enthusiastic devotion to scientific pursuits kindled and inspired all who came in contact with him.

Having finished an Arts course of four years at St. Andrew's, during which, according to the testimony of the Very Rev. Robert Haldane, Principal of St. Mary's College, "he greatly distinguished himself by his eminent talents, the marked propriety of his conduct, and the most ardent and successful application," J. G. MacVicar determined on completing that portion of the curriculum of study incumbent on an aspirant to a benefice in Scotland which related to theology, in the metropolitan, *i. e.*, the Edinburgh University. As matters of professional study he attended the classes of Andrew Brown on Rhetoric, William Ritchie in Divinity, Alexander Brunton in Hebrew, and Hugh Meiklejohn on Church History,—names these which have become the merest shadows of human memories as teachers, and have gone into the dim inane as good influences,—for they wanted the power of touching the soul to enthusiasm and of fructifying the germs of originality in young souls. "The hungry young," as Carlyle affirms, "looked up to their spiritual nurses, and for food were bidden eat the east wind." To this theological "dead letter" it does not seem that our Dundee student gave much of his mind, or did anything else in these classes than what was absolutely required to secure the several passports which were demandable by the presbytery previously to the attainment of a licence to preach. But it was all otherwise in other classes which he here attended voluntarily. In the chemistry class of Thomas Charles Hope, in the anatomical class of Dr. Alexander Munro, *tertius*, and in the extra academical class on physiology, taught by the noted Dr. Knox, to whom we, in a great measure, owe the Anatomy Act, he was an enthusiastic student; but in the class of natural history, taught by Dr. Robert Jameson, he found himself beside a living fountain where capabilities were educated and ideas were given, and some attention was paid to the aim of nature. To this distinguished naturalist Scotland is indebted for its famous "school" of natural history; for his rare energy, acuteness, and loving devotion to the interpretation of phenomena inspired his students to follow in his footsteps. Of him we possess in M.S. this testimony by one of his spirit-stirred students:—

"Professor Jameson was a true lover of the subject which he taught, and also of the Scottish minister. He used to say that he thought there was no profession to which this pursuit was more congenial than that of a clergyman, and that there were none who might do more to advance that science than the clergy; and as he knew that students in theology are often

scarce of money, these opinions he generously followed up by placing at the disposal of the professor of theology as many tickets to his class as the area of his class-room would allow when his paying students had been accommodated."

The fruit of his studies in natural history under Professor Jameson appeared first in "The Transactions of the Philosophical Society of Edinburgh," vol. x., in a paper "On the Germination of Ferns," in which he showed that their first fronds are confervoid, thus anticipating a discovery which brought honour to the name of C. G. Nees von Esenbeck, a famous German botanist; and in an article published in the first volume of the *Edinburgh Philosophical Journal*, commenced in 1819 by Professor Jameson and the late Sir David Brewster, describing "a double-stroke completely exhausting air-pump,"—somewhat like that which has been lately exhibited in Paris as Bianchi's air-pump. But more practical results may justly be mentioned here. Dr. Birbeck's assembly of mechanics for instruction in science had attracted attention, and had set the minds of reflective men in motion to encourage the development of thought among the masses. John Gibson MacVicar had already endeared himself to the mechanics of his native town, as we learn from a MS. reminiscence of those days, furnished to us by one who knows the facts, which affirms,—

"He had been a miracle to the Dundee mechanics ever since he was a boy of twelve. As soon as school hours were over he was always in some workshop or other, constructing some kind of philosophical instrument or other. Now in these the like-minded artisans were always more ready to assist him than their employers approved. And after a time the machine-makers' shops on all hands were giving secret birth to a wonderful number of camera obscuras, electrical machines, microscopes, and reflecting telescopes, which the apt mechanics made for themselves after the pattern which their philosophic hero had made, who was familiarly and lovingly known by them all as *Johnnie MacVicar*."

When, therefore, the popular education of workmen became the order of the day the mechanics were prepared to listen, as to an old and well-tryed friend, to the young lecturer, with his metropolitan reputation fresh upon him, who volunteered to instruct them in the marvels of chemistry, and the arts of self-help in the pursuit of knowledge.

This stir in favour of scientific culture led to the formation of the Watt Institute in Dundee in 1824, of which J. G. MacVicar was one of the early promoters, and one also of the first and most favourite lecturers on chemistry and natural history.

The acceptance which his endeavours in the cause of popular culture met, among his townsmen, during the ten years which elapsed from the opening of the Watt Institution in his native town to the period of his departure from home for a round of travel and study abroad, is borne amiable witness to by the fact

that the officials of that institution, headed by James Brown, Esq., the first president, and 186 members, voluntarily presented the young unbeneficed clergyman with an address, in which they thank him for his "valuable services," and assure him that they have "derived much pleasure and instruction from the numerous and varied lectures" he had delivered to them.

He was now, however, a probationer of the church, and as a licentiate of the presbytery of Dundee had the opportunity of exercising his gifts as a sacred orator in the various pulpits of the surrounding districts, as well as in any parish where there was a vacancy. He had no great anxiety, however, we believe, for securing a "cure," but took his place in the pulpit more in affectionate compliance with his father's wish than from any felt call to the holy office of the ministry; nor did the necessities of life peculiarly press upon him for decision in the matter of a "living." His father was, of course, anxious to see him settled, but at this time party was powerful in the church, and John Gibson MacVicar coveted independence of thought; hence, from his not being a Tory in politics, and a moderate in ecclesiasticism, promotion was withheld from him. In truth, a consciousness of powers better adapted to the discovery of the truths of nature and of science than to the elaboration of the then prevalent commonplaces of dogmatic theology and humdrum homiletics restrained him from pressing within the fold of the clerical profession, and induced him to hold aloof from the likelihood of "getting a call."

We get a glimpse of him at this time and in this aspect from the late Principal Haldane's pen.—"Mr. MacVicar," he says, "has often preached for me to a very large and delighted auditory. His discourses from the pulpit are characterized by great beauty and simplicity of composition, clear and forcible reasoning; and while they contain sound expositions of scriptural doctrine, they are always practical in their tendency, and are calculated to please and edify hearers of all descriptions."

His known ability, his popular talents, his enthusiasm, and his power of impressing others with a zeal fired by his own energy of inquiry, attracted attention, and by and by the celebrated Dr. Thomas Chalmers, then Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of St. Andrew's, proposed and procured the adoption of a motion for instituting in that university a lectureship in natural history. To the office thus inaugurated John Gibson MacVicar, M.A., was appointed in 1827; and here, for several years, he delivered a course of interesting and popular prelections on physical geography,—including hydrography and meteorology, geology, mineralogy, comparative anatomy, physiology, zoology, &c. Here, too, he commenced the formation of a museum of natural history, antiquities, &c., in the United College, which was the nucleus of the respectable collection now existing, and for which a special building has since been provided. During the intervals of leisure afforded by this lectureship, Mr. MacVicar visited Northern Germany and

Denmark. In Copenhagen he formed an intimacy with Hans C. Oersted, the gifted Danish physicist to whom electro-magnetism owes its origin, who was then full of those noble views which made him such an honoured pioneer of scientific progress. This genial investigator detailed his discoveries as well as described and exhibited his apparatus to the young St. Andrew's lecturer, who luminously re-explained to the students under him the ideas of the great master.

In the Danish capital, at this time also, he saw much of J. F. Schouw, Professor of Botany in the University of Copenhagen, the greatest European authority on the geography of plants; Jacobson, the physiologist; Rask, the celebrated linguist; Thor- kelin, the Scandinavian antiquarian, &c.

Of the manner in which Mr. MacVicar acquitted himself as lecturer in natural philosophy in the United College of St. Andrew's we have the best possible evidence in the references made in the Report of the Royal Commission (1830) on the Scottish universities, in regard to the labours and success of the lecturer, which elicited this unmistakable mark of approbation, that they recommended the endowment by the Crown, as one of the chairs of the university, of the class which he taught, so useful did it seem, so ably was it managed, and so worthy was its incumbent considered.

From a recent notice of the late John Goodsir, the celebrated anatomist, we gain the following testimony to the influential nature of the prelections delivered by the young lecturer:—

"St. Andrew's did much for Goodsir, though not altogether academically; he did more for himself than the university did, or perhaps could. The chief St. Andrew's influence was, that there for the first time he listened to a course of true scientific expositions of nature. There was no formative element in John Goodsir's career more influential than this; and, looking at his future studies, we cannot estimate it too highly. Remarkable as it may appear to those cognizant of the terribly repulsive, dry, sapless natural history and biology current forty years ago in England, there was one man at least who had arrived at a clear conception of the unity of nature; who taught that beasts, fishes, and fowls of the air, the trees and the hyssop on the wall, were something more than mere objects of admiration, decorative adjuncts of a higher sort than domestic architecture permits, not entirely provided for man's sole material benefit. . . .

Dr. MacVicar then lectured, apparently, to a class of volunteers, and among them was John Goodsir. It is pleasant to think that the teacher still survives, honoured, respected, and beloved in all his relations, as citizen, clergyman, and thinker." *

In 1828 Mr. MacVicar undertook, at the invitation of the prince of Scottish bibliopoles, William Blackwood, to set agoing and to edit the *Quarterly Journal of Agriculture*, a magazine which that eminent publisher, in concurrence with the directors of the Highland and Agricultural Society of Scotland, intended to issue in

* *Edinburgh Evening Courant*, January 9th, 1869.

connection with the transactions, prize essays, &c., of that association. His editorial contributions to this journal we have reason to believe were perused with interest and much admired, and at this period it almost seemed that science and literature would carry him off from the profession for which he had been educated.

For a long time he had been falling away from the received philosophy of chemistry, and was becoming a sort of heretic in science. He regarded the prevalent theory of chemistry rather as a reaction against the antecedent reveries of alchemy than as a correct reproduction in thought of the course of nature. His views on molecular philosophy were given to the world in the spring of 1830 in a large 8vo. volume, having for its title "The Elements of the Economy of Nature; or, the Principles of Physics, Chemistry, and Physiology," which bore a graceful and affectionate dedication to the father of the author, between whom and his son there existed the most charming bonds of intellectual sympathy. This work, though hastily written, and somewhat indigested, contained matter of considerable philosophical importance, but—though it was not quite so unsuccessful on its appearance as that book which has since revolutionized psychology, David Hume's "Treatise on Human Nature," a work which "fell dead born from the press"—it did not acquire the reputation it deserved. It does not appear that many were purchased, and copies are now scarcely to be had. A smaller work issued a short time subsequently, entitled "Inquiries concerning the Medium of Light," met an almost similar fate, and is now equally rare. All, however, that is cogent and valuable in these early products of the thoughts of his seminal mind is preserved and bettered in the author's subsequent works.

The just expectations which he had been led to form, that his lectureship would, in a short time, be transmuted into a professorship, having been disappointed, partly, at least, we believe, through the jealousy against rivals, who soared to higher heights of speculation than himself, entertained by the late Sir David Brewster, who was a sort of distributory agent of scientific patronage in Scotland at that time, the Rev. John G. MacVicar relinquished that position, and proceeded to travel on the Continent for personal improvement, study, and research. During the winters of 1834 and 1835 he resided at Paris, and having a thorough conversational mastery of the French language, he not only received the full advantage of the intellectual activity of Parisian society, but gained besides, the benefit of studying under H. M. de Blainville, the successor of Cuvier, and the friend of A. Comte, whose reputation as a zoologist stands high throughout Europe; Geoffrey St. Hilaire, founder of the Zoological Acclimatisation Society, a notable investigator of living structures, and an able theorizer on tissues and their functions; and Jean B. Dumas, then the newly appointed Professor of Organic Chemistry, who, by his eloquence and profound views, was entrancing the most brilliant audiences Paris could bring together. The intervening summer he spent in Italy, with

the intention of comparing certain views on æsthetics with the masterpieces of ancient and modern art. He was received into the best circles, and in Rome had the pleasure of being admitted as one of the *cognoscenti* into the studio of the Phidias of our century, Thorwaldsen. The results of his investigations into the special qualities of the finest paintings, the most superb architecture, the grandest sculptures, and the most remarkable scenery in Italy, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, and France, convinced him that his ideas on æsthetics were sound and scientific; and he issued in London, in 1837, a volume "On the Beautiful, the Picturesque, and the Sublime." This work was highly popular, its eloquence and philosophy were much admired, and the entire impression of it was speedily sold off.

Dr. Chalmers admired "the profoundness and ingenuity" of this work, and withal "the exquisite beauty, as well as original power and expressiveness of the whole composition." He declares that its author "has regaled the taste in the act of analyzing it, and invested the subject with those charms of descriptive eloquence and illustration which will make it interesting even to the more general reader;" and the work commended itself to him as seeming "to stand in a midway position between the more plain and popular treatises on the subject by the writers of our own island, and the transcendentalism of the Continent." This work the author subsequently regarded as one which only half developed his views on the subject, and he has since supplemented the theory by the publication of a work on "The Philosophy of the Beautiful," which, while more concise and cogent, is less fluent and oratorical, and therefore less calculated to be popular; has commanded the admiration of the most capable critics as an exposition of "sound and ingenious views," expressed in language correct, elegant, and powerful, obviously the products of a mind originally acute and vigorous, which has been cultivated and improved by extensive learning and careful reflection. The theory in these two works is so closely connected, that, though a little out of chronological order, it will be most advantageous to the reader to consider them as one, and we present at once the following outline of this instructive and suggestive issue of the author's mind:—

"'The Beautiful,' objectively considered, is one and the same thing with cosmical law fulfilled; and consequently to an adequate intelligence—to the creative mind, and possibly to other minds of orders higher than man—the whole creation is beautiful. But by man those objects only are adjudged to be beautiful and awake the corresponding emotions, which are so simple, compared with the whole of nature, that the cosmical laws concurring and triumphing in them, and determining their lineaments, are so few, that the mind of the spectator when beholding them (being itself the subject of the same cosmical laws) tends also to run spontaneously over these lineaments, without hindrance or embarrassment, or to rest itself in a state of repose while surveying their external features. Hence the mind experiences enjoyment while it gazes on them, and forms a judgment that

they are somehow (though it knows not how) in harmony with nature, truth, and goodness. This theory our author verifies with much detail in the illustrations of his earlier work, which render it, for this purpose, as serviceable as his later one. Thus in the former he shows inductively, that such beauty as is expressive or animated depended on the contour or lines of the object, and that such beauty as was merely static and kaleidoscopic depended on the areas of the objects. And these lines he determined to be the elliptical and others related to the ellipse, especially those which result when two portions of two ellipses of different curvature are united continuously and symmetrically, so as to give a waving flexure, of which Hogarth's line of beauty is an example. The areas also which give kaleidoscopic beauty he determined to be the lozenge, and its quarter, which is the beautiful triangle of the "Timæus" of Plato, and especially the trapezium of the same work of the Greek philosopher, which consists of two of the same so-called beautiful triangles, united by their longest sides, as an axis of the form.

"But all these empirical findings of the first work are placed on a rational basis in the second. There it is shown, as regards beautiful lines, that they are manifestations of the conic sections, that is, of those lines which it is well known that the laws of motion, when embodied in a dynamic system (in other words, the cosmical laws), ever tend to develop; and as regards beautiful areas, that they are manifestations of the triangle of forces when doubled (the lozenge) and halved (Plato's beautiful triangle); that is, that they are the simplest combination of equal and similar forces which can be regarded as statical in a mechanical system such as that of material nature. Thus our author has completed his theory, and shown that, in his second work, to be simply rational, which in the first seemed very mysterious."

During the summer of 1837, the Rev. J. G. MacVicar made a tour through Canada and the United States. Though the former was at that time in rebellion against the government of the late Sir Francis Bond Head, who subsequently defended himself in a "Narrative" of the political state of the Canadas, and of his own proceedings while there; and the latter, under its eighth President, Martin Van Buren, was passing through a great financial crisis, he saw much of the inner life, not only of that colony, but of the great Western Republic, and had in some measure, by suggestion, a share in the setting to its proper uses in the interests of science, of the immense fund—100,000 dollars—left by James Smithson, of London, to found an institution in America "for the increase and diffusion of knowledge among men."

Having returned to his own country with a mind ripened by study, experience, travel, and observation, and with a reputation made, alike in the walks of science and philosophy, at home and abroad, he had a right to expect that his position would be acknowledged, and that a high academical position would be at once accorded to him. But, unhappily, the war of ecclesiastical partisanship was muttering its commencement, and all posts of influence, importance, or emolument, were struggled for in the interests of the sectarianisms of a church divided against itself, and he could

take no pleasure in that passionate fight for seeming trivialities, by which the whole country was stirred and embittered.

All hope of the dispassionate life of devotion to science being well-nigh taken away from him by the distracted state of things, political and ecclesiastical, Mr. MacVicar, we suppose, found it prudent, and doubtless proper, to revert to his profession, and we know that about 1838-9 he acted as assistant (or curate) to Dr. R. S. Candlish in the pastorate of St. George's parish, Edinburgh, and with his characteristic moderation laboured to promote practical evangelical religion in the midst of the hot and furious religious radicalism and fanaticism, and the equally fiery and fierce Erastianism, which threatened to overwhelm by their agitations the natural Christianity of the northern kingdom. With this design he prepared and published anonymously a treatise on "The Catholic Spirit of True Religion," which was intended to "throw oil on the troubled waters" of church controversy, and to show that "not an outward uniformity over all (as the Church of Rome contends for), but a unity of spirit in variety of forms (as in the churches of the Reformation), is a constitution of the Catholic Church, answerable to the light of reason, of sacred history, and of Scripture; that in keeping with this state of things, religious men of every evangelical denomination are called upon, as disciples of Jesus, to entertain towards each other, and the communion they severally belong to, feelings of mutual recognition and esteem; and thus to seek to arrive at truth and ultimate unity over all through the medium of brother-love," without any sacrifice or compromise of their distinctive religious tenets. This work has not been without its effect on the subsequent religious life of Britain, and on the progress of inquiry into the principles of Christian unity. The ideas announced in it have become historical now, as forming the basis and foundation of the *Evangelical Alliance*, for the promotion of Christian union, fellowship, and brotherly co-operation in the interests of scriptural faith and Protestant toleration. But while this work was passing through the press, a change came over the prospects of its author's life. The Secretary of State for the Colonial Department—Lord John (now Earl) Russell—was desirous of establishing a branch of the Church of Scotland in Ceylon, the colonists of which, under the occupation of the Dutch, had been exclusively Presbyterians in their forms of worship, and still retained a preference for churches of that sort. On requiring the heads of the Scottish Church to recommend a suitable person to accept such an important charge, their choice fell unanimously on John G. MacVicar. He, on receiving the nomination, and after taking the best advice he could get from his friends in the ministry, resolved to accept the charge thus offered to him, and he was solemnly ordained to the pastorate of the Scottish Church in Ceylon, by the Presbytery of Edinburgh, in 1839. Thus he left the fields of ecclesiastical strife, and bequeathed as his departing legacy to the distracted church and country, his farewell

witness against the state of things in which they were involved, the able work of which we have made mention above.

On 2nd January, 1840, he married Miss Jessie R. MacDonald, of Kinloch-Moidart, granddaughter of Dr. Robertson, historian of Scotland and America, and biographer of Charles V.; and, passing through France and Italy, and thence to Egypt, went to his new home in "the utmost Indian isle Taprobane." While here we have the testimony of the late Sir James Stephen, Professor of History in the University of Cambridge, but previously Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, that "he zealously engaged in his pastoral duties, was earnestly devoted to the advancement of education among the native races, and employed his leisure in the assiduous pursuit of the sciences, moral and physical, to which he had always been attached." Sir James Emerson Tennant, author of "Ceylon, Physical, Historical, and Topographical," who acted as secretary to the Government of Ceylon, states that he "held the highest office in connection with the education of the colony, and fulfilled the duties of it most satisfactorily, displaying administrative talents of extraordinary value, and that he gave an impulse to the intellectual development of the island by the voluntary duties he undertook, involving scholarship and attainments of a very high order, in conjunction with the scientific societies of Ceylon." For many years, besides attending to the duties of his pastorate, and all the interests involved in it, and exercising a watchful inspectorate over education, he was in the habit of expounding all the newest and highest views of science—the issue of his own thoughts, or his extensive reading combined,—which attracted attention in the best intellectual circles.

These lectures, delivered in the Hall of the Legislative Council, Colombo, a competent witness who has since filled the chair of Logic in the Hindoo College, Calcutta, Dr. W. Knighton says—"impressed the auditors not less by the profundity of the learning they displayed than by the ease with which the lecturer rendered the most abstruse subjects clear and comprehensible to ordinary minds." He was besides a contributor to the *Calcutta Review*, the *Transactions of the Asiatic Society*, the *Edinburgh New Philosophical Journal*, as well as the *Transactions* of the Royal, the Wernerian, and the Botanical Societies of Edinburgh on subjects of specific interest to the several readers of these serials; and he took the valuable initiatory steps by which an "Association for the Encouragement of Cottage Husbandry" was established in Ceylon.

In that island the heat during a great part of the day all the year round forbids any kind of exercise—except that of thinking; and the leisure which was thus imposed by the insupportable heat of the climate, rendered most congenial to philosophic thought by the pleasant influence of the sea-breeze, the colonial chaplain of the Scotch Church seems to have devoted to profound speculations on mind and on the forms of thought, with the design, if possible, "to vindicate the spiritual nature, the liberty and the responsibility of

man, in a manner which might be scientific in form though popular in substance, and so find readers among those who—idolizing science all the while—were falling so fast into the contrary opinions—opinions which, whenever they have become popular, have proved no less fatal to the well-being of society than to that of individuals when held in private: "at least, so we gather from several allusions scattered through the work from the preface to which this sentence is quoted—viz., "An Inquiry into Human Nature"—"a resumption," as the compounded title indicates, "of Philosophical Speculation at the point where Hume's 'Treatise on Human Nature' and Reid's 'Inquiry into the Human Mind' started, and an attempt to bring into one the philosophy of Science and of Common Sense."

This work was published in 1853—the author having returned to Scotland on medical furlough in the autumn of 1852, and having found "no less need of works vindicating in a scientific way the grandeur of human nature than when he left, and for rescuing psychology from its threatened absorption into physiology"—"as a contribution slender indeed, but earnest, towards this end; and though with certain fears, yet not without a hope also, of being encouraged to follow it up by a more scientific and probably also a more extended treatise, in which the psychological views that are but hurriedly and incidentally indicated in this are fully expanded in scientific connection." This book gained instant recognition in the philosophical world for soundness of view, comprehensiveness of system, and precision of statement; as marked throughout by great acuteness of perception, and singular originality of thought, excellent in object and ingenious in illustration, and as likely to produce better fruits than the mere acquisition of popularity. "In the metaphysical field," even the *Westminster Review* affirmed, "we encounter a new name, which the world will hereafter recognise."

The approval which this work obtained excited the attention of the Church, and procured him the offer of several appointments to the pastoral office in his native country. Of these, though not offering the highest emolument, he accepted the presentation to the parish of Moffat, having been commended to the regard of the patron, John James Hope Johnstone, Esq., of Annandale, as being "not more eminent as a profound divine, an accomplished man of science, than as a minister of the highest character." To this parish, after due formalities, "Dr. MacVicar, late of Ceylon," was inducted in July, 1853, and in that pleasant locality, amid the southern Highlands of Scotland, he resides in rural yet learned retirement, as "guide, philosopher, and friend" to his people, warmly admired by the numerous visitors who, attracted by the amenity and salubrity of Moffat as a health resort, attend his ministrations, and belovedly recognised by many illustrious thinkers, who call upon him in his philosophical retreat.

Dr. MacVicar preaches for the most part extempore, in language choice, chaste, varied, and perspicuous; his sermons are generally logically developed, having a root of doctrine, a stem and spreading

branches of speculation or exposition, and a fruit of practical holiness as the test of the value of the doctrine, and a justification of its place in the divine scheme of Christianity. His expositions of Scripture go far below a mere assent to the dogmatic contents of the Confession of Faith; he gives his grounds in reason for consent to them. It cannot but be matter of regret to those who love a reasoned and reasonable theology, that he had not the opportunity from a chair of Christian Ethics of expounding his fine and refining views of human life under the discipline of true religious culture, for he would have thence inculcated a system of Christian doctrine of great power, purity, and pervasiveness, capable of showing that the true interests of human life are in perfect accordance with—nay, absolutely dependent upon—"the love of God in Christ Jesus."

In 1854, when the Principalship of the College of St. Mary, in the University of St. Andrew's, was vacant by the demise of Dr. Haldane, Dr. MacVicar was a candidate for the appointment, and presented very high testimonials to the Crown in his favour, unsuccessfully. Again, in May, 1856, on the death of Sir William Hamilton, he became a candidate for the chair of Logic and Metaphysics in Edinburgh; but the professorships in the metropolitan university have been of late conferred more from considerations of sect and party than of merit and approved endeavour, and his claim was disregarded by the electors. He has not since, so far as we are aware, made any effort to receive the recognition in academic circles to which he is entitled, but seems to be contented to do the work that lies before him, and to accept with philosophic equanimity the sphere of labour allotted to him. But ever and anon some bright effusion of his thoughts appears in the public prints of the time, or are given utterance to in some of the scientific associations of our age. His chemical views have been expounded in the British Association at Cambridge, at Glasgow, and at Dundee; he was an acceptable lecturer at the Edinburgh Philosophical Institution, where, in 1854, he prelected on the philosophy of the beautiful; at many of the popular institutions for the diffusion of knowledge he has lectured to interested audiences; and not a few of the scientific journals owe brilliant pages to his pen.

It may serve to show the width of the sweep of Dr. MacVicar's thoughts to quote the subjects of a few of his recent contributions, which happen to be known to us:—"On the Laws of Symmetry in Bodies," "On the Forces which determine the Crystalline State of Bodies," "A Speculation on the Molecules of Bodies," "The Theory of the Terminal Fructification of the Simple Plant, of Ovules, Pollen, and Spores," "On the Possibility of representing by Diagrams the Properties and Functions of the Molecules of Bodies," "On the General Principles of Vegetable Morphology," "The Philosophy of Arboriculture and Landscape Gardening." Of distinct works the following are known to the present writer—"Elements of the Economy of Nature," 1856 (a fragment), containing the "heads of

his methods and his principal results," and intended to advocate the adoption of a "right method of research," and to show that if "the accurate logic and vast synthetic power of positive geometry [were] substituted for the vague Pythagoreanism that prevails—which, while declining that name, would undoubtedly be disowned by the philosopher of Samos,"—some of the "most interesting of all possible problems in material nature" might be solved and set at rest. Of the speculations of the author on this subject the best judge then living, Professor Faraday, said, "They give aid for *advancing* to a right completion that which is at present imperfect to our understanding." "The First Lines of Science simplified, and the Structure of Molecules attempted," 1860, continues and extends the same speculations, and shows that "the groundwork of the economy of nature and man" are governed by similar cosmical laws. His most recent work—the work which contains, so far as it has yet been reached, the ultimate of the author's theory—the work which he posits as his contribution to the speculative thought of our age at once in science and philosophy, is entitled "A Sketch of a Philosophy,"—Part I., Mind; its Powers and Capacities, and its Relation to Matter. Part II., Matter and Molecular Morphology—the elemental Synthesis by diagrams—appeared in 1868, and is considered such by the present writer as to give the author a very high place among "Modern Metaphysicians." The title of the work is borrowed from *Une Esquisse d'une Philosophie*, published 1840—1846 by the once famous and always eccentric thinker, Abbé Félicité Robert Lamennais (1782—1854), but the philosophy itself is "native and endued" as regards expository psychology of "the constitutional instincts or inspirations of humanity, with which speculative minds may indeed dally for a generation, but which are ultimately inexorable," and as regards physics bringing forward views "as antithetic to existing hypotheses in chemistry as the Newtonian system was at its first publication to the Vortices of Descartes,"—an attempt, the boldness of which deserves higher recognition than serials in general dare venture to give.

Let us endeavour to supply some account of the views which this work contains.

Philosophy is "a cycle of thought, descriptive in an orderly way of what is held to be reality, in which everything that is cognizable has its own place, and which in everything that is introduced, while it stands in the last analysis on a solid basis, proves also to be harmonious with its concomitants and its consequents, or, in other words, is explained and justified by them."

The first part begins with Prolegomena (1) on the actual state of philosophy and science, which is regarded as in the last degree unsatisfactory; (2) on the method in science now popular, which is held to be inadequate to reach reality in any sphere; and (3) on consciousness as an organ of truth. And here the author's characteristic views declare themselves in strong colours. He claims to have discovered the cause of those logical contradictions in thought which Kant named "the antinomies of pure reason," and which are now invoked to such an extent to exclude from the

region of certainty those truths which in all ages, but the present, have been regarded as the proper themes of philosophy, viz., God, creation, liberty, morality, immortality. According to his view, these contradictory conclusions are not of equal authority, but that which gives limitation and negation is personal or private and of subordinate authority merely, while that which gives the simple affirmative, the Infinite, the Absolute, is cosmical and of permanent authority. Instead of being *antinomies* in pure reason he regards these contradictions as merely the *antilogies* of consciousness, the alternately passive and active state of the embodied mind.

To bring out this theory of consciousness he postulates nothing more than the existence of individualized realities, or elements of substance or power; for these two he regards not as really different, but the one the statical, the other the dynamical conception of the same thing. Moreover, these elements, while they are individualized, he also regards as essentially relational to one another, and thus not merely a multitude, but a multitude fitted for forming a *cosmos*. This, the relational element in every reality, he regards as a *self-to-other*, or a reciprocal self-manifesting power, as is attested by the fact that we cannot compass the conception of anything as existing, while at the same time that thing is completely non-manifesting or utterly undiscoverable by every intelligence whatsoever. Suppose, then, two elements of reality, differing in the amount of reality, substance, or potentiality of which each consists, and such that the weaker of the two is wholly absorbed, fixed, or stereotyped by the self-manifesting power of the more powerful of the two, while the stronger is fixed or stereotyped by the self-manifesting power of the weaker, only in part and as it were on the surface, its interior retaining its own proper potentiality; then the latter, being thus differentiated, must possess a twofold self-manifesting power. It must be self-manifesting to self, i. e., it must be conscious. Thus our author claims and secures liberty as the necessary condition of a fully developed consciousness. The pendant to this theory of consciousness is, that if the free perceptive potentiality, that is, if the personality of the mind could be altogether hushed during an observation, or could be brought into sustained unison with the impressions that are made upon the mind from without, then all those antilogies would vanish, and man would see things as they are. Here the author agrees with the philosophers of India, with Schelling and others. But his view of what may be called the genesis and structure of consciousness is, we apprehend, both new and important. If it be granted, then the reason for excluding from the domain of science (in consequence of the contradictions in which they involve thought) those great themes which have hitherto been regarded as the special themes of philosophy, God, the soul, liberty, morality, immortality, fails and falls to the ground.

But how are we to decide between the relative claims of matter and spirit? Are they the same in substance, except that matter is that which is wholly absorbed, fixed, and stereotyped from without; while spirit is that which along with an adequate impressibility or responsiveness to external impressions can also act from within, in its own right, and in virtue of its own proper potentiality? Perhaps this distinction comes very near the truth, and we think he would accept of this report of his philosophy if we were to say that he regards mind and matter as substantially the same indeed, but essentially different, that is, the same in the substance of which both consist, but wholly different in their characteristic attributes.

But to understand their interrelations it is necessary to go somewhat more into detail, and more especially to mark that point around which all this writer's ideas revolve as in a cycle. This is the doctrine that the universe of being, as actually existing in time, consists of two harmonious yet antithetic elements, the infinite and the finite, the absolute and the relative, the aboriginal and the produced,—more familiarly, the Creator and the creation, the latter being the work of God, the expression and embodiment in a true dynamism or effective reality of the divine idea or design that it should *be* as it *is* and should *work* as it *does*. These two, God and nature, he postulates as data of normal intuition, and the relations between them, which has been stated, results from his theory of the synthetico-analytic structure of consciousness. When this is held in synthesis merely, as tends to be the case in minds in which intellectuality is dominant, a Pantheistic view is taken. These two are confounded as one. When held in analysis merely, as tends to be the case in minds in whom individuality is dominant, they are regarded as two, with merely an incidental connection—a connection by miracle. But when held according to the synthetico-analytical or normal rhythm of consciousness, and the teaching of normal intuition in its fullness, they are both held as has been stated, that is, as Creator and creation, the middle terms or bond of union being providence in the Creator and plasticity in the creation.

And here he meets the question, why a creation at all? What motive can be conceived in a Mind in whom all fullness already dwells to award existence to that which, being necessarily finite, cannot but be comparatively imperfect? This difficulty is solved by considering the nature of a perfect mind when in a state of perfect well-being, that is, of perfect goodness and perfect happiness. Perfect goodness cannot but be moved to extend happiness, which is the condition of its own existence. But so long as only one, only God exists, only one can be happy, while by awarding existence to a creation an all but infinite number may be so. The Almighty One may therefore be expected to manifest himself as a Creator. And this the author verifies by showing that in all sentient creatures a state of well-being has been appointed to be a state of happiness, and that creation, so far as we can see, is teeming with sentient creatures wherever life is possible.

This theory of creation also determines to a certain extent the form of creation. Thus sensibility implies individuality; creation, therefore, cannot be one continuous mass or medium. It must consist of individualized elements, and of these, provided sensibility may attach to the least, we are to expect a maximum in point of number. Now it is certain that creation does consist, and that to a marvellous extent, of individualized elements. Nor let it be inferred that this partitionment has been carried so far as to destroy this argument for its existence, since neither the ethereal nor material elements are capable of sensibility or enjoyment. In fact, the theory of Creator and creation, while to a certain extent it gives the form of creation, gives also the creational or cosmical law, and that law demands such an extensive diffusion in space, and consequently such an extreme attenuation of reality, that, in the individualized elements that have been referred to, sensibility is no longer possible. But it also implies the confluence again and unification of these most attenuated elements into individualities of more substance and greater potentiality, to which sensibility will belong, and which shall attain to happiness as soon as they attain to the conditions of their well-being or enter cosmical order.

This cosmical law is implied in the conception that the creation is to be the manifestation and embodiment of the divine Mind when acting in this direction. It consequently implies that created reality, or the material of creation, shall be perfectly plastic under the divine Being and attributes, which are everywhere present, to mould it and to maintain it according to the mould. In a word, the material of creation must be an essentially assimilative substance. The individualized elements of which the creation consists must tend, so far as in them lies, to assimilate themselves in their being and properties (1) to the divine Being and attributes, and (2) to themselves and to each other.

And thus creation distributes itself into three orders of beings or things :

1. Those in which the quantity or intensity of substance or potentiality in the individual is so great that that individual is assimilated to the Creator in possessing a reserve of power of its own, even under the impressiveness of all that is external to itself, and is consequently in possession of consciousness, liberty, &c. We thus obtain spirit and the world of spirits.

2. Those in which the quantity or intensity of being or substance in the individual is such that its characteristic is to be assimilated to itself in successive moments of its existence, and every successive moment is stereotyped by the preceding moment, in so far as the individualized element is itself concerned, so that it tends to rest as it has been resting, and to drive as it has been driven, and, in a word, possesses a *vis inertia* merely, and exhibits no *vis voluntatis*. And thus we obtain matter and the material world.

3. Those in which the quantity or intensity of being or substance is so small that self-assimilative power, inertia, is on the eve of vanishing, and their characteristic is to assimilate themselves to other beings and things and to each other merely, and thus to transmit with another maximum velocity from one to another any assimilation effected in them by a being or thing of a higher order, and to submit to that assimilative action most completely, so as to represent that being or thing most truthfully. And thus we obtain ether and the ethereal medium or medium of light.

The Spirit World. The cosmical law of assimilation, or (which is the same) the steadfast will of God in action, gives, first of all, finite beings assimilated to the Creator as the Almighty, that is, beings possessed of power, which is necessarily finite in amount indeed, but which is fully individualized or free, this freedom, however, not consisting in mere madness, but in freedom of choice. This category is secured because the same law of assimilation in giving to the creature power and liberty, as representative of the Creator as the Almighty One, gives also, along with this dangerous gift, principles for the right guidance of liberty, which are representative of the Creator as the Supreme Intelligence, viz., religious and moral obligation and reason.

And when developing this part of his philosophy, which is philosophy *par excellence*, the author shows in detail that both these noble faculties, as also all the others which are commonly recognised, perception, the formation of ideas in the mind, retention of these ideas, memory, abstraction, classification, generalization, in a word, all the elemental capacities of the mind are phenomena of assimilation, now to the Creator, now to the creature, now to self alone ; while attention, judgment, taste, reasoning, imagining, discovering, &c., are manifestations of the same

law, in play with the individualized power or liberty of the individual. Thus the author's train of thought first leads him to look for the existence of a world of spirits, and that a hierarchy, composed of orders of spirits of varying dignity, so as may best fill up the interval between Him who is the Author of all, and those individualized beings and things which exist so far down the stream of being that the virtue of sensibility is quite gone out of them, and instead of the *vis voluntatis* there remains only the *vis inertia*.

In regard to man, considered as a member of the spirit world, he shows that along with religious and moral obligations and reason he has other principles of guidance to enable him rightly to acquit himself in his actual relations, viz., the assimilative action of his specific organization upon the spirit within, principles which are as determinate as that organization itself, and which are such as to suggest actions, placing and keeping man in harmony with his material environments, thus rendering possible to him the maintenance of the difficult mixed life which he is called upon to lead in this planet. Such, in a few words, is the new theory of spirit in general, and of human nature in particular, exclusive of a peculiar view as to the origin of the spiritual part of our being, which, in this philosophy, comes to be described only after the organization has been discussed. The law, the ground, is the existence of power and liberty in the individual. It is, therefore, antithetic to every form of pantheism, while yet the application to the free spirit of the law of universal assimilation invests it with all the scientific advantages of pantheism. In doing so, this cosmical law, which thus supplies principles of guidance to the free spirit, if it choose practically to accept and follow them, also constitutes the free spirit a moral agent, capable of merit and demerit, in the right sense of the words, and justly subjected to rewards and punishments. This is in perfect keeping with the catholic convictions of humanity, and altogether opposed to an opinion too prevalent among scientific men in the present day, viz., that man is merely a part of an always necessarily and fatally working Dynamism, which constitutes the universe of being,—the personal liberty which consciousness affirms being merely the embarrassment of ignorance, and the supposed responsibility attaching to it simply a delusion aroused by fear.

The Ethereal World. But guided by this all-embracing and alone available law of assimilation, we are to expect that while finite being shall be assimilated to the Creator as the Almighty, on the one hand, and thus give forth beings possessing power, in a word a spirit-world, we are also to expect that it shall tend to be assimilated to the Creator as inhabiting immensity and eternity on the other hand, and shall thus be diffused through all space, and therefore also, since it is finite, shall be attenuated, or become powerless to the utmost. Now this deduction leads to the conception of a medium, which shall possess the following characteristics. (1) Along with all its individualized properties its self-manifesting power must be on the eve of vanishing. When existing, or acting in harmony with the objects in it, therefore, it must be perfectly transparent to the greatest distances. (2) Its self-assimilative power must be a minimum, and thus it must be assimilable most completely to the objects which exist and act in it, and must therefore, image, or represent them most truthfully, and that to the greatest distances. (3) Motion must take place in it with the least possible resistance, while its continuity, as a medium (for it must

occupy all space to the utmost), must be a maximum. All motions in it therefore, will be propagated through it with a maximum velocity. (4) The self-conservative power of its elements must be very small. And therefore, since the unity of the Creator expressed in terms of the law of assimilation is a tendency in separate elements of being to unification, it is to be expected that these minimum elements of this universal medium shall tend to flow again into unities, each of which shall possess more reality, being, or substance, or which is the same, a greater potentiality than the individual æthereal elements.

Thus we have, as the opposite pole to the world of spirits, a state of being, whose position in nature and whose properties answers completely to the universal æther; and also a state of being, which, though wholly apathetic itself, is yet capable of being redeemed, and of becoming the mother of spirits, while meantime, and remaining as it is, it is capable in an eminent degree of being a home for spirits, and for opening up the universe to them through the beautiful and glorious symbolism of light and colour.

The Material World. But during the appointed confluence of the æthereal, or least elements of being into unities of higher orders, under the everywhere present unity of the great Creator, and the restoration to liberty of that which (as distributed in æther) has lost it, a very remarkable result must accrue, a result which appears as if it would forbid altogether the redemption of being and its restoration to life, if ever it had been called upon to represent the immensity of the Creator, that is, to assist in constituting the universal æther. For under the law of assimilation, all the æthereal elements must be identical considered as centres of force, and all spherical considered as forms. Suppose, then, that under the unifying operation of assimilation they are coming together, so as to form clusters or nebulous specks in the celestial spaces; the innermost layer or wall of all such clusters must, under the same law, consist of a definite number of æthereal elements and structures, which alone shall be statial. And this number and structure must be the same in all; moreover, it is to be expected that when the cluster has grown, so as to consist of a certain number of æthereal elements, its centripetal pressure will be such that this innermost layer of æthereal elements (each being in possession of but little self-conservative power) shall yield to the central pressure, and become confluent into a unity, thus giving to nature a new order of being. And this will occur in all the clusters forming in every region of the celestial spaces when the amount of pressure in each is the same, and therefore when the quantity in each is the same. Thus in the universal æther we have a new order of being, an element consisting of a unified nucleus or centre of force which is truly one, and which is much more powerful than the æthereal centre of force, while it is also invested by an æthereal atmosphere. Now of this new element, with which it thus seems as if all space will tend to be sown, all the æther granulated, what may we expect the properties to be? The æthereal element, that is, Reality in its most attenuated state, we supposed to be capable of manifesting the cosmical law of assimilation only by its capacity of submitting to be assimilated to other beings and things. We supposed that it was too weak to be capable of assimilating itself to itself also. Let us suppose now that this new element, which cannot be so weak as the æthereal element, possesses this power of self-assimilation, and let us see what it gives us. First, then, as to time: if it assimilate itself this moment to itself

as it existed last moment, it must either rest as it was resting or drive as it was being driven. Now this is as much as to say that it must possess the *vis inertiae* or inertia. Again as to space: given more than one such element, and then under the law of assimilation as to the space they occupy (or more generally under the law of unification) they must tend into one place, and being possessed of a *vis inertiae*, this they must do with pressure towards the place whither they are tending. Now this is as much as to say that they must gravitate. Again, each element being self-conservative in a higher degree than the æthereal elements, it may be inferred that when they, like the æthereal elements, unify into clusters also, and while their æthereal atmospheres are becoming more or less confluent so as to form one æthereal atmosphere for the cluster, the nuclei shall each conserve itself so that there shall be no confluence of nuclei, but only a *molecule*, its central parts consisting of the same order of being or kind of thing as its peripheral. Moreover such molecules will, under the same law of unification on the one hand, tend to form into masses, and under the law of assimilation (to what they were before) tend also on the other hand to expand into aëriforms similar to the æther. In a word, in this new order of elements we have what possesses the well-known properties of matter, the individual element being the true unit of weight.

This is the special field of inquiry in which Dr. MacVicar's fame is certain; on this topic he has expended the research and thought of the third of a century, and it would be interesting to trace the progress of his ideas from their somewhat crude form, as published in 1829, to their completely elaborated exposition in the present work. But the amount of detail, and the extent of explanatory matter which this would necessitate, precludes us from here and now entering upon this peculiarly scientific topic—a topic on which the best chemists assure us the author has pioneered the way to higher revelations than have added laurels to the brows of Black, Lavoisier, and Dalton. It may, however, be stated that the deductions made according to this theory prevent an almost perfect agreement in the number of material units of which its molecules consist with the atomic weights of the corresponding molecules as determined experimentally in the laboratory—so singularly does nature verify this molecular morphology, and so completely does the theory explain the otherwise unaccountable and capricious phenomena of chemistry.

The author, however, has not been contented with showing the genesis of all the more important chemical elements and their combinations in producing the precise chemicals of the laboratory; he has carried his synthesis into the organic world, and claims to have discovered the elements of tissue both in the vegetable and the animal kingdoms.

In arriving at the organic worlds, and specially the animal kingdom, we touch the goal of the new philosophy, the completion, that is, of the cycle of the various phases of finite being, from its diffusion and lapse through attenuation into an apathetic unconscious state, to its recovery of its higher endowments, and return towards the Creator as spirit. Here the author asserts that just as the whole material system may be regarded as a precipitate in the universal æther caused by a geometrical necessity, so during the development of the material system several other precipitates take place, by which the advent of psychical phenomena is delayed and the birth of spirits is attained only at the last. Thus the first condition of the well-being of an embodied spirit is the possession of an organic investiture, so

mobile that it may be the minister of will, while yet it shall be concrete and capable of being modelled into some kind of expressive and locomotive machinery. The synthesis of material elements into molecules and masses, while it culminates in this, gives birth also to molecules forming masses which are so fixed, so slightly mobile and transformable, that they remain much the same for ages. They are wholly unfit for the uses of sentient being, but they constitute the mineral kingdom, and go to construct that mineral world which affords permanent ground and solid footing for animated organisms. The mineral world, therefore, is a preparation for a world of sentient beings. Of those molecules which in virtue of their greater mobility and transformability rise out of the mineral world, and constitute organisms having life, the greater part are still too fixed to be fit for being ministers of sensibility and volition. They constitute a vegetable kingdom, which ministers still more eminently than the mineral kingdom to the well-being of the forthcoming animal kingdom—the realm of feeling, enjoyment, and thought.

The elements of this kingdom require to be the most mobile and transformable molecules; these are specially the aqueous and the ammoniacal elements, with those atoms which they yield on decomposition,—hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen. These, when bound together and retained in the concrete state by atoms of carbon (which is one of the most fixed elements in nature), constitute a tissue suitable for the high and varied life of sentience and intelligence.

The animal organization may be regarded as a myo-neuro-cerebral system, of which the skeleton is the support, the skin the protecting covering, &c. Of this structure the muscles are the peripheral part, the brain as the centre, and the nerves as the radii which connect the periphery with the centre, and maintain the whole as a unity. In the brain molecular analysis and synthesis are simultaneously carried to the highest degree, that there remains molecular matter just enough to serve as a scaffolding for a large volume of unified and organized æther, viz., that which belongs to the atmospheres of the nearly free atoms of hydrogen, aqueous matter, fat, &c., which constitute the brain. And this æther is the main agent in the specific function of the myo-neuro-cerebral centre, the brain, and in man becomes confluent into a being of a new order, higher than the material, namely, a psychical being,—ultimately a spirit. It is no longer actuated by the *vis inertia* merely, but by the *vis voluntatis*; and as to its capacity for keeping right in its relations with its environments, it is no longer the subject of blind attractions, repulsions, and polarities, but sees its own way, and is actuated by desire and aversion; in one word, it is a spirit. Thus, through the creation of man, according to this philosophy the cycle of finite being is completed, returns into itself, and reascends again, so as to look straight up, in worship, to the throne of the great Creator.

Thus the material system married to the universal æther is the nurse and mother of life, and while itself appointed to be unwoven as fast as it is woven, is for ever without abatement or retraction, giving off spirits into the realm of the spirit world, and thus, in so far as the design of creation is realized, is for ever multiplying happiness as the ages roll on. Each soul, as an individualized being, is capable of self-subsistence after existence has once been awarded to it, so that this philosophy absorbs into itself all the arguments which give a semblance of truth to materialism, while yet the immortality of the soul is fully made manifest by it.

Of this beautiful system of reasoned thought, which explains in one harmonious round of speculation all possible forms of being and activity, and holds in its capacious bosom all sciences and arts as components and integrants, we are aware that we have given a most inadequate outline. It is not easy to extract here and there a gem of thought from its original setting, and to string them into a new necklace of beauty and usefulness; it is not easy to get at the very inner essence and core of a system of philosophy which has been the growth of almost half a century, and to throw the light of another's soul just on those parts where the chief truths lie coiled like a mainspring; it is still less easy to show the fascination which a carefully elaborated and finished whole of thought exercises upon the spirit when only an occasional glimpse can be given, here and there, of that which, to be seen in its beauty, should be shown in its entire perfectedness of structure. All these difficulties, however, are increased when the expositor himself has been compelled to strain his conceptive faculties to the utmost in his endeavour to take in and comprehend the grand whole of thought to which a lifetime has been given. The philosophy, as published, is itself but a sketch of the author's speculations, and this is less even than an outline in chalk of the ground plan of the compact structure which the author has built up. Yet even such as it is it may be regarded as giving evidence that it points out to attention the work of a great and noble thinker, whose repute "the world will not willingly let die."

It is easy to write over against such speculations as these the words Theosophic Mysticism! and call it confutation; it is still easier to assert that the author postulates in his premises all that he brings out in his philosophy, inasmuch as he demands that God and nature should both be granted as existent; but it would be difficult to prove that any philosophy whatever can be built up of fewer elements, while it may be safely asserted that few speculations in metaphysics have grasped, under the same parsimony of postulation, a larger number of reasoned truths having undeniable likenesses, if not verifications of them in human nature and in the outer cosmos. This philosophy constitutes a cycle; it comprehends the entire round of things; and it professes to reveal the watchword and the law of all reality. It is a return to the Platonic conception of philosophy as an aspiration and a hunt after insight into reality, an endeavour to see, as if in the pure sunlight of thought, the eternal ideas of which changeful things are but the vestures or the signs, and to contemplate the divine mystery of being as a unity of wisdom; and as an attempt to escape from the entanglements and labyrinthine mazes of sense into the open plains of true science—and only so can philosophy provide perfect satisfaction to the soul. It is no slight commendation, especially at this present time, of the philosophy before us, that it harmonizes the highest speculations of Science—"cumbered about many things"—with the holiest teachings of Scripture, and brings Metaphysics, like Mary, to sit at the feet of Jesus—"the Way, the Truth, and the Life."

Politics.

OUGHT WE NOW TO HAVE THE BALLOT?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

"PHILOMATHES," in page 28 of the January number, says, "We shall be very much surprised indeed to find any of the contributors of the *British Controversialist*, the organ for the culture of a truly honest and impartial public opinion, advocating secrecy of voting, which seems to me a scheme for branding the expression of a genuine public opinion with disgrace."

Our friend has written strongly, indeed, far more so than he was warranted in doing, as must, on reconsideration, appear even to him clear, when he finds that various writers will differ from his views. Let me shortly examine his opinions, which I do not think are based on a solid foundation.

He commences with a dogmatic assertion, "Secrecy is suspicious." I say not necessarily so. Again, "Honesty is the highest form of morality as between man and man." This is no news, inasmuch as it was a truism which had existence a very long time before the writer's great-grandfather was born. It is a very easy matter for persons in independent positions to "act" with "fearless publicity;" they have nothing to lose, whatever offence they might give; but very difficult indeed is it for those who are under the "finger and thumb" of others to come out so boldly. I believe, by the way, that many who express their views as literary men anonymously, do so because they must not, dare not, or cannot, make themselves individually known. Many a man would find himself, to make use of a well-understood term, "out of a berth" if he "acted with fearless publicity," even in writing a letter in the public journals, or it may be penning an article for insertion in the valuable columns of the *British Controversialist*.

It is almost startling to read the following:—"I should prefer to see the franchise limited to men of independent means and independent mind, to whom a personal responsibility would attach for the proper enjoyment of the suffrage." For what reason? "Rather than consent to the legal institution of secrecy." Hear it, ye working men of England, you who have had the franchise granted to you after so many years politically struggling for it. Just because you cannot, many of you, "act" with "fearless publicity," you should be turned aside, your privilege be taken away, and "men of independent means and independent minds" be alone the possessors of the franchise!

Hear it also, ye shopkeepers of England, for the same remark applies to a large number of yourselves.

Our friend further intimates that "everything having virtue in it becomes depraved when darkness is allowed to shield its deeds from the public eye." Wonderful! cannot a word be found to express even greater astonishment at this assertion? If a man gives a hundred thousand pounds when his name is hidden "from the public eye," it must follow, therefore, that his gift "becomes depraved,"—forgetting the scriptural command, "Let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth." Then it is said that "the responsibility of the electoral suffrage is a public one, and ought to be exercised in the very light of the sun." I do not wish to be too fault-finding with the mode of expression of our friend; and let me tell him that whatever I may say, I do it in the best of temper; but I cannot help reminding him that it is possible to have an election on a cold dreary winter's day, when "the very light of the sun" does not appear, and what then? I will now let our friend alone, and make one or two observations on the important question, "Ought we now to have the ballot?"

Most of those who interested themselves in electioneering matters during the time of the recent general election, know well enough how much the ballot was asked for by a very large number of electors, especially those who had the privilege of exercising the franchise under the new Reform Act for the first time. They had, many of them, consciences of their own, but power or will to please themselves they had none. It is of no use to pass a law to confer a privilege upon individuals if the free way of carrying out that privilege be damaged or destroyed. Tradespeople, too, cannot vote as they like in all cases, consequently some of them, so as not to offend or lose custom, do not vote at all. Is this state of things right? Certainly not. It was not an uncommon thing to hear a man say, only a couple of months ago, and in these so-called liberal days, "You have given me a vote, it is true, but I must do as Mr. So-and-so does, or as Mrs. So-and-so wishes;" for remember, although ladies cannot vote, they know how to assist in putting on what is called the "screw." Consequently the present system of electing members of Parliament is not a genuine one. A man gets elected, who, if the electors generally had their own choice, would not have been so. Besides, when we vote, an oath is taken by us, a solemn thing; and then instead of recording that which the conscience ought to dictate, namely, a vote for the candidate each one prefers, a falsehood, in effect, is uttered when the name is given, because it is not the name which under better or other circumstances would have escaped from the lips. It must be an untruth, for surely if I prefer one man to another, and yet act exactly in opposition to my preference, I do that which is wrong and contrary to fact.

If we get the ballot, we shall put an end to canvassing, a system which is unpleasant to those taking part in it, as well as improper towards those who are canvassed; there is no good reason what-

ever why any one should be questioned as to the way he intends to exercise his right of voting, indeed it seems like taking an undue liberty even to put such a question to him, although custom has to a certain extent authorised it.

G. M. S. the opener of this debate on the affirmative side, has written very ably, and I venture to believe that when the time arrives for him to give his reply, many of his opponents, our friend "Philomathes," the opener on the other side, included, will find that he has the best of the various arguments. We want the ballot, we must have it, and, what is more, I think we shall have it, if not in the ensuing session of Parliament, at all events without much further delay.

Bristol.

B. D. ROBJENT.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

"MORE light! more light!" were the death-words of Goethe "More darkness! more darkness!" is the cry of advocates of the ballot. Publicity is found to be essential to human well-being and correct conduct in parliament, in courts of justice, in assemblies, and in general life, but one great act of political life should be shrouded in impenetrable darkness and unpierceable secrecy—the polling booth! That there be justice, let there be light, is the maxim of this age of progress; but keep the light away from the very place where political change gets its initiative, the personal vote of the elector! To make the free and independent voter "free" from a sense of the public eye, and "independent" of conscientious scruples, confer the ballot.

The granting of the ballot seems to me as if it would be the legitimization of hypocrisy, and the institution of a plan for misleading public men in regard to public opinion; it would certainly inaugurate a reign of political suspicion, if not of political duplicity. Under the ballot, a man might profess, expound, and promulgate the most fiery and popular Radicalism, and yet give his vote for Toryism; or he might profess in his daily intercourse with his neighbours, his fellow-tradesmen, his landlord, &c., the most rampant Toryism, and yet give his vote for Radicalism. What would be the worth of an open pledge to support any candidate, when those who had openly pledged themselves could hiddenly disregard their given pledge? What would be the use of influentially signed requisitions, when those who had signed them might secretly use their suffrage for the promotion of the election of the opposite candidate? Who could venture to proceed to the poll as a candidate, when, so far as possible public scrutiny was concerned, the electors could—

"Come like shadows, so depart"?

It is an English habit to have "the courage of one's opinions," and for good or bad, to hold what a man considers to be right. To be intimidated is an evil; to be conscious of acting under constraint is also an evil; but to smile with a political party, and to sneak into the opposite ballot-box, is a greater evil; for it makes the man by his

own consent commit a villany, and makes the crime a sin. It is altogether a matter of how far principle shall rule in life, or mere fair-seeming and expediency. I care not whether it should be the Conservative tradesman pushing his trade among Radicals, and expressing his opinions as one who "goes along with his customers a great way" in theory, but turns the other way in practice at the ballot-box, or the Radical cook of the shop, who is loud in praise of freedom and all the et-ceteras, and yet takes the ballot-box as his screen, to comply with a Conservative's (accompanied) request of the favour of his vote. In this matter I am sworn to no party, and am unable to see any good likely to result from the spread of suspicion and the diffusion of hypocrisy.

Public confidence is a boon and a blessing too great to be perilled for such a small advantage as secrecy of voting would confer. And no one, surely, can for a moment suppose that public confidence could co-exist with the ballot. Who could be trusted where all were distrustful? and the ballot is just the refuge of the distrusted and the distrusting—of the voter distrusted by his fellow and distrusting him, and of the distrusting voter distrusted by his fellow. The very men who sit upon a candidates' committee, might give their voice for him but their vote against him; and where this was possible, where could trust be? Either some men to prove their honesty would vote and proclaim their votes openly, or would expressly vote before witnesses, and all those who did not adopt this plan would be held by the populace as voters for the unpopular candidate, or candidates would find it necessary for their own protection to marshal those men, and march them to the poll, while all who did not go with one or other party would be looked upon with disgust by either, even though they did go to the poll, and take to the ballot-box. So grievous a breach of moral life would it be to destroy public confidence by the introduction of the ballot. Opportunity often leads to sin, and the beginning of evil is like the letting in of water; we may stop the small first beginnings, but we cannot effectually resist the mighty floods. Purity of election is not to be gained by impurity of moral feeling.

Of course this whole question is one of relative villany. If we are to suppose all men honest, then we have no need of the ballot, for there will then be neither intimidation to be feared nor bribery to be resisted. If we are to suppose some men dishonest, we must not suppose them all to be on the one side. All Conservatives are honest and some (if not all) Liberals are dishonest, is as incorrect an affirmation as all Liberals are honest and some (if not all) Conservatives are dishonest. Neither must we affirm all voters are honest, and therefore will only vote for the public good, unless put under pressure by landlords, noblemen, customers, &c., so that if we instituted the ballot, they would all give their suffrages according to right principle, any more than we can say all candidates for parliamentary honours are well principled and soundly orthodox in practical morals, who would scorn to intimidate or bribe anybody to

vote for them against their wishes, conscience, or opinions. The advocates for the ballot vaunt their pet plan as a cheap and easy way of making dishonesty impossible; but is it really so? is bribery so witless as not to be able to invent a means for overcoming the mysteries of the ballot-box? Can it not take promises and give promises on the ground that the return be effective, and can it not stipulate that evidence may be produceable in some form or other?

The ballotist replies, all knaves at elections are double-distilled knaves, and those who would accept bribes would be quite able to be base enough to take the bribe, and acute enough to revenge the insult of offering a bribe to them by giving the vote to the opposite party; thus contriving a double debt to pay—to pocket the profit of bribery, and to pay off the candidate for his dishonesty. In consequence of this the opposition avers bribery would cease and intimidation would be powerless; for who, they argue, would bribe if they did not know that they were to get their money's worth? and who would intimidate when the last act of the elector, that which intimidation was intended to affect, was done in secret, and the person intimidated could chuckle over his intimidator when he dropped his black ball against his candidate into the ballot-box? But what do the ballotists say to the wholesale sowing of suspicion and distrust, to the promises given all round and broken in a corner, to which that system would give rise? "Hole and corner" is the most reproachful thing that can be said of public business; but the advocate of the ballot, says Legalize this hole-and-corner system, and it will cease to be scorned. Would it be advisable to legalize hypocrisy and deception, and to give the legal right to promise a vote, and then secretly despise the promise?

I claim for the voter the right to be honest, and I claim from the State that if it gives a man a right to vote, it shall give him fair protection in the execution of the duty it imposes on him. It is the free and honest voice of the people in the choice of legislators that the nation wants; its duty is therefore to provide for the exercise of that free choice by making it a moral and political duty to abstain from coercion to vote or revenging a vote given. If men are unfit in themselves to vote rightly, the suffrage ought not to have been conceded; but the business of the State is, now that it has been conceded, to prepare every citizen to be able to perform his duty, and to avenge as an insult and an injury to the State any interference whatever with the political opinions and acts of another unless they are seditious. We call upon the Government to make it no idle boast that freedom of voting has been granted, and we call upon Government so to promote and farther popular education that freedom of opinion shall prevail, and that truth and falsehood may grapple with each other without any undue influence being able to be used in behalf of either. But I beseech them to pause before they consecrate concealment and deceit, hypocrisy and suspicion, and make an election demoralizing to the very inner life of the soul.

H. S. S.

Religion.

IS PROTESTANTISM FAILING AND ROMANISM GAINING?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

PROTESTANTISM and Romanism are essentially and necessarily antagonistic. If, then, we can show that Romanism is making encroachments in territories once held by Protestantism, we shall establish the affirmative of the whole question now under debate. Before proceeding to show this it will be desirable to give some definition of the two opposing forces which are now the subject of discussion.

The Diet, which met at Spires in 1526, issued a decree, which granted each of the German states liberty in religious matters. At that period the Pope and the Turks were finding full employment for Charles V. He had therefore no leisure for attempting to put down the Reformation. But in 1528 peace was made between the Roman Pontiff and the German Emperor, and a Diet was convoked to meet at Spires in the following year. At its sitting on March 15, 1529, the imperial commissioners announced that as the decree of Spires in 1526 had given rise to great disorders, the Emperor had annulled it. This unprecedented act filled the evangelical party with both indignation and alarm, and a commission was appointed to inquire into it. Of this commission some of the most violent enemies of the Reformation were members, and they demanded the execution of the Edict of Worms. On the other hand, the evangelical members of the commission called for the maintenance of the Edict of Spires. The majority rejected the demand of each party, and resolved that where the Edict of Worms had been carried out every religious innovation should still be interdicted; and that where the Edict of Worms had been deviated from, no new reform should be effected, no controverted point should be touched upon, and no Roman Catholic should be permitted to embrace Lutheranism. This resolution of the commission was passed by the Diet.

After some struggles between the partisans of the Papacy and the evangelicals, it was decreed that the latter should not be heard again, and it was announced to them that their only course was to submit to the majority. The evangelical princes now resolved to appeal from the Diet to the word of God. A declaration to this effect was drawn up, and this was the celebrated *Protest* that hence-

forward gave the name of *Protestant* to the opponents of the Papacy. This declaration was a protest against two things: 1st. The intrusion of the civil magistrate in matters of faith; 2. The arbitrary authority of the Church. Protestantism maintains two fundamental principles: 1. That the Bible is the only rule of faith; 2. The right of every one to judge for himself of that rule. Romanism admits apostolical and ecclesiastical traditions. It attributes to the writings of the fathers a validity equal with that of the Holy Scriptures. It maintains that the Scriptures are to be interpreted only in the sense in which they are held by the Church; that the Roman Pontiff has authority to determine what ought to be believed, thus giving him a dominion over the human conscience; and that out of the Catholic faith none can be saved. Romanism likewise sets up the priesthood as a mediatorial caste between God and man, which genuine Protestantism in no way recognises.

Besides these more fundamental principles of Romanism, there are other matters of belief and practice which are equally components of it. In Romanism we have a multiplicity of sacraments, auricular confession, a very great degree of ritualism in worship, as waving of censers, the display of crucifixes, imposing dresses of those who officiate, captivating music, and various outward insignia.

As evidence that Protestantism is failing and Romanism gaining, we adduce—1. The great increase and rapid spread of Ritualism in that Church of England which once was a barrier against Popery. Ritualists are now dressing the comparatively cold and bald service of the Church of England with the warmer accompaniments of Romanism. They have introduced the practice of chanting the psalms and responses. They have introduced altars with lights, flowers, and a crucifix, instead of the former plain table. The chancel is filled with the smell of incense. The clergy dress in their albs, chasubles, and coloured vestments, borrowed from the Romish Church. That the Ritualist clergy are increasing in numbers, strength, and boldness, is very manifest. In the earlier part of the present century there was a powerful party in the Church of England strongly opposed to Popery. Even at Oxford, so recently as 1829, Sir R. Peel was rejected from representing the university of that city on account of the part he had taken with reference to Catholic Emancipation. But this party is now almost obsolete. Is not this evidence that Protestantism is failing and Romanism gaining? 2. The important alterations which have been proposed to be made in the oaths to be taken by members of the Legislature, show the advance of Romanism. The Oaths Bill, which was proposed by Sir G. Grey, released members of Parliament from the obligation which before was imposed on them, to disclose all treasons and treasonable conspiracies. It released Roman Catholic members from the obligation before imposed on them to renounce that principle of their church which sanctioned the murder or deposition of princes who had been excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, as Queen Elizabeth was. It released Protestant members from the

obligation before imposed on them to protest against the Pope's ecclesiastical jurisdiction and authority within this realm. It released Romanists from the obligation before imposed on them to renounce the Pope's temporal authority, directly or indirectly, within this realm, as well as from the obligation to abjure any intention to subvert or weaken the Protestant religion, or Protestant government in the United Kingdom. Is not the fact that such a bill was passed by the House of Commons a plain evidence of the advance of Romanism? * 3. The Prison Chaplains Bill, and the appointments recently made to important offices, show that Romanism is gaining. We need particularly to observe only the recent appointment made to the highest post but one in Ireland. That position is not only conferred upon a Papist, but on one who is well known to be an extreme Ultramontane, who holds that the Pope is infallible. As it is well known that there are abler men on the Irish bench, both Protestants and moderate Roman Catholics, the appointment of Lord Chancellor O'Hagan can only be regarded as an evidence that Romanism is gaining in England, and, as a consequence, that Protestantism is failing. 4. The increase of convents; the partiality shown to them in their being exempted from the laws to which other establishments are subject; and the apathy of the great bulk of the people respecting the preference thus given to them, clearly show that Romanism is gaining. There are now between 200 and 300 of these establishments in Great Britain, and they are closed against all inspection. Every lunatic asylum, every reformatory, every prison is laid under the strongest restrictions, and is subject to visitation and examination from top to bottom. The door of every factory and workshop is open that the law may enter, and see that no oppression or cruelty is done to any one within. The door of every citizen's dwelling is open to the law, yea, even the door of the baron's castle is so. But the power of Romanism in this country is so strong that nunneries are exempt from all investigation. Every cathedral, meeting-house, and Jewish synagogue in the kingdom is open, and the law can enter at any hour, and satisfy itself that all is right. But the nuns may be shut up in dungeons, treated with the greatest cruelty, and exposed to deeds of violence, yet when the law comes to the door of the convent it finds it bolted, and bolted by an edict of Parliament; and let the oppression, cruelty, and crime which may be perpetrated within it be what they may, law cannot enter, either to prevent or punish it. We boast that the instant a slave touches our soil he is a free man, and yet without a protest being uttered against it, Parliament has been permitted to set a hedge, through which law cannot penetrate, around between 200 and 300 institutions of the worst kind of slavery. Is not this evidence that Romanism is gaining? 5. The proposals that have been made by certain eminent clergymen of the

* The *Weekly Register* says that considerably more than 2,000 persons have been received into the Roman Catholic Church during the past year.

Church of England for conference and alliance with the Church of Rome, is further evidence of the advance of Romanism. 6. Till of late those who have been most decided in their Protestantism have maintained a simplicity in both their places and their form of worship, and in the dress of their ministers. But now the importance which is attached to having splendid places for worship, the frequency of the ministers of religion wearing some peculiar dress when engaged in their public services, with the existence of a gorgeous ceremonial amongst denominations who have been heretofore very decided opponents of Romanism, plainly betoken a tendency thereto, and thus show that Protestantism is failing. 7. The various brotherhoods and sisterhoods which have been of late years established in such great force, and which are widely diffused in the community; the introduction of the practice of confession by some of the clergy of the Church of England; the assimilation of some of the established clergy to the Popish priests in their assumption of authority over the consciences of the people, with the willingness of the people to render to them the homage they seek, which assumed authority and subjection to it are so contrary to both the letter and the spirit of Protestantism, combine with a number of other circumstances to lead us to the belief that Protestantism is failing and Romanism gaining. S. S.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

“Con l' evangelio si diventa eretico.”
(With the gospel one becomes a heretic.)—*Italian Proverb.*

PROTESTANTISM is not a creed. It does not consist in the adoption or holding of any specific religious system of doctrine and discipline. Protestantism is an historical term. It acquired its historical importance on 13th April, 1629, when the reformers presented to the Diet of Spire their protest against the decree of Charles V., against innovations in religion. The Protestants declared that religious faith was not a matter of policy or civil interest, in regard to which they were ready to submit at once to the will of the majority of the Diet of the empire; but that it concerned the supremacy of the individual conscience and the eternal futurity which lay before man in the world to come. They affirmed that Scripture as a law of life was not interpretable by use and wont, by tradition or by authority, but was to be understood and known by comparing it with itself, and taking all its parts in due connection and dependence. This denial of the interpretative authority of Church traditions, and this assertion of the right of private judgment, constitutes the fundamental principle of Protestantism, and it does not necessarily involve an adherence to the doctrinal tenets of Luther, Zuingli, or Calvin; nor, indeed, does it imply any set of interpretative dogmas at all. Protestantism is an assertion of the right of the individual conscience to examine every faith, and to decide for itself thereon.

In August, 1868, the late Lord Bishop of Norwich, Samuel Hinds, D.D., published a pamphlet entitled, "The Free Discussion of Religious Topics." In this brochure, the acute and excellent logician, this earnest advocate for purity of faith and doctrine, has maintained this opinion in an irrefragable manner. The object of the reverend author is to show that the right of freely discussing every religious topic is inherent in every Protestant church, and constitutes an inalienable right, from the exercise of which neither clergyman nor layman can be properly debarred. He examines the authoritative standards of the English Church, and affirms that there is nothing in them inconsistent with the exercise of this right; while he argues that it is the duty of all Christian people, whether looking to the religious or irreligious world, to maintain and practise this right. This old champion for free debate, who defended Hampden in the controversy excited by his elevation to the Bishopric of Hereford, has not changed his staunch Protestantism on which he has always insisted—the right of private judgment, or in other words the duty of every one to think for himself in matters of religion. This is true Protestantism. It is a bastard pretender, that Protestantism which consists in the unconditional assent and consent of men to the tenets of any church whatever.

It is true that the churches of the Reformation have compiled and endeavoured to enforce elaborate creeds, confessions, articles, &c.; but in as far as these are attempted to be made authoritative on the individual conscience, as glosses and interpretations on which individual salvation depends, they sin against the very first principles of Protestantism, and make a paper-written creed occupy the old place of Romanistic tradition and authority. Protestantism is free thought on religious subjects, founded upon the Scriptures, as the informing origin of faith in God and His law, Christ and the salvation which He has secured for man, and the Holy Spirit as the revealer of the conditions on which this salvation may be made ours. A free Bible brought into immediate and living contact with a free soul, that is Protestantism; and we are asked, is this assertion of the right of individual inquiry on religious matters failing? and is Romanism, or the authority of the Church as the interpreter of Scripture and the infallible source of true doctrine, gaining? We are unable to see any ground for affirming anything else than that free inquiry and an acknowledgment of individual responsibility are progressing rapidly and gaining ground every day. Some may be inclined even to say free thought is going both too fast and too far.

The era of the Protestant Reformation was not altogether a period of negation. It was a time of attestation as well as protestation. The false doctrines of the Papacy were, of course, specially obnoxious to the early reformers, and they exerted their critical powers for the disturbance of human faith in them, and for their ultimate overthrow. But criticism was not used only to displace the old, it was employed to replace it by the new. Destruction

was requisite to afford scope for reconstruction, and they did produce formally substantiated schemes of doctrine to become the vital and germinative substitutes of the dead and effete dogmas of the traditionalists. But Protestantism, we repeat, is in its essence a spiritual revolt against the false and intolerable tyranny of creeds, traditions, churches, and governments over the individual conscience and the relations of man to God and the Saviour. So it shaped itself in Luther's soul. He felt that the personal relationship of God to man was wholly darkened, obscured, and obliterated by the priestly devices of Rome. He saw a mighty interpolation of priestly and saintly mediation placed between his soul and the mediation of the Divine sacrifice and intercessor, and thrust between him and the One propitiation for sin in whom hope was given. He felt in the midst of the complexities and perplexities of penances and confessions, labours and prayers, at a hopeless distance from the Father his soul sought. In his lonely Erfurt cell he fought out of the darkness of papal traditions into the glorious light of the grace of God in Christ, and gained a consciousness of personal redemption directly given from the throne of God and the cross of Christ. It was a spiritual act and movement which gave birth to Protestantism. But though it grew out of a strong spiritual personality and a noble ethical struggle, it soon strengthened itself by an intellectual study of the Scriptures in its own independent light. Erasmus quickened the intellectual element of the reformation, and prepared the early elements of a diligent study of pure Scripture; and after him a stout-hearted, serious, and spiritual race of scholarly minds arose who opened their souls to the free influences of the Bible, and brought the two elements of human rights and spiritual duty together, so as at once to protest against the usurpations of Roman traditions and authority over the soul, and of governmental power and interference with the creeds and doctrines which concern the life of the spirit. The force of a living piety excited their intellects, and they hungered and thirsted and longed for free communion of soul with God through the book in which His will was written, and the Spirit whose aid He had promised to all who honestly sought it.

The living energy of spiritual conviction, of being fully persuaded within one's own mind lies at the very root of Protestantism. In its heart there is a warm and expansive piety which seeks after God, but it is also determined to throw off all the intermediate and intercepting mummeries and trumpery of Rome, as well as all external force and interference, and to go direct to God's word for guidance and hope, for pardon and acceptance, for repentance and faith, for grace and sonship. Under the favour of God the good seed of His word fructified and ripened, and the nations delighted in its growth and course. The Bible was proclaimed to be the ark of truth, and all who took refuge in it were saved from the deluge of error which had issued from the seven hills of the central city of the church. "To the law and to the testimony," to the Scriptures,

as the word of truth duly searched, all theology was brought to appeal, and reason sat as the umpire to which conscience submitted the question, *What is truth?* Free inquiry is the shield of faith.

Protestantism is not failing; Romanism is not gaining. Romanism is itself quietly and covertly going over to Protestantism. What is this new council which Rome proposes but an acknowledgement on its part of the requisiteness of inquiry, the need for the exercise of reasoning of some sort, as a method of settling the faith of the church?

Romanism itself now appeals to reason, exerts the critical faculty on history, philosophy, and scripture, to prove that its tenets are in harmony with the spirit of man, of the age, and of the ideas of the age. It has taken on itself the advocacy of freedom and religious equality, and it sues the Greek Church, and the churches of the reformation in words borrowed from the lips of the Holiest, "Come and let us *reason* together."

I am quite aware that a great many earnest minds, troubled by the many perversions which are noted as taking place to Romanism, and impressed by the growing attractiveness of ritualism, and still more brought into consternation by the idea of an *Irenicon* or peace in the churches proposed by Dr. Pusey and his party, and eagerly hoped for by some sanguine spirits, have got a fear of the progress of Romanism. I know that it is industriously spread abroad by Romanist advocates that the Papal power is advancing with giant strides in Britain, and that the success of the Hierarchy of 1850 has induced the Pope to propose the erection of another Hierarchy in Scotland, but I am not confounded by statistics and by external appearances. I am persuaded that in the prevalency of dissent, in the current rationalist, and in the agitation of thought in every church, that Protestantism is advancing and Romanism is failing.

Romanism cannot progress in a reflective age; for Romanism is traditionalism and a mere acceptance of creeds and articles. Dogmas cannot flourish in our days, and Romanism commits suicide when it appeals to reason. That Romanism has betaken itself to popular preaching, to periodicals, and to newspapers, proves that the day of the triumph of any form of doctrine which claims acceptance without inquiry and intellectual investigation has vanished to return not. Both the age of chivalry and of Romanism is gone, the age of inquiry is come. There is more genuine activity in the churches of our day than there has been in any century since the reformation. Religious thought exerts a more prevailing power over the whole life and practice of men than it ever did before. There has never been in any period of time so much thought on the Scriptures and on the nature and extent of their power over the conscience than is now being exerted over the whole hemisphere of literature. While men are earnest in knowing what they ought to do, and believe with reasonable ground and healthy assurance, we need not fear for Protestantism. It cannot fail. Nor can Roman-

ism prosper in an age of free Bibles and free thought, of free churches and an unfettered press, of political enfranchisement and religious conscientiousness. N. Y. M.

Without prejudice to the matter in debate, the conductors think it right to place on record the following statements selected from the Annual Roman Catholic Ecclesiastical Register and Almanack, entitled, *The Catholic Directory*, London, (*Burns*), and published *permissu superiorum* under the sanction of Archbishop Manning, and furnishing authenticated information respecting the Clergy and Laity professing the Roman Faith. The selection here re-printed appeared in *The Glasgow Herald* of 23rd January, under the heading—

ROMAN CATHOLIC STATISTICS.

It appears that there are 30 Peers of the three kingdoms and 50 Barons who profess the Roman Catholic faith, and also 38 members of the House of Commons. There are now 13 Romish "dioceses," including the "arch-diocese" of Westminster, all of which, taken together, form the "Province" of Westminster, with Archbishop Manning at its head. Of his 12 "suffragans," there remain only two—Dr. Ullathorne of Birmingham, and Dr. Brown of Menesie and Newport, who were among the hierarchy revived by Pio Nono under Cardinal Wiseman in 1850. The other "suffragans" are Dr. Grant, of Southwark; Dr. Turner, of Salford; Dr. Brown, of Shrewsbury; Dr. Roskell, of Nottingham; Dr. Goos, of Liverpool; Dr. Vaughan, of Plymouth; the Honourable Dr. Clifford, of Clifton; Dr. Amherst, of Northampton; Dr. Cornthwaite, of Beverly; and Dr. Chadwick, of Hexham. During the past year there have been 63 Romish priests ordained in England and Wales, 56 belonging to the regular, and seven to the secular clergy. There are 19 Roman Catholic chaplains to the forces, including three "on half-pay." The total of Roman Catholic priests in England and Wales is 1489; of churches, chapels, and "mission stations," 1122; the monasteries, or convents of men, 67; the nunneries, or convents of women, 214; and the colleges 18 in all, including some "preparatory colleges," or, as we should term them, schools. Of the chapels in England and Wales, about 640 are registered for marriages, and therefore, the *Directory* says, "may be regarded as parochial." The Roman Catholic Church in Scotland is presided over by four bishops, and geographically divided, not to "dioceses," but into "districts." These are three in number—the Eastern, the Western, and the Northern. These "districts" number 201 clergy, who serve 207 chapels and "mission stations." Besides these, there are in Scotland 18 convents for women and two colleges. The list of Roman Catholic Peers of the three kingdoms is as follows:—The Duke of Norfolk, the Earls of Denbigh, Buchan, Fingall, Garsard, Kenmare, Orford, Dunraven, and Gainsborough; the Countess of Newburgh; Viscounts Germanston, Taaffe, and Southwell; Lords Beaumont, Camoys, Stourton, Vaux of Harrowden, Petre, Arundell of Wardour, Dormer, Stafford, Clifford of Chudleigh, Herries, Lovat, Trimleston, Louth, Effrench, Howden, and Bellow. To these must be added the Marquis of Bute, who apparently "seceded" after the sheets of the *Directory* were sent to press. Roman Catholic Peers in 1760, just 100 years ago, included only eight English and six Irish peers, viz:—The Duke

of Norfolk, the Earl of Shrewsbury, the Lords Stourton, Petre, Dormer, Teynham, Langdale, and Arundell, in the peerage of England; and Viscounts Taaffe, Molyneux, Fairfax, and Barnewall, and Lords Cahir and Baltimore. At the time when Roman Catholic emancipation was granted, 40 years ago, the list stood as follows :—The Duke of Norfolk, the Earl of Shrewsbury, Lords Stourton, Petre, Arundell, Dormer, and Clifford, in England; the Earls of Newburgh and Traquair, in Scotland; and the Earls of Fingall and Kenmare, Viscounts Gormanston, Taaffe, and Southwell, and Lords Trimleston and Ffrench. The Roman Catholic Baronets are given as follows :—Sir Robert T. Gerard, Sir Francis Vincent, Sir Henry A. J. Doughty-Tichborne, Sir Bouchier P. Wrey, Sir Charles M. Wolseley, Sir Nicholas W. Throckmorton, Sir Edward Blount, Sir John M. Haggerton, Sir John D. Acton, Sir Henry Webb, Sir George Bowyer, Sir Henry P. Bedingfeld, Sir Charles F. Smythe, Sir Rowland S. Errington, Sir Edward R. Gage, Sir Piers Mostyn, Sir Paul W. Molesworth, Sir Robert Gordon, Sir William D. Stewart, Sir William R. Codrington, Sir John Sutton, Sir Reginald A. Barnewell, Sir John Esmonde, Sir Joseph Burke, Sir Gerald D. Fitzgerald, Sir John V. Bradstreet, Sir John St. George, Sir Arthur C. Rumbold, Sir Vere E. De Vere, Sir Richard H. Pollen, Sir Charles Nugent, Sir Thomas John Burke, Sir George Goold, Sir Rowland Blennerhassett, Sir Archibald K. Macdonald, Sir Charles C. Domville, Sir Thomas Clifford-Constable, Sir John Simeon, Sir Edward V. Vavasour, Sir Percy Nugent, Sir Colman M. O'Loughlen, Sir Henry Grattan-Bellew, Sir Humphrey De Trafford, Sir John Lawson, Sir Henry W. Barron, Sir James Power, Sir Patrick O'Brien, Sir Dominick J. Corrigan, Sir John Annis, and Sir Charles H. Tempest.

LORD LYTTON (SIR EDWARD BULWER LYTTON), ON THE IRISH CHURCH.—They talked of Irish bulls; but the words "Irish Church" were the greatest bull in the language. It was called the Irish Church because it was a Church not for the Irish. They had heard that those who ministered to the altar should live by the altar. But the Protestant clergyman did not minister to the altar. The Catholic priest ministered to the altar, and the Protestant lived upon the flock. But they were told that, though they had the legal, they had not the equitable right to appropriate Church property. Could any Protestant use this argument? How, then, did the Protestant Establishment exist? We stood upon the gigantic ruins of the Catholic Church Property. Should we quarrel with the very title-deeds by which we held our possession? They had been told that it was arranged at the Union that the two Churches of England and Ireland had been incorporated as a defence to the weaker, or, in other words, the Protestant party; and they had been solemnly adjured to adhere to the contract. Was it at that time of day they were to be told that what the Legislature of one age had established the Legislature of another age could not amend? Talk of adhering to the legislation of the past! You might as well talk of adhering to the Heptarchy. . . . Your Church in Ireland costs you cent. per cent. to maintain it: at least it costs as much for the police and the soldiers as for the clergy themselves. And what after all is our profit? Where is the triumph of Protestant ascendancy? Where the evidence of Christianity itself? Do we imitate the Saviour, or the Impostor, when we carry the Bible in one hand and the sword in the other?—*Hansard*, vol. 33, pp. 1356-7.

Literature.

ARE PROVERBS WORTH STUDYING?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

“The people’s voice, the voice of God we call ;
And what are proverbs but the people’s voice ?
Coined first and current made by public choice,
Then sure they must have weight and truth withal.”

PROVERBS are short pithy sentences, expressive of some well-known truth, ascertained by observation or experience, or some witty product of associative thought, which incorporates some general illustration of some well-known truth or fact. Proverbs are the wit of one adopted as the wisdom of many, and acknowledged by the general voice of the people to be true as an exposition of some form or phase of life. Every country has its proverbs, proverbs peculiar to itself, as the products of the soil are, and as the manners and customs of the people are ; and it is a distinguishing feature of all proverbs that however accidental the form of the expression, they contain as their essence some moral truth or lesson of practical life. They are in fact the philosophy of experience ; and hence, as Shakspeare, a great lover and user of proverbs, says, “never stale to thrifty minds.”

The incorporation of the same inner truth in an outward layer of difference may be illustrated as follows :—

Don’t count your chickens till they’re hatched.—*English*.

Unlaid eggs are uncertain chickens.—*German*.

Don’t cry your herrings till they’re in the net.—*Dutch*.

Don’t sell the bearskin before you have caught the bear.—*Italian*.

It’s ill to eat the kernal before cracking the nut.—*American*.

Dirna gut your fish till ye get them.—*Scotch*.

Each of these proverbs forewarns against treating mere speculations and dreams, hopes and expectations, as if they were realities, and are meant as cautions against the too common tendency of men to expect to find and calculate on getting things as they wish.

If we wish to say it is useless, unprofitable, or unnecessary, if not absolutely foolish, to do anything, we say, you might as well carry coals to Newcastle ; the French liken it to taking leaves to the wood ; the Dutch to sending fir to Norway ; the Americans to exporting ice to the North Pole ; the Germans to giving water to the sea : the Jews to sending sword blades to Damascus ; while the Scotch speak of taking salt to Dysart and puddings to Tranent.

This turning of an abstract truth into a concrete and definite

form gives impressiveness, force, and attractiveness to the statement, and at once states, illustrates, and exemplifies the idea designed to be conveyed. In this we see one of the uses of the study of proverbs; for it shows us that if we would teach wisely, we must not deal in abstract ideas which seem so far removed from experience that they are inapplicable to common life, but rather that we ought to discourse in such terms as may show that what we insist upon is closely connected with and quite consistent with human experience. Can the fact of the anti-biblical nature of the Roman Catholic faith be more keenly and expressively taught than by the use of the Italian proverb—With the gospel one becomes a heretic?

"*Liars should have good memories,*" say the Scotch; but the Italians intensify the proverb by saying, "*For an honest man half his wits are enough, the whole is too little for a knave,*" intending thereby to prove, as Archbishop Trench explains it, that "the ways of truth and uprightness are so simple and plain that a little wit is sufficient for those who walk in them; the ways of falsehood and fraud are so perplexed and tangled that sooner or later all the wit of the cleverest rogue will not prevent him from being entangled therein. How often and how wonderfully has this found its confirmation in the lives of evil men; so true is it, to employ another proverb, and a very deep one, from the same quarter, that *the Devil is cunning, but weaves a coarse web.*"—Trench "On the Lessons in Proverbs," p. 38.

Though we should say that the hopes of man often deceive him or mislead him, or even advance to the poet's fine line, Hope told a flattering tale. We do not give anything like the impressiveness to the untrustworthiness of hope that we do when we say, "Death mows while Hope sows;" and the insatiability of human expectations, the strange inclination of men, Micawber-like, to trust in something turning up, could scarcely be more tersely and strikingly expressed than in the old Scotch "The book of 'May-be's' is very big," and we may add this wise saw, "They who live in hope have but spare diet."

The good and sober wisdom of proverbs—on a level as they are with the experiences of the world—is a great recommendation to them. Our English poet, Young, has beautifully and truly said,—

"Be wise to-day: 'tis madness to defer;
Next day the fatal precedent will plead;
Thus on, till wisdom is pushed out of life.
Procrastination is the thief of time;
Year after year it steals till all are fled,
And to the mercies of a moment leaves
The vast concerns of an eternal scene."

But to our mind there is more poetry and pith, spirit and effectiveness in the Spanish proverb which says, "Along the street of *By and bye* we arrive at the house *Never*." Now it is a good thing to

see that the observation of the worldly has led to precisely the same conclusion as religion, and calls upon us to improve the time, knowing our days are full of evil.

The deceitfulness of riches, and the love of money are topics much dwelt on in the discourses of our Saviour and the writings of the apostles; but men of worldly disposition, who love gold and gold's worth, are always inclined to doubt the teaching of the Divine Book. It is certainly a very singular confirmation of the exceeding evil of this love of lucre that even the Italians say, "Everything may be borne except good fortune," so apt is prosperity to make us god-forgetting, which is still further avouched by the saying, "In prosperity no altars smoke."

History has been called "Philosophy teaching by example." Proverbs may be called the philosophy of common sense—of such sense as men in general may be supposed to be possessed of. Proverbs are the inductions which men have deduced from experience, and they incorporate the lessons which they think they may rightly receive and act upon as the results of that experience.

"Thus common wit worketh wonderly
Upon the five gates that are receptative
Of everything, for to take inwardly
By the common wit to be affirmative,
Or by discerning to be negative
The common wit, the first of wits-all
Is to discern all things in general."

Proverbs are the threads of experience spun into the yarn of discourse, they are heads of thought, and notes made by the way upon life and living-notes too, to whose accuracy, as observations, general assent has been given, because it is only when sayings have become accepted by the people as applicable to their everyday life and lot that they become proverbs. They are signed and countersigned by hundreds as genuine; and it cannot but be advantageous and beneficial to know what conclusions men have come to concerning the course and way of human life. This has been accepted as a fact by the best of thinkers, who have all loved, quoted, delighted in and drawn wisdom from those wise and pithy sentences into which experience has been coined in "the process of the suns."

This it will be noticed is a very different opinion from that given expression to in the closing sentence of his paper (p. 35) by "Anti-P," whoever he may be. He therein asserts that "Proverbs are the scum of the intellect, not its choicest fruit." This is just one of those dashing epigrammatical flashes of smartness which look like clever sayings until they are examined a little more closely, and then they are seen not to be genuinely worthy of the credit asked for them or granted to them. The sentence is a contrastive one; but "scum" and "fruit" are not contrasts, unless "Anti-P." should wittily rejoin that they both rise to the top and yet differ

in value; but then we might reply—do potatoes, turnips, mangel-wurzel, &c., as fruits rise to the top? But let that pass. *Scum* is extraneous matter which rises to the surface, the refuse and vilest part of the thing subjected to some process of purgation or purification, which is generally useless. Proverbs are not extraneous matter, but yet they are the very top and head of human experience; they are not regarded as refuse, but as the refinings of human thought, and so far from being useless they are highly useful and very frequently used. Ought not "Anti-P." then to have said Proverbs are the *cream*—not the *scum*—of the intellect? Again, *fruit* signifies the product, result, or effect of culture upon something possessed of a power of self-multiplication.

This seems to us to be the precise definition of a true proverb, and we might illustrate that by the fact that just as the same plant, so far as circumstances will permit, produces everywhere the same sort of fruit, so similar experiences in all countries seem to produce similar proverbs. For example, Germany says,—

"Doctor Luther's shoes do not fit every parish priest."

England gives expression to quite the same idea when she uses this reference,—

"Many a one speaks of Robin Hood that never shot with his bow."

Of the same notion Scotland has yet another form in the saying,—

"Mae (more) can use Wallace's word than his sword."

These instances may be taken as illustrations of the idea that Proverbs are the *fruit* of experience. "Anti-P." says again that they are the "rags of wisdom handed down from the early ages" (p. 33); does he not see that if the universal experience of man from the early ages has been uniform in making certain impressions on the minds of successive generations, the Proverbs in which these conclusions are handed down from age to age must be worthy of study were it only to see how they arose, how far they are true, and what effect they have had on the mind of man in the course of time? Even as matters of curious antiquity, then, he should admit that proverbs are worthy of being studied.

The Proverb says that "every man's tale is good till another is told," and perhaps it may be that when our readers have perused our remarks they may think that "Anti-P." has not "all the good corn in his own sack;" but again, as the proverb says, "Every *may* be hath a *may not* be," and our words may not strike the reader as being more appropriate than those that "Anti-P." has put before them; but I have great faith that most of them will consent to my argument that great weight is to be attached to those sayings of wisdom which have been tested again and again by age after age,

"Till old experience doth attain
To something like a prophet's strain."

H. W. JUN.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THAT men have got into the way of using various expressions, which have been repeated from age to age, until they have become common property, and have got a sort of reverential rust of antiquity about them, must be admitted, and it is quite right that the propriety and advantage of this system of employing second-hand expressions and general maxims as if they gave greater weight to what was said or meant, should be examined into, and have some opinion pronounced upon it. The proverb has not the same defence at all as the quotation—the quotation is justified by its being an acknowledgment to another for a thought or an expression, of which we have felt the use and taken the advantage, and because it adds to the reader's enjoyment to see how thoughts fit into each other, and expressions acquire an appropriateness by being brought into distinct prominence and acknowledged place. But a proverb is nobody's, and it is seldom that it communicates any real information or true addition to the sentence in which it occurs. It is often said that proverbs are the hereditary wealth of nations, and perhaps this is the reason that they are brought out for show, and pass from hand to hand, but never are effective in the traffic of thought. Our impression of proverbs is, that in general they are as dull as ditch water, and do not at all deserve the amount of study and interest they have received from or excited among men.

If it is desirable to study contradictory commonplaces, broad inductions from narrow experiences, the mere worldly wisdom of the would-be clever persons who can say smart scandals of their neighbours, then proverbs are worth studying. The noble proverbs which have been accepted by men, and which have been allowed to pass current among them as "wise saws," are excessively few, while those which give a depreciating view of human character are very numerous—so numerous, in fact, as to make a book of proverbs essentially a libel upon mankind, and a manual of all uncharitableness. It is, in our opinion, never wise to fill the soul with pollution,—especially with that pollution which does not lie on the surface of the spirit, but which does, though in a widely different sense, lie within the soul. Life is sacred; let us then keep her inner chambers free from the loathsome dissections of the evil heart of man by those who see only its wickedness, and call attention only to its criminalities. Proverbs are the Mephistophelic issue of the heart—the gospel of Satan, and the wisdom of this world. A Babel-like confusion of contradictions is commonly the only issue of an attempt to get any settled idea out of a book of proverbs—even the best—*e. g.*, "answer not a fool according to his folly," and "answer a fool according to his folly," follow each other as maxims of diplomacy issuing from the mind of the wisest Solomon, but would not one require more than the wisdom of Solomon to use both in the right way, and at the right time, to the right person?

What can be learned from the adage, *Nubes post imbrem*, clouds after rain; a classical expression of the statement that "misfortunes never come single"—a statement which the Italians make in the form of "Evils like crows always fly in crowds?" And is it not equally a fact, though it is, I grant, often lost sight of in the unthankfulness of our hearts, that "Blessings never come single?" If a Yorkshireman tells you that "A razor cuts sharp;" or a Scotchman informs you that "Oaks grow in the nighttime;" or we learn from poor Richard, "Little strokes fell great oaks;" what the wiser are we? One might as well call it wisdom to say the sun shines, the wind blows, rain falls; these are all as true and wise as Time flies, all men are mortal, money makes the mare go, and a thousand other of those products of the brains of wiseacres which are called proverbs.

Here are what I suppose ought to be regarded as the best of proverbs, as they are culled from the plays of Shakspeare, but what after all do they tell us worth studying in them?—

"God sends a curst cow short horns."—*Much Ado about Nothing*, ii.

"Heldfast is the only dog."—*Henry V.*, ii, 3.

"Trust no one."—*Henry V.*, ii., 3.

"Pitch and pay."—*Henry V.*, ii., 3.

"As mad as a buck."—*Comedy of Errors*, iii., 1.

"Dead as a door nail."—*Henry IV.* (Part II.), v., 3.

"Good wine needs no bush."—*As You Like it*.—*Epilogue*.

"Good liquor will make a cat squeak."—*The Tempest*, i., 2.

"My cake is dough."—*Taming of the Shrew*, v., 1.

Shakspeare most truly said "Homekeeping youths have mostly homely wits," and I suppose a thousand "wise saws" of this description might be found in his pages which would beat these quoted proverbs hollow. Had he been capable of producing no higher wit than proverbs exhibit, I do not think he would have been the type of the perfect Englishman he has become. This, of course, may all arise from my ignorance, as the proverb says, "There's many a slip 'twixt the cup and the lip,"—mark the orphic rhythm of that saying! the sense may have slipped out of the cup between the utterance and the hearing; or perhaps it is because "Every ear cannot hear the same truth."

I take again a set of proverbs which seem to me as little endowed with wisdom as any set of words can be, and ask what can they show of wisdom that can make it advisable to study them? These are: "What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander;" "Too much of one thing is good for nothing;" "A nod is as good as a wink to a blind horse;" "Out of the frying-pan into the fire;" "As mad as a March hare;" "What is one man's meat is another man's poison;" "It is a long lane that has no turning;" "The least said is soonest mended;" "He measures other people's corn by his own bushel;" "Short reckonings make long friends;" "As well be hanged for a sheep as a lamb;" "It is an ill wind

that blows nobody good." I have not selected these as the most nonsensical things of the sort I could find, I have quoted them just as they occur in a paragraph on proverbs, on which I happened to be able to lay my hands, and which quoted these proverbs for a purpose quite different from that of the present paper.

I have tested the worth of proverbs by selections from Shakespeare, and his use of them does not appear to me to prove the saying of Lord Bacon, that "the genius, wit, and spirit of a nation are discovered in its proverbs." I shall now make a few selections from Sir Walter Scott, in which Scottish proverbs are used, and having thus tested the case in a fair manner I shall conclude that proverbs are the wisdom of fools, because they have only the appearance of sagacity, while in reality they are barren and useless, "A fair offer Jeannie is nae cause o' feud—*as man may take a horse to the water, but twenty winna make him drink.*"—*Heart of Midlothian*. Fair and softly gangs far, said Meiklehose, and if a fool may give a wise man a counsel, I would have him think twice or he wells with Knockdunder."—*Heart of Midlothian*.

The worst may be tholest (endured) when its kenned: better a finger off as aye wagging."—*Heart of Midlothian*. "Now I'm of the mind to gang in gude earnest—better soon as syne (late)—better a finger off as aye wagging."—*Rob Roy*.

"I ken best how to turn my own cake. Jean serve up the dinner and nae mair about it."—*Bride of Lammermoor*.

"They were, said she, pawky auld carls that kenned whilk (which) side their bread was buttered on."—*St. Ronan's Well*.

"Tak the bent Mr. Rashleigh—mak ae pair o' legs worth two pair o' hands,—Ye have done that before now."—*Rob Roy*.

"I ken weel, by sad experience, that poortoth (poverty) takes away pith, and the man sits full still that has a rent in his breeks" (trousers).—*Fortunes of Nigel*.

The Blue Room is the best—and they that get neist best are no ill off in this world.—*St. Ronan's Well*.

"Law licks up a' as the common folks say. I have had the siller to borrow out of six purses."—*Heart of Midlothian*.

"Folk muman (must) creep before they gang"—(walk).—*St. Ronan's Well*.

The foregoing examples are honestly chosen, here and there through two or three of the novels of the Wizard of the North, with which the writer is best acquainted. There does not appear to be any great amount either of wit, wisdom, genius, or spirit in them, and of them our readers may form their own opinion, which we are inclined to think must be somewhat like our own. That by the use of such phrases, some people may salt and garnish their discourse is possible, but we are inclined to think it must be because they are scant either of thought or of language.

We are aware that some people profess to find deep and significant truths in these said saws as they are called, We see the Italian's craft, the Spaniard's haughty hypocrisy, the Frenchman's

levity, the German's stolidity, the Russian's greed, the Scotchman's worldliness, the Englishman's independence and love of good-living, in the proverbial phrases they employ. This seems to me quite a following up a foregone conclusion, or, as using a proverb, we might say, "reading between the lines." I know of no more tiresome employment than to read through any collection of proverbs. In all our reading we have found very few "jewels five words long." We do not care to think that "Revenge is a morsel for God," or "They say so, is half a liar." It may be true that "Pride is a flower that grows in the devil's garden," but what is the study of these and similar sentences likely to teach us? After spending some time in the perusal of proverbs, we have scarcely ever been able to find fit ones for incorporation in conversation or writing. We should prefer the study of a "Dictionary of Quotations," or a laconic of elegant extracts at any time to a garland of proverbs. Unless it be because those who use them have nothing better to say, and may better say these than remain silent, we do not know of any good reason for studying proverbs, but even then the study might be better spent.

If "evil communications corrupt good manners," as a divinely-inspired writer affirms, how depraving and degrading must the study of the proverb-literature of any country be; for they are almost all full of expositions of meanness, selfishness, cunning, and unworthy dispositions. To encourage selfishness they tell us to "throw sprats to catch whales," and assure us that "a hook is well lost if it catches a salmon." The Portuguese say "Alas for the son whose father goes to heaven," because having been an honest man he must leave his son poor; but the Scotch, with equal hardness of heart, reverse the saying, and exclaim, "Happy the son whose dad goes to the devil," for he is likely to have left something worth having behind him, for "the de'il's aye gude to his ain," and "the de'il's cow calves twice in ae year." "Money makes the mare go," is the English commendation of that, the love of which is declared to be "the root of all evil;" but even the Scotch, of whom one might have hoped better things, affirm that "There's nae friend like the penny," while they add "there's nae sel (f) so dear as our ain sel (f)." But we must do our canny northern neighbours the justice to notice that they also bid us remember—"Sel (f), sel (f) has half-filled hell." What a scandal on human nature it is that that which the Psalmist of Israel said in his haste and anger is now said leisurely and in cool blood, for is not "Now-a-days truth's news" just to affirm "all men are liars."

Perhaps there is nothing so bad as evil advice—except bad example. It cannot be advantageous to study ill-advice, for the heart is already too prone to evil to require much advice to lead it astray. We do not think it is possible to get a worse collection of advice than is to be found among proverbs. What a lesson of improvidence is it to say—"Let them care who come behind us," or, "after me the deluge!" or, even as the Scotch say, "Let the morn

come and the meat with it." Here is a saying which is sorely opposed to the spirit of charity which ought to animate men—"Do a man a good turn and he'll never forgive you." Money worship could scarcely be expressed in less ambiguous terms than in this saying,—

"Be it better, be it worse, be ruled by him who has the purse."

Is it not somewhat woeful to think that Cæsar's unwise averment that he "would rather be the first man in a village than the second man in Rome,—a sentiment which Milton showed his detestation of by putting the sense of it into the mouth of Satan, in his estimate of his rebellious conduct—

"To reign is worth ambition, though in hell ;
Better to reign in hell than serve in heaven,"—

should have been familiarized among us as a proverb in these words, "Better be the head of the Commons than the tail of the gentry?" and what a thankless sneer is that which says "God sends fools fortunes," or affirms, as an excuse for a thanklessness of spirit, that "Graceless meat makes folk fat." W. H.

SHAKSPEARE'S PROVERBIAL PHILOSOPHY.—Take up any one of his plays, Hamlet, for example, and you light on such adages as "Conscience doth make cowards of us all," or "Brevity is the soul of Wit," itself a justification of the use of Proverbs. When Hotspur says to Lady Percy (Henry IV., [Part II.], ii., 3),—

"No Lady closer,—for I well believe
Thou wilt not utter what thou dost not know,
And so far I will trust thee, gentle Kate."

He is but endorsing the Scottish Saw, "Women and bairns lein (conceal) what they kenna." Lady Macbeth, when she would shame her husband out of his irresolution, calls up the adage "The Cat loves fish, but is loth to wet her feet;"—

"Letting 'I dare not,' wait upon 'I would,'
Like the poor cat in the adage."—*Macbeth*, i. 7.

From the "Merchant of Venice" comes "The Devil can cite Scripture for his purpose," and in the same play, Shylock, quoting the proverb "Fast bind, fast find," characterizes it as "a proverb never stale to thrifty minds" (ii., 5.) But such as have been diligent conners of proverbial lore will constantly detect proverbs inlaid, so to speak, in the Shaksperian dialogue. One old and beautiful adage, "The grace of God is gear enough," peeps out in Launcelot Gobbo's words to Bassanio: "The old proverb is very well parted between my master Shylock, and you, sir; you have the grace of God, and he has enough" (Merchant of Venice, ii., 2.) Gonzago, in "The Tempest," comforts himself that the ship will be saved because the boatswain's "complexion is perfect gallows," and runs on with a string of facetias based on the adage "He who is born to be hanged will never be drowned;" and we almost scruple to set on paper the truism that such titles of plays, as "All's Well that Ends Well," "Love's Labour Lost," &c., are all proverbial expressions.—*The Quarterly Review*, "Proverbs, Ancient and Modern," July, 1868, p. 247.

The Essayist.

IN MEMORIAM, 1868.

"We study our grief by the lamp of the heart:"—*J. E. Lowell.*

As night darkens, the stars shine out; and as the melancholy contemplation of the doings of death during the year overglooms the mind, the names of the illustrious come into prominence and rise up above the edge of the darkness, and take their places in memory. How bright with splendour does the skyey vault of night seem to the eye that gazes with entrancement into its vast concave! Yes, truly,

"Night brings out stars as sorrow shews us truths!"

Sitting at the year's close, looking out on the cold, cold moonshine creeping into the heart of the chilly snow, and seeing the darkening sky becoming more and more dotted with the quivering brilliances of the stellar orbs, can it be wondered at that we find an analogy between this gazing on heaven with all its stars, and our own doleful task of peering into the dark of Death, to note among the passed-away of the bygone year whom we shall call into memory as the lights of their time. Of the myriads of orbs which in multitudinous crowds occupy the celestial spaces, how few are visible by the eye of the observer,—how few are recognisable by him,—and how very few of those which are at once familiar, recognisable, and known? So of the many multitudes of the year's dead; how many are altogether beyond individual ken—how few are recognisable by the ordinary spectator for aught that claims attention, and how meagre is the roll and list of those whose names are written in the consciousness of nations as among the notable and the memorable? In contrast with the inevitable ignorance incident to man, can we restrain our thoughts from rising up to One of whom it is said,—*"He telleth the number of the stars; He calleth them all by their names;"* and of whom it is also affirmed He *"needed not that any should testify of man, for He knew what was in man!"* As of the stars which—

"New the cope of Heaven doth hold."

We know but few, while all are known to One; so though we know only a few of those who have recently departed as throwing a light from out of the darkness of the grave upon our memory, it is matter of supreme joy that among the myriads of the Dead there is One who knows all, and in whose hand the fate of all is;—One in whose presence *"they that be wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament, and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars for ever and ever."*

One by one as they rise up into memory we have jotted down the names of those who have issued from "the soul's frail dwelling-house," in order that we may pass in review, in conscious appreciation, the losses of the year that is gone (its gains by birth we cannot know, and another chronicler must register), for the purpose of forming to ourselves and to others a sketch of the doings of the Tyrant of the Earth—even Death, the Skeleton; and yet may we not hesitate to consider Death under this his common aspect, as if it were a grief to forfeit "this muddy vesture of decay," coming to "stop this gap of breath with filthy dust," and to sear, wrinkle up, and foreclose all the delights of love and joy, of effort and activity, feeling and thought?

Surely we are far too much accustomed to think of Death as the bringer of "woe, destruction, ruin, loss, decay," to say to ourselves, with the creeping horror of a shunless dread,—

"Ay! but to die, and go we know not where,
To lie in cold obstruction, and to rot;
This sensible warm motion to become
A kneaded clod." . . . 'Tis too horrible!
The weariest and most leathard worldly life
That ache, age, penury, and imprisonment
Can lay on nature, is a paradise
To what we *fear* of Death."

Our *fear* it is, as Shakspeare, like a true philosopher, knew, which conjures up these many legions of strange fantasies, these horrid visions of lying—

"Might skulls and coffins, epitaphs and worms."

Death is rather to be represented to our thoughts as an emigrant vessel which comes to bear us to another clime, in which we place all that is precious of our personality, and leave behind us only that which is useless, or would be burdensome in our passage and at our journey's end. True, we leave behind us the loved and the loving; but we go forth in hope and with fair prospect of the beyond; and our friends, as they watch the retreating bark with its lessening bulk, and its dimming lights, and its farewell signals, and see it gradually pass beyond the bound of vision below the horizon, feel in their hearts the natural grief of parting, and of beholding the last of us here, but they too hope, like us, for happiness ahead, whither we hasten, and promise themselves to see us soon, when the rapid lapse of time shall bring their hour to arise and go hence.

If we think on it well, are we not also really but little removed from those who have seen the end? "Whatsoever of our age is past Death holds it;" it is to us the dead past. We talk of life as a possession and as a treasure, and even fondly call it "our life;" but all of life that ever is truly given to us is "the present moment,"—the past is gone for weal or for woe, irrevocably and irre-

coverably, and the future is assured to none. Of life, in fact, we have only the use, and that on the tenure of an instant, and hence we are truly but "moments in the eternal being,"—congregations of atoms, aggregations of consciousness, integrations of present force, but ever liable to disintegration and dissolution. We are the fools of fancy when we construe life into a measurable space.

"And all our yesterdays have lighted fools
To dusty death."

The concourse and flow, the stream of conscious being is constantly "passing away," and though we for the present are, we have no continuing or permanency here ;—

"For Time is strong
And stayeth no more for psalm than song,
And mirth and agony, right and wrong,
He whirleth them all with the stars along."

The present is built on the graves of the past, and of the future the present must become the foundation, but we are not of those who wholly die. The present truly and ever lives, lives as an ever present, full of effective force, and of those influences which affect and change men and things. Life is spiritual, and as each moment thought developes itself in our material frame, our frames perish, but our thoughts persist.

But moralization must cease ; for the task of existence is laid on the living, and the duty of the hour must be endeavoured. Our memorials of the dead and the gifted must be written, though the radiance of hope may be darkened by the mist of sorrowing tears ; but we must endeavour to inscribe them in such a manner as to show that there may be rejoicing in our sorrow, because we write *for* the living as well as *of* the dead—for the living, to prove that—

" 'Tis not the grapes of Canaan that repay,
But the high faith that failed not by the way ;"

and of the dead, so as to excite with the reader's sympathetic spirit substantial evidence that—

"Praising what is lost,
Makes the remembrance dear."

Time is a stern preacher, whose ever-recurring text is for joy or sorrow, for duty or destiny, act or endeavour, justice or mercy, plan or performance, for life or for death—"Be ye also ready!" and whose constantly repeated song is—

"Spin, spin, cloths spin !
Lachesis twist, and Atropos sever,
In the shadow, year out, year in,
The silent headsmen waits for ever."

But One presents Himself to us in these words,—“I am the Resurrection and the Life; he that believeth on Me, though he were dead, yet shall he live.” Solemn, and beautiful, and sustaining words, which were read at the grave’s head of the noted French protestant preacher, M. Athanase Coquerel, whose name falls to be inscribed first upon this page, set apart as the Register of Death. After a ministry of nearly 52 years, begun at the early age of twenty-one, he “fell on sleep” on the tenth day of snowless January. He was an eloquent and earnest expositor of the revelation of God in Christ, an ardent and eager worker for human good, and one of those thoughtful harmonizers of religion and life, whose efforts are given to the education of conscience and the excitement of faith. He was a Christian orator of a high order, and was for half a century a moral power in France. Three days after, a spirit not less fervent, though exercising its efforts in a secluded and retired district of the Southern highlands of Scotland—one who was worthy of the love of a trusting people, and of the friendship of Thomas Carlyle—one who was quick and sensitive to the glory of his master, after a lingering but patiently borne illness, was loosened from the bonds of clay where-with we are daily bound, and in emancipated joy, as we who loved him hope, “saw the Master.” A memorial volume of the Sermons of John Riddell has been issued in this, proves him to have been a consummate master of the persuasive powers which the pulpit demands—a speaker of the truth in righteousness. It is a wide stride from the pulpit to the stage, and yet the greatest ornament of English literature placed it close to the pulpit as *Censor Morum*, a critic of morals intended “to hold, as ’twere, the mirror up to nature, to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image, and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure.” Charles Kean as an illustrator (who died on 23rd June), at least of the common readings of the heroes of Shakespeare, acted in some measure as a Commentator on the dramatist, while he did much to uphold the drama in its highest mood, and near to the Elizabethan standard. He worthily maintained the morality of a profession, sadly subject alike to vicissitudes and temptations. He has little claim to posthumous remembrance in regard to literature, but he was an earnest and thoughtful student, and in a life where “all the world’s a stage,” he is currently reported to have been “a well-graced actor.” State craft has often resembled stage-craft in seeking to be a pleasing performance to the public eye, and proper study of scenic effects, but the statesmanship of Sir Edmund Walker Head was of the practical working order, in which industry effects more than diplomacy, and well-disciplined common sense than showy talents. As governor of Canada, he was painstaking and sedulous of the public weal, and cultured the self-reliance of those Colonies. As an art critic he had attained a rare eminence as an acknowledged authority on executive skill, idealistic beauty, and representative realism. His demise occurred on Jan. 28th, after public service of no inconsiderable merit and consequence.

One of the most distinguished physiologists of France, a discoverer of some of the occult singularities of organic life, E. R. A. Serres, a *protege* of the illustrious Cuvier, and the successor of the renowned Chaussier, is also among the January departures from this earth of organic existence. The mention of this searcher into the secrets of bodily structure, reminds us also of another loss due to the year's eldest scion. Adalbert Stifter, one of the best prose writers of Germany, as a poet, almost the head of a new school. It is true that in his vivid appreciation of the splendid romantic woodland scenery, which lies along the border land of Austria and Bohemia, he sometimes made man seem as if he were but an accession to his scenes, but now when that hand, so powerful and fertile in sketches of exquisite beauty, has returned to dust, do we not excuse this apparent defect in art for its apt truth as a philosophical fact; for what is man really but an accessory—a passing shadow among the everlasting hills and the age-outliving trees? In his reactionary protest against the romantic school, as well as in his public acts as Counsellor of Instruction for Upper Austria, he did good service to his race, and deserves the remembrance of thinkers.

Science was sorely stricken when on 10th February the Scottish veteran, Sir David Brewster, passed away in his 87th year. A Christian philosopher, who realized in himself faith in Jesus, and confidence in science, love to God, and devotion to the study of nature, he had won the veneration of churches, academies, and universities alike; he had gained almost every honour Science has it in her power to confer, and men regarded him as the patriarch of physics, as has been shown—shall we not say with truth and beauty?—in that paper which ably described his “Toiling Upward” in this serial*—a paper which amply releases us from employing the language of eulogium regarding one who entered, while on earth even, through the portals of light into the presence of the all-glorious Creator, who dwells “in light that is inaccessible and full of glory.” Only three days had elapsed when science sustained another bereavement in the death of one of the most notable analytical chemists of our time,—William Herapath,—one of those men whose devoted zeal for comprehending nature, and the working of her forces, was combined with a power over their fellows, and the capacity for performing the practical duties of public life as an employer, a magistrate, and an accomplished contributor to the literature of science. In Eyre Evans Crowe, who died 28th February, history lost one of her minor ornaments, and literature one of her most industrious contributors. His “History of France” is a work of superior merit to the usual compilations of the day,—especially in its careful adherence to the authentic in narrative, and to sobriety instead of sensationalism of statement. His “Tales of Irish Life,” though little known in these “run and read and remember as little as possible times,” were happy and

* See *British Controversialist*, May and June, 1867.

correct in delineation, and pure in plot-interest. His numerous contributions to serial literature were notable for skilful workmanship, aptitude of expression, and adaptation to their end. To the deaths of February belongs the demise of a king-poet, though not a sovereign one. Charles Auguste Louis, ex-king of Bavaria, opened his reign in the second quarter of this century under the most hopeful auspices, but soon dashed the expectations of his subjects by his reactionary policy and his ultramontanism. He was aware of impulses rather than principles, of tastes rather than designs, of sentiments rather than convictions. He instituted magnificent works of art, and bestowed much favour on science and literature, while he felt though he did not yield much devotion to the church. His escapades in love affairs brought him into many difficulties, and Lola Montes out-vexed the patience of the people, and he was compelled to retire from business. His poetical works exhibit rare talent and originality, both of conception and matter, although they do not approve themselves to critical readers as destined for immortality. His life of mistakes closed on the odd last day of leap year February.

Sturdy March, despite of its much blustering, added but few to the deaths of the memorable, though often an unkindly time. In our note-book we find no other names than those of Christopher Benson, D.D., at one time golden preacher, and one of the most famous of our pulpit orators for power, unction, earnestness, and thought. His sermons may be still read with profit and delight, and his long life settled into the peace of death, if we mistake not, in his 90th year, on 28th March. The other name is that of Edward Jesse, who had attained the age of 88, whose descriptions of his "Favourite haunts and rural studies," and the "Scenes and occupations of country life," have given such charms to nature for many by teaching them to observe and interest themselves in the things that lie around them; and whose "Gleanings in Natural History" have afforded so much gratification to those who love to look on nature with the delighted eye of thoughtful contemplation.

In the middle of March a mighty master in ecclesiastical controversy "shuffled off this mortal coil." The most individual and characteristic of Scottish clergymen, the leader of what might be denominated at once the Ritualistic and the broad Church of Scotland-loving aesthetics in worship and freedom in speculation, advocating a liturgical form of sacred service but full "liberty of prophesying." In the midst of the Senate of the Scottish Church how noble and active he looked!—his litho and flexible form seemed to quiver through all its nerves with the spirit of debate; his countenance shimmered with the rare delight of criticism; his eye quickened and his fine features put on a new life, so that you almost felt as if his body thought. And then how variedly and vigorously his periods came, how closely knit his arguments appeared, and how aptly he clinched the rebutting portions with words borrowed from his opponents' speech. Every argument was

wrought as exquisitely as the magic war-robes of the heroes of the Scandinavian sagas, and seemed to invest him in armour-proof mail. He had been called to appear before the highest judicature of the church to defend himself from a charge of contumacy and non-conformity. He prepared an elaborate and searching defence, and in the quiet retreat he had chosen for the preparation of this thrilling and telling forecasting of possible opposing arguments, he requested the present writer to give an opinion on the soundness of some portions of his anticipatory refutation of the proposed accusatory matter. The dialectic skill with which these were wrought, and the amount of splendid declamation with which they were fraught could not have failed to have formed most effective elements of the series of speeches which he expected to deliver, but they were never delivered. Having undergone the laborious course of preparation almost to exhaustion, he was taking equestrian exercise for the recruitment of his bodily frame, in anticipation of the fatigue of the Church-parliament and the embroilment in which he would be kept for the ten days of its duration, when, just the morning before the opening of the General Assembly, Dr. Lee was prostrated with paralysis, and a long period of unconsciousness ensued. He rallied somewhat, but was never again to occupy the gladiatorial pre-eminence he had won. His mind had outworn its scabbard, the body and a lingering semi-life alone was his for ten long months, when he expired, somewhat unexpectedly, at Torquay. Dr. Lee was a man of ideas, and these ideas possessed over him an overmastering power. He had a fertile mind and a subtle reasoning faculty; he was exceedingly transparent and straightforward, ever impatient to realize his convictions. He was a man of consummate gifts and not a few graces, and he had the rare faculty of making disciples. His mind was essentially exegetical, and he was probably one of the most thorough scholars in the Scottish Church. He was a loving and living Christian gentleman, a clergyman of high note, and a professor of the greatest ability.

On April 7th, an assassin's hand was laid rudely on the life of the Hon. Thos. D'Arcy Magee, who had been one of the poets of Young Ireland, a revolutionist in 1848, and expatriated and rebel editor in New York, to which city *The Nation*, as the organ of "Ireland for the Irish," had been transferred, who had risen by effort, industry, and ability to a leading place among the statesmen of Canada, and who seemed to be likely to write his name among the benefactors of Canada and the promoters of the happiness of the race.

On the celebrated 23rd of April, the Bishop of Hereford, Dr. Hampden, entered into his rest. In his day he had his due share in the controversies of the time. He was a singularly independent thinker, and gave full scope to his free and fertile intellect. He had assimilated to himself the learning of the Greek fathers in philosophy and the scholastic in theology; but he had retained amid all this weight of learning the minutest accuracy of syllogistic, the most perfect mastery of dialect, and the purest personality of thought.

His "Philosophical Evidence of Christianity" forms an appropriate and worthy companion to "Butler's Analogy ; ' his exposition of the "Syllogist of Aristotle" is clear and thorough, though somewhat limited in range ; and an adequate authority declares he alone, of all modern students of philosophy, has penetrated "far into the wilderness of scholasticism." Of his "Lectures on Moral Philosophy," the best authorities speak in the highest terms. All his writings show a sincere love of truth, independent thought, great power of argument, copious stores of learning, much originality, and singular force of individuality. His hardy endurance of the moral martyrdom to which he was exposed, as an advocate of freedom of speculative thought and impartial controversy, give him claims to our gratitude ; for we seldom, now a days, find bishops in the front ranks of the advocates of liberty of thought and conscience. They are too often only lords of common place. Bishop Hampden's religious earnestness, and his zeal for the advancement of human welfare and God's glory, are indubitable ; his sermons are splendid specimens of sustained religious ratiocination, the fervour of which is more intense than glowing. His episcopal charges are cautious and reserved, as became a man whose duty it was to control without guiding thought, to maintain peace in Zion without encouraging quiescent traditionalism, and to lead the way to heavenly aspiration, in consistency with the progress of investigative science and practical social life.

We crave the privilege of mentioning in a single line, an humble follower of the Muses—Miss Susanna Hawkins. Of the results of her poetic endeavours as sung we dare say little, of the persistent perseverance with which she strove to maintain herself by her own efforts, and of the careful and ardent joy her productions excited in her, we might say much. Occasionally she did rise to a poetic idea, and she asked the writer once to "remember her when she too was mingled with the dead, as Homer, and Shakspeare, and Byron, and Burns, and so many of the mighty of old were." We do remember her, and give this brief note of her name, which may hereafter lead some literary antiquary to inquire for her twelve pamphlet volumes of rhyming ware, and to learn that in self-reliant loneliness she spent an obscure life filled with the immortal thirst for poetic fame, and died suddenly in her solitude in "proud pined April."

On the 7th day of "fair May,"—the death date of the famous French historian, *Sieur J. A. de Thon* (1617), whom he so much resembled in love of order, hatred of vice, horror of tyranny, courage in maintaining the rights of the people, and honest attachment to the just prerogatives of the Crown, *Lord Brougham* died at Cannes. He achieved distinction by his first published production in the year of the battle of the Pyramids and the victory of the Nile, 1798, when only 19 years of age, and during the subsequent 70 years of his life was one of the most indefatigable and weariless workers in every field of intellectual effort that the world

has ever seen. He was, in himself, the equal of many men eminent in single departments—*orator, statesman, agitator, social reformer, educationist, pamphleteer, quarterly reviewer, historian, biographer, lawyer, theologian, philosopher, controversialist, physiologist, physicist, moralist, mathematician, political economist, critic, experimentalist, philanthropist, &c.*; he even ventured into the realms of verse, and attempted the novelist's art. In all of these he stood above the midmost men in their own special walks, and was, probably, unexcelled by any living man of the age for manageable power over every faculty of his mind and every item of his knowledge. He was literally a living encyclopædia, but an encyclopædia which continually disbursed its contents in application to the immediate state of things, and by a subtle chemistry of state, as constantly absorbed into itself the entire elements of life, thought, experience, information, and science, which the present was able to yield. And yet his mind had that kaleidoscopic power by which old things took on new forms, and experience, knowledge, and events transmuted themselves into original thought. His name was Legion. He seemed to be exhaustless beyond mortal possibilities, and to have within him the elasticity and wear of many lives. He sported with work which would have worn out a common man, as if with the gaiety of a giant, and, with the utmost flexibility of spirit, could pass from toil to toil without appearing to be subject to human fatigue. In his myriad-minded activity, he perhaps laid too much stress on evoking astonishment, but no one can doubt that he was a marvel of humanity,—a sort of specimen of the men required in the days of steam and electricity, ever alert, self-possessed, clear in judgment, work-enjoying, and with a mind always open to the latest light. His multiscience, however, seldom degenerated into knowingness, and his life-celebrity was of longer duration, probably, than that of any other actor on the stage of state in Britain. He was at one time known as "the peerless peer," and since his death the language of eulogium has almost been exhausted to find fitting phrases to express his fame—though the high halls in which his reputation was gained and maintained, have been singularly silent in regard to him. In his latter years, a something did overcast his character, but there are few indeed whose monument can be so set that in some quarter or other no shadow shall fall, and while men are mortal, no human fame can be faultless and flawless. Even such as he was, however, Lord Brougham was a man whose career has lessons for many men, and is an especial example of man's capacity for work—but at last the lamp glimmered in its socket, and the light has gone out.

Louis Marie de la Haye Cormenin was a sort of French Brougham, as a publicist and a legist, though destitute of the Scotchman's zeal for science and greed of toil. He was a logical thinker, with a powerful command over human passion; his knowledge of jurisprudence was intimate and comprehensive, he had a passion for reform and remodelment, and he was an inflexible critic of public

measures, Government abuses, and personal inconsistencies. He was, in his youth, inclined to poetry, in his riper years he became the critic of "The parliamentary orators of France," and in that book has spoken out with great freedom of speech on rhetoric, statesmanship, and reform. He was one of the cleverest pamphleteers in pamphleteering France, while his writings on administrative law are worthy of the highest commendation of pith, clearness, honesty, and intelligence; no man in France could cope with him in controversial force, pertinence, and pungency. Trenchant, caustic, logical, and earnest, he acquired great power over the minds of educated Frenchmen, and used that power to promote no party or private end, but to secure administrative reform and social progress. He was a man France could ill afford to lose, and one to whom its people owe much, intellectually, morally, and politically. His religious essays, "Yes and No," "Fire and Faith," &c., had a great effect in furthering the cause of religious liberty, and his exposures of "Electoral Corruption," have done much to weaken the power of that shameless moral debauchery which intimidation and bribery develops among the people. Mainly to his advocacy the people of France owe the adoption of universal suffrage under the Empire of Napoleon III. Cormenin died on the 12th of May—Brougham's funeral day.

On the 11th June, Sir James Brooke, the Rajah of Sarawak and Governor of Labuan—a man who almost exceeded the limits of fiction by the truth of his life, as one of the most daring and heroic men of our time—departed from the turmoil and change of existence into the calm and restful grave. A man of genius and adventurousness of great varied powers, who underwent the strange vicissitudes of life with much equanimity, and was not a little worried and beset by criticism of an obtuse sort, which accused him of being a reckless spiller of human blood, but succeeded in clearing his name of the stains attempted to be thrown upon it by those who represented him as one whom no conscientiousness "Forbade to wade through slaughter to a throne." His labours to civilize a great territory were carried on with energy and patience, and he has earned for himself the reputation of a great English coloniser. His *Journals and Correspondence* contain wonderful revelations of the might of mind over savage natives, and his success in extirpating piracy in the Indian Archipelago has gained for him a fame surpassing that of some of the heroes of Eastern fable, for spirit, perseverance, enthusiasm, and ability, while his efforts to develop and civilize one of the richest and most extensive of the islands of the globe, has given him the affectionate esteem of philanthropists, men of business aptitudes, statesmen, and the friends of human progress, happiness, freedom, and beneficence.

In June, too, the Rev. Robert Vaughan, D.D., one of the most notable of the men who have conferred upon Nonconformity a fame for scholarship, erudition, and culture, such as were but half a century ago the traditional equipment of Episcopalian dignities.

In history and criticism not less than in theology his reputation has been long acknowledged. As a Professor of History he added to the interest derived from the curiosity which leads us to turn back to past ages, the additional charm of making such explorations under the guidance of one who was able to trace out the lines of force which causation took, and of grasping with masculine might and comprehensiveness the whole of the facts which were necessary to prove and illustrate the course of events as a determination of providence, and thus to "justify the ways of God to man." As the conductor of one of the most influential of the organs of thought which stand as watchmen on the high towers of outlook to survey the progress of literature and events, he was a powerful and terse, profound and weighty, cautious and penetrating leader. In theology, while strictly orthodox, he was nobly independent, and as an historian he was at once erudite and original, the former in the accumulated materials requisite for his purpose, the latter in the insight of character, the retrospective calmness of survey, and the appreciative realism which he combined in his expositions of the facts of human life in individuals or in nations.

He was no mere chronicler of incident and describer of the upholstery of events. He had wide and philosophic views of History, and those who pursued their studies under him found these studies a delight rather than regarded them as an obligation. From the great uplands of history or biography he directed the eye to the streams of causation springing into form from the gifts of heaven, concentrating themselves into powers and passing along, leaving long trails of consequence behind them in their course—and even, the dreary and barren wastes which sometimes lay at the foot of the summit he connected with the unguarded or unregarded on rush of the stream, or showed to be due to the neglect of vigour and caution in the control and guidance of the forces of existence. In history he demonstrates Providence to be Omnipotence, and human opinion but its interpreter and agent. To this let us add that his pulpit oratory was of a more than usual intellectual character. One distinguishing feature of this distinguished man was his progressiveness—he grew and greatened with his years, and his works were always subjected to the severe and thorough revision which such growth necessitated. He was one of the Powers of Nonconformity, and the numerous memorials of his thoughts with which he has endowed the world cannot fail to secure for him the reverential veneration of many generations of Christian thinkers. He has rested from his labours, but his works remain with us as a possession and a delight, and his memory as a glory.

Samuel Lover, as poet, novelist, dramatist, painter, musician, and conversationist, won a hearty recognition from the public in many of his efforts. True to his name, he was a lover of many pursuits, of frequent changes, and of his fellows, and he certainly felt in his soul the wish expressed in his pretty song of "The Four-leaved Shamrock,"—

"Oh, thus I'd play the enchanter's part
 In casting bliss around,
 Till not a tear, nor aching heart,
 Should in the world be found."

He had humour, tact, jauntiness, frolicsomeness, and rollicksomeness, mingled with pathos, passion, and poetry. He was a most lively and interesting entertainer, and had a readiness of conception and an appropriateness of thought which made him a useful *litterateur*, while the real genius of his spirit ran into lyrics of the heart. On the 6th of July he ceased from being here, and being able to (we use the words of Charles Kent)—

"Summon back fond recollections,
 Such as gentle sounds prolong,
 Flies of memory embalming
 In the amber of a song."

Dr. John Elliotson lived a pretty long life of active controversy. His was a mind greedy of truth, and open to the reception of novelties,—no mind of enthusiastic and energetic daringness in speculation and unhesitant devotion to the convictions of his soul. Heterodox in many of his views on human nature as he was considered to be, he was, if heterodox, heterodox in perfect good faith, and testified to his sincerity by his willingly suffering the losses which his conscientiousness caused him to incur. He was never heterodox through selfishness or for singularity, and it is not to be denied that many of his so-called heterodoxies have since become leading facts in physiological science, and many of his modes of treatment, formerly scouted and flouted at, are now no longer opposed, but incorporated into regal or medical practice by the first men in the profession. His "Lumley Lectures" first unveiled the mysterious diseases of the heart, his "Human Physiology" has been a growing work; for his restlessly researchful mind could not content itself with the results of past investigations while others remained to be made. In the *Lancet* and other medical journals, in the transactions of many professional societies, and in the *Zoist*, his phreno-mesmeric serial, devoted to the investigation of the secrets of thoughtful and sensitive being, his pen did much work of a valuable sort. He was the able lecturer and an instructive frequenter of those meetings in which mind had the opportunity of making itself manifest and felt.

Of Joseph Stirling Coyne, who died 8th July, pleasant memories arise as we think of his sparkling additions to the drama of the day, his novellettes and sketches, and his wise and witty chit-chat on club nights. He added much to the innocent mirth of life, and took his place, too, among those who knew that it was best for men to mingle thought with recreation, and to have before them a true measure of the consequences of human affections.

Jean P. G. Viennet, statesman and *litterateur* of France, was probably one of the most voluminous versifiers of our age. His "Epietis"

raised among critics quite a warfare of wags against him. They had a good spice both of hardihood and wit in them, and several were capable of stinging with some pungency, though in self-defence the literary men tried to laugh off the pain they caused. Epics and odes, dramas and squibs, operas and romances, fables and memoirs, dictionaries and compilations of all sorts, histories and political articles, epigrams, and anagrams, all came rushing forth in profusion from the prolific and fevered brain of this old soldier, modern statesman, old journalist, modern peer of France—knight at once of the tongue, the sword, the pen, and the paragraph; an able yet unpopular man, a hero of the revolutions, and a member of the French Academy, he was one of the wonders of Parisian society, and one of the enigmas of literary and social life, and his career of incidents and changes continuing during ninety years, is perhaps the marvel of the century in which he died. He was the Nestor of French authors.

Of John Douglas Cooke, editor of the *Saturday Review*, who died on 10th August, we know nothing personal; he had been long engaged on the London press, and had toiled laboriously in his profession. The opening presented to him in the new venture with which he was connected till his death, offered him influence and competence; and the ability with which he catered for the peculiar *clientele* of the able critical journal over which he presided and gave it an express individuality, says much for his power, judgment, and appreciation of men and things.

Of the Dean of Ripon (Dr. W. Goode), whom we heard preach once, we only know that he was an active and earnest opponent of Tractarianism, and was an eager controversialist in the days when the Church seemed to be open to argument on the side of the sufficiency of Scripture as a divine rule of faith and practice, and a thorough Protestant in the days when Puseyism as a speculation was rampant if not triumphant at Oxford.

Jacob van Lenness, the Flemish poet, historian, novelist and philologist, acquired a European reputation early, and his works have been translated into most of the cultured languages, from the Dutch in which they were written,—works which gained him the fame of the Flemish Walter Scott. He skilfully translated the poems of Southey and Tennyson, and many of Shakspeare's finest dramas, and he edited a splendid edition of the works of Vondel, the prince of Flemish poets.

To us, as far as note of news is concerned, a great part of August and September is simply *dies non*, for then we were seeking health ourselves, where—

"Hung with the blushes of the bunding vine,
Streamed the blue light upon the sparkling Rhine."

But one name which September enrolled among the immortal dead may not be passed over in any enumeration of those who have been (using his own words)—

"From the burden of the flesh
And from care and fear released."

Dean Milman carried an Atlantian weight of learning on his shoulders, and in his spirit bore the fine essence of classic culture. Sustained, elegant, eloquent, elaborate, and rhetorical though most of his poetry is, his prose is noble, chaste, stately, and pleasing. He is rather a poet of culture than of nature, and much of his most ambitious writing is stagey rather than dramatic. And yet it seems ungrateful to say so, having in one's mind's eye the splendid effects produced by Miss Faucit in *Bianca* in the early tragedy of "Fazio," by which Milman first tried to win fame to his name. As an historian of Christianity he is singularly able, impartial, and faithful. His theological writings are composed in a fine vein, and his endeavours to enlighten men have added many brilliant pages to our periodical literature. He has embalmed many precious thoughts in excellent verse, thoughts which have no chance of being forgotten in the annals of our age. Let us say one word in favour of his bold endeavour to revive—not indeed the drama of Shakspeare, for *that* was beyond endeavour—but the Jacobean drama of Massinger and Ford, Beaumont and Fletcher, &c., with the addition of a more fervent incorporation of Christian conception than was then possible. His "Martyr of Antioch," "Fall of Jerusalem," "Belshazzar," "Anne Boleyn," &c., are specimens of that style of composition which contain many beautiful and exquisite gem-like settings of emotive thought, but when we compare them with the great drama of progressive development, we must confess that our idea of them seems expressible in his own words:—

"I see a silent shape of stone
In which the majesty of human passion
Is to the life expressed. A noble image,
But wrought by mortal hands upon a model
As mortal as themselves."

His "Hymns for the Services of the Church" are exceedingly sweet, melodious, and happily phrased; not so warmly devotional, so glowing, or ecstatic as many conceive the language of adoration ought to be, but breathing a full heart's passion into the worship of the sanctuary. Dean Milman, as an expositor of Christianity, kept close to the doctrinal standards of his church; in his private life he was much beloved, and in his death, which occurred on 24th September, he exhibited a true faith in the divine One whom he felt to be—

"Almighty to avenge, almighty to redeem."

Florian A. Jle (known as Count) Walewski is perhaps more noted in recent history as having been one of the Counsellors of the Second Empire in France, a diplomatist, courtier, and politician, than as a man of the world, a publicist, and dramatic author and pamphleter. His exposition of "The School of the World" may

probably live on the French stage for its smart dialogue and the splendid *rôle* it yields to an enchanting actress, but it is certain that his life, though varied and eventful, has been little if at all productive of lasting influences and works like those of Thiers, Guizot, or Dumas, with all of whom he held alliances as collaborateur, while as a statesman he must stand in the shadow of Napoleon III. He was stricken suddenly out of consciousness on 27th September, and in a short time Death laid his "finger on the lips of care." We ought not, perhaps, to close the record of September without a word of recognition of the quaint, ingenious, and laborious, but eccentric Shaksperian, Dr. William Bell, whose exposition of Puck and the folk-lore of the great dramatist contains so many queer items from the superstitious of nations to illustrate the bard, and who was the first definitively to raise the question of the probability of the dramatist's having spent some time in Germany. He was a knowing, acute, peculiar man, whose interest in curious questions was excessive. He expired in Germany on the closing day of the month of "harvest riches,"—under the sickle of the sure reaper.

A note of personal sorrow is most justly due from us because of the loss sustained by the church and by letters in the death of John Lorimer, D.D., the historian of the reformed church in France, one of the calmest, most judicial, ripe, and cultured minds in his native country, and a man who in wise cheerfulness, geniality, and frankness, freshened the whole moral atmosphere around him. He was sincerity itself in the perfect candour of his nature, and yet singularly charitable in his judgment of others. He was most unostentatious, though he had in himself stores of erudition which might have stocked a good many popular writers and pulpit orators. He was thorough in all that he did, and many indeed are the authors who owe to his researches the best matter of their published works; for he ungrudgingly imparted what he had laboriously acquired. He took a warm-hearted interest in young and promising men; in every movement for the amelioration of man's condition he bore an active part; in effort for the cause of Christ he was never weary; in everything that concerned public duty he had elevated views and acted them out; his sermons were powerful and moving without being exactly eloquent, and in his speeches he was concise, logical, and earnest. Of influences on the writer's early life his was one of the most potent, and from him he gained much benefit. We dare not sorrow for him on his death (on 9th October), for he must have gone to his elder brother's house, where he—

"Felt the new immortal throb of soul from body parted."

R. W. Jameson, who died on 10th December, though during his life a hard-bound toiler in connection with the newspaper press, was animated by an ambition to add something to the creative fancy which the life of earth may yield, and endeavoured to fulfil this aim in "Nimrod," "Timoleon," "The Curse of Gold," &c., poems

which are, though somewhat extravagant, worked out with vigour and effect, are daring in conception, and possess many characteristics of true poetry. In the effusive prodigality of these poems, he perhaps endeavoured to give his spirit the scope which the provincial press of England does not give to its servants. He laboured hard to do his duty, and he wished much to be memorable among the sons of men; may he now have found a purer ambition gratified by being set among the sons of God.

On the same chill December day a German apostle of truth and love—Dr. F. W. Krummacher—passed into the light and radiance of Eternity. He was one of the best of the realizers of the scenes and events of Scripture—as his “Elijah the Tishbite,” and his “Elisha” testify. He was a realist rather than a rationalist, and took the divine book to his heart as God’s own,—after the fashion of the elder Lutheranism of his native land. His oratory was peculiarly bold, impressive, and fiery—especially attractive to the soldiery, of whom a large part of his congregation consisted. He was a distinguished advocate for brotherly love among all Christians, and it is believed that his “Glances into and Glimpses of the Kingdom of Heaven” have been exchanged for living sight.

On the closing day of the year Science lost one of her favourite and favoured sons—James David Forbes, a distinguished cultivator of physical science, remarkable for industry and exactness, critical judgment in planning experiments, and keenly watchful in performing and registering them. He was as notable for sagacity in seeing what was requisite for proof, as for caution in limiting his opinions to what was involved in it, and he was peculiarly observant of the line which separates hypothesis from fact or proof. In experimental physics he was a model of a thinker and observer, and he had the art of describing his researches with such livingness of detail that they were perused by those interested in his investigations with as much interest as novels are said to be read. He avoided loose generalization and hasty inference, and laid great stress on revised experiments, and the use of every opportunity of seeing nature at work. His works are full of happy suggestions and sagacious inferences, of laboriously pursued researches and daring adventure in scientific inquiry. His great aim was to discover the natural philosophy of the phenomena of creation, and the principles on which nature worked to effect her changes. In his investigations on “Glaciers” he crossed the chief chain of the Alps twenty-seven times by twenty-three different passes before he ventured to write down his completed theory on that subject. He was a most enthusiastic explorer of the secrets of nature and a profound student of the History of Science, and trustworthy report asserts of him that “while earning a European reputation he remained a sincere Christian, and the hopes which had strengthened him through life remained to cheer and sustain him at the end.” As the year closed so did his eyes, and Time was to him no longer “*incipit vita nova.*”

So circles the year, and ever the Scythe-bearer plies his change-causing harvest work ; and yet how true is it—

“There is no Death ! What seems so is transition,
This life of mortal breath
Is but a suburb of the life elysian,
Whose portal we call Death ” !

The tendency of man to bewail the time departed and to grudge the speed with which life passes is old, old. “ Few and evil have the days of the years of my life been, and have not attained unto the days of the years of the life of my fathers in their pilgrimage,” was said sadly by one of “ the world’s grey fathers.” An ancient sage admonishes his fellows that their days are “ few and evil,” and the Psalmist laments that “ we spend our years like a tale that is told.” Even the gayest gentleman of antiquity awakened—probably on the opening day of a new year—felt himself constrained to exclaim,—

“ Eheu ! fugans Posthume, Posthume
Labuntur anni ! ”

(Alas, O Posthumus, Posthumus ! our flying years glide swiftly away.)

But all murmuring is vain against the ordinance of fate, for Time deaf to all words of man—in the words of Tasso (translated) exclaims,—

“ On with wing unflagging, I
Keep my course eternally,
Days and nights and years, and ye
My swift-flying family
Whom the all-creating Hand
Framed ere earth itself was planned,
Up ! and still untiring hold
Your triumphant course of old,
And still your rapid cars be driven
O’er the boundless fields of heaven.”

Since, then, Time cannot be stayed, and the lot in the dark urn may fall to us at an unknown moment, there is only one way left for us to look on Time. If we would enjoy, we must employ it, regard its continuance as a cause of thankfulness and an incentive to improvement, and as a period wherein duty is to be fulfilled, with the consciousness that the more that has been given the nearer is the hour of life’s exhaustion—as an earthly gift. Each—

“ New year forth looking out of Janus’ gate
Doth seem to promise hope of new delight ; ”

but darkness falls upon the fairest prospects, and the hour of adieu may speedily be at hand. Let us rejoice, however, that if we fade out of sight, even as the stars do, it is because the light of a glorious morn arises.

The Reviewer.

The Pearl of Parables. By the late JAMES HAMILTON, D.D.
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The Prodigal's Return. By Rev. WM. RITCHIE. London:
Hamilton, Adams, & Co.

HERE are three works upon "the most precious and most beautifully set" of all those gems of wisdom which the loving Lord Jesus has placed before us for our learning. The tale, brief though it is, is so living, so full of suggestion, so graphic, and so true to human nature, while it flings out a radiance purer and brighter than sunbeams upon the Divine nature and mercy, that it possesses an intrinsic and thrilling interest such as few mere stories possess, and is of itself one of the proofs which are manifold that, "never man spake like this man." Read in connection with the context, it is seen to be truly like "all Scripture," "given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction and instruction in righteousness, that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works." Read as a revelation of the mysteries of the Most High, how finely does it appeal to the sympathies of men! Read as an exposition of religious doctrine, how holy and pure is it! Read as an outburst of the heightened emotions of the Saviour, as a testimony of His more than human lovingkindness, and as an evidence of his superiority to the selfish Judaism of that age, it carries a force of conviction with it that this is the Son of God. It would lead us away from our object were we to pursue the characterization farther. Our object is to note the value of the books before us here for review, and to estimate their worth in some measure, and we must not allow ourselves to be carried away by the exquisite dramatic unity of the plot, the naturalness of the evolution of character, the sun-clear glimpses of suggestiveness which it employs, and the Divine whole which arises from the few perspicuous phrases in which it is made to stand out before the intellect with all the realism of life. Thousands of pictures from it have been painted, many poems on it have been written, statues have been sculptured, based upon its simple yet effective and affecting groups, and sermons without number have been preached from the twenty-one verses in which the whole wondrous story is comprised; but its perennial interest has never been exhausted, and its splendid simplicity has never been eclipsed by all that has been spoken about it. It is unobscurable in the intense brilliancy of divine thought that gleams from it, and it is indestructible even by the soul-killing stupidities which have some-

times been written regarding it. But there, we are again carried off from the task before us, and endeavouring the fruitless achievement of painting the lily, adding perfume to the rose! Halt! The titles of these works are given above, in what we regard as the order of merit.

The first contains "the late Dr. Hamilton's notes on the parable of the prodigal son," but the title has been altered in accordance with "a wish expressed by him shortly before his death." There are twelve chapters in all, bearing the following titles:—The Fatherland; Leaving Home; The Far Country; Riotous Living; A Mighty Famine; Feeding Swine; A Wise Resolution; A Happy Meeting; The Best Robe; The Festival; An Angry Brother; A Righteous Father. It is full of wise remark, good counsel, excellent quotations, attractive anecdotes, rich experience, ripe thought, sage admonition, and is evidently perfumed with the delicious odours of diligence, preparation, and prayer.

The second consists of eight lectures delivered by the writer to his congregation during the winter; they are given under fitting heads, and are animated by a fine spirit, a pleasing grace, a winning earnestness, and a homeliness, but directness and almost individuality of address, which must have made them very effective in delivery. They are really highly deserving lectures, denoting a power in their author of invigorating the text with the true pulse of genuine reflective life. Passages of urgent entreaty in them rise to high eloquence, and the whole is calculated to make the word of God more useful as a light to human feet, and a lamp upon human paths in life.

The third is perhaps more doctrinal and more minutely critical than either of the two preceding works. It aims especially to cast light upon the two main purposes, as the author thinks, of the parable,—penitence in man and pardon in God. In the introduction he places its relation to the context clearly and interestingly before the reader, and particularly shows its connection with yet its essential difference from the parables which go before it in the chapter. In eleven discourses, genuine sermons, he expounds this "gospel within the gospel." The illustrations employed by the preacher to give effect to his instructions are drawn from Scripture incident and character, from nature, and from history or actual life; and the author expressly defends his own plan of exposition in extending the lessons so as to include so much by saying, "there is far greater risk of coming short of the meaning of the Divine word than of going beyond the grand truths they contain." This, of course, is true when a judicious interpreter like the author of "Life for God exemplified in Nehemiah" takes it up; but he surely has not forgotten that there are some who wrest even the Scriptures to their own destruction by endeavouring to be wise above what is written.

We can really recommend these works as illustrative of this parable—not unworthy of the great theme.

The Topic.

OUGHT LORD MAYO TO BE RECALLED FROM THE VICEROYSHIP OF INDIA?

AFFIRMATIVE.

THE recall of Lord Mayo is a topic which, for the last month or two, has caused a large amount of interest, and has been the subject of such an amount of speculation in the national mind as to render it exceedingly interesting and important. His appointment to the post is of such a recent date as to require but little to be said in reference to it. The question to be decided is as to whether Lord Mayo is a fit and proper person to take the reins of government in our Indian territories. If we may judge from his previous acts, there is nothing that would have the effect of recommending him to the position. I take it that he is simply a nominee of the Tory party, sent out to do Tory work, and I think, therefore, that as a change of government has taken place, he should be at once sent home to enjoy those pursuits to which his mind is more specially adapted.—R. H.

The above question may be answered with great brevity. When we consider the circumstances under which Lord Mayo left this country to become the Governor-General of India, we cannot but condemn the appointment to that important and onerous position as one made solely to serve party purposes, and therefore dangerous to the stability and peace of the Eastern Empire. What qualifications are possessed by Lord Mayo for this exalted position? It is true he held office under the late 1869.

government as Chief Secretary for Ireland (in which he eminently distinguished himself); but what of his knowledge of Indian affairs? Where did he attain it? When have we heard of it? Had he been in the position of Sir Stafford Northcote (Secretary for India), there might have been some plea or justification for the appointment. But for a man, without experience, to assume the reins of government at a time when our Indian matters are becoming exceedingly complicated and difficult to manage, I regard as a great act of folly on his part and extremely discreditable to the government of which he was a member. I therefore noticed with pleasure the (reported) promptitude exercised by the present government in recalling one so unfit to represent us in that part of her Majesty's dominions, and thus preventing the acquisition of "ill-gotten gains."—J. T. S.

If the voice of the people be, as we are often told, the voice of God, then, without doubt, Lord Mayo ought never to have gone to India. Judging impartially, by means of papers of every party and creed, no one could fail to arrive at the conclusion that in the opinion of the British public, Lord Mayo was unfit for the post for which Disraeli had selected him. To all intents and purposes he was somewhat in the position of the old lady, in the stethoscope song,—

"Now when the neighbouring doctors found

A case so rare had been described

They every day her ribs did pound,
In squads of twenty, so she died."

Unfortunately, however, Lord Mayo has not died; the question, therefore, is ought he to be recalled. At first sight we should incline to the answer No; inasmuch as there is a striking resemblance between Ireland and India, each of these countries having a feeling of repugnance to their present rulers, more or less latent or expressed. Now Lord Mayo, having been ruler of the one, ought certainly to have qualified himself, in some measure, to be the ruler of the other. Were proofs forthcoming of ability displayed in the performance of Irish duties, unquestionably he would have a right to demand forbearance, until events developed themselves in the far East. Facts, however, seem against him. In vain we search for administrative skill; we look for wisdom, and behold foolishness; for firmness, and behold imbecility. The appointment of Lord Mayo was, to us, the greatest blunder of the late administration—its lasting disgrace. The question has often been asked, "Why was Lord Mayo appointed?" Echo answers "Why." Two answers have suggested themselves to us: as a signal reward for his desperate contradictions of himself during the Irish Church debates, for boldly attempting to explain away words which, if language had any meaning at all, were unmistakable, or else to become the political scapegoat, bearing away the mistakes of the late government, leaving the present one one point the fewer to attack. During the present century there have been two instances of recall which might serve as precedents, Lord Minto and Lord Heytesbury, the latter being displaced upon a plea which we think might well apply to the present case, viz., that

the then government required the post to be filled by one for whose conduct they could assume the responsibility. A vital point, however, requires deep consideration, whether it savours not too much of a party move, and whether it may not be so regarded in India, so that our Court here may be looked upon as the Court at Hyderabad or Gwalior, where a palace intrigue may at any time displace a minister, however able and virtuous.—A. J. G.

NEGATIVE.

An insidious attempt is now being made, by some petulant critics, to shake public confidence in the ability of the noble Lord Mayo. The cry raised, to our thinking, betrays a lamentable amount of party rancour. He may not, we admit, possess the potential genius of a Hastings; but neither, we submit, does he possess the ruthless and insatiable ambition that characterized that great and misguided genius, of whom Macaulay has made a hero. That Lord Mayo's talents are of the highest order we are satisfied. His Viceroyship in Ireland proves it—judicious and tolerant, yet firm and calm. No sudden sunburst of political talent has brightened his past career; all has been gradually reached; but we are all the more sanguine of his future on this account, now that opportunity occurs for the development of his latent genius. With a fair and impartial trial he will be found equal to this the greatest moment in his public life. The true interests of the Indian will be safe in his hand, while the "Star of India" will shine with a growing splendour. To the recall of Lord Mayo, therefore, we enter our unqualified dissent.—MACK.

No! let him "serve his time out" under a Liberal Government. It will be an excellent training for him to join Conservative caution to Liberal progress. While India will be

pretty safe under a *régime* in which the Viceroy of the East will be well watched and keenly criticised.—E. M. S.

It would never do to make our Indian Empire a mere appanage of the party in power, and to introduce into it the results of the contests of parties at home and the changes they necessitate here. The virtual sovereignty of the Viceroy ought to be respected; for were the inhabitants of that mighty empire to get an idea that his power was one of so much precariousness as to be affected by the mere change of a ministry in England, it is not likely that they would long yield him the

respect and obedience on which it is necessary to insist in a distant province of varied races and forms of political existence. It must be recognised and known that the representative of the royalty of Britain is not a mere upper servant, whose dismissal may be intrigued about there, and be the object of party trickery at home. The recall of Lord Mayo would shake the stability of our power in India. We cannot afford to retrieve even the gigantic mistake of sending him there by such a measure, without making the cure worse in its consequences than the disease.—J. D. U. B.

HEBREW POETRY.—The poetry of the Psalms is a poetry not of *words* but of *thoughts*. It consists of an exquisitely artificial connection—not of sound with sound, or syllable with syllable, but of one idea with another. And this in order that it might not lose its poetry or force by translation. The whole Mosaic institution was a profoundly conceived and exquisitely arranged plan of education; and it is only by considering it in this light that its true character can be understood, or its real excellence appreciated. It was for this end that the tabernacle and the temple were constructed with so much magnificence and splendour; it was for this purpose that the service of the sanctuary was made impressive on the outward senses; and that the very girdles and bonnets of the priests, and, still more, the robes and mitre of the High Priest, were formed, as we are expressly told, “for glory and for beauty.” But, above all, it was for this purpose that God, by the ministry of David, added the ordinance of Divine psalmody, that it might be a sort of animating soul to the beautiful body already constructed. It was, doubtless, nobly fitted for all; but the appropriate voice of this delightful institution is “Come, ye children,” &c. The views of God,—of His majesty, His power, His omnipresence, His paternal goodness, which they display, at once convey lessons the most important, and present objects the most congenial, to a young mind. The beauty and grandeur of material nature never elsewhere came together in such rich variety, in such sweet simplicity, or in such irresistible majesty. A single expression carries more instruction to the mind, and takes more powerful hold on the heart, than volumes of reasoning. God is there seen in a mirror formed by Himself, in a light that familiarizes while it awes, and animates while it informs. Piety is seen in its truest nature, as the sublimest triumph, the solidest joy, the sweetest pleasure, the securest rest. There is no engaging character which it does not possess; no delightful image with which it is not associated. . . . The Psalms are actually themselves, as far as words and thoughts can be, the very green pastures and still waters they describe, and the stated use of them tends, as much as means can, to the accomplishment of their own lovely promise: “They shall be satisfied with the plenteousness of Thy house, and Thou shalt give them to drink of Thy pleasures, as out of a river.”

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

817. Who and what was Lücke, the Scripture commentator?—S. T. R.

818. Could any of your numerous readers tell me where to find the best rules, &c., for conducting a literary society?—O. C.

819. Is there a book entitled the "Annual Register" published, or any other which contains a record of the principal events in the year? If there is, who is the publisher, and what is the price?—GEORGIUS.

820. Would you be so kind as to point out to me any books or articles on the following subject—"Is it justifiable to take possession of and colonize territories inhabited by uncivilized races?"—J. L. B.

821. Would some of your kind readers inform me the best method to begin the work of self-education, as mine has been entirely neglected, and I am desirous of correcting the folly of my youth? I am aware that I shall have to study grammar; please tell me which is the best, also a course of reading best suited to one who desires to become a British controversialist.—HAMLET.

822. Can any of your readers inform me how to melt and refine gold?—J. J. H. H.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

808. That system of shorthand-writing which is the most simple in its construction is undoubtedly the "easiest" to acquire a practical knowledge of. As to the "best," in a great measure that is a matter of opinion. I have perused some scores of systems, varying in price from guineas to a few pence, each of

which the authors have professed to be the best. Making books for sale and imparting practical information are two very different things. Shorthand writing is merely a mechanical art, and to be of any use requires great practice, and almost unremitting attention. For upwards of thirty years I have, as a professional shorthand writer, used Byron's system; but Gurney's or Harding's, in my opinion, is equally good. Odell's small edition has but a very few, but very useful rules. Any person, with the assistance of a few lessons from a proficient in the art, may by the study of either the one or the other of those systems, with practice, easily acquire a thorough knowledge, and report *verbatim*. I should strongly advise "Ariel" to avoid attempting to learn any system of shorthand in which the characters vary in length and breadth, or where the "*instructions*," as they are called, are so multitudinous that you are referred from page to page and section to section until the brain is almost bewildered. As brevity is the soul of wit, so is simplicity the soul of shorthand writing.—J. S. H.

Shorthand.—Experience teaches us that "Pitman's Phonetic Shorthand" is the easiest and best, as it is the most simple and philosophical ever invented. This system is not based upon the present orthography of the English language (which is proved to be anything but philosophical), but upon the principle that every sound, both simple and compound, and every articulation in the English language shall be represented by its appro-

private sign, and that no sign shall be used to give an uncertain sound. While it is thus made the most legible, it is the easiest to write, as the characters used are the most simple that can possibly be made. As in this system a complete analysis of the English language is given, it will be found to afford the greatest facility for learning its correct pronunciation. We cannot here enter into a further exposition of this beautiful system, but would earnestly recommend "Ariel" to procure Pitman's "Manual of Phonography" and Ellis's "Plea for Phonetic Spelling," wherein he will find abundance of delight and edification.—R. G.

817. Götffried C. F. Lücke, one of the founders of the modern faith school of German theology, was born at Egelu, near Magdeburg, 24th August, 1791. He studied at Halle, under Knapp, and at Göttingen, under Planck, and became a proficient in exegetico-historical sacred learning. In 1816 he became a privat-docent at Berlin, and in 1817 he issued a work on New Testament Hermeneutics and their history, which affiliated him in theology with Schleiermacher. In 1818 he was appointed Professor-extraordinary at Bann, where he remained till 1827, in which year he was removed to Göttingen as the successor of Steindlin. In 1820 he commenced the publication in parts of a "Commentary on the Writings of the Apostle John," which he continued to issue till 1832. In the interval he composed his treatise on "The Authority of the Holy Scriptures and their relation to the Rule of Faith, 1827." In 1834 he wrote a memoir of Schleiermacher, in 1835 a biography of his old master Planck, in 1839 a tract on "Strauss and the Church of Zurich," which helped to enhance the agitation

which led to the expulsion of the author of "Leben Jesu" from his Swiss professionate, and in 1850 a "Sketch of Delvette," with whom and Schleiermacher he was for a long time co-editor of the *Journal of Theology*, published at Berlin. He was also coadjutor with the historian Gieseler, of the *Christian Journal*, issued at Bonn. For these and other German serials he wrote a great many papers. He died at Göttingen, 14th February, 1855. We abridge the following estimate, and procure the foregoing particulars from a paper in commemoration of him, which appeared in the *Studien und Kritiken*, November, 1855, probably from the pen of Dr. Umbiast.

"He was one of that noble band of men who, in the providence of God, were called to set again before the German nation a living Christianity, a Christianity of which Christ the Son of God is the centre, and which, in opposition to a one-sided intellectualism, as well as moralism, insists upon regeneration and close union and communion with Christ,—who viewed Christianity as a vital power, determining not only the life of the individual, but closely connected with all that is great and true in history, and destined to renew and regenerate not only science, but also the life of church and state. This idea was the aim and object of his life; to realize it, he laboured in the sweat of his brow, and in all he did he had regard to the wants of the present time, and of the Church more particularly. Although not a man of great originality, but rather of a pre-eminently receptive nature, yet he gave a peculiar form and expression to everything which he had received. He was, it is true, not free from the errors and defects which attach to all the men of this school; but it should never be for-

gotten that he was to very many a guide to faith and peace, who after looked down upon him as an unsettled man, who had remained behind, and was destitute of a right sense and sympathy with the Church. He, least of all, has deserved the abuse which was poured upon him during the last years of his life by bigoted churchmen, whose exclusiveness he thought himself in duty bound strenuously to oppose. As a man of peace, his

theology was pre-eminently a theology of peace; and the violent commotions caused, on the one hand, by the assaults of Strauss and his followers upon everything Christian, and, on the other hand, by the blind zeal of an exclusive High-Churchism and Confessionalism, with family affliction superadded, embittered the last years of his life. The character of his theology was pre-eminently Melancthonian."—S. N.

The Societies' Section.

THE BROTHERHOOD OF TRUTH.

IN 1834-35, Forbes and a few other students formed themselves into a "*Maga Club*," whose objects were literature and god-fellowship—the latter for a time was probably the more demonstrative. The literature of the Club found vent in the "*University Maga*"—a weekly sheet of poetry and prose, and felicitous portraiture of lecturers, students, and snobs—that delighted every son of *Alma Mater*. Forbes, though foremost with both pen and pencil in the *Maga*, and distributing healthy satire and fun broadcast, was alive to a higher feeling of association than "Club nights," with *Maga* toasts and "Rule Britannias." He and his friends, C. E. Stewart and D. Macaskill, therefore, resolved to found a brotherhood for mutual help and encouragement in their several spheres of occupation, be it art, literature, or science. The brotherhood, or "Order," as it was called, had a freemasonry repute among the uninitiated; and the words "Wine, Love, Learning," were adopted as the watchword. As symbolic of the "Order," the

members wore across the breast a narrow silk ribbon, rose-coloured and black, with the mystic letters O. E. M. worked into its texture. At the meetings of the "Order" the higher-class brethren wore a small silver triangle, with the favourite Greek triad engraved thereon. By outsiders the men of the brotherhood were generally called "the red ribbons," or "Oinero-maths." The "good-fellowship" brethren, vinously reticent of the principles of the "Order," brought it into ridicule, if not contempt, so that in 1838 it was needful to weed out those whose "besoms glowed with oinero-mathic fire," and to have the earnest lovers of truth planted in the foreground; and these alone entered "The Universal Brotherhood of Friends of Truth." Scrupulous care was exercised in the admission of new members, and of those only who had proved themselves worthy by works done, or by the show of a diligent pursuit after truth, and no less by the possession of a genial and hearty spirit to further the interests of the brother-

hood. There were gradations in the "Order;" "frater," "triangle," and ceremonial officers — *ex. gr.*, "the Bearer of the Mystic Lyre," and "Arch Magus." Forbes, after two years abroad, returned to Edinburgh (Nov. 1838), and among the first acts of the "Brotherhood" was the election of John Goodsir as "frater;" in November of the same year he rose to the honour of "triangle." The brotherhood consisted of men of different callings — artists, scholars, physicians, naturalists, poets, priests, and mathematicians. Less would have been said on this subject had not Goodsir come to be the *alter ego* of Forbes in the "Brotherhood," and given the last touches to the amended principles issued in 1841.

Goodsir was a noble example of the brotherhood that sought to bind man to man in ties of home and friendship, love and goodwill; he was a brother of help and of counsel in scientific research, and free from petty misgivings and jealousy of his compeers. No man after Forbes — the *Archimagus* — showed a more catholic spirit in maintaining the principles of the "Order;" no one was more eager for the interpretation of truth, and few, if any, had greater hopes of a day of promise and fulfilment awaiting the patient investigation of organized bodies.

THE UNIVERSAL BROTHERHOOD OF FRIENDS OF TRUTH.

This Brotherhood is a Union of the Searchers after Truth, for the glory of God, the good of all, and the honour of the Order, to the end that mind may hold its rightful sway in the world.

It is a Fellowship demanding of its Members earnestness, ability, and philanthropy, and recognising among them no distinctions of nation, party, rank, or profession.

Works done and approved, a sincere and loving spirit, and the energy to act are the qualities required of the candidate.

Love for the good and the beautiful is demanded of the Brothers, as well as the determination to seek for truth, and urge others to the search. Charity to all earnest opinions, kindness to all living creatures, and thankfulness for the blessings by which we are surrounded, are inculcated by the Brethren.

Co-operation in research, assistance in danger and adversity, advice and firm friendship, are extended by the Brethren towards each other.

The Triangle, symbolical of learning, love, and fellowship, and the Roseate Band, emblematical of their union, are the outward signs by which the Brethren recognise each other throughout the world. — *Lonsdale's "Memoirs of Prof. John Goodsir, M.D."*

PERTH—PEOPLE'S CLUB AND INSTITUTE.

A PUBLIC meeting was held in the City Hall, on the 24th December, to consider the propriety of forming a people's club and institute and public reading-room for the city. There was a large attendance, and on the platform there were Lord Provost Pullar, Bailie M'Carroch, Councillors M'Neill, Duncan, and Hunt; Rev. Messrs. Milne, Miller,

Tulloch, Wilson, Brown, and Sutherland; Sheriff Barclay, Sir David Ross, Dr. Miller, rector of Perth Academy, &c. The Lord Provost was called to the chair, and having stated the subject of the meeting, said he entirely sympathized with it. Such institutions as the one proposed had been inaugurated in Edinburgh, Glasgow, Manchester,

London, and other places, and had been found to work beneficially in the advancement of the moral and intellectual improvement of the working classes. At the same time he had to say that if the institution proposed was to be successful it must be under the management of the working men themselves, and without that they (the working men) could not expect that any help from without could perpetuate any institution for their own moral and intellectual improvement. In conclusion, he had to say that the Magistrates and Town Council would do everything in their power to facilitate the present movement. Mr. Andrew M'Ewen, wright, moved the first resolution, to the effect that an institution as proposed be formed. The motion was seconded by Mr. John Moncrieff, glass manufacturer. Sheriff Barclay supported the motion. He was surprised that such an institution as that now proposed was not inaugurated in Perth long ago. They had had their Mechanics' and Andersonian institutions in Perth, but being principally under aristocratic management they did not succeed and had gone down. He strongly advised young men that in regard to politics, philosophy, and religion, they should read both sides. He approved of pleasurable games being permitted in connection with the proposed institute, without anything being on the table that could injure the head or the heart. The motion of Mr. M'Ewen was then unanimously agreed to. Councillor M'Neill then read a list of names as a committee to promote the object of the meeting, and after short addresses by the Rev. Mr. Brown and Dr. Miller, the gentlemen named were appointed a committee as proposed by Mr. M'Neill. A vote of thanks was passed to the Lord Provost, and the proceedings terminated.

LONDON: *The Dialectical Society*.—The Dialectical Society was the subject of much talk and curiosity a few months ago. The discussion of such questions—social, philosophical, or religious—as are generally tabooed in society, as well as in the lecture-room, forms the aim of the Dialectical. Not only is absolute liberty of choice of subject granted, but absolute liberty of debate is also conceded to the members. The Dialectical Society, in short, has for its object the ventilation of subjects which society in general, bound as it is by a vast number of necessary conditions, dare not or will not discuss. The Society meets once a fortnight, from October to July, at 32, George-street, Hanover-square; friends of members being also admitted. Ladies are not excluded from the discussions; indeed, one well-known and gifted lady figures in the list of vice-presidents. The list of members comprehends most of the “advanced thinkers” of the metropolis. The president is Sir John Lubbock; the vice-presidents, Viscount Amberley, M.P.; Andrew Clark, Esq., M.D.; Miss Frances Power Cobb; Professor Huxley, F.R.S.; George Henry Lewes, Esq.; the Rev. H. B. Wilson, B.D. From the list of subjects discussed since the formation of the society we select the following, which may perhaps indicate its *specialité*:—“On the Laws relating to the Tenure of Land;” “On Utility—the ultimate Test of Morality;” “On Marriage Contracts;” “On the Credibility of Miracles;” “On the Existence of a Deity, and a Future State;” “On the Historical and Moral Value of the Bible;” “On Prostitution;” “On the Happiness of the Community as affected by large Families.” The most recent meeting of the society was held on the 20th January, when the topic for discussion was “The Relation of Metaphysics to Theology.”

HULME YOUNG MEN'S TOTAL ABSTINENCE LITERARY CLUB.—A new society has just been formed in Manchester with the above title. A number of young men in Hulme and the neighbourhood who take a warm interest in the Temperance and Permissive Bill movements, and who are prepared to give time and energy to their promotion, have banded themselves together for mutual improvement, so as to develop their powers of reasoning and delivery, and to thus render themselves more efficient as advocates of temperance. It cannot be disguised that the temperance advocacy is capable of improvement. The early advocates of total abstinence, though in many cases but poorly educated, undoubtedly did a work of which they may well be proud; but it is no disparagement of their labours and achievements to say that a larger number of advocates, of refinement and education, are wanted to push the temperance enterprise into circles where its power has not yet been so fully felt. Feeling the need of this, at a very opportune time, some Manchester young men have determined to form a club with the object of securing this, as far as is in their power. The club is confined to total abstinens, and its great aim is to secure that the advocates of total abstinence and the Alliance question shall be well fortified with fact and argument, and united *inter se* in order to a more effective advocacy amongst thinking and educated men. The society will meet every other Monday evening, at eight o'clock, in Milton Street, York Street, Hulme. Already a goodly number of intelligent and able young men have taken the matter up, and there is little doubt of its success and utility. The Permissive Bill is the first subject for discussion or enquiry, and on this question the greatest unanimity prevails amongst the members of the

club. The Rev. W. Shipman is the president of the association. A *soirée* has been held at Zion Chapel, Stretford Road, to inaugurate the club. A large company of ladies and gentlemen, with the president in the chair, showed a warm interest in the undertaking. Clubs like this would be of use in every part of the country, and might well replace clubs of inferior aims which are usually connected with public houses.

SUBJECTS SUITABLE FOR DEBATE.

Is English as spoken, or English as printed, the better form for the effective expression of thought?

Was Horne Tooke a true Patriot?

Has Bentham added materially to political science?

Are Church forms inconsistent with freedom?

Is more wages and less work a fair claim?

Should Reformatory treatment be extended to adult criminals?

Should Vagrancy be entirely prohibited?

Does the lodger franchise require revision [or abolition]?

Is it the fault of the people that British taxation is too high?

Is Marriage a co-partnership?

Was Gibbon an Infidel?

Are aboriginal races capable of enduring [undergoing] civilization?

Can societies undersell individuals?

Is co-operation as essential to cheapness in distribution as in production?

Ought religious tract and similar societies to trade in or seek profit upon their publications?

Was Lord Bute a national benefactor?

Is a House of hereditary, preferable to one of life peers?

Has the influence of the aristocracy on the House of Commons been beneficial or injurious?

Is "Party" the very life-blood of freedom?

Should the rights of individuals ever be suspended for the interests of the State?

Is it implied or expressed in the New Testament that the revelations of the Old Testament were gradual, partial, and imperfect in their character?

Should Turkey be eliminated from European powers?

Is the federal system of government more advantageous than the isolation of States?

Does the modern idea of a fallible Bible add any force to the idea of an infallible Church?

Are medical men not acquiring too great an amount of legal power, influence, and patronage?

Is the English law of divorces in harmony with Scripture?

Is Theism more or less reasonable than Atheism?

Is drunkenness curable by legislation?

Did the Premiership of Lord Palmerston tend to promote the best interests of Great Britain?

Did Cardinal Wolsey serve or injure his country?

Do the facts and principles of Christianity harmonize?

Has England's foreign policy been beneficial to the world?

Has the progress of fiction as an art excelled that of other arts?

Should ancient or modern languages be more taught in schools?

Ought the creeds and articles of the Church to be made binding on the individual conscience?

Would reformatory colonies be preferable to penal settlements?

Has the influence of the Christian clergy been beneficial to society?

Can the doctrine of sacrifice be deduced from the Scriptures?

Is there a true unity in the teaching and narratives of the New Testament?

Ought Government to prohibit the vending of quack remedies for diseases?

Was the time of the Georges "one of the most hopeless unexalted ages that ever benumbed the faculties of man"?

Is infidelity almost always mixed with civil rebellion?

Would absorption or conciliation best solve our Indian frontier difficulties?

Is "Passenger Postage" a possibility?

Ought Spain to become a Republic?

Is the progress of English jurisprudence satisfactory?

Is Representative Government more favourable to despotism than to freedom?

Ought priests to interfere in politics?

Are English courts of law effective and economical?

Were French politics prior to the second empire superior to those under it?

Was ancient political economy inferior to modern?

Is the geological theory of Hugh Miller's "Testimony of the Rocks" as satisfactory as it is specious?

Is Macaulay or Stephens the superior historical essayists?

Is the practice of Christian Missions consonant with their principles?

Is Ministerial responsibility sufficient for the protection of society, without the power of impeachment?

Is political servitude less galling than ecclesiastical tyranny?

Is the national expenditure better controlled by a Liberal than by a Conservative government?

Should the term *Gentleman* have a "hard and fast" line of defining demarcation?

Is it possible to have a free Church in a free State?

Has the Concordat of Napoleon I. with the Papacy been advantageous to the Church [Christianity]?

Are the relations of Pius IX. and Napoleon III. more beneficial to the Church than those of Napoleon I. and Pius VII.?

Is the absolute submission of the soul to clerical authority compatible with the full and perfect exercise of the rights of a freeman in the State?

Is a Reformed Parliament likely to issue in an era of change and progress, or of revolution?

Does Religion preserve Learning?

Has Religion or Learning been the link between ancient and modern civilization?

Is physical force a sufficient security for allegiance?

Would Italy be more prosperous as a Federal Union of small Republics than as a United nationality?

Is the poetry of the Cavaliers superior to that of the Puritans?

Are Diplomatic relations between kingdoms best conducted in secrecy?

Was Queen Caroline, consort of George IV., guilty or innocent of the crime of which she was indicted?

Is it a natural law for fathers to feel a stronger affection for their daughters, and for mothers to feel a stronger attachment for their sons?

Had Henry VI. or Edward IV. the better claim to the English throne?

Is the Papal system antagonistic to the civil liberties of man?

Has a free Bible or a free Press been the more influential cause of British prosperity [or progress]?

Can the [asserted] Inspiration of the Scriptures stand the test of Reason?

Is a precomposed form of prayer [private or public] a hindrance or an aid to Devotion?

Ought "assault" to be punishable by fine, by imprisonment, or by flogging?

Are international strikes more objectionable than international money-lending?

Are trades' unions intended for protection or coercion?

Is imprisonment for debt absurd and inefficient?

Are English workhouse infirmaries properly managed?

Is the wickedness of women more disastrous to the world than the wickedness of men?

Ought the police force to be local or national?

Is the organization of our police force satisfactory?

Ought the national provision for the poor to supersede or stimulate local charity?

Should the nurses of children in their own homes be licensed, registered, and subjected to inspection?

Does education increase non-conformity?

Are Post Office superior to savings banks?

Do the revenue returns show that the country is in a prosperous condition?

Ought we to have local courts and tribunals of commerce?

Should strikes and lock-outs be [equally] regarded as crimes?

Ought land to be let on life leases?

Has the Social Science Congress done any good?

Is a standing army expedient in a free country?

Ought music and dancing licences to be withheld from buildings where intoxicating drinks are sold?

Is the "ticket-of-leave" system just and expedient?

Would total abstinence from intoxicating drinks result in the degeneracy of the English race?

Is it more desirable to localize than to centralize the administration of justice?

Are the office-bearers of charitable

institutions justifiable in allowing their expenditure to exceed their income?

Are our existing patent laws productive of public benefit?

Is it prudent to allow the free export of coal?

Should Government enforce outward morality?

Are "private vices" ever "public benefits"?

Is the Church of England a failure and a sham?

Must the amelioration of mankind be the work of individuals?

Would Unitarianism be likely to spread if the disestablishment of the English Church was accomplished?

Is the Dogmatical or the Ethical side of Christianity the more effective in modern days?

Are mystery and miracle essential to Religion?

Did Christ in his early ministry make claim to be Divine?

Is Epigram as effective in Politics as Discussion?

Can the existence of the universe be "accounted for"?

Can a Necessitarian advocate Freethought?

Is a belief in the atonement calculated to have an immoral influence on men?

Is an "armed peace" preferable to actual war?

Ought the law of extradition to be extended and amended?

May the "Church" and the "Methodists" not be reconciled?

Are "partnership of industry" generally practicable?

Would union among the Scotch churches be advisable?

Would Union among the Non-conformists of England be possible and beneficial?

Is co-operation in labour a workable scheme?

Should women study and practise medicine?

Have Clergymen of the Church of England any real position as priests?

Ought Clergymen to be excluded from the House of Commons?

Is a Cosmopolitan Federation possible and desirable?

Is Religion destructive of lofty views of Morality?

Would a State organization of labour be beneficial?

Is Democracy worse than Caesarism?

Is a tyranny of the majority possible?

Are Democratic Republics as much given to war as Despotie Sovereignities?

Ought we to have a United States of Europe similar to the United States of America?

Can a Christian or an Infidel give the better reason for being sober, chaste, industrious, and tolerant?

Has the heart gone entirely out of Conservatism?

Do Constituencies now exercise greater mastery over parliamentary candidates than formerly?

Is the House of Commons the only strong institution left in England now?

Should British Capitalists seek investments abroad?

Ought Nationality of capital to be declared?

Has Napoleon III. become the *Hamlet* of Europe?

Have the Conservatives been too lavish of peerages?

Ought the Church to be free from the control of the State?

Can human life be legally arranged so as to produce "the greatest possible happiness of the greatest possible numbers"?

Would the institution of women's clubs be advisable?

Should friendly societies be local or national?

Ought commons to be preserved

Literary Notes.

A MEMORIAL monument to Leigh Hunt has been suggested, and is in course of being subscribed for.

A memoir of the late Dr. James Hamilton, from the pen of the Rev. Wm. Arnott, is in preparation.

At one time Ada, Countess of Lovelace, Lord Byron's daughter, was reported to be the author of "The Vestiges of Creation."

A *fac-simile* edition of "The Vatican New Testament" is in progress, and one vol. has been issued.

A new journal is spoken of in Paris, which will take for title the significant name of *l'Avant-Garde*, and have for editor Victor Hugo. Amongst the list of contributors figures the name of M. Henri Rochefort.

The speeches of the late Mr. Cobden are now being prepared for publication by the Right Hon. John Bright, M.P., and Mr. Thorold Rogers, editor of Bright's speeches.

W. Bailly is said to be preparing a "Life of Albert (Richard) Smith," author of "History of Mont Blanc," &c.

The literary endeavour which Mr. Passmore Edwards failed to make a success, is to be re-attempted by Messrs. Nichols, of Parliament Street—viz., "A Magazine of Biography." It will include a register of births, marriages, and deaths, probates of wills, &c., besides obituary memoirs of eminent characters, and studies specially in neglected biography.

A memorial of Chaucer has been set up in Westminster Abbey, over his tomb in Poets' Corner.

A new cheap edition of the works of Skelton, "The Rabelais of Eng-

land," under the care of Alex. Dyer, is projected.

Mr. Arber's *English Reprints* have met with great success. The programme for 1869 is superior even to that of 1868. Among the most important are a "Harmony of the Essays of Lord Bacon," in four parallel columns; More's "Utopia," Puttenham's "Art of English Poesie," Habington's "Eastara," and several of the earliest English dramas.

A new historian, Joseph Irving, is to supply us with "Annals of Our Own Time."

"A History of the English Bible," by Brooke Foss Westcott, is promised.

From the original MSS. we are to have "The Life and Reminiscences of Henry Crabbe ("Prosperity") Robinson, one of our second-rate politicians, who was and saw much behind the scenes in statecraft.

A new complete uniform edition of the "Works of Archbishop Leighton," including life, letters, new sermons, miscellaneous pieces, chronological references, quotations correctly given, &c., in six vols. of English, and one of Latin, has been projected.

The Empress Charlotte is reported to be preparing a "History of the Re-establishment of the Mexican Empire," founded on public records and private documents.

A newly revised library edition of the "Works of Thomas Carlyle," in 30 vols., is in the press.

Samuel Lucas, author of "Secularia," "Mornings of the Recess," &c., died 31st November, aged 50.

T. W. Allie's "Formation of

Christendom," a united review of history, religion, and philosophy, will contain a chapter on Greek Philosophy in its relation to Christianity.

W. E. H. Lecky, the historian of Rationalism, has in the press "A History of European Morals, from Augustus to Charlemagne."

The Echo, an evening paper, published at one halfpenny, is printed by two of Marinoni's machines, recently erected at *The Echo* Office, capable of producing 80,000 perfect copies per hour. They are, we believe, the first of their kind introduced into this country, although they have been used for some time to print *Le Petit Journal*, the halfpenny evening paper of Paris, which has a circulation of over 250,000 copies per day.

We note how the work of some of our antiquarian printing societies stands. The Early English Text Society has its last book of the Original Series for 1868—Part III. of "The Romance of Merlin"—all printed; in its Extra Series it is still behindhand; only two-thirds of Chaucer's Prose Works, Part I. (Mr. Ellis's "Treatise on the Pronunciation of Chaucer and Shakespeare"), being in type; and Part II., the "Boethius," though all in type, not being wholly revised and prefaced; but Mr. Gibbs's "Chevalere Assigne" is ready, and Mr. Skeat's "Havelock the Dane" is now ready. The Chaucer Society has four of its six texts of "The Prologue" and "Knight's Tale" finished, and other two in type, with Mr. H. Ward's side-marks, showing exactly what lines of the "Knight's Tale" are translated, what paraphrased, and what imitated, from Boccaccio's "Teseide." Mr. Hoote's translation of Professor Ebert's review of Sandras's "Etude sur Chaucer" is also in type, and Mr. Brook's edition of

the Latin "Treatise on the Childe" is nearly ready. For the Ballad Society the first part is nearly ready of Mr. Furnivall's "Ballads from Manuscripts on the Condition of England during the Reigns of Henry the Eighth and Edward the Sixth, including the State of the Clergy," with a long introduction, inquiring whether Mr. Froude or the contemporary Ballads are right as to the prosperity or misery of the people. The second part of the same volume is half in type, and contains ballads on Wolsey, Anne Boleyn, Queen Elizabeth, Buckingham, Essex, &c. Richard Williams's "Poor Man's Pittance" is also in the press; three poems on Campion, Essex, and the Gunpowder Plot; "Captain Cox, his Ballads, and Books," or a reprint of Laneham's famous Kenilworth Tract, is to follow. The Roxburghe collection and the Civil War Ballads will begin, it is hoped, this year. The Roxburghe Library's last volume for the year—three rare tracts; one on Serving-Men, illustrating the social state of England in Elizabeth's time—is just ready.—*Athenaeum*.

The nephews of Sir Walter Scott have been less fortunate in the world than the sons of Robert Burns. The last surviving son of the Scottish poet is spending a green old age as a British colonel, while the last surviving nephew of the novelist—William Scott, son of Sir Walter's brother Daniel—is an inmate of the charitable "Home" of the St. Andrew's Society of Montreal. He is 64 years of age, and on week days saws and splits firewood for the Home.

Captain Burton is once more before the public. He is at this moment in Brazil, but his wife has brought his manuscript to Europe, and seen through the press his new work, "Explorations of the Highlands of the Brazil."

Mr. Tennyson is said to have granted to Messrs. Strahan and Co. a right of publication of his poems for two years for £8,000.

The Committee of the International and Permanent Peace League have opened a subscription to award a prize of 5,000 francs to the author of the best work on the "Crime of War."

The *Temps* contains an interesting article by M. Gustave d'Eichthal on the "Association for the Promotion of Greek Studies in France," founded June, 1867, by several of the most eminent members of the Institute and Philhellenes, including the author of the article. This Association found a ready and zealous protector in the Minister of Public Instruction, M. Duruy, who, at their suggestion, caused additional prizes to be offered for Greek composition at the Concours Général of the Lyceums at Paris and in the departments. Among the members of the Association there was the late M. Berryer, and M.M. Thiers and Stuart Mill are still of the number; so also many eminent men at Athens and Constantinople. The University of the former city has voted a large annual contribution to the funds of the Association, and even the Bank of Athens has had itself inscribed among the founders. There is at Constantinople a literary society, formed a few years ago by a number of distinguished *litterati*, under the name of "Hellenikos Philologikos Syllogos," having the same end in view—viz., that of promoting the knowledge of ancient Greek literature, as also its archaeology, history, and philosophy. Its researches on these subjects are published in its transactions which appear quarterly, and have been doing so for the last six years. The "Syllogos" has now entered into friendly correspondence with the Parisian Association, and many of its members now belong to

both. Among them is the chief of the Orthodox Church, Patriarch of Constantinople, and many of the higher Greek clergy. A merchant at Constantinople, M. Christakis Zographos, has sent over to the Association a sum of 20,000*f.*, the interest of which is to be given as an annual prize to the author of the best work calculated to promote the study of Greek. The Association has just published its "Annuaire" of 1868, and but lately awarded a prize to M. Tournier for his valuable edition of "Sophocles."—*Galignani*.

A cheap, popular edition of the works of Douglas W. Jerrold, wit, novelist, journalist, dramatist, &c., is in preparation.

The issue of a people's edition of "The Writings of Leigh Hunt," has been proposed.

"The Worthies of Warwickshire" is the excellent title of a good book projected by the Rev. F. L. Colville.

A work on the gods and men of the Greek historic age, to be named "The Youthhood of the World, *Juventus Mundi*," is in preparation, by W. E. Gladstone, Premier of England.

"Shaksperian Genealogy" will shortly receive illustrations from the pen of G. E. French.

"Hereditary Genius: its laws and consequences," an extension of papers contributed by Francis Gutton to *Macmillan's Magazine*, will soon be published.

The Lectures of Sir F. H. Doyle on "Poetry," as professor in the University of Oxford, are in the press.

In a volume of "Biographical Sketches," re-issued from the *Daily News*, 1852-68, containing notices of 5 royal personages, 11 politicians, 10 professional gentlemen, 2 men of science, 4 social celebrities, and 14 literary men, Miss Harriet Martineau (born 1802) signalizes her retirement

from literary labours, extending over 45 years.

Messrs. Strahan will, it is said, supply soon, what we have frequently suggested, a people's edition, good and cheap, of the poems of Alfred Tennyson.

Professor Welcker, philologist and archaeologist, died 19th December.

A biography of Sir Richard Steele, essayist, dramatist, &c., is in preparation by W. H. Wills, formerly sub-editor of *All the Year Round*, &c.

The King of Saxony has issued a people edition of his excellent version of Dante's "Divine Comedy" into German.

A new edition of Spenser's works, with a memoir, is announced as nearly ready.

A memorial window in honour of Henry Kirke White, and a medallion of the young poet, in white marble, have been presented by subscription to Wilford Church, Nottingham.

Two biographies of Rossini are already in progress—one by Mr. Ella, and another by Mr. Sutherland Edwards.

J. D. Forbes, D.C.L., late Principal of the United College, St. Andrew's, author of "Norway and its Glaciers," "Travels in the Alps," &c., died, 31st December.

Lamartine has nearly finished a poem on "Forgetfulness."

William B. Jerrold has been commissioned by Government to inspect the pauper hospitals of Europe.

Martin F. Tupper's "Proverbial Philosophy" has just been translated into Swedish under Royal patronage.

The authoress of the "Women Articles" in the *Saturday Review* was, it is said, Miss Alderson, sister of the Countess of Salisbury, and is Mrs. Lynn Linton, the novelist.

C. B. Wild, author of the "History of the Royal Society," of which he was assistant-secretary, died, January.

Sir Henry Ellis, formerly principal librarian of the British Museum, editor of "Dugdale's Monasticon," &c., died, January.

A collection of early tracts on "Steamboat Navigation" is shortly to be issued.

A new journal is spoken of in Paris, which will take for title the significant name of *l'Avant-Garde*, and will have for editor Victor Hugo. Among the list of contributors figures the name of Mr. Henri Rochefort.

During 1868 1918 books, including new editions, were published in the United States. Of these 1450 were original American works, 359 reprints of English books, and the remaining 109 translations or reprints of books published on the continent of Europe. A classification of the titles results as follows:—Theology, 264; juvenile works, 235; fiction, 310; law, 108; arts and sciences and fine-art books, 116; trade, commerce, and political economy, 41; travel and geographical research, 82; history and biography, 174; poetry and the drama, 127; year-books and annual publications, 134; medicine and surgery, 101; education, philology, and classical literature, 71; miscellaneous, 155.

Modern Historians.

GEORGE GROTE, D.C.L., LL.D., F.R.S., &c.,

Historian of Greece, and Expositor of Plato.

"It has been well said that 'there are some men whose writings have an interest for us even before we begin to read them; the instant that they rise, as it were, to address us, we are hushed into deep attention.' Such is, in great measure, the case with the history before us. The singularity of the author's position is of itself enough to excite, if not our admiration, at least our wonder and curiosity. Every reader of the two previous works on the same subject must have been struck by the contrast between the respective authors. We would not, indeed, underrate the calm, practical wisdom which Dr. Thirlwall has had the opportunity of displaying, not only in his history, but in that perhaps unparalleled succession of charges which has since distinguished his episcopal career. Nor should we, in fairness to the fallen warrior, who headed the forlorn hope of our countrymen into the enchanted fortress of Grecian story, forget the immense difference between the phantoms which flitted across the stage of Goldsmith, and the men of flesh and blood who crowd the solid ground of Mitford. Still it is impossible not to miss from time to time in the marble coldness of the Bishop of St. David's something of the animating warmth which his predecessor derived from his practical life as an English country gentleman; while, on the other hand, every one recognises the abundant stores of knowledge, and the tact of finished erudition, with which the Cambridge scholar was so largely gifted, and which to the Hampshire squire were almost entirely denied. It is from the combination of two excellences in Mr. Grote that we might anticipate a result of almost unique value. To far more than Mitford's experience of public life, he joins an intimacy with the classical authors and their foreign commentators, at least equal to that of his immediate predecessor. A man of business, and a recluse professor—a strenuous advocate of vote by ballot, and an indefatigable student of classical antiquity, are the elements which have met together in this laborious performance. The union of experiences which Arnold so earnestly desired, and which Niebuhr to a certain extent enjoyed, for the history of Rome, has been now, probably for the first time, exemplified in the third English historian of Greece."*

* *Quarterly Review*, March, 1850, p. 385.

Such are some of the words of characterization which have been accorded, even by political opponents, to Mr. Grote—most deservedly, as is now universally admitted. How grateful then must it have been to those students of University College, London, to whom prizes and certificates of honour were on 1st July, 1846, publicly distributed, to receive the same from the hand of the illustrator of the annals of Greece, George Grote, Esq., who “presided at the request of the council”! We are glad to be able to give a few extracts from the address which the historian then delivered to the students, choosing for this purpose the allusion he makes to his own connection with the institution, his remarks on the requirements of modern education, and on the nature of collegiate study (in which we fancy we see a slight self-reference), and his hortation on life and culture, all of which will, we believe, be read with interest, not only for their own value, but because they are not found in any easily accessible form elsewhere. They run as follows:—

“To be the instrument of placing in the hands of those students most distinguished for their ability and diligence that meed of honour which they have so fairly won, is a duty which no man can perform unmoved, and which the first men among us for position and intellect might well be proud to perform. In the success of University College I have always felt a sincere and lively interest, have taken a part, though an humble part, in its first foundation, and have had my name honoured by being commemorated with the foundation-stone as a member of its earliest council. . . . In former centuries, when the great universities now existing in Europe were founded, the range of science and literature open to be studied was very narrow; but now each separate branch has been widened, and several new branches have been put forth; the mathematical and physical sciences have come to comprise an immeasurable mass of theorems and general facts, such as could not have been imagined even in the time of Lord Bacon: the true requirements of scientific method, the progress of logic and induction, and the phenomena of psychology generally, have been reviewed and analysed anew by minds trained to these positive investigations; the languages and literature of the ancient world, though not more extensive in respect of original documents than they were a century ago, have yet been examined by more piercing eyes, and have been found to suggest inferences which reproduce Rome and Athens under new points of view; comparative grammar and philology have brought languages, ancient and modern, distant and near, under one common analytical survey. Moreover, in addition to that which constitutes the stock of the scientific and literary men, there are the ministers of applied science, the practical chemist and the civil engineer, who have acquired, in the present industrial development of society, an importance such as those professors never before enjoyed; and, though last mentioned yet not least in importance, the schoolmaster of the present day has come to have his dignified mission correctly appreciated. Here are large intellectual exigencies belonging to our age, and tending to yet farther increase and expansion for the future. . . . I hope, and I believe, that they will succeed in diffusing among the public of London larger ideas on the proper measure of a citizen’s education—in correcting

that mistaken impatience with which parents, often under no pressure of necessity, abridge those years requisite for their son's complete education, and hurry him into professional life a half-educated man: above all, I hope they will succeed in extending and deepening that love of knowledge without which every man, let his station or prosperity in life be what it may, remains essentially mutilated in one of the most essential features of the human character. To bind men together by this *love of knowledge*, (the primitive meaning of the word philosophy), a tie more ample and comprehensive than either political or theological party, to concentrate in the same establishment an array of distinguished teachers, with wide diversities of intellectual aptitude, yet organized and acting in concert towards the grand purpose of all-sided education, to eliminate at the same time those seeds of discord which cause what is meant for mankind to be given up to sect or party,—this has been the animating scheme of University College, in which every exalted and patriotic mind will wish to it the fullest success. . . . The knowledge which your residence in University College has implanted in you, the literary and scientific associations which are now grouped in your minds, the habits of reading and application of which you have shown such conspicuous proof, are not mere artificial enforcements applied to your youth, destined to be thrown aside when you take up the active duties of a profession; they are to be preserved and cultivated side by side with those duties, as the recreation, the treasure, the interior mental life of the professional man. The man of regular habits will suffice for both exigences; he will indeed account pecuniary independence and self-reliance to be an obligation not less imperative than pecuniary integrity; but the largest construction of this obligation will still leave him leisure enough to preserve him from the misfortune—I had almost said the disgrace—of an unlettered life—that unlettered life which has been characterized by more than one eminent man, as a life no better than death, *Vita sine literis mors est*" (a life without knowledge is death).

It is interesting to note that the names of not a few on the lists of honour-men of this year have been written with distinction since in law, science, legislation, medicine, literature, &c. Without attempting an exhaustive enumeration, and without intended invidiousness, we may name Walter Bagehot, editor of the *Economist*; E. A. Leatham, M.P. for Huddersfield; Rev. Edward Steere, LL.D.; Rev. Robert Halley, D.D., Principal of New College, London, &c.

Sir Wm. Molesworth, Bart., in 1846 completed the issue of his edition of "The Works of Thomas Hobbes, of Malmesbury," with the exception—unfortunately for metaphysics—of the life of the author and a view of his philosophy, which was intended to form the closing volume, but the preparation of which was interrupted by Sir William's entrance into political life as Member for Southwark, in the interests of philosophical radicalism. These works, "deservedly admired, as well for depth of thought as for exquisite precision of style, both in Latin and English," are "indispensable for all who wish to acquire a mastery of metaphysical science." Up to that time it had been "a source of regret, and even of well-merited reproach, that whilst the productions of his contemporaries (Bacon, Grotius, Galileo, Gassendi, Descartes, Milton, and we may

add Locke) have been carefully collected, a similar degree of diligence had not been evinced with regard to those of the master-mind Hobbes;" and we quite agree in the opinion which Mr. Grote expressed, that "the philosophical public are much indebted to Sir William Molesworth for this new edition of the works of Hobbes."

Our chief reason for the mention of this literary fact is, that it affords us an opportunity of noting and quoting the well-digested and original views of the Greek historian on this distinguished thinker, who endeavoured to place "the moral and political sciences upon firm and indisputable bases," but who found himself "confirmed in that aversion to democracy and civil broils to which his constitutional timidity naturally predisposed him," by the study and translation of Thucydides. Our quotations are taken from an article reviewing the first two volumes of "Molesworth's Hobbes," which appeared in the "*Spectator*, 13th April, 1839, to which we would refer the reader for some farther literary, biographical, and philosophical details. We present our extracts merely as a whet to the appetite of the reader:—

"There is doubtless much of striking remark, of enlarged anticipation, and of aphoristic and illustrative expression, scattered throughout Lord Bacon's works; but we venture to affirm that in all those qualities which go to make up the philosophical investigator—in the clear apprehension and searching analysis of intellectual difficulties, in systematic following out of deductions from his premises, in perspicuous exposition of the most perplexed subjects, and in earnest application of his mind to the discovery of the truth, whether the truth when attained be of a welcome or of an unwelcome character,—in all these great mental endowments the superiority of Hobbes to Bacon is most decisive and unquestionable. . . . Had it not been unfortunately the fact, as Bishop Butler has remarked, that even amongst the number of persons who desire to know *what has been said*, not one in a hundred cares to find out *what is true*—we are persuaded that the moral, the metaphysical, and the political works of Hobbes would have been considered as entitled to a very distinguished place in the esteem of every instructed man. For, in order to peruse them with interest and advantage, it is by no means necessary that the reader should sit down with the submissive faith of a disciple, or that he should acquiesce implicitly in the conclusions which he finds laid out for him. No frame of mind can be less suitable for the perusal of Hobbes, who addresses himself exclusively to the rational convictions of every man, and who disdains, more perhaps than any other philosopher, ancient or modern, all indirect and underhand methods of procuring mere passive adhesion. There is a fearless simplicity and straightforwardness in his manner, which, while it conveys his own meaning, without reserve, operates at the same time most powerfully to awaken a train of original reflection in the reader; and this fruit of his writings, rare and valuable to the last degree, is admitted even by the least friendly critics. . . . The persons most interested in these writings, within our own observation, have usually been men of radical principles, who entertained the loftiest ideas both of the functions of government and of the possible training of the people—men who agreed

with Hobbes in his antipathy to those class interests which constitute the working forces of modern pseudo-representative monarchy, but who differed from him by thinking that their best chance for combining rational submission on the part of the governed with enlarged and beneficent views on the part of the governors was to be found in a well-organized representative system. . . . To admit or reject particular doctrines, not on account of the weight of affirmative or negative evidence, but on account of the inferences to which they give rise respecting the excellence or turpitude of human nature, is in effect to subvert the whole scientific edifice of moral and metaphysical philosophy—to degrade the science into a mere assemblage of conventional fictions, which it is dangerous to scrutinize and criminal to overthrow. The less analytical philosophers have been generally but too ready to employ this method of discrediting those who pushed the process of analysis further than themselves, unconscious that they were at the same time undermining the fabric and destroying the trustworthiness even of such doctrines as were common to both. If Hobbes had spoken of human nature in terms of the most stinging cynicism, or with the sternness of an Antinomian divine, it would still have been unworthy of sound philosophy to employ this method of refuting him: but, in reality, he has dealt in no such unmeasured censure. He speaks of mankind like a shrewd and penetrating observer, applying his remarkable powers of analysis to the phenomena which he saw before him. Sir James Mackintosh complains that Hobbes ‘strikes the affections out of his map of human nature;’ and others have alleged in like manner that he denies the existence of any benevolence in man, because he treats the benevolent as well as the other affections as being not inherent or original, but as derivative, and resolvable into the primary sentiments of pleasure and pain. It is common with metaphysicians of the Scotch school to represent such a doctrine as tantamount to a denial of the existence and efficacy of the benevolent affections: but this is a great injustice; for our compound and derivative feelings are just as real, and just as much a part of our human nature, as our simple and original feelings. And it would be full as reasonable to say that Bishop Berkeley, when he showed that the perception of distance by the eye was not original but acquired, denied the reality of the visual power in human nature—as to accuse Hobbes of disputing the fact that there *were* benevolent affections, because he disputes their title to originality. . . . The first two sections of the treatise ‘De Corpore,’ entitled ‘Computatio sive Logica,’ and ‘Philosophia Prima,’ appear to us among the most instructive and valuable of his works, exhibiting a rare combination of analytical sagacity with condensed and perspicuous expression, and assisting most powerfully to unravel those extreme abstractions, without the comprehension of which no man can successfully cope with the difficulties of mental philosophy.”

These hints of the estimate which Mr. Grote has formed of the philosopher whose speculations determined, in a great measure, the character and direction of thought in Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Hartley, Mill, &c., derive their chief importance from the fact that they show not only the fulness of the information the writer possesses, and the thoroughness of the investigation he expends on every study, but the independence of his mind in forming judg-

ments. In this paper he shows a competent acquaintance with the specialities of the Scottish philosophy.

In 1847 appeared the third and fourth volumes of "*The History of Greece*," in which the main topics treated are the age of despots, the early history of Athens, the life, character, poems, laws and constitutions of Solon; the colonies of Greece, the state, condition, and relation of the nations surrounding Greece, the Pan-Hellenic festivals, Greek lyric poetry, the seven sages, Peisistratus and the Peisistratids, the growth of the Persian empire, Cyrus and Darius, the Ionic revolt against Persia, and the battle of Marathon, concluding with a chapter on the Ionic philosophers, especially Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans. Equally with the former volumes these were hailed by critics as displaying a wonderful harmony of imaginative reproductiveness, acute ratiocination, erudite acquisition, and sound judgment; in them as a reviewer has said, "Poetry and philosophy attend the historian on either hand, and do not impede or misguide his steps." Immediately after the issue of these volumes, their author, who lives a life of learned research indeed, but wisely varies it by extensive intercourse with society at home and abroad, left home for Switzerland, passing through France, with whose internal history and affairs he is singularly well acquainted. He had resigned his seat in the Commons' house of parliament, but he had not resigned his interest in the welfare of man, nor the insight for the analogies of time and circumstance which the historian and the politician always exerts and employs.

"Of the numerous travellers who, during the course of every summer, visit the magnificent scenery of Switzerland, there are not many who interest themselves in the political or social condition of the people." Mr. Grote, however, is no ordinary wayfarer, with pleasure and self-interest uppermost in his mind. In 1847, "the serious character which Swiss politics" had assumed, disturbed the ease and prospects of commonplace sightseers; and diverted in many cases the summer sojourners from the health-resorts that nestle between the Lakes of Constance and Geneva. Mr. Grote felt that the social politics of the Swiss republic ought to be full of interest to all intelligent people, and acknowledged that "to one whose studies lie in the contemplation and interpretation of historical phenomena they are especially instructive—partly from the many specialities and differences of race, language, religion, civilization, wealth, habits, &c., which distinguish one part of the population from another, comprising between the Rhine and the Alps a miniature of all Europe, and exhibiting the fifteenth century in immediate juxtaposition with the nineteenth—partly from the free and unrepressed action of the people, which brings out such distinctive attributes in full relief and contrast. To myself in particular they present an additional ground of interest, from a certain political analogy (nowhere else to be found in Europe) with those who prominently occupy my thoughts,

and on the history of whom I am still engaged—the ancient Greeks.”

The foregoing quotation is taken from the preface to “Seven Letters on the Recent Politics of Switzerland,” originally published in the *Spectator*, between 4th September and 16th October, 1847; and republished immediately thereafter in a small and now rare volume, as embodying “the results of reading and inquiry during a recent excursion in Switzerland,” in the course of which he attended the debates in the Diet, and conversed with the chief politicians and statesmen of the time in the land of Tell. This series of letters contains a very excellent epitome of the history of Switzerland for nearly twenty years, an intelligible account of the cantonal divisions and peculiarities of that country, a sketch of the interworking of the sectional and the sovereign authorities, and a statement of the special features of party in the republic. It includes besides an estimate of the respective social influences of Catholicism and Protestantism, of the evils of a *cleroocracy* or priestly government, especially in the hands of the Jesuits; and a view of the system of taxation and finance adopted in the several cantons, and in the supreme government. The perusal of it would show how strangely history repeats itself by suggesting an intimate analogy between the revolutionary struggles of the cantons in the Alpine republic, and the State rebellions of the transatlantic democracy. Had the importance of the Swiss experiences of 1840—1848 been duly estimated by our modern historians, the writers for the daily press, there might have been greater foresight of Western events exhibited in newspaper literature.

It would lead us too far from our main object in this paper to enter into farther details regarding this book, but it may be interesting to know Mr. Grote's opinion of M. Guizot in the shadow of the revolution of 1848. Speaking of that *doctrinaire's* interference with Swiss politics as a useful manœuvre in reference to his own position in France, by giving him an opportunity of inflaming the public “against Radical principles, and of impressing upon them the dignity of Conservative politics sanctified by religious zeal,” he goes on to say that Louis Philippe's minister “owes that position not to any esteem or confidence entertained towards him by the French people—still less to any hopes which they feel of progress or improvement under his ministry; but chiefly to the fears which the French electoral body have been taught to entertain of Radicalism.” The food riots in 1847 led to a development of feeling too overwhelming to be resisted, and Radicalism was called into place to conserve France,—but the words Napoleon III. indicate with what success.

The year of revolutions, 1848, proved the sagacity of the eye that saw in the Swiss troubles an intentional diversion from internal difficulties, but we know no incident in the historian's life due to this date, except that he put to press at the close of that year the fifth and sixth volumes of his Hellenic narrative,—volumes dealing

with the Persian war, and the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, the battles of Thermopylæ, Artemisium, Salamis, Platæa, and Mycale, the retreat of Xerxes, and the final repulse of the Persians; the lives and characters of Miltiades, Themistocles, and Aristides; the establishment of popular government in Sicily, the proceedings of the Greek confederacy under the leadership of Athens, the early years of the administration of Pericles, the thirty years' truce and the events of the Peloponnesian war till the peace of Nicias. These volumes appeared in 1849, and along with them there was published a new and revised edition of the first four volumes, incorporating remarks and corrections suggested by "various critics, contained in reviews both English and foreign," some suppressions or rectifications of opinions advanced in error or on inadequate evidence, and several enlargements in illustration or defence of opinions called in question, and containing this announcement:—

"Having now finished six volumes of this history without attaining a lower point than the peace of Nicias in the tenth year of the Peloponnesian war, I find myself compelled to retract the expectation held out in the preface of my first edition, that the entire work might be completed in eight volumes. Experience proves to me how impossible it is to measure beforehand the space which historical subjects will require. All I can now promise is, that the remainder of the work shall be executed with as much regard to brevity as is consistent with the paramount duty of rendering it fit for public acceptance."

Two additional volumes (vii. and viii.) were issued in 1850. In these two volumes Mr. Grote carries on the history of Greece from the peace of Nicias (B.C. 421) to the close of the Peloponnesian War (B.C. 404). The personages of Grecian history casually exhibited or elaborately reviewed in it are—among the Athenians, Nicias, Alcibiades, Antiphon, Theramenes, Socrates, Critias, Thrasybulus, and others of less note,—among the Lacedæmonians, Gylippus, Agis II., Callicratidas, Lysander, &c. In general terms it may be said that the period of the public life of Alcibiades coincides exactly with the period of Grecian history traversed in these two volumes; and, after the death of Nicias, towards the close of the first of these volumes, it is chiefly the figure of Alcibiades that the reader seeks to keep in his eye. Owing to the peculiar style of his activity this is not easy. From his escape to Sparta (B.C. 414) to his return to the Athenian service (B.C. 411) we catch but a glimpse of him intriguing here and there—at Sparta with the Spartans, in Asia Minor with the Persians. Thenceforward to his second exile (B.C. 407) a period of lustre; after which we hear little more of him till his death in Phrygia (B.C. 403) by order of the Persian satrap, amid the horrors of fire, the shouts of enemies, and beneath a shower of darts—the dark of night and of death being lighted only by his blazing home.

What a wonderful panorama of facts does the story of these two volumes afford! The failure of the half-century of truce agreed on

at the peace of Nicias, between the Athenians and the Spartans; the large and splendid Syracusan expedition disastrously and disgracefully foiled, and the *prestige* of Athens almost destroyed thereby; the confederation between Persia and Sparta, and the conspiracy of her own citizens to overthrow the government and to institute the oligarchy of the four hundred; the arousing might of democracy applied to the discomfiture of the oligarchy—basely making overtures of submission to their Spartan rivals; the first exile of Alcibiades on an accusation of irreligion, and his second on account of a sea defeat at Notium, which a lieutenant under him sustained; the difficulties of Athens under the combined attack of Lysander the Spartan, and Cyrus the Satrap, afterwards king of Persia; the defeat of the Athenian fleet at Ægospotami (B.C. 405); the establishment, under Spartan auspices, of “the thirty tyrants,” their defeat and expulsion under Thrasybulus, and the institution of the magistracy of the Ten—form some of the topics whose glow and warmth, intensity and complexity, stir and resultfulness, give interest to the page, animation to the narrative, and ground for dissertation, explanation, and inference.

The greater portion of the eighth volume turns away from history proper to poetry, oratory, and philosophy. Having omitted, as Mr. Mill notices, a whole generation of poets,—the generation of Pindar,—Mr. Grote discourses on “the drama, rhetoric, and dialectics” and the “Sophists.” The sixty-eighth chapter he devotes to Socrates; and in regard to these two chapters the following allusion is made in the preface:—

“It has been hitherto common to treat the Sophists as corrupters of the Greek mind, and to set forth the fact of such corruption increasing as we descend downwards from the great invasion of Xerxes, as historically certified. Dissenting as I do from former authors, and believing that Grecian history has been greatly misconceived on both these points—I have been forced to discuss the evidences and exhibit the reasons for my own way of thinking, at considerable length. To Sokratēs I have devoted one entire chapter. No smaller space would have sufficed to lay before the reader any tolerable picture of that illustrious man—the rarest intellectual phenomenon of ancient times, and originator of the most powerful scientific impulse which the Greek mind ever underwent.”

The portions of the work here spoken of have excited great interest in the literary and philosophical world, and have been justly characterized by Mr. Mill as—

“Those admirable chapters on the sophists and on Socrates, which may be pronounced the most important portion yet written of this history; whether we consider the intrinsic interest of their subjects—the deep-rooted historical errors which they tend to dispel—or the great permanent instruction contained in their display of the characteristics of one of the most eminent men who ever lived—a man unique in history.”—*J. S. Mill's “Dissertations and Discussions,”* vol. ii., p. 510.

The author gives this statement of the opinion entertained respectively of the Sophists and of Socrates:—

"The Sophists are spoken of as a new class of men, or sometimes in language which implies a new doctrinal sect or school, as if they then sprang up in Greece for the first time—ostentatious impostors, flattering and duping the rich youth for their own personal gain, undermining the morality of Athens both public and private, and encouraging their pupils to the unscrupulous prosecution of ambition and cupidity. They are affirmed even to have succeeded in corrupting the general morality, so that Athens had become miserably degenerated and vicious in the latter years of the Peloponnesian war, as compared with what she was in the time of Miltiades and Aristides; Sokrates, on the contrary, is usually described as a holy man combating and exposing these false prophets—standing up as the champion of morality against their insidious artifices."

This notion he holds to be quite unwarrantable, and he contends that a "Sophist," in the genuine sense of the word, was a wise man, a clever man, one who stood prominently before the public as distinguished for intellect or talent of some kind." All who publicly taught or professed to teach rhetoric or dialectics were called Sophists. It is thus that Mr. Grote distinguishes between these two sorts of instruction:—

"The rhetorical teaching was an attempt to assist and improve men in the power of continuous speech as addressed to assembled numbers, such as the public assembly or the dikastery; it was therefore a species of training sought for by men of active pursuits and ambition, either that they might succeed in public life, or that they might maintain their rights and dignity if called before the court of justice. On the other hand, the dialectic business had no direct reference to public life, to judicial pleading, or to any assembled large number. It was a dialogue carried on by two disputants usually before a few hearers, to unravel some obscurity, to reduce the respondent to silence and contradiction, to exercise both parties in mastery of the subject, or to sift the consequences of some problematic assumption. It was spontaneous conversation systematized and turned into some predetermined channel; furnishing a stimulus to thought, and a means of improvement not attainable in any other manner—furnishing to some also a source of profit or display. It opened a line of serious intellectual pursuit to men of a speculative or inquisitive turn, who were deficient in voice, or boldness, in continuous memory for public speaking; or who desired to keep themselves apart from the political and judicial animosities of the moment."

Passing next to his opinions on Sokrates, we may present the following quotations to our readers:—

"Three peculiarities distinguish the man. 1. His long life passed in contented poverty, and in public apostolic dialectics. 2. His strong religious persuasion—or belief of acting under a mission and sign from the gods, especially his *Dæmon* or *Genius*—the special religious warning of which he believed himself frequently to be the subject. 3. His great intellectual originality, both of subject and method, and his power of stirring and forcing the germ of inquiry and ratiocination in others."

And of this method, this dialectical controversy, this turning men's minds to human life and duty, this advocacy of the opinion

that "the proper study of mankind is man," so powerful, original, and effective, the following brief intimation may supply a hint:—

"On such questions as these, What is justice? What is piety? What is democracy? What is law?—every man fancied that he could give a confident opinion, and even wondered that any other persons should feel a difficulty. When Sokratès, professing ignorance, put any such question, he found no difficulty in obtaining an answer, given off-hand, and with very little reflection. The answer purported to be an explanation or a definition of a term—familiar indeed, but of wide comprehensive import—given by one who had never before tried to render to himself an account of what it meant. Having got this answer, Sokratès put fresh questions, applying it to specific cases, to which the respondent was compelled to give answers inconsistent with the first; thus showing that the definition was either too narrow, or too wide, or defective in some essential condition. The respondent then amended his answer; but this was a prelude to other questions, which could only be answered in ways inconsistent with the amendment; and the respondent, after many attempts to disentangle himself, was obliged to plead guilty to the inconsistencies, with an admission that he could make no satisfactory answer to the original query, which had at first appeared so easy and familiar. Or if he did not himself admit this, the hearers at least felt, it forcibly. The dialogue, as given to us, commonly ends with a result purely negative, proving that the respondent was incompetent to answer the question proposed to him in a manner consistent and satisfactory even to himself. Sokratès, as he professed from the beginning to have no positive theory to support, so he maintains to the end the same air of a learner, who would be glad to solve the difficulty if he could, but regrets to find himself disappointed of that instruction which the respondent had promised."

On the peculiar value of these chapters, and of our own views on the material elements of the facts and arguments, we need not now enlarge, as we have had an opportunity on several former occasions of referring to the questions raised in these ingenious disquisitions. We, at present, particularly refer to our papers on *European Philosophy*.—"The Sophists," *British Controversialist* for April and May, 1860, pp. 217—234, and 289—298; and "Socrates," July, 1860, pp. 1—12.

As we have paused in our course to make these remarks, quotations, and references, it may be as well to note here some matters to which we intended to refer, which may be best accomplished by making the following quotations:—

1. On the spirit in which Greek history has been and should be written.

"As Grecian history has been usually written, we are instructed to believe that the misfortunes, and corruption, and the degradation of the democratical states are brought upon them by the classes of demagogues of whom Kleon, Hyperbolus, Androcles, &c., stand forth as specimens. These men are represented as mischief-makers and revilers, accusing without just cause, and converting innocence into treason. Now the history of this conspiracy of the four hundred presents to us the other side of the picture. It shows that the political enemies—against whom the Athenian

people were protected by their democratical institutions, and by the demagogues as living organs of those institutions—were not fictitious, but dangerously real. It reveals the continued existence of powerful anti-popular combinations, ready to come together for treasonable purposes, when the moment appeared safe and tempting. It manifests the character and morality of the leaders, to whom the direction of the anti-popular force naturally fell. It proves that these leaders, men of uncommon ability, required nothing more than the extinction or silence of the demagogues, to be able to subvert the popular securities and get possession of the government. We need no better proof to teach us what was the real function and intrinsic necessity of these demagogues in the Athenian system—taking them as a class, and apart from the manner in which individuals among them have performed their duty. They formed the vital movement of all that was tutelary and public-spirited in democracy. Aggressive in respect to official delinquents, they were defensive in respect to the public and the constitution. If that anti-popular force, which Antiphon found ready made, had not been efficient, at a much earlier moment, in stifling democracy—it was because there were demagogues to cry aloud, as well as assemblies to hear and sustain them. If Antiphon's conspiracy was successful, it was because he knew where to aim his blows so as to strike down the real enemies of the oligarchy and the real defenders of the people. I here employ the term demagogues because it is that used commonly by those who denounce the class of men here under review: the proper neutral phrase, laying aside odious associations, would be to call them popular speakers or opposition speakers. But by whatever name they may be called, it is impossible rightly to conceive their position in Athens without looking at them in contrast and antithesis with these anti-popular forces against which they formed an indispensable barrier, and which come forth into such manifest and melancholy working under the organizing hands of Antiphon and Phrynichus."

2. An abstract of Hellenic history as prospective :—

"About 560 B.C. two important changes are seen to come into operation, which alter the character of Grecian history—extricating it out of its former chaos of detail, and centralizing its isolated phenomena :—1. The subjugation of the Asiatic Greeks by Lydia and by Persia, followed by their struggles for emancipation—wherein the European Greeks became implicated, first as accessories, and afterwards as principals. 2. The combined action of the large mass of Greeks under Sparta, as their most powerful state and acknowledged chief, succeeded by the rapid and extraordinary growth of Athens, the complete development of Grecian maritime powers, and the struggle between Athens and Sparta for headship. These two causes, though distinct in themselves, must nevertheless be regarded as working together to a certain degree—or rather, the second grew out of the first. For it was the Persian invasion of Greece which first gave birth to a wide-spread alarm and antipathy among the leading Greeks (we must not call it Pan-Hellenic, since more than half of the Amphiktyonic constituency gave earth and water to Xerxes) against the barbarians of the East, and impressed them with the necessity of joint active operations under a leader. The idea of a leadership or hegemony of collective Hellas, as a privilege necessarily vested in some one state for common security against the barbarians, thus became current—an idea foreign to the mind of Solon,

or any one of the same age. Next came the miraculous development of Athens, and the violent contest between her and Sparta which should be the leader; the large portion of Hellas taking side with one or the other, and the common quarrel against the Persian being for the time put out of sight. Athens is put down, Sparta acquires the undisputed hegemony, and again the anti-barbaric feeling manifests itself, though faintly, in the Asiatic expedition of Agesilaus, but the Spartans, too incompetent either to deserve or maintain this exalted position, are overthrown by the Thebans—themselves not less incompetent, with the single exception of Epaminondas. The death of that single man extinguishes the pretensions of Thebes to the hegemony; and Hellas is left, like the deserted Penelope in the 'Odyssey,' worried by the competition of several suitors, none of whom are strong enough to stretch the bow on which the prize depends. Such a manifestation of force, as well as the trampling down of the competing suitors, is reserved not for any legitimate Hellenic arm, but for a semi-Hellenized Macedonian, 'brought up at Pella,' and making good his encroachments gradually from the north of Olympus. The hegemony of Greece thus passed for ever out of Grecian hands; but the conqueror finds his interest in rekindling the old sentiment under the influence of which it had first sprung up. He bends to him the discordant Greeks, by the force of their ancient and common antipathy against the Greek king, until the desolation and sacrilege once committed by Xerxes at Athens is avenged by the annihilation of the Persian empire. And this victorious consummation of the Pan-Hellenic antipathy—the dream of Xenophon and the ten thousand Greeks after the battle of Kunaxa—the hope of Jason of Phœræ—the exhortation of Isokrates—the project of Philip and the achievement of Alexander,—while it manifests the irresistible might of Hellenic ideas and organization in the then existing state of the world, is at the same time the closing scene of substantive Grecian life. The citizen feelings of Greece became afterwards merely secondary forces, subordinate to the preponderance of Greek emergencies under Macedonian order, and to the rudest of all native Hellenes—the Ætolian mountaineers. Some few individuals are found, even in the third century B.C., worthy of the best times of Hellas, and the Achaean confederation of that century is an honourable attempt to contend against irresistible difficulties; but on the whole, that free, social, and political march, which gives so much interest to the earlier centuries, is irrevocably banished from Greece after the generation of Alexander the Great.'

3. Mr. Grote's estimate of Athenian progress:—

"Nothing in the political history of Greece is so remarkable as the Athenian empire; taking it as it stood in its completeness, from about 460—413 B.C. (the date of the Syracusan catastrophe), or still more from 460—424 B.C. (the date when Brasidas made his conquests in Thrace). After the Syracusan catastrophe, the conditions of the empire were altogether changed; it was irretrievably broken up, though the Athenians still continued an energetic struggle to retain some of the fragments. But if we view it as it stood before that event, during the period of its integrity, it is a sight marvellous to contemplate, and its workings must be pronounced, in my judgment, to have been highly beneficial to the Grecian world. No Grecian state except Athens could have sufficed to organize such a system, or to hold in partial, though regulated, continuous, and specific communion, so many little states, each animated with that force of political repulsion

instinctive to the Grecian mind. This was a mighty task, worthy of Athens, and to which no state except Athens was competent. We have already seen in part, and we shall see still further, how little qualified Sparta was to perform it; and we shall have occasion to notice a like fruitless essay on the part of Thebes."

To this we do not think we could do better than subjoin the opinion of Mr. Millon the same subject:—

"Though Grecian history is crowded with objects of interest, all others are eclipsed by Athens. Whatever in Greece most merits the gratitude of posterity, Athens possessed in fullest measure. If the Hellenic nation is in history the main source and most conspicuous representative of progress, Athens may claim the same honourable position in regard to Greece itself; for all the Greek elements of progress, in their highest culmination were united in their illustrious city. This was not the effect of an original superiority in the natural endowments of the Athenian mind. In the first exuberant outpourings of Grecian genius, Athens bore no more than her share, if even so much. The many famous poets and musicians who preceded the era of Marathon, the early speculations in science and philosophy, and even the first historians, were scattered through all the divisions of the Greek name; with a preponderance on the side of the Ionians of Asia Minor, the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, and the islanders, all of whom gained prosperity much earlier, as well as lost it sooner, than the inhabitants of continental Greece. Even Bœotia produced two poets of first rank, Pindar and Corinna, at a time when Attica had only yet produced one. By degrees, however, the whole intellect of Greece, except the purely practical, gravitated to Athens, until, in the maturity of Grecian culture, all the great writers, speakers, and thinkers, were educated, and nearly all of them were born and passed their lives in that centre of enlightenment."—*J. S. Mill's "Dissertations and Discussions,"* vol. ii., p. 520.

Volumes ninth and tenth were not produced till 1852, as a third edition of the four earlier volumes, and a second edition of the fifth and sixth had been called for in 1851. In 1853 volume eleventh was issued alone, and the heavy task was only brought to a conclusion by the publication of the twelfth volume in 1855. It is a curious fact in itself, as well as an illustration of the distinct popularity which the work had attained, retained, and commanded, that of this last volume, 1,200 copies were sold during the currency of the first week of its issue, a sale far exceeding that of even a popular novel in ordinary circumstances.

These last four volumes of this gigantic work carry on the story of Greece in a more continuous and animated narrative, though, as we think, with less vitality of interest than the previous tomes displayed. This consecution of event on event is gained by his adjournment of the consideration of the philosophical character and teaching of Plato for subsequent and separate treatment, and his confining the notice of that great and important hero of Greek thought to his personal and political relations, especially his share of the transactions which bring Sicilian life within the sweep of

Hellenic history. The expedition of Cyrus and Xenophon's *Retreat* of the Ten Thousand afford materials for the earlier chapters—chapters realized to us by an eyewitness and actor. Then we have the thirty years' ascendancy of Sparta, the recoil against their oppressive selfishness, and the complete defeat of the Lacedæmonian power by Epaminondas at Leuctra (371 B.C.) in such a humiliating manner as it richly merited, and the brief restoration of Athens to chieftaincy and dignity. Sicilian Greece next becomes the stage and theatre of the historic drama of reality. The Dionysian dynasty, in the successive phases of its rise and fall, is vigorously and rigorously sketched, and we have splendid episodes on Dion, and on the Sicilian liberator, Timoleon. From this the author turns to "that gloomy period of Grecian history, the age of Philip of Macedon," and the glorious story of the powerful, wise, and statesmanly Demosthenes. The history terminates with the last sad act of inevitable doom—"the fatal day of Chæroneia;" for "the historian accustomed to the Grecian world, as described by Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, feels that the life has departed from his subject, and with sadness and humiliation brings his narrative to a close,"—"the *free life* of collective Hellas" has been exhausted. How brilliant, how intricate, how interesting, and how glorious is the tale!—how manifold its windings, how singular its events, and how remarkable its results! What a marvellous outcome of thought and toil, of scholarship and diligent collation of facts and statements is this work! In it the birthday of Athenian greatness—the day of Marathon, which gave Athens its position among the states of Greece, and broke the charm of Persian power, is portrayed, with all its perilousness of incident with the careful touch of one who can estimate every element in the contest and its issue. The climax of Greek story and glory—the era of Pericles, the princely and self-possessed pupil of Anaxagoras, patron of Phidias, and lover of Aspasia—in all its splendour of sculpture, magnificence of architecture, potency of poetry, ardency of life, in all its eventfulness and change, is brought before the soul in the resplendency of its collected characteristics. The catastrophe of the Athenian downfall, with its dramatic combination of incidents, and the romantic thrill of its accidents, is detailed with the highest analytical skill, and with the most vivid realism, especially the aleoploss night of agony and distress when the news of doom arrived, and the scene of the funeral oration, in which Pericles, greatedened by grief into poetry, hushed the very anguish of despair by the might of his thoughts, and the unfelt calmness of his outward bearing. We mention these as the grand stages in the story, without venturing to name other and not less mighty themes which occupy the interspaces. Still less dare we undertake to detail the names which form the bead-roll of the most famous among the notables of Hellas, suggested, shall we say, by the type characters Epimenides, Solon, Cleisthenes, Miltiades, Themistocles, Aristides, Pericles, Socrates; and, at a still later date, Xenophon, Iphicrates,

Epaminondas, and Demosthenes, names which are fames, and histories, and powers.

Mr. Grote "has" indeed, as J. S. Mill says, "produced a finished picture of the political and collective life of Greece, and the distinctive characters of the form of social existence during and by means of which she accomplished things so far transcending what has ever elsewhere been achieved in so marvellously short a space of time. From the legislation of Solon to the field of Marathon, a hundred years of preparation; from Marathon to Chæroneia, barely a hundred and fifty years of maturity,—that century and a half is all that separates the earliest recorded prose writing from Demosthenes and Aristotle, all that lies between the first indication to the outer world of what Greece was destined to be, and her absorption by a foreign conqueror. A momentous interval, which decided for an indefinite period the question whether the human race was to be stationary or progressive."*

The history of Greece absolutely teems with controversial matter, and the *pros.* and *cons.* of these debatable items are always given with such fulness and fairness that one is sometimes tempted to think that the author, with a sort of gladiatorial courage and self-confidence, gives a choice of weapons to his antagonists to be used against himself. In writing for this serial it may not be amiss to call attention to a few of these. Are the myths and legends of ancient Greece capable of an historical or semi-historical explanation?—as Bishop Thirlwall and Colonel Mure are inclined to believe, but Mr. Grote denies or at least doubts. Have the Greek genealogies a trustworthy historical basis?—as H. Fynes Clinton thought and Colonel Mure maintained, but Mr. Grote discredits. Are the Homeric poems the work of one author or of several—the product of one age or of different ages?—a subject on which almost a library of controversy exists. Are the Olympiads trustworthy as a system of chronology?—which Mure, Clinton, Jervis, &c., affirm, but Grote shows grounds for considering as questionable. "Was Lycurgus the institutor of Spartan agrarian law?—as Mansel, Müller, and Thirlwall grant, but Grote hesitates to acknowledge. Has social and political life under Solon been better explained by Grote or Niebuhr? Was Ostracism a justifiable legal expedient, and did the dikasteries hold an analogous place and possess similar beneficial characteristics to British jury courts? These are only a few of the questions which have been raised, but many more may be noted. Not to speak of the Comteian assumption running through the whole history that there is "an inevitable law of intellectual progress," as a peculiarly disputable hypothesis in the form in which it is employed; nor of the direct and close analogy between modern monarchies, democracies, and legislation, and those of ancient Hellas, almost always implied in his remarks, as misleading, and liable to misconstruction; nor of his suggested

* "Dissertations and Discussions," vol. ii., p. 515.

parallel between Athens and her allies, and Britain and her colonies, as likely to suggest inaccurate notions, not only of ancient but of modern international relations; we may mention, as affording fair grounds for the reconsideration of discussion, the character of Pericles and of his administration, and the rehabilitation of the fame of Cleon, which again suggests a question raised by Richard Shillito, M.A., Classical Lecturer at Cambridge, in a tract, entitled, "Thucydides or Grote," viz., Is the veracity of Thucydides impeachable? Ought we to study the geography of an ancient country before or after its mythology?—is suggested by Grote's earlier chapters, and by the closing chapters of the eighth volume, the character of the Sophists, and of Socrates are brought before us in such a form as to afford fair debating materials—materials of great originality and worth in Grote—in opposition to whose views some important elements may be found in F. D. Maurice's "History of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy," Zeller's "Socrates and the Socratic Schools," J. H. Stirling's notes to "Schwegler's History of Philosophy," W. A. Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy,"—especially in some excellent notes by the erudite editor; an article, in No. II. of the Journal of Classical and Sacred Literature, by the Rev. E. M. Cope, and many other sources. Even the general question, as between Mitford and Grote, on the influence of democracy on the welfare of nations, may be discussed with considerable advantage to clear views and moderation of sentiment by those who care to find firm thoughts as the basis of their political beliefs and their practical life. A remarkable matter of controversy, too, is raised by Mr. Grote in the closing chapter on the condemnation of Miltiades—viz.: Were the Greeks fickle? Again, in the sixth volume, towards the end of the forty-eighth chapter, he plainly advances the question: Is a democracy more favourable to liberty of thought and action than in a government where *one* or *a few* set the fashion?—a topic on which he discourses at some length in the thirty-first chapter of the fourth volume, where he treats of "the efficacy of the democratical idea," and draws a contrast between "earlier and later democracy." Such are a few of those matters—set down somewhat at random we confess—on which these volumes suggest or provoke controversy, and so prove their stimulant and exciting power over the philosophic spirit, and in historic letters.

In 1856, the third uniform and revised edition of this splendid monument of literary labour, philosophic insight, independent investigation, and perseveringly acquired scholarship, was called for, and it then took its place in the literature of England, as one of those notable and surpassing works which defy rivalry and eclipse envy—a gift of inappreciable value to the author's own age, and an inestimable heirloom to posterity. In the same year, Dr. William Smith, the most laborious and intelligent compiler of our times, made an abridgment of "The History of Greece," for schools, mainly founded on the lucid and comprehensive work thus formally

installed, by general consent of scholars and critics, among the masterpieces of historical reproduction. It possesses far more than the main excellences attainable by ordinary historical writers; it was distinguished by an industrious accumulation of carefully appraised authorities, sedulously collected and selected during a long course of years, skilful and conscientious criticism of the statements made by those who are accepted as the furnishers of the facts of events, an acute and well-trained power of analysing thoughts and motives, the result of a thorough mastery of psychological doctrines and principles, and a properly-grounded theory for the interpretation of the phenomena of social life, not only imperfectly reported, but far removed from personal experience and modern customs, as well as an interest in the important questions, important in all times, which history teaches to futurity. It has been well and truly said, by a somewhat hostile critic in the *Times*, that:—

“Mr. Grote has achieved a noble work—a work which, unless the glory of classical Literature is a dream, will well repay, in usefulness and renown, the devotion of a scholar's life. His book will be called great while Grecian story retains its interest. Even making allowance for the wonderful labours of the Germans, and the extraordinary addition which their learned toils have made to our knowledge of the subject, we should say that the work before us had almost disinterred many portions of Greek life. We cannot sufficiently extol the wonderful knowledge of all the feelings, habits, associations, and institutions of an extinct people, which every page exhibits, and the familiar mastery with which a mind steeped in Grecian lore analyses, combines, criticises, and unfolds the mass of heterogeneous, and often conjectural, materials on which it has to work. Not only have we been enabled to read Greek history with new eyes and a new understanding, but light has been poured upon its literature; and, to apply to Mr. Grote the compliment which he pays to others, ‘the poets, historians, orators, and philosophers of Greece, have been all rendered both more intelligible and more instructive to the student, and the general picture of the Grecian world may now be conceived with a degree of fidelity which, considering our imperfect materials, it is curious to contemplate.’”—“*Essays from the Times*,” by Samuel Philips, first series, p. 271.

The mass of erudition brought together upon every department of this history is truly marvellous; only to catalogue from the notes the references to subjects considered and debated, deliberated on and adjudicated regarding—mere side-lights to the facts of the general theme—would furnish names sufficient to indicate a library of no mean extent. To these we must add, not only those works which supply the ground work of the narrative, but also all those through the perusal of which he acquired the principles of judgment on the immense variety of matters requiring the formation of a ripe opinion, and the deliverance of a correct and explicit, reasonable and trustworthy, decision. Disputed questions in geography, geology, political economy, criticism, philology, numismatics, interpretation, metaphysics, psychology and logic, evidence, probability and inference, mythology, poetry and speculation, coinage

and calculation, war, peace, polity and civilization, justice, legislation and literature, manners, customs and modes of social life—all arise in the course of the narrative, and receive a reasoned consideration, in which the grounds of the judgment given are stated, and the authorities on which it is founded are quoted or referred to. This concentration of extensive studies and varied scholarship, gives it the unique place in letters it holds, as a work rivalling the most learned of German treatises, and excelling, in laboriousness of reference, the Herculean learning of Gibbon or Dannon, Hallam or Macaulay, Niebuhr or Heeren.

The Quarterly Review thus expresses its admiration of the modern Historian of Hellenic Democracy:—

“Mr. Grote's History of Greece is the most important contribution to historical literature in modern times. Whether viewed as a special history of the Hellenic race, or as an exhibition of the true method of historical criticism, it is alike admirable. There is hardly a single subject connected with Hellenic antiquity upon which this work has not thrown new and unexpected light; and it is surprising to find, after the labour that has been bestowed upon Grecian history by many of the most learned scholars in Europe, how much remained to be done; how much we had both to learn and to unlearn. Errors the most inveterate, that have been handed down without misgiving from generation to generation, have been for the first time corrected by Mr. Grote: facts the most familiar have been represented in new aspects and relations; things dimly seen, and only partially apprehended previously, have now assumed their true proportions and real significance; while numerous traits of Grecian character, and new veins of Grecian thought and feeling, have been revealed to the eyes of scholars by Mr. Grote's searching criticism, like new forms of animated nature by the microscope. The completion of such a work is a subject of congratulation, not only for Mr. Grote himself, but for our national literature.”—(Vol. 99.)

In his celebrated chapters on the sophists and on Socrates, Mr. Grote commenced, as we have seen, an exposition of Greek philosophy, as a component and effective part of Greek life. But he found that to give due place and importance to the intellectual endeavours of the great thinkers of antiquity, would lead him into questions of minute and recondite criticism, which could scarcely be expected to be relished by the mere reader of history, and which would occupy so large a space with the details as materially to interfere with the compactness and formal proportions which ought to be observed in any history of the Greeks. He found it advisable on this account to reserve his exposition of the efforts of the philosophers after reasoned truth for separate treatment. Having accomplished the recital of the eventful period which lay between the death of Socrates and the accession of Alexander of Macedon, he returned to this reserved labour, and devoted laborious study to the history of Hellenic thought. In 1865 he presented a first instalment of this complementary effort in a work entitled “Plato, and the other companions of Sokrates.” In the three volumes of this

highly original and meritorious work, the author seeks "to describe as far as evidence permits, the condition of Hellenic philosophy at Athens, during the half-century immediately following the death of Sokrates, in 399 B. C." This work contains a concise outline of the speculative philosophy of Greece, from the time of the three Milesians, Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes, to the time of Sokrates, which is intended chiefly to show the theories in the midst of which Sokrates began to work out a style and matter for philosophy of a unique and fresh character—a sort of extempore dramatization of controversial thinking. He bestows considerable care in enabling his readers to comprehend the successive advances made in regard to scientific curiosity by the twelve predecessors of "the impressive and eccentric" martyr for freedom of thought and speech; and he especially comments on, and explains, the Dialectic of Zeno, the Eleatic, by which it became necessary not only to produce a theory which looked fair to the constructive imagination, but to fortify it by proof, guard it against objections, defend it against imputations, and to bring it into comparison with other and rival modes of explaining the same facts. Then he expounds the peculiar mode of working on other men's minds, which the controversial philosopher introduced by subjecting all thought to the trial by the combat of question and answer. The life and character of Plato, the authenticity and genuineness of the canon of his works, the nature, intention, and arrangement of the dialogues, all receive illuminating consideration, and he affirms that the Shakespeare of philosophers,—“Plato was sceptic, dogmatist, religious mystic, and inquisitor, [i. e., investigator,] mathematician, philosopher, poet, (erotic, as well as satirical) rhetor, artist—all in one; or at least, all in succession, throughout the fifty years of his philosophical life.”

The spirit in which this work was undertaken, and its relation to the philosophical chapters in his historical work, are thus set forth in the preface:—

“I intend to describe, as far as evidence permits, the condition of Hellenic philosophy at Athens during the half century immediately following the death of Sokrates in 399 B. C. My first two chapters do indeed furnish a brief sketch of Pre-Sokratic philosophy; but I profess to take my departure from Sokrates himself, and these chapters are inserted mainly in order that the theories by which he found himself surrounded may not be altogether unknown. Both here, and in the sixty-ninth chapter of my history, I have done my best to throw light on the impressive and eccentric personalities of Sokrates: a character original and unique, to whose peculiar mode of working on other minds I scarcely know a parallel in history. He was the generator, indirectly and through others, of a new and abundant crop of compositions—the “Sokratic Dialogues,” composed by many different authors, among whom Plato stands out as unquestionable Coryphæus, yet amidst other names well deserving of respectful mention as seconds, companions, or opponents. It is these Sokratic dialogues, and the various companions of Sokrates from whom they proceeded, that the present work is intended to exhibit. They form the dramatic manifesta-

tions of Hellenic philosophy—as contrasted with the formal and systematising, afterwards prominent in Aristotle.”

In an able and lengthy criticism contained in the *Edinburgh Review*, April, 1866, and republished in the third volume of his “Dissertations and Discussions,” J. S. Mill—to whom the genius, studies, and talents of Mr. Grote are thoroughly known—welcomes and appraises this work; and after an elaborate notice of its contents, unhesitatingly accords it one of the highest places in modern platonic literature. Of this we quote the opening and the closing sentences, which explain the place, purport, and character of this masterpiece of disquisition and exposition:—

“The reader of Mr. Grote’s ‘History of Greece’ were not likely to forget the hope held out in its concluding volume, that he who had so well interpreted the political life of Hellas, would delineate and judge that great outburst of speculative thought, by which, as much as by her freedom, Greece has been to the world what Athens, according to Pericles, was to Greece—a course of education. It might have been safely predicted, that the same conscientious research, the same skilful discrimination of authenticated fact from traditional misapprehension or uncertified conjecture, and the same rare power of realizing different intellectual and moral points of view, which were conspicuous in the history, and nowhere more than in the memorable chapters on the Sophists, and on Sokrates, would find congenial occupation in tracing out the genuine lineaments of Plato, Aristotle, and their compeers. But the present work does more than merely keep the promise of Mr. Grote’s previous achievements—it reveals new powers: had it not been written, the world at large might never have known, except on trust, the whole range of his capacities and endowments. Though intellects exercised in the higher philosophy might well perceive that such a book as the ‘History of Greece’ could not have been produced but by a mind similarly disciplined, the instruction which lay on the surface of that great work was chiefly civic and political; while the speculations of the Grecians philosophers, and emphatically of Plato, range over the whole domain of human thought and curiosity, from etymology up to cosmogony, and from the discipline of the music-school and the gymnasium to the most vast problems of metaphysics and ontology. Many even of Mr. Grote’s admirers may not have been prepared to find that he would be as much at home in the most abstract metaphysical speculations, as among the concrete realities of political institutions—would move through the one region with the same easy mastery as through the other—and would bring before us, along with the clearest and fullest explanation of ancient thought, mature and well weighed opinions of his own, manifesting a command of the entire field of speculative philosophy, which places him in the small number of the eminent psychologists and metaphysicians of the age.”

The point of view from which these topics are treated, as all acquainted with Mr. Grote’s writings would expect, is that of the Experience philosophy, as distinguished from the intuitive or transcendental; and readers will esteem the discussions more or less highly, according to their estimation of that philosophy; but few, we think, will dispute that Mr. Grote, by this work, has placed himself in a distinguished rank among its defenders, in an age in which it has been more powerfully and discriminately defended than at any former time. For further knowledge we must refer

to the work itself, which will not only be the inseparable companion of Plato's writings, but which no student, of whatever school of thought, can read without instruction, and no one who knows anything of philosophy or the history of philosophy, without admiration and gratitude."

Our waning space forewarns us that we must content ourselves with giving only a hint of the arrangement and the matter of this exhibition of the "reasoned truth" which Plato and the other companions of Socrates fancied they had attained.

"The first chapter is devoted to the speculative philosophy of Greece, up to the time of Sokrates. The three Milesians—Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes—Pythagoras, Xenophanes of Kolophon, Parmenides of Elea, Herakleitus of Ephesus, Empedokles of Agrigentum, Anaxagoras of Klazomenæ, Diogenes of Apollonia, Leukippos of Elea, Demokritus of Abdera, are successively passed in review." In the second chapter the author criticises these fathers of philosophy, and maintains that they show scientific curiosity rather than reasoning skill, while he expounds the Eleatic logic as the necessary preparative for Sokrates, the controversialist. These preliminaries being duly disposed of, he proceeds to the main labour of his theme, of which a more concise and accurate account cannot be given than that which we now quote from J. S. Mill's paper:—

"He first relates the biography of Plato, as far as it can be constructed from the extant authorities. He then treats of the Platonic Canon; and after a comparison and ponderation of evidence, equal in merit to any in his history, accepts as works of Plato the entire list recognized by the Alexandrian critics, and admitted by all scholars until for the first time disputed by German editors and commentators in the present century. A chapter is next devoted to a general view of the Platonic writings; and the remainder of the work (except the final chapters on the minor Sokraticæ) consists of a minute analysis and *compte rendu* of each dialogue, separately giving first a complete abstract of the dialogue, omitting no idea and no important development. Attention is next drawn to the light which the dialogue throws on Plato's doctrine or method, and the bearing which it has upon the author's general conception of Plato and his writings. Lastly, the thoughts on which the particular dialogue turns, or which are struck out in the course of it, are disentangled from the context, and critically examined, sometimes at considerable length, both from Plato's point of view, and from the author's; and when the verdict is adverse, we are shown the author's own view of the same questions, and its justification. The book is thus a perfect treasury of instructive discussions on the most important questions of philosophy, speculative and practical, while, at the same time, it is a quite complete account of Plato."

The following extract from the work on the investigation and advantages of controversy will interest our readers:—

"This aggregate of beliefs and predispositions to believe, ethical, religious, æsthetical, social, respecting what is true or false, probable or improbable, just or unjust, holy or unholy, honourable or base, respectable or contemptible, pure or impure, beautiful or ugly, decent or indecent, obli-

gateway to do or obligatory to avoid, respecting the status and relations of each individual in the society, respecting even the admissible fashions of amusement and recreation—this is an established fact and condition of things, the real origin of which is, for the most part, unknown, but which each new member of the society is born to and finds subsisting. It is transmitted by tradition from parents to children, and is imbibed by the latter almost unconsciously from what they see and hear around, without any special reason of teaching, or special person to teach. It becomes a part of each person's nature, a standing habit of mind, or fixed set of mental tendencies, according to which particular experience is interpreted and particular persons appreciated. . . . The community hate, despise, or deride, any individual member who proclaims his dissent from their social creed, or even openly call it in question. . . . Society, though its power to make an individual happy is but limited, has complete power, easily exercised, to make him miserable. The orthodox public do not recognize in any individual citizen a right to scrutinize their creed, and to reject it, if not approved by his own rational judgment. They expect that he will embrace it in the natural course of things, by the mere force of authority and contagion—as they have adopted it themselves—as they have adopted also current language, weights, measures, divisions of time, &c. . . . Nomos (law and custom), King of All—to borrow the phrase which Herodotus cites from Pindar—exercises plenary power, spiritual as well as temporal, over individual minds, moulding the emotions as well as the intellect according to the local type, determining the sentiments, the belief, and the predisposition in regard to new matters tendered for belief of every one, fashioning thought, speech, and points of view, no less than action, and reigning under the appearance of habitual and self-suggested tendencies.”

It may be permitted to us here to recall to the notice of our readers the similarity of the views taken by the writer of this paper of the character of this great Athenian cross examiner of speculations, arrived at quite independently in the articles on *European Philosophy*, “Plato as a controversialist” and “Platonism” in the *British Controversialist*, Nov., 1861, and June, 1862. We think we may here advantageously refer the thoughtful reader to the pamphlet, from which we make the following extract as well worthy, in connexion with this topic, of careful perusal:—

“Mr. Grote, in this as in everything else, is the most uncompromising assessor of freedom of inquiry: authority in any shape is to him tedious. He scorns to fetter his liberty of criticism by any deference to received opinions, to any views, theories, or habits of thought which may happen to prevail amongst commentators and historians of philosophy, or to the assertions of ancient historians. He goes right to the fountain-head—that is, to the text of Plato, which he examines dialogue by dialogue, explaining and analysing, criticising and contradicting, the arguments and doctrines as they appear then and there stated. Regardless of authority, and with a thorough-going independence and zeal in the advocacy of any cause which he espouses, he draws his own conclusions, and is indeed himself a living exemplification of the Protagorean theory which he advocates, being pre-eminently amongst all thinkers his own measure and his own standard of truth and knowledge. His principle is to take nothing for granted; and

with this his practice is in conformity. Let us know what Plato actually says, *how* he says it, in what context and connection; and *when* he says it, at what period of his life, what stage of his philosophical development; and *then* we may proceed to estimate and criticise it.”*

In the *Westminster Review*, January, 1866, Mr. Grote contributed the leading article, entitled “John Stuart Mill on the Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton,” an article which has since been re-issued as a separate production. It is a singularly full and earnest discussion of the questions, and it contains full proof of the intimate acquaintance of its author with the chief writers of the Scottish psychological school; many trenchant criticisms of Mr. Mill’s opinions; and it is remarkable for the accuracy of the estimate of Sir William Hamilton, formed by the most thorough student of dialectics in our day. We are unable to quote much from this interesting paper, but cannot resist extracting a warm tribute to the character of James Mill, and an autobiographical reminiscence of Mr. Grote’s of a recent visit to France:—

“His unpremeditated oral exposition was hardly less effective than his prepared work with the pen—his colloquial fertility on philosophical subjects, his power of discussing himself and of stimulating others to discuss, his ready responsive inspirations through all the shifts and windings of a sort of Platonic dialogue—all these accomplishments were, to those who knew him, even more impressive than what he composed for the press. Conversation with him was not merely instructive, but provocative to the dormant intelligence. Of all persons whom we have known, Mr. James Mill was the one who stood least remote from the lofty Platonic ideal of dialectic—*Τὸῦ διδοῦναι δεχέσθαι λόγαν*—(the giving and receiving of reasons)—competent alike to examine others, or to be examined by them, on philosophy. When to this we add a strenuous character, earnest convictions, and single-minded devotion to truth, with an utter disdain of mere paradox, it may be conceived that such a man exercised powerful intellectual ascendancy over younger minds. Several of those who enjoyed his society—men now at or past the maturity of life, and some of them in distinguished positions—remember and attest with gratitude such ascendancy in their own cases; among them the writer of the present article, who owes to the historian of British India an amount of intellectual stimulus and guidance such as he can never forget.”

“In July, 1864, we were present at the annual meeting of the French Academy at Paris, where the prizes for essays sent in, pursuant to subjects announced for study beforehand, are awarded. We heard the titles of various compositions announced by the president (M. Villemain), with a brief critical estimate of each. Their comparative merits were appreciated, and the prize awarded to one of the competitors. Among the compositions sent to compete for the prize, one was a work by M. Taine, upon which the president bestowed the most remarkable encomiums in every different point of view—extent of knowledge, force of thought, style, arrangement—all were praised in a manner which we have rarely heard exceeded. Nevertheless, the prize was not awarded to this work, but to another which the president praised in a manner decidedly less marked and emphatic. What was here the *ratio*

* “*Plato’s Theætetus and Mr. Grote’s Criticisms*,” by E. M. Cope.

decidendi? The reason was, and the president declared it in the most explicit language, that the work of M. Taine was *deeply tainted with materialism*. 'Sans doute,' said the esteemed veteran of French literature, in pronouncing his award, 'sans doute les opinions sont libres, mais!'—It is precisely against this *maie*—ushering in the special anathematized or consecrated conclusion, which it is intended to except from the general liberty of enforcing or impugning—in matters of philosophical discussion, that Mr. [J. S.] Mill, in the "Essay on Liberty," declares war as the champion of reasoned truth."

The literary honours which *have* been conferred on Dr. Grote are exceedingly numerous. "His name is enrolled in a score of learned societies, from St. Petersburg to Washington." The Universities of Oxford and Cambridge have conferred upon him the highest degrees which they have it in their power to bestow; on the demise of Lord Macaulay he was appointed his successor as a foreign member of the French Institute; and since the death of Henry Hallam, he has represented literature as a trustee of the British Museum, an office which he esteems highly, to the duties of which he attends assiduously, greatly to the advantage of the republic of letters. Under his leadership the University of London has advanced to great and important changes, and gone into the forefront of educational progress. Though himself one of the most distinguished classical scholars in Europe, and one whose renown has been won almost entirely in the fields of ancient literature, he was a zealous promoter of the new degrees of Bachelor and Doctor of Science, conferred by the London University, after a successful examination on the physical sciences, and the philosophy of intellect and morals, and he still continues to advocate the necessity of uniting to the study of ancient letters the modern languages and the sciences of reality, as well as of those of formal thought; and he has always been remarkable in the senate for the favourable view he has taken of the wide and varied curriculum of the Scottish Universities, as compared with the limited one so popular at Oxford and at Cambridge. Had space permitted, we should have been glad to quote here some valuable observations made by him at the distribution of prizes in the Faculty of Medicine at University College at the close of Session 1861, 2.

In November, 1867, the students of the University of Aberdeen having, according to custom, to choose a Lord Rector, a circumstance which usually excites all the zeal of the students on one side or other, two candidates were proposed—George Grote, Historian of Greece, and Mountstuart Elphinstone Grant-Duff, Esq., of Eden, near Banff, M.P. for the Elgin burghs, and author of "Studies in Politics," &c. The former, on being applied to for permission to put him up as a candidate, generously replied that he would "consider it both an honour and a satisfaction to be elected to a post of so much academical dignity," and promised that he would "willingly accept the office, conferred as it is by the free voices of the students of the university." It is much to be re-

gretted, for the honour of the most northerly university in the kingdom, that local influence and Scottish clannishness were so powerful among the matriculated students, that the result of this election was the defeat of George Grote by a slight majority, a result by which that university has been prevented from writing on its annals the name of an equal to Thomas Carlyle, J. S. Mill, and J. A. Froude (gentlemen recently chosen to fill Rectorial chairs in Scottish Universities), and has been compelled to content itself with a Lord Rector who matches, perhaps, with Lord Stanley and Lord Advocate Moncrieff, men who have earned their repute not specially in the field of letters, and whose elevation to their posts of honour was due more to their political creed and their special position than to their possession of that literary fame which ought to be attached to the popularly chosen head of a seat of learning, scholastic training, and intellectual culture.

It is generally known in literary circles that George Grote is at present engaged on a work—"On Aristotle and the Aristotelian Philosophy," in a similar scale of thoroughness and exhaustive treatment to that of his other works. Readers who may be interested on the subject, and who have perused G. H. Lewes's estimates and analyses of Aristotle's scientific treatises, will be glad to learn that a pretty considerable instalment of Mr. Grote's work is available to them in "An Appendix" on "The Psychology of Aristotle," extending to fifty-six closely printed pages, issued in the third edition of "The Senses and the Intellect," by Alexander Bain. Every lover of learning, philosophy, logical investigation and free-thought, will earnestly wish that George Grote may be spared to supply a complete and duly elaborated exposition of the great scientific logician of antiquity—the intellectual Alexander of his time. Though specially devoted to history, philosophy, politics, and finance, there is probably no living thinker who holds so nearly a place, in our day, analogous to that of Aristotle in Alexandrian Greece, as the Master of all available Knowledge systematized and mapped out in the proper relation of each department to each, and of each to all. To his most striking characteristic fullness he adds unimpeachable accuracy, and by the clear thoughtfulness of his methodical understanding he has almost elevated history from being a narrative of facts, to being a philosophy of events, and has, at least, made it not only the record of the past, but also the exposition of the causes of human progress, felicity, and civilization.

Politics.

OUGHT WE NOW TO HAVE THE BALLOT?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

A SYSTEM of electing members of Parliament, which would insure their being simply and solely the representatives of the people, and not the mere nominees of the "aristocracy, the moneyocracy, and the landocracy;" and by which bribery and coercion would be prevented, is one of England's greatest wants at the present time. To supply this want has been one of the greatest objects of modern legislation. For this object statesmen and lawyers have laboured hard, but yet, as every fresh election testifies, the abuses connected with our voting system still exist. Statutes have been passed to facilitate the discovery and insure the punishment of bribery and intimidation; corrupt constituencies have been disfranchised; and those who obtained their seats by bribery or coercion have been unseated: but all in vain, voters are still bought, or forced to vote against their consciences.

The reason of this is very simple; the Acts of Parliament have all had one radical defect,—they have aimed at preventing bribery and intimidation solely by fear of punishment, and not by removing the power to commit those crimes. "Prevention is better than cure:" how much wiser it would be, then, to abandon the present system, and to prevent coercion and corruption by adopting a method of electing members of Parliament which would render both these evils impossible! Such a method is offered by the ballot. It would be impossible to make a man vote for a certain candidate when he had no reason to fear doing the reverse, because none could tell how he voted; and not only would intimidation and coercion be thus rendered impossible, but bribery would be effectually prevented; for those who now are guilty of the dishonourable practice of corrupting electors would be compelled to desist; not being able to know how the subject of their bribery did in reality vote, they would not risk bribing him, for no reliance could be placed on the bare promise of such a one to vote in a certain way.

G. M. S., in his able article on this subject, has brought forward many excellent arguments for the adoption of the ballot now, but he has apparently omitted to urge that its extensive use on the Continent and elsewhere is an argument in its favour. Mr. Hepworth Dixon, speaking on this subject, has said, "Every civilized nation on this planet, except one, enjoys the free vote. That ex-

ception is England." This alone is a very significant fact; a homely old proverb (worth studying) says, "The proof of the pudding is in the eating." Now surely if experience had not proved to the United States, and to many important European nations, that the ballot was a success, they would not use it. In our own colonies, also, the ballot is used, and proves thoroughly successful. The Hon. A. M'Arthur, late of New South Wales, and brother to Mr. M'Arthur, recently sheriff of London, writing on this subject, says:—

"Under the old system of voting, rioting, drunkenness, and intimidation were of frequent occurrence at elections, and there was occasionally serious risk to life and property. Since the introduction of the ballot I have not seen, nor do I recollect having heard of, any serious disturbance. Intimidation and bribery are unknown, there has been less drunkenness, and electioneering expenses are a mere trifle compared with what they formerly were. I may add, that although there are exceptions, yet I believe in the majority of cases the best of the candidates have been returned."

Nor is Australia an exception to the general rule; in many other countries the ballot has been equally successful; and the result of this practical test is the best of all arguments in its favour. Why, if it has been so eminently successful in other countries, should it not be so here? It has worked well on the continent of Europe, in Australia, and America, hence we may reasonably presume that it would do so in England.

Nearly all the arguments advanced against the ballot belong to what Hepworth Dixon has termed the "Metaphysics of Political Science," few of them are really practical; they do not deal with the real working of the ballot, but are based on certain pet ideas and fancies of philosophers and theorists, which may do very well for such, but which are not entertained by nor suited for any practical politicians, who look at things in their real and not their ideal character.

"Philomathes," judging from his article, considers secrecy in the performance of public duties dishonourable, but this, to a great extent, is an erroneous idea. There are many things which, in certain cases, are wrong, but which under other circumstances are undoubtedly right. Secrecy in the performance of public duties is one of these things. There are cases in which it would be very improper to resort to it, but however dishonourable, where not essential to the proper performance of a public duty, it is, when necessary for that purpose, no dishonour, but perfectly right and justifiable. Thus it is with the ballot; every voter has a duty to discharge; that duty is to use his vote in such a manner as shall, in his own judgment, conduce most to the benefit of his country. In order that he may discharge this duty without any bribery or external pressure, it is essential that—to use the definition of Jeremy Bentham, which "Philomathes" has adopted—"secret voting" be resorted to. Hence the ballot, or "secret voting," is not disho-

nourable, but perfectly honest and justifiable. It is far more disgraceful and dishonourable to allow bribery and intimidation to exist, when we have the means of preventing them, than to resort to the ballot, which would render them impossible.

Such arguments as those of "Philomathes," with reference to public voting "being the state's security from the selfishness of men," will not bear investigation. Putting coercion for a moment out of the question, voters may be divided into two classes,—1, those who, in voting, only consider their own private interests; 2, those who vote conscientiously for the public good. As regards the first class, although the ballot would not in all cases improve them, yet many, not being able to obtain a bribe, would vote with the second class; and the remainder, although not improved, could not make a worse use of the franchise through the introduction of the ballot. With reference to the second class, those who really possess that "sense of responsibility," which "Philomathes" mentions, they would vote equally as well with the ballot as without it. Thus we see that, apart from coercion, the ballot would not in any way lessen the number of those who rightly use their votes, but would rather tend to increase it by preventing bribery. And when we consider the ballot in relation to its effect upon the coercion now existing, we know that by the use of it, class 2 above referred to would be largely increased; for although it is very well for "Philomathes" to write about honest men always acting rightly in public, we know that voters are but men, and that, as such, the loss of money, of a situation, of a farm, or of a customer, is a serious consideration to many of them, and operates powerfully when they exercise their right to vote; but remove all fear of any such loss, place voters in such a position that they can vote without a possibility of any injury resulting to them for voting conscientiously, in other words, have the ballot, and then large numbers of electors who now dare not vote as their conscience dictates, for well-known reasons, will join those who now vote for the public good; and hence we see that instead of the state losing its "security from the selfishness of men," it will derive additional benefit from the use of the ballot, by the increase of those voters included in class 2 above mentioned.

Any such fears as those which "Philomathes" appears to entertain as to the state being endangered, if men were to vote without being subjected to public scrutiny, are almost worthy of being classed with what Mr. Gladstone has termed "womanish fears;" they are certainly groundless and absurd. Those nations which use the ballot are all evidence of the folly of such fears. If they have any reason in them, how is it that both our colonies and the United States, with a much more extended suffrage, have flourished, and that their Governments are firm and their people prosperous with the ballot in use amongst them?

"Philomathes" states that "publicity of voting . . . is the safeguard of the elector's honesty," but experience proves that the

reverse is really the case; that instead of "publicity" being "the safeguard of the elector's honesty," it is very frequently the means by which the elector is made dishonest; for it is through voting being public that bribery and intimidation are rendered successful; and if this publicity did not exist, these two evils (as has been pointed out in the commencement of this article) would be prevented.

"Philomathes" also says, "I do not contend that secret voting is un-English, though that *might be maintained*," but it is fortunate for that gentleman's reputation as a debater that he did not endeavour to prove this, for if he had, he would certainly have failed. It is far more "un-English" for men in this land of liberty to be obliged to vote against their consciences, or to sell their votes for money, than to resort to the ballot. And anything known in England above two hundred years ago is scarcely an innovation on English customs. The ballot was used in 1637, as proved by an order in council of Charles I., forbidding its use by certain corporations in the City of London which had already adopted it; and in 1710 a bill was introduced by a Mr. Wortley into the House of Commons, and passed that House, but was rejected by the Lords. How then can the ballot be "un-English?" And still more ridiculous is it to say that to introduce it would be to "Americanize our institutions," for the ballot was in use amongst the ancient Greeks and Romans ages before the present American nation existed. But even if the ballot were an American invention, would it be any the worse for that? Surely not; we may, in this respect, as in some others, advantageously "Americanize our institutions;" and great indeed must be the paucity of real arguments amongst the opponents of the ballot, for them to use such a cry as this, which, although it has not yet appeared in the present debate, is often employed by them.

"Philomathes" has compared the ballot to a patch over an eating ulcer; but it should rather be viewed as the medicine, or ointment, which the surgeon uses, when he cannot cut out the diseased part, to allay the mischief it might occasion to the body; for we cannot cut out the diseased part, *i. e.*, we cannot prevent persons having power in the shape of money and land, but we can prevent the improper use of that power in elections by applying the ointment, or using the medicine, *i. e.*, by having the ballot.

We should bear in mind that those who oppose the ballot are, generally speaking, those who never can feel the necessity for it, and that those who favour it are those who experience that coercion, and are cognizant of that corruption, which the ballot alone will prevent,—those who practically know the want of the ballot, and those who would feel its effects. Let us remember, also, that under the present disgraceful election system many men who are qualified by learning, experience, and intelligence, to become members of Parliament, are debarred from that honour; not having interest or wealth sufficient to enable them to defeat the "suckling" aristocrats and wealthy stupid who oppose them; but that, if we

had the ballot, these latter would stand no chance when opposed to the former.

And let us remember that the ballot will effectually prevent a recurrence of those disgraceful, "un-English" riots which took place at last election; will enable every man to vote according to his conscience, and will render bribery impracticable. Let us have the ballot now. Amid the existing relationship between capital and labour, landlord and tenant, customer and tradesman, it is necessary in order to prevent the use of the "screw." Yes, let us then adopt it at once, its use will be the death-blow to bribery and coercion, and will mark the commencement of a period in the history of our land when, our voters being free to vote according to their consciences, England may better lay claim to the title of "the land of the free;" when the sale of votes, and the purchase of a seat in Parliament for money, shall be unknown; and when every one who occupies a place in St. Stephen's Hall will owe his position, not to the influence of capitalists and landowners, but to the conscientious votes of free electors.

GEORGIUS.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

Is it ever a good thing to allow those who have suffered from the operation of any law or custom to be the judges of whether that law or custom is right, proper, and fit to be continued? Is it advisable that the abolition or perpetuation of a specific item of legislation should be relegated to the decision of those who have experienced the evil effects of things as they are? Is it not a most imperative requisition, in regard to a fair and honest decision, that the party adjudicating should be in a position to be an impartial and uninterested thinker upon the question submitted for settlement? A great deal has been made by advocates for the ballot of the conversion of certain Cabinet ministers to a sense of the necessity of securing secrecy of vote—notably of the change of opinion on this topic said to have passed over the minds of our present premier, W. E. Gladstone, whom the Lord Advocate for Scotland most injudiciously designated "the ruler of the kingdom," the Hon. Henry Austin Bruce, Mr. Milner Gibson, &c., who have been ousted from the seats they coveted by the votes of those who had the suffrage. This very fact takes away from the value of their conversion—for conversion from motives appertaining to self are always regarded with distrust by honest Englishmen. We think, then, that the sudden conversion of so many statesmen to a sense of the necessity of the ballot, instead of its being a recommendation of the question, and a proof of its advantageousness, constitutes a grave cause for doubt as to its advisability, and is some reply to all those who congratulate the cause of the Ballot on its recent acquisitions.

On the fallacy of the usual arguments for the ballot I cannot but believe that the *Times* is mainly right when it remarks that—

"The single and essential objection to the ballot is that it treats the voter as exercising a right for the exercise of which he is no more responsible to the public than he is responsible for the way in which he may spend the money in his pocket. It proceeds on the assumption that a man's vote is his private property, instead of being what it really is—a privilege allowed him for the benefit of the community, which may be taken away from him the moment he abuses it. If the franchise were, indeed, a private possession, it would not be easy to see on what ground we forbid its possessor from selling it to the highest bidder. Why is bribery a misdemeanour, and upon what principle have we proceeded in sending judges with extraordinary powers through the country to search out and punish those who commit it? Why were Great Yarmouth and Totness disfranchised in 1867, and why is Norwich at this hour in danger of a suspension of the privilege of sending representatives to Parliament? Clearly, in all we do and all we think on this subject, we proceed from the assumption that the right of voting is a right allowed by the community to those who give promise that they will exercise it for the public benefit alone—a right liable to be withdrawn if proof be adduced that this condition of enjoying it be neglected or broken. The ballot can be justified only on a different view. It indicates what we cannot help calling a low tone of political morality, and its adoption cannot be excused except in the last necessity as a remedy for worse evils."

This, in our opinion, sets entirely at rest the argument of right, and we think that the *Spectator* has given the argument for the policy of the ballot a most complete overthrow in the few brief but pithy words which we subjoin:—

"Shut out publicity, and we let in the most dangerous of all the influences under which a crowd can act—caprice, arbitrariness, the fiat of a mere concurrence of wishes. The despot acts under a restraint—the restraint of respect for the nobles and the people. An aristocracy acts under a restraint—the restraint of respect for the masses, before whom it is powerless. But a democracy acts under no restraint, except deference to its own reason and justice. Protect each unit of the democracy from all fear of being tried by the common standard of reason and justice, and you tend to generate, instead of a steady public opinion, a fickle popular caprice."

Another and a very potent argument against the introduction of the ballot now is that it would be ineffective, would, in fact, produce consequences worse than those we are anxious to avoid. This has been well put by a writer in the newspaper press. thus:—

"Secret voting would have quite the reverse effect to that which is expected. It would legalize, rather than put down, bribery and corruption; for how could a man be said to have received a bribe for his vote, when no one could tell how he had voted? and a man might sell his vote, and yet not be scoundrel enough to cheat the buyer out of what he had bought and paid for. Many men would leave their party and principles for the prospect of patronage, or charities, or loaves and fishes, if they could do so secretly, who would not dare to do it openly."

Publicity is the safeguard of truth, and is, in fact, in the long run, the safeguard of self-interest. But publicity is not only a safeguard, it is a necessity, for (as the *Spectator* has said):—

“An opinion on public affairs formed in secret, and not tested or justified by public expression at all, wants altogether the principal guarantees of sound public opinion. What you encourage by the shade and shelter of secrecy is not the growth of a sound public opinion, but of a variety of units of strictly private opinion about public matters—a very different thing, and an infinitely less valuable thing. What is the value of a strictly private view on any subject, before it has been moulded and sifted by submission to the test of criticism, and remark from those who have the best opportunity of knowing its deficiencies or excesses? What is the value of a strictly individual opinion even on domestic matters unless it has run the gauntlet of family criticism and discussion? What is the worth of any opinion on political matters, concealed from general view, formed in the dark, and formed, therefore, without that reference to the necessity of justifying and defending it to others, which is one of the best guarantees both of sincerity and accuracy, namely, that it proceeds from personal conviction, and that it proceeds from a personal conviction not founded entirely on one-sided considerations? Certainly very much less than of political convictions which are prepared to run the gauntlet of adverse criticism, and formed, therefore, under a sense of public responsibility.”

An election is intended to bring into focus and force the public opinion on political matters, but the ballot would only supply us, at best, with a key to the private opinions of men. Healthy opinion cannot, we affirm, be formed without free, open, and impartial discussion. Even thinkers who have elaborately reflected on important subjects are apt to take crotchets for truths and points for panaceas, unless they have had opportunities of subjecting their theoretical principles to the review and consideration of other minds. How little, then, can the less reflective and more impatient of men be likely to arrive at truth without due deliberation exercised on political subjects! But due deliberation cannot be exercised by ordinary thinkers without debate—the advocacy, *pro* and *con.*, of every proposal; for ordinary thinkers have no skill in originating thought, even when they have the capacity for judging of its correctness when stated. The ballot is an extinguisher of free discussion, because it implies that a man's political opinions ought to be kept secret, that he ought not to let the likelihood of how he is about to vote, or has voted, leak out. If this is not meant, wherefore the use of secrecy of voting? If opinions are to be proclaimed, why the ballot? Any one who thinks in public—that is, who speaks, converses, or writes politics—must let his opinions and leanings be known, and hence the ballot would be useless to him. As a corollary to the ballot we must have concealed opinions, we must not only have anonymity of journalism, but we must cut out of the realm of converse and public consideration all politics and political reflections. This would be trimming our sails with a vengeance. But this is not freedom of thought,

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liberty of political action. As an able writer in the *Coventry Herald* has said,—

“We want not only that every man should be taught intellectually what is right, but that he should be taught *above all things* to stand up for it, *regardless of consequences*. This only is true manhood, or angelhood either, as Milton puts it,—

“To stand approved in sight of God, Though worlds judge us perverse.”

It matters comparatively little which way a man votes, so that he stands up *openly* for what he thinks right. Public opinion rules in England, and no party can do much wrong so long as that opinion is openly and fearlessly expressed, and not by ballot-box. Protection to the voter indeed! By all means let the voter be protected, but let it be by standing up like an Englishman and meeting the oppressor, and the briber, and the men who would use any kind of coercion, face to face, in open daylight, and don't let us seek protection *by hiding ourselves*.”

The true political freeman is not fascinated by the love of popularity, not deterred by the fear of unpopularity from sympathy with an unpopular cause or an unpopular name. Such thinkers pursue the right, and—

“Through the shock
Of fighting elements, on all sides round
Environed, win their way, harder beset
And more endangered than when Argo passed
Through Bosphorus, betwixt the jutting rocks.”

Any man who holds opinions by conviction cannot stifle their utterance. They come out of him as naturally as water descends the hill slopes, and to him, therefore, the ballot affords no concealment. Unless thought be concealed what is the use of the ballot? Voting is only the registration of thought, its formation is a prior process. There can be no free debate where there is either need for or anxiety to conceal opinions, and therefore the ballot is antagonistic to free debate, to mature deliberation and cultured thought, and opposed to the best intellectual and moral interests of mankind: and this for the very simple reason, that no political opinion formed without the sense of public responsibility can be sound, and the habit of secrecy in the delivery of opinion has a tendency to promote a habit of secrecy in forming it—in other words, a habit of giving weight to mere private taste and irresponsible preferences in political life generally.

T. B. P.

Literature.

ARE PROVERBS WORTH STUDYING?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

FOR the affirmative of the question now debated, we have the highest of all authority—that of God.

A part of the sacred Scriptures consists of proverbs. And when Christ was on the earth, He employed such proverbs as were current among the people of Palestine at that time. In the synagogue of Nazareth He referred to the proverb, "Physician, heal thyself;" also to that, "A prophet is not without honour, but in his own country;" and at the well of Sychar he quoted the saying or proverb, "One soweth, and another reapeth." In one of the historical books of Scripture (1 Sam. xxiv. 13) we have a reference to a proverb of the ancients, "Wickedness proceedeth from the wicked." To say, therefore, that proverbs are not worth studying, is to disparage the wisdom of God, who has employed them for the purpose of imparting instruction to his creatures.

Proverbs are worth studying because in them wisdom is gathered up, condensed, and fixed in a few words. They are quintessences of wisdom.

That proverbs are worth studying will be evident if we closely observe what kindness, prudence, patience, equity, and perseverance are inculcated by them. Also the knowledge of human nature which they display, and the useful hints, wise counsels, and weighty admonitions which they offer on the most important points, show that proverbs are worth studying. Let us briefly notice some proverbs which display the qualities we have just spoken of as enforced by them. And first we turn our attention to the Book which beyond all others demands our respect and careful consideration. In that Book we have the following,—*"Hatred stirreth up strifes, but love covereth all sins."* In this proverb we not only have expressed what is of common occurrence between man and man, that hatred in the heart of a man against his neighbour finds causes of contention, and by various means stirs up quarrels, while love hides and bears with failings, but we have also a deeper signification, an utterance of the greatest of all Bible truths, even that of the love of God covering and blotting out the sins of His creatures. *"He that walketh uprightly walketh surely; but he that perverteth his ways shall be known."* How true, and how full of meaning! He that walketh uprightly walketh surely, or safely, and has no cause for either fear or shame; but he that perverteth

his ways, who walks crookedly and craftily, has his tricks and artfulness sooner or later discovered. "It is naught, it is naught, saith the buyer; but when he is gone his way, then he boasteth." What a picture in a few words of the continual practice of men who when buying profess that the commodity they are in want of is of small value, and when they have purchased it boast of their bargain, and pride themselves on the cleverness of the fraudulent manner in which they have obtained it! "Whoso keepeth his mouth and his tongue keepeth his soul from troubles." This proverb is worth studying for the fulness of truth it contains, reminding us that he who bridles his tongue, who is careful to speak nothing that is untrue, who speaks sincerely and without dissimulation, who abstains from ill language, and who on many matters avoids speaking anything, even truth, escapes many sorrows which those who give their tongues too much liberty become involved in. "He that maketh haste to be rich shall not be innocent." He who is inordinately anxious to get riches is by that immoderate desire tempted to use unlawful means for the accomplishment of his wishes. "A child left to himself bringeth his mother to shame," is a truth which few need go far to find an illustrative instance of. We frequently meet with a child who has been left to himself, who has been under no parental restraint, who has been left to his own way; and when we meet with such a sight we see too that such a child bringeth his mother to shame, for he does those things which grieves his parents and bring disgrace upon them.

Let us now direct our attention to proverbs other than those which are found in Holy Writ. "Extremes meet." On this short sentence what a volume might be written! In how many ways is its truth verified! Old age terminates in a second childhood. Extreme cold has the effect of extreme heat. The extremities of joy and grief each find vent in tears. The same person is often both flatterer and calumniator, and another is full of both cruelty and self-indulgence. "Before fording the river do not curse Mrs. Alligator," is a proverb among the inhabitants of Hayti, and admonishes us not wantonly to provoke any one in whose power we may soon be. "He that lies down with dogs shall rise up with fleas," reminds us what we may expect will be the consequence of evil companionship. "He expects better bread than can be made of wheat," warns us against unreasonable expectations, against looking for more from any thing or situation than it can or is likely to afford us. "Measure thy cloth ten times; thou canst cut it but once," admonishes us to consider often and carefully a step which, once taken, is irrevocable. "One foe is too many, and a hundred friends too few," expresses a truth with which most people are practically conversant,—that hatred is often a more active principle than love; that the love of our friends may be passive, while the enmity of our foe will be active. "One father can support ten children; ten children cannot support one father," points to the

fact of the greater strength of the paternal than of the filial affection.

"Do evil and look for like." This proverb fully accords with the declaration of Holy Writ, that as we mete to others, so shall it be meted to us, and its truth is in every-day experience continually verified. "It is the privilege of the illustrious to be hated," is a saying in which much is comprehended, as the great in every walk of life, those who have been before their fellows, could amply testify; such have ever had to experience the hatred of envy, conscious inferiority, and interest in things as they exist. "When gold speaks all tongues are silent," happily yet unhappily expresses the undue influence of wealth in overcoming opposition to the wishes of its possessors, and shutting men's mouths even when they know that they ought to speak. "Speculation is a word that sometimes begins with the second letter," has received over-abundant confirmation in our own times, as the annals of law courts and the experience of many can testify.

Proverbs are worth studying because they frequently display certain local or national features, and express certain circumstances peculiar to their own birth-land, so much so that they could hardly have sprung into existence elsewhere. Thus, "March in January, January in March I fear," expresses the fact in England we frequently have in January the weather which is seasonable in March, and in such a case we usually have in March the weather which is or would be more seasonable in January. "Drought never bred dearth in England," is a proverb peculiarly applicable to our "weeping climate," for in such seasons the grain is good and heavy, of which we had a striking exemplification in the unusually fine wheat crop produced in the uncommonly dry summer of 1868. "Make hay while the sun shines," is another English proverb in which we have a distinct allusion to the variable weather of our own country. "The world is a carcass, and they who gather round it are dogs," bespeaks itself to belong to Eastern lands, where dogs are the scavengers. So the proverb, "When the tale of bricks is doubled, Moses comes," shows itself to be of Jewish birth, and to allude to the wonderful circumstances of the history of that people which is contained in Exod. v.

Other proverbs, again, show that certain things are felt to be true by all nations, inasmuch as by all they are proverbially expressed. Thus, "The receiver's as bad as the thief," "He sins as much who holds the sack as he who puts into it," are respectively the English and French expression of the same truth.

Proverbs are worth studying because frequently they have grown out of an incident to which they but faintly allude, and as a consequence they are fully intelligible only when the incident is understood out of which they have grown. Thus the proverb, "He has gold of Toulouse," had its origin in the circumstance of the Roman consul Cæpio taking the city of Toulouse, and possessing himself of its great wealth by a very perfidious act. Calamities afterwards

fell thick on both him and his, which were viewed by the sense men had of a God of retributive justice, as having been brought on him by his wicked gains, and thus the proverb has come to be applied to such as have by similar means enriched themselves and exposed themselves to similar consequences. So with the Spanish proverb, "Let that which is lost be for God," the origin of which is stated by a Spanish writer to have been this:—The father of a family disposing of his goods on his death-bed, willed that a cow which had strayed, should, if found, be for his children; if not, for God. This proverb is worth inspection and study, for it expresses the subtlety of the evil in the human heart, which oftentimes gives to God that which costs us nothing,—that from which, in short, we expect no profit.

Proverbs are worth studying because they discover the spirit, the manners, the opinions, the superstitions, the customs of the people among whom they have been current. Thus the proverbs of Greece contain such allusions to the early incidents of their own history, and to the legends of their gods and heroes, as to give evidence of the high intellectual training of the people, and that that training was diffused through the nation. A great number of the Roman proverbs relate to farming, and thus bear witness to that great interest in agricultural pursuits which was a striking feature in the old Italian life. The proverb current in Egypt, "Do no good, and thou shalt find no evil," reveals that country as one the rulers of which have an instinctive hostility to all goodness; where they punish, but never reward; and where to be unnoticed by them is the highest ambition of their subjects. W. H. asserts that proverbs "are almost all full of expositions of meanness, selfishness, cunning, and unworthy dispositions." And again he remarks, "We do not think it is possible to get a worse collection of advice than is to be found among proverbs." Against these remarks of W. H. we place the statements of Archbishop Trench, who, in his book on proverbs, displays an acquaintance with the popular sayings in at least ten different languages, and who informs us that a collection of Spanish proverbs only, used by him contains between seven and eight thousand. He must therefore be allowed to be an authority on the subject. In his book on proverbs and their lessons, to which we have been indebted for some portions of this article, he writes, "The comparative paucity of unworthy proverbs is a very noticeable fact." And again, "Immoral proverbs, rank weeds among the wholesome corn, are comparatively rare. In the minority with all people, they are immeasurably in the minority with most."

Seeing, then, that proverbs have been employed for the conveyance of instruction, caution against evil, encouragement to what is right, and reproof of the wrong, by the Lord himself, and by some of the wisest of men in all ages and countries, and that they are full of information as to the spirit and customs of various nations, we believe them to be worth studying.

S. S.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

"As stale as a proverb" has itself become a proverb. Erasmus does say that "a proverb is a celebrated saying, famous for its remarkable elegance, wit, and novelty," but I fail to see the remarkable elegance of the adage, "As rare as a black swan or a white crow;" "Old birds are not caught with chaff;" and "Every man has his price." I cannot discern the "remarkable wit" in "Be just before you are generous;" "One at a time is good fishing;" or "A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush." I am equally incapable of seeing "remarkable novelty" in "Birds of a feather flock together;" "It is an ill wind that blows nobody good;" and "Take care of number one," or "Man, mind thyself." These phrases appear to me undiluted commonplace words, almost wholly destitute of appreciable sense—less than the shadows of thought. They seem to me to be singularly remarkable for poverty of idea and low in moral principle—not at all equal to many phrases quotable from old writers, which have not attained the dignity or reputation of proverbs. I would instance as examples Bishop Porteus's sayings, "One murder makes a villain, millions a hero;" "War its thousands slays, peace its ten thousands." Blair's rendering of a saying borrowed from Dante, "Of joys departed never to return, how painful the remembrance," and Tennyson's repetition of the same in the words!—

"Sorrow's crown of sorrows is remembering happier things."

Nor are such pithy, pregnant, and perspicuous phrases scarce in English literature. We might quote them in hundreds, of which the following form a specimen few.

From Gray we get—

"Even in our ashes live their wonted fires."

"Where ignorance is bliss 'tis folly to be wise."

"A favourite has no friend."

"Rich windows that exclude the light,
And passages that lead to nothing."

Thomson supplies—

"Loveliness

Needs not the foreign aid of ornament,
But is, when unadorned, adorned the most."

"Delightful task! to rear the tender thought,
To teach the young idea how to shoot."

"'Tis the great birthright of mankind to die."

"To put the power

Of sovereign rule into the good man's hand
Is giving peace and happiness to millions."

"Rash fruitless war, from wanton glory waged,
Is only splendid murder."

"The cruel cannot weep."

"Keep virtue's simple path before your eyes,
Nor think from evil good can ever rise."

Addison yields these among many :—

"Falsehood and fraud shoot up in every soil."

"When vice prevails, and impious men bear sway,
The post of honour is a private station."

"A day an hour of virtuous liberty
Is worth a whole eternity of bondage."

But not in old writers only are these gems of thought to be found; the moderns have them too. Thomas Campbell is prolific in such passages, *e. g.*,—

"'Tis distance lends enchantment to the view."

"Like angels' visits few and far between."

"To live in hearts we leave behind
Is not to die."

"To bear is to conquer our fate."

"Coming events cast their shadows before."

Byron is quite a quarry of quotations :—

"Maidens, like moths, are ever caught by glare,
And Mammon wins his way where Seraph's might despair."

"Folly loves the martyrdom of Fame."

"Pride points the path that leads to Liberty."

"Hereditary bondsmen! Know ye not
Who would be free themselves must strike the blow?"

"Years steal
Fire from the mind as vigour from the limb,
And life's enchanted cup but sparkles near the brim."

"Heaven gives its favourites—early death."

"As falls the dew on quenchless sands,
Blood only serves to wash Ambition's hands."

"'Tis strange but true; for truth is always strange,
Stranger than fiction."

"The many still must labour for the one."

"'Tis pleasant sure to see one's name in print,
A book's a book although there's nothing in't."

These are a few of the living and winged words of poetry which excel the wit, wisdom, and worth of proverbs. And there are many more where these came from and elsewhere.

R. H. Horne, in his "Orion," says,—

"Secure is he who on himself relies."

"He conquers not who flies, unless he bear conquest within."

"The circle widens as the world spins round."

"'Tis always morning somewhere in the world."

These appear to me to be wise, aptly expressed, and often applicable words, but they are not proverbs. Proverbs nearly akin in sentiment, but much less elegant and suggestive, are—

"God helps those who help themselves."

"He may change his clime who travels, not his mind."

"The world is wide and there's room in it for us all."

"There's aye light in the sky if we could see it."

But who in their sane and sober senses would prefer these old said-saws to their modern instances? What a weight of contempt Milton makes Samson express for popular opinion by the use of one word which includes mean calumny and senseless judgment, harsh thought and selfish rejoicing in iniquity, when he says,—

"Tell me, my friends,

Am I not sung and *proverbed* for a fool in every street?"

This complaint is beautifully borrowed by Milton from his predecessor in divine song—David. "I made sackcloth also my garment; and I became a *proverb* to them. They that sit in the gate speak against me; and I was the song of the drunkards" (Psa. lxi. 11, 12).

If it is true as Pope has said, in words which ought surely to have become proverbial, it is, that—

"True expression, like the unchanging sun,
Clears and improves whate'er it shines upon;
It gilds all objects, but it alters none."

Can the following "saws" be true expressions? True expression,

we must remember, is an essential characteristic attributed to the proverb, for your type proverb must be witty, elegant, old, yet new and true.

"There's little use in locking the stable door when the steed is stolen."

"Like likes like," yet "Likes an ill mark."

"Two of a trade seldom agree."

"Set a thief to catch a thief."

"Raw leather will stretch."

"A baited cat is as fierce as a lion."

"Out of the frying-pan into the fire."

"Out of the brook into the mire."

"Familiarity breeds contempt."

"Long absent, soon forgotten."

"Absence makes the heart grow fonder."

"Beggars should not be choosers."

"A rainbow in the morning is the shepherd's warning,

A rainbow at night is the shepherd's delight."

Can any of these claim as their own truth, novelty, applicability, quaintness, and elegance? Or can they for a moment bear comparison with those poetic phrases which we have previously quoted? Certainly not, and hence the inferiority of proverbs is proved.

I do not lay any stress upon the scriptural references contained in E. A.'s article (p. 30). The Book of Proverbs in the Bible is the wisdom of heaven applied to earthly life, but proverbs are as a rule of the earth earthy, often carnal, not unfrequently devilish. The two things are the same only in name, and we must not allow ourselves to be misled by the fallacy of naming. The use of proverbs by distinguished writers, urged in the same paper, is equally fallacious as a proof that proverbs are worth studying. These writers were appealing to the crowd, and required to use the language of the crowd, and not unfrequently so used it as to suggest that their new thoughts were but developments of old saws. Archbishop Whately's *jeu d'esprit* shows only that a little nonsense now and then is relished by the wisest men, but it affords no proof of the worth of proverbs. "H. W., jun.," calls proverbs "the philosophy of *common sense*," but he surely means, as "Anti-P.'s" paper suggests, *commonplace*. He has not been very successful in exhibiting any *philosophy* in them, and the sense has been so common that an idiot would be ashamed to be considered so ignorant as to be instructed by them. In our opinion for men to whom life is earnest, and full of interests, and purposes, and duties, "proverbs are not worth studying."

C. J. A.

Religion.

CAN THE GOSPELS BE HARMONIZED ?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

It is important, before we proceed to discuss the question as it stands, to ascertain what kind of harmony is to be looked for in the four Gospels. To do this we must inquire who were their authors, what were the circumstances of writing, and what the purpose of each.

1. *Authorship*.—"Two of them were written by apostles, and two by apostolical men." The two former write as eye-witnesses, the two latter as those who have received from eye-witnesses the accounts of the events they record and the doctrines they teach. Several theories have been from time to time afloat as to the means of information these historians possessed. But after much rigid scrutiny it has been agreed that the sources were oral rather than written, and we need not on this ground hesitate to accept them because of the general uncertainty that belongs to traditional records, when we reflect that the writers were contemporary with the events they record, were either eye-witnesses or instructed by eye-witnesses, and when they were under the guidance and instruction of that Spirit who should "bring all things to their remembrance."

2. *Circumstances, &c., in which they were written, and the purpose of each*.—Tradition assigns an early date to the publication of all the four Gospels. The first three were certainly written before 70 A.D., and the last must have appeared about the end of the first century. As the Church during that time was in such a condition that its principal teachers had not unfrequent opportunities of meeting, it is more than probable that the MS. of one evangelist had been perused by each of the others before the writing of his own: As their grand object was one, viz., the dissemination of the doctrine of the Founder of Christianity, by means of a biographical narrative, it is easy to see that one would write less for the purpose of confirming what had been written by the other, than for supplementing it, less for the purpose of repeating, than of extending and increasing the knowledge which the first publication of the life of Christ had given rise to. Thus the

three synoptic writers whose narratives were all published before the beginning of the last quarter of the first century, while confining themselves to narratives and doctrines, do so in various degrees, and with different proportions of the two. Thus Matthew, who was evidently writing to Jews, introduces those events which tend to show that the subject of his narrative was no other than the long-expected Messiah; Mark, who, it is universally admitted, compiled his Gospel under the eye of Peter, who acted as his informant, records the events of Christ's life with a simplicity and minuteness not found in the others, and evidently intended it for the Gentiles; while Luke makes a happy combination of doctrine and incident, for the purpose, as he tells us, of setting at rest the idle rumours current regarding Jesus of Nazareth, he having been sufficiently instructed by those on whose testimony he could unhesitatingly rely. And his Gospel is especially fitted to show that not only was Christ the Messiah of the Jews, but the Saviour of the world; not only the Deliverer to whom the finger of the past had pointed for ages, with ever-increasing definiteness, as the root and the offspring of David, but as the seed of the woman who should bruise the head of the common enemy of the human race. Each of the three, while coinciding in presenting both narrative and doctrine, has thus presented the two in different proportions, according as the particular object which he had in view required.

As for John's Gospel, which was certainly written after the others, and when the author was far removed from the scene of the events he recorded, it had evidently a different purpose to serve,—a special end in view. Written in the midst of the Asiatic philosophy, it is tinctured with the spirit of the inquirer. A bare narration of facts and doctrines would have been insufficient here; the question of Christ's divinity had been mooted, and was jarring on the peace of the Church. Hence this Gospel begins with an elaborate treatise on the divine origin of the "Lamb of God,"—the Logos,—the Creator,—“God manifest in the flesh.” Throughout the work doctrine and reasoning predominate, little narrative is introduced,—only what had been omitted by the others, and little more. Hence we find little repetition of the other three in this fourth Gospel, little in common except the great Centre of the whole—Christ himself—and the tone of the discourses he so elaborately records. But we find also the *great facts* of Christ's life prominently brought before us, and those relating to His sufferings, death, and resurrection, with peculiarly touching pathos and wonderful minuteness and circumstantiality.

Such being the aim of the four Gospels, it will be apparent that a harmony of them on the principle of strict literality cannot be insisted on. Neither can one founded on minute circumstantiality in all particulars and events related by two or more of the evangelists. Suppose, for example, that four individuals were to address themselves to the task of giving an account of any event or series of events—say the Crimean war. What should we expect? Sup-

pose all the four on the ground ; suppose them all possessed of equal means of information, what would be the result ? We should have four histories of the Crimean war, all different, and yet substantially the same. In the first place we should expect a relation not only of the mere external events, but also of the diplomacy and tactics of the rival generals ; we should also expect to have these in a kind of order, arranged on a principle. Each writer would pursue his own principle, each would arrange his book after his own fashion. We should also expect to find a correct chronological order observed, but would this be really the case ? In all the great events, which would serve as landmarks, we certainly should, but innumerable little incidents, not insignificant in themselves, though little when compared with those of greater magnitude and importance in conjunction with which they are arranged, would creep in, in almost any order, partly through the forgetfulness of the historian, and partly through defective information to begin with. Nor should we consider such an account one whit the less trustworthy that a few such anachronisms had crept in with or without the knowledge of the writer. And our faith in the record would not be diminished when, on perusing the others, we found such discrepancies, such little deviations in the strict order of time. Similarly, many little events might be recorded by one which another did not deem worthy of a place in his narrative ; while the latter might, on the other hand, have given prominence to some event or events which the former had omitted to notice. And yet would we reject all as unworthy of credence because they did not agree in sundry minor particulars,—because one said such and such a general remained inactive during a considerable part of the fight, while another made no mention of the fact ; because one said the death of such a standard-bearer took place *before* attacking such a column, while another declared it to have happened *during* the attack ? Would we reject all, and say, “Because you do not agree in your narratives we do not believe that such events as you record ever happened” ? No ! we should certainly regard the discrepancies as the natural result of independent testimony, and as giving force to the credibility of each narrative, inasmuch as no collusion on the part of the writers could have taken place ; for had such been entered into, the discrepancies and apparent inaccuracies would have been studiously avoided. In the four supposed narratives, therefore, we have that which is accepted as conclusive evidence in every court of justice, as that which recommends itself to every man who is capable of sifting and weighing testimony—substantial unity amid circumstantial diversity in the testimony of the witnesses. On similar evidence to this many a one has been executed or sent to the hulks ; this way the secret crimes of midnight darkness have been brought to light ; by means of this the most cleverly concocted schemes of fraud and villany have been frustrated.

It is precisely such evidence that we have from the four evangel-

ists. They wrote at different times, had different special aims, and one of them especially had heresy to controvert—the sophistries of Gnosticism to cope with. In these circumstances had they agreed in minutiae—in material or formal arrangement, sceptics would have met us with the accusation that the whole matter was a cleverly devised fable, and unworthy of the credence of reasonable men, inasmuch as four men had manifestly concerted and entered into a plan for the purpose of deceiving the world. In the case of the four historians we supposed them all writing at the same time, and in circumstances as nearly as possible identical, and yet we found (and facts bear out our supposition) that in many little details there is no harmony; how much more then may we expect that such discrepancies will occur in the writings of four men removed from each other by intervals of space and time, when each had his own idiosyncrasies of style and of taste, and when each had a special purpose to serve,—a purpose coinciding with the place and circumstances in which he wrote!

These things being premised, we have now to ask, Is circumstantial diversity with substantial unity to be considered a sure enough basis on which to rest a plea for the harmony of the four Gospels? And we do not expect our opponents to deny this. To deny it would be unworthy of them, to deny it would be the opposite of complimentary to the readers of the *British Controversialist*. If it be denied, and a circumstantial as well as a substantial unity be insisted on, we give up the point; we do not believe the latter possible,—no man of sense would. Every schoolboy would see it to be impossible, every coffee-house politician would eschew the idea. Presuming, therefore, on the good sense of our opponents in this matter, we will now adduce a circumstance or two to show that this substantial harmony is not only possible, but that it really exists.

Perhaps this is the proper place to notice the article of W. H. S. That article, in our estimation, might with a very slight modification rank among the affirmative articles in this debate. The writer has gone over in part the very ground we have been traversing, he has laid down almost the same premises, but when he was about to draw his conclusion a side wind seems to have turned him round and made him write it upside down. Whether this may have been the case, or whether he really meant from the very commencement to write “negative” at the top of his article, is not for us to say, but it is certain that “therefore the Gospels can be harmonized” was the legitimate conclusion for him to draw from the premises he had laid down. The admission that there is in them “an essentially divine harmony” encourages us to hope that W. H. S. holds precisely the same ideas with ourselves regarding the *kind of harmony* that is to be looked for and insisted on in the question before us. Inasmuch as each writer had his own idiosyncrasies, his own purpose, his own audience, his own peculiar circumstances and time of writing, it must of necessity

follow that a harmony which has for its object a *verbatim* record exhibited in four collateral columns cannot but be a failure ; anything but failure in such circumstances would be suggestive of collusion, and would throw very strong suspicions indeed on the authority and credibility of the Gospels. Hence we are at one with W. H. S. in considering this impossible. But then he adds "in the same sense to each individual mind." This phrase has puzzled us not a little. It is worthy of the late prime minister. "In the same sense to each individual mind." Would not the narratives of four independent biographers be substantially harmonious "in the same sense to each individual mind," even though each wrote for a special purpose, at different times, and to different people ? Would not the *main facts* of the life of their hero be substantially the same ? Would not the principal sayings they recorded be substantially identical ? It is true one might give more than another, and as each would use his own language it is not to be expected that the verbal reports would be identical, but would there be a want of harmony because of this ? Were it contended that because of some glaring contradictions no attempt at harmony could be successful, we should then see some force in the objection ; but that facts and doctrines stated by four individuals, each in his own way—one giving a greater number, another a smaller number, and one omitting what another has recorded, but all substantially agreeing—should give rise to a conclusion that to discern in them harmony is beyond our reach, is what we cannot understand, and cannot rejoice at.

The article of S. S. has shown in how many points the Gospels agree. Now, to say the least of it, the existence of such agreement is a strong presumption in favour of harmony, and this presumption becomes positive proof as soon as no real contradictions can be shown to exist. We say *real* contradictions, because we are not blind to the fact that many apparently glaring contradictions and difficulties do exist. A reference to one or two of them may wind up our article.

The two accounts of Christ's genealogy have been treated, and as satisfactorily disposed of as circumstances will admit, by S. S. That the one was the natural, and the other the royal line of Christ, seems the most satisfactory explanation. These would be compiled from existing records, and the fact of the apostles being inspired did not give them licence to alter them. They would take them as they were.

Certain chronological difficulties present themselves. We find events related in one combination by one evangelist, and in another by another. But in meeting with such we ought to bear in mind that the evangelists do not profess to write their narratives in chronological order ; on the contrary, they often make wide deviations from the order of time. Nor is this to be wondered at when we remember what has been already referred to, that each had a special purpose to serve, and that each would bring out those

events most prominently which would best suit his purpose. Upon the whole, however, we believe that Luke adheres most to the strict order of time, and his *καθεξής* (i. 3) would seem to imply his original intention to do so. But when we find that even he is very indefinite as to dates, and that sometimes he inserts an "about," and sometimes "in those days;" we cannot maintain that he has been able to fix the precise dates of the events he narrates in all instances, and this is confirmed by the reflection that in oral testimony (and we have no reason to assume that Luke had anything else) there is always a want of adherence to dates,—that these, in fact, slip from the memory. We find even in the ordinary events of life that perfectly credible witnesses relate circumstances of which they have been eye-witnesses in different order, and yet we do not throw their narratives aside, but accept them as substantially true. Nor does the application of this to the four evangelists militate in the least against the doctrine of inspiration, for in non-essentials they were left to their own resources and means of information.

The only other particular instance we shall at present notice is the apparent discrepancy in the four accounts of Christ's resurrection. These may be reconciled by supposing that, first, Mary Magdalene, and Mary the mother of Joses, and Salome come together to the sepulchre, and find the stone rolled away (Mark xvi. 2, 4). Mary Magdalene, leaving the other two women, immediately ran and told Peter, and the disciple whom Jesus loved (John), that they had taken away the Lord (John xx. 1). During her absence an angel appears to Mary the mother of Joses, and to Salome, declaring that He is risen, and sends them to inform the disciples. These two women now leave the sepulchre to tell the disciples (Matt. xxviii. 5—8; Mark xvi. 5—8). Peter and John in the meantime come to the sepulchre, and after viewing it depart (John xx. 3—10). Mary Magdalene, having followed Peter and John, returns to the sepulchre, and remains after their departure, and then being alone sees two angels; and turning round saw Jesus himself, whom she took for the gardener (John xx. 11—17; Mark xvi. 9). Mary Magdalene goes to inform the disciples, and meets again with Mary the mother of Joses, and Salome; and while the three were together Jesus appears to them all (Matt. xxviii. 9, 10; John xx. 18). The women from Galilee, among whom was Joanna, being ignorant of these things, came with the spices to the sepulchre when the others had left, and there also see two angels, and then returned and told the eleven, and all the rest (Luke xxiv. 1—11). Peter is supposed after this to have gone again to the sepulchre (Luke xxiv. 12); and that when returning Jesus appeared to him (Luke xxiv. 34; 1 Cor. xv. 5).*

Our arguments stand thus :—The four Gospels having each a

* Pinnock's "Analysis of the New Testament," § 444.

different author, a different purpose to serve, and written under very different circumstances, cannot be harmonised in the sense of strict literality and circumstantiality. But inasmuch as they have in the midst of this diversity a common theme,—viz., a biography of Christ, with an account of the doctrines he taught, it follows that a substantial harmony *may* exist between them. That this *does* exist is shown (1st) positively, there is a manifest agreement in all the principal facts, (2nd) negatively, though at first sight discrepancies appear, these are in a closer scrutiny found to vanish; and no real contradiction can be shown to exist between the four narratives. It is true we have not taken up all the apparent inconsistencies and explained them away, but we deem such a course unnecessary. The *onus probandi* in this particular matter is with the other side; they must adduce the difficulties and “irreconcilable” passages, and that being done it is for us to answer them. Meanwhile we consider enough has been said to support our present position,—viz., that the four gospels are capable of being harmonised in substance, which is all that either the philosopher, the man of science, or the mere popular reader can with any show of reason desire or contend for. D. S.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

It is certainly a very legitimate inquiry, “Can the Gospels be Harmonized?” not only for the confutation of gainsayers and the silencing of infidel objectors, but for the better establishment of believers in their most holy faith.

Our Gospels are professedly written by two eye-witnesses, Matthew and John, and by two chroniclers, Mark and Luke; the former of whom is said to have been Peter’s interpreter, and to give his statements on the authority of that apostle, he is therefore only a recorder—a hearsay witness, we presume, he would be called in law; the latter distinctly intimates that he was not an eye-witness himself, but that he derived his information from those who had been so. He is a convert of St. Paul’s. Hence the two Gospels of Matthew and John are regarded as accounts of Jesus Christ embodying the knowledge and evidence of the immediate apostles of Jesus Christ, while the two represented as owing their authorship to Mark and Luke are looked upon as accounts of the disciples of the apostles. If it be true that in the mouth of two or three witnesses shall a thing be established, then we see that we have in Matthew and John the minimum of trustworthy evidence, and that what *they* affirm is only credible when they unitedly affirm the same fact in the same manner, as happening at the same time and in suitable circumstantiality; and anything that may be said by Mark and Luke can at the most be regarded as corroborating and, as it were, incidental; hence H. K.’s argument is fallacious, as he treats the Evangelists as *four* independent and contemporary witnesses—which they are not.

Of course Mark, relying on Peter’s authority, was a recorder of 1869.

what was seen by him; for Peter affirms, "We made known unto you the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, and were eye-witnesses of His majesty" (2 Peter i. 16). Still this is testimony indirect, not direct. It is quite admitted that the judicious by laying together the circumstances, attestations, and characters of those who are concerned in them, or in reporting them, either receive or reject what at first only eye-witnesses could absolutely believe or disbelieve. I have a faint impression that I am here repeating an observation, in its main form, made by some writer on Christian evidence, though I cannot exactly recall the authority. At all events, what is said is quite correct, and we can believe on sufficient testimony—even when we have no direct report from direct eye-witnesses. If, however, a harmony of the Gospels is to be made in a proper method, H. K.'s form of doing it must be avoided; we must take the two eye-witnesses, and find what they tell unitedly with consistent particularity; we must then consider how far what they tell, discordantly or independently, may fit in with the accepted and trustworthy evidence. In considering this, we may use the help of the corroborative evidence afforded by the secondary witnesses, those who are mere reporters of what others said they saw, that are witnesses to what they saw themselves. Now this purging of evidence has never been justly made, and any attempt to harmonize the Gospels as independent and co-equal evidence must give fallacious results. Hence the statement of the *present* Archbishop of Canterbury, quoted by the *late* R. S.—(How changes thicken as time passes on!)—that "the four Gospels agree essentially" (B. C., Oct., 1868, p. 283) is inaccurate as a statement of fact. The four Gospels *differ* essentially as evidence—two being *direct*, two *indirect*; and though they may *confirm* each other, they do so by their difference no less than by their agreement. But confirmation is not harmonizing—the former is to show to be believable, the latter to show to be adjusted into a unity fitted together with exactness of collation into each other. Our own opinion is that Faith is more certainly provided for by confirmation than by harmony; for any doubt about a harmony destroys belief and impedes faith, while evidence, trustworthy in itself, duly confirmed, although there may be discrepancies here and there in its course, does not interfere with faith. In fact harmony requires certainty, and implies knowledge; but confirmation requires the highest degree of probability, and implies faith—a faith realizable as knowledge in the soul as the evidence of things not seen. On this account we look on attempts to harmonize the Gospels as likely to disappoint expectation, by raising too high the desire for certainty and minute critical interpretations, and giving too little place to faith, and to the operation of the ordinary laws of evidence as the groundwork of a true and living faith.

These things are written that we might *believe* that Jesus is the Christ, and that believing we might have life through His name. On this account we say—slightly altering the opening paragraph

of a paper by S. S. (Dec. 1868, p. 420)—“The *friends* of Christianity have oftentimes *brought* to discredit the testimony of the Evangelists on account of the difference and difficulties which appear on comparing them,” being racked and tortured to bring them into harmony, when all that we should aim at or attempt is to confirm the faith of those who are asked to believe in the Lord unto eternal life.

“Then Faith shall fail and holy Hope shall die,
That lost in certainty and this in joy.”

“Faith is a firm belief of the whole word of God, of His gospel, commands, threats, and promises,” as Archbishop Wake says; but then belief is the credit given to something that we do not or cannot know, in reliance on the authority upon which it is delivered. This is quite compatible with discrepancies, but harmony is not. On this ground we think the harmonists have done much harm, and that they have provoked claims which cannot be substantiated.

Taking the Gospel principle, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses a thing shall be established, how can the harmonists receive these important items which are mentioned by only one Evangelist? Of such matters we quote only a few.

All that portion of the Gospel history which proclaims the Eternity and Godship of Christ depends only on John i. 1—18; that about the conception and birth of John the Baptist—miraculous as it was—is to be learned only from St. Luke’s first chapter; and of the marvels and miracles connected with the birth of Christ, we have only a few incidents related by Matthew and Luke, and the incidents related differ considerably in details. Luke alone gives us the story of the youthful Jesus in the Temple. The testimony of John the Baptist concerning Jesus we learn only from John; the early miracles at Cana, Capernaum, and Jerusalem, the interview between Jesus and Nicodemus, Jesus and the woman of Samaria, and the healing of the nobleman’s son at Capernaum, we learn on the same single authority. To the same sole witness we owe the account of the cure at the pool of Bethesda, and the persecutions for Sabbath-breaking which thence arose. In Luke alone we find Simon’s feast, and the penitent woman’s anointment of his feet. Matthew is our only authority for the cure of two blind men at Capernaum, and of a dumb demoniac there. Mark alone describes His teaching in the synagogues of Nazareth; John alone records His appearance as a prophet in the synagogue of Capernaum. St. Luke is our single reporter in regard to the appointment of the seventy, the parables of the good Samaritan, of the barren fig-tree, the unjust steward, the prodigal son, the rich man and Lazarus, &c.; as also His cure of the woman’s infirmity, with which she had been afflicted eighteen years, and of the man ill with the dropsy; to these, in this connection, we may add His denunciations of the Pharisees, His teaching His disciples to pray, the stratagem of the Pharisees, winked at by Herod to induce him to leave Galilee that

he might be apprehended and slain. John is our only authority for "the going up to Jerusalem," not openly, but, as it were, in secret." Jesus there teaching in the temple, the sending of the officers to take him, the woman taken in adultery, the attempt to stone him, the cure of a blind man on his washing in the pool of Siloam, and the inquiry which resulted from it, the exasperation of the Pharisees, and the escape of Jesus through the midst of Samaria and Galilee. Luke records the cure of "ten lepers," His discourse to the Pharisees about fasting and prayer, and the parable of the Pharisee and the Publican. He also is our sole authority regarding Zaccheus, the parable of the nobleman going into a far country. John is the single witness for the parable of the good shepherd, His conversation in Solomon's porch, His going to Bethabara beyond Jordan, the raising of Lazarus, His supping with His friends at Bethany, and Mary's anointment of His feet, and the plot to put Lazarus to death, the interview of the Greeks, and the discourses of Jesus regarding unbelief. Matthew is the single evidence of the delivery of the parables of the ten virgins, the talents, and his description of the day of judgment. John alone tells us of the temptation of Judas Iscariot by Satan, the washing of the disciples' feet, and the supper before the feast of the Passover, with the incident of "the sop," and the long discourses by which He sought to comfort His sorrowing followers. The details of the Lord's Supper are recorded only by John. John alone tells us of His presence with Peter in the outside, in the hall of the High Priest, and of what occurred during the examination of Jesus by Annas; Luke is the only informant we have concerning the interchange of civilities between Pilate and Herod. The repentance of Judas is narrated by Matthew, and does not harmonize with what Luke (?) says in Acts. Luke alone gives us the prediction of Jesus regarding the calamities soon to befall the Jewish people. John alone tells of the bequest in his favour of the guardianship of "Mary the mother of the Lord," of the breaking of the malefactors' legs, and the piercing of Christ's body. Matthew gives the account of the early visit of the women to the sepulchre, having previously told of the precautions taken for its security, and afterwards affirming the bribery of the guards. Luke tells us of the past resurrection-appearance of Christ at Emmaus; John, His appearance "in the midst" of the mourning disciples, twice, and the confutation and the confession of Thomas, and of His third appearance at the Lake of Tiberias. Matthew records His appearance at Galilee, and His parting commandment; and Luke alone, in Acts, tells us of His Ascension, and the announcement of the Second Advent.

Our affirmation is that these several passages can be explained and accepted in consistency with the events recorded by the Evangelists as a whole, and that from the entire Gospels a harmony, not of events and circumstances, but of character and influence, arises—superior in its effects to any harmony of passages possible, whatever the ingenuity exercised in fitting in and peddling and pottering

about with the mere externals of the narrative. "The letter killeth; it is the spirit that giveth life."

A reasonable faith the Gospel demands, a reasonable service God requires, a reasonable hope the Saviour offers. The whole Gospel is done on the principle of "come and let us reason together, saith our God." Now reason is the power of selecting probabilities from uncertainties, and it is the moral reason to which the Gospel appeals, rather than the intellectual reason. To lead people to expect a Harmony of the Gospels is to proffer a mathematics of probabilities, instead of a reasonable ground of faith. It is expecting too much and representing too much. That the Gospels are trustworthy, consistent in themselves, and consistent with history, may most certainly be believed by us; but that all the parts and portions of the Gospels can be so fitted into each other that the whole shall be harmonious as an angel's song is impossible—because it was never intended to be a harmonized whole, but only to make us wise unto salvation—for which it most fully suffices.

H. B. T.

The Essayist.

ARTHUR H. HALLAM AND "IN MEMORIAM."

(Continued from page 58.)

To the same period—1830—belong the piece addressed "To Two Sisters," containing a high and graceful play on the names of Mary and Emily, originally signifying "Exalted" and "Beloved," and a fine essay on the philosophical writings of Cicero, which obtained a college prize.

In January, 1831, he wrote stanzas "To the Loved One"—doubtless the "Emily" of the poem just mentioned, as its last lines were these:—

"Consent to be 'beloved;' I ask no more
Than to fulfil for thee thy warning name,
And in a perfect loving live and die."

No vulgar curiosity, but a deep tender interest in Arthur's short but beautiful life, and in the affection which raised the great tribute to his genius and virtues, bids us observe that this was addressed to a sister of Alfred Tennyson, who has indirectly expressed his joy at the prospect of friendship being consummated in the nearer relationship of a brother.

"Nor have I felt so much of bliss
Since first he told me that he loved
A daughter of our house; nor proved
Since that dark day a day like this."

In another mood of recollection and glimpsing "into the world of 'Might have been,'" he sings,—

"I see thee sitting crowned with good,
 A central warmth diffusing bliss
 In glance and smile, and clasp and kiss,
 On all the branches of thy blood ;
 "Thy blood, my friend, and partly mine ;
 For now the day was drawing on,
 When thou shouldst link thy life with one
 Of mine own house, and boys of thine
 "Had babbled 'Uncle' on my knee ;
 But that remorseless iron hour
 Made cypress of her orange flower,
 Despair of Hope, and earth of thee."

Thus Arthur addresses "The Loved One," bringing all his gifts,
 and laying them as a glorious offering at her feet :—

"All thoughts that in me live and burn,
 The thirst for truth, the sense of power ;
 Freedom's high hope—to thee they turn ;
 I bring them as a precious dower !
 "The beauty which those thoughts adore,
 Diffused through this perennial frame,
 Centres in thee ; I feel it more
 Since thy delivering presence came :
 And with a clearer affluence now
 That mystic spirit fills my heart,
 Wafts me on hope's enthusiast flow,
 And heals with prayer the guilty smart.
 "Oh ! best beloved, it were a bliss
 As pure as aught the angels feel,
 To think in after days of *this*—
 Should time a strength in me reveal
 To fill with worthy thoughts and deed
 The measure of my high desire ;
 To *thee* were due the glorious meed,
 Thy smiles had kindled first the fire."

In a yet higher strain is the poem commencing—

"This was my lay in sad nocturnal hour,"
 written in the succeeding month. It closes thus :—

"Thy word hath passed
 Upon my spirit, and is a light for ever,
 High o'er the drifting spray of circumstance.
 Thy word, the plighted word, the word of promise
 And of all comfort ! In its mighty strength
 I bid thee hail, not as in former days,
 Not as my chosen only, but my bride ;
 My very bride, coming to make my house
 A glorious temple ! Be the seal of God
 Upon that word until the hour be full !"

A fine sonnet to his mother, in which he speaks of the "barren doubt" which "made an unkind December of his spring" as having passed away, while

"On the calmed waters once again
Ascendant Faith circles with silver plume,"

belongs also to 1831.

In this year he obtained the first prize for English declamation, his subject being, "The conduct of the Independent Party during the Civil War." The address was never printed, but his success entailed upon him, according to college custom, to deliver an oration in the chapel immediately before the Christmas vacation. He chose for his theme "The Influence of Italian Works of Imagination on the same class of Compositions in England."

His acquaintance with Italian and French literature was almost as perfect as his knowledge of the great authors of his native country. Dante, in particular, was "the prime mover of his spirit." In the grand imagery of the "Inferno," but still more in those of the "Paradiso," he found scope for his own great thoughts and majestic speculations.

The concluding passage of the oration, which is marked by a sustained purity and eloquence of language, and a complete critical mastery of his materials, is as follows:—

"An English mind that has drank deep at the sources of southern inspiration, and especially that is imbued with the spirit of the mighty Florentine, will be conscious of a perpetual freshness and quiet beauty resting on his imaginations and spreading gently over his affections, until, by the blessing of heaven, it may be absorbed without loss in the pure inner light, of which that voice has spoken as no other can ;

"Light intellectual, yet full of love,
Love of true beauty, therefore full of joy,
Joy, every other sweetness far above."

In the following January, being then within a few days of his twenty-first birthday, he took his degree, and left Cambridge.

From that time he lived with his father, at 67, Wimpole Street, of which he used playfully to say, "You will always find us at sixes and sevens." This is the residence alluded to in the "In Memoriam" lines expressive of the first absorbing and overshadowing grief at his loss, which clad all things in its own monotonous gloom :—

"Dark house, by which once more I stand
There in the long unlovely street ;
Doors, where my heart was used to beat
So quickly, waiting for a hand,
A hand that can be clasped no more."

Arthur began the study of the law at home, and was entered on the books of the Inner Temple.

His "Lines spoken in the character of Pygmalion" belong to 1832. They were written for an acted charade, but at once take a bold intellectual character, and bear no trace of being thrown off merely for amusement. He seems as if unable to write otherwise than seriously and earnestly. They open thus :—

"'Tis done, the work is finished—that last touch
Was as a god's! Lo! now it stands before me,
Even as long years ago I dreamed of it,
Consummate offspring of consummate art;
Ideal forms itself! Ye gods, I thank you
That I have lived to this: for this thrown off
The pleasure of my kind, for this have toiled
Days, nights, months, years;—am I not recompensed?
Who says an artist's life is not a king's?"

His leisure was spent in studying and partially translating the *Vita Nuova* of Dante, and in writing a powerful reply to Professor Rosseti's "Disquisizione sullo Spirito Antipapale," which had promulgated the startling theory that the chief productions of his favourite literature were written with a hidden political meaning and spirit, which was known only to the members of a secret society designed for the overthrow of the Papal power. To use Mr. Hallam's words,—

"It seemed to Arthur the worst of poetical heresies to desert the Absolute, the Universal, the Eternal, the Beautiful, and True, which the Platonic spirit of his literary creed taught him to seek in all the higher works of genius, in quest of some temporary historical allusion which could be of no interest with posterity."

Three short memoirs of Petrarch, Burke, and Voltaire, are also written at this time, but his chief attention was given to metaphysical researches and the history of philosophical opinions.

In October, 1832, he entered the office of a conveyancer to gain a practical insight into the application of legal knowledge. Visits to his dearest friends have been vividly and sweetly indicated.

"How often, hither wandering down,
My Arthur found your shadows fair,
And shook to all the liberal air
The dust and din and steam of town:
"He brought an eye for all he saw;
He mixt in all our simple sports;
They pleased him, fresh from brawling courts
And dusty purlieus of the law.

* * * * *

"O bliss, when all in circle drawn
About him, heart and ear were fed;
To hear him, as he lay and read
The Tuscan poets on the lawn:

"Or in the all-golden afternoon
 A guest, or happy sister, sung,
 Or here she brought the harp, and flung
 A ballad to the brightening moon."

Sometimes walks in "distant woods" diversified the day, during which the two companions

"Glanced from theme to theme,
 Discussed the books to love or hate,
 Or touched the changes of the State,
 (This—we may note—was just after the passing of the Reform Bill),
 Or threaded some Socratic dream ;

"But if I praised the busy town,
 He loved to rail against it still,
 For 'ground in yonder social mill
 We rub each other's angles down,

"And merge," he said, "in form and gloss
 The picturesque of man and man.
 We talk'd——"

returning only at the calm setting of the evening star.

But these pleasant times were soon to close. Arthur was attacked by intermittent fever in the spring of 1833, and perhaps the resulting weakness brought on a return of the disordered circulation from which he had previously suffered. In company with his father, he visited Germany in August, 1833, and at Vienna a rush of blood to the head suddenly closed his life on the 15th September, 1833, at the early age of twenty-two years and a half.

His remains were brought to England, and interred in the chancel of Clevedon church, picturesquely situated on the landward slope of a lonely hill which overlooks the Bristol channel.

"'Tis well, 'tis something ; we may stand
 Where he in English earth is laid,
 And from his ashes may be made
 The violet of his native land.

"'Tis little, but it looks in truth,
 As if the quiet bones were blest,
 Among familiar names to rest,
 And in the places of his youth.

"There twice a day the Severn fills,
 The salt sea-water passes by,
 And hushes half the babbling Wye,
 And makes a silence in the hills."

—————"O to us
 The fools of habit, sweeter seems

"To rest beneath the clover sod,
 That takes the sunshine and the rains,
 Or where the kneeling hamlet drains,
 The chalice of the grapes of God ;

"Than if with thee the roaring wells
Should gulf him fathom deep in brine;
And hands so often clasped in mine,
Should toss with tangle and with shells."

His only brother was nine years old at the time of Arthur's death. He, too, grew up into a youth and early manhood of extraordinary promise, but was stricken down at the age of twenty-six, and laid in the same grave. There now lie mother and sister, the two brothers, and doubtless the father also; "lovely and pleasant in their lives," and in death no longer divided.

The regret with which the intelligence of Arthur's decease was received in the circle of his acquaintances was wide-spread and intense.

Let Tennyson speak again:—

"My blood an even tenor kept,
Till on mine ear this message falls,
That in Vienna's fatal walls,
God's finger touched him and he slept.

"But I remained, whose hopes were dim,
Whose life, whose thoughts were little worth,
To wander on a darkened earth
Where all things round me breathed of him."

"Whatever way my days decline,
I felt and feel, tho' left alone,
His being working in mine own,
The footsteps of his life in mine.

* * * *

"Such

A friendship as had mastered time;

"Which *masters* Time indeed, and is
Eternal, separate from fears:
The all-assuming months and years
Can take no part away from this:

"But summer on the steaming floods,
And spring that swells the narrow brooks,
And autumn with a noise of rooks,
'That gather in the weaning woods.

"And every pulse of wind and wave
Recalls, in change of light or gloom,
My old affection of the tomb,
And my prime passion in the grave."

And thus:—

"My Arthur, whom I shall not see,
Till all my widow'd race be run;
Dear as the mother to the son,
More than my brothers are to me."

Also the passionate utterance, first published in 1842, which is

as the one prelude to the sad, solemn, though at length triumphant music of "In Memoriam," eight years later in appearing:—

"Break, break, break
On thy cold gray stones, O Sea!
And I would that my tongue could utter
The thoughts that arise in me.

* * * * *

"And the stately ships go on
To their haven under the hill;
But O for the touch of a vanish'd hand,
And the sound of a voice that is still!

"Break, break, break,
At the foot of thy crags, O Sea!
But the tender grace of a day that is dead,
Will never come back to me."

Another friend states:—"I have met with no man his superior in metaphysical subtlety; no man his equal as a philosophic critic on works of taste; no man whose views on all subjects connected with the duties and dignities of humanity were more large, more generous, and enlightened.

"It seems due to his memory that it should be known how far what he had done falls short of what a few years hence he would have done; how far his vast and various powers were from having attained their full stature and mature proportions.

"The compositions which he has left (marvellous as they are) are inadequate evidences of his actual power, except to those who had watched the workings of his mind, and seen that his mighty spirit (beautiful and powerful as it had already grown,) yet bore all the marks of youth, and growth, and ripening promise."

Another says:—"I can scarcely hope to describe to you the feelings with which I regarded him, much less the daily beauty of his life out of which they grew. Numberless scenes, indeed, grave and gay, come back upon me which mark him as the most accomplished person I have known or shall know."

A school companion writes thus, and the testimony, it should be remembered, is of him while in early youth:—"It was my happiness to live at Eton in habits of close intimacy with him; and the sentiments of affection which that intimacy produced, were of a kind never to be effaced. Painfully mindful as I am of the privileges which I then so largely enjoyed, of the elevating effects derived from intercourse with a spirit such as his, of the rapid and continued expansion of all his powers, of his rare and, so far as I have seen, unparalleled endowments, and of his deep enthusiastic affections, both religious and human, I have taken upon me thus to render my feeble testimony to a memory which will ever be dear to my heart."

All agree in their high estimate of his gifts, but upon each the

same impression was produced, that these were but in growth, and, great as they had already become, were far from having attained their full development and grace.

His portrait shows a brow and face of noblest and sweetest—most god-like—form and expression, shaded by the pensiveness of one who sees into the depths of perplexity and sorrow of which human life is full.

But, as I have said, "In Memoriam" will ever be his truest monument. To that we must always look for his full outline, and by the measure of its grief strive to guess the greatness of the departed.

"So, dearest, now thy brows are cold
I see thee what thou art, and know,
Thy likeness to the wise below
Thy kindred with the great of old.
"And there is more than I can see,
And what I see I leave unsaid,
Nor speak it, knowing Death has made
His darkness beautiful with thee."

In Tennyson's poems, published in 1830, there is one which seems to be intended as a sketch of Arthur Hallam. It may be quite otherwise, but it is certain that it appeared within a year of their first meeting, and every word it contains may with perfect truth be applied to Arthur, as his works and the testimony of those who most intimately knew him have enabled us to conceive, and partially to fill up, the features of his character. The first stanza is—

"Clear-headed friend, whose joyful scorn
Edged with sharp laughter, cuts atwain
The knots that tangle human creeds,
The wondering cords that bind and strain
The heart until it bleeds,
Ray-fringed eyelids of the morn
Roof not a glance so keen as thine:
If aught of prophecy be mine,
Thou wilt not live in vain."

It is pleasing to trace, as I have already attempted in some instances to do, the reciprocation of sentiment in Arthur's works,—and we are gratified to know that he perceived and heartily welcomed the rising genius shown in "Claribel," "Mariana," and other pieces. Some of his own poems were to have been published—and were actually in type—along with Tennyson's in 1830, but were withdrawn in compliance with his father's wish. From a review of the future Laureate's volume the following is taken:—

"We have remarked five distinctive excellences of his own manner. First, his luxuriance of imagination, and, at the same time, his control over it. Secondly, his power of embodying himself in ideal characters, or rather moods of character, with such extreme accuracy of adjustment, that the circumstances of the narration seem to have a natural correspondence with the predominant feeling, and, as it were, to be evolved from it

by assimilative force. Thirdly, his vivid, picturesque delineation of objects, and the peculiar skill with which he holds all of them fused, to borrow a metaphor from science, in a medium of strong emotion. Fourthly, the variety of his lyrical measures, and exquisite modulation, of harmonious words and cadences to the swell and fall of the feelings expressed. Fifthly, the elevated habits of thought, implied in these compositions, and imparting a mellow soberness of tone, more impressive to our minds than if the author had drawn up a set of opinions in verse, and sought to instruct the understanding rather than to communicate the love of beauty to the heart."

Contrasting the two, Tennyson appears to have secured the greater mastery of expression, and to have had more power of restraint over his mental workings, thus succeeding better in the endeavour to suppress the sense and colouring of his own personality in favour of that of the objects which engaged the interest and labour of his muse. The constructive and realizing potency of his imagination is unapproached. But the intensely subjective character of most of Hallam's works reveals him in a mightier strength, manifesting a far higher level of culture and philosophic grasp and comprehension, dealing with loftier conceptions, grappling with problems of tremendous import, which have been, wisely perhaps, but still so as to suggest some sense of comparative inferiority, avoided or but little acknowledged by the other. There is no doubt that he would soon have felt a lack of interest in verse-writing of the ordinary stamp, and his speculative and enquiring disposition might perhaps in the end have led him entirely away from poetry, to fix his exclusive attention on moral and religious philosophy and metaphysics. As Dr. Brown has beautifully put it: "We agree entirely in his father's estimate of his poetical gift and art, but his mind was too serious, too thoughtful, too intensely dedicated to truth and the God of truth, to linger long in the pursuit of beauty; he was on his way to God, and could rest in nothing short of him, otherwise he might have been a poet of genuine excellence."

Tennyson has been left, as a wise and Christian teacher of his age—made wiser and holier, doubtless, by the cherished grief from which his highest strains arose; and thus their friendship has become a priceless legacy to us and a possession to all time, which is the best apology for this imperfect attempt to make its nature and incidents more familiarly known.

What is said has had its source in much reverence for Arthur Henry Hallam, and much love for "In Memoriam." If it leads one reader to a more intelligent interest in either, and to the thought that consecrated genius is not lost, but, whether here or in a purer and higher range of being, has its part to do towards the coming of that

"Far off divine event
To which the whole creation moves;"

my purpose will have been attained.

Oswestry.

W.

The Reviewer.

The Church in its Relation to the State. London: Edward Marsh.

THIS is "an address from the Religious Society of Friends [commonly called Quakers] to their fellow countrymen," and is authoritatively "issued by the representative body" of that section of religionists, on the propriety of a church establishment. It considers, first, the argument in favour of church establishments usually drawn from "*Mosaic institutions*." Second, the "founding of the Christian church." Third, the "introduction of church establishments." Fourth, exhibits the "contrast between primitive Christianity and the age of church establishments;" and fifth descants on "the present aspect of the question." The writing is calm, weighty, grave, concise, and considerate; and the tract which is included in thirty-two pages makes constant reference to scripture, and the best secular authorities. We admire much the spirit in which it is written, of which the following extract is an indication:—"We feel the gravity of the present crisis. We would urge nothing in the spirit of contention, or from the love of change. We know well how much of wisdom is needed in every attempt to correct old institutions; and especially in all that relates to Christianity, how necessary it is that the ground shall be cleared in the hearts of men before either the foundation or the superstructure can be safely laid. Hence the necessity for patience, forbearance, and mutual charity, no less than for earnestness and zeal. As each is willing to be taught, all may find that they have much both to unlearn and to learn."—p. 29.

The Science of Man. By CHARLES BRAY. London: Longmans, Green, Reader, & Dyer.

THIS pamphlet, which presents "a bird's-eye view of the wide and fertile field of anthropology," is, as we understand it, a plea for the thorough pursuit of "the proper study of mankind"—*Man*. In regard to mere questions of curiosity, the author appears inclined to let "the dead past bury its dead," and seems desirous of directing investigation towards the present laws and conditions of man's being. In the first part, Mr. Bray describes his idea of the science of man. It displays, as all that he writes does, full reading, apt quotation, excellent collection of seemingly far-distant ideas, and a general tendency to completeness and roundness of speculation. His acquaintance with what has been thought, and the references he makes to authorities, constitute this tractate a valuable one,

and we are glad to find him proclaiming—as against Drs. Hunt, E. C. Blake, and others—that “metaphysics is the highest of all sciences, and it is based on physics.” In part second, Mr. Bray treats of “The occult powers of man.” He not only admits “the mutually convertible forces” of Dr. Buchner,—“gravitation, mechanical force (pressure?) heat, electricity, magnetism, affinity, cohesion,”—but wishes to add to these odyllic force, vital, and nervous or mental force, all of which he gives outline explanations. The work is valuable as an additional chapter—showing the author’s advancement in thought—of his interesting work. “Force and its correlates,” of which due note was taken in a recent sketch of the writer as a “modern metaphysician.”

Man: Where, Whence, and Whither. By DAVID PAGE, LL.D.
Edinburgh: Edmonstone & Douglas.

DR. DAVID PAGE is one of the most notable of Scottish geologists, and is a favourite lecturer in modern Athens. This “glance at man in his natural history relations” is an extension of the material and thought of two lectures delivered at the Edinburgh Philosophical Institution, which excited attention and controversy at the time of their delivery, and are worthy of attention not only for their actual contents in the way of information, but for the plainness with which they express opinions which may be characterized as altogether belonging to this present life and world. The “where” of man is, of course, the bounded “continent of universe,” as Bunsen calls the earth. Of his “whence,” Dr. Page inclines to believe in the natural view of the origin and progress of man. And the “whither” that he discusses is that of the race and not of the individual, and refers to an earthly future, not to any other; for Dr. Page rigidly keeps himself on the hither side of possibility and experience, and contends that on this side we have quite enough to inquire into and to know without attempting to make out what is on the other side. It is a clear, readable, forcible, plain-spoken statement of one side—the earthly one—of the question of the origin, condition, dwelling and destiny of man. We quote a passage from the conclusion in favour of free inquiry, without committing ourselves to the implied results as to the whither of human thought:—

“To those who have accompanied the author through this brief review, it must now be sufficiently obvious that there is nothing in the question of ‘Man’s Where, Whence, and Whither’ that places it beyond the domain of scientific inquiry—nothing that earnest minds may not discuss with freedom, and honest words convey without restraint. As a problem of natural history, it must be solved by natural history methods; and however uncertain the conclusions yet arrived at, they are, like those resulting from every earnest and truth-seeking effort, entitled to a candid consideration. That they run counter to old beliefs may be sufficient reason why they should be narrowly scanned and received with hesitancy; but it is no

honest cause why their tendency should be misrepresented and their advocacy be traduced. Our beliefs are ever according to the measure of our knowledge; and as the knowledge of our biological relations becomes more intimate, and the nature of our geological relations more fully established, so will the new beliefs respecting the origin, antiquity, and destiny of man gain a wider acceptance. It is the old warfare with ignorance and prejudice; the old combat between rational inquiry and traditional faith. Need we indicate with what side the victory must ultimately rest?"

The Topic.

OUGHT EMIGRATION TO BE MADE COMPULSORY ON THE ABLE-BODIED POOR.

AFFIRMATIVE.

POVERTY is neither a crime nor a disgrace in itself, but it is not unfrequently both from its origin and its circumstances. In all states and communities all men should be prepared to do their proper share of labour for the common good; but in our country—in most European countries—there has sprung up a race of vagrant poor, workhouse haunters and sturdy beggars, lying rascals and professional mendicants, waifs and castaways, who cannot be turned to good account in the crowded places of civilization. These, as being possessed of bone and sinew, could very well be drilled into an army of culture, to go forth and subdue, under some great captain of industry, the wide spread fields of many colonies. By compelling enlistment in these industrial regiments and drafting them off, in proper marshalling and order, into some of those outlying fields of effort, where physical labour offers productive results in return for its exercise, we might cause those who now feed

upon and pauperize our land to provide for their own sustenance by their own labour, and also supply us with valuable imports in such a way as to increase the sum of human happiness, and the grand total of the prosperity of nations. To them compulsory emigration would be a boon, and to those from amongst whom they were taken a blessing. Thus it would be, like mercy, "twice blessed."—O. A. W.

It is impossible for any country to endure the heavy local taxation levied in large cities for poor's rates. This taxation presses upon the poor in the shape of assessments on their scanty incomes, in the shape of assessments on the rents of the shops in which they buy their goods, in the shape of assessments on the warehouses, machinery of their employers, and on the lands and fields of those who rear grain or stock. Hence wages are lowered and prices are raised, and between these the poverty of the poor is made more powerful and pressing. We all know that a very large proportion of the money expended for the re-

hief of the poor is absolutely wasted on able-bodied impostors, tramps, vagrants, and vagabonds, who suck up the State provision for the poor more greedily and insatiably than the daughters of the horse-leech do blood, thus perpetuating and increasing the decadence of the poor. These able-bodied paupers are the real tyrants of the poor, the real down-draughts to national prosperity. They deprive the true poor of bread, of employment, and of sympathy. What would be better than the compulsory emigration of every proved pauper—not provided with a trade or other visible or known means of support, who became chargeable on any parish? It would greatly benefit the poor, greatly improve trade, greatly lessen the burden of local taxation, greatly increase real sympathy for the deserving poor, greatly add to the real happiness and welfare of those so compelled to go and work for their own subsistence.—V. P.

Certainly it ought on those who are strong, healthy, and able to work, but are doing nothing for their living, and burdening their more industrious neighbours with rates for their support. Of course Government ought not to send them out to our colonies or elsewhere, without providing them with some means of subsistence when they reached there; but there would be no difficulty in doing that, for manual labour is always in demand in our colonies. It may be urged that such compulsory emigration would be an infringement of the personal liberty of the subject, but we must remember that public good must always be preferred to private, and that, therefore, to remove some of our surplus population, to lessen the poor rates, and to benefit the country generally, emigration ought to be made compulsory on the able-bodied poor.—

GEORGIUS.

1869.

For able-bodied tramps and professional paupers, and for all those able-bodied vagrants who can show no ostensible means of obtaining a living, I do not know that a better plan could be hit on than their compulsory removal to some other land, where they would require to yoke themselves to labour, because in it they could not find that accumulated capital out of which charity is possible and profitable. This fungus of civilization—able-bodied pauperism—is in no other way likely to be eradicated. The love of the easily attainable enjoyments of existence in the midst of a civilized community makes these rogues and vagabonds delight in able-bodied idleness, and causes them to make lying and imposture their trade. All such persons ought to be summarily deported from the plenteousness of civil communities, which are overrun by these parasites of states, and sent out to colonies where exertion and labour were necessary to life, and where, under proper regulations, a possibility of fair play and honest work would be given, and where no permission would be given for vagrancy or idleness. Able-bodied idleness—not caused by slackness of trade, but by professional vagrancy—is a crime against society, and for all such persons we ought to have reformatory colonies—to be the same for vagrants and laziness-made paupers, as reformatory schools are for the young Arabs of the street.—B. S.

Over-population is the curse of our labour market. That in a properly civilized community productive labour should ever be too plentiful is one of the things which we should reckon an impossibility, and that any community would willingly prefer to have its productive labourers idle to having them busy, one would be inclined to judge to be an improbability. But idleness, even

Q

enforced and unwilling idleness, is by no means uncommon in our country. The question, "what is to be done with our redundant population?" is continually recurring. Among other suggestions made in solution of this enigma of civilisation, that of compulsory emigration has recently been mooted. This is a very important practical subject. Hitherto men have been often contented to sue for the means of emigration as a boon, now it is proposed to make it imperative. I do not know what conditions may be affixed to such an enforcement, but if they were anything like fair and just in the provision they made for the future chances of the emigrants, Government could with difficulty discover a better way of settling the question of able-bodied pauperism. Poor rates at home would be reduced, and abroad the poor would have an opportunity of a fair livelihood at productive labour, of acquiring an independent position, and of being a benefit and a blessing to the world, instead of a burden to others and a wee to themselves.—C. C.

It is a provision of the poor laws that the able-bodied poor shall be relieved only in the workhouse, and this involves imprisonment, with separation in the case of married persons from each other, and from children, if any; as well as the disgrace attaching to a life in the workhouse. There are few who would not gladly avail themselves of a compulsory emigration in preference to a compulsory imprisonment—under proper provision for gaining a proper chance and opportunity of beginning the world abroad on a right footing. Thus our poor-houses would have their expense lessened, and yet those who were the recipients of help would not be mere consumers of the world's produce, suffering the penalty of privation and separation for their stinted meals, but would

have the opportunity opened up to them of a productive life and remunerative labour—being beneficial to themselves and to those who sent them out. It would certainly be a great blessing if this solution of "the condition of England question" could be accepted, and colonization under suitable regulations were proceeded with by Government. Why should the empty places of the earth not be peopled by those who cannot get work in this country, but could get a good livelihood if they were compelled to emigrate?—H. H.

Pauperism is Britain's cancer. It is a rank and injurious growth, and it needs extirpation. But paupers are loath to leave the precincts of cities and the purlieus of commerce, for they know that chances of life are open to them from the commiseration of some, the fear of others, and the consideration of society. The pauperism I mean—and that which I presume is meant in the "Topic"—is the pauperism of the able-bodied but unwilling-to-work hanger-on on the skirts of civilized society, not the honest working man temporarily out of employment, or the man who through the earnest toil of a lifetime has done his duty to the state, and is reduced in circumstances from the chances or exigencies of life. It is well known that there are vampires of social life going about from town to town, lying, begging, &c., and visiting workhouse after workhouse, using the charity of the good-natured and the nation for the encouragement and promotion of indolence and vice. These ought to be deported from our shores—after due proof of their vagabondage—and be set to labour in some colonial possession, where the law enforced work for sustenance, and provided the means of gaining at least a living by the use of the ordinary industry of ordinary bones and sinews. It would

be a happy day for the real poor when the false poor were weeded out from among them, and the poor rates were left free for their proper objects,—the decayed, the needy, and the temporarily unemployed.—
JAMES F.

NEGATIVE.

Ought anything to be made compulsory on any one? If the answer to this question be in the affirmative, then it is possible to deal with the first query; if in the negative, then it follows of necessity that our answer to the first query will also be in the negative. Education, and that alone, should, I think, be made compulsory on any and every one, not merely on the able-bodied poor alone. This, of course, excludes emigration as being compulsory. But to advance my reasons against this single proposition alone, apart from any other considerations. How can the State with any semblance of justice, or even of expediency, appropriate to itself the very dubious right of compelling any or some of its citizens to banishment? Yes, to banishment—to a social exile. True, it is not on account of any criminal act done by them, except, perhaps, to speak in the language of the first Lord Chatham, for “the atrocious crime of being —” poor. But the very fact of their being compelled to exile, to emigrate, what does it in itself denote? What is the principle involved? That they are not good enough, of sufficient value, to entitle them to live in their native country. They must go abroad, they must seek employment elsewhere. It may be said that it would be for their own advantage and the public good. I think that while not having committed any act rendering them amenable to the law, they may well be left to judge for themselves, and to decide on their own course of

action. While Government is offering grants of land to those who will go out and settle in the colonies, and in some cases, I believe, they even offer them a free passage by sea, though I will not be sure about that, it cannot be laid as a charge against the State that they have no care for their poorer and humbler members. And be it further remembered that were the State to compel them to emigrate, they would not only have to see them safely landed there, but also to compel them to fix on some trade or profession, and to see that there were sufficient means for their subsistence. For it would be a flagrant act of injustice to convey a man *forcibly* across the seas to a foreign land, and there to leave him to exist as best he might. Once having used force you must continue to use it. This is a question capable of much extension, but for a contribution to “the Topic” the above will suffice.—J. S. B.

It is one of the first principles of the British constitution, that every man, in whatever circumstances, has freedom to go where he chooses, as long as he submits to the laws of that constitution. Therefore it would be a gross violation of one of the greatest privileges enjoyed by the British nation, to enforce measures which would deprive even one of the lowest of its subjects of their national liberty. Our statute-book also maintains that no man shall be destitute, therefore it is the duty of the nation to maintain its subjects in adverse circumstances; for when the cold hand of poverty creeps imperceptibly over an honest working man, it would be ungrateful indeed to banish him from his native soil, and cast him abroad to foreign climes, as though he were a felon, and not what he is—a decayed mainstay of our great nation.—C.

Whilst thinking over this topic I

came across this passage in Jeremy Taylor, which gave me plenty of food for reflection:—"When Abraham was at his tent door, waiting for strangers to entertain them, he espied an old man stooping and leaning on his staff, weary with age. He received him kindly, washed his feet, provided supper, caused him to sit down; but observing that the old man eat and prayed not, nor begged for a blessing on his meat, he asked him why he did not worship the God of heaven. The old man told him that he worshipped the fire only, and acknowledged no other god. At which answer Abraham grew so zealously angry that he thrust the old man out of his tent, and exposed him to all the evils of the night and an unguarded condition. When the old man was gone, God called to Abraham, and asked him where the stranger was. He replied, 'I thrust him out because he did not worship Thee.' God answered him, 'I have suffered him these hundred years, although he dishonoured Me; and couldst not thou endure him one night?'" The leaving one's home and friends under any circumstances, even if the place of exile be distant but a few hundred miles, within the circuit of the sea-girt isle, is sad even to the heart of a rover. The case under consideration, however, is far harder; to be thrust out must beyond doubt send the iron deep into the soul. To be banished, outlawed, sent beyond the sea, uncertain if the ogre of the deep will not require you to satisfy his rapacious appetite, must be to the heart of a true-born Briton the most unkind cut of all. The state of trade, too, at the present period seems also exceptional. Is there not a probability that ere long trademay come round, orders briskly come in? and then the cry will be, "Come back, my banished skilled workmen." It is no use locking the

stable door when the horse is stolen. —A. J. G.

In this free England of ours there ought to be nothing like compulsion in such matters, for in this case it amounts to exile in a mild form. Most men, whether rich or poor, high or low, form connections, and have more or less a love for and attachment to their native country, consequently, they leave it with reluctance, which would be transformed into defiance if the State attempted to compel them against their free will. Men would liken it to transportation—a punishment for an offence. The colonies require men with some experience in their individual calling, principally agricultural; but the able-bodied poor are for the most part labourers. The consequences arising from such a state of things would be that the markets would be overstocked, and the only refuge for the surplus commodity, pauperism, a heavy weight on the shoulders of a rising colony. With a few exceptional cases it is the skilled workman who produces work for the labourer, not the labourer for the skilled workman. Again, compulsion would necessarily involve a guarantee for support; that is, if a man is sent out of the country and he is unable to find means of subsistence, you could not let him starve, even in the interests of humanity. Here is at once a plea for the indolent, who are too idle to seek work. No doubt something must be done, and let us look forward anxiously to that time when the present condition of the able-bodied poor will be ameliorated.—C. F. A. S.

I assume that the words "able-bodied poor," mentioned in the topic, are to be understood as applying only to paupers who are able-bodied. If so, they may be divided into two classes,—(1) those who wander from workhouse to work-

house, making vagrancy a profession ; and (2) those who are desirous of maintaining themselves and others who may be dependent upon them, but who, through inability to obtain employment, or through accidental or other circumstances, are unable to do so. Persons of this class are either vagrants or settled paupers. To compel those who are vagrants by profession to emigrate would, for the following reasons, be highly objectionable. (1) The system would operate as an encouragement to vagrancy by holding out the certain prospect of a free passage to such of the poor as might be desirous of emigrating. (2) Compulsory emigration would not effect their reformation. Persons who are vicious, criminal, and habitually idle at home, and who at the same time have nothing to lose, would not be likely to improve in another country. On the contrary, they would undoubtedly take advantage of the additional facilities afforded them for gratifying their worst dispositions. (3) It would be a gross injustice to those among whom they would be introduced. No country has a right to relieve itself by liberating amongst a quiet and peaceable community, men of the most degraded characters—men who have practised every vice, and who would not scruple to perpetrate the worst of crimes. (4) It would involve an increase of expenditure. The statistics of the Poor Law Board do not show the number of professional vagrants in England ; but there are doubtless many thousands of them. Hence the cost of removing them would be very considerable. (5) Such expenditure is unnecessary. The number of professional vagrants can be very considerably reduced without incurring any expense, by impressing upon the public the great importance of refusing assistance of any kind to persons begging from door to door.

With respect to the vagrant portion of the second class I need only remark that they either obtain work, and thereby, in most instances, cease to be paupers, or they become professional tramps, and form part of the class first distinguished. There is now only one question remaining for consideration, and that is, should emigration be made compulsory upon such of the able-bodied poor as are settled in a particular locality? I reply again in the negative. It is a principle of the poor law that, subject to certain exceptions, every able-bodied person, male or female, requiring relief, shall be relieved wholly in the workhouse. Experience has proved the soundness of this principle. There are but few referrible to this head, however destitute they may be, who are willing to exchange their liberty and privileges for the restrictions to which they would be subjected in a workhouse, and for the disgrace which would attach to them for having entered it. Hence it is that so few able-bodied persons are now to be seen as permanent inmates of our workhouses. Those who do enter are but temporary inmates, and the cost of their maintenance is trifling compared with the cost which would be incurred in exporting them. On these grounds I negative the whole question.—T. S.

By no means. If any man, rich or poor, thinks he can by leaving his native country better his position, and will by so doing promote the general interest, it is a duty as well as a justice that he should take such a course, but on no account compel a man to quit the country of his birth and childhood simply because he is poor. It will be an unhappy period for this country if it should at any time sanction a law which made it binding on all persons born poor, and having reached the stage of manhood in no better position,

that they shall be summarily expelled from amongst us. This wholesale transportation of the poor and destitute of our country would, I believe, be received by the intelligent and benevolent part of the community with feelings of disgust. If emigration is to be made beneficial to the poor of our country, they must be led to see clearly first that it is their interest to emigrate, and not be coerced into doing so by the strong arm of the law. It must be a matter of their own choice and free will, and I venture to say, therefore, that if such stringent measures are adopted as proposed they will result in complete disaster. What we have to do is to encourage the masses of our countrymen to respect the laws and government of our country, and create within them a spirit of patriotism; but if we go and pass such tyrannical measures as the compulsory emigration of the poor, it will cultivate feelings of distaste, envy, and malice towards our country and those who are better situated. Let our aim be to improve the present condition of the poor, rather than transplant them to another soil. What we propose to do is to restrain the people from the accursed drink traffic of the country, keep the matter of education before their eyes, make the homes of the people more like English hearths than dens of vice, show them the necessity of providing for the future by enrolling their names as members of benefit societies, impress upon them the importance of cultivating a more contented spirit, and above all, convince them of the necessity to look well after their spiritual wants. If they follow in

the path as thus laid down, a future is lying in store for them of the most glorious character, which will entirely obviate all such measures as those proposed for the compulsory emigration of the people.—
R. HILL.

“Compulsion, gaunt and stern,
Oppression’s friend, the tyrant’s
stay,”

at once brings home to the mind of a liberty-loving Briton a feeling of disgust, and in its train the spirit of resistance. Compulsion, though repugnant to the mind, is in many cases advisable, nay, is absolutely necessary. The streets of our cities, and the rural villages of this our “beloved isle,” are overrun with the children of “poor ones” growing up in ignorance and crime. Our only remedy is compulsory education. The good that would result from it is so apparent, and appears, nay, is felt so desirable, that we forego our prejudices, and are ready to exclaim, We must have compulsion. But the subsequent good of compulsory emigration does not so forcibly present itself. It is quite true our surplus population must be got rid of, but would we compel a man to quit his native home, and seek employment in a foreign land, where he would toil in, it might be, discontent—not as a free man, but as an exile? Ought he to be forced from the land of his fathers? Shall he be forced to quit the land of his childhood? Shall he be forced to rend himself from all that is dear, from a land to which his heart is knit by a thousand fond remembrances? Never! never! never!—W. W.

Our Collegiate Course.

MILTON'S "IL PENSEROSO."

The following *additional notes* may be found interesting to, and useful by, the student. The references are made to the *Lines* of the poem.

(52) Yon is an adverb, signifying at a distance but within sight; in poetry (it is obsolete as a prose word) it indicates a nearer relation of distance than *there*; *yonder* is a sort of comparative form, pointing to something farther off, *e. g.*, "Yon flowery arbours, yonder alleys green."—"Paradise Lost," iv., 626.

(55) A similar idea recurs in "Paradise Lost," iv., 603:—

"But the wakeful nightingale
She all the night her amorous decant sung;
Silence was pleased."

(57) The word *plight* has a double derivation assigned to it: (1) from the Saxon word *plihtan*, to pledge; and as that which is *pledged*, plighted, or staked as security, is put in a state of risk, or hazard, plight comes to signify danger, difficulty, condition, &c., as in "Paradise Lost," i., 335:—

"Nor did they not perceive the evil *plight*
In which they were," &c.

(2) From the Latin *plicatus*, plaited; hence intertwined, bound, pledged or engaged by joining hands, as in—

"A fairy vision
Of some gay creatures of the element,
That played i' the *plighted* clouds."—"Comus," 299.

"Could stir the constant mood of her calm thoughts,
And put them into misbecoming plight."—"Comus," 372.

I. e., confused complication. Plight may therefore here mean "strain of interwolved melody." What Isaac Walton calls "the sweet descants, the natural rising and falling, the doubling and redoubling of the nightingale's voice."

(59) Shakspeare, in allusion to these dragon attendants of Night, makes Achilles say in "Troilus and Cressida," v. 8,—

"The dragon-wing of night o'erspreads the earth."

And Iachimo, while soliloquizing in Imogen's chamber, exclaims,—

"Swift, swift yon dragons of the night, that dawning
May bare the raven's eye."—"Cymbeline," ii., 2.

(96) In "Paradise Regained" Milton recurs to this idea:—

"Princes, heaven's ancient sons, ethereal thrones,
Demonian spirits! now from the element,
Each of his reign allotted, rightlier called
Powers of fire, air, water, earth beneath," &c., 121—124.

(97) The word *gorgeous* is probably derived from *gorge*, to feed greedily, and being transferred from the palate to the eye means splendid, magnificent, luxuriously adorned; both ideas are brought together at one view in "*Comus*:"

"Swinish gluttony
He'er looks to heaven amidst its gorgeous feast,
But with besotted base ingratitude,
Craves and blasphemes his feeder."—376—379.

(110) Spenser takes up the story in his "Fairy Queen," Book IV., cantos ii. and iii., saying of Chaucer,—

"I follow here the footing of thy feet,
That with thy meaning so I may the rather meet."

(145) By Massinger, in whose plays Milton was well read, *Consort* is similarly employed, *e. g.*, *Moriaca* says of *Sophia*,—

"She admits no visits,
Kats little, and her nightly music is
Of sighs and groans, tuned to such harmony
Of feeling grief, that I, against my nature,
Am made one of the *Consort*."—"The Picture," ii., 1.

See also the same author's "City Madam," iv., 2.

(148) See the same idea in—

"The timely dew of sleep,
Now falling with soft alumberous weight, inclines
Our eyelids."—"Paradise Lost," 614—616.

(168) These lines recall to our memory the closing lines of Sir David Lyndsay's "Complaint," 1529:—

"My God
Shall cause me stand content,
With quiet life and sober rent;
And take me in my latter age
Unto my simple hermitage,
To spend the year my elders won,
Like Diogenes in his turn."

LITERATURE OF ENGLAND;

BIOGRAPHICAL, CHRONOLOGICAL, CRITICAL, ETC.

TABLE V.—HISTORIC WRITERS (1600—1700).

*Names and Dates.**Events and Works.*

35. SAMUEL PURCHAS, } Born at Thuxted, in Essex; educated at St.
1577—1628. } John's College, Cambridge; where he took
B.D. in 1600. In 1604 was vicar of Eastwood,
but being appointed rector of St. Martin's, London, and chaplain to the
Archbishop of Canterbury, he was able to devote his life sedulously to the
collecting of accounts of sea voyages and land travels, by Englishmen and
others. He published in 1619 "Micro-Purchas, his Pilgrimage;" in 1613,
"Cosmos, or the History of Man;" in 1623, "The King's Tower and
Triumphant Arch of London;" and in 1625, "Purchas, his Pilgrims." A
funeral Sermon of his bears date 1669.

36. SIR THOMAS ROW } Born at Leyton, near Wanstead, Essex;
(OR ROWE), } studied at Magdalen College, Oxford, and at the
1580—1644. } Inns of Court; and became squire to Queen
Elizabeth. Knighted by James I., he was sent
on a voyage of discovery to the West Indies. The East India Company
fitted out an embassy for him to the Great Mogul in 1614. In 1620 he
was M.P. for Cirencester, but was next year ambassador to the Grand
Seignor, and continued so under Oswan, Mustapha, and Amurath. In
1629 he went to Poland and Sweden, and had a medal struck in his honour
for his aid in bringing about the peace between these nations. He was M.P.
for the University of Oxford in 1640, and in 1641 was sent to mediate on
behalf of the Prince Elector at Ratisbon; on his return he was made Chan-
cellor of the Garter, Member of the Privy Council, &c. An account of his
embassy to the Mogul was published in 1665; a "History of the
Embassy to Turkey" in 1640; and "A Compendious Relation of the Pro-
ceedings at the Ratisbon Conference" exists in MS. in Magdalen College.
He was buried in Woodford Church, near Wanstead.

37. JOHN SPEED, } Born at Farrington, in Cheshire; was a
1545—1629. } tailor and freeman of the Merchant Taylors'
Company. He was patronized by Fulke Gre-
ville (Lord Brooke), and assisted by Cotton, Selden, &c. "The Theatre of
the Empire of Great Britain," a collection of Maps, 1606; "History of
Great Britain," 1614. He was buried in St. Giles', Cripplegate. He com-
piled the Scriptural Genealogies prefixed to the Authorized Version of the
Bible in 1611, &c.

38. SIR HENRY SPELMAN, } Born at Congham, near Lynn; studied at
1562—1641. } Trinity College, Cambridge, and Lincoln's Inn;
became a friend of Cotton, Camden, &c., and
was a member of the first Society of Antiquaries. He was sheriff of Nor-
folk, and was knighted by James I. He acquired a knowledge of the
Anglo-Saxon tongue, and established a Lectureship for the study of it at

Cambridge. He died in London, and was interred in Westminster Abbey. [His son, Sir John Spelman, was author of a "Life of King Alfred."] His "Archæological Glossary" was issued, Vol. I., in 1626, and Vol. II. under the care of his son and Sir William Dugdale. His collection of "Councils, Decrees, Laws, Constitutions, in regard to the Ecclesiastical Affairs of the Britannic Circle," Vol. I., 1639, Vol. II., 1644, was also left incomplete.

39. SIR WM. TEMPLE, } Born at Blackfriars, London; eldest son of
1628—1699. } Sir John, Master of the Rolls, Ireland; studied
under Cudworth, as tutor, at Emmanuel College,

Cambridge. Went abroad, and then to Ireland, where he had public employment. He was chosen in 1610 member of the Irish Convention for Carlow. He was chosen as colleague to his father in the representation of the county of Carlow, with a younger brother as member for the burgh of Carlow, after the Restoration. In 1618 he went to reside in England, and was shortly afterwards employed diplomatically at Munster and in Spain; he was the chief negotiator of the triple alliance, 1668, but was dismissed in 1671, on which he retired to Sheen. He acted in the Treaty of Westminster, 1674, and at the Congress of Nimeguen, 1678. He was offered the secretaryship of state, and refused it; he was offered office under William III., but declined. He wrote "Memoirs," "Essays," &c. His wife's kinsman, Jonathan Swift, was for some time his secretary.

40. IZAAK WALTON, } Son of Jervis Walton, yeoman, Stafford.
1593—1688. } He was a hosier in Fleet Street in 1624, from
which he retired in 1643, with a modest competence.

He was first (1626) married to Rachel Floud, a descendant of Cranmer's, and from her uncle, who had been a friend and pupil of Hooker, he is supposed to have got much information; he married as a second wife Anne Ken, Bishop Ken's half-sister. He issued "Lives" of Donne, Hooker, Sir H. Wootton, and George Herbert, 1670; and added that of Sanderson in 1678. "The Complete Angler" appeared in 1655. He died, aged 90, in the house of his son-in-law, Dr. Hawkins, prebendary of Winchester Cathedral, and in that sanctuary he is interred.

41. BULSTRODE WHITE- } Son of Sir James Whitelock (a judge in the
LOOKE, } reigns of James I. and Charles I., author of a
1605—1676. } treatise on "Lawful Combats in England");
educated at Merchant Taylors' School, St.

John's, Oxford, and the Middle Temple. In 1640 became M.P. for Great Marlow, Buckinghamshire. He was chairman at the impeachment of Strafford. He was one of the Commissioners to treat with the king at Oxford, and a member of the Westminster Assembly of Divines, where he opposed the Presbyterians. He condemned the trial of the king as a bad business, though under Cromwell he was one of the commissioners of the Great Seal, was ambassador from the Commonwealth to Sweden, Speaker of Parliament, President of the Council of State, and Keeper of the Great Seal. After the Restoration he lived in retirement. He wrote "An Account of the Swedish Embassy;" "Memoirs of English Affairs from the Beginning of the Reign of Charles I. till the Restoration;" "Memorials of English Affairs from Brute to James I.'s Reign," all published after his death, which took place at Chilton Park, Wiltshire.

Epitome of Critical Opinions.

35. "Purchas, an English clergyman, imbued by nature, like Hakluyt, with a strong bias towards geographical studies, after having found an extensive library in that department, and consulted, as he professes, above 1,200 authors, published the first volume of his '*Pilgrim*,' a collection of voyages in all parts of the world, in 1618; four more followed in 1635. The accuracy of this useful compiler has been denied by those who have had better means of knowledge, and probably is inferior to that of Hakluyt; but his labour was far more comprehensive. '*The Pilgrim*' was at all events a great source of knowledge to the contemporaries of Purchas."—*Hallam*. "These five volumes contain many papers of great value, and have been of much utility to later writers. It is a peculiarity of the author that he mingles largely theological discussions and reflections with his narratives."—*Dr. Angus*.

36. "That very intelligent observer, Sir Thomas Roe."—*Lord Macaulay*. "A medal was struck in his honour, of which an impression now exists in the English State Paper Office."—*Robert Harrison*.

37. "Among the head sources or fountains of our knowledge in the department of national antiquities."—*G. L. Craik*. "He published a history of Great Britain long deemed the best that had yet appeared; it is remarkable for the care with which the author sifts his authorities, and for its rejection of many of the fables of the preceding chroniclers; it extends from the earliest times to the union of the two crowns under James I. Speed is also the author of the best maps in his day of the shires and cities of England."—*Dr. Angus*. "Speed's maps, in 1646, appear by no means inferior to those of Blaeuw; but several of the errors are the same."—*Hallam*.

38. "A legal and ecclesiastical antiquary."—*Dr. Angus*. "The writings of this author have furnished valuable materials to English historians, and he is considered as the restorer of Saxon literature, both by means of his own studies and by founding a Saxon professorship in Cambridge."—*Robert Chambers*.

39. "The lively, agreeable, and well-informed essayist and memoirist."—*G. L. Craik*. "Much inferior to Dryden in vigour of thought, but not much below him in the mechanism of style, was Sir William Temple, who indeed may share with him the merit of having founded regular English prose."—*Wm. Spalding*. "He had gradually formed a style singularly lucid and melodious, superficially deformed, indeed, by Gallicisms and Hispanicisms, picked up in travel or negotiation, but at bottom pure English, which generally flowed along with careless simplicity, but occasionally rose even into Ciceronian magnificence. . . . Temple was not a very deep or accurate reasoner, but was an excellent observer; he had no call to philosophical speculation, but he was qualified to excel as a writer of memoirs and travels. . . . The style of his essays is, on the whole, excellent, almost always pleasing, and now and then stately and splendid. . . . He was no profound thinker. He was merely a man of lively parts and quick observation, a man of the world among men of letters, a man of letters among men of the world."—*Lord Macaulay*.

40. "The mild-tempered angler and biographer."—*G. L. Craik*. "In the *Lives of Isaak Walton* (which introduce us to the acquaintance of some of the greatest men of the seventeenth century) we have an example of that candour and sweetness of disposition—that open sense of humour, good-

ness, and human character which is the necessary moral basis of biography."—*James Hannay*. "Walton's Complete Angler," for "its sweetness, its natural grace, and happy intermixture of graver strains with the precepts of angling, have rendered this book deservedly popular, and a model which one of the most famous among our late philosophers, and a successful disciple of Izaak Walton in his favourite art [Sir Humphry Davy, in his "Salmonia"], has condescended to imitate."—*Hallam*. "A rich storehouse of rural pictures and pastoral poetry, of quaint but wise thoughts, of agreeable and humorous fancies, and of truly apostolic purity and benevolence. The slight tincture of superstitious credulity and innocent eccentricity which pervades his works gives them a finer zest and original flavour, without detracting from their higher power to soothe, instruct, and delight."—*Robert Carruthers*.

41. "Whitelocke's 'Memorials' is a diary full of important public matters, and the noble editor, the Earl of Anglesey, observes that "our author not only served the State in several stations, both at home and in foreign countries, but likewise conversed with books, and made himself a large provision from his studies and contemplation, like that noble Roman, Portius Cato, as described by Nepos. He was all along so much in business, one would not imagine he ever had leisure for books; yet, who considers his studies might believe he had been always shut up with his friend Selden, and the dust of action never fallen on his gown." When Whitelocke was sent on an embassy to Sweden he journalized it; it amounts to two bulky quartos, extremely curious. He has even left us a History of England."—*Disraeli*. "Industrious, dull Bulstrode [Whitelocke] has a kind of dramaturgic turn in him, indeed, an occasional poetic friskiness, most unexpected, as if the hippopotamus should show a tendency to dance,—which painfully deducts from one's confidence in Bulstrode's entire accuracy on such occasions. Here and there the multitudinous Paper Masses of learned Bulstrode do seem to smack a little of the date when he redacted them,—posterior to the ever-blessed Restoration, not prior to it. We shall, nevertheless, except this dramaturgic report of conference; the reader will be willing to examine, with his own eyes, even as in a glass darkly, any feature of that time; and he can remember always that a learned Bulstrode's fat terrene mind, imaging an heroic Cromwell and his affairs, is a very dark glass indeed."—*Carlyle*.

The Societies' Section.

London : Social Science Association.—At the meeting of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science on 8th February, the Right Hon. Russell Gurney, M.P., in the chair, Mr. Cooke Taylor read a paper on the employment of women in the civil service. Mr. Taylor, in reply to the objection that it is unnatural that women should do the work usually done by men, said that there was nothing especially masculine in compound addition or unfeminine in the art and mystery of penmanship. To the objection that upon women it devolves to bear children and to tend them in infancy, and that such duties would interfere with their employments, he urged that at present men, when incapacitated by illness, obtained leave of absence, or, if prolonged, provided substitutes, or in some cases resigned their appointments. Why should not women do likewise? Moreover, this objection applied only to mothers, the class least likely to require such employment. The idea that women by following such occupations would become less refined and harsher and sterner he believed to be an entire delusion. Women were as a rule unproductive consumers, and clerks were also comparatively so. The employment of women as clerks would liberate a number of men to become productive labourers. Mr. Cooke Taylor urged that in the new department of the telegraphs the appointments should be open to men and women alike. By this course he considered the public mind would become habituated to the idea of male and female clerks,

and this example would lead to women being employed in banks and commercial houses. In the course of the discussion which followed Mr. Holland said that the employment of women in clerkships was on the decrease, and he thought this rose from employers finding that they were not so well fitted for such work as men. Women were four times more liable to illness than men. Mr. Thwaites thought that if women were to take men's lighter employments they must also take the heavier ones, and become policemen and soldiers. In France, where the women kept the books at home, the men lounged in the *cafes*. Mr. C. W. Dilke, M.P., said he thought that no legislation was needed to open the civil service to women. In America, save old soldiers, the clerks in the war office were women. The chairman, in summing up the discussion, said that the objection that wives' work was not profitable fell to the ground when we consider that there were about a million of women who could not be wives.

Birmingham : Art Literature Class.—A meeting to inaugurate *The Students' Art Literature Class* was held in the Reference Library of the Birmingham School of Art. The head-master, Mr. D. W. Raimbache, the chairman, called upon Mr. Peter Hollins to propose that the statement of the Provisional Committee and draft of rules be adopted. He came (he said) rather as a listener than a speaker; but they had one admirable rule, that no one should speak more than five minutes. When he was the age of

the young gentlemen before him such a society as that was never in contemplation; but he could say from experience that though he had not been a member of a society of that kind, he had done the same sort of work that the members proposed to do, and therefore he should be able to sympathize with them, as it were. He had no doubt of the great good that would result to all. If they took the list of subjects that had been proposed in their rules, namely, essays upon historical, biographical, and ornamental art, &c., they were certain to receive valuable instruction. With regard to biography it was absolutely necessary that they should know by what means the men who had gone before had attained success. Though societies of that kind would remove some of the difficulties that these men had to contend with, they would not remove them all, for really those difficulties were the schooling of the mind. If a man thought there was any royal road to art, he made a great mistake; he might look upon all the paintings that ever were painted, and buy all the pictures, but if he did not love art he could not understand these things. But if he overcame difficulties, if he took it up as a pleasure, he would get on. The overcoming of difficulties makes the man. (Applause.) Then, again, they would see the extraordinary enthusiasm that had always surrounded men who had overcome difficulties. It was that enthusiasm which they all, of course, must have. They were all, he hoped, ambitious; if they were not, there was no use in their being there. He would not give a halfpenny for a man who was not ambitious. He remembered once presenting a letter of introduction, written by a friend, and the first sentence was—"He has the ambition to rival Chantrey." If

they have not the ambition to "rival Chantrey," let them give up Birmingham. They must be ambitious to rival the best of men. If they wanted to see some choice bits of biography, he recommended them to read Pilkington's "Lives of the Painters." It was no doubt in the library. (The Chairman pointed to the shelves, and said, "It is there.") If it did not contain the notes of old Fuseli he would not recommend them to read it. If they read the notes to the best artist they were sure to be benefited. The notes upon Rembrandt were most exciting. Although not an Englishman, he was like Kosuth, he had learned English through Shakspeare. Rembrandt was one of the most wonderful geniuses; he had no opportunities such as they had now, but he had such a strong enthusiasm for and love of art that he did not care how other men entered the temple of fame. He forged a key of his own, and got in by a door of his own. They must do the same. Rembrandt had seen beauties in nature, and beautiful effects, that he had not seen in paintings, and tried to realize them. Why, Fuseli himself had not the means nor the talent that Rembrandt had of forging a key of his own; he missed it from exuberance of courage. He used to say to the students in his lectures at the Royal Academy, "I hate insipidity; caricature is infinitely preferable to insipidity. Then, again, with regard to literature, they would find in the best writers, Shakspeare, Milton, &c., every now and then little bits so artistic that they would conceive the picture at once; and if they afterwards saw the picture of that very thing, they would perceive an amount of beauty they never thought of before. He gave an instance where the writer and the painter hit upon the same notion;—

"The pearly wrists" of Milton and Ary Scheffer; and said it was useful for the student to get these hints, how to carry art to the very highest degree of beauty in the enthusiasm and love of the thing. The love of the thing was everything. If they did not love it for its own sake they would never make artists. It was useless for a man to sit down and say, "I will get five guineas for this." He must love it for its own sake, and the reward would come afterwards. So he said to them, look to it, and they would get people to do the same by them. Once he entered the room of Bryant (who had recently died in Rome), and he saw him engaged with the most lovely forms. He had nothing to control him—nothing to do but indulge that most delicious feeling that the artist had of doing what he liked. He said to him, "What a treat it is to be in your place! Where are your busts?" He found that he had none, that he did not know how to make a pair of whisks! He was a man who for a long time had a great many drawbacks, but he was a very moderate man. We said to him, Determined to finish up in Rome, "Now," said he, "I cannot do enough, and this very work is ordered by Sir Robert Peel, of your neighbourhood. I was in Rome seven years, and not a penny did they give me for my work. But now," he said, "I am an old man, I cannot work fast enough for them. Here is your Sir Robert Peel's work, and he wants it done in marble. It is come at last, but many people would have broken down before it came. They must all be prepared for great hardships, or else they would never become great men." (Loud applause.)

Mr. J. S. Wright seconded the resolution. He said his friend Mr. Hollins, who had been an artist all his life, and had been imbued with

the genuine artistic feeling from his cradle, might naturally speak to art students. How pleasantly he had done so they could all bear witness. His position was different, for though he had not done much for art, he felt intense pleasure in it. When he looked upon beautiful works, such as Lichfield Cathedral, the Duomo of Milan, or the Baptistery of Florence, he had a feeling which he could hardly describe of intense pleasure and delight. The Birmingham of the future would owe its prosperity to the skill and the love of art of the young men of to-day. He spoke of the great benefits that would accrue to society and to those present if they would only follow out the plan with patience and perseverance, and make the undertaking a success as far as they themselves were concerned.

The resolution was carried unanimously.

Mr. Aitken recommended the students to strive to become good industrial modellers and designers rather than artists. He thought in such a town that an industrial artist was of far greater importance than if he worked in the direction of fine art. He also gave some good advice on working in gold, iron, and ornaments, throwing out many suggestions by the way.

Several of the students then spoke of the good they hoped to derive from the mutual interchange of thought. They also hoped that it would be the means of cementing them in the bonds of fellowship, and in the labours of endeavour.

So far the undertaking has proved a great success, several of the students having contributed very excellent papers on a variety of subjects connected with art, which have been discussed with great spirit and earnestness.—D. W. B.

Literary Notes.

THE death is announced of a veteran *littérateur*, Robert Eyres Landor, the brother of Walter Savage Landor, and a country clergyman, the rector of Burlingham, near Pershore, Worcestershire. He was the author of "The Fountain of Arethusa" and "The Fawn of Sarcotus."

Father Vercellone, editor of the Greek Bible of the Vatican, died 20th January.

A new edition of Shelley's Works, with a biography by W.M. Rossetti, is in preparation.

A new novel by Mrs. H. B. Stowe is announced.

"Academical and Historical Miscellanies," by F. W. Newman, are in the press.

A new "Life of Edmund Kean" is promised by Wynford Hawkins.

Documents of extraordinary value, connected with the biography of Mohammed, have been discovered by the librarian of the India House.

To Dr. Guy, of King's College, the Swiney prize of a silver goblet worth £100, and sovereigns of equal amount in it, has been awarded for his "Principles of Forensic Medicine."

At the Royal Society, Professor Tait, Edinburgh, communicated a paper "On Mill's Theory of Geometrical Reasoning," intended to show that, when mathematically considered, it was unsound as an explanation. Its author is W. R. Smith.

A poem entitled "Brittain's Ida," first published in 1628, which has been attributed by Wakley to Spenser, by Bright to Shakspeare, and by Warton to Phineas Fletcher, has been made the subject of a critical letter by Rev. A. B. Grosart in

favour of the author of "The Purple Island;" thus suggestion number three is his favourite. This clerical bibliophile has in preparation an edition of Phineas Fletcher's poems.

The *North Londoner* reports that Laurence Oliphant — an excellent writer of books, and contributor to *Blackwood*, statesman, &c. — has enrolled himself in the "Brotherhood of the New Life," under Thomas Luke Harris, as the Vicar of Christ at Brocton, near Lake Erie, U.S., and has renounced the world, its temptations, its claims, and its duties.

J. S. Mill, as Rector of St. Andrew's University, having prescribed an essay to be competed for by the students of either college there, on the "Theory of the Association of Ideas," only three students competed for the prize (£25). Mr. Mill considers all the essays excellent, but awarded the prize to Mr. Horne, of the United College, a Congregationalist, and a student in the Congregational Theological Hall, Edinburgh, of which the Rev. Dr. W. L. Alexander is one of the professors.

Carlo Cattaneo, born at Milan, 1815, the greatest political economist and statistician of modern Italy, editor of "Historic Archives," &c., died at Lugnano, Feb. 9th.

A complete, uniform, and cheaper edition of the works of the late Hugh Miller, in monthly volumes, is in progress.

The Rev. Alex. Dyce, so learned in dramatic literature, has an edition of the works of John Ford all but ready.

Modern Metaphysicians.

REV. WILLIAM ARCHER BUTLER, M.A.,

Late Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Dublin.

IRELAND has contributed in no small measure to the excitement and culture of philosophic thought. It may not, it is true, number among its illustrious sons many originative minds in the department of logic, but in the fields of metaphysics they have certainly sown seeds of priceless value and of precious power. In rhetoric and in oratory it may be admitted that they excel the more staid and circumspect English, but in close consecution and uninterrupted continuity of reflection, according to the laws of syllogistic reasoning, they can scarcely be affirmed to equal the Saxon thinkers. In depth and subtlety of metaphysical research and investigation, in clear and sharp insight into the revelations of consciousness, and in distinct envisagement of the facts of the intellectual capacities, Ireland has produced speculative minds which have had no superiors among those who have devoted themselves to the unravelling of the mysteries of thought.

At Annerville, near Clonmell, in the county of Tipperary, Ireland, William Archer Butler, was born about—as nearly as may be ascertained—1814. The family of which he was a scion had long held an honourable position among the county gentry; but early in life he lost his father, who was a member of the Established Church, and he was brought up under the care of his mother, who was a warmly attached adherent to the Church of Rome. At her earnest request he had been baptized into the communion of that Church; and so imperfect had been at that period the registrations of the parish priests, that there exists no public record of the birth or baptism of this illustrious thinker. He speaks of his father as

“A sire

Whose accents gently solemn, swift awoke
The slumbering promise of life's future fire,
Caressed each opening power, and bade it bloom.”

For his mother he entertained the most enthusiastic devotion, and towards her memory his thoughts always turned as to a joy unspeakable. In early boyhood he was removed to Garnavilla, a charming place on the banks of the Suir, about two miles from 1869.

Cahir, which is about nine miles distant from Clonmell. The scenery of this neighbourhood, enlivened by the perfect spirit of beauty, enchanted his early years, and he remembered with deep poetic delight those groves and sunny fields, watered by (we had better quote)

"Rivers, whose forgotten waters stream
Bright, pure as ever from the rifted brow :
Of hills whose fadeless beauty, like a dream,
Bursts back upon my weeping memory."

When he was nine years of age he was sent to the endowed school of Clonmell, then taught by the celebrated Dr. Bell, a gentleman who was distinguished for the earnestness, efficiency, and excellence of the training which he imparted to his pupils, and the love of himself and of knowledge with which he simultaneously impressed them. Butler was a pupil of rare endowments, to whom the common tasks of boyhood came easy, and who, without severe study, was able to accomplish his school duties to the satisfaction of his master and with a fair rivalry towards his classmates, and yet have a large margin of time on his hands to dispose of in miscellaneous reading, the composition of verses, and the study and practice of music. He did not peruse the classics so much with the microscopic vision of a grammarian as with the wide views of a poet and the keen perception of a rhetorician. He undertook the most discursive course of reading in poetry, philosophy, history, &c., even in boyhood, and was early intimate with the writings of Locke, Bacon, Shakespeare, Milton, Gibbon and Hume, as well as many of the recent productions of those writers whose works form the *belles lettres*. He was not an adept at school games, and rarely mingled in the noisy mirth of the playground, but his amiability and general *esprit* made him a peculiar favourite with his companions. He thus describes the special characteristics of silence and thoughtfulness which marked him as a boy:—

"But of my boyhood ;—o'er the sunny hill
To wander, not alone, but with the aid
Of gentle contemplation ; in the still
And dream, like hush of noon, to watch the shade
Lazily darkening half the distant slope ;
To joy amid the valley streams ; to form
Torrents and armies from the clouded cope
Of the red sky at eve ; to dread the storm
That marred its beauties and my happiness ;
Such sports—such dreams—sufficed my strange still youth to bliss.

"What marvel, then, if I was not as those
Whose childhood blossomed round me ? if at heart
I yearned not for their happiness, and rose
From their light laugh of joyance to depart

To my lone grove and fancy dream? Alas!
 There were but few who loved me, or with whom
 My heart could link its joys! I learned to pass
 Already as that fabled one whose doom
 Is life and wandering, whose seared heart hath known
 What death it is to live with men and love not one!

There was a silence that none understood
 In my unjoyous childhood."

The desultory course of reading he had pursued gave him great advantages among his schoolfellows in the gaining of that popularity which induced them to condone his aid in the playground on account of his helpfulness as a prompter and his readiness in interesting them with the results of his book-lore. He acquired at an early date an enthusiastic admiration for Wordsworth's poetry, and at the age of fourteen he projected a poem, in the manner of that philosophic singer, on the progress of an inquiring and imaginative spirit through a course of studies, literary, poetic and philosophic; the discipline of the social circumstances of man's life; the exercises of the loves and of the griefs of our probationary existence to the ultimate attainment of the peace which passeth all understanding provided for the soul by true Christianity. Portions of this poem appeared in *The Dublin University Magazine* under different titles, as "The Boyhood of a Dreamer," July, 1836, June, 1837; "Remembrances of a Poetic Childhood," March and November, 1840, &c., in some portions of which we catch autobiographical glimpses of the writer, as in the following able and expressive lines:—

"I ran
 Through sects and systems,—taught my soul to dare
 Question herself, and in her secret shrine
 Explore the mystery of her being's aim,
 The wherefore of her nature and design.
 Dim the response; but light celestial came
 Whence only it hath ever come. I trod,
 With fearful steps and slow, the temple-courts of God.
 And now the story of Supernal Grace
 Flooded my heart with wonder."

This seems to us a poetical hint of the intense struggle of the religious life of culture with that of reason which passed within the spirit of this early ripened inquirer, when, in consequence of the stir and agitation regarding Catholicism and Protestantism, he determined, with reverential but thorough investigation, to search into the great controversy of his times, especially in reference to the groundwork of his own religious faith. He had been from his childhood a conscientious and faithful observer of the rites and ceremonies enjoined by his spiritual superiors, but his sensitive moral nature had begun to desire a surer basis than authority, and

doubts of the efficacy of formal piety came into his mind. He examined the various phases of the controversy, and drawn step by step reluctantly towards the Protestant creed as an embodiment of truth, he, in opposition to the agony felt at separating himself from the faith of his mother, followed his convictions and adhered to the Reformed faith. This study of "the lore of manhood" in his "youth" took place during the two last years of his school course, and he entered the University of Dublin in the year 1829, about the age of fifteen, having acquired under Mr. Bell a considerable amount of that training which results in college successes as well as a good deal of practice in oratory such as was in these days common at annual school exhibitions.

Though William A. Butler during his university course pursued much the same plan of desultory study as during his school days, and never made any express and definite mark among his fellow students as a philologist or a mathematician, he yet managed to become in great measure an accomplished scholar, in proof of which he obtained a number of prizes—a scholarship, and ultimately the gold medal in the metaphysical and ethical course. His prize compositions in prose and verse attracted the notice of the heads of the university, and they saw cause for considering him as one of the hopeful and deserving on whom patronage might be well bestowed. While Butler was at college an ethical moderatorship was instituted at the degree examination under the influence of Provost Lloyd. The course of study marked out for this examination was singularly enticing to Butler; he read with the most earnest application, and when in November, 1834, the examination was held, the head name on the roll was William A. Butler. For two years longer Butler resided as a scholar at the university, and indulged in the learned leisure it afforded his love of reading in the splendid library of the university, sadly regretting as the years fled the necessity of choosing a profession and engaging in the turmoil of life; for having no addiction to mathematics, there was no possible hope of his attaining any of the fellowships in the gift of the university.

While yet an undergraduate and in his teens, William A. Butler was one of the projectors of and earliest contributors to *The Dublin University Review*. This serial had but a short existence. It commenced in January, 1833, and closed its career in April, 1834, after the issue of six numbers, forming two volumes. Of Butler's contributions we know only definitely of two, though we believe he supplied many more. The former of these, commencing on page 87, vol. i., is "On Shakespeare;" and the latter, in the same volume, page 325, is on Cowper. The paper on Shakespeare exhibits discrimination in judgment, strength of mind, perspicuity, and elegance of expression; and that on Cowper is full of feeling, geniality, and charming simplicity of spirit. We happen to have a jotting of the closing sentences of this able and interesting paper on the rivalless bard of Avon; and it may not be amiss to

quote them as a specimen of the excellence of phrase and the wisdom of appreciation to which he had attained at so early an age.

"The heart of man—the same in every clime and season—was the subject which Shakespeare sought to examine; and he disencumbered the mighty problem of every term which did not immediately enter into the calculation. Scorning to confine himself to the superficial varieties of character, he explored the quality of the metal that lies beneath. Others are content to consign to verse the endless modifications of social man. It was Shakespeare's alone to grasp the abstract spirit of humanity."

Of the form in which *The Dublin University Review*, the predecessor (if we have been rightly informed) of *The Dublin University Magazine*, took shape and birth, we have gleaned the following account. In the university of the Irish metropolis, over a roaring fire, in the wintry months of 1832, a few choice spirits used occasionally to meet—youths who had a greater relish for the feast of reason than an ordinary college supper, and dismissed everything superfluous from their board on condition of having all sorts of intellectual aliment supplied in abundance. "The Porch"—as the scene of their meetings, was appropriately called—re-echoed to many a witty sally, many a powerful argument, many an affecting narration, many a humorous epigram lost to all but the conclave of philosophers. Compositions of great variety and excellence, as it appeared to those young enthusiasts in lettered lore, were brought under the notice of the meeting, and dreams of publication flitted before their intellect, but at last the dream took a tangible shape. If we are not mistaken, William Archer Butler was one of the foremost of this young band, so also was the late Sir W. Rowan Hamilton, and the recently deceased Carleton was another who took the initiatory steps which led to the publication. He treated with the publisher, and got him to consent to a trial of the project; they procured as well as gave promises of contributions, and they at last ventured on fixing upon an ostensible editor who could organize, connect, arrange, and complete the necessary arrangements; and when all these preliminaries were settled, Butler, as deputy from "The Portico," asked Charles Stuart Stanford, editor of Xenophon's *Anabasis*, translator of "Plato's Dialogues," Cicero's "Offices," &c., to accept the headship of the new venture. This he did during the continuance of the *Review*, but politics broke up the partnership; and after consideration Messrs. Curry adopted the responsibilities of the undertaking, and transformed the *Review* into a monthly magazine, having for its object the maintenance of Conservatism, the furtherance of Protestantism, and the promotion of letters.

To the early issues of this serial W. A. Butler was an assiduous and copious contributor; even in his undergraduate time he was a fluent and facile producer of capital magazine matter, and aided by his ready and pliant genius many of the struggling periodicals of that early time. His early friend, Thomas Woodward, Dean

of Down, informs us that even at this period "his refined taste in criticism, and his eloquence of diction naturally made him one of the most popular as well as the ablest of reviewers. In *The Dublin University Magazine* alone there appeared, from time to time during his college course, enough of poetry and of essays on the most various subjects, historical, critical and speculative, to fill several volumes." We reiterate his opinion that "it is much to be hoped that some selection from this valuable mass of material may be made and given to the public." The subjects range over widely distant fields, but all are handled and elucidated with the same masterly facility. His poetical contributions to the same periodical and others were frequent, and many of them were of an extremely high class of merit. It is almost enough to say in reference to his poetry, that its excellence inspired Wordsworth with a feeling of brotherliness to Butler, and that Professor Wilson (Christopher North) loved his verse and welcomed his pen as a contributor to *Blackwood*.

Butler was especially celebrated as a member of the Historical Society—a debating association, which, like the Speculative Society of Edinburgh, and the Union at Cambridge, has been the nurse of many able minds—and in several other of these communities of sympathetic minds which are usually organized among students for the culture of the powers of thought, debate, and expression. In these little worlds, where young and ardent minds may measure themselves with each other, and greatness somewhat under the impulse of ambition, Butler was brought face to face with the problems of history, the inquiries of metaphysics, and the questions of the day. Among the frequenters of such reunions of choice spirits, he was remarkable for freedom, fearlessness, and exquisite readiness of speech, for power of thought, and thoroughness of information. In the union of common sense, copious reading, ready utterance, innate sagacity, and quick apprehension, few could equal, and none could surpass him. In the year 1835, W. A. Butler filled the office of president, and in that capacity delivered two addresses—addresses which, though delivered by a young man who had but attained his majority, would sustain a reputation gained by length of years and multiplicity of efforts. It is in all cases difficult to select from speeches of the hortatory sort, specimens which may justly be regarded as equally fair to speaker and hearer; for the greatest merits such addresses possess are completeness and appropriateness; but we are inclined to think that the two selections following will amply gratify our readers:—

1. *On oratory in general.*

"The subject of oratory is the moral nature of man—that nature, even yet how noble! I am not forgetting the darker side of the picture when I speak of eloquence as an invariable instrument of justice. It is true that oratory does not, and cannot, stoop to advocate injustice as injustice. We acknowledge that the rhetorician can cloud the light of simple truth, but even then, how does he assail the rectitude of his hearers? With weapons

borrowed from truth herself, and from the purest emotions of man, he attacks virtue by seeming virtuous. And the miserable man (for are not such unhappy as criminals, deceived as deceiving?), who, feeling that eloquence will not come where virtue is not, prostitutes the topics of truth to the purposes of hypocrisy, is really, by the moral law of our nature, obliged to disseminate the principles of virtue at the very moment that he tempts to the practice of vice. This, because the moral nature of man—that nature to which eloquence has to appeal, though fallen—is yet sublime in its degradation. Man, standing midway in eternity, looks back to Deity as his author, and forward to Deity as his protector, and bears the pledge and impress of Deity on his immortal spirit. Upon such a spirit, the effusion of God, and with reason and feeling prompted by such a spirit, the advocate of truth has to act his part. Were we perfect, eloquence were needless; were we imbruted, eloquence were unavailing; but we are erring, yet loathing our guilt, and loving the very virtue we abandon; possessed of a humanity that wavers through all the gradations between the angel and the demon in unceasing variety of change—to us persuasion is necessary, and accordingly to us the benevolence of Heaven has made it a thing of power. Yes, the temple of our moral greatness may be, it is, a ruin, but it is a stupendous ruin, and the God still haunts His dwelling. The oracular voice of the divinity hath not yet forsaken its lonely abode, though the perfect beauty of its proportions be marred, and an imperishable holiness still and for ever glorifies the broken shrine. Is there, on this side the grave, a nobler task than that which calls the secret spirit from the depth of this tabernacle, and teaches a fellow creature to glow with all of the Deity that is given to man while on earth to feel? Who has ever marked the kindling eye and the flushing cheek of the auditor that listens—and in his indignation can scarcely pause to listen—to the dark tale of some foul wrong, and has not witnessed in that ecstasy of impassioned virtue the outbreak and self-revealings of something loftier in man than man himself can measure? Nay, I will speak to your personal experience, and I will ask, which of you has himself thrilled with the glow of such feelings, while he has lain burning before an orator of power to inflame the soul with themes that may arouse them, and can compare ought with that transporting tumult of conscious virtue, of sympathy grieved with the pain of others, yet how immeasurably happier than in the enjoyment of all the sensual bliss that ever enfeebled our frail mortality? I know these topics are trite, but it is the glory of our nature that they are so. They are trite only because every candid reasoner who, from the first shock of our primal fall has looked into the heart of man, has seen there not only a mystery of sin and sorrow, but a still more mysterious condemnation of evil, a principle of nature that repudiates the nature of which it is a part, a something so clearly belonging to a higher sphere, so repugnant to all the lowliness that surrounds it, so awfully the visible presence of God in the world, that to call upon mankind to obey and cultivate it has been the message of wisdom to the thoughtless of every age. It is on these hidden treasures of the soul that the art of eloquence has to work—it is for the orator, like the adept of the Rosicrucians, to wave that ‘divining wand’ of gifted words which, by the mystic sympathy of its warning attraction, hovers over the concealed riches of the heart, and aids to draw forth the pure and precious ore of every gracious emotion from the dark and valueless mass that surrounds it.”

2. *On pulpit oratory in particular:—*

"The statesman deals with the concerns of empires; but empires, though they flourish through a life of centuries, yet ultimately share in the mortality of their founderr. The advocate vindicates the claims of individuals whose earthly existence is yet more transient; but to the preacher alone is appropriated the assertion of a subject whose extent is infinite, whose duration is eternal. To him alone is it given to consider man in the one aspect in which he is unchangeably sublime. With every other view of his nature the low and ludicrous may mingle; for in every other view he is a compound of the wondrous and the worthless; but in the contemplation of a being, whose birth is the first hour of an unending existence, no artifice can weaken that impression of awful admiration which is the great element of sublimity—a feeling which overclouds all the brilliant rivalry of wit, and overwhelms all the efforts of opposing argument. But, like all other means of affecting the passions, a power invincible by art is enfeebled by familiarity. I know not whether to this or to other causes it is attributed that, notwithstanding the boundless resources of the subject, the eloquence of our pulpits is strangely ineffective. Perhaps the vastness of the theme produces inadequacy of language, and its frequent repetition monotony. Where our knowledge has little peculiarity, we are apt to wander into vagueness; and where it is so generally diffused we lose the great charm of novelty. In the soliloquies of the pulpit, eloquence must miss the vivacity it gains in discussion; a disadvantage, probably, not counterbalanced by the opportunity of deliberate preparation, and the certainty of uninterrupted attention. When these circumstances are considered, we ought not, perhaps, to be surprised that, with innumerable living preachers of great religious excellence and usefulness, our pulpits can boast of comparatively few who are great orators; few, who by the mingled power of argument and imagination, can win us from the present into the glorious or the gloomy future; few who have succeeded in obtaining—if the thought be not too fanciful—the gift which the Grecian sighed for,—a point in the distant heavens, on which to prop that moral machinery which shall move the earth and its powers with a force supplied from the skies!"

Bartholomew Lloyd, D.D., who had been promoted to the dignity of Provost of Trinity College, Dublin, on Dr. Kyle's removal to the Episcopate in 1831, is spoken of as "the most devoted, the most enlightened, and the most energetic governor the university ever possessed." Ireland is indebted to him for much; but her chief obligation to him is, certainly, the discovery, recognition, and patronage of Butler, whose connection with the university must have ceased at the expiration of his scholarship but for the wise forethought and judicious energy of that discerning promoter of learning. He had marked with approving eye the singular combination of qualities possessed by the first ethical moderator, and was anxious to secure his services to fill up properly a deficiency in the curriculum of Dublin; and he succeeded by dint of earnest and persevering effort in procuring the establishment of a professorship of moral philosophy, and by a unanimous vote of the council board, William Archer Butler was chosen in 1837, to be the first occu-

pant of the new chair. At the same time, being now prepared to enter into the ministry of the Church, his college conferred on him the prebend of Clondelhorka, in the diocese of Raphoe, and county of Donegal.

The young professor entered upon his duties with the zeal and energy of an enthusiast, and the glowing eloquence, fascinating grace, and learned thoughtfulness which pervaded his prelections awoke a general interest, and showed how highly philosophical studies commend themselves to men when they are brought before them fittingly. As the early lectures of this course have been published, we may gratify our readers by a few specimens of Butler's philosophical eloquence.

The editor of these lectures, Dr. William Hepworth Thompson, Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Cambridge, informs us that they were delivered during the first four years of the author's professional life, that prior even to 1842 he had abandoned the custom of reading his discourses, and that, though no complete lectures remain, "a large pile of papers," then in his keeping, contained "ample materials for structures never completed," and furnishes striking evidence of Mr. Butler's varied and profound erudition. Though personally unknown to Mr. Thompson, Butler, through his masterly "Letters on Development," had commended himself to his mind as one entitled "to rank among the most gifted of his generation." He expressly states that "though Mr. Butler did not pretend to the title of an exact classical scholar, the philosophical acumen of his mind has generally enabled him to seize the true meaning of even the more recondite works of Plato and Aristotle." He reports himself to be, especially in the introductory series, somewhat dissatisfied by the rhetorical pomp of the style, but thinks this may be tolerated on account of "the really fine vein of thought and sentiment which it conceals."

It may not be amiss to place before the reader the opinion as to the actual value of the lectures entertained by an authority so trustworthy as the learned editor, in regard to certain portions of their contents, at the time of their issue.

"Of the dialectics and physics of Plato, they are the only exposition at once accurate and popular with which I am acquainted; being more accurate than the French, and incomparably more popular than the German treatises on those departments of the Platonic philosophy. The author's intimate familiarity with the metaphysical writings of the last century, and especially with the English and Scotch school of psychologists, has enabled him to illustrate the subtle speculations of which he treats, in a manner calculated to render them more intelligible to the English mind than they can be made by writers trained solely in the technicalities of modern German schools, or by those who disdain the use of illustrations altogether. . . . In composing his comparatively brief notices of the *earlier* Grecian schools, the author appears to have made considerable use of the German histories of philosophy, especially that of Ritter. His estimate of Socrates, on the other hand, evinces the same independence of

judgment and the same preference of original documents which mark his lectures on Plato, and, as far as they go, those on Aristotle also; but the subject is handled in a manner too slight and cursory for its importance. . . . As the lectures stand they constitute a history of the Platonic philosophy—its seed-time, maturity, and decay. . . . An upright and intelligent history of Platonism written by an uncompromising defender of the Catholic truths, as well as of the historical evidences of Christianity."

Of the entire lectures—which have been issued in two handsome volumes, with annotations from the pen of the editor, by Messrs. MacMillan of London and Cambridge—it is impossible for us to supply any epitomized digest; and yet so able, sound, original, and eloquent are they, that we would fain bring before our readers some of the finest passages which characterize these volumes. Recollecting that in previous issues of this serial, expositions of European philosophy have been given, which provide the basis of biographic fact and of speculative interest, we presume that the most profitable method for our readers will be to insert in a brief *compte rendu*, a few of the most striking, new, or eloquent portions, that thus an intelligent interest may be awakened on the topic and regarding the author.

The following extracts from the first lecture state—(1) the object of the introductory observations; (2) the subject of the course; (3) the methods of pursuing the study; and (4) the effects of metaphysics on man and history.

"The one case of the experimental sciences excepted, its true utility will ever be *less* the communication of new and profound truth, if that truth require a long course of reasoning, than the production of an interest, the creation of a taste, the stimulus given to the circulation of thought. . . . I. Setting out from **THE MIND ITSELF**, as the great receptacle at once, and instrument both of knowledge and of activity, we may consider it as the sole original substance of all the diversified phenomena of the intellectual and the voluntary life. We may regard science and action as its remote product and creature; or rather we may neglect the product in the process of production. In this view of the relation of things, the human soul is contemplated as the starting-point, not as the goal of knowledge,—as its initial requisite, not as its final attainment. . . . The philosophy of the mind is to be regarded as the *first* step of science; because it is the observation and theory of that without which science cannot exist. In the *logical* relationship of the sciences it holds this position. . . . II. But though it be conceivable that the philosophy of the human mind might present itself in this its logical priority as the first and principal object of speculation to the reason of a comprehensive observer, there is also another and a very different path by which the same great subject may enter the field of thought. If in the method just described it be assumed as the first, it may also be arrived at as the *last* term of Science. . . . The following simple but magnificent generalization, that there is a philosophy which is to every specific philosophy what that specific philosophy is to the individual objects of its classification, that the sciences which theorize the world may be themselves theorized, that the subjects of their inquiry and the relations whose

endless varieties they detect may be themselves resolved into classes of subjects and classes of relations, that these classes of subjects and relations are themselves again amenable to one grand final classification, as the attributes of a single permanent substance. Gentlemen, that substance is the mind of man, and ~~that~~ philosophy is the philosophy of the human mind! As the reason of a man influences his will, so does the mental philosophy (which is the collective judgment) of a people influence and guide its scientific activity; and as the one influence in innumerable cases occurs without any immediate reference to any settled or systematic theory of conduct, so also that secret but important directive light, which I may term the *latent metaphysics* of an age, may operate irresistibly and incessantly, without having its source, its mode, or its power detected."

Lecture second, which treats of the Science of real existence or Ontology, contains some splendid passages, but we can do little more than present the following excerpts. There are, he says,—

"Four great fields for the cultivation of psychological inquiry. These are: (1) the truths, subjects, and processes of science; (2) the recorded results and processes of imagination; (3) the facts, causes, and general laws of history; and (4) the treasures of direct personal experience. . . . *Science* in all its branches is, as it were, the rich and variegated tapestry which is woven upon this common ground; *Poetry*, in its widest sense, and all its many kinds and divisions, is but the practical form of a portion of this philosophy; mankind in the grand and melancholy review of *History* is but performing its evolutions; and in the private experience of mere individual life, every action is an experiment, every practical rule a tacit theorem in the same universal science of the soul. . . . I would gladly teach you to prefer contemplating the truth that gave such systems their still undestroyed charms to resting in the errors that disfigured and enfeebled them. I would willingly lead you to a reverence for the leaders of our human reason, even when, misled by the double fascinations of imagination and emotion, they sometimes rather wished a theory than established it. While sternly discountenancing the result of error, accustom yourselves, by tracing out its origin, to disintricating the germ of truth it invested; refute incomplete views not by rejecting but by completing them; and remember that even when by too fondly worshipping a partial vision of truth great thinkers have erred, a certain modified admiration is due to these very errors which flow from an excess of intellectual elevation."

In the third lecture the author communicates his views on Psychology and Ontology, and the various departments into which the Philosophy of mind may be divided. We quote a sentence or two on Metaphysics as an inductive and a speculative science.

"One division of the science, for example, resolves the whole internal experience into a few faculties (or ultimate modes of consciousness); it reduces all the known varieties of mental posture into phenomena of sensation, phenomena of intellect, phenomena of sentiment, phenomena of volition. The others, basing itself upon the 'return' handed in by this analytical inquiry, and detecting in the phenomena it contains, or some of them, certain characters that involve realities beyond the scope of our immediate consciousness, finds in the laws of the human reason—speculative and

practical—a revelation of the absolute laws of the universe, and more especially the involved certainty of that Supreme causative and reasonable nature who is the Law of Laws, and the depositor in the human mind of those principles of truth which we possess as the testimonial and manifestation of His all-containing and all-disposing existence.”

Lectures fourth and fifth are very able statements of the possibility of an inductive Science of the mind, in the course of which, by varying illustrations, he most eloquently expounds that idea. He then in Lecture sixth proceeds to descant on the superiority of the science of mind to all other sciences, and in the seventh explains the disciplinary value of Psychology, and exhorts his hearers on the spirit in which it ought to be pursued. From this important prelection we must make lengthy extracts.

“If, then, you wish to *join* in the spirit of the age, you must understand it in order to contribute to it; if you prefer to *counteract* it, you must equally understand it in order to do so effectually. . . . Now, I say that one of the dominant, perhaps indeed the dominant, characteristic of the existing age is the tendency to restless examination of the principles of all things. . . . The specific character of the polemics of republicanism is the tendency to publicity, inquiry, censure; in short, to that which, transported into the sphere of philosophy, becomes the spirit of bold examination into the principles of all things, the spirit of audacious and indefatigable analysis. Commencing in political discussion, its very spirit, that of pursuing inquiry to the utmost, must urge it through every topic with which political opinions are connected; while again, the philosophical habits in their turn powerfully react upon the practical. . . . The philosophy of human nature in any age is usually the condensed expression of that age; that is, it is the refined and sublimated spirit which, diluted and diffused, takes shape as the habits and manners of the people. It is the logic of the public practice; the grounds and reasons which each generation presents to the tribunal of time as its memorial and justification. The history is the philosophy in action; the philosophy, the history in speculation; they are (to borrow a scholastic metaphor) the matter, and the form (or idea) of the times. The reciprocal action of these elements is powerful and perpetual; and has been more and more evident ever since the press has given an almost instantaneous ubiquity to thought. . . . Though the ‘contest for opinions’ is commonly derided as the worst form of human folly, I confess I have eyes sharp enough in the detection of good, to find even in this folly an element of hope and indications prophetic of a happy future. . . . If (from whatever cause) the analysis of principles both in action and speculation be the predominating character of modern times, and more peculiarly the character of the present age, an acquaintance with the ultimate laws of the mind, and with that master science which holds in its hand the last link of each chain, rises from the dignity of a fine accomplishment to the intrinsic authority of a necessary and fundamental attainment. . . . There is a general and final limitation of the faculties, within which is possible knowledge, and beyond which is certain ignorance; so there is also a relative and mutual limitation of the *faculties with respect to each other*, as well as of the chief subjects upon which each can be exerted. . . . It is not unlikely that if the mind

were strictly subjected to an intellectual regimen, like the body and its muscular system, results as far beyond ordinary calculation might be produced. The extraordinary power sometimes generated by constant practice in particular pursuits, may assist us to some conception of the energies that are dormant in human minds only because they are not aroused by cultivation. . . . It is commonly said that genius cannot be infused by education, yet this power of concentrated attention, which belongs as a part of his gift to every great discoverer, is unquestionably capable of almost indefinite augmentation by resolute practice. . . . Every idea is vivid in proportion to attention; and every idea suggests a greater number of related ideas in proportion to its vividness. . . . The great principles here are, (1) the fearless pursuit of truth, in the bright and holy confidence that all truth will ultimately right itself; (2) the careful expulsion of all counteracting influences in study which can be traced to *wides* prepossession of any kind, or by whatever title consecrated; and (3) the cultivation of a spirit of candour towards all who, whether, as you think, in truth or in error, have given, or are giving, their days in sincerity to advancing the growth of human knowledge."

With this lecture the Introductory Series concludes, and the First Series on the History of Philosophy commences in the next section. From the first address, which is chiefly bibliographical and critical, and deals with the characteristics and value of "Ancient and Modern Histories of Philosophy," we cannot quote, but from Lecture second, "On Definitions of Philosophy and on the province and functions of an Historian of Philosophy," we think the succeeding paragraphs will be found interesting and instructive:—

"Philosophy is the science of principles, of the principles eminently of knowledge and action. . . . The world of thought is vaster than any system, and no school that the world has yet seen is fitted to constitute itself the arbitrary judge of all. . . . The true object of a true philosophical history is to reduce this vast aggregate to the methodical unity of system; to classify its varieties, and to detect (as far as may be possible) the laws of their manifestation and their recurrence. It is in a manner the psychology of the human race. . . . Philosophy, then, lies in the exercise of the *reflective* faculties, in the investigation of first principles; and the history of philosophy is the history of that exercise. . . . In all human conceptions of real existences there are two elements logically separable, the substantial and the circumstantial; the thing itself and the relations under which it is apprehended. . . . This distinction, then, of the circumstantial—the absolute and the relative—seems to be involved in the very foundations of human reason. Now of the circumstantial or relative conditions under which this absolute essence manifests itself to human apprehension, some, it is plain, are mentally necessary, others mentally contingent; that is to say, some are such that to perceive at all we must perceive subject to them; others such that to suppose them altered would involve no contradiction. . . . These two orders of coexisting beliefs, wholly distinct in their nature and origin are harmonized to each other in the complexity of the human mind by the adapting skill of the Great Author of our being. To the second of these classes—events in their nature contingent but known to be stable,

which form the domain of the natural or inductive sciences—must be added a third. . . . This third department includes all events, on whatever laws dependent, *which are* (and *so long as they are*) *considered as* casual or accidental influences and connections. In this class are, then, involved all facts whose laws of occurrence are either themselves unknown, or are, though partially known, yet suspended upon conditions which are undetermined and indeterminable. . . .

"All history, to be true, must be based upon facts; to be profitable, must be systematized by induction. . . . The history of *Philosophy*, properly so called, . . . should, on the one hand, collect and combine the scattered rudiments of pure reflective truth or error in every age, expounding (as far as is at once discernible) their *internal* connection; it should, on the other, trace the interwoven order of circumstantial events which illustrate their *external* fortunes. . . . The *history* of truth does not suppose truth itself to be multiple; but it supposes the circumstances, degrees, and aspects of its manifestation, to be multiple. It is the office of the science of truth to investigate truth as it is in itself; it is the office of the history of truth to investigate truth as it appears to man. . . . Truth, indeed, of all kinds, specially the true theory of man and nature, is *one*. But this single truth (which of course comprehends an extensive series of propositions) may, 1st, be expressed in a diversity of forms; may, 2ndly, be joined with a variety of other propositions not evident, or not true; may, 3rdly, be only partially seen as to greater or less *degrees* of it; may, 4thly, be seen by different observers in *different* parts exclusively; may, 5thly, though seen entire as to its actual elements, be yet so apprehended and stated as to destroy the proportion between the parts, and to give undue weight to some. . . . The passage from the outward to the inward worlds is usually accomplished by one of three acts: 1st, *Religious belief*; for this in a manner externalizing the mind itself (in the conception of a supreme mind or minds) transforms even the outward tendency into a mental one. 2nd, Logical disputation or scepticism, which forces the examination of the principles of reason. (This agent is remarkable in the transition of the Socratic age in Greece.) 3rd, The discussion, even though it be only the practical discussion of general *morals*. . . . The history of *Philosophy*, the history of the Church, the history of Governments, what lesson do they all unite in teaching? Tolerance and candour. . . . In this case, the effect is produced by the strong arm of science reducing to simple laws and connections, no longer the revolutions of the skies, but the revolutions and interferences of error and of truth; and while such a labour would tend to lessen the undue power of casual associations by exposing their influence, it would tend also to create in the mind of the philosophical observer that calm and equitable appreciation of the genuine position of man in respect to truth which is one of the happiest aids that science can lend to the soothing precepts of practical religion. Recognising everywhere the unity of human nature in the variety of positions it sees or teaches to see, in each honest misconception, the misfortune of a brother, not the crime of an enemy; and in harmonizing, if not contradictory opinions, yet contradictory prejudices, by referring those opinions to the almost inevitable partiality of views, it finds even in the cold domain of speculation some of that happiness, and may perhaps anticipate some of that reward, which the Divine Author of the great practical *Philosophy* of man promised, when he declared, '*Blessed are the peace-makers; for they shall be called the children of God.*'"

Lecture third, "On the Speculative and Practical Philosophies of India," though vigorous and thoughtful, deals with matter which has been much canvassed of late with varying results; and therefore we shall pass on to the eighth lecture, on the Philosophy of Greece, in the early part of which we find these exquisitely phrased sentences on the birthland of speculative thought:—

"That country to which the filial devotion of every cultivator of his own intelligence turns as to the mother-country of the mind; to which every man instinctively points when he would illustrate the indefeasible claims and inherent destinies of human nature. A speck of the globe, a few cities on either side of a narrow sea dotted with isles, scarcely discoverable on the chart of a continent, has been the outward and visible scene for the successive apparition of the whole universe of mind. On that little theatre of mental action, and in the rapid development of a couple of busy ages, performers have played their part, who, even after the vast European movement of our later centuries, still preserve, if not their exclusive authority unquestioned, at least their intellectual eminence unshaken. There poetry still finds in many departments her most exquisite examples; there (and perhaps there alone) sculpture finds her ideal, and ceases to be a dream; there painting, doubtless, may lament that her more perishable materials should have defrauded *her* of her triumphs; and music, that *her* achievements must be received upon the faith of history; there philosophy has at least directed her course to every point of the compass of thought, and touched at all its points of access; and there, finally, language, on whose ministrant services reason and imagination are alike co-dependent, arrived, even in its infancy, at a perfection which made its proud and conscious possessors to class all who spoke not their own melodious tongue, by one indiscriminate appellation, characteristic of their vocal inferiority. But great as are these services to civilization, they are not the only ones for which Europe is indebted to that glorious people. Placed as the outpost of that continent, which was one day to take the lead in the civilization of mankind, the Greeks fought for the cause of human enlightenment as well as personally advanced it. . . . What was the day of Marathon as an element in the history of man? Was it the brilliant struggle of some mountain-tribe against the wild ravages of some ancient Zenghis or Timour? Gentlemen, it was the cause of the world that was perilled that day. The destinies of ages hung trembling upon every blow of these gallant men of Attica. When, as the old historian tells us, the soldier, covered with the dust of that immortal field, rushed into the Athenian assembly with his *Kaipere!* *χαίρομεν!* and fell dead of his wounds; as he gasped the words he spoke a message to which the civilization of ages was to be the echo or the answer! Had the despot of Western Asia been as successful as his Turkish copyist 2,000 years later, had he gained his footing in Greece at that hour, and flooded with his slaves the soil in which were deposited the seeds of the world's advancement, the civilization of Europe had been adjourned for centuries. Homer and the early lightnings of the lyric muse would have been perhaps irrecoverably lost; no age of Pericles would have placed Athens where she is in your hearts; her borrowed light would never have taught Romans to think and feel as well as act; and the spirit would not have existed which, evoked from its sepulchre in codex and palimpsest, was in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries once

more incarnated in modern forms, and became the vivifying principle of the literatures of Italy, France, Germany and England. . . . Greece was a *free* country, and a country of boundless publicity in all its civil proceedings. This advantage—not too common even now—was in the early Grecian æra, as far as we can learn, a blessing solitary in the world. I need not remind you that India, through which you have lately accompanied me, or of those vast Asiatic edifices of empire, of which little more than the king and the king's murderer and successor are known in history. Conceive, then, the influence of this spirit of publicity upon the development of the reason. Every man ran the course of his day, every man delivered his *opinion* and struggled for it, as a champion at the games; he had all Greece to witness him. The Grecian love of glory in all its forms—physical and intellectual—was so impassioned, and their sympathy with mental energy, however manifested, so cordial, that for a long period it supported philosophy, even against their superstition; and if a few of the leading teachers were ever and anon banished from Greece or from the world, how many hundreds of these speculators were suffered to live and die in peace! Now of this emulation and this glory *publicity* was the parent. Cyrus, as Herodotus tells us, laughed at the Spartans for meeting together to practise on each other in the public squares; 'the Persians,' as he says, 'being unprovided with any place of public resort.' Does not the historian's simple remark speak volumes?"

These quotations will show the spirit in which the author entered upon the consideration of the subject, and afford a glimpse of the eloquence with which he illustrates and enforces philosophic thought. As the succeeding lectures of this series deal with biography, exposition and criticism, which would require minute examination if they were noticed at all, we think we had better now only give a statement of their contents as a guide to the student, and let our previous quotations suffice as proof of the merits of this thinker.

Lecture fifth deals with the early efforts of philosophical inquiry in Greece, and the Ionic and Atomic schools; lecture sixth with the Pythagorean and Eleatic schools; the Sophists and Socrates occupy the foreground of lecture seventh; and those who are interested in philosophy will scarcely fail to read this chapter with care, especially as the editor's notes make it very helpful in comprehending the essence of Socratism. It should form an excellent prelude reading before taking up the chapters of Grote, on which we have in a previous paper made some comments. Indeed this same remark may be made regarding the whole of the second volume as well. It deals with Plato and Aristotle, and it could not be criticised aright here without constant allusion and reference to the monograph on Plato and the companions of Socrates, which we owe to George Grote. The few lectures on the psychology of Aristotle are incomplete; while, on the whole, the writings of Grote may be said to have exhausted the subject of Platonism much more than these lectures do, it ought by no means to be thought that they have superseded Butler. On the contrary, we

think that no better preparation for a thorough appreciation of Plato, as expounded by Grote, could be found than in the careful perusal of the bold and perspicuous lectures of William Archer Butler.

Except when the duties of his profession called him to Dublin, the prebend of Clondehorka resided constantly on his benefice, and performed assiduously the duties incumbent on him as a clergyman. He generally preached extempore that he might attract and catch his parishioners; he trained the village choir, and though his parish included an extensive district, scattered along the shores of the Atlantic, with bogs and hills interspersed among its seclusions, he visited each dwelling, however remote, with constancy, and noted all the characters, circumstances, and requirements of his parishioners. Though diligently occupied in preparations for his lectures, or engaged in producing articles for the periodicals of the time, he was always accessible, courteous, and kind on the slightest occasion, leaving at once his delightful studies to visit and condole with any member of his flock. During his incumbency at Clondehorka, he preached two sermons on behalf of the Irish Church Extension Society, in January, 1840, which attracted great attention, and led to a good deal of controversy. The society had made a good choice, for Professor Butler was a preacher whose sermons displayed not only pathos, fervour, and brilliancy, but profound thought and logical argument. But the professor lived to change his views of the matter, and came to regard the National Board of Education (of which Whately had the headship) not as an antagonist but a subsidiary agency to the church as an educating body. Dean Woodward (with due intimation of this change of opinion) reprints these in the first series of Butler's Sermons, as specimens of pulpit eloquence too valuable to be lost. This series of sermons has been so productive of delight to religious minds, from their rare combination of the qualities of a sacred writer and an able thinker, which they show, that they have been followed by a second series, edited by Dr. J. A. Jeremie, Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge. These sermons are truly spoken of by the *Athenæum* as "distinguished by the point and vigour of their style, the happiness of their illustrations and the largeness of their views." The two following quotations describe their character with precision and eloquence:—

"We would recommend them to our readers, not only for their force and subtlety of thought, brilliancy of fancy, and exuberant eloquence of words, but for that spirit of love, that profound and glowing devotion by which they are animated, and with which no one can come into sympathizing contact without feeling himself elevated and refined."—*North British Review*.

"They are marked by the same originality and vigour of expression, the same richness of imagery and illustration, the same large views and catholic spirit, and the same depth and fervour of devotional feeling which
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so remarkably distinguished the preceding series, and which rendered it a most valuable accession to our theological literature."—*Dr. Jeremie.*

In order that our readers may have an opportunity of seeing for themselves the nature of the topics upon which the famous pulpit orator dilates, and may be encouraged to peruse them, we subjoin a list of the subjects, and take occasion to point them out as models of sacred discourse—discourse in which the orator employs—

“The words of wisdom, virtue, knowledge, sense,
To move by pathos, fire, by eloquence;
By sweet persuasion to constrain, or roll
The tide of just invective o’er the soul,
Command the right, or reprobate the wrong,
Give courage to the weak, and judgment to the strong.”

Besides an introductory memoir by Dean Woodward (to which we have been much indebted), the following are the

CONTENTS. I.:—Uncertainty of Christ’s Coming—The Incarnation—Daily Self-denial of Christ—Crucifying the Son of God afresh—The Power of the Resurrection—The Trinity disclosed in the Structure of St. John’s Writings—Meetness for the Inheritance of the Saints in Light—Occasional Mysteriousness of Christ’s teaching—Christ our Life—Self-delusion as to our real State before God—The Eternal Life of Christ in Heaven—The Canaanite Woman a Type of the Gentile Church—The Faith of Man and the Faithfulness of God—The Wedding Garment—Christ sought and found in the Old Testament Scriptures—Human Affections raised, not destroyed, by the Gospel—The Rest of the People of God—Christ the Treasury of Wisdom and Knowledge—The Divinity of our Priest, Prophet, and King—Expediency of Christ’s Invisibility—The Invisible Government of Christ through His Spirit—Christ’s Departure the Condition of the Spirit’s Advent—The Faith that cometh by Hearing—The Christian’s Walk in Light and Love—Primitive Church Principles not inconsistent with Universal Christian Sympathy—Church Education.

II.—Christ the Source of all Blessings—Living and Dying unto the Lord—The Hope of Glory and the Charities of Life—The Holy Trinity—The Sorrow that exalts and sanctifies—The Purifying Power of Tribulation—The Growth of the Divine Life—Lessons from a Monarch’s Death—Dying to Sin and the Law—The Restorer of Mankind—The True Fast—The Way to Divine Knowledge—The Ascension—The Folly of Moral Cowardice—The Will of God towards His Children—Strength and Mission of the Church—The Ingratitude of the Jews—Danger of Backsliding—The Word of God—The Claims of Spiritual Destitution—The Blessedness of Submission—The Holy Trinity—“Watchman, what of the Night?”—The Principles of the Final Judgment—Eternal Punishment.

The Dublin Professorship of Moral Philosophy was instituted with a tenure of five years. In 1842, Butler was re-elected to the chair, and in the same year he was promoted to the rectory of Rumohy in Raphoe. At the visitation of the bishop, Sept. 1842,

Butler preached before the bishop and the clergy of the diocese of Derry and Raphoe a masterly sermon, entitled "Primitive Church Principles not inconsistent with Universal Christian Sympathy." As a Churchman's discourse, this is perhaps one of the most admirable sermons in modern pulpit literature; it is, as the Bishop of Lichfield says, "full of power and wisdom." In 1844, Professor Butler accepted the invitation of his friend, Rev. Robert Graves, incumbent of Ambleside, to visit the Lake district. Here he went in company with Sir Wm. R. Hamilton, and met Archdeacon Hare and William Wordsworth, as well as several other "persons" of literary repute at that time in the place. Here he made several excursions through the beautiful scenery of that pleasant and picturesque region, enjoying the society and sociality of those who imparted (to him) half its charm to the literary locality. Of this visit there is a pleasing account in a letter from Mr. Graves, in Dean Woodward's Memoir. During his visit to Ambleside, he preached several times with great acceptance—choosing voluntarily to do so extempore, though he had along with him some carefully composed discourses. The visit was the occasion of verse, not only by the professor, but the sage old prophet of Rydal mount.

The controversy excited by the Oxford Tractarian School had been gradually rising since 1833 in intensity and embarrassing popularity, and obtained its crisis about 1845, by the retrocession of J. H. Newman into the communion of Rome, an event which was immediately followed by the publication of a work on "The Development of Christian Doctrine," intended as a semi-autobiographic explanation of the process of thought which had led the writer's mind from Oxford to Rome. Butler, who had gone through all the controversy in his youth, returned to it now again, and with the intention of speaking a word in season, had prepared himself thoroughly, by an extensive collection of thoughts and references; but the occasion came suddenly, and he was compelled to meet it in the readiest manner. This appeared to him to be that of letters; and he accordingly prepared a series, the first of which appeared in *The Irish Ecclesiastical Journal* (to which he was a constant contributor), in Dec., 1845. These letters have been collected and published under the editorship of the Very Rev. T. Woodward, Dean of Down, with the title, "Letters on Romanism"—a reply to Dr. Newman's Essay on Development. It is described as "one of the ablest refutations of Romanism in its latest and most refined form," as constituting "a manual of the highest value upon some of the main points of the Romish controversy," and as a "triumphant refutation of the great neophyte of Romanism." "There are books," as was said in the *British Quarterly*, "which while elicited by temporary controversy become so rich in genius as to possess a permanent value. The book before us is of that rare class."

In the famine winter, 1846-7, Butler laid aside his philosophic and literary pursuits for the nobler works of Christian benevolence.

From morning till night he toiled to overtake the necessities of the times, as the distributor of charitable funds to great numbers. At this period, some of the clergy of the Church endeavoured to make their alms-giving auxiliary to Protestant proselytism. This drew from him a strong letter addressed to the editor of the *Weekly Mail*; from this we quote a passage of undying interest, because it comes from one who had himself gone out of the darkness into a fuller light, and knew the dis severing of the moral and intellectual nature which accompanies the *fact* of conversion :—

“It is not without fear and trembling I should at any time receive into the Church a convert from any of the forms of Christianity outside of it, *whom I had known to be sincerely devoted according to the measure of his light.* The duty of so doing may arise, and, when the duty is plain, it must, of course, be done; I only say that I should feel very great anxiety in doing it. Men ought never to forget how fearfully heavy is the responsibility of a new convert. You have unsettled all the man’s habitual convictions—are you prepared to labour night and day to replace them with others as effective over the heart and life? If not, you have done him an irreparable wrong. Motives to righteousness, low, mixed, uncertain, as it may be, are greatly better than none; and there can be no doubt that he who has lost so many he once possessed, requires constant, earnest, indefatigable exertion on the part of the teacher who undertakes to supply their place. What care, what skill, what persevering patience does it need, to repair the shattered principle of faith in one whom you have succeeded in convincing that all the deepest practical convictions of his whole past life are delusion !”

These are wise and weighty words, and they contain in them an important and valuable thought. Missionariness is the very essence of truth; but every effort of missionary zeal should be twofold—simultaneously destructive of error and constructive of conviction. Change is not conversion, unless the change issues from living faith. Faith is the seminal principle of life, and any new faith must be stronger and more energetic than that which existed before; because it must not only overcome all the ordinary temptations of life, but vanquish and subdue all the old habits and associations of the mind and body.

In this terrible year (1847) of difficulty and disaster, when “men’s hearts were failing them for fear,” and Ireland illustrated for England “the political economy of a famine,” Butler seems to have been strangely impressed with the might and majesty of faith; and he resolved to compose a treatise on that most important of all philosophico-theological subjects. He devoted himself laboriously to the work of preparation, and determined to spare no toil of collection or reflection on the matter of his theme. The Fathers, the Schoolmen, the Reformers, the Anglican divines were diligently studied, and their chief ideas, brought into small compass by extract into his notebooks, were made his own; but unfortunately no outline of his main-thought, his method, or his ultimate purpose has been left. We know that his mind was absorbed by the theme, but to what issue it tended we do not learn. We are aware that

he had peculiar experiences in regard to faith in his own case; it is likely that he noticed peculiar manifestations, as far as faith was concerned, in the times of the potato failure, not only in his flock, but among his fellow labourers in the ministry; and it is not improbable that he designed his treatise to possess a thoroughly philosophical basis, an intensely practical reference, and a distinctly theological connection,—but this is speculation only, and not statement of fact, and to this we return.

During all the years of his pastorate he contributed largely to periodical literature, especially to the *Dublin University Magazine*. Of many of these articles we would gladly have spoken more at large. So varied are the gifts they exhibit the possession of, that it is difficult to characterize them in a few phrases. In philosophy we may note the papers on "Berkeley," in April and May, 1836, and on Whewell's "History of the Inductive Sciences," February and November, 1841; in history, an article on Sismondi; in divinity, two papers on Oxford and Berlin theology, September and October, 1843; in biography, "Goldsmith," January, 1836; in criticism, "Evenings with our later Poets," October, 1846, January and May, 1847; and in poetry a great number of contributions bear his initials in the early issues, besides those previously referred to, and "The Even Song of the Streams," published in *Blackwood's Magazine* in June, 1835; as specimens of the very superior qualifications he possessed as contributor to the serial literature of the age.

We quote the following humorous little *morceau* from a paper on "September Flowers," a poetic critique.

"Having in early life intended to write a 'Treatise on Eloquence,' I was always collecting materials for such a work, and have at last thrown them into 'A Poem on Poetry.' . . . This work is *five thousand* lines long. It is altogether original—written in what is commonly called our heroic, or ten-syllable rhyme, with *as much* animation *at least* as Pope's 'Essay on Criticism,' and it is, I hope, a little more instructive than that bagatelle!! This 'Art of Poetry' has cost me more labour than can be imagined. . . The Greeks had nothing on the subject, but a very worthless performance which goes under the name of Aristotle, but was not written by the pupil of Aristotle. The Romans had little more than Horace's 'Art of Poetry,' which is a short essay of only 475 lines. The French have a good translation of that essay, which they call 'Boileau's Art of Poetry.' That meritorious development is, however, only 1100 lines. We ourselves have nothing but Pope's 'Essay on Criticism,' 750 lines, almost all borrowed—the little poem of the Duke of Buckingham, containing 350 lines, which *modestly* profess to teach the whole art of poetry—Lord Roscommon's 'Essay on translated verse,' 350 more—and other trifles of less note. My work will be accompanied with notes, and cannot be properly edited in *two* octavo volumes!!!"

On Trinity Sunday, 25th June, 1848, he was selected to preach the sermon preparatory to the ordination of the Lord Bishop of

Derry in the parish church of Dunboe. He was the guest of Archdeacon Gough, and was in his most sprightly mood, full of vigour of frame and mind. He preached, important though the occasion was, and in the presence of so many brethren in the ministry, an extempore sermon, from Matt. xxviii. 18—20, on "The Apostolic Commission, and the Duty of the Christian Church." It is described as powerfully argumentative, splendidly ornate, clear in statement, and effective in delivery. It included a review of the grounds of episcopacy, a criticism of some of the greatest Anglican divines—belonging both to Established and Dissenting communions—and it closed with a fervent and fervid appeal to the people to have faith in Christ crucified, and to the clergy to proffer for their people's acceptance the Lord Jesus Christ as the only Saviour. His preaching, which always partook largely of the characteristics of the French school, was thoughtful, emotional, scriptural, and profoundly impressive, and it excited the admiration of his whole audience. He awaited the ordination, and on the Friday, 30th June, thereafter, went home to attend to his immediate pastoral duties. "He had heated himself by walking before he took his place in the public car by which he travelled." A death-chill struck into his frame, and on reaching home he was ill. Fever set rapidly in, and he felt that his end was near. He had only one wish to live to complete his work on Faith. Only one little month of vigorous health to accomplish that meditated task was all he sighed for, but it was not to be given. On 5th July, at the early age of thirty-four, he breathed his last, and on Saturday, 8th July, he was laid in the churchyard of Rumoghy, in the presence of the bishop, the clergy, the gentry, and thousands of the peasantry of all sects, belonging to his own parish, and those that lay nearest it. The Irish press was unanimous in its expression of grief, and tributes of respect to his memory were given from almost all the churches of the diocese; and the Bishop of Derry, in his first charge delivered to the clergy, 18th July, spoke with deep feeling and affectionate regret of the loss to the church, to letters, and to thought, his decease was, or at least appeared to be. The love and admiration of this notable thinker, still cherished by those who knew him, is perhaps the highest testimony to his personal worth, and the acceptance which his lectures and sermons, though not issued till long after his demise, received from philosophical readers and from the theological press, indicates the possession of such ability and worth as justifies remembrance by the narration of the events, few though they are of his outward life, and a notice, however cursory and imperfect, of the thoughts to which he gave literary utterance during his mortal career.

Politics.

OUGHT WE NOW TO HAVE THE BALLOT?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

I AM glad to find that you have recently thrown open your columns to the discussion of the ballot, and I doubt not but that such an opportunity for laying bare the opinions of your numerous readers and correspondents will be readily availed of. I see that the subject has been fairly started by G. M. S. in your January number, and "Philomathes" has no doubt done his best to rebut some of the arguments employed by those in favour of the ballot. I confess the more I look into the matter, and make myself more thoroughly conversant with its details, the more do I become convinced of the importance which attaches to the subject. When we come to examine into some of the evils which this reform seeks to remedy, the wonder to me is that there can possibly be a person blind enough in this enlightened age not to be able to see the glorious results which will be attained through the working of the ballot. This question has assumed such an importance of late, as will make it, I believe, one of the prominent matters to be settled in the present parliament. Our experiences during the late elections have, at any rate, been quite sufficient to convince us of the necessity of some change in the mode at present adopted for the giving of the vote. The numberless instances of bribery, corruption, intimidation, and the like, which have come before our eyes, have been such as to, at any rate, deepen in us the conviction that we cannot allow the matter to rest as it at present exists; what we ask is, that the ballot shall have a fair and legitimate trial; we have no wish at all to force it upon the country if an equivalent will be given in its stead, but what we say and adhere to is this, that the voter, on going to record his vote on the polling day, shall go unbiassed and unfettered by any landlord influence or tyranny, in any shape or form. There is something about this question that ought to make it exceedingly popular amongst all sections of politicians, and that is its freedom from all party character. What it seeks to promote is not party aggrandisement or power; its privileges and blessings will be participated in by all classes; its aim is national, and ought therefore to receive the hearty and unflinching support of all parties who desire to extend electoral purity, and advance the cause of good government throughout the world.

The objections which have been raised against the ballot have been of such a flimsy and paltry kind as almost to render them unworthy of notice. For instance, we hear from some that now

well worn out theory, that it is un-English; in what respect it is un-English, the promoters of this idea have as yet failed to teach us. I presume the great thing which they wish to enforce is, that it will rob the voter of that spirit of independence and loyal adhesion to those free institutions which we, as Englishmen, prize so much. Now I confess for my own part that if the present system of voting was in no way tampered with, but allowed to take its general course, that there would probably not be so much to complain of, but when we see such gross advantage is taken of the present system, and that it is abused by men of influence and position, we say that a remedy for such a state of things is anything but un-English, being in fact only an act of justice to those who are empowered to exercise the franchise.

Now that we have so large an increase on the register of voters, it is nothing but an imperative duty on the part of the legislature to protect the voter from those unmanly and outrageous influences which have been set on foot by those who, looking at their position and education, ought to know better. Better, almost, had the franchise not been extended, if the shelter which the ballot affords is not to be conceded to the masses. It only opens a finer field for those individuals who appear never so happy as when up to their eyes in political corruption; it extends the area over which these men can pursue their terrible work, and it is in reality almost a premium on those whose business seems to be to mislead public opinion, and degrade the holders of the suffrage to the level of the brute creation.

The blessings which will result if the ballot becomes law, cannot, I think, be easily overrated; instead of the rioting, blackguardism, and revolting scenes which are now carried on at our elections, we shall have a peaceable, quiet, and civilized state of things. Our colonies have given it a trial, and have found it to work well; our neighbours, too, on the Continent and the other side of the Atlantic, have no fault to find with it, and why, then, in the name of common sense, should we not give the ballot a fair trial? The only party who seem to be afraid of it are the upper classes; they know full well it will swamp that power which they exert so unsparingly at the present time, and of course are naturally very jealous as to the change proposed for taking this undue influence out of their hands. Not that I would for one moment say that the ballot will cure all the evils complained of, but what I say is that it will act as the forerunner of more perfect systems to be worked out in the future, which will have the effect of crushing out tyranny and despotism in all its forms.

I am rejoiced to see public opinion is beginning to change on this question. Statesmen, who were accustomed to look at it with an eye of suspicion, are now earnest advocates of the movement. The press has come out manfully in its defence, and with all these mighty agencies, I have little fear but that success will attend our efforts in the end. Let us labour on, toil on, till we see this move-

ment in a flourishing and growing condition. We need *more* sympathy and co-operation than we have as yet had. Let it be our ambition, so far as in our power lies, to beat back the prejudices of the people, and set public opinion right on this question. If we do this, it will not only be honouring ourselves, but conferring a blessing on the community at large.

ROWLAND HILL.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

MEN who are interested in political matters are tolerably well acquainted with elections, their modes of procedure, their results, and their accompanying evils and benefits. It must be patent to any one, who has given any attention to the subject, that our elections for some time past have not been conducted in the most creditable manner to all parties concerned. It is therefore thought desirable by many persons to change the mode of election from an open vote to a secret vote, or, in other words, to a vote by ballot; and such a change demands, we believe, the most serious consideration. A vote is supposed to be an expression of a political opinion, each man being supposed to vote for the candidate who most accurately represents his own views and desires. But it has been found that there are men so devoid of principle, so lost to all moral responsibility, as to be willing to sell their vote to the highest bidder; it has been found that there are other men, wealthy, intelligent, highly educated men, men who are accounted respectable by society, who are mean enough to offer them payment for their vote; and it has also been found that these purchasers of influence, knowing that their return to parliament is owing to the weight of their gold, and not to the soundness and appreciation of their principles, can take their seat as honest men, in an assembly of gentlemen, as the political representatives of their constituents. Now, will the introduction of the ballot tend, in any way, to effect a change in such a disgraceful state of affairs? We believe it will. It has also come to light that there are large and influential employers of labour, who are in the habit of dismissing from their employment men who are conscientious enough to give a clear, honest, and open expression, by vote, to their views, and that there are old country squires who scruple not to turn away from their homes poor but truth-revering tenants, for no greater or other crime than voting on the opposite side to that on which their landlord has taken his stand. Now we do submit that these are serious wrongs and evils: we do believe that the time has come when we should make an attempt to remove them, and believing that the ballot would accomplish that end, we think it advisable that it should be introduced as early as possible.

The granting of vote by ballot would prove beneficial in many ways. Bribery would be abolished, for it is hardly probable that a man would risk giving a bribe when he would have no security that it had answered his purpose, and it certainly is a temptation to men

who are, or rather who suppose themselves to be, totally uninterested in the government of the country, and who may be sorely in need of a little pecuniary help, to take a bribe; and just for that reason is it so mischievous. The very men who need to be taught the value of a vote, and the duty of voting conscientiously, are the very men most affected by bribery, men generally of a very limited education, and although it would be far better to teach a man to be honest than to prevent him from being dishonest, it has been found impossible to do so at once, and the next best course at present is to remove the temptation from his reach. Such men might then be induced to give their vote for other than mercenary reasons; in fact, I feel certain that in many cases they would.

Nor is intimidation a less evil than bribery,—perhaps greater; for a man is entirely a voluntary agent in accepting a bribe, but an involuntary one in accepting his master's or his landlord's decision, and the ballot would remove this evil also. The large number of voters in comparatively humble circumstances that now exist, and especially the lately enfranchised, require some protection from this tyranny exercised by the upper classes. It is unjust, if not a contradiction in terms, to give a man a privilege which places him in a worse position, in some respects, than he was prior to its possession. All that is required from the voter is an expression, in some form or other, of his political principles; we simply wish to know what man or men, from a certain number, he considers best adapted to promote the interests of the nation. The ballot would supply all that, and would afford no scope for the monstrous evils that accompany the present system. I do not say that the ballot would be preferable to open voting were society as it should be, but I consider that it would be an improvement on the latter plan, taking society as it is. G. M. S. very truly says, "Legislators should always frame laws for society as it exists;" to legislate for society as it ought to be would be an absurdity. God Himself, in the government of the world, took man as he was, and worked in an upward direction. Contrast the old dispensation with the new, the dispensation of Christ with that of the Spirit. The whole course has been educational, from the material to the spiritual. It began with sacrifices, altars, and laws; its climax was Spirit. To the patriarchs of old, the writings of John, and the apostolic letters of Paul, would have been a sealed book, and the age of the Spirit needs no stone altars, or codes of laws; we have grown out of them, as a child grows out of the "shalts" and the "shalt nots" of his younger years, and frames his later life from the dictates of his own conscience. The ballot is well adapted, we believe, for the present time; but if we can so grow as to be, in the future, independent of it, it can be discarded for something more applicable.

By its introduction the expense of elections would be considerably diminished, and the less money used in all undertakings of that nature the better. The disorderly proceedings which have taken place at so many elections, would be, to a very great extent,

probably altogether, done away with, and the serious accidents which occurred at the late one, the hindrance to business, the great inconvenience to which all classes of people were put in the towns in which the excitement was most intense, ought to be an argument at least worthy of consideration for the adoption of the ballot now. The result of the late trial of the ballot at Manchester was very favourable. No man passing through the city would have known that anything different from ordinary was taking place. The voter entered and left the room as quietly and comfortably as though he were taking his customary visit to the Stock Exchange, laying a check before his banker's clerk, or taking his place in the work-room. No policemen were marshalled round the city, no wounded men were carried to the hospitals or dispensaries.

By the adoption of the ballot now, we should also have a speedy termination to the system of canvassing, a system which, although useful in many ways, is fraught with much mischief, and open to many serious objections. It may not be out of place to mention here a scheme suggested by a Huddersfield gentleman in one of the north of England newspapers. It was as follows:—The polling-booth shall be divided into three compartments, two shall be occupied by the clerks, &c., who shall attend to the voter's qualifications, check off the books, &c. The voter having passed successfully through these rooms, shall present himself in the third. We will suppose five candidates are in the field, out of whom two are to be chosen in this room; there shall be, therefore, two rows of five self-registering turnstiles, each turnstile representing a candidate, the second row corresponding with the first. The voter shall pass through the stile in the first row representing one of his chosen candidates, and likewise pass through the stile in the second row which represents the other, and then retire by a door at the further end of the room. A few gentlemen pledged to secrecy shall be in the room, and allow only one man in at a time. Such is the plan, and although perhaps capable of a little alteration, is, at any rate, worthy of consideration. It possesses many points of recommendation, and is extremely simple; and although only one man could be in the room at once, inasmuch as he would have merely to walk through it, the process could be conducted at a very tolerable speed, and in principle it is the same as the ballot.

Many objections have been raised against the adoption of the ballot. It is, for example, said to be un-English. G. M. S. says, "Let the people have the machinery whereby they can vote according to their own sense of duty, even though insulted by statements that the ballot is unmanly and un-British," and "Philomathes" says, "I do not contend that secret voting is un-English, though that might be maintained;" and what if it were maintained, and even what if it were true? Have we got all the world's good in this little isle called Great Britain? Decide all new suggestions by the question, "Is it English?" discarding those that are not, and where should we be in fifty years' time? In a very similar

position, I ween, to what we are at present. Would it not be a nobler and a better thing to ask, Is it right? is it just? is it desirable? would it be an improvement? If France, or Austria, or America can offer us any good suggestion, or any improvement on our present methods of working, let us accept the suggestion, and thank our benefactors, and entirely forget such a miserably sectarian cry as "It is un-English, we won't have it;" and as to being unmanly, I fail to see anything very childish or very effeminate about it.

A great deal has been talked and written in reference to the moral or immoral effects of secret voting and secret doings in general. "Philomathes," in a declamatory article in the January number, says, "Everything having virtue in it becomes depraved when darkness is allowed to shield its deeds from the public eye." Does it, really? I cannot believe that Christ taught men the road to depravity, yet I do believe that He once said, "When thou prayest, enter into thy closet;" and as "R. D. Robjont" has reminded "Philomathes," the same teacher, the only one that never erred, did tell men that when they gave alms, their left hand was not to know what their right hand did. Darkness may serve as a cover for a wrong deed, but that is no fault of the darkness. If a man preconceive an evil action, and wait for the darkness that he may carry out his designs, there cannot be any virtue in it to become depraved, the thing is depraved from the commencement. I have thought the matter carefully over, but I do not see anything depraving in a vote by ballot. "Philomathes" says, "If we had vote by ballot we should have no public opinion, we should have only a dark and secret consistory issuing its edicts as to the persons who are to conduct public business." But would not the "dark and secret consistory" be the public, and would not the "edicts" be an expression of the opinion of the public? Instead of preventing an expression of public opinion, the ballot would be the means of giving a truer expression of opinion than has yet been given, because the causes would be removed which now pervert such an expression.

"Philomathes" says, "What shall we think of the proposal to transform our entire elections into a hole-and-corner proceeding, a huge hypocrisy, in which the foundations of the State might be undermined in the dark, and no means of checking the evil could be adopted, because its agents worked in secret, and had acquired the irresponsibility of being unknown?" A terribly distressful picture! But for our part, we do not see the necessity of passing any opinion on such an awful contingency, for the simple reason that we have not yet had any intimation of such an one. The same writer says, "To supply opportunity to hypocrisy is unwise, and secret voting would have a direct tendency to do so." H. S. S. in the February number says, "The granting of the ballot seems to me as if it would be the legitimization of hypocrisy . . . would it be advisable to legalize hypocrisy and deception, and give the legal right to promise the vote, and then secretly despise the pro-

mise? . . . I beseech them (Government) to pause before they consecrate concealment deceit, hypocrisy, and suspicion, and make an election demoralizing to the very inner life of the soul." Now as to this question of hypocrisy, I cannot see why the ballot system should make one single hypocrite. Would a man who had not sufficient honour and truth in him to pursue one straightforward course, be very particular about whom he voted for? I think not. Where is the necessity, what reason is there, for all this hypocrisy that we hear about? Could not a man "promise a vote," "secretly despise the promise," and vote on the contrary side for which it was promised, quite as easily under the open vote system as the secret vote system? The only difference would be that in the one case his falsity would be known, in the other case it would not, the question of hypocrisy remaining untouched; and even did his fellow-creatures not know of it, a higher retribution would await him, and we can form but poor opinions here of each other. Does it not occur to "Philomathes" and H. S. S., that a man might promise a liberal vote and give a liberal vote, and yet be a hypocrite all the while? It is not merely the promising of a certain vote and giving it that makes a man honest. A thief could do that. I cannot see how the safety of the State, or the morality of the country, would be endangered by the adoption of the ballot. The end of the election would be gained, gained in a manner free from the abuses that now exist, and gained, I imagine, much more truthfully than at present. H. S. S. says, "The whole question is one of relative villany . . . Purity of election is not to be gained by impurity of moral feeling." Certainly not; but why "impurity of moral feeling," or why "demoralizing to the very inner life of the soul?" I fully believe that a man could go to the poll, and come away, feeling none the worse so far as morality is concerned.

In fact, the more I study the question, the more do I feel the necessity of an immediate adoption of the ballot,—the deeper am I convinced of the utter futility of the arguments of its opponents; and although granting the fact, that were society as it should be, open voting would be far preferable, inasmuch as it is not, I consider the adoption of the ballot as most expedient and desirable; meanwhile, let us look forward to the day, which we shall gladly welcome, when honesty and rectitude shall take the place of the distrust between man and man which now fills the hearts of so many.

H. S.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

IF we can show that voting by ballot is ineffectual to accomplish the end for which it is desired, that it is not necessary, that it is not desirable, and that it would be injurious to the morals of voters, we shall effectually establish the negative of the question before us, and evince that we ought *not* to have the ballot *now*, as that which is not at any time either necessary, desirable, beneficial, or promotive of the object at which it aims, cannot be that which we ought to have *now*.

Voting by ballot would not accomplish the end for which it is intended. This system of voting could not of itself conceal the sentiments of voters. A frank and hearty political agitation cannot be carried on without those sentiments to which a man inclines becoming known. A real keeping of the secret could not be maintained without restraining in some form or other the expression of political opinion. The ballot is extolled as a sovereign remedy for bribery and intimidation, yet it would not be possible for the secret system of voting to close the eyes of a landlord to the act of his tenant, or to shut the eyes of the best customers of a tradesman to the way in which the tradesman voted. On this point we will quote the very appropriate remarks of the late Sidney Smith:—"The single lie on the hustings would not suffice; the concealed democrat who voted against his landlord must talk to the wrong people, subscribe to the wrong club, huzza at the wrong dinner, break the wrong head (if he wished to escape from the watchful eye of his landlord), lead a long life of lies between every election; and he must do this, not only *cundo*, in his calm and prudential state, but *redundo* from the market, warmed with beer and expanded with alcohol. And he must not only carry out his seven years' dissimulation before the world, but in the very bosom of his family, or he must expose himself to the dangerous garrulity of wife, children, and servants, from whose indiscretion every kind of evil report would be carried to the ear of the watchful steward." As, then, the ballot would be ineffectual for the accomplishing of that at which it aims, why should we have it at all, and most of all *now*?

Again, with personal canvassing the ballot itself would not ensure purity of election. As long as candidates and their agents are allowed to go round about among the voters in the various constituencies, and to hold special private interviews with each elector, we shall not be safe from bribery and corruption. If it be simply desired to hide this eyesore in our constitutional system—if we want to cover it up from view, and make it impossible for any one to say whether it still exists or not—let voting by ballot be adopted, which will secure the voter from responsibility to the community, and at the same time leave him open to personal solicitation for the solemn promise of his vote, or to personal promise of a reward if a certain candidate wins. What is needed instead of the ballot is the most stringent preventives and correctives of any possible intimidation, or any interference with the honest expression of the voter's opinion. The recent election trials have shown that it is the paid agents and canvassers who carry on the bribery and intimidation, and that this is done often without the knowledge of the candidates. Then let personal canvassing be altogether abolished; let candidates appeal to the constituencies only through the various agencies of the press, and through public meetings; then corruption will be at once vastly diminished. But with personal canvassing, as it is carried on in our country, the ballot will

not of itself, if at all, prevent bribery. The ballot is unnecessary because a genuine Englishman does not need or desire it for his protection. We here quote some remarks lately made by the writer of a leading article in a London newspaper, on the recent voting by ballot at Manchester:—"We are quite sure that whenever we vote at an election we shall wear the colours of the man we support round our hat, and shall proclaim in every possible way that we support him, and advise others to do the same. At Manchester on this occasion many of the electors spoke freely of the way in which they were to vote or had voted, and declared that they wanted no protection. We are much mistaken in our estimate of the character of our countrymen if ninety-nine out of every hundred Englishmen would not in practice follow the example of those Manchester voters by the ballot, who said that they would vote as they chose, whoever saw them."

The ballot is not desirable, because there is greatly needed a reverence for public opinion strong enough to keep all persons of every class and position from daring to interfere with its development in the fullest, freest, and most honourable way. This reverence for public opinion voting by ballot would not foster, but discourage. The benefits of publicity in Parliament and in our courts of law, which are easily to be discerned, show that the ballot is not desirable; it is, indeed, contrary to the spirit of the English constitution. In the House of Commons, which is the real legislative power of the country, the practice is open debating and open voting. There is no screen behind which the voter or speaker can skulk to hide from the public the course he pursues. The ballot is contrary to the practice of the English in all the ramifications of public duties; for justice, whether it be in criminal or civil cases, is administered openly, and thus honesty and impartiality are fostered, while many evils are prevented.

Voting by ballot would be injurious, because the consciousness of the secrecy of this mode of voting would afford voters of a certain character a very favourable opening for doing that which they would be ashamed to do publicly, enabling them to indulge revenge or some personal pique without its being known to others, also furnishing them with the means of gratifying personal rivalry or promoting personal interests in the same secret manner, and all of which by means of the ballot a voter could do in contradiction to his open professions. Opportunities for evil doing are often the occasion of temptations to do evil. Temptations to evil are exceedingly likely to be yielded to, and each commission of evil makes it easier to commit that evil again by strengthening the habit of it, while the removal of opportunities for evil doing is oftentimes the removal of temptation, or if temptation be presented, the means are wanting for acting in accordance with it. We hold, therefore, that voting by ballot would be injurious to the morals of voters by tempting them to gratify selfishness, malice, rivalry, prejudice, and other evils, and that the necessity of voting openly is a benefit.

Further, voting by ballot would prevent the exposure of such as vote contrary to promise. Even under our present system of open voting some give their votes to other candidates than those for whom they had promised to vote. At the last election more than one case was known to us of a voter promising his vote to each of the two opposing candidates. Now while we know that such iniquity is perpetrated in the light of day, what may we not believe would be transacted under the cover of the darkness which would be furnished by the ballot? The ballot would therefore be injurious by giving an opportunity for deceit and lies to be practised without the practice of these gross evils becoming known.

Voting by ballot would be to a great extent an abolition of manliness, and of the sense of personal honesty. It would be an encouragement of moral cowardice and of the fear of man, which are necessarily debasing. Besides, cowardice in one matter has a tendency to induce it in other matters; and slavery is not a condition into which it is desirable that the people of England should be brought; on the contrary, it is very desirable that they should be free, bold, magnanimous, and honest. As, then, voting by ballot would be ineffectual to accomplish the end for which it is desired, as it is neither necessary nor desirable, and as it would be injurious to the morals of voters, we ought not to have the ballot, either now or at any other time. S. S.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

I HAVE seen no argument in opposition to the ballot so plain, so forcible, so explicit, and so radical, as that which the Hon. Mr. John Bright gave expression to, in his address to the Associated Chambers of Commerce, on 24th February last. We quote these wise and impressive words:—

“I hold that in a free country every man is a legislator, and that it requires the greatest vigilance in a free country—and of course infinitely more vigilance in a free country than in any other, though in any other vigilance is almost of no use—on the part of every man to see that every opinion, his own and his neighbour's, be represented, in order that right opinion may affect the legislature, and may find its embodiment in rightful and just measures.”

This is the right and proper view to take of voting. It is legislation in embryo. It is supplying the Sovereign of the land with advice and counsel, and “the faithful Commons” to whom she appeals are in reality the holders of the franchise. Every exercise of the suffrage at an election is truly an exercise of the subject's duty and right to give to the best of his power such advice to the occupant of the throne as may tend to the stability of the kingdom, and the prosperity of the realm. The electors are the true body-guard of the sovereign's throne; and the vote if given wrongfully is an act of treason against the good government of the country. It is a responsibility put in each man's hand to be exercised not according to his interests, but according to his judg-

ment. It is not a personal perquisite or a royal donative; it is a national duty delegated to him, to be truly and faithfully performed for behoof of the nation, as an act of loyalty and fealty, of trustworthiness and of honourable dealing.

The disposal of a vote is not a case of "cannot a man do what he likes with his own?" The vote is not his own as an individual, but as an agent, bound to use his best judgment and interest on behalf of the general good in part entrusted to him. This is the reason why "the duty of voting, like every other public duty, ought to be performed under the eye and criticism of the public, every one of whom has not only an interest in its performance, but a good title to consider himself wronged if it is performed otherwise than honestly and carefully." In our day "the mischievous power of the *few* over the *many* is decreasing;" and as that power which the many can exercise grows in applicability, the bribery, intimidation, and undue influence which now occurs at elections must decrease. The hope of our country is in the spread of the principle of this Magazine, that every question should be impartially discussed, that every opinion should have utterance and representation, and that the interests of men and nations can never fail when due and diligent search is made for truth. We have both the coercion of the few and the selfishness and the selfish partialities of the many to guard against at elections; and therefore it is that we must, as far as possible, have the suffrage exercised so as to require a reasoned and reasonable motive in its exercise.

Every action of man's life is to be regulated by a sense of responsibility. Man is not made to gain his ends in private, and to perform his duties in secret. Man is expressly formed to be a social creature; and it is a distinct part of this sociality of being that man should act openly from a sense of right. The advocates of the ballot all speak of the relief it would give from bribery, intimidation, and undue influences; have they reflected fully on the terrible consequences which may happen if we give men a release from the sense of shame? Now if a man is known to hold opinions of a particular sort (and few can keep their opinions—if they have any—so carefully concealed but that those who work beside, reside near, or associate with them, do not know pretty well how they incline), and then is seen and known to have given his vote to another, he feels that he has occasion either to feel shame and self-reproach, and he is anxious to plead off on some ground from the responsibility he felt himself under. This sense of shame and feeling of social accountability may be a low motive, but it is a heaven-implanted one, intended to restrain us from doing conscious wrong without consideration for the natural expectations, hopes, and interests of others. If shameless corruption is the strongest expression we can employ concerning bribery and influence, does it not imply that there is much power in the sense of shame to make it so deep a reproach to have been wanting in it?

Well, then, we are justified in asking our opponents if they have

properly considered the question in this light—that shameless corruption even now occasionally occurs at elections; but if the secret vote enabled those who were corrupted, bribed, intimidated, or influenced, to do their evil deed in darkness and concealment, would not a powerful restraint upon human action be withdrawn through the institution of the ballot? Would not a strong stimulant to do right be withdrawn from active operation among men by the possibility of secret voting? To make that which even now is shameful to all but the most depraved, demoralized, or ignorant—namely, the giving of an unconscientious vote—shameless in its being unseen and unnoted, would not surely be likely to heighten the moral nature of man.

This shamelessness is, by the hypothesis of the ballot, always assumed *sub silentio* as a good thing. For the ballot is nought if it is not meant thereby to provide a facility for giving a vote otherwise than the voter, in some way or other, has led the social community among whom he lives to expect from him. It is even sometimes boldly assumed that a man should be so doubly shameless as to take a bribe, and then record his vote against the person in whose behalf the bribe was given, as a species of revenge for the (taken) bribe.

We know that in every secret corporation there is an amount of shamelessness which cannot bear the light. All the legislation of this reformed age has been to bring corruption to the light, that it may be scathed, scotched, and, if possible, slain. All the investigations into the abuses of the Irish Church, Endowed Schools, Admiralty and Navy departments, &c., have shown that in secrecy there is danger; in publicity, safety. We say this, though we have read “R. D. Robjont’s” sophistic reference to the secrecy enjoined in Scripture, in which reference he has ingeniously, not ingenuously, forgotten to supplement by reminding his readers that they are to let their (good deeds) light so shine before men, that they may take knowledge thereof; and that it is enjoined in the same Book that we should be living epistles, seen and known of all men. Any step in legislation which would lead us back to the dark ages of secrecy ought to be resisted. Those who have read the history of the newspaper press, and the great obstacles thrown in the way of the nation in getting publicity given to the proceedings of the House of Commons—the difficulties, the prosecutions, and the tact required to bring about the state of things with which we are so familiar,—will not be anxious to reinstate the days of secret voting, when it was a breach of the privileges of the House to report any matter that took place within its walls.

Let us now set ourselves honestly and resolutely to secure the absolute freedom of the voter, by punishing with severity and certainty every one who endeavours, by any other means than suasion, to influence a voter. Let it be seen we are in earnest, and the genuine freedom of man will be secured, when the thoughts of man are free, and his right to vote is as secured to him by law as

his duty to pay taxes or give obedience. Let the penalties of the law be such as shall degrade the rich briber and intimidator, as well as the rascally seller of his country's prosperity. Let it be distinctly understood that the vote is not a piece of personal property, to be used, sold, or neglected, as a man pleases; but that it is a national tax on a man's intelligence, honesty, and honour, which he is bound to pay to the utmost, and that any one who seeks illegally to possess himself of it is a traitor to the nation, a rogue and a vagabond in the eye of the law, and to be dealt with accordingly, whether he be duke, earl, agent, or friend. The nation's right, and not the voter's privilege, is at stake. The nation claims an intelligent and honest deliverance upon the fitness of candidates to fulfil certain duties. Every man who helps to put a wrong man in the Commons House of Parliament is a traitor; for every voter is virtually a legislator and an adviser of the sovereign, and ought to give his vote with as high a sense of responsibility as he would tender his advice to the august personage who asks her faithful Commons to supply it.

J. S. M.

THE FATHER OF MR. GLADSTONE.—When John was just of age he was sent by his father to Liverpool, to sell a cargo of grain which had arrived at that port. He so attracted the attention of a leading corn merchant there, that the latter earnestly entreated his father to let his son settle at that port. After sundry negotiations, the result was the formation of the firm of Corrie, Gladstone, and Bradshaw, corn merchants, Mr. Corrie taking the two latter young men into partnership. The firm had hardly existed two years ere its stability was very sorely tried. There came a general failure of the corn crops throughout Europe. Mr. Corrie at once despatched his junior partner, Mr. Gladstone, to the United States to buy grain. John Gladstone was then about twenty-four years of age. Having the needful letters of credit, he started upon a mission of which the parties to it entertained the most sanguine hopes. On reaching America he found that the corn crops had failed there also, and that there was not a single bushel to be procured. To his dismay, by the next advices which he received from England, he was informed that some twenty-four large vessels had been chartered to bring home the grain which he was supposed to have bought. The situation was most perilous, and it seemed that the prospects of so young a man were fairly shipwrecked; indeed, when the news became known at Liverpool, it was considered impossible for the house to recover the shock arising from so many vessels returning in ballast instead of bearing the cargoes which they had been chartered to convey. Corrie and Co. were therefore regarded as a doomed house, and the deepest commiseration was felt for the young absent partner, while the senior was blamed for his precipitancy. But young Gladstone, though strongly impressed with the difficulties of the position in which he found himself, maintained unimpaired his courage and presence of mind. He sought every means by which to lighten, if not to avert the blow. By careful examination of price lists, by ascertaining what procurable products would best suit the English market, he succeeded, without waste of time, in filling the holds of all the vessels. And when all was sold and realised, the net loss on the large transaction of the house hardly exceeded £500. From that time John Gladstone became a marked man on the Liverpool Exchange and in the English commercial world.—*Life of Gladstone, by M'Gibbon, Esq.*

Literature.

ARE PROVERBS WORTH STUDYING?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

THE study of proverbs is the study of man. To closely investigate these gems of fancy is to look at nations and individuals in their every-day garb as well as holiday dress, to pry into their houses, to watch them at their various occupations, to understand their ways of living, to probe the thoughts and designs which actuated their ever-changing actions. Proverbs are, as it were, sun-drawn portraits of the manners and customs of bygone ages, and the value of them is as far above ordinary tradition as the verbiage of an ordinary talker is below the smart conversation of one whose mouth opens but to let slip some sparkling epigram. Disraeli the elder has likened proverbs to antique furniture, and all must admit the aptness of the simile. Stout of limb, wood well chosen and seasoned, exhibiting to-day the finest polish, curiously carved by the master-hand of an artist—these are the characteristics which strike at once the eye on beholding a relic of the far long ago. Look a little closer, examine more minutely, and the play of fancy exhibited in its workmanship strikes but to charm, whilst its fitness for the many-headed necessities of life fills the eye with admiration. Such and so various are the beauties and uses to be discerned in these five-word sentences, bequeathed by successive generations to us.

Doubtless in the primitive ages proverbs served as the alphabet of morals, and were handed down from father to son, as embodying the secret of life. Many, too, of the ancient saws reveal to us that there was wrapt up in them methods peculiar to a particular family, working a particular trade. Thus it became quite a profession to decipher these strange-looking, tersely worded expressions. Solomon claimed a place among the wise for understanding a proverb and the interpretation thereof, and doubtless with an intent to prove to the world that in the highest art of writing he himself penned those marvellous paragraphs, which contain within them materials for endless reflection. Would that all writers of the present day were as fond and as capable of condensing as the proverb-making king! Strength consists in the selection of materials, it is true; but there ought also to be no superabundance to obtain any required result. Good sense, then, and a habit of speaking laconically, are the two essentials to the formation of a proverb. The

former, though not numbered among the sciences, is, as one of our poets has justly observed, worth all the seven. The barren superfluity of words, the curse and bane of modern writing, needs no condemnation here. Many recent volumes may indeed be considered as mere expansions of what has been far better exemplified by proverbs. As we have before observed, proverbs are known to be of very ancient origin. So large was their number in the time of Aristotle, that he considered them to be the wrecks of an ancient philosophy, saved from general ruin by their elegant, curious, and compact form. Plato loved them, and frequently used them. The unbounded admiration which he felt for them found utterance in the words, "The ability of uttering such sentences is the province of a man perfectly learned;" and the whole wisdom of the seven sages he declared to be summed up in the short sentences spoken by each. We shall not, therefore, be surprised to find that he greatly admired the Lacedæmonians, and awarded them the palm for wisdom over their contemporaries, and this chiefly on account of their laconic style of conversation.

Two of the greatest men of ancient times, therefore, were satisfied as to the value of proverbs. If we look to modern times, and enumerate those who have dearly loved them, we shall perceive that many have been considered wise in their generation. A man who searches diligently (prying into odd corners, removing cobwebs from many dusty tomes), expending time, labour, and money, must have an affection for the object of his search. Such love was manifested by Cicero, Bacon, Erasmus, Scaliger, Fuller, Herbert, Grose, Heywood.

The age of proverbs with us seems to have been in the time of Elizabeth and James I. Then it was the fashion to adorn articles of furniture with proverbs; thus a husband was reminded of his lordly duty by seeing presented to his gaze on his trencher, "The calmest husbands make the stormiest wives." At this period of the history of proverbs it was of frequent occurrence for statesmen to discourse in proverbs; and, as we know full well, the business of the country was not quite neglected, though fewer words were spoken. A lesson in this respect would be worth learning in the present day, when the House is almost stifled by its own words, and people are oft heard muttering, "Empty vessels make the greatest sound."

Proverbs, when looked carefully into, are as full of wonders (and to the kindred spirit they will assuredly reveal their treasures) as the magic mirror of the astrologers; but, unlike the visions disclosed by the latter, that which they disclose may be entirely relied upon by a competent beholder. The weathercock never more truly determined the direction of the wind than does the proverb, "Better be the head of a dog than the tail of a lion" point to the period when English yeomen strove for the place of honour at Crecy and Poitiers. Is there no trait in the following, "Nits will be lice," to help you to trace its origin? Surely it must come

from a vigorous mint, rude but penetrating; the mind which gave utterance to it would certainly know how to prevent possible opposition developing itself. It bears the stamp of Cromwell. Are there no lessons to be learnt from the fact that many proverbs have their cognates in many tongues? Who could doubt the state in which a country must have been, when it was commonly said, "What Christ takes not, the exchequer carries away?" and so we look to Spain to own this proverb. There are one or two proverbs that would well be worth the attention of people of the present day. One of these, taken from a very modern collection, made by one of the most pleasant philosophers of the age, the author of that charming book, "Friends in Council," seems peculiarly suitable. "Make the four salutations to a friend every day," if taken to heart by the many, might perhaps persuade the few to show as much deference to the feelings of friends as is usually accorded to strangers. Parents, about to select a book for their darling boy, would doubtless be more careful in their choice, had they learnt to appreciate the truth of the wisdom expressed by "Fools and children should not see half-finished work." A sadness creeps over the spirit when the head is obliged to allow the correctness of the following, when the decisions and operations of various public bodies are weighed and judged,—"Everybody's business is nobody's."

Proverbs may be divided into many classes;—those relating to trade; those casting light upon manners; those giving indications of a particular phase in morals. Some are serious almost to sadness; some brimming over with fun; others almost burn with the suppressed fire of sarcasm.

Amongst trade proverbs we may notice—

He steals a sheep, and gives away the trotters.

He has more business than English ovens at Christmas.

Small fish are better than none.

Some people seem to be starched before they are washed.

Those who will not be ruled by the rudder must be ruled by the rock.

In a calm sea every man is a pilot.

These have long been standard examples of this kind of proverb, and are full of ripe wisdom, which doubtless will fit themselves to the experiences of many. There are some, however, which are not so well known as those which have just been mentioned:—

Two to the ear, one to the tongue.

One never gets fat at Promise All's table.

Truth, like "Adam pure," goes naked.

To poison friendship, jest with your friend.

"I heard" is not as good as "I saw."

"Consider all" should have a long life.

Though an ass ceaseth to bray, yet turneth he not wise.

Each day of our lives many of us utter great truths, which, however, pass unregarded, simply from the want of being attired in a tighter fitting, more elegant dress. Coming forth unheeded, like

marble from the quarry, our thoughts, put into the form of a proverb, become changed, and the inherent beauties appear; and, like the stone in the hands of the polisher, display their peculiar characteristics of colour, cloud, and spot. Perhaps this will appear more clear in the following quotation:—"Hardly any original thoughts on mental or social subjects ever make their way among mankind, or assume their proper importance in the minds even of their inventors, until aptly selected words or phrases have, as it were, nailed them down and held them fast." And herein lies the great lesson to be learnt from proverbs—concentration; concentration in writing, in speaking, in the way of living. To know the want of it in one particular way, walk but into the various rooms of an ordinary dwelling, and candidly answer if it is not more like a museum of curious, useless disfigurements. Here, then, is a clear want of that concentration which lessens labour, and consequently promises leisure.

Let us look just for a moment at the ordinary reasons adduced for pooh-poohing proverbs. Lord Chesterfield, to whom all proverb-haters refer, observes that a man of fashion never has recourse to proverbs and vulgar aphorisms. The secret to the whole lies in the word vulgar. Proverbs are used by the common people; and therefore, forsooth, unfit for the mouth of the elegant Lord Chesterfield and those who follow in his train.

Ah! "more servants wait on man than he'll take notice of." Like the daisies, which the exquisite treads under foot in his spring-time walks, totally regardless of their wondrous beauty, so it is with proverbs; he passes them by with just a look, muttering, "Too common for me." But whilst regarding the truth that "expression is the clothing of thought," and that its reception with the world depends as much upon this as a man's does upon the coat he wears, it behoves us to remember that there is danger in trusting too much to a prepossessing exterior. Any one who has inspected the rank and file of proverbs must be aware that all do not prove genuine soldiers. Discrimination, then, is necessary, and to the true student that task is of material benefit. Great care must doubtless be taken, for "a clear stream oft appears shallow;" and though all may desire to be rid of the chaff, yet the grain is too golden to be idly sacrificed. The approach of error must, however, be narrowly watched for; for, as Bacon says, "the apotheosis of error is the greatest evil of all; and when folly is worshipped, it is, as it were, a plague-spot upon the understanding." Granting, therefore, the point that all proverbs are not so full of wisdom as to be in danger of that precious material oozing out on all sides, we would hint to our antagonists, though one boiler burst, all boilers are not condemned. Old Hesiod had a proverb which in some degree may be made to apply in this case, "The half is greater than the whole." What a homily is wrapt up in those seven words!

A. J. G.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

It is curious how, when people get hold of a proverb, a pat quotation, a pet notion, they hold it and hold to it. Proverbs have been spoken of as—

“Jewels five words long,
That on the stretched forefinger of all time
Sparkle for ever.”

A very pretty but altogether truthless and fanciful notion. It has no ground at all except by the personification of time as a bejewelled dandy, showing off the glittering baubles which adorn his ostentatiously exhibited digit. It is quite as inaccurate in its allusion to the length of a proverb as in regard to its brilliancy and its eternity. Altogether it is a misleading metaphor, and bears nothing at all upon the real argument.

We are told by E. A. that in “the divine book Proverbs, the words of the wise have been gathered together under the sanction and inspiration of the Spirit” (p. 30). But this is a mere *ad captandum* argument. E. A. did not expect the readers of the *British Controversialist* to deny that the Book of Proverbs is worth studying, and he congratulated himself too soon and too surely, it would seem, on an easy victory. He did not expect, we hope, that any of his readers would be deceived—unless he was calculating on the proverbial *Vulgus vult decipi; et decipiuntur*—by the transparent fallacy. The Book of Proverbs is a part of the Word of God. Every part of the Book of God is with studying, and therefore Proverbs are worthy of study. For we do most explicitly deny the truth of the proverb being the voice of the people—as “H. W., jun.,” quotes (p. 117)—being the voice of God,* besides denying the convertibility of the Book of Proverbs in Scripture into proverbs of every nation, kingdom and locality. The voice of the people is exactly that which all knowledge and religion has been for many, if not all ages been engaged in setting right and bringing nearer to divine wisdom, and the proverbs of the Scriptures are given in a book, and as a whole, not in disjointed and unsifted individuality and isolation. With all respect to E. A., we apprehend that this argument of his does not stand the test of investigation, and must be held to be inconclusive on the point at issue.

The example of Jesus, on which he next lays stress, is, we doubt, equally invalid. It is evident on the very face of the New Testament that Jesus made use of proverbs, but we have no proof that

* “The voice of the people may be the voice of God when they rise as one man on some grand occasion for the just and necessary vindication of their rights, but it is difficult to recognise the divine origin when we hear nothing but the Babel-like hubbub of selfishness, corruption, and intrigue.”—*A. Hayward's Essays*, vol. ii., p. 148.

He studied them. He employed them as admitted terms in an argument to show that on *their own grounds* the objections taken to His divinity were disputable. He has not sanctified their use; He has only shown that it is allowable to use them against the prevalent first notions of men as a proof that they ought not at a first glance to deny that two things were incompatible one with another, because they could not think them both together as one thought. And He expressly instances the absurdity of proverbs by using two in such a way as to neutralize both, and yet to suggest the high truth of His own doctrine.

I refer now to His employment of the proverbs, "He who is not for Me is against Me," and "He who is not against Me is with Me," as indicating that the motive and the faith of men were the things which He judged by and not the outward form which an action took.

It may help to enliven this discussion if I venture to recover from the pages of an old magazine a humorous exemplification of the contradictory nature, and therefore the uselessness of proverbs. They may be read as a counteractive of the learned fooling of Dublin's Archbishop (Whately) Richard I., of the proverbialists. About Richard II. (Trench) I may have something to say hereafter. The lines proceed as follow:—

PROVERBS.

My good aunt Bridget, spite of age,
Versed in valerian, dock, and sage,
Well knew the virtues of herbs;
But proverbs gained her chief applause;
"Child," she exclaimed, "respect old saws,
And pin your faith on proverbs."

Thus taught, I dubbed my lot secure;
And, playing long-rope, "slow and sure,"
Conceived my movement clever,
When lo! an urchin by my side
Pushed me head foremost in, and cried,
"Keep moving," "Now or never."

At Melton, next, I joined the hunt,
Of bogs and bushes bore the brunt,
Nor once my courser held in;
But when I saw a yawning steep,
I thought of "Look before you leap,"
And curbed my eager gelding.

While doubtful thus I reined my roan,
Willing to save a fractured bone,
Yet fearful of exposure;
A sportsman thus my spirit stirred—
"Delays are dangerous,"—I spurred
My steed, and leaped the enclosure.

I ogled Jane, who heard me say,
 That "Rome was not built in a day,"
 When lo! Sir Fleet O'Grady
 Put this, my saw, to sea again,
 And proved, by running off with Jane,
 "Faint heart ne'er won fair lady."

Aware "new brooms sweep clean," I took
 An untaught tyro for a cook
 (The tale I tell a fact is).
 She spoilt my soup: but, when I chid,
 She thus once more my word undid,—
 "Perfection comes from practice."

Thus, out of every adage hit,
 And finding that ancestral wit
 As changeful as the clime is,
 From proverbs turning on my heel,
 I now cull wisdom from my seal,
 Whose motto's "Ne quid nimis."

Here it seems to be pretty well indicated that proverbs are double-faced, or rather are intellectual imitators of "Mr. Facing-both-ways." If you think you are doing all right by observing one proverb, pat down comes another having quite an opposite turn and meaning—and which are you to choose? If some of our believers in the worth of proverbs would just kindly make a collection of proverbs which could be depended upon, and tell us the ones which are false, though fair-seeming, perhaps we might be led to the conclusion that those proverbs were worth studying; but in the meantime they appear to us untrustworthy, and therefore unworthy: for wit or wisdom which cannot be depended on is almost as bad as having none.

When we think of the form in which proverbs appear we see at once a reason for hesitating to believe that they are worth studying, because they may be made to mean almost anything, according to the humour one is in. What is to be made of the following old Greek saws?—"War is the father of all things;" "No man can wade twice in the same stream;" "Time is a child at his sports;" "A man's character is his destiny;" "The most learned are not the wisest men;" "Men are mortal gods—gods are immortal men;" "Life is the death of gods, death their life;" "The wisest of men is an ape to the gods." Are they not incomprehensible except by putting a gloss and interpretation which they were probably never intended to bear?

I am equally at a loss to know the hive and store of wisdom laid up and preserved in the following English proverbs:—"As worthless as Grantham gruel;" "He travels with a pocket fender;" "Lips like lettuce;" "I speak by the card;" "When the devil quotes Latin the priests go to prayers;" "Have the French for

friends but not for neighbours ;" "Keep it in Pimlico ;" "The donkey means one thing, the driver another ;" "Prayer and provender never hinder a journey ;" "Every dog has his day, and a cat has two Sundays ;" "Needs must when the devil drives ;" "It is all in apple-pie order ;" "In two places at once like a bird ;" "He whistles the devil's music ;" "As jolly as sandboys ;" "You'll be married by the hangman yet ;" "He who would wish to thrive must let spiders run alive."

The foregoing are samples culled absolutely at random on turning over the pages of a book, and they are not in any way chosen from among those presented *ad aperturum libri* on the page, but are given at haphazard. I confess that to some of them I can attach a meaning. I know that I can interpret several in several different ways, and I know that some of them are worse than Icelandic Hebrew—if such a thing were possible—to me. Language was given us to reveal, not to conceal thought. If we wrap wisdom up in enigmas, or fritter it into conundrums, we may indeed have wisdom preserved in them, but how is it to be found out? We cannot all unriddle the riddle of the Sphinx ; neither can we all make out the correct and uniform sense of proverbs. I look upon the time spent in endeavouring to comprehend the meaning and application of proverbs as more useless even than the time bestowed on charades, guesses, and anagrams. They do not seem to me either to be true or amusing, and therefore I am forced to conclude that proverbs—despite Archbishop Trench and his followers who have taken part in this debate—are not worth studying. O. B.

ANECDOTE OF THEODORE HOOK.—At a certain printing-office where a work of this celebrated humorist's was being printed, there was an old compositor who went by the nickname of "Twaddle." In completing a sheet of one of Mr. Hook's novels, the copy was given out in small "takes" or portions, to each one of which the compositor's name was, as usual, appended. When the proof was sent out to the author, there appeared a line drawn down the margin of a certain page with the word "Twaddle" at the side. Mr. Hook received his proof, read it, and brought it back to the office, with the remark that, "Though he was not above criticism, he did not think the reader was quite the man to make it." The overseer sent for the reader, who explained the circumstances to the novelist. Mr. Hook heard him patiently, but was by no means satisfied with the explanation offered. "It is very ingenious of you, Mr. Reader," said he "to explain away the matter in that fashion. I have read the passage over and over again ; and though it is certainly not very brilliant, I do not think it deserves to be called twaddle !" The reader protested, and assured him that the man was so called in the office, and offered to send for him to confirm his assertion. But Theodore Hook would not be convinced. "Well, well," he observed, "I shall say no more about it ; but don't let it occur again. Twaddle, indeed !" — *Bookseller*.

Religion.

DO THE SCRIPTURES FAVOUR OR OPPOSE THE IDEA OF THE NATURAL IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

“God has bestowed—and this is the fundamental condition of the Christian doctrine of immortality—on all beings that He has formed after His own image and raised to personality, an inexhaustible power of existence; nay, so indestructible is the personal individual, that it is able to place itself, through that which is wicked, in the most enduring contradiction with itself, without at the same time compromising its existence. That the human creature can surrender itself to that which is wicked with full determination, without annihilating itself, is, in fact, one of the most powerful and most tremendous witnesses for the indestructibility of all personal existence.”—*Julius Müller.*

Is man an heir of immortality? or is he but a creature of a day, an expiring spark, lit for a moment then quenched for ever? Is he the heir of all the ages of the past only, and has he no future to look forward to except the transient futurity of time? Is the world our all in all of life, or may we anticipate another? Are we mortal only, or mortal yet immortal? If so, what a lot is that of man!

“His wandering feet life’s magic paths pursue,
And while he thinks the fair illusion true,
The trackless scenes disperse in fluid air.”

Life is a strange enigma, and death is even a stranger one. Who would think any one wise that would construct an exquisite complex, self-developing machine, able to do and execute marvels of activity and power in consequence of the concentration of a marvellous source of self-perfecting energy within it, and, at the moment when that potency which moved the entire machine had become effective and trustworthy, would dash the fine machine to dust, and disperse into nothingness the labour he had spent and the perfectedness accumulated in the motive power? How shall we reconcile to our minds the idea of One all-wise and almighty dismissing from being those cultured and marvellous minds whose thoughts, experiences, and moral condition have been the growth and toil of many years and many influences?

Even the heathen Plato formed the idea that death is not the de-

struction but the emancipation of the soul, but we are informed on good authority that "our Saviour Jesus Christ hath brought life and immortality to light through the gospel" (2 Tim. i. 10).

The doctrine of the inherent immortality of the soul commended itself to Plato as probable, and, indeed, trustworthily believable, from the idea of the impossibility of the cycle of existence being broken; from the reminiscences of the soul as indicating a life prior to that of our present one; from the unity and indivisibility of the soul; from the Socratic view of the sovereignty, and therefore the value of the soul; and from the longing after immortality dwelling in the soul. Other reasons have been assigned by Addison, namely, the nature of the soul—especially its immateriality, its passions and sentiments, and particularly its recoil from annihilation, the nature of God, who would not have implanted hopes and fears to which no reality corresponded, and the power of progressiveness in the soul. But I think that the most common reasons for believing in the immortality of the soul are not so much the immateriality of the soul as its seemingly self-potent life, its power of abstraction and ideality, and the aspirations it possesses for life in the midst of all the evidence of death that surrounds it.

The question before us, however, is not one referred to natural reason or philosophy, but calls our attention "to the law and to the testimony." We are asked to pronounce upon the thesis, "Does the Bible favour or oppose the idea of the natural immortality of the soul?" Even though—

"He the immortality of souls proclaimed,
Whom the oracles of men *the wisest* named."

it bears nothing at all upon our argument, which demands that we should produce proof from the sacred oracles that man is destined to immortal life, and was so created that eternal being was conferred on him at his first apparition in the world at the head of created things. It is a potent and important question which the poet puts:—

"And he, shall he,
Man, [God's] last work who seemed so fair,
Such splendid purpose in his eyes,
Who rolled the psalm to wintry skies,
Who built him fanes of fruitless prayer,
Who trusted God was love indeed,
And love creation's final law ;

Who loved, who suffered countless ills,
Who battled for the true, the just,
Be blown about the desert, dust,
Or sealed within the iron hills?
No more? A monster then, a dream,
A discord. Dragons of the prime
That tare each other in their slime,
Were mellow music matched with him.

Oh life as futile, then as frail!
 Oh for thy voice to soothe and bless!
 What hope of answer or redress?
 Behind the veil!—behind the veil!"

Yes; that is the right answer, there is "an anchor of the soul, both sure and steadfast, within the veil." Eternal life in the soul is most certainly the original statement of Scripture in regard to man's first estate. By the breath of God "man became a living soul," and in the early, only commandment of prohibition or of self-control uttered by the heavenly Father it is announced, "In the day thou eatest thereof" (i. e., of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil) "thou shalt surely die," a statement which involves as its conditional opposite, that so long as they refrained they would live. But this was said only of the body, as we learn from the statement on the original sentence, "Dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt return." It was his body that was formed "of the dust of the ground," and no sentence of death was pronounced in regard to anything except the bodily frame. This is temporal death, and its sentence has neither been passed upon the soul nor the spirit. Man as "a being breathing, thoughtful breath," shall fail, but the soul may certainly be regarded as deathless, and it—

"Shall flourish in immortal youth,
 Unhurt amid the war of elements,
 The wreck of matter, and the crash of worlds."

This will farther appear on a proper consideration of the nature of life in man.

It is usual for philosophical writers to content themselves with a twofold discrimination of the parts in man; as into corporeal and intellectual; but the Bible, which is "given by inspiration of God," the former of man, gives man a threefold nature. The apostle Paul, for instance, says, "I pray God your whole *spirit* and *soul* and body be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ" (1 Thess. v. 23). Again he says, "The word of God is quick and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of *soul* and *spirit*, and of the joints and marrow, and is a discernor of the thoughts and intents of the heart" (Heb. iv. 12). Here it is distinctly intimated that in the psychology of Scripture the living and thinking powers of man are held to be, in God's sight at least, twofold—really distinct from each other, but yet so really interwoven into apparent unity that divine might and skill are required to separate and disjoin them. It affirms that man possesses a rational *spirit*, animal life, and bodily frame. Nor is it only in the New Testament that we find this dispartition between sentiency and intelligency; it holds a place also in the Old Testament. Elihu says in Job xxxiv. 14, 15, "If He [God] set His heart upon man, if He gather unto Himself His *spirit* and His *breath*, all *flesh* shall perish together, and man

shall turn again into dust." So Isaiah speaks of God as "He that giveth *breath* unto the people upon it [the earth], and *spirit* to them that walk therein" (xlii. 5). Solomon says, "The *spirit* of man is the candle of the Lord;" and Elihu repeats the same thing emphatically thus—"There is a *spirit* in man, and the inspiration [*breath*] of the Almighty giveth him understanding" (Job xxxii. 8); and Job affirms, "The *spirit* of God hath made me, and the breath of the Almighty hath given me life" (xxxiii. 5). In this he expressly asserts of himself what revelation affirms to be true of the original of our race—Adam: "The Lord God formed man [*'s body*] of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils *the breath of life*, and man became a living soul." This breath of God constitutes the rational part of man, and is only intertextured with the animal life which permeates, and is formative and effective in the body; and this spiritual part, as it partakes of the nature of God, is as God its giver—an immortal essence. Scholars say that *neskama*, the Hebrew word for breath, is never in Scripture applied to the lower animals, but is used in regard to man to distinguish him from the lower animals; that it is employed to designate man's reasonable soul as something different from his animal life, and that it is also applied to God as a spiritual, immortal Being. On the contrary, the Hebrew word *ruach* is used in regard to animals and men alike, to the wind and to the (exerted) Spirit; and these distinctions are said to be uniformly observed in the translation of the word *neskama* in the whole twenty-four times in which it occurs in the Old Testament.

Man possesses a bodily frame curiously and wonderfully made, a material body as the lower creatures have. There is placed within this organized body a principle of life, animating it, and capable, in the degree of the perfectness of the framework, of thought—as the result of sensation and experience yielding perceptions, conceptions, and notions—the phenomena of understanding. But *inter-added* as well as *super-added* there seems to be a rational spiritual essence—a reasonable soul, the seat of intuitions and ideas, or those forms of thought which have no adequate correspondent to them in the phenomena of sensation, full of the power and life of nature and of God, and which yield the phenomena of reason. As reason the spirit is *regulative*, and along with the experience attained through the understanding it is *constitutive* of thought in its highest forms. These two principles are intended to co-operate in the human being—the junction between animal and spiritual existences—partaker of the nature of each, yet being, strictly speaking, neither. When the genuinely spiritual nature of man is excited to activity in accordance with its own proper characteristics, it often finds thought and inclination opposed to it, and hence the contest of soul, spirit, and body, of which Paul the apostle speaks: "I delight in the law of God after the inward man, but I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members" (Rom. vii. 22, 23).

The body which gives origin to fleshly lusts must perish, but the spirit which is enticed by these must live for ever, to give account of the deeds done in the body, for it is appointed unto all men once to die, and after death comes the judgment, when they that have done good shall come forth "unto the *resurrection* of life, and they that have done evil unto the resurrection of damnation" (John v. 29).

"And as touching the dead, that they *rise*; have ye not read in the book of Moses, how in the bush God spake unto him, saying, I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. He is not the God of the dead, but the God of the living: ye do therefore greatly err" (Mark xii. 26, 27), "because ye know not the Scriptures, neither the power of God" (Mark xii. 24). May we all feel that there is indeed a natural immortality of the soul; but may we learn to rejoice besides that, as an old divine has it, "Christ is risen from the grave, having conquered death by dying; and is ascended into the pure and peaceable habitations of glory. Therefore all His members who are united to Him in the inseparable bonds of faith and love shall feel the effects of his powerful life in immortalizing their very bodies;" inasmuch as He assures us, "Because I live, ye shall live also" (John xiv. 19).
D. U. M.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

LIFE is a very solemn thing, and so is death. We all naturally cling to the life we have, and are loth to lose it; and the desire for the continuance of existence has raised in the minds of the old philosophers the question—Is man immortal? This has been answered in various ways, most men arguing for immortality, yet living for and in the enjoyment of this present life, as if nothing lay beyond it. As a speculation in philosophy, it is altogether an inquiry without a result. "If a man die, shall he live again?" is a question which philosophy fails to answer, though it has always agitated the heart of man, and been an attractive puzzle to his intellectual curiosity. Almost every religion more or less advocates the affirmative of this topic, and endeavours to impale the soul on the fear of an hereafter. It is not a little singular, that in almost every heathen religion, the idea of immortality is used more as a terror than as a boon, and that in these gloomy credulities—

"The fear of hell's the hangman's whip
That keeps the wretch in order."

In Christianity this is transformed and transfigured into a hope instead of a fear, and immortality is shown to be a result and a reward. The Scriptures reveal immortality as the gift of God, given to those who believe in and follow the Lord Jesus Christ, and give us assurance of life from the dead as a consequence of our receiving the Spirit of Christ by a true, living, earnest, and active faith.

Man was created to be immortal, and hence there are immortal longings in his heart. But when God gave the early commandment which constituted the covenant of life, He made life dependent on obedience and submission. But "man being in honour did not abide" therein. He sinned, and "as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, so death passed upon all men; for that all have sinned." It is plain from the declaration of Scripture, "the soul that sinneth, it shall die," that God did not design to perpetuate sin, nor suffer sinners to prolong the evil of their ways in His sight. Man, originally gifted and endowed with the immortal soul which God breathed into him, transgressed the conditions of life, and hence became subject unto death—the soul, in fact, became dead in trespasses and sins. As all men have inherited this sinful nature, all men also inherit this soul of death. Thus those who sin, or inherit a sinful nature, and practise sinful works, lose the power of life, and go down to the grave as to the blackness of darkness for ever. The soul has lost its immortal nature through sin, and there is no provision made for the immortality of sin—indeed, the immortality of sinful souls would be the perpetuation of that which God hates, and would be indeed the triumph of evil and the powers of evil.

Man's earnest longings are not given to him that he may be peremptorily disappointed in the attainment of the gratification of his desires. Man that is born of woman is of few days and full of trouble; his life is but a span; threescore and ten years form almost the ultimate sum of his days—days which he spends as a tale that is told. To this frail creature of days and dust and ashes, who is of dust, and must return to the dust from which he was taken, an opportunity is given of gaining the gratification of his thirst for life. To this end he must be "born again;" he must receive the Spirit of Jesus, and in His life have life. In this way our Saviour "bath brought life and immortality to light in the gospel." The promise is, "Whosoever believeth in Me shall never die," but "hath eternal life abiding in him." To those who have faith in the Son of God there is no more fear of death, for they have passed from death unto life. Regeneration has been wrought in them, and immortality is to them a certainty. Those who possess the saving grace of faith can say, "According to His abundant mercy God hath begotten us again unto a lively hope by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, to an inheritance incorruptible and undefiled, and that fadeth not away, reserved in heaven" for all those who love Jesus.

The gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord. It is a gift, therefore, not an innate property. It is not born in us, for we require to be born again. The Spirit of God imparts this everlasting life to the soul, and therefore it is not a natural and indwelling power of our nature. That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and of the flesh doth reap corruption; that which is born of the Spirit is spirit, and of the Spirit receiveth life eternal. Jesus

came to earth that we might have life, and that we might have it more abundantly than we can have it now. He desires that His words may be as wells of water, springing up unto everlasting life. He speaks of the ordinary water of Jacob's well as that of which, if a man drink, he shall thirst again; but He proffers the waters of eternal life. There is no natural immortality attributed to man in Scripture. The living shall praise Thee, says David; but the dead and they that go down to the grave cannot praise Thee. Solomon affirms of man and of the beast, "As the one dieth, so dieth the other;" and he assures us that there is no work nor device in the grave to which we are hastening. Christ is our life if we have life at all, and those who continue in sin go down to the grave in unprofitable corruption and infamy.

The eternal immortality of wicked spirits, however brought about or permitted, would be the eternity of evil, a possibility which one cannot entertain in regard to a time when God the Father shall put all things in subjection to the Son, Jesus Christ. If all things are made subject to Him, all things must be made good, or else all that is not good must die, disappear, and become as though it never had been. To suppose that all souls would, after a lapse of ages, however numerous and lengthened, be made good, would be either to reinstitute purgatory or to advocate universalism. It would take away from this life its character of probation; for if purgatory exists, there is other probation than this world affords; and if universalism is true, the probation of this world matters nought. But if we accept the doctrine of Scripture, that by the first sin the natural immortality of the soul was forfeited, that thereafter all men became "dead in trespasses and sins," for thereby "death passed upon all men," and that Christ came that all might find life in Him—to give His life a ransom for many, to impart life to as many as call upon His name out of a pure heart fervently, to renew the inheritance of eternal life to those who believe,—then we have an analogy to all that we see in nature—that which fails of its end dies, that which fulfils it lives. Every one knows that powers improve with proper use, and die when not suitably exercised, and that thus to him that hath is given, and from him that hath not put out his powers to usury is taken away even that which he hath.

The immortality taught in Scripture is a new life, in order to possess which we must be born again; we must have the Spirit of Christ given, imparted, and placed within us—a new spirit, which is a gift of grace. "As the Father hath life in Himself, so hath He given Me to have life in Myself," is the declaration of Jesus; and He asserts of Christians, "Because I live, ye shall live also." In Him is life, and without Him there is no life at all. Immortality has been forfeited by all our race, but we are restored to eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord. Moses truly said unto the fathers, "A Prophet shall the Lord your God raise up unto you from among your brethren, like unto me; Him shall ye hear in all things whatsoever He shall say unto you. And it shall come to

pass, that every soul that shall not hear that Prophet shall be destroyed from among the people."

The whole tenor of the revelation of the Scriptures on this subject seems to be—that man was created naturally immortal, upon a certain condition, and that he had in him then "a soul of lives," as some translators give the phrase; that by sin death came into the world, and death passed upon all men, in exact accordance with the first law and its decreed punishment, but that a way of escape was opened up for believers from this doom of sin and death, through faith in Jesus Christ. Eternal life is not now the natural inheritance of man, but the gift of God. It is through Jesus Christ that we are made heirs of immortality.

The redeemed live in the mansions of the Father, on account of the merits and sacrifice of the Saviour. The carnal, earth-satisfied spirit has no eternal life abiding in it. That alone which is born of the Spirit of God is spirit in this Christian sense. Those alone who are born to newness of life in Christ are those who shall live for ever in God's favour and dwell in His presence. "The blackness of darkness for ever" shall fall upon the unrighteous, the earthly, sensual, and devilish. Evil shall not dwell in the sight of the Lord Jehovah for ever. It must be vanquished and extinguished. All things must bear the image of the Most High in purity and holiness. The Vine Jesus imparts his life to the branch, and if any branch does not receive its life from Him, it withers and dies. The human being, like the parabolic vine, cannot bear fruit of itself unless it be quickened by the life of the Eternal One. The everlasting punishment of annihilation, that most dreadful of all conceptions to the sensitive spirit full of the instinct of self-preservation, is already given forth as the doom of impenitent men. Such are "condemned already," bear their condemnation in themselves. The spirit of man, when redeemed and sanctified, is alone promised eternal life; and it is by the implanting of His own life in us that the Holy Saviour becomes unto the faithful band of believers the power of God unto salvation from the curse of a broken law, and makes them partakers of the covenant of grace.

P. O. S.

The Essayist.

THE STUDY OF HISTORY.

OF all the departments of literature, the subject of history is in some respects the most interesting; for it has attractions peculiarly its own. It may be said to contain the essence of all others; for each in some degree enters into its composition. The philosopher will there find abundant materials for his study; for the philosophy of history is a life-study in itself, whether it be reducible to a science or not. He will there find the facts upon which his conclusions are grounded, and by which his speculations may be tested. He will find what his predecessors have done on the same ground, and the results of their labours. He will learn something of the moral government of the universe, and of the principles which have guided the conduct of men. The scientific man must look to history for a record of the changes which the world of nature has undergone, and of its bypast phenomena. The geologist will there find valuable aid in his suppositions regarding the origin and growth of rocks and fossils, and the crust of the earth. The antiquarian finds it throwing great light on the fragments and relics which constitute his study, and leading him to reliable information regarding these, which their appearance and nature would not of themselves afford. The poet and romancist will there find abundant materials for thought and the cultivation of their arts. The student of biography will find the lives of all kinds of men, the circumstances that led to the formation of their characters, and the influence they exerted on their contemporaries and on posterity. And the student of prophecy will there find the data upon which his surmises regarding the unseen future must be built. He will gather together as it were the tangled web of past ages, and looking at their issues he will have some guide as to what is likely to spring from the events going on around him, and a clue to the movements and changes to which these in turn will give rise. History is thus common ground on which men of all tastes and pursuits can meet; and it presents fields of research which the most indefatigable labours will almost never overtake, and sources of instruction and delight which can scarcely be exhausted.

It is almost appalling to think of what history is; to think of its boundlessness and the variety of the materials composing it. It would be impossible to write a complete history of the world for a

single year; for no building could contain the books that would have to be written: a lifetime would not suffice to write it—a lifetime would not be long enough even to read it. It would be necessary to chronicle not only the great occurrences which had taken place, but also the countless incidents which these had originated; and in pursuing their endless ramifications the mind would be confused and lost. In such a history nothing would be valueless, for the veriest trifle would throw light on something else; and that again would affect another, onward and onward, until the greatest of all was reached. History may be said to include a narration of all facts in connection with a given subject—the subsidiary, as well as the most important ones; and it may also embrace comments, explanations, or parallels by the author; for if these were excluded, it would be annals only and not history. Tradition, poetry, tales, biography, old letters and accounts, state papers, and other such documents, are undoubtedly all parts of national history, although not precisely known by that name; for every one of them supplies valuable materials for its compilation. True, indeed, many an historian in the past has not taken advantage of all such materials, but has fallen far short of our ideal of true history. There are histories of every variety between Herodotus' most interesting work and Froude's delightful volumes. Some of these historians have gone to the one extreme of relating everything they knew, however improbable, and whether they believed it themselves or not; and others again have given us only a dry matter-of-fact recital of the great occurrences in the world's progress. Many have thought they have done all that could be required of them when they have narrated this battle, or that great national victory, how such a hero emerged from obscurity, and astonished the world, or when such a king, nobleman, or prelate was born and died; while nothing was said about the common people, and information as to the manner in which these classes lived and died will be sought for in vain. Some people may think it beneath the dignity of history to condescend to such particulars as these, yet there cannot be a perfect history without them. A writer who gives us only a dry description of the great events of the period, is like an artist who would paint a fine landscape, filling in the mountains, rivers, and dells, the houses, roads, and trees, but without filling in the grass and the rustling foliage, the blossoms on the hedges, or the weeds by the water's edge. Such a picture would manifestly be a failure; and so is such a history.

This voluminousness of historic details brings with it one or two drawbacks. One of these is that it is impossible to overtake all history; and it is therefore needful to confine one's attention to a comparatively limited portion of it. No doubt a man might, in the course of years, make a rush through universal history, and read something about all nations, and during all their periods. But what the better would he be? He would have a confused notion of many things, and a thorough knowledge of nothing. It is true

he must know something of the other parts of it, as well as his own special study ; for it would be discreditable to him if he did not know whether Julius Cæsar was a Roman or a Greek, whether Socrates was a philosopher or a warrior ; though he might well be excused if he did not know that the former had twice landed in Great Britain and conquered its inhabitants, and that the latter had a very ill-tempered wife. A student must know something of general history, but his strength should be given to some particular part of it, and his attention confined to it till he has mastered its minutest details. Each one should select an epoch or country best suited to his own taste, and make that his study and the focus of his reading, everything else being greatly subordinated and in connection with it. British history in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries may be quoted as an illustration, which is one of the most interesting periods of our history, and for which abundant materials can easily be had. This begins in Scottish history about fifty years before the Reformation, and until the union of the kingdoms ; and in England during the reigns of Henry VIII. and his family, the Jameses, the Charleses, and William and Mary. The introduction of printing into Scotland, the battle of Flodden, the martyrdom of Hamilton and Wishart, the times of Queen Mary, Knox, and the Reformation, Henry VIII. and his many wives, the martyrdom of Ridley, Latimer, and Cranmer, the Armada, the Gunpowder Plot, the Cavaliers and Roundheads, the execution of Charles I., and Oliver Cromwell's Protectorate, are some of the great subjects included in it. More, Latimer, and Fox ; Shakspeare, Jonson, Beaumont, and Fletcher ; Spenser, Cowley, and Milton ; Hooker, Bacon, and Baxter ; Butler and Dryden ; Tillotson and Bunyan ; Clarendon and Burnet, are some of the great stars of our literature, whose lives and writings at once adorn and illustrate the period.

This abundance of historic materials is the cause of another disadvantage. As it is impossible for an historian to mention everything, a selection is necessary, and room is thereby opened up for partiality and unfairness. An historian's great object should be to give a clear idea of the period about which he writes ; and as he cannot give all the details, he should present his readers with those that furnish a true idea of the whole. But this expectation is often sadly disappointed. Some have written under party bias, or with strong feelings in favour of certain personages ; and some have written with the express purpose of creating certain opinions, and to accomplish a definite object. And this may be done to a very large extent without falsifying or even exaggerating facts, by simply leaving out those that would interfere with the intended impression, or explaining them away, and giving full prominence to those on the other side of the question. This makes it necessary to read as much as possible on the subject, so as to learn all the versions of the story, and the different opinions concerning it. The history of Queen Mary may be referred to as an illustration. Dr. Robertson

wrote of her in a somewhat condemnatory strain, believing her guilty, and William Tytler wrote in refutation of his views. More recently Sheriff Glassford Bell has written a history in her defence, but he is so partial that his work may be said to be more like an advocate's special pleading than anything else; and P. F. Tytler, in his History of Scotland, the best we have, after careful inquiry, takes quite an opposite view to that of his grandfather, and gives probably the most correct description of her character that can be had. Knox's history also is a very good one, and his account of her may be accepted as true, in spite of his dislike to her, and his intense hatred of her religion. Thus by reading all the different histories—one supplying what the other has omitted,—weighing conflicting evidences, and considering opposite opinions, a true conception of the subject may be secured, and the most reliable information obtained.

“An historian, we conceive, should transport himself in spirit to the age and country about which he writes. His whole being should be as much suffused and influenced by them as if he lived amongst them, having actually seen the deeds he relates, and heard the tales he recounts. He should stand on the battle-field, and give us not merely an outline, but a photograph of the scene, telling us not only where the commander stood and directed its movements, where the fighting was fiercest, and the carnage greatest, but also how the soldiers were clothed and armed, what kind of armour they wore, and with what weapons they fought. All these should be told; for they contribute not less to the interest of the picture than do the quarrels and subterfuges, the mistakes and crimes which provoked the contest. But this vivid imagination should be tempered by a clear judgment and sound discretion. While desiring a striking and attractive picture, he ought never to sacrifice accuracy to effect, and never to create incidents for the sake of embellishing his story. He should possess the faculty of rightly analyzing character, giving his readers an insight into the feelings and dispositions of those about whom he writes, and showing how they thought in private, as well as how they acted in public. Then we would have histories truly worthy of the name, and combining the good qualities of all with the accuracy of Tytler, the impartiality of Hallam, and the eloquent brilliancy of Macaulay.”

—As already hinted, many of our historians confine themselves to the great movements in the world's progress, and tell us little or nothing of the more personal and domestic life of the times about which they write. But these are to be found elsewhere; and it is well worth while going a little out of our way in search of them. Let us suppose that some information is desired regarding English life and manners about five hundred years ago, and although we may obtain some details in histories, we will get them far more fully and vividly from Chaucer in the Introduction to his *Canterbury Tales*. The plan of the work is, that a company of people from all ranks are assembled at the Tabard Inn, in Southwark, before pro-

ceeding on a pilgrimage to the shrine of Thomas à Becket, at Canterbury. It is suggested by some one that each in turn should tell a story, to beguile the long journey over the rough roads; and before relating these, Chaucer, in his prologue, describes the narrators themselves. Of the descriptions we select one or two, changing a few of the obsolete words. The country parson is described as—

“A poore parson of the town,
But rich he was in holy thought and work.
He was also a learned man, a clerk,
That Christe's gospel truly would preach,
His parishes devoutly would he teach.
To drawen folk to heaven with fairnesse,
By good example was his businesse;
For Christe's love, and His apostles twelve,
He taught, but first he followed it himself.”

Of the doctor he says,—

“He knew the cause of every malady,
Were 't hot, or cold, or moist, or dry.”

The monks, as we know, were not all ascetics, for some of them were as jolly fellows as Friar Tuck. Here is Chaucer's:—

“I saw his sleeves perfumed at the hand
With grease, and that the finest in the land.
And, for to fasten his hood 'neath his chin,
He had of goldy wrought a curious pin,
A love-knot in the greater end there was,
His head was bald, and shone as any glass.”

And in his account of the yeoman we have a glimpse of the good old days of merry England:—

“Withouten bake meat never was his house
Of fish and flesh, and that so plenteous,
It snowed in his house of meate and drink,
Of all the dainties that men could ere think.”

Again, if we require some such particulars about the Elizabethan age, it is not so much in histories as in the writings of Shakspeare that we will find them. If we want some information about the country justices, the “great unpaid” of these days, there are Justice Shallow, and his constables Verges and Dogberry. The Boar Tavern in Eastcheap, and the hostel of Mrs. Quickly, invite us to learn something of the tavern life of our ancestors. Mr. Ford and Mr. Page of Windsor will show us middle-class society; and in the company of Goodfellow and Peablossom, Snug the joiner, or Snout the tinker, we learn a great deal about the amusements and follies of the common people. Take some of the characters in

Henry IV. as an illustration. The king sends an officer to demand the liberation of some prisoners, and he is described as follows:—

“ Came there a certain lord, neat, trimly dressed,
Fresh as a bridegroom ; and his chin new reaped,
Showed like a stubble land at harvest home ;
He was perfumed like a milliner.

Prince Henry is a well-drawn figure. He was what in modern phraseology would be called a “fast young man.” He gave himself entirely up to the follies of the hour, and spent his days in pleasure and amusements among a set of men of congenial tastes whom he had gathered around him. Tired of the constraints and ceremonies of court life, he spent his evenings in the taverns and theatres ; and although not actually liking low company for its own sake, he yet took part in it, believing that he could see life better there than anywhere else. But his father’s death, and his accession to the throne, seemed to have called forth his better nature, and like one who had been roused from a long dream, he stirred up his dormant faculties, and became a new man. As he himself says,—

“ Presume not that I am the thing I was ;
For Heaven doth know, so shall the world perceive,
That I have turned away my former self ;
So will I those that kept me company.”

Here, too, there is Falstaff, perhaps the best known character in Shakspeare’s writings. He was a regular man of fashion, without any principle or honour, and, indeed, a hoary old sinner. Shakspeare has displayed considerable ingenuity in describing him, for he had to make him both attractive and repulsive—attractive to account for Prince Henry’s partiality for him, and repulsive in the interests of virtue. He was rendered the former by his humour, which he possessed in a more than ordinary degree, and which he turned to account upon every possible occasion, thereby getting himself out of many a scrape by his humorous excuses. He was what the Yankees would call “cute,” always looking sharply after himself, and far too wide awake to be imposed upon. He excites our laughter by his cowardice, even when he is telling the most improbable stories of his own hardihood and bravery : for instance, hacking his sword like a handsaw, after running away at Gadshill, and affirming that it was done while fighting with the overpowering numbers who attacked him. He was sent to the war, and ordered to collect a regiment on his way. He gathered together about a hundred and fifty of the greatest rascals in the country, mostly regular jail-birds, and so ragged were they that they had only one shirt amongst them. He could not avoid going into the battle, but when he felt he was getting the worst of it, he fell down motionless, and pretended to be dead. When the fighting was over, he rose and thrust his sword into the dead body of Hotspur, which was lying

near him, and which he carried away on his shoulders as a trophy of his prowess, saying that he had killed him after fighting with him for an hour by Shrewsbury clock!

Such details and hints of life and manners as these cannot be obtained from history; and it is well that we can thus get them from other sources. We like to stand behind the scenes, and see the king and his courtiers, not only in their crowns and coronets, and engaged in state ceremonials, but as they were in their private lives, in their amusements, loves, and hatreds, and it may be in their follies and sins. We desire to accompany the housewife to the markets and booths, as she purchases provisions for her family, and, true to her instinct, tries to cheapen her bargains. We wish to see the handicraftsman at his labour, and see how he did what is now being done by machinery. We want to stand at the corner of the streets, in the market-places, in the playhouses and taverns, when every part of social life is opened up to view, and when everything and everybody can pass before us like the figures in a panorama. All this is true history; and in reading old poetry, plays, or novels, we are not only wandering among the flowers of literature, but gathering solid information, and studying history in the best possible manner.

It is especially interesting to read the past history of our country, from the striking contrast it presents to its present condition. We have indeed wars and rumours of wars flying about, yet these affect us but slightly. There was the Crimean war a few years ago, and the Abyssinian expedition a few months ago; and the only difference these made to us was a little excitement and anxiety to hear the earliest news from head-quarters, and perhaps also an increased taxation. But how different are these from the days of our forefathers, when the country was rent asunder by civil war, the people fighting with the Government, and faction against faction, the plains and hill-sides dyed with blood, and their fellow-men lying unburied around them! These men had literally to defend their families and property; every one looked askance at his neighbour; the burgesses had to mount guard over their cities; and the watchword was demanded at every gate. We can never read the long and weary struggles which our ancestors made for civil and religious liberty, without deep interest and gratitude for the rich inheritance they have won for us. Especially are we grateful for the toleration and religious freedom now enjoyed by all; and when we read of the sacrifices made by the Covenanters in Scotland, and the Puritans and Nonconformists in England, we feel there is a close bond of connection betwixt them and us, since we are every day reaping the fruits of their labours. It is difficult to realize the true state of these troublous times. Traditions and stories have floated down to us on the stream of time, now elevating such a man into a hero of romance, and describing another as of the worst possible character. And yet when we dive deep into the recesses of history, we often find how erroneous such impressions are, and how much some men

have been misjudged, and their motives and lives misunderstood. Oliver Cromwell is a case in point. He has often been described as a stern and inflexible despot, a gloomy fanatic, or a canting hypocrite. That he was the greatest of men, the most unsullied of patriots, or the best of Christians, we cannot aver; and yet the latter description of him is far nearer the truth than the former. He was a man who set duty constantly before him, and ever acted up to the light he possessed; and although he had many faults, these we think are overshadowed by his virtues. We can form no true and adequate conception of him by merely reading his biography; we must also know a great deal of contemporary history. It is not enough to know that he usurped the government, but we must find out why he did it, and the results which followed. He must be judged, not by the light of the present day, but by the views of his own time, and by the circumstances with which he was surrounded. Most of his biographers present to us quite a different man, therefore we must judge for ourselves, and gather the materials for our verdict from the whole range of historic details.

And now may I not say in closing, that the attentive reader of history will find a higher hand than man's guiding it all, and disposing it for his own wise purposes? Not that he will be able to see the reason of everything, or trace the divine handwork in every event; for many things will often appear inscrutable to his limited knowledge, and about which he must be content to remain ignorant. As a man could not be expected to understand the contents of a book by only reading a few pages in the middle of it, so he cannot understand the plans of God, from the little he knows of the past, or the little he sees going on around him. He feels that history is not the record of a confused mass of irregular events, carelessly thrown together, without purpose or utility; that it is not the working out of a cold and inflexible destiny, which has no regard to individual welfare, but which moulds all things according to its own iron purpose. But he feels that it is the Supreme Intelligence carrying out a grand and comprehensive purpose, beneficent in its design, and glorious in its working; that it is the development of certain moral principles, and that the whole is presided over by One whose power is inexhaustible in its resources, unfettered in its exercise, and unlimited in its range. He will see in the calamities and destructions that have overtaken nations the just punishment for their iniquity. He will see the innate depravity of the human heart abundantly illustrated; and, above all, he will see in the progress and triumphs of Christianity in the past, the promise of its universal dominion and consummation in the future, when the kingdoms of this world shall have become the kingdoms of the Lord and His Christ.

R. D., JUN.

Our Collegiate Course.

LYCIDAS: A MONODY.

[“In this monody (1) the author bewails a learned friend, (2) unfortunately drowned in his passage from Chester on the Irish seas, 1637; and, by occasion, foretells the ruin of our corrupted clergy, then in their height.” (3)]

“The song is not the song of Milton speaking in his own person, but of Milton transformed in his imagination, for the time, into a poetic shepherd, bewailing in the season of autumn the untimely death of his fellow-shepherd Lycidas. Hence the whole elegy is an allegoric pastoral—a lyric of lamentation, rendered more shadowy and impersonal by being distanced into the form of a narrative and descriptive phantasy.”—*D. Masson's “Life of Milton,”* vol. i., p. 610.

“It is constructed in irregular stanzas, and though equal in ornate diction and picturesque illustration to anything from the same pen, it is so difficult to read even with the eye, that it is probably less perused than any other of Milton's masterpieces, though from none are a few peculiar passages more frequently quoted.”—*James Montgomery's “Memoir of Milton,”* p. xxii.

(1) Monody, in ancient poetry, signifies a lament or mournful kind of song, in which the person singing gives vent to his grief all alone; a solo, in opposition to *Chorodia*, or the song of the chorus.

(2) This was Edward King, Esq., son of Sir John King, Knight. He was a fellow of Christ's College, Cambridge, where he had fulfilled the duties of tutor and prolocutor, and was qualifying himself for the Christian ministry. He had been educated under the learned critic and grammarian, Thomas Farnabie, in Goldsmith's Rents, London, and the Rev. and learned Wm. Chappell, Dean of Cashel, and Provost of Trinity College, Dublin, under whom he read while acting as tutor of Christ's College. He became Milton's fellow-student in 1626, proceeded to M.A. 1633, and was regarded as one of the ornaments of Cambridge for learning, piety, and lettered skill. He contributed to several volumes of encomiastic verses, issued at Cambridge during his residence there. On a voyage to Ireland (of which he was a native, having been born at Boyle, in Connaught) on a visit to his relatives and friends, the ship in which he sailed stove against a rock not far from the British shore, and he, in the act of prayer, went down with the ship, August 10th, 1637, aged 25. In 1638 a volume of commemorative verses was issued by King's friends, in Latin, Greek, and English: of the English pieces this poem was the last, occupying pp. 20—25.

(3) This poem, written in November, 1637, as it appeared in the “Obsequies to the Memorie of Mr. Edward King, A.D. 1638,” had no title, and

"Strict pastoral was first written or perfected by the Dorian Greeks settled in Sicily; but the conventional use of it, exhibited more magnificently in 'Lycidas' than in any other pastoral, is apparently of Roman origin. Milton, employing the noble freedom of a great artist, has here united ancient mythology with what may be called the modern mythology of Comus and St. Peter, to direct Christian images. . . . The metrical structure of this glorious poem is partly derived from Italian models.—*"The Golden Treasury," by F. T. Palgrave, p. 312.]*

Yet once more, O ye laurels, and once more,
 Ye myrtles brown, with ivy never sere,
 I come, to pluck your berries harsh and crude;
 And, with forced fingers rude,
 Shatter your leaves before the mellowing year. 5
 Bitter constraint, and sad occasion dear,

Line 1. Again.
 2. Unfading.
 3. Sour; unripe.
 4. Unwilling; unkindly.

5. Tear; in the early part of;
 ripening;
 6. Painful necessity; grievous
 cause.

was only signed with the poet's initials, J. M. But on republishing it in his Poems, 1645, under his own name, the author prefixed the heading here given, and thus shows that part of this poem is intended to express the writer's ideas concerning the condition of the Church and the State at the period of its composition. In general, the contributions to the collections of university poems were confined to contemporaries at college. This monody of Milton's is the last of those in English; it was probably contributed at the special request of his friends at Cambridge, after the preceding portion of the volume was in type. It may have been, as Thomas Keightley ingeniously suggests, "That as it had to be transmitted from Horton, it did not arrive till after the other poems had been printed." The authorities of the university do not appear to have had the poems published under their own supervision; had they done so, the Syndics could scarcely have failed to notice and object to the passage concerning the Churchmen of that day, lines 108—131.

Line 1. The true significance of the redoubled "once more" of this pre-luding line is this:—Milton's mother died 3rd April, 1637, and he had been called to mourn for her with the unutterable grief due to that occasion, and now little more than four months after that bereavement he is brought to think again of the king of terrors. Casting his thoughts backward to a previous time of grief, he pathetically commences the present poem with an allusion to that preceding great loss. This seems to me to give greater force and appropriateness to the passionate exclamation than the ordinary explanation, that the poet here means, I am again called back to poetry, by a sad necessity, from the law studies to which I had begun to devote myself.

3. Berry-bearing twigs of "laurel, the ornament of Phœbus' toil" were wreathed round the brows of victorious heroes and distinguished poets as a tree sacred to Apollo—whence the terms *laureate* and *laureation*; the

Compels me to disturb your season due :
 For Lycidas is dead, dead ere his *prime*,
 Young Lycidas, and hath not left his *peer* :
 Who would not sing for Lycidas ? he *knew*,
 Himself, to sing, and *build the lofty rhyme*.
 He must not *float* upon his watery bier
Unwept, and *welter* to the *parching* wind,
 Without the *meed* of some melodious *tear*.
Begin, then, sisters of the sacred well,

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| 7. Make it obligatory on ; interfere with ; proper.
8. Full years.
9. Equal.
10. Was able.
11. Construct ; sublime poetry. | 12. Be allowed to swim helplessly ; couch.
13. Unmourned ; roll about ; drying.
14. Just reward ; sign of grief.
15. Commence, therefore ; revered spring. |
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myrtle was sacred to Venus, as the symbol of youth and beauty, and was often used as the sign of honourable friendship. Ivy was, as Horace tells us, the prize of learned brows ; hence the threefold wreath which Milton intended to weave for him was significant of poesy, friendship, and letters.

8. Perhaps a name suggested by "the gentle Lycidas" (*teneram Lycidan*) of Horace in his *Ad L. Sextium*, odes i., iv., 19. This repetition of a word or phrase which ends one clause, at the commencement of another clause, "dead, dead," is called by rhetoricians *anadiplosis* ; a still more striking instance occurs at lines 37 and 38 in the echoing impressiveness given to the phrase "now thou art gone."

11. This is hyperbolic ; Professor Masson says of King's verses, "There is nothing in any of these performances that would impress us now, if we came upon them unawares, with the notion of superior genius. There is little poetry in the thought."

14. Catullus uses the word in a like sense, when alluding to the elegies of Simonides in his touching expostulation with his friend Cornificius, whom he requests to come and see him during a period of depression :—

"Paulum quid lubet allocutionis,
 Mæstius lacrymis Simonideis."

"Prithee a little talk for ease, for ease,
 Sad as the tears of poor Simonides."

Leigh Hunt's "Imagination and Fancy," p. 269.

15. The nine Muses, daughters of Jupiter and Mnemosyne, called *Heliconiades*, because they dwelt in Mount Helicon, whence the fountain of *hippocrene* flowed, and where Jupiter, as *Heliconus*, was worshipped. "The hill here is of course Cambridge ; the joint feeding of flocks is companionship in study ; the rural ditties on the oaten flute are academic *iondies* and elegiacs ; and old *Damocetas* is either Chappell, whom Milton has long forgiven, or some more kindly fellow of Christ's."—*Masson's "Milton,"* vol. i., p. 611.

That from beneath the *seat* of Jove doth *spring*;
 Begin, and somewhat *loudly sweep the string*;
Hence with denial vain, and coy excuse :
 So may some *gentle Muse*
 With *lucky words* favour my *destined urn* ; 20
 And, as he *passes, turn*,
 And *bid fair peace* be to my *sable shroud*.
For we were nursed upon the selfsame hill,
Fed the same flock, by fountain, shade, and rill.

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| 16. Throne; well forth. | 20. Suitable, befriend; fixed death-hour. |
| 17. Resonantly touch the harp. | |
| 18. Away with refusal; cunningly shy apology. | 21. Goes along, incline himself. |
| 19. In a similar way; kindly singer. | 22. Invoke or call; rest; dark death-dress. |
| | 23. Because; brought up. |
| | 24. Tended; sheep. |

17, 18.

"Begin, and somewhat loudly," &c.

"Hence with denial vain," &c.

"The first of these lines has a poor prosaic effect, like one of the inane mixtures of familiarity and assumed importance in the 'Pindaric' writers of the age. And 'hence with denial vain,' is a very unnecessary piece of harshness towards the poor Muses, who surely were not disposed to ill-treat the young poet."—*Leigh Hunt's "Imagination and Fancy,"* p. 269.

20. Compare Horace, Odes, ii., 8, 25—28:—

"Omnes eodem cogimur, omnium
 Versatur urna serius ocios,
 Sors exitura et nos in eternum
 Exilium impositura cymbæ."

"There is a hand to one same spot,
 Urging us all;—of all the lot
 Is turning in the urn about,
 Sooner or later to spring out;
 And in the boat embark us, sent
 Into eternal banishment."

Sewell.

"Nec vero hæc sine sorte datæ, sine judice sedes :
 Quesitor Minos urnam movet, ille silentum
 Conciliumque vocat, vitasque et crimina discit."

Virgil's "Æneid," vi., 481—483.

"Nor lacks even here the law's appeal,
 Nor sits no judge the lots to deal.
 Sage Minos shakes the impartial urn,
 And calls a court of those below,
 The life of each intent to learn,
 And what the cause that wrought them woe."

Connington.

Together both, ere the high lawns appeared 25
Under the opening eyelids of the morn,
We drove afield, and both together heard
What time the grey fly winds her sultry horn,
Battening our flocks with the fresh dews of night,
Of till the star, that rose at evening bright, 30
Toward heaven's descent had sloped his westering wheel.
Meanwhile the rural ditties were not mute,
Tempered to the oaten flute;
Rough satyrs danced, and fauns with cloven heel
From the glad sound would not be absent long : 35
And old Damocetas loved to hear our song.

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| 26. In close companionship ; before ;
uplands were seen.
26. Beneath the rays of the early
risen sun.
27. Hastened to pasture ; noticed.
28. Sounds ; heat-indicating.
29. Feeding well ; early moisture.
30. Frequently ; shiningly. | 31. In the direction of ; steep ;
turned downwards.
32. Rustic melodies ; silent.
33. Attuned ; straw pipe.
34. Bristly ; divided hoof.
35. Merry music.
36. Listen to. |
|--|---|

26. Isa. xxv. 8 ; Rev. xxi. 4 : Rev. xv. 2—4. We are told of leviathan that "his eyes are like *the eyelids of the morning*," Job xli. 18.

28. An insect of the order *Diptera*, two-winged, and of the family *Muscidæ*, the species of which are very numerous. This particular insect is named here from its colour ; it is also called the trumpet-fly, from the sharp humming sound it makes.

33. Pastoral pipe, as Collins in his Ode to Evening says,—

"If aught of oaten stop or pastoral song
 May hope, chaste Eve, to soothe thy modest ear."

Milton calls it simply *oat* in line 88 of this poem, and at line 124 he says, satirically,—

"Their lean and flashy songs
 Grate on their scrannel pipes of wretched straw ;"

recalling for us Virgil's line,—

"Silvestrem tenui Musam meditaris avena ;"

"Thou meditatest woodland minstrelsy with a slender straw-stalk."

34. Satyrs, gods of the woods and fields, representing the luxuriant vital powers of nature. They had bristly hair, played on pipes, and were fond of all pleasures of an animal sort. They were Greek mythological personages. The *Fauni* of the Italians, though afterwards confounded with them, were distinct. The Fauns were half men, half goats, and had horned brows. These terms are used here as personifications of Greek and Roman pastoral poetry.

36. Damocetas, a Virgilian shepherd, who had given Alexis "a pipe, formed of seven unequal hemlock reeds," and thus indicating that one of the college tutors is meant as Damocetas, a communicator of knowledge and an approver of their studies.

But oh the *heavy change* now thou art *gone*,
 Now thou art gone and never must *return*!
 Thee, shepherd, thee the woods, and *desert caves*,
 With wild thyme and the *gadding vine* o'ergrown, 40
 And all their *echoes*, *mourn* :
 The willows, and the hazel *copses* green,
 Shall now no more be *seen*
Fanning their joyous leaves to thy *soft lays*.
 As *killing* as the canker to the rose, 45
 Or taint-worm to the *weanling herds* that *graze*,
 Or frost to flowers, that their *gay wardrobe* wear
When first the whitethorn *blows* ;
Such, Lycidas, thy *loss* to shepherd's ear.
Where were ye, nymphs, when the *remorseless deep* 50
Closed o'er the head of your *loved Lycidas*?

37. Saddening alteration ; dead.
 38. Come back.
 39. Lonely hollows.
 40. Wildly roving.
 41. Resounding hollows, express
 grief.
 42. Undergrowths.
 43. Observed.
 44. Moving about ; gentle songs.

45. Destructive.
 46. Young flocks that nibble the
 pasture.
 47. Beautiful garments don.
 48. At the time that ; earliest ; bursts
 into blossom.
 49. So greatly saddening ; demise.
 50. In what place ; un pitying sea.
 51. Wrapt its waves above ; dear.

45. This is the Latin word *cancer*, a crab, with the Roman pronunciation. Here it signifies a caterpillar, as in "The Two Gentlemen of Verona," i.,—

Proteus. Writers say, as in the sweetest bud,
 The eating canker dwells, so eating love
 Inhabits in the finest wits of all.

Valentine. And writers say, as the most forward bud
 Is eaten by the canker ere it blow,
 Even so by love, the young and tender wit
 Is turned to folly," &c.

47. This line is a beautiful periphrasis for "in April," which is the period "when first the white thorn blows."

48. Whitethorn, the *Crataegus oxyacantha*, or hawthorn. "All our old poets have done reverence to the milk-white scented blossoms of the hawthorn—the May of poetry."

51. "The very best image of drowning he could have chosen, especially during calm weather, both as regards sufferer and spectator. The combined sensations of darkness, of liquid enclosure, and of the final interposition of a heap of waters between life and the light of day, are those which most absorb the faculties of a drowning person."—*Leigh Hunt's "Imagination and Fancy,"* p. 269.

The Reviewer.

A Short Bible History for Schools and Families. By Rev. EDMUND FOWLE. London: W. W. Gardiner.

WITHIN the compass of thirty pages the vicar of Shipton-Bellinger, Hants, has contrived to give a bird's-eye view of the contents of the Old and New Testaments, from the creation till the destruction of Jerusalem. This work is worthy of the attention of all who are interested in possessing a concise outline of the gospel narrative. We only object to the repetitions in Parts I. and II., which we think might have been made quite as easy had the additional matter been printed between brackets in the first part. Some valuable tabular matter condenses information so as to be readily rememberable, and to form a framework for further teaching.

Plain Preaching to Poor People. London: W. Macintosh.

THIS is a good idea, well worked out. The style is as simple as that of the "Pilgrim's Progress," and the sermons are plain, practical, and earnest, with no rhetorical flourishing, but solid and attractive thinking. They are thoroughly orthodox Church of England sermons, but are quite able to afford comfort in believing to any one. Four of them have come into our hands, elegantly printed, at a penny each. Their topics are—"The Fight of Faith;" "Watching with Christ;" "It is Finished;" "Forgetfulness of God." In these monthly issues the poor have the gospel preached unto them. They are well fitted for cottage lectures, fireside reading, tract distribution, &c.

The New Testament. Leipzig: Bernhard Tauchnitz.
London: Sampson, Low, & Co.

THIS is the thousandth volume of the collection of British authors issued by Baron Tauchnitz, which has so large a circulation on the Continent, and which supplies readers of English in Germany, France, &c., with so many excellent works at a lower price than they can be had in English. Though the gospel can only by a stretch of phrase be included among the works of British authors, yet we think it was a good idea to consecrate, as it were, the series by a reproduction of the English (so-called) authorized version. We recommend this edition, which—unlike the other volumes of the series—is procurable in England, to all persons desirous of applying thoughtful study to the Word of God. The following descriptive notice from the *Daily News* is strictly accurate, and as it expresses our own views on the production, we reproduce it here verbatim rather than in paraphrase:—

"Beren Tauchnitz, the eminent publisher of Leipsic, lately finding that he had carried his series of editions of English authors to the 999th volume, determined to mark the publication of the 1,000th by a special production. Accordingly he invited the eminent scholar and critic, Constantine Tischendorf, to prepare an edition of the English authorized version of the New Testament. The result is before us in as pretty a volume as could be desired. The peculiarity of this edition may be soon explained. The English authorized version, as we may be excused for observing, was translated from the Greek text, as it was in use among Protestant theologians in the days of Elizabeth and James I., that which Erasmus and Robert Stephens had founded upon manuscripts written after the tenth century. But since their days Greek manuscripts of the New Testament have been discovered far older than any with which they were acquainted, and scholars now for the most part agree that the older manuscripts must come nearer to the original than those which, though more numerous, are of later origin. The work of Tischendorf in the present edition has been to take the three texts which are most highly valued by Christian scholars and to supply from them at the foot of every page translations of those readings which vary from the text from which the authorized version is translated. The texts he has used for this purpose are, first, the *Code Vaticanus*, which appears to have been in the Vatican Library nearly 40 years, and which is assigned to the fourth century; secondly, the *Code Alexandrinus*, which is in the British Museum, a MS. given to Charles I. by the Patriarch of Constantinople, and probably written in the first half of the fifth century; and thirdly and lastly, the Sinaitic MS. obtained by Dr. Tischendorf himself, in 1859, from the Convent of St. Catherine on Mount Sinai, and believed to be the oldest of the MSS. of the New Testament, and of the fourth century. The history and description of these precious documents, accompanied by an estimate of their comparative importance, is presented here in a gracefully written introduction by Tischendorf, who acknowledges the assistance he has received in the preparation of the work from our countryman, Mr. B. Harris Cowper. Facsimiles of portions of each Codex are given opposite the title-page. The volume is published for about the price of one of the cheap yellow-covered novels that we see on the railway book-stalls."

Atheism or Theism? Edinburgh: Wm. P. Nimmo.
London: Houlston & Wright.

We have received five numbers of 16 pp. royal 8vo. each, of this work. It is issued in two forms, one on ordinary paper, price twopence, and one on fine paper at threepence per number. It is a revised edition of a "Debate between 'Iconoclast,' the accredited champion of British Atheists, and others; and Wm. Gillespie, the author of a well-reputed work on 'The Necessary Existence of God.'" "Iconoclast" is the Editor of "The National Reformer," in the pages of which this Discussion was originally conducted. He was an aspirant for parliamentary honours at the recent election as a working man's candidate, and he is favourably known throughout the country as an able lecturer on the Secularist side of things. Mr. Gillespie is a Scottish Laird, whose writings in favour of Theism have been before the metaphysicians of his logically minded countrymen for upwards of a quarter of a century, and are

recognised on both sides of the Atlantic as possessing great power of abstract reasoning. It would be unadvisable to criticise the debate in the state in which it comes before us in these serial parts; but some of our readers may be glad to know that the Discussion is in course of publication, so that they may supply themselves with the current numbers. We hope on its completion to be able to notice the entire controversy, and meanwhile we commend the work to the notice of our readers as something worth possessing and perusing. It is interesting, lively, varied, acute, and profound, in parts, in its progress.

The Topic.

OUGHT CONVENTUAL AND MONASTIC INSTITUTIONS TO BE INSPECTED?

AFFIRMATIVE.

CERTAINLY. The Government of this country is expected to take an interest in the happiness and well-being of the people. As a government, it is expected to exercise its functions without limitation of idea; and wherever it suspects all is not quite right, it should make full investigation to the extent of its power. The facts adduced at the late trial in Hull are in themselves sufficient to warrant and to call loudly for further inquiry. Looked at as a religious body, we object to the interference of Government; but considered as an established institution, whose operations are believed to be tainted with much of immorality, we do submit that, if only for their own interest, their doings should be open to inspection. "Am I my brother's keeper?" The divine voice answers; "Thy brother's blood crieth unto me." The iniquity abounding in too many such institutions is too well known to be blinked at, and the revelations which have from time to time been made are quite enough to justify such a measure as

has been named. If the inmates of such places are working and living with the sole desire of saving perishing souls and leading a godly life, they surely can have but little objection to the outer world being acquainted with their manner of life; but if crimes and profligacy have mingled with their devotion, then the judicial power of the land should have at least a legal right to expose the iniquity and bring the delinquents to its bar.—H. SCOTT.

To these luminous establishments spread over our benighted country we have looked, but in vain, for some scintillation of the light which "shineth more and more unto the perfect day." Evidence abounds to show that they are not the beatific abodes they are represented to be; indeed, their whole history proves them to be singularly fatal to real virtue and holiness. We hold them to be the veriest nurseries of vice. In corroboration of this we subjoin a sentence or two from the denunciation of the Dominicans by nuns of St. Catherine of Pistoia, presented to the Grand Duke Leopold in 1775. "In place of leaving us in our innocence, they injure us

both by words and deeds, and come frequently from the sacristy, of which they have almost all the keys; and there being a grating of sufficient largeness, they do us a thousand indecencies, even to putting . . . (The brutality here specified we neither can nor dare print, even in Italian.) They put their hands in the bosom of their friends (female) Amiche, &c. If at any time an occasion occurs of entering under any pretext into the convent, they go alone into the chamber of their favourites." "Though often warned by us, they neither intermit nor break off their dangerous intimacies; and from this it has happened that many enter many times during the night to revel and sleep with the nuns, having caused false keys (to) be made." "Those nuns who live according to their ideas are by them uplifted and satisfied, even in things the most extravagant; and the others must either betray their conscience by compliance, or suffer perpetual war, as at present." Is the proof quoted nullified by distance or time? Assuredly not. It is perfectly competent for us to select proof from any period, as the religious system, of which these conventual institutions are an essential part, is declared to be infallible at all times and in all places. These pestilent houses are but the outposts of a power whose aim is the destruction of constitutional life and liberty. Religion they use as a mask for their covert designs. The stern lesson that Monachism has received from resuscitated Spain will, we trust, be of use to England. We bid, in accordance with our view of the question, for a rigid governmental inspection.—**MAX.**

If honestly conducted, they have nothing to fear; if dishonestly, they have much need of inspection. Either way it is advisable; for truth is always precious.—**K. V.**

NEGATIVE.

Inspection is the panacea of the day for everything. Instead of following the good old rule, "Every one mind and do his own business," we say, send somebody to see that everybody minds and does his own business; and hence it has come about that many run to and fro, that knowledge may be increased about how other people do their work. We shall shortly have an army of inspectors, and then who will inspect our inspectors? Inspection is the legalization of the poke your nose into other people's business curiosity which abounds among most of those who busy themselves in seeing that other people do right. Conventual and monastic life are entered into voluntarily; the members of such sisterhoods or brotherhoods have laws of their own, and nobody is bound to enter into them without her or his own free consent. If we were to introduce the inspectorate system into these places, we should encourage people to enter rashly into the vows they imply, in the hope that if they disliked the affair after trial they might find relief by complaint to inspectors. Besides, to agree to inspect them would be to legalize them and to arm them with the panoply of law, and this would make it more enticing, for people imagine that all that law sanctions it approves. Quack medicines thrive because Government taxes them, and convents and monasteries are merely quack medicines for the soul.—**T. E. N.**

Religious vows, as well as views, ought to be considered as altogether holy and beyond the legislation of the State. Any State action in regard to them would completely alter their character and make them conventions instead of convictions. What would a vow of perpetual

poverty, obedience, and chastity mean, if Government inspectors might decide on whether it would be expedient to fulfil it or no? The State must not enter into partnership with monasticism otherwise than as permitting it. Religious vows cannot be enforced by legislative measures, they could only be relieved by it, and this would altogether break down the idea of its sacred and binding character.—**M. T.**

Why should the law interfere with the religious recluse, whose aim is to live,—

“The world forgetting by the world forgot,”

and thus thrust the world and its concerns and designs continually upon the conscience and consciousness of those who have seen fit to withdraw themselves from its snares, embroilments, interests and entanglements? In doing so the State can do nothing except tempt to discontent, repining, and an inclination to retract the vow and retrace the steps to a worldly life.—**S. A. H.**

When the State is unloosing itself from the Church and its concerns, it would be very impolitic for it to undertake the institution of an inspectorate of monkeries and nunneries, and so create a large interest in the progress and growth of religious houses.—**W. E. D.**

To what good end would inspection tend? Inspection would of itself do not a particle of good, unless reports were published and cases were to be brought before the law courts somewhat after the manner of breaches of the Workshops' and Factories' Act. But could such a thing be done in accordance with our modern ideas of liberty? Religious seclusion, holy vows, devotional retirement, and all the other inducements, causes or recommend-

ations of conventual life would all be infringed, and in fact be rendered nugatory by any system of inspection that could be adopted. How could seclusion be observed when public inspectors would have a right to enter at any time, to question on any subject, and to write down and perhaps publish the replies? How could holy vows be kept when the world was thus forced on the minds of the devotees continually? What sort of devotional retirement would that be which inflicted inspectorship upon those who had no wish to remember anything but God and godliness? It would be preposterous to call these monastic institutions, into which, by its proxies, the public could force its way and enforce answers to any of the questions which may be asked, and if questions could be left unanswered when asked what would be the use of inspection? Inspection would either be a nullity or a tyranny—neither would advantage the public nor the inmates; therefore inspection ought not to be adopted.—**H. C.**

Bit by bit legislation is making itself intrusive. We must now all live in the light of the public eye, and perform all the functions of life in the presence of statisticians and inspectors appointed by the public to see that all is right. Domiciliary visitation will soon be proposed to see that we take the due quantity of sleep, and do not over-eat while at meals. What in the name of wonder can it matter to the public what goes on inside of a conventual establishment? beyond the fact that any violation of personal freedom or interest, if committed therein, may be punished by legal tribunals! That is the case now, and the very constitution and intent of convents and monasteries would be defeated and destroyed if inspection were attempted.—**M. B.**

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

823. Is there a manuscript magazine in circulation among any of the readers of the *British Controversialist*? if so, the writer would be glad to know particulars.—H. H.

824. I should feel extremely obliged if any one of your readers would kindly inform me what subjects a candidate for the degree of B.A. at the London University is examined in, and the amount of knowledge required in each. Also whether it would be possible for a young man of studious disposition to acquire that knowledge in the spare hours of say five years. Any information throwing light on the examination for this degree would also much oblige
Z.

825. A sheet recently fell into my hands bearing the imprimatur of "Thomas Asquith, Printer, Leeds," on which was printed a poem, entitled, "God: a Poem, by Derzhavin, a Russian gentleman, born 1763," who is spoken of as a statesman. Could any reader of the *British Controversialist* oblige me with further particulars concerning the life, &c., of Derzhavin, the author of this striking poem? SAMUEL.

826. Would you be kind enough to inform 'Speru' what is the usual way of conducting M.S. magazines in an association for the Members' Mutual Improvement.—SPERA.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

808. From my own experience I consider that Pitman's system of shorthand is the best, and I think that opinion is now universal. The 12th edition is, I think, the one which cannot be changed, and therefore there can be no risk in learning it.

As to its being the easiest, I think there is little doubt. I know for a fact that by giving one hour a day to its study, it may be learned within six months, and afterwards it only remains for practice in reading and writing to make the student proficient. The first book may be obtained through any stationer for 6d. it is entitled "The Teacher's Companion."—G. E. M.

815. *The Apocryphal Gospels*.—I know nothing of the book itself which has occasioned the question of R. J. One thing, however, is certain from the title-page alone—that an outrageously false impression is wilfully sought to be produced, with respect to the historical genuineness of the spurious and foolish writings the work professes to present for English readers. So far from being true and contemporary, or even early records, the so-called "histories" date from the second century at the earliest, and continued to be produced for some hundreds of years afterwards. Their utterly trivial character would, one might have supposed, at once have marked the attempt to institute a comparison between them and the four received Gospels as too dangerous to scepticism itself to be pursued. "The materials are drawn partly from the New Testament, partly from traditions, and partly from the imagination of their authors. They are of no historical or doctrinal authority, and were never officially recognised in the Church. On many accounts they deserve nothing but contempt, and that has been liberally heaped upon them in all ages. It has been very truly observed of the false gospels in particular, by Bishop

Ellicott,—‘Their real demerits, their mendacities, their absurdities, their coarseness, the barbarities of their style, and the inconsequence of their narratives, have never been excused or condoned. It would be hard to find any competent writer, in any age of the Church, who has been beguiled into saying anything civil or commendatory.’” As to the use of these “gospels” being forbidden by the bishops of the Nicene Council, it need only be said that the foundation of this report is (1) that Jerome (340—420) wrote that “some people said the book of Judith was quoted as an authority at the council of Nice,” A.D. 325. (2) Pappus, in the sixteenth century, quoted from an obscure Greek work, supposed to be of the tenth century, a story to the effect that certain books, which were not specified, were divinely set aside by means of a miracle, at the Nicæan council. It may also be remarked that—(a) many of these writings were produced after the date of the Council. (b) There is no contemporary or ancient evidence to even suggest, much less prove, that the question of the canon was considered at Nice. One or two of the documents under consideration were accepted by heretical sects as genuine, but both sects and documents were totally repudiated by the Church at large. In 1693, Dr. Wake, afterwards Bishop of Lincoln, and then Archbishop of Canterbury, published an “English version of the genuine epistles of the apostolical fathers, with a preliminary discourse concerning the use of those fathers.” This does not, apparently, refer to the spurious gospels which profess to supplement the evangelical histories of Christ, and even to the supposed “epistles” he attributes a greatly exaggerated value. The Rev. Jeremiah Jones, Dissenting minister (1693—1724), published all of the pretended gospels that he could

find. Dr. Giles, in 1852, published “Codex Apocryphus N. T.,” or “Uncanonical Gospels and other writings.” In 1820, the celebrated William Hone, then a sceptic, issued “the Apocryphal New Testament : being all the gospels, epistles, and other pieces now extant, attributed in the first four centuries to Jesus Christ, His apostles, and their companions, and not included in the New Testament by its compilers.” “What Hone did in preparing it was to select some of the translations of Jones, and attach to them the version of the apostolic fathers by Wake ; all these he cut up into chapters and verses, prefixing headings to his chapters to make them look like ordinary editions of the New Testament. His introductions and notes are borrowed (without acknowledgment in great part) from the same sources as his text, and hashed up to suit his purpose.” The book referred to by R. J. is evidently the somewhat altered reprint, with additions, of Hone’s work, referred to in the introduction to the most recent and valuable publication upon the subject, of which it remains for me to speak. The most complete collection of apocryphal gospels, &c., which has yet appeared, was published in 1867, by Messrs. Williams and Norgate. Its full title is, “The apocryphal gospels and other documents relating to the history of Christ. Translated from the originals in Greek, Latin, Syriac, &c., with notes, scriptural references, and prolegomena, by B. Harris Cowper.” The translator and editor is well known as one of the ablest oriental and biblical scholars of our day, and as conductor of the (now defunct) “Journal of Sacred Literature.” From the lengthy introduction to the work a large portion of the foregoing facts, and all the quotation passages, have been gathered. R. J. may, in the handsome volume which it forms,

depend upon receiving a faithful and complete version of the curious documents which have excited his curiosity, together with all reliable information respecting their date and origin. To any readers who may have been led by such titles as that cited by the querist, to suspect that these childish stories may possibly be entitled to equal credit with the evangelical histories, I can assuredly recommend a perusal of them as certain for ever to dispel such an idea. The price of Mr. Cowper's volume is six shillings.

W.

816. The Percy Anecdotes (according to the preface of a "verbatim reprint of the original edition," published by Warne and Co., 1868) were originally "published in forty parts in as many months, commencing 1820, and were compiled by 'Sholto and Reuben Percy, brothers of the Benedictine monastery of Mont Berger.'" "But the names and the locality were *supposé* or *de plume*. Reuben Percy was Mr. Thomas Byerley, who died in 1820. Sholto Percy was Mr. Joseph Clinton Robertson, who died in 1852." The edition published by Warne and Co., in 1868, is in two volumes, of about one thousand pages each. The anecdotes are classified under about forty different heads, such as "humanity," "heroism," "war," "justice;" and are generally regarded as authentic. They are very useful for illustration, they contain a large amount of information, [on a great variety of subjects, and, to use the words of the preface, "for the leisure half-hour. The Percy Anecdotes may be safely recommended to all classes of readers."

GEORGIUS.

825. Gabriel Romanovitch Derzhavin, the most famous lyric poet of Russia, was born at Kasan, 3rd July, 1743, educated at the gymnasium of that city, and entered the military service in the department of engineering. His mathematical

attainments procured him promotion. He quitted the service in 1784 to become a Councillor of State, and was successively governor of the districts of Olonetz and of Lambov, of the latter of which he wrote a topographical account and description. In 1791 he was raised by Catharine II. to be Secretary of State; two years afterwards he was called to the Senate, and in the following year he was made President of the College of Commerce. He was Minister of Justice in 1802. He died at his estate near Novgorod, 6th July, 1816. He is the author of an able and admirable treatise on lyric poetry, as well as one of the masters of that mighty form of musical utterance. His muse is fresh, original, and rich; his language delights by its picturesque power, while his matter at once elevates, purifies, and enraptures the soul. The noble grandeur and the moral dignity of his conceptions are well matched by the intensity of feeling he displays, and fittingly expressed in the choice and energetic diction he employs. He was a great and good man, a genuine patriot, and a notable person, who even at the foot of a throne like that of Catharine II. remained heartily devoted to philosophy, poetry, and religion. He is said not to have been quite a purist in his use of terms, but we presume this merely means that he could employ the vernacular speech to produce effects which had hitherto been thought possible only to a received poetic classicality of expression; in other words, that he possessed the true lyric inspiration which expresses emotion, and emotion always prefers and selects common words, while it makes them glow with a new brilliancy, and bestows on them the vitality of the roused soul. His "Oda Bog," the poem to which "Samuel" refers, is one of the most impressive and sublime odes in the

entire range of lyric literature. It has been translated into almost every European tongue, and though the cold habits of Western emotion may incline some to charge it with Oriental extravagance and conceit, a thorough conception of its plan and purpose will justify its vigour of language, parity of tone, loftiness of idea, and daringness of flight. It has had the singular distinction of being translated into Japanese, and by order of the sovereign it has been inscribed on silk embroidered with gold, and hung up in the chief temple of Jeddo; almost equal

appreciation has been bestowed on it in China. The collected works of Derzhavin were published at St. Petersburg during the closing years of his life, 1810-1815, in five vols., and they have gone through many editions since. Readers desirous of seeing this poem (translated) will find it in "Lays of the Pious Minstrels," by Henry Wright, p. 97, as well as in J. E. Carpenter's "Penny Readings," vol. iii, p. 169. It was translated by Sir John Bowring in his "Specimens of Russian Poetry," 1821-23. S. N.

The Societies' Section.

The Young Men's Mental Improvement and Mutual Aid Society, Birmingham.—During the year, the close of which is indicated by the Report now presented, your Committee feel great pleasure in stating that the Society has met with more than its usual success, in the number of its members, the diversity of its operations, and the increased advantages it has been enabled to offer to its students. The Society having now completed the fourteenth year of its existence, it may not be out of place to give a brief sketch of its history.

In the autumn of the year 1854, soon after the introduction of the Saturday half-holiday movement, our much-esteemed President, Edward Watson, Esq., proposed a series of weekly Saturday Evening Lectures to young men, on Scientific, Literary, and other subjects of interest. A course of thirteen Lectures was accordingly delivered in the assembly room of the Young Men's Christian Association, then

in Paradise Street. In the meanwhile a Committee was elected, and a Society instituted; Drawing Classes were commenced, and a Library formed. The Lectures were continued; the attendance both at Lectures and Classes became larger, and classes for Education, Languages, Chemistry, and other subjects were added as required. After a time, Prizes were offered for the best Drawings, then an Exhibition of the works of the students took place, which has been followed by Exhibitions year after year; each one giving evidence of improvement upon its predecessors. The promoters of this Society have had no object to serve except to benefit young men, and it was supposed that by the numerous advantages offered, many might be induced to avail themselves of the opportunities thus afforded, in preference to more enticing but prejudicial pursuits; and thus, by leading them into habits of diligence and thoughtfulness, enabling

them to become, not only more skilful workmen, artists, speakers or writers, but better members of society. In support of this statement it may be mentioned that many Young Men have left our Society to occupy distinguished and honourable positions in public and private life.

It will be seen from the Report that the past year has been one of considerable progress, and the unusually large number of members now on the books, the increased attendance at the classes, and especially, the advantages the Society has acquired by its recent connection with the Government Science and Art Department, at South Kensington, lead to the confident anticipation of a future career of still greater usefulness. There are now 21 Classes connected with the Society meeting on different evenings at the rooms in Temple Street, including Classes in Art, Science, Language, and Literature. Five additional Classes have been introduced since our last Report, viz.—Practical Geometry, Chemistry, Building Construction, Mechanical Drawing, and Perspective. The number of students who have entered the Society during the year is upwards of 550, being an increase of about 250 over the preceding year.

The actual number of members on the books for the year is 564, with an average regular attendance of upwards of 300. The difference in these figures is, however, owing to the ever changing circumstances in which many young men are placed. The number of Lectures delivered has not been so numerous as in former years, the requirements of the Classes rendering the use of the Lecture Room necessary. In consequence of this and for other reasons, it has been decided to dispense with the usual courses of

Public Lectures on Saturday evenings.

The following is a list of the Lectures delivered at the commencement of the year:—Jan. 18.—Chemistry, Mr. J. Edmonds; Jan. 25.—On Reading Poetry and Speaking Prose, Mr. J. Edmonds; a course of ten Lectures on "The Principles of Arithmetic" was delivered during February, March, and the beginning of April, by Mr. H. Watson; April 11.—On "The Sea," Mr. H. Ball; April 18.—"The Physiology of Nations," Wihu Burritt, Esq., M.A.; May 2.—On "Air and Water," Mr. J. Edmonds.

The Lecture room has also been occupied on several Saturday evenings by the Drawing Classes, including the class for sketching from nature; the examination of Students for Prizes; the distribution of Prizes and Public Meetings of the Elocution Class.

On the 26th of May, the students in English, French, and Arithmetic were examined as to their proficiency, and Prizes were awarded to the successful competitors.

In the autumn of the past year it was considered desirable to connect the Society with the Science and Art Department at South Kensington. With this view a number of gentlemen were requested to act as a Committee, and having kindly consented, the requisite arrangements were forthwith made, and the aid of well-qualified Drawing and Science masters secured. Since this valuable addition to the Society was made the number of members has largely increased. Students in these classes are now eligible to compete in the local Government Science and Art examinations, including Whitworth Scholarships, Royal Exhibitions in the School of Mines, Medals, Queen's Prizes, and Government

Certificates. It will be seen from the foregoing Report that the Society has done, and is doing, a work of great usefulness. Its promoters have for many years refrained from asking aid from external sources, but its operations having extended and the subscriptions (which are fixed at a low rate to suit the convenience of young working men) being inadequate fully to meet the increased expenses, the Committee would feel thankful for donations to enable them to promote and develop such plans as the results of past years warrant them in continuing; and thus to accomplish a strong desire which has long existed in their minds, namely, to make this Society one of the permanent Institutions of Birmingham. The fact that existing educational Institutions do not offer sufficient provision to supply the increasingly felt wants of instruction on the part of our young working men, and the statement lately made public that hundreds of young men are unable to obtain admission to the Classes of the Midland Institute for want of room, furnish additional force to this appeal. It may be questioned whether any wiser or more efficient mode of meeting the wants of the town in these respects can be conceived than that of aiding Societies which, like this, are largely supported by the payments of their members; indicating on their part an appreciation of the value of knowledge, and a desire to secure its benefits.

The chief Officers of the Society are, Edward Watson, Esq., President; Treasurer, Mr. A. Langford; Hon. Sec., Mr. J. Edmonds; with a General Committee of 24 gentlemen and Secretary, D. Taylor; together with a Special Committee in relation to the Science and Art Department (now in connection with the Society), of which the

Chairman is Mr. Alderman H. Manton, with a Committee of nine gentlemen and Secretary, A. Southall.

Edinburgh, The Royal Society.

—On the 1st March, The Royal Society met in the Royal Institution —Sir William Thomson, one of the Vice-Presidents, in the chair. There was a large attendance. At the request of the Council, a paper was read by Prof. Allman on the gorilla and other anthropomorphic apes recently acquired by the Edinburgh Museum of Science and Art.

The Professor described the geographical distribution, structure, and classification of the quadrumana generally, dwelling more particularly on those of the four anthropomorphic apes, the gibbon, orang, chimpanzee, and gorilla. He entered into a comparison between man and the apes, and concluded with remarks suggested by this comparison. It is quite certain that in physical conformation man approaches more nearly to the gorilla or the chimpanzee than these do to the lower apes. Must we, therefore, while the gorilla and these lower apes are included in a common zoological order, logically unite with them man as another member of that order? I believe not; and, in the first place, for this reason, that while the gorilla graduates by intermediate forms into the lower monkeys, there are no connecting forms yet discovered between man and the gorilla. I must, notwithstanding the able advocacy of the opposite view by so acute and philosophic a zoologist as Professor Huxley, continue to regard the bimana as a logically constituted order, distinct from that of the quadrumana.

In thus assigning to man an order distinct from that of the quadrumana, we must beware of

giving to such a distinction more importance than it deserves, and of overlooking the obvious relations not only between man and the apes, but between man and every other mammal. And why should we hesitate to recognise these relations or feel alarmed or humiliated at their discovery? The grand differences after all between man and the brutes lie in psychological phenomena, and not in any recognisable physical conformation. There is no race, however low, in which the rudiments of the highest intellectual endowments may not be detected; and though it may be true, what travellers tell us, that the aboriginal Australian cannot count beyond five, the fact of his counting at all shows that he can recognise the fundamental relation of number, and that he is gifted with a faculty which under the required conditions of development may culminate in the fluxions of a Newton or the quaternions of a Hamilton—a development, however, which we are not to look for in the individual or limit in time, for it can only be conceived of as the work of ages—as the operation of that progress, slow but sure, which, after countless generations, has educated the civilized man from the brute-like savage.

Man alone is capable of conceiving the relations of number. The simplest numerical proposition which it is possible to frame is incomprehensible to the highest brute. "One and one are two" involves an idea to all but man utterly unintelligible. While a faculty of imitating gestures and sounds is possessed by many brutes, man alone has the power of what may be termed imitative delineation and imitative constructiveness, or the faculty of expressing the forms of objects by drawing and construction. This is eminently a human

faculty; we find it in the lowest and most degraded savage; and almost the very earliest evidence we possess of human intelligence—the intelligence of a period when man was as yet the contemporary of the mammoth, and when the reindeer roamed with him along the slopes of the Pyrenees—almost the earliest evidence we possess of the manifestation of human intellect is to be found in portraits of that mammoth and of that reindeer scratched on fragments of their tusks and of their horns. And yet there is no physical obstacle to the exercise of this power by animals. The beak and the claw are implements as effective as the rude flint-point of the savage, and there is nothing in the physical conformation of the gorilla to prevent that flint-point from becoming in his hand an implement of design. Man alone anticipates the termination of life; he alone can image to himself a future state, and approach to a comprehension of the Infinite. Of man alone it can be said that his knowledge is cumulative—that the results of his intelligence are progressive and improvable from generation to generation. And finally, and above all, man alone is gifted with the faculty of speech, an endowment which no recognisable difference in physical structure can in any way explain.

What matter, then, if man, participating as we know him to do in a common vertebrate, or even a common mammal structure, is a little more or a little less removed in his physical conformation from the chimpanzee, or the dog, or the ox? Deep and wide, and still unbridged, is that chasm which separates from them all, him who can carry his thoughts back into the indefinite past and forward into the untold future; who can discourse to us of what this world was,

countless ages before it was yet tenanted by the human race—of its ancient seas and its ancient seashores, and of the plants and the animals which inhabited them—beings which played their parts in the history of that old world, and then vanished from its living forms, until man's time in the great progress had arrived, and he became the interpreter of the past, and called them once more into life from their sleep of ages. Or who can send his prophetic vision into the future, or make known to us the events of the coming centuries; who can predict the arrival of the comet, or tell us of the moment in still remote time when the shadow of our satellite shall sweep over the earth, and can trace out its dark path as surely as if he were but watching the shadow of a cloud as it passes over the mountain side? For whom space no more than time can raise a barrier to knowledge, or render impossible the determination of the physical constitution of the universe in regions so remote that in estimating their distances our dealings seem almost to be with infinity; who can give expression to his ideas of beauty in the Parthenon of Athens, or in the cathedral towns of Milan, or Rouen, or Cologne; in the Venus and the Apollo, and the Laocoon; in "The Last Supper," which still throws a glory over the wall of that old convent at Milan; in "The Transfiguration" in the Vatican, and the "Madonna di San Sisto." Who can find in language a vehicle for his sublimest thoughts—thoughts which, when clothed in words, have made immortal the pages of Newton, and Leibnitz, and Hamilton, of Davy, and Faraday, and Oersted, of Aristotle and of Cuvier—who can weave these words into the inspired verse of Dante, and Shakspeare, and Milton, and Goethe?

or who, when needs be, can bind them to the lightning's shaft, and over deserts of sand and mighty continents, and through the silent depths of the great ocean, send them rushing round the world? What matter if, at the other side of that vast gulf which separates us from every living thing besides, we can yet recognise a bone or a muscle or a nerve-mass identical in conformation with our own—for still in the unapproachable characteristics of humanity there is enough to awaken within us gratitude for the present and hope in the future. Lord NEAVES expressed his general concurrence in the views of Professor Ailman. There was no other public business before the Society.

LONDON: *The Victoria Institute.*—The ordinary meeting of the Victoria Institute was held Feb. 1st, at 9, Conduit Street, Regent Street, Rev. W. Mitchell, M.A., Vice-president, in the chair. A paper was read by the Rev. Dr. Wm. Josiah Irons, author of "The Whole Doctrine of Final Causes,"—"Analysis of Human Responsibility." The writer, after an introductory reference to Positivism, pointed out the difficulties of the fact of accountability, which fact, however, must be accepted. He showed that it implies approbation and disapprobation, and involves ideas of right and wrong; that right is the relation of approbation to some good, both the good in itself and in the doer; that the latter implies some freedom, within limits; that approbation and praise, and their opposites, imply contingency, or a possibility of doing or of refraining from doing. The writer next examined the question of "God" as referrible to the conscious agent; and advanced to the question of various kinds of responsibility in the social system, involving the adjustment of relations, often inscrut-

able, between man and man. Further, it was shown how some difficulties are met—(1), in the pre-Christian philosophies, by merging the right in the useful, and how met (2) in modern civilization and law by imperfect approximations to a moral ideal, at best, and chiefly by utilizing the religious convictions. Finally, the need of a supreme governing power was shown if there be finite responsible agency, unless there be a denial of facts. The paper was marked by the well known ability of the author, and was listened to with the closest attention by a large audience. In the discussion that ensued the following took part:—Rev. Dr. Rigg, James Reddie, Esq., Rev. C. A. Row, and Rev. D. Greig, &c., in the course of which many able remarks were made.

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Young Men's Christian Association, Edinburgh.—The Literary Section held their annual *soirée* in the Craigie Hall. The President, Mr. Tause, W.S., occupied the chair, and was supported by several members of the General Committee of the Association. The evening was very pleasantly spent in listening to addresses, songs, recitations, readings, &c., given by the members, and in social intercourse with each other. The Report was read by the Secretary. In this it was stated, *inter alia*, that the number of members at present on the roll is 43. That essays have been read on the following subjects, viz.:—Lord Byron; Woman's Sphere and Work in the World; Are the Tendencies of the Present Age towards Universal Goodness? This World not the only Inhabited Body; Spirit-rapping; Wallace; The Duties of the Government of a Free State; and Thackeray. That the Debates have been as follows:—

Has literature done more than science for the interests of mankind?

Ought the Catholic Emancipation Bill to have been passed?

Ought married life to be happier than single?

Was Hannibal a greater general than Cæsar?

Ought organs to be used in Presbyterian churches?

Does poetry decline with the advancement of civilization?

Was Oliver Cromwell a hypocrite?

Does the present multiplicity of periodicals retard intellectual progress?

Do great cities conduce to the morals and religion of a nation?

The report concluded with a few observations, of which the following is the first:—

The mere recital of these titles expresses very inadequately the nature of our mimic warfare. We must therefore leave you to imagine what we cannot describe.

Many a good, honest, straightforward thrust has been given against sluggishness, and pride, and vanity. A better and nobler spirit has been infused into every member of our section, and an impulse given to go forward in the right direction. This world is no place for dreamers, and we desire none such amongst us. We wish diligent, persevering fellow-workers. We look upon man's exalted position, and still higher destiny, and we feel and believe that now is the time in which we must fit ourselves for the great realities of life. Time is winging its way with rapid flight, and human life is all too short for the work to be accomplished. Whatever therefore may be the ambition of the young men of the period, let it be understood that we consider time too valuable to be wasted in idle pursuits, and in pleasures which leave nothing but a sting behind.

Literary Notes.

MR. LEAVITT, a clergyman of New York, is the winner of the gold medal of the Cobden Club for the prize essay on "The best way of developing improved political and commercial relations between Great Britain and the United States." The essay is to be published by the club. The following subject has been chosen for the prize essay for the annual gold medal of the Cobden Club for the present year:—"Free Trade in its Relation to the Colonies and Dependencies of Great Britain." The essays are to be sent in to Mr. Thomas Bayley Potter, M.P., Honorary Secretary, Reform Club, London, before the 1st Jan., 1870. No essay is to exceed in length fifty pages of the *Quarterly or North American Review*. The committee reserve the right of publishing the successful essay.

It is said that forty-five different volumes containing notes made by Napoleon I., at St. Helena, have been found among the family papers of Princess Baciocchi.

An edition of James Mill's "Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind" with notes illustrative and critical by George Grote, Alexander Bain, Andrew Findlater, editor of Chambers's *Encyclopædia*, and by his son, J. S. Mill, has just been issued from the press, in two vols., 8vo.

An important work on "Congregationalism," being six essays on the several relations of Nonconformity, in the manner of the "Essays and Reviews" is announced.

Robert Williams has been for some time engaged on a new translation of Aristotle's *Ethics*, apparently in dissatisfaction with the annotated and commented transla-

tion, not long ago given to British thinkers by Sir Alexander Grant, now Principal of the University of Edinburgh.

A History of Norman Kings, by Thomas Cobbe, may be looked for at an early date.

J. P. Collier has reprinted, in his yellow series, all the pamphlets connected with the *Nash and Harvey* controversy in Shakespeare's time.

Mr. Catlin, the prairie traveller, has a work on "The Rocky Mountains" in preparation.

Sam, John, Vander Bergh, the Flemish poet, who died recently, has left behind him a translation of *Enoch Arden*, which will be published shortly.

The Marnix Association has resolved on the publication of all the documents connected with the period of the history of the Reformation in the Netherlands.

"Short Studies in English," a collection of essays, is to be issued by Richard Morris, as an *Avant-Courier* to his projected English Grammar, historically considered.

G. W. Edgington has issued Vol. I. of a translation of the *Odyssey* in blank verse, as a companion to Earl Derby's *Iliad*.

The property in Halfway, Irvine, N.B., comprising the house in which James Montgomery, "the Christian poet," was born, and the Moravian chapel in which his father preached, have been brought to public sale, and bought by Mr. Maxwell Dick, bookseller. We understand that Mr. Dick has made the purchase for the Irvine Burns Club, the members of which had some time ago expressed a desire to secure the buildings, and maintain them in good repair, *in memoriam* Ayrshire's Christian Burns.

The Philosophy of Politics.

SOVEREIGNTY.

"Make high majesty look like itself."—*Shakspeare.*

POLITICS is, acknowledgedly, one of the most difficult of those subjects upon which human speculation can be employed. To bring Experience and Theory into harmony, and to show how, the incidents and accidents of history notwithstanding, Politics is not a mere empirical and experimental but a truly inductive and deductive science, are tasks not perhaps easy of accomplishment. But if patient reflection, careful reading, and consistent thought, are applied to the topics that arise in the course of considering "the Philosophy of Politics," some good results should surely be gained; and even if a satisfactory solution of the several difficulties that show themselves may not be attained, some part of the results may probably be beneficial to those who pursue the speculations undertaken, in a thoughtful spirit. Either some matter tending to set the subjects treated of in a proper light shall be brought forward, or, at least, a given pathway of thought having been explored, shall be shown to be ineffective in leading to the right and proper end of speculative toil. We dare not profess that we have reached absolute truth, but we do profess to have attempted to carry from thought to thought, as each occurred, such light as our powers of reasoning could supply, and to have exposed each to such tests as logic suggested.

The object of these papers is not to bring forward all that may be said on, and so to exhaust the topics under review, nor to advance dogmatical opinions upon them, but to place before the reader such ideas as seem to bear most directly on the object in view, and so to suggest and produce reflections which may tend to promote the intelligent study of political questions. This we explained in our introductory paper, and in our subsequent articles on "The State" and "Citizenship" we have endeavoured to adhere to our programme. We now require to consider the embodied power of the State, the corporate and tutelary authority issuing from, and ultimately depending upon the citizens, yet operating for their repression, control, and subjection; in other words, the

"Power,
Pre-eminence, and all the large effects
That troop with Majesty"

The affirmative force of a nation, the sum of its determinations, and the distinct purpose which a State has in view at any given
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time require realization. To this end they must be effectively concentrated and unified, must have a centre of action, and a trustworthy mainspring, by which the civic intents may be set to work and kept working so as to effect the aims in view. To this we give the name of Sovereignty. It is

"That spirit upon whose spirit depend and rest
The lives of many." . . . "It is a massy wheel
Fixed on the summit of the highest mount,
To whose large spokes ten thousand lesser things
Are mortised and adjoined."

It is the fixed point from and on which power works. To adjust efforts to obstacles constitutes effective power, and it is the duty of the supreme power of States to lead the free, active forces of its members to such manifestations as agree with the ends of the organization of the society, to restrain from all or any sort of acts which may impede progress towards that end. Sovereignty is State force and mastery. It is originative and executive, and is the main efficacy by which the moral world is advanced. It is, in reality, a positive, affirmative, manageable centre of activity; the nation's concentrated strength and the pith and sinew of civilization. It translates determining into doing, absorbs deliberation and transforms it into practical action. It is the continuous receiver and distributor of the vital force of civil life, "the drill-serjeant," to use a Carlyleism, of the State. Such sovereignty is looked at in the abstract. Independent, originating, governing, controlling, exciting, executive power or force, make it a causative energy. In the concrete, sovereignty takes many subdivisions of signification. "Hence historians and other writers, in describing the acts of a government, often use such expressions as monarch, king, sovereign, prince interchangeably, as if they exactly corresponded with one another and were convertible terms. A farther variety is likewise sought in metaphors, as crown, sceptre, throne," &c. But these, though answering well enough in ordinary cases, especially to enable the writer "to avoid the monotony of recurrent phrases, do not, in scientific composition, keep the mind sufficiently fixed on the main idea of chief—because concentrated and recognised—force and supreme power. Looked at, philosophically, as a prime force and first cause in State-craft, sovereignty implies and suggests much that it does not include or bring out by its associations when considered as an element of practical existence. But we must get hold of the pure idea of sovereignty in Philosophic Politics before we are able to form any theory; when we come to concrete applications, it will take on conditioning characteristics as readily and easily as the perfect circles of theoretical geometry adapt themselves to practical architecture and mechanics. Sovereignty, when thought of in its essence, is free power, force concentrated yet independent. When, however, it becomes concrete as an element of a State, it becomes conditioned by the end held

in view by the State when incorporating it, and so loses its independence and freedom by contracting an alliance in which a given purpose prevails. Sovereignty then resigns its freeness of force, and engages to employ itself in developing the State, in quickening and widening civilization, and the State consents to the concentration and invigoration of its forces by adopting sovereignty as one of the agents of civilization. Each conditions the other, as we shall see in the sequel.

Sovereignty signifies supreme power. Etymologically it is derived from the Low Latin of the Middle Ages. Ducange gives *supranus*, formed from *supra*, after the model of *superus* from *super*. *Supra* means "on the upper side, above, beyond, or over;" *supranus* being above, beyond, or predominant over all. From this word we get the Italian musical term *soprano*, the highest of the voices, treble, and by mutation of *p* into *v* *sovrano*, the highest in position, chief—as in Milton's "Ode on the Morn'g of Christ's Nativity," line 60:—

"As if they surely knew their Sovran Lord was by ;"

and in Coleridge's "Hymn before Sunrise in the Vale of Chamouni," line 3:—

"Hast thou a charm to stay the morning star
In his steep course? So long he seems to pause
On thy bald awful head, O Sovran (Kingly) Blanc!"

Our common word, *sovereign*, comes to us through the French *soverain*, from *supranum regnum*, and thus the modern spelling is accounted for. Sovereignty, as regards a State, signifies independence of external coercive authority, the possession of self-sustaining and self-governing power, internal autonomy. Men aggregated into communities must vest their power really, officially, representatively, or formally in some distinct, supreme, recognisable, and responsible chief, and in regard to this real or delegated predominance, headship, or primacy among men, the person is said to hold the sovereignty, to be sovereign, to possess the reins of government, and is usually spoken of as being the original and source of all the power, authority and honour, belonging to the State.

"The only way," says Hobbes, "to erect such a common power as may be able to defend them (i.e., the members of a commonwealth) from the invasion of foreigners and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort as that by their own industry and by the fruits of the earth they may nourish themselves and live contentedly, is to confer all their power and strength upon one man or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will; which is as much as to say, to appoint one man or assembly of men to bear their person, and every-one to own and acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that beareth their person shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern the common peace and safety,

and therein to submit their wills every one to his will, and their judgments to his judgment. This is more than consent or concord, it is a real unity of them all, in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner as if every man were to say to every man—*I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition—that thou give up thy right to him and authorize all his actions in like manner.* By this authority, given him by every particular man in the commonwealth, he hath the use of so much power and strength conferred on him that, by terror thereof, he is enabled to perform the wills of them all, to peace at home and mutual aid against their enemies abroad. And in him consisteth the essence of the commonwealth, which, to define it, is *one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves, every one, the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient for their peace and common defence.*

And he that carrieth this person is called *sovereign*, and is said to have sovereign power, and every one besides to be his *subject*.*

"Civil society is impossible except under the sway of common rules of action or defined laws, and these laws must not only be enforceable on each, but the right so to enforce them must be vested in some specially recognised member or members of the community."

"Those members of the community whose office it thus is to enforce the rules through which the community subsists, are, for this purpose, invested with rights—termed the rights of Government. The possessor of these rights is said to have authority in the community."†

The supreme authority in a community, to whom the ultimate enforcement of the powers of the State are confided, is (under whatever name he may be spoken of) the *Sovereign*.

"The acts of the State are those in which the members of the State, according to their respective positions, share, at least by assent and sympathy, if not by joint action." "The existence of a State is continuous, and its moral character is, in like manner, continuous. Its acts must have a coherence. Its life is its history, and in its present acts it must have a regard to its past history so as not to interrupt the vital connection of one period with another. The State may reform its conduct and improve its views, and it may do this rapidly and even suddenly, but it must preserve some identity through the change, else the State's moral agency vanishes in the supposed reformation. If each person who successively occupied the place of Governor might at once proclaim his own views as the doctrines of the State, the act would be of little or no value, since the proclamation of to-day might be superseded by a contrary one to-morrow."‡

* *Hobbes' Leviathan*, part ii., chap. 17, Works, vol. iii., p. 157.

† *Whewell's Elements of Morality including Po'ity*, Vol. i., Book II., chap. 6, p. 117.

‡ *Ibid.* Vol. ii., Book V., chap. 3, p. 184-5.

This shows clearly that the continuity of a nation's life and history depends on its progress and its laws, not on the arbitrary actions of its nominal or even its real chief, and proves that law is the ultimate sovereign—the guide of the chief, the controller of citizens, the arbiter of rights, and the preserver of States.

Originally, it is probable that the idea of sovereignty took its rise in the suggestions of the patriarchate:—that the headship of nations bore an analogy to the father of a family, extended afterwards to a tribe, and thence to all the servants, indwellers, and connections of the tribe. This headship, or chieftaincy, would be lovingly obeyed and lovingly administered, the considerations of policy being such as would meet with the ready concurrence of all the members of the tribe and their dependants, and would secure the hearty enforcement of all its members. Though having its root in the affections of the family, and practically a despotism, it would be, through the sense of relationship between chief and tribesubject in general, a tyranny tempered with love in its administration and supported by affection in those who were under dominion. Natural feeling would prompt kindly and considerate treatment in the superior, and enlist the best spirits in the tribe to submission and respect. Common counsel would not unfrequently be taken with those who stood nearest in relationship to the patriarch, or who were recommended to him as wise in regard to the matter under consideration, while kindly remonstrance concerning special decisions would secure exemption from obedience or a repeal of the injurious legislation. So long as the sense of brotherhood prevailed among a tribe, the patriarchal government would be a sovereignty of might, excellence, and suitability. But when that failed and the ties of affectionate rulership and subserviency were broken by accident or necessity, the patriarchate would cease to be possible as an original form of government, commending itself to men's minds and commanding submission from those who were nominally under the sway of such chieftaincy. This is most probably the source whence the idea of "the divine right of kings" has been received. The family is a divine institution, and the rulership of the family is naturally and properly vested in the parents, and especially as sovereign power in the father and as sovereign love in the mother. The extension of the family relations to those of the tribe or race appears to be not only politic but inevitable; for marriage and kindred complicate life and society. At the same time, also, they weaken the natural bonds of allegiance, and introduce tendencies to divergence, insubordination, disputes regarding obedience and power, sometimes leading to co-ordinate claims, conflicting jurisdiction, and contentions as to the seat of power. In such circumstances two modes of settlement alone seem possible, namely (1), a contract regulative of the causes and terms of the sovereignty claimed and the obedience promised, and (2) the forcible assertion of the right to govern successfully, upheld against opposing claimants and effectively maintained over those who are

declared to be under obligation to give suit and service. The former suggests the social contract or institutional sovereignty, and the latter brings before us the idea of government by conquest or acquisitional sovereignty.

Of a social contract the main end, so far as concerns the subjects, is, of course, security of life, person, property, and so much of freedom as is compatible with the supremacy of the sovereign and the mutual rights of the parties to the compact. This implies (1) an agreement to form a community, commonwealth, or state, wherein, by mutual covenant, the contracting parties undertake to live and labour together upon certain conditions. This is the *pact of union*. But it requires, moreover (2), an agreement to place the supreme power of the whole multitude for defence against enemies, for the maintenance of peace, prosperity, and submission among the citizens in the hands of one chief, as formal head, which may be denominated the *pact of submission*. To this must be added (3) an undertaking by the person or persons on whom the supreme power is conferred to promote the public good according to the form or mode involved in the provisions of union; and this may be called the *pact of sovereignty*. We do not assert that all these points have ever been historically and consciously laid down in explicit terms and in definite form, but we cannot conceive a social contract real or implied, as a ground for the institution of a government which would not involve, in the progress of its development, these considerations and covenants, not only on behalf of the subjects, but also in favour of the supreme power in the long run and issue of events.

The acquisition of sovereignty by force has, if we may believe history, been much more frequent among men than the institution of it by contract. Conquest has, in all ages, had a glow of glory shed over it, and war has been one of humanity's mighty means of change. The sword has always been recognised as giving indisputable title deeds to sovereignty. Probably the earliest manifestations of the might of conquest arose out of the difficulties of maintaining the patriarchal relation in the midst of the changes which take place by intermarriage, immigration, extension of territory, and the progress of wealth, commerce, and luxury. Power is not only one of the greatest of luxuries in itself, but, as the means of attaining almost every other luxury, it possesses singular fascinations for men. The love of power is perhaps the most active propensity of men. In the form of war, force becomes one of the simplest of arbiters in regard to the fortune of states and their sovereigns. Force is one of the ultimate powers of humanity, and is much more easily wielded and phalanxed than argument and moral right. Hence the sword has often opened up a short cut to the throne, and the right of conquest has generally been perforce admitted to be a good and sufficient title to sovereign power, so long as it remains unchallengeable by a greater and more peremptory force than it can bring into the field.

Sovereignty is acquired by force when, in consequence of placing men under fear of death or in terror of bondage, or of bringing them into danger of stripes, exile, poverty, capture, and enforced servitude, the inhabitants of a territory are compelled to come under the yoke of the conqueror and submit to the will of the victor, and so are put under the necessity of authorizing, permitting, and enduring every act and determination of him who has vanquished the country or those who have forcefully intruded on their lives, liberty, and former civil state. The sovereignty attained by war, however, is most usually maintained by some show of moral, legal, or hereditary right, and may also be said, in the long-run and up-shot, to involve a contract of submission to the claim of the victor in the performance of certain duties, and a compact of sovereignty in so far as that, on these duties being rightly performed, the conqueror and lord shall observe certain conditions towards those who obey, which, by perpetuity of endurance, become restraints on the original power of the sovereign and rights on the part of the subjects. In this way it is that society cements itself by bonds of alliance, associates and consociates rights and duties, and, as a condition of submitting to the constraints of civil life, insists on the recognition of certain restraints, under real or implied agreement, on the exercise of sovereign power. "Dominion acquired by conquest, or victory in war," says Hobbes, "is that which some writers call despotical, from *despotes*, which signifieth *lord* or *master*, and is the dominion of a master over a servant. And this dominion is then acquired to the victor, when the vanquished, to avoid the present stroke of death, covenanteth either in express words, or by other sufficient signs of the will, that so long as his life and the liberty of the body are allowed to him, the victor shall have the use thereof at his pleasure."* Even in this case, however, the sovereign gradually ceases to be the absolute and unconditional master of his subjects, and forbears to regard them as his goods and chattels, as instruments or insensient things to be disposed of at his pleasure. Habits are formed, customs arise, forms of intercourse are instituted, and these concrete into generally acknowledged rights, consequent on the proper performance of certain duties. Thus a sort of social contract is, in reality, entered into by implication, and even a despot withholds his hand from tyrannous oppression gratuitously, and inspires a kind of reverential obedience, in reciprocation of the customary forms of life allowed in his dominions, and the understood coincidence of a given course of treatment with a given course of conduct, whether friendly or the reverse.

Thus, under every form of sovereignty, we see law emerging as the ultimate and conditioning element of social life, as the regulator alike of the rights of the chief and the duties of subordinates, the magisterial and efficacious arbiter of power and obedience, of the rights of the sovereign and the citizen. In the patriarchate,

* *Leviathan*, part ii., ch. 20. Hobbes' Works, vol. iii., p. 188.

perhaps, the law of love—love as the family bond of mankind—predominated; in despotism the law of force; and in constitutionalism the law of utility. But in all, we notice the gradual assimilation of all the various conditions of life into fixed and definite forms, and either constituting in themselves, or by mutual concurrence have the force of laws. These form a check on the rebellious tendencies of the people, and on the tyrannous or exceptional exercise of power by the monarch; both the security and guarantee for the beneficial exercise of power, and the ground and condition of willing submission. Law has two great auxiliaries to insist on its definiteness and impartiality. The first is the need for determining the balance of interests in the commonwealth, and the second, the growth and progress of public opinion. The conflict of interests necessitates some general forms and means of deciding upon and balancing them in such a manner as to procure peace and secure justice. On these decisions, and the facts on which they depend, public opinion deliberates; and with the progress and development of a healthy public opinion, law is improved, and power and popular rights are reconciled. Thus law acquires a unanimous sovereignty over nations, and monarchs not only govern according to but are ruled by it.

“States, like individuals, have a continuous existence; a series of purposes and actions; a connected course of being; a *life*.” The State is a unity and a permanency; not only a collection of individuals, but of individuals possessing relative rights, and performing correlative duties; and so forming a community in which property, life, condition, privilege, municipality, family, &c., are regulated by defined law. Law is the authority and magistrate of civil life. Law is sovereignty. There is no power in a State above law; all power is according to law, and must be conformable therewith. The Sovereign is the representative of the law, which is supreme over all persons and authorities within a State. The law contains the expressed will of the State. The will of the State overrules that of any one forming part of it; and hence that will is enforceable by penal sanctions. These desires issuing by due determination from the State, the sovereign authority is bound to see observed and carried out; and hence law is also the guide and condition of the exercise of sovereignty. While enforcing law, impartially and discreetly, obedience and submission are due, and worthily so. When neglecting to comply with or to enforce the laws properly enacted of the State, the Sovereign possesses, unless under exceptional circumstances, no right to compel submission. The actual historical idea of sovereignty is by no means so clear and steady as that which theory advances. The position, powers, revenues, mode of election or succession, and other circumstances of office and its tenure, have been so far from uniform, that it is impossible to lay down any general proposition regarding these things that will hold true of all or of the greater part. It might serve some good purpose, however, in the clearing

up of the comprehension of history, were we to notice here some of the more ordinary mistakes made concerning sovereignty by ordinary readers.

In popular discourse and common composition royalty is treated of as if it were equivalent to sovereignty, and a king is spoken of as a sovereign without any reference to whether he possesses the supreme power, or exercises only a part of it; but royalty is a term of *status* and rank, not necessarily indicative of investiture with any determinate political functions; it is a title denoting dignity of position, not might or majesty of power. A royal person is not necessarily one who is reigning, and the duties of persons bearing this title have varied and do vary from the mere bearing of this honorary designation, to the performance of most of, if not all the functions of supreme political government. This depends on historic accident and change, and these and other elements of confusion tend to unsettle in the minds of men the grounds which determine the difference between royalty and sovereignty.

Again: Monarchy is not unfrequently employed as a synonym for sovereignty; and this might be an exact equivalent if States were always placed under the supreme power of one person; for monarchy (from *monos*, one, and *arche*, government) properly signifies the government of a single individual. The sovereign power, however, as in republics, is often shared by a few (which constitutes an oligarchy), and not unfrequently is entirely based on the wish of the people (in which case it forms a democracy), and even in monarchies (so-called) the sovereign power is sometimes vested in one purely, absolutely, and unconditionally, and at other times it is what is called limited, constitutional, or mixed, in which the sovereignty rests with the king and his responsible advisers, the former being representatively the executive of the nation and the fountain of honour, and the latter being really the dispensers of patronage, the performers of the national will, and the promoters of civilization within the realm.

The existing usage, issuing as it does from the accidents of history, appears to be difficult of explanation; but if we rightly interpret the events by which the present has been brought about, we shall find that sufficient reasons have arisen in the course of ages to change the current usages of statesmanship, and to make a reconstruction of the idea of sovereignty advisable, and a change in the thing itself advantageous.

"When the representative is one man, then is the commonwealth a MONARCHY; when an assembly of all that will come together, then it is a DEMOCRACY, or popular commonwealth; when an assembly of a part only, then it is called an ARISTOCRACY. Other kinds of commonwealth there can be none; for either one, or more, or all, must have the sovereign power, which I have shown to be indivisible, entire.

"There be other names of government in the histories and books of policy, as *tyranny* and *oligarchy*; but they are not the names

of other forms of government, but of the same forms disliked. For they that are discontented under *monarchy*, call it *tyranny*; and they that are displeased with *aristocracy*, call it *oligarchy*; so also, they which find themselves grieved under a *democracy*, call it *anarchy*, which signifies want of government; and yet, I think, no man believes that want of government is any new kind of government; nor by the same reason ought they to believe that the government is of one kind when they like it, and another when they dislike it, or are oppressed by the governors."*

Thus we see that not only may the same words have dissimilar meanings, but not unfrequently dissimilar meanings are included under the same words. These things greatly embarrass all—but especially political—speculation.

The following may be regarded as conditions applicable to modern sovereignty:—

1. The sovereign power is derived from and is representative only of the laws of the State; that is the will of the citizens duly expressed and promulgated. Of the organic unity, the State, the Sovereign is the formal and efficient agent and chief.

2. The best is the right sovereignty. To this consideration, if test be required, all claimants must submit. Sovereignty is required for behoof of the State; the State is not instituted for behoof of the Sovereign. That which best effects the purposes of civil life, according to the expressed or implied will of the State, is the right sovereignty. Unless a given sovereignty possesses the natural, moral, legal, and peculiar qualifications requisite for the maintenance, progress, and prosperity of the State, according to its given constitution, the civic life of the State is jeopardized, and the very intention of sovereignty is frustrated.

3. Sovereignty ought to restrain itself, or be restricted to what it can thoroughly accomplish and achieve; especially ought it to reserve itself within the limits of the law, of morals, and of right. Neither ought it to press unduly on the subject's ability to obey, lest obedience be transformed into resistance.

4. Sovereignty ought to be rigidly confined to the enforcement and observance of the laws of the State over which it exercises authority, and ought not to intermeddle with the government and sovereignty of other States, unless in just and proper time, place, circumstance, and condition.

Sovereign power implies all the might and authority which are essential to the government of men in civil communities with civil rights. These may be briefly exhibited in the following tabular form:

Sovereignty is either	{	1 Formal	{	1 Honorary or Ornamental
				2 Representative
	2 Effective	3 Ratificatory		
		1° Executive		
		2° Legislative		
		3° Jurisprudential		
		4° Prerogative		

* Hobbes' *Leviathan*, part ii., ch. 19. Works, vol. iii., p. 171.

Sovereignty is exercised in a threefold form, in, over, and of a nation. Formal sovereignty includes the right of taking the chief place on all state occasions, of receiving homage and recognition as the source of honour and privilege, and of being invested with insignia of power and dominion. On State occasions the Sovereign represents, acts for, and is recognised by the nation as impersonating and being in regard to international transactions, to all intents and purposes the State itself. Hence the sovereign power ratifies all treaties, alliances, honours, appointments, laws and privileges in name and on behalf of the State. Effective sovereignty necessitates supreme ultimate power over all the forces, civil and military, which the State can or may provide for its protection and progress; the right to claim and appropriate the services of those who are best able to accomplish the purposes of the State, and to enforce all legal submission to the ordinances and requirements of the State.

As the law is the expression of the desire of the State in its corporate capacity, all legislation flows, in its effective and enforceable form, from the Sovereign. It may be and is the result of the advice of counsellors really or impliedly competent and acknowledged, but the assent and consent of the Crown is that which imparts the last effective touch to the deliberative voice of the people. When legislation has taken form and been duly promulgated, the application of it to individual cases and the determination of its incidence falls next to be provided for and maintained. As the head of the executive, the Sovereign, either personally or by delegation, sets the law in operative motion, and decrees and demands recognisable submission to its requirements. In many cases, exceptional points arise on which there is no specific and applicable determination of the State, and the discretion which the State claims in dealing with all matters concerning it is lodged in the hands of the sovereign power. This discretion constitutes the prerogative of the Crown. It may be initiative, permissive, or in some instances abrogative, but in all cases it requires to be discreetly employed and brought into action. If overstretched it may be resisted, and if not exercised when due occasion arises, evil consequences may occur which were not contemplated by the law or the State; or good results may be lost to the State which may thereafter be irrecoverable.

In the early ages and stages of civil life, sovereignty was in a great measure *personal*; in our own time, circumstances have so changed that sovereignty has become almost *impersonal*. This fact is accounted for thus:—In the progress of intelligence knowledge is power: any one of those who first possessed the power of knowledge and were able to apply it was called "*Rex*, regulator, *Roi*; our own name is still better, *King*, *könning*, which means cunning, able man." Through such men—

"Order arose to harmonise brute force."

By mere force, the sovereign's will became law, and led to conquest, commerce, tax, tribute, submission. The Sovereign was then a great personality. As knowledge increased, more men became possessors of the secrets of power, and these claimed a share in the management of men, and ever as the waves of intelligence have spread over the earth, so over a wider area of mankind has the function of sovereignty extended, while the nominal and formal sovereign has, as a personality, more and more receded,—fading not into powerlessness but into impersonality, or becoming rather a fresh impersonation of law as the will not of himself, nor as the able-man of his age, but of the will of the State, the whole ability of which the Sovereign now representatively wields as the head and chief of a nation whose will has been transformed into law and been vested in him as Sovereign. Hence his personal impersonality.

It will be seen from what we have said that our theory of sovereignty is very different from that which constitutes the *Cæsarism* of Napoleon III., or the *Ablest man* government of Carlyle. The former affirms that "when Providence raises up such men as Cæsar, Charlemagne, and Napoleon, it is to trace out to peoples the path they ought to follow; to stamp with the seal of their genius a new era, and to accomplish in a few years the labours of many centuries." But then, how does Providence legitimate Cæsars and Napoleons, Cromwells and Washingtons as sovereign men, that they may follow them?—and by what certificate are we to do what Carlyle bids us, viz.: "Find in any country the ablest man that exists there; raise him to the supreme place, and loyally reverence him; you have a perfect government for that country." It may be true that "the ablest man; he means also the truest-hearted, justest, the noblest man;—what he tells us to do must be precisely the wisest, fittest, we could anywhere or anyhow learn; the thing which it will in all ways behove us, with right loyal thankfulness, and nothing doubting to do! Our *doing* and life were then, so far as government could regulate it, well regulated; that were the ideal of constitutions:" but we have no directory power either for gaining and knowing these ablest men Cæsars, and without that how can we ever get true sovereigns? Now, since by no adequate attainable test—competitive examination or otherwise—that man has yet been able to devise, can the true sovereign be got hold of by any *à priori* process—and any *à posteriori* one is both too late and too dangerous, we conclude that modern statesmanship has solved the question best by the institution of a personal impersonal sovereign—one who because he acts through constitutional and responsible advisers, "can do no wrong;" in his *impersonal* functions; and who, because he only acts within the expressed will of the people, as law, "can do no wrong" in his *personal* capacity. As a regulative and a registrative agency, such a sovereignty acts as perfectly as may be; as an administrative agency, provision is possible by ministry, parliaments, and subordinates to discover the

best and wisest as well as the most practicable course, in any given exigency or emergency, and on the whole the sovereignty of the law is the most endurable form in which the supreme power of the State can be exercised.

"In practical working, it is found expedient to separate the functions of sovereignty, and distribute the legislative, the judicial and the executive, each into different hands. The imperfection of humanity renders the legislator liable to a partial and undue estimate of the laws of his own enacting, and that he should regard them in some measure from his own share in the making of them, and not solely from their bearing upon public freedom. It is not safe that the legislator should be the judge of his own laws, nor, for the same reasons, that the judge should execute his own decisions. The bias of personal prejudice and private interest is best excluded by separating these functions of sovereignty to different officials. And then again, each one of these has in practice farther checks and balances imposed, in popular governments, for the sake of securing the public freedom better."*

Legislation is now done for him by constitutional advisers, representatives of the various opinions of his subjects; judicial proceedings are now delegated by him to others who interpret and apply the promulgated laws of the realm in his name and by his authority; and even sometimes for or against him, when he pleads before the national tribunals; even the executive functions are performed in a great measure by deputy and agency. Law legalizes this power, but law also insists on the responsibility of the agents, while securing to the sovereignty the impersonality now conceded to it. This, however, is a modern growth. The early sovereignties were intensely and peculiarly personal. The Greeks in their republics imparted to the sovereignty only a representative existence; but the Romans by the codification of jurisprudence give to law its noble place in civil life as the protector, regulator and improver of human rights. Even in the middle ages, the sense of right as a correlative of duty was but imperfectly recognised; and the acknowledged right to the full and free enjoyment of life, property, personal capacity and political independence, was possessed only by a favoured few. In more modern times the sovereignty of the citizen over himself—the right to find what there is in oneself—power to do; and to do that, within the limit of a similar right in others to do the same, has been proclaimed: so the sovereignty of the individual has been sanctioned by the sovereignty of law. Law controls individual choice and action, only for the greater freedom of the choice and action of all. The conservation of the greatest possible amount of right to the greatest possible number of citizens is now the true aim of sovereignty, and civil authority is no longer the tyrant but the protector of the individuality of the individual and the conservator of public freedom.

* L. P. Hickok's "System of Moral Science," p. 102.

Religion.

CAN THE GOSPELS BE HARMONIZED ?

NEUTRAL ARTICLE.

"I never did, and never shall, care about the question of Inspiration; no honest mind will make any dangerous mistake. There is inspiration enough to exclude error. If in religion you demand a demonstration which shall preclude the possibility of doubt, you cannot have it. An atheist seems to me a fool, yet I cannot absolutely demonstrate that there is a God."—*George Steward.*

"We have seen that each Gospel has its own features, and that the Divine element has controlled the human, not destroyed it. But the picture which they conspire to draw is one full of harmony. The histories are true according to any test that should be applied to a history; and the events that they select, though we could not presume to say that they were more important than what are omitted, except from the fact of the omission, are at least such as to have given the whole Christian church a clear conception of the Redeemer's life, so that no one has ever complained of insufficient means of knowing Him."—*Smith's Dictionary of the Bible: Art. Gospels.*

THE interest of our subject is twofold: it has a distinct and important bearing upon our conception of the human life of the Divine Master, and another upon the nature and extent of the inspiration on almost all hands attributed to the authors of the four histories of Christ. To an intelligent Christian it is a matter of deep enjoyment that he can trace, step by step, with at least a considerable degree of confidence, the growth and journeyings, experiences and teachings, of the Lord, and may also, by further reading and research, connect these with the localities and scenery of the favoured land—

"Those holy fields,
Over whose acres walked those blessed feet
Which, eighteen hundred years ago, were nailed
For our advantage to the bitter cross."

And he will also entertain a very strong desire to know exactly in what light to consider the records of that life, inasmuch as opinions are conflicting, at the present day, upon that prominent and, according to some, momentous question.

Instead of working from the facts disclosed by a fair and patient

comparison of the narratives to a knowledge, or at least a belief, concerning the existence and the nature of the Divine afflatus in their writers; it has often been the case that the true logical order has been reversed, a theory first formed, or foregone conclusion laid down, and such modes of *compelling* harmony resorted to as best seemed to hide or destroy what would otherwise be disagreements or differences between the various accounts.

As a help to my own more thorough study of the Saviour's life, and for the light which such a comparison casts upon the subject of inspiration, I have made a complete parallelism of the four *Evangelists* in the best chronological sequence it seemed possible to construct. It is almost needless to observe that this has not been done upon the principle of doubling and trebling the incidents narrated, because of slight discrepancies of time or place in the separate histories, which is sometimes applied as a means of explaining these away. Natural common sense, applied as to documents written by common sense persons, has been my guide. Difficulties have not been sought out, nor imagined, but neither have they been ignored. The question, then,—what have I found?—will lead at once to the subject of inquiry and to the facts upon which further opinions must be based.

We have four histories, varying in style and contents, respecting one character and life.

1. How far do they narrate the same events? An outline of the entire career of Him who is their subject is necessary to answer this. It is of course impossible to give this within the limits of an article, but each reader can form it for himself, or obtain it in any one of the published harmonies or chronological arrangements of the Gospels. I would specially mention the table prefixed to the New Testament section in the Religious Tract Society's admirable pocket paragraph Bible,* as being exceedingly useful in this respect, though I cannot wholly accept the order of events which its compiler has adopted.

It will be found, on examination of such a summary, that the following important passages are peculiar to Matthew: the adoration of the Magi; the departure into Egypt, and the return to Galilee; large portions of the Sermon on the Mount, particularly those upon the salt of the earth; the light of the world; the fulfilment of the law and the prophets; the sin of unrighteous and enduring anger, and the wickedness of evil thoughts as well as evil deeds; upon oaths; the seeking for publicity and repute in almsgiving and prayer; forgiveness dependent upon forgivingness; upon fasting; heavenly treasures; singlehearted service; trust in the Divine fatherly care; the broad and narrow ways (it must, however, be noticed that many of these passages were afterwards repeated by our Lord, and given in *their second connection* by Mark and Luke); Christ's upbraiding of the three cities; His

* Price 3s., or New Testament alone, 1s. 4d.

thankfulness that the lowly and simple-hearted attain to true wisdom; the invitation to the weary and heavy laden; the parable of the corn and tares; that of the leaven; those of the hidden treasure; the pearl of great price, and the net cast into the sea; the healing of the two blind men who followed Jesus; the casting out of the dumb devil; the larger portion of the exhortation to the disciples when they were first sent forth; the parable of the husbandmen and his hired labourers; that of the ten virgins; the account of the judgment at the coming of the Son of Man; the testimony of Pilate's wife in favour of Jesus; that governor's weak attempt to deny any share in the unjust condemnation of Jesus; the resurrection of the saints on the death of the Saviour; the precautions of the chief priests against the removal of His body; and His meeting with the disciples in Galilee.* Besides these, there are many incidental particulars, in accounts common to Matthew and one or more of the other Gospels, which are found in his history alone. Specially, the discourses of the great Teacher are given with a fulness which John alone can parallel. Matthew, however, confines himself, as a rule, to the practical teachings, John to the mystical side of Christian truth—Christ's and the soul's internal relationship to each other and to God.

Mark has not many passages which are not found elsewhere, but he frequently adds to the narratives of the other writers. He alone records the parable of the silently but surely growing seed; the healing of the deaf and stammering man; the restoration of the blind man at Bethsaida; and the incident of the young man who followed Christ after His betrayal and seizure, when the disciples had forsaken Him. In the following instances Mark's history is either more complete than the others, or presents circumstances which are not recorded in them:—the reasons of John's imprisonment, and Herod's feelings towards him; the subsequent preaching of Jesus; His teaching in the Capernaum synagogue, after the second calling of the disciples; the healing of the leper after (according to Matthew) the Sermon on the Mount; the withdrawal to the sea; the persistence of the people in following Him, and the charitable conclusion of His relatives; the stilling of the storm; the healing of the woman with an issue of blood; the raising to life of Jairus's daughter; the blessing of the children; the withering of the fig-tree; the character of Barabbas; the discovery of the open sepulchre; the final commission to the disciples; with others which must here be unnoted.

Mark's parallelism is chiefly with Matthew and Luke together; then with Matthew, Luke, and John; next with Matthew alone; and but little with Luke or John, whether singly or together, except where Matthew also corresponds.

Luke's is the completest of the four narratives. He both includes

* I have not named all the passages peculiar to Matthew: space precludes my doing so. The same remark will apply also to the other Gospels.

most of what the other historians relate, and, with the exception of the discourses, imparts the greatest amount of additional information.

The largest proportion of passages in Luke which are paralleled in Matthew, Mark, or John, appear in Matthew and Mark alone; next in order of number and importance are those common to the four; then those which are elsewhere found in Matthew only. Recorded by Mark and John, but not by Matthew, are,—the early preaching of Christ in Galilee, and His first appearance after the resurrection to the company of the disciples; by Mark only—the casting out of the unclean spirit in the synagogue at Capernaum; the departure into a desert place for prayer; the incident of the widow's mite; the walk to Emmaus, and the ascension of the Redeemer. By John only—Pilate's first declaration of the innocence of Christ, and Peter's visit to the sepulchre.

The quantity of entirely new matter in Luke is so great that it cannot be detailed; but a glance at the tabular arrangement to which reference has been made will at once enable it to be distinguished.

The instances in which he gives additional particulars to events and incidents recorded also by one or more of the other evangelists are many. As a rule, too, he writes with greater force and distinctness, as if gifted in an unusual degree with the realizing imagination of the true historian, seizing hold of points which add life and naturalness to a narration, but by more matter-of-fact chroniclers are passed over as unimportant.

John's Gospel is very distinct, both in style and contents, from the other three. Dividing the entire bulk of the evangelical histories into one hundred parts, Matthew, Mark, and Luke have about sixty-five, or nearly two-thirds, wholly peculiar to themselves. Of the remaining thirty-five, or one-third, included in John's narrative, only seven parts, or one-fifth, are common to John and one or more of the other writers, and the remaining twenty-eight parts, or four-fifths of the third, have been recorded by him alone.

In no case does John relate an event which is common to him and to Matthew or Mark alone. The instances of parallelism with Luke only have been already noticed, and also those with Mark and Luke together.

With Mark and Matthew together he is several times in harmony, even where Luke is entirely silent. The instances are these: the stilling of the storm, the anointing before burial, the mockery of kingship, the offering of vinegar after the cry of forsakenness and thirst, and the appearance of Jesus to Mary Magdalene after His resurrection.

The points of union between all four historians are as follows: the appearance and mission of the Baptist, the departure into Galilee after the imprisonment of the forerunner and the visit of Nicodemus, the entry into Jerusalem, the Passover supper with 1869.

the twelve, the declaration afterwards that one of the company should betray Him, the confident professions of Peter, the going forth into Gethsemane; the actual betrayal, the wounding of the high priest's servant, the leading before Caiaphas, Peter's three-fold denial, the transfer to Pilate's judgment, Pilate's first questioning, the proposal to release Jesus, the counter demand for Barabbas, the departure to be crucified, the place of execution, the two malefactors, the superscription, the division of the clothing, the death, the burial by Joseph, and the discovery by Mary Magdalene of the open sepulchre.

To these should be added instances in which agreement is not actually expressed, but where it is clearly necessitated or implied.

It is accepted as most probably true that Matthew wrote his biography for the use of Jewish converts; Mark his for Gentile Christians; Luke his critically and with the view to supply a complete and connected account of the life of Jesus; and John his in part as supplementary to the other three, though chiefly to preserve his own recollections of the Lord, particularly as they bore upon and counteracted the spreading errors of gnostic philosophy. Matthew and John were eye witnesses of most of the circumstances which they record. Mark was Peter's companion, and would learn much from him, and would likewise be placed in a very advantageous position for the collection of materials. Luke accompanied Paul upon his journeys, and, naturally, was often brought into contact with numbers who had personally known the words and works of the Lord Jesus. Paul, too, would certainly have taken every opportunity of learning more of the human life of the Divine Master, the spirit and principles of whose teachings had been communicated to him by special inspiration; and Luke, there can be no doubt, shared fully in the knowledge which he had thus obtained.

What is the result, then, of our inquiry into the nature and degree of the correspondence existing between the four books as to the materials of which they are composed? John's Gospel, having been written for a special purpose, distinct from the desire to present a connected life of Jesus, may for the present be excluded from consideration. In Matthew, Mark, and Luke we have independent writers, animated by a common aim, but addressing themselves, in a great degree at least, to distinct classes in the case of the first two, and at a distinct period and stage of progress in the instance of the third, which ought therefore to present, as it were, the character of a perfect solution of the other two in a medium of its own.

Do we find any proof or trace of a *superhuman* knowledge and selection of the facts according to their special adaptation to the condition of the persons for whom the writings were respectively intended? In all reverence it must be confessed that I cannot do so. An ordinary human adaptation there may be, and is, confirming, or rather giving legitimate foundation for, the hypothesis already

quoted as to the intentions of the authors. But this does not extend beyond what would be expected of any persons of ordinary intelligence, and its absence would have exposed the writers to the severest critical condemnation.

The omissions of each evangelist have a direct bearing upon this position, and so have some of the particulars which they include.

Matthew has chiefly in view the Messiahship of Jesus, and writes particularly for Jewish converts and inquirers; yet he overlooks the important recognition of the infant Christ by Simeon and Anna at the temple. It is strange also that he does not refer to the visit to Jerusalem at the feast when twelve years old, it being so entirely in harmony with Jewish custom and expectation, and likewise showing on the part of the boy Jesus a consciousness of His special relationship to God, and on the part of the teachers a recognition of extraordinary wisdom and power in one so young. The Baptist's distinct and repeated repudiation of Messiahship and testimony to Jesus as the Christ are given only by John, notwithstanding the fact that the mission of the desert prophet had filled such a large space in the thoughts and expectations of the Jews, and harmonized so completely with their cherished and trusted Scriptures. It must be considered, on any theory of the supernatural origin of the Gospels, that many of the early miracles were of importance only in the teaching of the Gentiles, or to the higher stages of Christian culture addressed by Luke and John, inasmuch as they are not recorded in the narrative of Matthew. The healing of the blind man at Bethsaida is apparently of use only to the readers of Mark; though it is true, on the other hand, that the case of the two blind men who received their sight after the restoration of Jairus' daughter has been recorded only for the Jews. The first instance of raising the dead—that of the widow's son at Nain—is given only by Luke. The payment of the temple dues is noticed only by Matthew, in which we see a point naturally interesting to a Hebrew, and also natural for Matthew to notice from his former occupation of a receiver of the imperial customs' levies. The lamentation over Jerusalem, in the first place, and the tears over it at the triumphal entry, are noticed only by Luke, not by Matthew, who, however, records the upbraiding of Capernaum, Bethsaida, and Chorazin, and the prophecy of their doom. The parable of the good Samaritan, which is included in Luke's Gospel, might readily be supposed to have little importance for Mark's purpose, but its lesson to the Jews was so pointed that we may express a legitimate surprise that Matthew did not include it in his pages. Christ's mournful prediction to the sympathizing women who followed Him to Calvary, of the approaching downfall of their city, might also have been expected to appear even in a summary intended for the Jews.

Mark entirely omits the Sermon on the Mount, and few corresponding teachings are recorded by him elsewhere. It might have been supposed that the Gentiles, even more than the Jews, were in

want of its sublime moral teachings and exhortations to confidence in the fatherly love of God. The tender invitation, "Come unto me," as winning to one of Gentile race as to a member of the chosen nation, is not inserted. The parable of the wicked husbandmen, which has a special bearing upon the Jews themselves, is included, while others of more comprehensive meaning and application are left unrecorded by this evangelist.

Pilate's distinct and repeated declarations of the innocence of Jesus have not been noticed by Mark or Matthew.

In Luke it is found not only that dropped links, as it were, of connection have been picked up, intermediate to the larger ones we have already seen in Matthew and Mark, but also that a considerable portion of new and really important matter has been supplied. Much of this may have been kept back before as being of no particular importance to either of the classes addressed by Matthew and Mark, though even then the difficulty remains that those writers have included in their Gospels much else which must likewise be so described. Again, a large portion is doubtless now presented for the first time upon a principle already indicated—of adaptation to a second and ascending stage of Christian culture on the part of the converts to whom, through Theophilus, the book was addressed. But this will not apply to the *open* teachings, experiences, and works of Jesus, though it may properly enough to those which were heard, shared, and witnessed by the disciples only. But there are parts which cannot be thus explained; and again, what is yet more surprising, a considerable portion of the incidents which the other two record is totally omitted.

The extraordinary circumstances attending the birth of John the Baptist are given only by Luke; yet they might fairly be supposed important to Matthew's aim, as adding great weight to the proof of his being actually the prophesied forerunner. There is proof without them, it is true, but they would have joined with the other testimony to produce a deeper and stronger impression upon Matthew's readers. Matthew gives Joseph's genealogy as legal inheritor of the throne of David; Luke the same, as lineal descendant of the great king by natural birth. Mark omits the whole subject, although he refers to Jesus as the Son of David; and again, in the account of the entrance into Jerusalem, records the rejoicings of the multitude that the kingdom of God had appeared in Him. The rebuke to the disciples who would have destroyed the village in Samaria would, it seems to us, have been well in place both in Matthew and Mark.

But completeness in the enumeration is impossible, and I must only glance at the omissions of Luke.

Among these are—the assurance of the angel to Joseph of Mary's purity, the adoration of the Magi, the jealousy of Herod, and the flight into Egypt. Though included in a history addressed specially to Jews, in another addressed to both Jews and Gentiles they are not inserted, and are therefore to be held as comparatively

unimportant. Of the great sermon on the Mount, only a few fragments, inconsequent by contrast with the steady progress of the thought in Matthew, are retained, though some of the missing portions are given in other connections later in the book. A portion of the teaching respecting the greatness of true service is given, but the beautiful practical illustration by Christ Himself is left untold and supplied afterwards by Luke. The testimony by Pilate's wife, and Pilate's own figurative repudiation of a share in the condemnation, found in Matthew, are not in Luke, who likewise omits the mockery and scourging testified to by Matthew and Mark. The great cry, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" to which those two also bear witness, is unmentioned; also the precautions taken by the chief priests and the Roman governor against the removal of the body. The appearance of Jesus to Mary Magdalene, recorded by each of the other three, is not noticed by Luke; nor, finally, is the other appearance to a company of the disciples on the shore of the sea of Tiberias.

The Gospel of John has now to be considered. Some of its characteristics have been already pointed out. Owing to its partially supplementary aim, and to the further purpose which animated the writer, of meeting new and spreading theological error—the cases in which facts and discourses recorded in the former histories are omitted become of no importance. They are intentionally overlooked. But the singularity of the contents of the fourth Gospel from this point of view is—that the omissions are not always made, and that the retentions appear to be capricious; sometimes, and quite naturally, they are made in order that some further particulars may be added; but in other instances this is not the case.

The feeding of the five thousand is recounted by each of the first three evangelists. John repeats it, but only adds the name of the apostle to whom Jesus spoke when He asked whence bread should be obtained to feed the vast company before them (this question elsewhere appears rather as a direction to the disciples generally to supply the people with food), the fact that the five loaves and two fishes were in the possession of a lad, apparently of the multitude, instead of belonging to themselves, and the final opinion of the men who had been fed respecting the character and mission of the great Teacher. The supply of the four thousand he does not mention. Parallel with Matthew and Mark, John gives the history of Jesus walking upon the sea, and adds to it only the reason why Jesus departed into the mountain alone (which scarcely corresponds with that assigned by the other two); the fact of the disciples rowing, and the approximate distance which they had made. In the case of the anointing at Bethany with a similar parallelism, John in part fails to coincide with the other writers, and adds the facts of the presence of Lazarus, of Martha's serving, of Mary being the woman who thus testified her love, of Iscariot being the holder of the common purse, a thief, and the objector to

the wasting of so much value, and of the presence of many Jews. To the triumphal entry into Jerusalem, which John narrates in common with Matthew, Mark, and Luke, he adds nothing, but rather omits much, except the after recognition by the disciples, that in this an old prophecy had met with its fulfilment. To the narrative of the betrayal he adds considerably, and yet also omits much that is found elsewhere. Peter's self-confidence is recorded without addition or omission; but in stating the incidents of the denial, part of them are given less in detail than in Matthew, Mark, and Luke, while others are more fully and particularly told. The final scene, of the Lord's looking upon Peter, and Peter's repentance, is omitted altogether. The preference of Barabbas for release is given with greater brevity than in the other histories; and though something is contributed to the story of the crucifixion and decease, much more has gone unnoticed or, at any rate, unrecorded. The reverential attention of Nicodemus to the dead body is added to the account of the burial by Joseph. The appearance of Jesus to the assembled disciples is briefly told—although Luke has already described it fully—and without any new information, except as to the day, and the fear of the Jews which the disciples felt causing the doors to be closely shut.

If John himself wrote—though this is improbable—the closing verses of the Gospel as we have it, he admits that a vast amount of material for the life of Jesus has been left unused; and there can be no doubt that such was the case, even apart from the testimony of this passage, and that the fourth evangelist could have taken many other portions from the work of his predecessors, and have enlarged them by additions, which might have been both more important and more in number than those which mark his version of the incidents to which I have referred.

The entirely new matter which we owe to John is, in a small but uncertain degree, composed of his own observations and reflections. The chief part is formed by Christ's discourses—to the disciples and to others in a tolerably equal proportion. The latter section is again divisible into what was spoken to the people generally, and to individual persons, as Nicodemus and the woman of Samaria. With respect to what was spoken openly to the Jews, or to such hearers as the Samaritan woman, and to the accounts of otherwise unrecorded miracles, there is no reason to be discovered why all should not have been included in the histories of Matthew, Mark, or Luke. The words spoken at Jacob's well, if suited to the woman's comprehension, would certainly not need to be kept back until a higher degree of knowledge and spiritual light had been generally attained. In the case of Nicodemus it might well be otherwise. His was a trained and philosophic mind, and the instructions of the All-wise took somewhat of a corresponding cast.

The miraculous healing at Bethsaida, and the dispute with the Jews which followed, the discourses upon the bread of life and upon the good Shepherd, the raising of Lazarus, the repeated questioning

of Peter, and the commands which indicated his appointed work, are all instances in point, for which no reason can be assigned why they did not appear in the earlier writings, where, from the simplicity and interest which characterize them, they might fairly have been expected to do efficient service.

The more elevated teachings to the disciples, and the scope and character of the Gospel as a whole, fully agree with, and evidently fulfil, the great purpose for which it was composed: they completely suit the higher culture which the continued preaching of the apostles would gradually produce, and meet the heresies which arose by the side of the true faith with the testimony of Christ Himself; while, had these portions been made public earlier, they would doubtless have fallen on minds then but ill prepared for their reception and comprehension.

But again, it is to be borne in mind that many of the Lord's loftier teachings, as I have called them, to His immediate followers, were actually included in the early Gospels, particularly in Matthew and in Luke.

Thus far, then, as to the harmony of the Gospels. It is found that they present the first kind of agreement (however valueless that, standing alone, may be considered), which results from the absence of contradiction or incompatibility; and also the somewhat higher union which may be described as a partial parallelism, or correspondence in the incidents narrated.

But as to the further question of inspiration. Is this degree of consistency supplemented by the more advanced stage in which the omissions and inclusions are manifestly seen to have been adapted to a special purpose in each case? In part it is so, but in part it is, or appears to be, otherwise.

What, then, is the evidence given by the kind and degree of harmony which the four narratives thus far exhibit with respect to the Mind which presided over their arrangement? Is that shown to be simply human or unmistakably divine? On a prior hypothesis of the latter, it must be remembered that a distinct selection must necessarily have been made in each case, inasmuch as the incidents of the entire life, and all the knowledge necessary to their adaptation, would be present to the Supreme Intelligence who was the real author. But, as already stated, no trace of such a divine selection can be found, but only the signs of a common, imperfect human discretion, not amounting even to ordinary genius. The choice is rough, capricious, dictated by no recognisable principle whatever.

How greatly this adds to our proofs of the dignity and impressive moral power of the Redeemer's life will be seen as we proceed.

It may be said that perhaps the special ends assigned were not the real ones; there were possibly others, which the Gospels fulfil with a divine fulness and efficacy, for which their adaptation by a human intelligence alone would be totally insufficient. If so, by the very fulfilment of the purpose it would become manifest,

and commend itself to man's judgment, as an unmistakably divine provision for his varying wants in the differing circumstances, times, and places in which the histories were intended to be used.

We see, however, such a selection and arrangement of materials only as have constructed but a more or less rough outline of the life of Jesus, to realize a general rather than a carefully defined purpose: we find no trace of other than a human authorship, such as almost any moderately intelligent mind would be able to fulfil.

2. How far do the Gospels harmonize in their chronological arrangement? Their writers have plainly intended that, and it becomes a legitimate inquiry as to the degree of their coincidence in this respect.

In the chronological parallelism constructed for my own use, Luke has been followed most closely, from greater confidence in his cultured acumen, and from the ascertained fact that, under his guidance, the amount of alteration in the succession of incidents, taking the four books together, is smaller than would be needful if Matthew's record were taken as a basis. Of course it would be easy, by a multiplication of similar incidents, to avoid any break whatever in the chronology, and also the otherwise necessary ignoring of certain little conjunctive and prepositional links which, in Matthew, bind some narratives to their literal predecessors. But to act thus would, in many cases, lead to absurdity, and, moreover, it is to be noticed that almost always the displaced paragraph in Matthew fits into another place, parallel with Mark or Luke, without even the verbal alteration of the connecting phrases, just as if a disjunction had occurred, and in the readjustment the passage had been inserted in a position similar to yet not the same as that which it originally and properly occupied.

The total number of variations between Matthew and Luke is not large; between Luke and John there are none whatever, with the slight exception that, whereas the latter makes Christ's lamentation over the foreseen fact that one of the disciples would betray Him come after the lesson upon the true greatness of service, that order is reversed by the former.

In the cases of variation between Matthew and Luke, Mark is often entirely silent, not noticing the incident, but where he does mention it he more often confirms the order of Luke than coincides with that of Matthew.

The order of the three temptations is not the same in Matthew and Luke, but Matthew seems to give the more naturally probable succession. The whole of the Sermon on the Mount, as recorded in the first Gospel, should, according to the third, with which the second (though it does not record the actual discourse, but only its introducing circumstance of the appointment of the twelve apostles) coincides, be placed after the call of Matthew and the question of John's disciples about fasting, the narratives of the plucking of the corn upon the Sabbath, and the healing of the withered hand, being first interposed, taken from some chapters later on.

The healing of Peter's wife's mother, and of the many that were sick, should, in Matthew, be brought forward from the chapter following the Sermon on the Mount, and placed immediately after the call of Simon, Andrew, James, and John by the sea of Galilee. The cure of the centurion's servant, the purpose of the scribe and another disciple to follow Jesus, the calming of the waves, the healing of the Gadarene demoniac, the cleansing of the leper, the raising of the ruler's daughter, the relief of the woman with an issue of blood, the mission of the twelve disciples and their instructions, the casting out of a blind and dumb devil, and the Pharisees' charge of the use of Satanic power to accomplish this, the request for a sign and its denial, the second cleansing of the temple, the anointing at Bethany, the departure into the Mount of Olives after the chanting of a psalm; all require an alteration of place in the narrative of Matthew.

In Mark, only the following are out of their proper consecutive order: the charge of Christ's dependence upon Satanic power for His control over the demoniacs, and the anointing at Bethany.

In Luke, one of the three temptations, as already pointed out, and the incident of the ten lepers, which is inserted in the middle of a long series of discourses at Jerusalem, but is verbally relegated by the writer himself to its proper place, alone required alteration.

In John, though there is great difficulty in giving its chronological place to the large amount of new matter which he introduces, the succession he assigns to it does not need to be altered in a single instance.

Of course the basis on which the foregoing arrangement has been made may be erroneous, but this is unimportant to an inquiry into the facts of agreement or non-agreement. The need for adjustment remains the same, whether one plan or another be adopted to supply it.

Nor are the transpositions I have noted made upon any distinct system, which might be supposed to add to the efficiency of the narratives for the purposes which the writers had in view. Then, as to the divine Mind, the whole of the events must be always present in their true order; on a theory of inspiration of word or form, we must believe in a purposeless selection to confusion and error.

Thus, while there is no proof or indication of a divine order in the arrangement of the incidents and teachings in each Gospel, it is also the case that at least one of them is characterized by much disturbance of the true consecutive order, and that the others only exhibit a purely human and natural harmony, such as truthful and fairly intelligent observers and historians would be expected, as a matter of course, to furnish.

Oswestry.

W.

(To be continued.)

NOTE.—The reader must bear in mind that only the *selection* and *succession* of the contents of the Gospels are at present referred to. The

character of the narration, and of the contents themselves, has yet to be considered. Also, the writer protests against being credited with opinions drawn from this portion of his article alone: thus far he has been occupied upon one side of the question only. He accepts the responsibility of the tone and conclusions of the entire paper, but not of a detached section of it unmodified by the rest which the present instalment is; as the conclusion is held over by our Editor from considerations of space.

DO THE SCRIPTURES FAVOUR OR OPPOSE THE IDEA OF THE NATURAL IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE positive and repeated declarations of Scripture that the wicked shall eternally suffer, and that the righteous shall partake of everlasting bliss, demonstrate the natural immortality of the soul, and it is evident that P. O. S. feels, that the doctrine of an eternity of punishment for the ungodly involves the soul's immortality; for, in order to get rid of the latter, he has to deny an eternity of suffering, and advocate the doctrine of annihilation. It must be our business, then, to prove from the Scriptures that the souls of all mankind will exist for ever; and if P. O. S.—and doubtless others with him—can be convinced of the truth of the doctrine that those who die in impenitence shall suffer for ever, they will at the same time be convinced of the natural immortality of the soul, and if our arguments in favour of the eternity of the sufferings of the wicked be incontrovertible, it will be impossible for the opinion of the non-immortality of the soul to be established.

In adducing proof from Scripture that the souls of all men will exist for ever, we shall dwell more particularly on the evidence of the ungodly enduring everlasting sufferings, as the eternal happiness of the righteous is on each side admitted.

Both the Old and the New Testament furnish evidence that the wicked will suffer for ever. The question put by Isaiah, in chap. xxxiii. ver. 14, plainly implies that the future suffering of the ungodly will be eternal, for what else can "*everlasting burnings*" set forth? In Daniel, chap. xii. ver. 2, it is expressly affirmed that not only will some of the dead awake to everlasting life, but likewise that others will awake to shame and *everlasting* contempt, and if the contempt to which the wicked will rise be not never-ending, neither will the life which is designed for the righteous. In the New Testament we have the testimony of the Lord Jesus Christ, first, as recorded in Matt. xxv. 41, in which Scripture, Christ informs us respecting the solemn transactions of the last judgment, and assures us that He will then sentence the wicked to "*everlasting fire*." How a state of existence which is described as everlasting fire can accord with annihilation we cannot at all comprehend, nor can we conceive how the words can set forth anything besides the intolerable fierceness of the misery which the wicked will endure, together with its perpetual continuance and duration. In ver. 46,

of the same chapter, the Lord affirms, "And these *shall* go away into *everlasting punishment*." Not into non-existence shall they go, but into everlasting punishment. In Mark ix. 44—48, we have the testimony of Christ five times given, that hell is a state in which the fire is not quenched, which expression can only denote the greatness and the unending duration of the sufferings of the wicked. In John v. 28; 29, we have the further evidence of the Lord Jesus, that the hour is coming, in which, not only shall they who have done good come forth from their graves unto the resurrection of life, but also they who have done evil shall come forth unto the resurrection of damnation, and if there be any meaning in words, damnation certainly is not annihilation, nor is the word understood or employed in that sense by either the profane or the pious. In Rev. xx. 10, it is positively declared of the wicked, that they shall be tormented *day and night for ever and ever*. In the same book, chap. 14, ver. 11, it is testified of the same characters that the smoke of their torment ascendeth up *for ever and ever*, and that they have no rest, day nor night, which descriptions assuredly cannot set forth a state of non-existence, or endless rest. Strange indeed it would be if, when Scripture speaks of some having no rest, day nor night, *for ever and ever*, it means that they rest for ever, which they would do if their existence were terminated, as when the life of the body is departed, and the body is buried, we speak of it as resting in the grave. The capability of the soul to endure the fierce wrath of God through endless ages bespeaks its immortality, and, indeed, the Scriptures are so far from furnishing the slightest hint of the non-immortality of any human souls, that they show that even the body will after the resurrection be immortal, that the bodies of the wicked will be capable of enduring unutterable woe without termination or alleviation, while the bodies of the righteous will be able to bear a weight of glory which they could not in this world live under.

The arguments of P. O. S., are grounded on an entire misapprehension of the subject. This writer while remarking that in almost every heathen religion the idea of immortality is used more as a terror than as a boon, states that in Christianity this is transformed and transfigured into a hope instead of a fear. Now the Scriptures we have adduced show that while immortality is a just ground for hope to some, it is an equally just ground for fear to others. P. O. S. likewise remarks that the Scriptures reveal immortality as the gift of God, given to those who believe in and follow the Lord Jesus Christ, and that they give us assurance of life from the dead as a consequence of our receiving the Spirit of Christ. But the immortality which is revealed in the Scriptures as the gift of God is not the perpetual existence of the soul, which is common to all souls, but that perfect and perpetual bliss which in the Scriptures is spoken of as eternal life in opposition to that condition which in the Scriptures is termed the second death or eternal damnation, because it is an endless dying to all happiness and to all hope,

which awful state is further set forth by the expression the bottomless pit, to show that the lost are for ever sinking, but can never reach the termination of their sufferings.

P. O. S. further remarks, "When God gave the early commandment, which constituted the covenant of life, he made life dependent on obedience and submission." Now the life which was made dependent on obedience and submission was not the soul's unceasing existence, but the exemption from all mortality, as well as from that endless suffering which in the Scriptures is denominated the second death, together with the continuance of that life of holiness and happiness which man possessed before the fall. So again, the Scripture declaration, "the soul that sinneth, it shall die," is not a threatening of an extinction of the soul's existence, but a death to God, to holiness, and to happiness.

P. O. S. states that those who sin "lose the power of life, and go down to the grave as to the blackness of darkness for ever." But this "blackness of darkness" is not the darkness of non-existence but the blackness of despair, the darkness of a perfectly hopeless condition. P. O. S. states, "The soul has lost its immortal nature through sin." This statement is not correct. Sin has not deprived any soul of its immortality, neither did it deprive fallen angels of theirs. The immortality of sinful souls, P. O. S. states, "would be the perpetuation of that which God hates, and would be indeed the triumph of evil and the powers of evil." Not so. That which God hates is indeed perpetuated, but neither evil, nor the powers of evil triumph. On the contrary, evil is overcome, subdued, put down, and punished, while the powers of evil are shut up, controlled, bound and held fast, and punished for ever. P. O. S. quotes the promise, "Whosoever believeth in me shall never die." Here the expression never die does not signify shall not cease to exist—as though that were the peculiar privilege of those who believe in Jesus, but it signifies that such shall not die the second or eternal death, and deliverance from this is the eternal life which is not an innate property of the soul, but is the gift of God.

P. O. S. refers to what Solomon affirms of man and of the beast, "As the one dieth, so dieth the other." Now, man dies as the beast, not by ceasing to exist, but as the beast dies by ceasing to breathe, so does man, each being possessed of the same animal life, which is maintained in each in the same manner. Man also loses his life by diseases and accidents of the same sort as those which cause the death of the beast, and thus, "as the one dieth, so dieth the other." The remark of Solomon referred to by P. O. S., that there is no work, nor device in the grave, is one the correctness of which is manifest, for the grave is the abode of death, whether it be the grave of the righteous or of the wicked; therefore if this Scripture makes against the immortality of the soul, it makes against that of the righteous, equally with that of the wicked.

In confirmation of this argument we may quote the deliverance of the archbishop of York:—

"The doctrine of a terminable punishment for the wicked finds no countenance whatever from Holy Scripture. Those who have maintained it can do no more than suggest plausible explanations of texts that make against them; even they must admit that there is not one passage of Scripture that clearly authorizes the hope of restoration for the sinner once condemned. On the other hand, the declarations that the punishment of the wicked is eternal are many, and those most clear and emphatic. Eternal wrath put into antithesis with eternal life; eternal chains; the wrath of God abiding on a man so that he shall never see life; the worm that never dieth; can all these be explained away? Even if they could, not one of them promises salvation for the sinner once condemned. If they were not conclusive for everlastingness, they would not be in favour of the salvation of the wicked at last. On the other hand, the doctrine that the wicked are punished for ever would be gathered not from these texts alone, but from the whole tenor of Scripture, which speaks of this life as our probation, and of the next as our reward, which represents the judgment as final; which is utterly silent as to any economy of probation after death."

The Scripture doctrine that all things shall be put in subjection to Christ does not clash with the eternity of evil. Though evil will exist for ever, yet it will be in perfect subjection to Christ. The living existence of persons in the dominions of an absolute monarch is not incompatible with their being held in subjection by him.

P. O. S. speaks of the everlasting punishment of annihilation as the most dreadful of all conceptions. But surely the anticipation of everlasting suffering is a conception far more dreadful than that of everlasting annihilation. When Judas felt the wrath of God for his sin, he had an anticipation unspeakably more dreadful than that of annihilation. If the cessation of existence be the only punishment of sin in the world to come, the most awful characters have not much to dread, and may reasonably indulge to the full their wicked inclinations, for as an inspired apostle says, "If the dead rise not"—or if they rise not to continue in existence, but to be annihilated—"let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die."

S. S.

TIME.—In all the actions which a man performs, some part of his life passes. We die while doing this for which alone our sliding life was granted. Nay, though we do nothing, time keeps its constant pace, and flies as fast in idleness as in employment. Whether we play, or labour, or sleep, or dance, or study, the sun posts on and the sand runs. An hour of vice is as long as an hour of virtue. But the difference between good and bad actions is infinite. Good actions, though they diminish our time here as well as bad actions, yet they lay up for us a happiness in eternity, and will recompense what they take away by a plentiful return at last. When we trade with virtue, we do but buy pleasure at the expense of time. So it is not so much a consuming of time as an exchange. As a man sows his corn, he is content to wait awhile that he may, at the harvest, receive with advantage.—*Owen Feltham.*

Politics.

OUGHT WE NOW TO HAVE THE BALLOT?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—VI.

THIS is a subject upon which much may be said on both sides. We allow that many objections may justly be raised against the introduction of the ballot into our electoral system; but yet, when we look at all the considerations suggested to our mind in connection with this subject, we feel persuaded that the time has come when we ought to have the ballot. "Philomathes" shows by his quotation from Hume, and by his own remarks, that he has great faith in general principles; and we know that general principles do form an excellent foundation on which to base our arguments, but we must maintain that they are dangerous things, and we need to be very careful how we make use of them. In relying upon general principles for the foundation of our reasonings, we must be careful of three things: 1st. That we put a right construction upon the general principles laid down; 2nd. That that construction is applicable to the subject under discussion; and 3rd. That the force of the general principles adduced in support of our view of the case, be not more than counterbalanced by more weighty general principles that have an opposite bearing. If we neglect either of these three points, our whole train of reasoning will probably be vitiated. We will now proceed to follow up these preliminary remarks by briefly considering this subject, both synthetically and analytically, first bringing forward a few general principles in support of the affirmative of this question, thus showing "Philomathes" that the general principles which bear upon this subject are not all on his side, and then criticising some of the arguments of "Philomathes" and H. S. S., to show, that in some cases they misconstrue the general principles brought forward, and that in other cases the general principles laid down are not applicable to the subject under debate.

The first general principle that we shall bring forward to support the affirmative of this question is—That the weak require more protection than the strong, and that it is the duty of the state to legislate, not for the strong alone, but rather so as to give, as far as possible, that amount of protection required by the weak. The strong-minded voter can despise the ballot, and rail against it as un-English, cowardly, and demoralizing; but the weak-minded voter needs its protection. The strong-minded voter, and the man who has nothing to lose by voting as he pleases, can afford to vote openly, and to brand the ballot as mean, suspicious, and

hypocritical; but to many of the weak-minded and dependent voters, the ballot is absolutely necessary to enable them to vote freely according to their consciences. As the weak-minded and dependent voters require such a protection, and as it is the duty of the state to legislate not for the strong alone, but more especially for the weak, therefore we ought to have the ballot now, unless this protection can be given in some better way. We think it could easily be proved that weak-minded and dependent voters need some protection from intimidation and other corrupt practices. How often are election agents told when canvassing tenant farmers, agricultural labourers, and the employes of large manufacturers, I should like to give you my vote, but my landlord (or master, as the case may be) will vote for your opponent, and I must vote as he votes; for if I give you my vote, I shall have to suffer for it. And how often do we see cases in which electors have to suffer for voting contrary to the wishes of their masters and landlords! We believe the ballot would afford that protection which the weak-minded and dependent voter requires. It would enable him to record his vote without any one being able to know who he voted for; therefore he could not be punished for not voting for his master's favourite, because it could not be proved whether he did really vote for his master's favourite or not. No one would think of intimidating voters by favouring those who promised to vote for a certain candidate, and punishing those who refused to give such a pledge, because it could never be proved whether those who had pledged themselves to vote in a certain way had fulfilled their promise; and therefore we maintain that the ballot would afford the requisite protection. We do not know of any less objectionable and equally efficacious mode of affording protection to the enfranchised class in the exercise of their rights; at all events, the onus of finding such better plan rests with those who oppose the introduction of the ballot.

It is the duty of legislators to frame laws suited to the actual condition of society in the present time, and not merely to make such provisions as would meet the wants of society if it were just what it ought to be. If the state of society were what it ought to be, we should not need any police force; but it is so far from being what it ought to be, that a police force is absolutely necessary for the protection of life and property. Many objections might be raised against the employment of a police force, but the advantages which result therefrom are sufficient to overrule all objections, and though crimes are often committed in spite of the police, yet we all admit that the police force is a necessity of the age. So, if electors, landlords, and employers of labour were what they ought to be, the ballot would not be required; but they are not what they ought to be, far from it, and therefore the majority of electors require that protection which the ballot would afford.

In voting, the elector should be guided by one motive, and one only—viz., a desire to do that which would be most conducive to

the welfare of the country at large. But under the present system, many are influenced to vote for certain candidates by motives of personal aggrandizement. The ballot would take from the voter the opportunity of gaining personal advancement by selling his vote, because the candidate or agent would be unwilling to purchase a vote when the action of the voter is placed beyond his knowledge. Thus the ballot would act so as to lessen the influence of impure motives upon electors in the exercise of the franchise. The ballot would put an end to the dishonourable, disagreeable, and demoralizing practice of canvassing, because, if secret voting were employed, the candidate and agent would not consider it worth their while to ask the elector to promise them his vote. Thus, though many may conscientiously oppose the ballot, we firmly believe that the advantages which would result from its adoption would more than counterbalance all the objections that could be raised against it.

"Philomathes" says, "Secrecy is suspicious. . . . He who would act nobly, must act honestly and openly." True; but to be honest in secret, however suspicious, is far preferable to being openly dishonest; and to act sincerely in an ignoble and secret way, is better than to be openly corrupt. We next read that "Truth does not slink in the dark, nor do honest men seek to hide their light under a bushel." Certainly not; but are the majority of electors incapable of being influenced by false and impure motives in the exercise of the franchise? and are the majority of electors so honest that they vote for the candidate they believe most likely to legislate for the good of the country, apart from every other consideration? If not, then the remark we have just quoted has no bearing upon the subject of this debate. It is all very well for the upright and strong-minded to declaim about the suspiciousness of secrecy, the nobleness of acting openly, and the undisguised way in which truth and honesty present themselves to the public gaze, but they must remember that the enfranchised are not all so upright and strong-minded as they are. If we desire to have elections conducted upon principles of the strictest purity, we must adopt measures to prevent the corrupt practices of the dishonest and to strengthen the hands of the weak. "Prevention is better than cure;" the "Corrupt Practices Act" will punish those who conduct elections upon corrupt principles, but the ballot would be a means of preventing the commission of such illegal acts.

"Philomathes" then says that "It has never been found that secret societies have long remained free from serious objections, and to grant the ballot to voters for members of Parliament would be to transform the constituencies into vast secret societies," in the secrecy of which not only the sense of individual responsibility would be lost, but even the sense of personal honesty." Now this comparison will not hold good, for to grant the ballot with the franchise would not be "to transform the constituencies into vast secret societies." A secret society is one in which secrecy is enforced

upon its members, who would be punished or censured by the society if they divulged its secrets. But the ballot would not compel electors to keep it a secret how they voted; it would merely give them the privilege of voting without any one knowing how they voted, if it were to their interest to do so. The ballot would not cause electors to be punished or censured for publicly declaring how they voted, and this makes an essential difference between a secret society and a constituency voting by ballot. We also demur to our opponent's assertion, that the ballot would destroy the sense of individual responsibility in the voter. We believe that it would increase that feeling of personal responsibility; for it would show the elector that Parliament, in conferring the franchise upon him, intended that he should vote according to his own judgment, and not according to the will of his master.

"Philomathes" says that with regard to the franchise, "the maxim that a man may do what he likes with his own has no place. His vote is not a man's own." This is not strictly correct; the elector's vote is his own property; he has a legal and a moral right to it, although he must not use it for his own individual benefit. The State recognises the right of the elector to have a voice in the government of the nation; and it is his right to vote according to his own private judgment, uncontrolled by any other person or persons whatsoever. The ballot would enable many to do this, who without it could not do so; therefore we think that we ought to have the ballot now. We believe with "Philomathes," that "opportunity creates a sinner;" and we believe that our present mode of conducting elections gives many opportunities for bribery, corruption, and intimidation, which would not exist if the ballot were introduced; therefore we maintain that the ballot ought to be adopted.

H. S. S. commences his article by saying that "'more light! more light!' were the death-words of Goethe; 'more darkness! more darkness!' is the cry of advocates of the ballot." And thus he endeavours to place the advocates of the ballot in direct opposition to those who love the light. We, however, like to act openly as much as possible, and we love the light as much as Goethe or H. S. S.; but we must maintain that there are certain states in which the light of open day cannot be endured. When the patient is suffering from brain fever, the doctor often orders the window-blinds to be drawn down, and all light carefully excluded from the sick-room; and we ask, is there not a disease prevailing amongst our constituencies which gives the legislator good cause to say, Exclude the light, and let the votes be recorded in secret?

We believe there is; and were it not for this unhealthy state of the public morality, which breeds corruption, bribery, and intimidation, we should not plead for the ballot. When the patient's fever has abated the doctor orders the curtains to be drawn up again, and the light of day is once more permitted to shine into the room. So, when the disease that pervades our constituencies has been

oured, when every voter can vote openly without fear of being made to suffer for the vote conscientiously given, then, and not till then, can we honourably dispense with the protection afforded by the ballot. In the present state of things we cannot speak of every elector as "a free and independent voter;" but we desire the introduction of the ballot, in order to set the voter free from the intimidation, &c., of those who would exercise an undue influence over him, and to make him independent of those who would purchase his vote. H. S. S. says, "Opportunity often leads to sin; and the beginning of evil is like the letting in of water; we may stop the first beginnings of evil, but we cannot effectually resist the mighty floods." True; and bribery, &c., might have been checked by the force of moral influence in the time of its small beginning, but now that it has become a mighty flood, it can only be effectually resisted by withholding the opportunities of committing this offence, through the adoption of the ballot. H. S. S. suggests that bribery might invent means to overcome the mysteries of the ballot. True; such inventions are within the bounds of the possible, but most certainly they do not come within the limits of the probable. Criminals often invent means to evade the vigilance of the police, yet the police are very useful in the prevention of crime; so also it would be with the ballot, even if bribery did sometimes invent a way of neutralizing the advantages of secret voting.

In conclusion, we would repeat our most prominent arguments on this subject:—That a weak-minded and dependent voter requires a protection which the strong-minded and independent elector does not need; that it is the duty of the State to protect the weak and the dependent; that the ballot would afford the required protection; that if society were in a perfectly healthy state, the ballot would not be needed—but that society is in such an unhealthy state as to require the ballot; that secret voting would diminish the influence of impure motives on the part of the electors; that the adoption of the ballot would not compel the elector to keep it secret how he voted, and that therefore a constituency voting by ballot would not resemble a secret society; that a voter has a right to exercise the franchise according to his own judgment, and that in many cases he cannot do so because of having to vote openly; that we believe the advantages which would follow the introduction of the ballot would more than counter-balance the evils that might result from its adoption; and therefore we maintain that we ought now to have the ballot.

SAMUEL.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—VII.

It is remarkable that nearly all who write vigorously against the ballot as a system of voting, rely, for their chief arguments, on the supposed evils of secrecy. In truth, they do not essay to encounter the practical arguments involved in the question, but to refute the

reasons adduced by the ballotists as showing that the ballot would directly tend to counteract some of the existing evils attendant upon open rating, they indulge in a profusion of undignified epithets, denunciatory of everything connected with political government that is at all in opposition to publicity. And so solemnly do the opponents of secrecy deprecate the introduction of the ballot as a method of voting, that one might suppose the ballot, where it is established, to be a veil that

"Mantles the earth with darkness, until right
And wrong are accidents, and men grow pale
Lest their own judgments should become too bright,
And their free thoughts be crimes, and earth
Have too much light."

It is a fundamental principle, with the advocates of the ballot, that a vote is given to a man that he may exercise it consistently with his own individual convictions. This being a "first truth" in their political creed that cannot possibly be confuted, their argument in favour of the ballot may be stated in syllogistic form. The voter should exercise the franchise as expressive of his own personal convictions; the ballot alone will enable him perfectly to exercise the franchise in this manner, therefore the ballot is the best method of voting. When the State has conferred the right of voting, I conceive it is the duty of the State to protect the voter in the enjoyment of that right. Whether the vote be a privilege or a right affects not the responsibility of the State in affording protection to the voter. Be it a trust confided to him, or be it a right which, as a man, he can indisputably claim, it is evident that he is to exercise it as his own reason and conscience shall dictate, and it is also evident that the system of voting which most effectually protects the voter in the exercise of the franchise conferred upon him should be established by the State. Now the ballot is clearly superior to open voting in securing the *freedom* and *independence* of the voter, and should, therefore, be established by the State. I believe, with Mr. Milner Gibson, "that nobody has any right to know for whom he (the elector) votes. If he chooses to proclaim it himself before the world he is at liberty to do so. But if he wishes to record his vote in favour of the candidate he prefers, and, for the interest of his country, let him do so, and you have not free institutions, you have not liberty, unless you give a man the right of giving his vote free from risk either to himself or his family." It seems to imply a distrust of the people not to permit them to record their votes, which are supposed to express their opinions, under the system which most effectually shelters them in the discharge of so high and important a privilege. And yet, if the people are not to be trusted, why give them the franchise at all? If the interests of the country are not secure in their hands, why place them under the care of such perilous protectors?

The ballot, if adopted, would materially diminish, if not entirely prevent bribery. There can be no doubt that the most powerful

incentive to bribery under open voting is that the briber can obtain positive proof as to whether the bribe has really been effective in directing the vote or not. The ballot being established, this would not be the case. The essential and inevitable conditions of voting which the ballot presupposes destroy the possibility of his knowing, with certainty, that the voter has given his vote as desired. H. S. S. asks, "Can it not be stipulated that evidence may be producible in some form or other?" As opposing the ballot, it is incumbent on him to show that it can be produced, and, until he has done so, the friends of the ballot will contend that clear and satisfactory evidence as to the opinions the voter may have supported at the poll is not producible. Further, he inquires, "Would it be advisable to legalize hypocrisy and deception, and to give the legal right to promise a vote, and then secretly despise the promise?" Now the ballot, in common with almost all great measures, is susceptible of individual perversion, but it cannot, therefore, be admitted that the State, by adopting secret voting, "legalizes hypocrisy and deception." The State merely introduces the ballot as a shield by which the voter may be protected, but if he be so unprincipled as to practise deception under the shelter thus provided, surely he, and not the State, is the delinquent in such conduct. It cannot be proved by the most ingenious sophistry that the State legally justifies the voter in secretly despising his promise. The State merely enables the voter to give active and tangible expression to his political principles by means of the vote entrusted to him, protecting him from the unjust interference of the officious and unscrupulous intimidator. Under the mode of voting now in vogue a man's political life may be one of unrelieved hypocrisy. He may tacitly entertain certain clearly defined political opinions, and yet, from the illegitimate influence that is employed with respect to him, he may be compelled to practise self-falsification by having to vote in diametrical opposition to his own opinions. This being so, the argument of H. S. S., logically extended, will prove that the State legalizes "deception and hypocrisy" under the present system of open voting. Will he accept the conclusion to which his reasoning unavoidably conducts him?

The opponents of the ballot are candid in the admission that it conceals the vote, as the language of those who have already contributed papers to this discussion distinctly shows. And if the ballot is efficient in concealing the vote, is it not fairly inferable that it preserves inviolate the essential individuality of the elector, and surrounds him by protective conditions that enable him to maintain his independence as a citizen; and that it impels him to exercise his political influence, not at the behest of an external and usurped authority, but in strict conformity with his own convictions as one who reflects on the great political questions of his time.

A. B.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—VI.

JUDGING from public opinion, the nation desires that the question of the ballot should be thoroughly investigated and settled. The mind of England is, I think, firmly made up that the character of elections must be altered, that the rampant iniquity which characterises the days of nomination and polling shall be seen no more, that if the strong arm of the law, put in motion by wise legislation, can effect this, the elections of England shall henceforth be pure. This being the case, it is the duty of every Englishman to think out the problem of "obtaining purity of election." It is one which has absorbed the attention of many eminent politicians, and has brought out many rival and antagonistic proposals. It has been by some thoroughly investigated, according to their views, and to the best of their abilities. There are many, however, who, without caring to think deeply upon the subject, nevertheless imagine they require a solution, and these jump at what appears to them to be the simplest, "vote by ballot." In order to approach the subject warily, I would first inquire what the objects to be attained by its adoption are, and these I think may be said to be—the prevention of intimidation and bribery and the discontinuance of the riot and disorder hitherto attendant upon the occasion of an election. These are the very points, I believe, we are all striving to obtain. The question is, therefore, Is the ballot the only way of bringing about the desired end, and, if not, is it the best possible means? The first is easily answered. No, it is not the only way. The second is the point, then, I intend to consider. The great aim of the ballot being to prevent intimidation and bribery, I would first notice that the illegal acts here assailed take place prior to the election.

To any one who has witnessed an election, it must be palpable that the crime of intimidation is frequently committed months even before the electors are addressed by the candidates. Canvassers deftly chosen, pass from house to house, in some cases politely soliciting votes, in others bringing pressure to bear, in others unlocking the gate by a golden key. Here, then, is the root of the evil, but it requires not a ballot box to upturn it. Much has been written and spoken concerning the widespread extent to which intimidation has been carried, but I, as far as I have been able to judge, believe that it has originated more in the fears of electors who are employed than in the threats of the employer. An employer, doubtless, if he were deeply interested in the return of a particular candidate, would ask those whom he called servants to vote for Mr. A. or Mr. B., but unless the heart of England is rotten to its very centre, very few would be found to be at the booth to see that any one subservient to him recorded his vote on the wrong side. The vote given thus, to please an employer, in the majority of cases, has been honestly recorded according to the promise made. Granting, then, that this is an evil, the cure for it

is easily found: make canvassing, either by agents or by enthusiastic friends, illegal, and punish an offence in this direction by loss of vote, in addition to a heavy fine. If canvassing, then, be declared contrary to law, we might, I think, reasonably look for an immediate solution of the bribery difficulty, for no candidate would think of bribing in person, or personally an elector. G. M. S. says, speaking of the ballot, "Besides, it would go far to do away with canvassing and the many evils that are connected with it." I would rather maintain that prohibiting canvassing would do away with the necessity for the ballot. How the ballot is to effect that which it professes to do, viz., prevent those scenes of debauchery and devilry (which, alas! have been too common in our elections), whilst all the usual machinery is left intact, no one has deigned to inform us. The advocates of the ballot point to other nations where the ballot is used and exclaim: "See how an election is carried on where secret voting is in vogue. Look at the quietness of the scene, no uproar, no disorder, but all peace and harmony." Very beautiful, no doubt, rather overdrawn it is true, but it is not added that all means of obtaining intoxicating drinks are withdrawn, or that the people using this method of voting are either more highly educated or are not addicted to the vice of drunkenness. Again, in secret voting there can possibly be no excitement. If, therefore, a remedy for these two afflictions be found, I think another barrier of the ballot rampart will have been carried. Close the public houses, make it illegal to convert such a house into a committee room, withhold the hourly or half-hourly state of the poll, and, above all, abolish the force of nomination day. Let but the preceding measures pass into law, and we shall then be a long way on our road to a peaceful, quiet scene, where the future M.P. will be elected with as little disorder as the friends of the ballot claim for such ceremonies, where their favourite method reigns supreme. Time, of course, will be required to make the change complete, as the residuum, which is the most potent party in the scene without the polling booth, have, as yet, scarcely begun their education. The schoolmaster, however, is abroad; let us hope that a nobler idea of the beauty of order may be one of the first results of his efforts.

Having then endeavoured to show that other means without the ballot would be likely to answer the purpose required, I will now essay to point out how, to my mind, the ballot would work badly. Its advocates claim for it the title of "universal medicine for bribery," and take every opportunity of informing the world that

" . . . the sovereign't thing on earth
Is parmaceti for an inward bruise."

So far, however, from acknowledging its efficacy, I believe that it would increase bribery, certainly it would legalize it. Those with whom the ballot is all in all say no candidate would be so

foolish as to bribe, where he was unable to see that the douceur had its desired effect. I would reply, Many at the present time are prevented from accepting a bribe from a candidate because their neighbours, being fully aware of their opinions, they dare not subject themselves to the just scorn of their fellow citizens. Put the ballot in force, and Mr. A., being venal, will walk down to the poll with Mr. B., coinciding with (in the main) the views expressed by him, replying in a similar strain, and, to all appearance, in unity, entering the polling booth, and, under the mask of friendship, neutralizing his vote. Doubtless my opponent will exclaim, "But this is an exceptional case." Has he searched out or made inquiries as to the number who refrain from promising their vote till the last moment, and, having done so, has he weighed such waverers in the balance? Many who have paid attention to this point have been struck with surprise as to the number and character of such voters. These possessors of the franchise, then, having been legally bribed (for no action for bribery could possibly stand if the ballot be established), the result is that a lower tone of morality will be introduced, because the hold which public opinion has upon a man has been withdrawn. Considering this point settled, I would now ask you to follow me one step further. "In the lowest yet a lower deep." Human nature is sadly belied if candidates will refrain from bribing by their agents, because the world says it will be sowing the wind. Agents know the electors better than to think a bribe will prove altogether useless, and no doubt their judgment is correct. Many, many, although they can stoop so low as to sell their birthright (they look upon it as property), would shrink from proving knavish as well as venal. Others there are, nevertheless, who, protected by the veil of the ballot, would receive bribes from all parties, make promises to all, and perhaps deceive all. Picture this to your minds, and say if it is your will to make this possible.

Oh, men of England! whether is it better that a little injustice should be done (for I do not conceive my plan to be perfection), or that fraud, deceit, lying, should be encouraged, fostered, and legalized in the shady retreat and treacherous darkness of the ballot-box. Better all else than a universal lie.

Lastly, there is one point to which I think no one has yet alluded. Allowing that there are employers who consider themselves lords both of the body and soul, as it were, of their servants; that there are customers who imagine they buy also the liberty of the vendor when they purchase his chattels, think you that these will be altogether balked in their game because the ballot-box stands betwixt them and their intended serf. Nay, if, as we have been frequently told, workmen, servants, tradesmen, are ground beneath the heel of the corresponding upper classes, these latter, under the altered circumstances, will still exact the promise. In many cases, it may be, this will be broken, and the result will be that the vengeance of the deceived will fall upon the innocent.

It requires no very great imagination to picture the following scene, on the day after the declaration of the poll. A customer, who has previously exacted a promise from his grocer, enters the shop, and, having seen his candidate defeated, and, his suspicions being aroused, he fancies he perceives in the manner of his friend behind the counter an uneasiness which he has never noticed before. His suspicions gain ground, as in the remarks upon the loss of the election the customer fancies he has acquired a stronger basis for his suspicions. Ultimately he believes them, and as surely will the grocer lose the custom of the aforesaid customer and his friends. The decision arrived at may be a just one, but it is just as likely to be an iniquitous one. When we consider how apt we are to feed our own suspicions, we surely ought to guard against raising such malignant demons. Believing, then, that these and many other potent objections have to be met ere the friends of the ballot have a sure case to submit to the public, I would beseech legislators to pause ere they introduce a system which contains in it the germs of cowardice, double-dealing, and suspicion. Rather let them aim to elevate the grovelling instincts of the lowest class, teach them they are men, and inspire them with that respect for themselves that they may learn to feel themselves desirous of the respect of others.

A. J. G.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—VII.

OUGHT we to have the ballot *now*?

Your recent contributors appear to have forgotten that the main question of the ballot, as an advantageous or disadvantageous measure, has already been discussed in *The British Controversialist*, and that the special point for debate now is—Is the present time, and are the circumstances of our own day, now that we have got an extended representation and a new bribery law, such as to make the ballot advisable and necessary? Had this been kept in mind a great deal of valuable space might have been saved, and much ingenious but inapplicable argument would have been seen to be unnecessary.

I think it is very right to ask if, in our altered circumstances, under the reforms now secured, it is not time to give up agitations which lead to no good end, and devote ourselves to real practical legislation such as may truly benefit the masses by securing remission of taxation and extension of education? We have fought long enough surely for mere theoretical politics; let us try to accomplish some practical result with what we have got. We have as yet spent our labour in political agitation for that which is not bread, and our endeavours after parliamentary reform for that which satisfieth not.

I shall not detain the reader long with my reasons why we should leave the ballot unsought for *now*.

1. It would be better to give ourselves heartily to the securing

of some practical advantage from the reforms now accomplished than by again thrusting forward theoretically good-looking claims, give an excuse for impeding progressive legislation.

2. It would be better to press financial reform than any other now, for that is a reform of which all would feel the immediate benefit; while asking the ballot in preference seems to me like soliciting chaff rather than good wheat. Besides, successful financial reforms would make many men independent of intimidation, and would increase the number of those entitled to the franchise.

3. The recent extension of the franchise and the institution of law courts for trying election petitions have made it more dangerous, as well as less likely to be successful to attempt to debauch a constituency by bribery, corruption, and intimidation; and hence it is advisable that we should try these safeguards thoroughly before asking new ones. Does not our agitation for the ballot prevent us from using aright the safeguards we have?

4. The spread of education, as it makes men more intelligent, will make them more independent, and less in need of the ballot; while the prevalence of agitation for chimerical advantages makes men unmindful of improving the chances they have got.

5. The absolute ubiquity and general honesty of the daily press; the readiness with which cases of oppression or undue influence can be brought before the public, and held up to scorn even when they do not reach the heinousness of being brought before legal tribunals, makes the agitation for the ballot rather a stirring up of faction than an endeavour after true reform.

6. An over hasty judgment of our recently instituted bribery courts, and of the other laws prohibiting any measures in opposition to freedom of elections, seems to us to be implied in the outcry for the ballot. Ought we not rather to try to perfect the machinery, legal and moral, we have, and when it has been actually proved to be a failure, let us then agitate for something which will really secure the freedom of the franchise. It appears to be absurd to cry out for the ballot now until we have weighed the new law in the balances of justice and found them wanting.

7. All the arguments in favour of the ballot seem to go upon the principle of the need for prohibiting the application of "the screw," as it is called by the upper classes on the lower. But justice requires us to acknowledge not only the force of mob law, but the intimidation of trades' unions and other associations of the working classes; the frequency with which riots are raised by non-electors, and all the means by which votes may be influenced by the lower classes. May not these latter be regarded as an offset against the former, and might we not easily agree by mutual compact, that if the one were given over the other would be refrained from?

I shall not say more now, but leave these few remarks to win their way into the minds of those who read and think. I dare say

that unornamentedly as they have been stated, your intelligent readers will see and feel their force, and will be inclined to say, on a full consideration of the whole subject—We ought not *now* to have the ballot.

O. N. U. S.

Literature.

ARE PROVERBS WORTH STUDYING?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

"The words of the wise are as goads, and as nails fastened by the masters of assemblies, which are given from one shepherd."—Eccles. xii. 11.

It was not my intention to have given a fresh definition and derivation of the word proverb, but through the very sarcastic remarks of "Anti-P." on the meaning of the above word, I feel I am entirely justified in so doing. "Anti-P." says, p. 34,—*"I am quite (sic) well aware, of course, that grand and sounding definitions of proverbs are common. They are 'Words of wisdom,' 'the wit of one and the wisdom of many,' 'the essence and extract of intelligence.' And in contrast, I will give one of 'Anti-P's.' own definitions, which is certainly not very complimentary, p. 35: 'Proverbs are the scum of the intellect, not its choicest fruit.'"*

I shall, in this short paper, first endeavour to show that the above definitions are correct, that they set forth the meaning of the word proverb in its truest sense; and consequently are a sound and powerful argument and reason for the study of them. Secondly, that "Anti-P's" definition is radically wrong.

The word proverb (Lat. *proverbium*) is derived from two Latin words, *pro*, forward, and *verbum* a word; from which, with the general acceptance of the word, we gather that a *word* or *saying*, coming more readily forward than other sayings,—or a short familiar sentence forcibly expressing a well-known truth or moral lesson; or, in short, a brief, pithy sentence, setting forth, clearly and forcibly, some well-known truth, clothed in a garb through which, by the help of association, the moral lesson taught is impressively fixed on the memory,—is a proverb. I am sure the above could not have been more plainly, definitely, and briefly expressed than by the sarcastically quoted and ignored phrases referred to.

They are "Words of wisdom:" how beautiful the sentiment! the sound of which is like music, carried by the balmy breeze across

the rippling river, to the ears of a wise, intelligent and highminded man. Yea, to him they are very pleasant. "For wisdom is better than rubies, and all things that may be desired are not to be compared to it." If I can prove—which I have no doubt I shall—to the majority of the readers of *The British Controversialist*, that a proverb is a "Word of wisdom," I think this alone would be sufficient to convince one that the study of proverbs is beneficial. My first proof that they are "Words of wisdom" is that they contain words of warning, counsel and encouragement, in which some great moral truth is inculcated.

"Look before you leap."

"Marry in haste, repent at leisure."

"Consult the town-clerk of Ephesus, and do nothing rashly."

"Ponder the path of thy feet, and let all thy ways be established."—

Prov. iv. 26.

The above are words of warning, inasmuch as they instruct us to premeditate, to consider, to think, and look into the affairs and events of this life with caution, before we come to a conclusion. How many who are now suffering from the results of an "unhappy marriage," would have had cause to be thankful, had they taken *in time* this pithy and truthful proverb, "Marry in haste, repent at leisure." How many who are now beginning life over again, might in their old age, have lived in comfort and ease, had they taken the timely warning—"Look before you leap!"

"There's many a slip 'twixt the cup and the lip."

"Tis not all gold that glitters."

"The better part of valour is discretion." (Hen. IV., part i., act v., scene iv.)

"Discretion shall preserve thee, understanding shall keep thee."—Prov. ii. 11.

These are words of counsel, teaching us to use judgment and discretion, not to take anything for granted from what it seems to be on its first appearance. For in believing a circumstance, or a scandal, or even a new opening in life, at first sight to be true and good, many have made serious mistakes, which have taken years to remedy.

"Faint heart never won fair lady."

"Rome was not built in a day."

"Labour shall refresh itself with hope." (Hen. V., act ii. scene ii.)

"If thou faint in the day of adversity, thy strength is small."—Prov. xxiv. 10.

These encourage and stimulate the faint and weak-hearted, teaching them to aim in all their doings so as to be able to cry, "Excelsior! Excelsior!" rather than fall victims to "Black despair." Are there not many who have received encouragement

and comfort from the proverb, "Faint heart never won fair lady," and have lived to prove that though the old adage of Shakspeare, "The course of true love never did run smooth" (*Midsummer Night's Dream*, act i., scene i.) is true, yet "All's well that ends well." And many there are who have been stimulated in every walk of life to patience and perseverance by the proverb—"Rome was not built in a day."

My second proof is that the Scriptures encourage the study of them. "A wise man will hear, and will increase learning; and a man of understanding shall attain unto wise counsels." "To understand a proverb, and the interpretation: the words of the wise, and their dark sayings."—Prov. i. 5, 6. "And, moreover, because the preacher was wise, he still taught the people knowledge; yea, he gave good heed, and sought out, and set in order many proverbs."—Eccles. xii. 9. "I wisdom dwell with prudence, and find out knowledge of witty inventions."—Prov. viii. 12.

My third proof that they are "Words of wisdom" is that the divine Author of wisdom made use of them:—"I will open my mouth in a parable; I will utter dark sayings of old."—Ps. lxxviii. 2. Our Saviour frequently quoted them in his discourses, especially in his beautiful Sermon on the Mount, a few of which will suffice. "A city that is set on an hill cannot be hid." "Neither do men light a candle, and put it under a bushel, but on a candlestick."—Matt. v. 14, 15. "The very hairs of your head are all numbered."—Matt. x. 30. "It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God."—Matt. xix. 24.

Jesus on the occasion of reading the Scripture at Nazareth, made this remark, "Ye will surely say unto me this proverb, Physician, heal thyself;" to which He also gave an answer by quoting another: "No prophet is accepted in his own country." On the occasion of comforting His disciples, our Saviour called their attention to the following: "These things have I spoken unto you, in *proverbs*."—St. John xvi. 25.

Proverbs are "the wit of one and the wisdom of many:" this is apparent to all who believe a proverb is a word of wisdom. It is only from a few of the wisest celebrities of a century, such as Solomon, Luther, Shakspeare, Sir Walter Scott, and the ancient Greek philosophers, whose writings and sayings have become maxims, adages, household words and proverbs, to the world at large in their age, and those that follow that we get proverbs.

They are "The essence and extract of intelligence:" this follows from the literal character of the word, as before shown. It is a saying attracting our immediate attention, or a sentence coming forward from the surrounding writings, in which we see an arrow of truth, well calculated to go home to the hearer. "Anti-P." p. 34, quoting the proverb, "Stirring the wrong fire with a broken poker;" to denote that we are not very able to expatiate on the question, and have mistaken the point in dispute; (whether "Anti-P.'s."

comment on the proverb is correct, it is not in my province to say, but I leave it to the judgment of the readers,) says, "Surely this is not a whit more readily understood and expressive than to say that we have not taken up the subject right, and do not understand the gist of the question." With this view, I must decidedly disagree. I maintain had Solomon written a book with as many words as contained in the Bible, on "Wisdom and Morality," in the common and general way of prose writings, as in the style "Anti-P." would have, Solomon could not have taught *so many* moral truths, shown the beauties of virtue, the abhorrence of vice, the value of wisdom and understanding, and the way and danger of the foolish, in such a striking and satirical manner, as in his brief, witty, illustrative, impressive and pointed sayings, contained in the *small* "Book of Proverbs." I will bring this section, the first part of my paper, to a conclusion by quoting the immortal bard's words, "Brevity is the soul of wit."

It now remains for me, in the second place, to prove my statement, that "Anti-P.'s" definition of a proverb is radically wrong. He has pictured intellect in very beautiful and symbolical language; in fact, he could not have chosen a more correct and truthful figure than in representing it as belonging to the vegetable kingdom; which, for the sake of argument, we will say belongs to the class of fruitbearing trees, such as the apple. He then brings to our notice two illustrations—*scum* and choicest fruit, professing to represent its products: whether these are correct or *not* we will prove by analogy. So far as the latter figure is concerned, there is not the slightest ground for doubt of the consistency in the emblem employed; it is quite natural to expect from an apple tree fruit, and from different trees fruit of various comparisons; even on one tree, some of the fruit will be of a finer quality than others. But it is the former metaphor, *scum*, which we have to deal with. "Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles?" neither, then, do I expect a thing as a fruit, *or rather a so-called fruit*, which is entirely foreign to it. Fruit, which signifies product, consequence, effect, advantage, or that which is borne or produced, in order to be eaten or *enjoyed*. It is generally applied to plants, and sometimes to the productions of the animal and mineral kingdoms. Scum which signifies, foam or froth, extraneous matter, refuse, dross, or that which is external, foreign, *not belonging* to or *dependent on* a thing, not essential. It is generally applied to liquids, and the refuse of chemical preparations. Here it is "Clear as noon day" had "Anti-P." used any other style of symbolic language, it would have been utterly impossible to have employed the two similes, *scum* and *choicest fruit*, as contrasts, correctly.

"Proverbs are the *scum* of the intellect, *not* its choicest fruit." What are its choicest fruit? The choicest fruit of an *educated* intellect (for this, like trees, needs to be dug about its roots—to be manured and in due time to be grafted; or else, instead of finding "Apples of gold in pictures of silver," alas! that it should be only

wild crabs—not the *scum*) are wisdom, understanding, and learning. And the worst fruits of a neglected intellect are ignorance, vice, and foolishness. I think I have proved satisfactorily that proverbs are "Words of wisdom," consequently are the choicest fruits of the intellect, not its wild crabs, or to use "Anti-P.'s" words—the *scum* of the intellect. The falsity of the word *scum* has been ably sustained by our friend "H. W., jun.," p. 120, and I cannot do better in concluding this paper than by again asking the question, Ought not "Anti-P.," then, to have said, proverbs are the *cream*—not the *scum* of the intellect? GEORGIUS D. E.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

I AM really surprised that any writer on this subject should have ventured to place before the readers of *The British Controversialist* an argument so palpably fallacious as that proverbs are worth studying, because there is a Book of Proverbs contained in the Scriptures, and Jesus, the Great Teacher, made use occasionally of the proverbs current in Judea during his sojourn on the earth. An exactly parallel argument would prove that the drama was a right and proper amusement for the people, because there are in the Scriptures two divine dramas at least,—“Job,” and the “Song of Solomon,” and St. Paul has quoted the dramas extant in his day in the Scriptures of the New Testament. If these arguments, which are precisely analogous, are not both equally convincing, then the opponents of our thesis that proverbs are not worth studying ought to show some reason why they believe in the divine approbation of proverbs, and yet deny the divine approval of the drama. It is evident that S. S. has unwittingly outwitted himself in this application of logic to Scripture. So far, then, the argument from the Bible may be regarded as having been entirely overturned. We have turned the flank of the Bible advocates of the worth of proverbs, for Bible proverbs derive their worth from being infused with the inspiration of the Almighty, which giveth wisdom.

A. J. G. affirms, in thus imitating S.S., that the study of proverbs is the study of man, and infers that because “the proper study of mankind is man,” the proper study of mankind ought also to be proverbs! One might as well say the study of sin is the study of man, and deduce thence that sin was worth studying. A. J. G. has surely mistaken a “gem of fancy” for an argument. Proverbs are not men. They are not even any considerable amount of human opinion. It has been well shown, besides, that they are more variable than the wind, and constitute less than “the small dust of the balance” in inducing men to act, or enabling them to act wisely. Our affirmative friends bear down upon us with full sail, with a couple of Irish archbishops in their van, and they have made what they conceive to be *Trenchant* charges from the archbishop’s canons of criticism, so as to make their opponents like *what Ely* often was before it was thoroughly drained—quite overcome. In those days of disestablishment and disendowment, they might have

had the good sense to perceive that Irish archbishops were but frail buttresses to any cause, because, like David and Job of old, they themselves were become but "a byword among the people." Archbishops are exposed to an archery that should have withheld our opponents from placing them in the forefront, had they not had as little charity as common sense.

S. S. does not seem to know a jest from a proverb. He instances one of Douglas Jerrold's *bon mots*, "Speculation is sometimes better spelled by beginning at the second letter," as a proverb. He might as well call the pregnant criticism, "Ritualism is the reverse of spiritualism," a proverb. But these are jests. A volume might be written on the proverb of two words, "Extremes meet." But what really is the meaning of this so-called proverb? and are proverbs themselves illustrations of its truth? Are they compounds of common sense and common nonsense? "Common sense," says Voltaire, "is the least common thing in the world;" but proverbs are not the least common things in the world. How, then, can proverbs contain common sense? How is it possible that in them "wisdom is gathered up, condensed, fixed in a few words"?

S. S. supplies one of the best arguments against the worth of the study of proverbs when he tells us, on the authority of the Dublin arch-bishop, that the country in which ignorance, bigotry, and stupidity reign more triumphantly than in any other European land—Spain—one collection of proverbs contains seven or eight thousand. If proverbs are the essence of wisdom, how essentially wise the Spaniards must be! But what say the facts? and "Facts are stubborn chieftains, that winna ding, and canna be disputed"! They say that Spain is almost without literature, learning, or common sense.

S. S. praises the comparative paucity of wicked proverbs, but his reasoning is fallacious. He is referring only to book proverbs; but everybody knows that there are many proverbs, as there are many terms, current in every language, which cannot be printed. To argue from the purity of the proverbs of books to the purity of the hearts of the people who use such proverbs, is as clear a *non sequitur* as to argue the purity of the human heart from the clean and wholesome pages of a dictionary, from which necessarily all the most obnoxious terms in use, even among the common people, not to say, the lower classes, are most carefully purged. Nathan Bailey's Dictionary sinned against this taste, by incorporating many common terms; but his reward has been that he is sedulously kept on the highest shelf of the library in which it happens to have a place. His plain speaking is offensive.

I have been much struck with the paper of C. J. A. He has shown plainly that proverbs cannot compare with poetry for the felicitous compression of a fact in a taking phrase. If the advocates of proverbs can equal his collection by quotable proverbs, they will go a good way to confute our main force—that proverbs are for the most part worthless in themselves, and therefore not worth studying.

J. M. D.

The Essayist.

THE SACRED POETRY OF THE XVIITH CENTURY.

How happy, yea, how blessed and holy a thing it is, when poetry, instead of being wasted, too often alas! *worse* than wasted, on the things of time and sense, is consecrated to the interests of eternity!—when, hallowed by devotion, and enkindled by love's holy fires, it is wafted, like incense, to heaven, wherein alone true beauty dwells! Poetry, in its highest expression,—sacred poetry being taken as the type,—is the utterance in harmonious numbers of a deep, soul-felt longing for that beauty, that eternal, spiritual beauty, of which all earthly beauty is but, as it were, the evanescent image and reflection:—

“For what is Beauty, judged aright,
But some surpassing, transient gleam;
Some smile from heaven, in waves of light,
Rippling o'er life's distempered dream?”*

Sacred poetry lays claim to a very high antiquity: thus, great part of the Old Testament is of this character. We may enumerate:—The song of Moses,† that oracular song foreshadowing through long vistas of time the future of Israel. The vaticination, in rapt, awe-inspiring utterances, like some mystic chant, of Balaam, that wizard Seer so finely imaged in the poet's vision:—

“His wild hair floating on the Eastern breeze,
His tran'c'd yet open gaze
Fix'd on the desert haze,
As one who deep in heaven some airy pageant sees.”‡

The triumphal songs of Miriam and Deborah, the most ancient of the kind, perhaps, on record, the thanksgiving song of Hannah, the Book of Job, that grand primæval vindication of “the ways of God to men,” the Psalms of David, whose “clear harp of divers tones”§ still echoes through the Church, touching responsive chords in many a heart, the Song of Solomon, rich in pastoral imagery, breathing “Sabæan odours,”|| and many portions of the prophetic writings, are composed in a strain of lofty and impassioned poetry.

* “May Carols.”—Aubrey De Vere.

† Deut. xxxii.

‡ Keble.—“Christian Year.”

§ Tennyson.—“In Memoriam.”

|| “Sabæan odours from the spicy shore of Araby the Blest.”—Milton's a.
“Paradise Lost,” Book iv.

In the New Testament the refrain is taken up again and repeated, as in the Song of Mary, known as the *Magnificat*, the Song of Zacharias, of Simeon, and, lastly, in the Book of Revelation, the whole multitude of the redeemed are represented as joining with the heavenly choirs in one ever-pealing anthem of praise and adoration. Coming thence to the period of ecclesiastical history, we find the names of many hymns and hymn-writers. In the primitive ages of Christianity we may note Ambrose and Gregory, names associated, each of them, with the chants of famous memory, of Prudentius, Ausonius, Sedulius, and of a host of hymn writers, Greek and Latin. In the mediæval ages occur the names of the two Bernards, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Bernard of Clugny, authors, the one, of the hymn "*Jesu, dulcis memoria* :"—

"Jesu, the very thought of Thee
With sweetness fills my breast,
But sweeter far Thy face to see,
And in Thy presence rest!"

the other, of the hymn "*Jerusalem the golden*,"—"that lovely hymn," to quote the words of Archbishop Trench, "which within the last few years has been added to those already possessed by the Church." We should refer also to the names of Thomas of Celanus, the supposed author of that grand old hymn the "*Dies Iræ*," of Adam of St. Victor, Bonaventura, and many others. But, narrowing our range, we come down to the Reformation period, and trace the rise and growth of sacred poetry in England from the age succeeding that period (the 17th century) to the present. Not to mention Milton, who towers in lone sublimity above all his contemporaries, even as Snowdon would if placed beside the Malvern hills; not to mention this supreme of poets, this all but inspired bard, the names of three sacred poets stand conspicuous in the English Literature of the 17th century,—Herbert, "Holy George Herbert," as he was called, Vaughan, and Crashaw, the precursors of that line of sacred poets which culminated in him (John Keble), the sweet singer of our day, that nightingale of sacred song, whose notes, fresh ringing in memory's ear, shall never die. A few words on each of these three, and their distinguishing characteristics. At the head of the list stands Herbert, the well-known author of "*The Temple*"—a work still frequently quoted and referred to. The following estimate of the characteristics of Herbert's poetry is taken from the pen of a late writer of literary eminence.* Taking a general survey of the poetry of the 17th century, its excellences and defects, he begins by remarking :—"In estimating the poetry of this period, it is very common to condemn it for the conceits in which it abounds. This is a censure in which it is necessary to exercise some caution. It is true that simplicity of thought is a precious element of poetry, as distinguished from complications and involutions and entanglements of thought. The fault in many of these poets was,

* "*Lectures on The British Poets.*" By Henry Reed.

that not content with a thought or feeling in its first simple form, they wandered far away from it in search of all fantastic allusions; and when they bring you back to the original thought or feeling, its life is gone; it is dead and spiritless. These are what are called *cold conceits*. But it has been well said that a conceit is not necessarily cold. The mind, in certain states of passion, finds comfort in playing with occult or casual resemblances, and dallies with the echo of a sound. What is not a conceit to those who read it in a temper different from that in which the writer composed it? The most pathetic parts of poetry to cold tempers seem and are nonsense, as divinity was to the Greeks foolishness. When Richard the Second, meditating on his own utter annihilation as to royalty, cries out, "Oh that I were a mocking king of snow, standing before the sun of Bolingbroke, to melt myself away in water-drops!" If we have been going on pace for pace with the passion before, this sudden conversion of a strong-felt metaphor into something to be actually realized in nature, like that of Jeremiah, "Oh that my head were waters, and mine eyes a fountain of tears!" is strictly and strikingly natural. But come unprepared upon it, and it is a conceit; and so is a head turned into "waters."

It is necessary to understand that real feeling may be compatible with a great deal of eccentricity of thought and quaintness of imagery in poetry, in order to appreciate those singular strains which, fancy-wrought as they are, were uttered from the very bottom of the heart of that sweet singer, George Herbert. It is poetry with many of the characteristics of the serious poetry of the seventeenth century, but with feeling, fancy, and thought blended together in proportions unlike the combination on any other pages. It is essentially devotional,—devotion, with Fancy serving it with the speed and wildness of a fairy's movements, taking any shape that poetic ingenuity could give, with the hope that

"A verse may catch a wandering soul that flies
 Profounder tracts, and by a blest surprise,
 Convert delight into a sacrifice."

What, in its way, can be more pleasing than the sweet moralising in what are perhaps his best known lines, on virtue?—

VIRTUE.

Sweet day, so cool, so calm, so bright,
 The bridall of the earth and skie:
 The dew shall weep thy fall to-night;
 For thou must die.

Sweet rose, whose hue angry and brave,
 Bids the rash gazer wipe his eye,
 Thy root is ever in its grave,
 And thou must die.

Sweet spring, full of sweet dayes and roses,
 A box where sweets compacted lie,
 My musick shows ye have your closes,
 And all must die.

Onely a sweet and vertuous soul,
 Like season'd timber, never gives ;
 But though the whole world turn to coal,
 Then chiefly lives.

His lines on "Life" have somewhat a more solemn strain, but so gentle a warning to mortality, that even the young, light heart of beauty, happy with its innocent tribute of flowers, may not unwillingly receive a salutary pensiveness :—

LIFE.

I made a posie, while the day ran by :
 Here will I swell my remnant out, and tie
 My life within this band.
 But time did becken to the flowers, and they
 By noon most cunningly did steal away,
 And withered in my hand.

My hand was next to them, and then my heart ;
 I took, without more thinking, in good part,
 Time's gentle admonition ;
 Who did so sweetly death's sad taste convey,
 Making my minde to smell my fatal day,
 Yet sugring the suspicion.

Farewell, dear flowers, sweetly your time ye spent,
 Fit, while ye lived, for small or ornament,
 And after death for cures.
 I follow straight without complaints or grief,
 Since if my scent be good, I care not, if
 It be as short as yours.

Most beautiful, simply and naturally beautiful, to our mind, of all Herbert's poems, is the tender and pathetic effusion* entitled—

THE FLOWER.

How fresh, O Lord, how sweet and clean
 Are Thy returns ! ev'n as the flowers in spring ;
 To which, besides their own demean,
 The late past frosts tributes of pleasure bring.
 Grief melts away
 Like snow in May,
 As if there were no such cold thing.

* Coleridge calls this "a delicious poem."

Who would have thought my shrivel'd heart
 Could have recovered greenness? It was gone
 Quite under ground; as flowers depart
 To see their mother-root, when they have blown;
 Where they together
 All the hard weather,
 Dead to the world, keep house alone.

These are Thy wonders, Lord of power,
 Killing and quickening, bringing down to hell
 And up to heaven in an hour;
 Making a chiming of a passing-bell.*
 We say amisse,†
 This or that is:
 Thy word is all, if we could spell.

O that I once past changing were,
 Fast in Thy Paradise, where no flower can wither!
 Many a spring I shoot up fair,
 Offering at heav'n growing and growing thither;
 Nor doth my flower
 Want a spring showre,
 My sinnes and I joining together.

But while I grow in a straight line,
 Still upwards bent, as if heav'n were mine own,
 Thy anger comes, and I decline:
 What frost to that? what pole is not the zone
 Where all things burn,
 When Thou dost turn,
 And the least frown of Thine is shown!

And now in age I bud again,
 After so many deaths I live and write;
 I once more smell the dew and rain,‡
 And relish versing: O my onely light,
 It cannot be
 That I am he,
 On whom Thy tempests fell all night?

* i.e., Making a joyful peal of a doleful funeral-bell.

† In our short-sighted wisdom we judge amiss in saying this or that is (joyful or sorrowful), since, if we could but read the mystery aright, all is well that falls out in accordance with the word of God.

‡ Cf.—“Once more she hears the whispering rains
 On flowers and paths her childhood trod;
 And of things present nought remains
 Save the abiding sense of God.”
 (“*May Carols*”—*Aubrey De Vere.*)

These are Thy wonders, Lord of love,
 To make us see we are but flowers that glide :
 Which when we once can finde and prove,
 Thou hast a garden for us, where to bide
 Who would be more,
 Swelling through store,
 Forfeit their Paradise by their pride.

What a depth of yearning, melancholy tenderness in these lines! How charming their antique grace and simplicity! Sweetly pathetic beyond expression is the simile of the revival (in a spiritual sense) of youth in age, like as the frost-nipped flower beneath the gentle dew and rain of spring!

CHRISTIANITY AND RECREATION.

In recreation there is a divine excellency and fitness which none may discover nor enjoy but those who with brave hearts go forth into the world's wide field, the spade of honest effort in hand, and earn their penny.

"Recreation, said Bishop Hall, "is intended to the mind, as whetting is to the scythe, to sharpen the edge of it, which otherwise would grow dull and blunt. He therefore that spends his whole time in recreation is ever whetting, never mowing; his grass may grow and his steed starve; as, contrarily, he that always toils and never recreates is ever mowing, never whetting, labouring much to little purpose. As good no scythe as no edge."

"Then only doth the work go forward when the scythe is so seasonably and moderately whetted that it may cut, and so cut that it may have the help of sharpening."

Memorable too are the words which the Saviour uttered on the mountain's side to the anxious, listening throng, "Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest." No doubt there are many narrow-visioned people incapable of grasping more than what they call the spiritual meaning of this welcome. But it is exceedingly broad, embracing within its benediction the whole man, soul and body. For only just before this the Great Teacher had been speaking of the self-satisfied and callous-hearted, under the similes of "piping to those who would not dance, and lamenting to those who would not weep;" continuing, he mentions, the base insinuations that had been brought against his moral character, because the "Son of Man had come eating and drinking," and was sometimes to be seen reclining at the banquet tables of the publicans, or found enjoying the generous hospitality of households like that of Bethany.

If the Scribes and Pharisees would have him place more burdens on the backs of those already overtaxed by forms and ceremonies they were mistaken in the man and his doctrine.

The grand and beneficent message which he proclaimed in His life and death was not to fetter but to loosen the bonds of the children of men, and so, once more to bring into harmony with the laws and spirit of heaven, the false and disorganized condition of human society.

Admitting then, that Christianity is not opposed to innocent recreation, the question naturally arises, What is innocent recreation? or, What amusements may a sincerely religious person lawfully engage in?

Two hundred years ago good Richard Baxter wrote his *Christian Directory*, a book laborious enough, but exhibiting on the part of the learned author a wonderful felicity in raising out-of-the-way questions, however much his aim might have been in the contrary direction.

Here is an example:—"If a gentleman have a great estate by which he may do much good, and his wife be so proud, prodigal, and peevish, that if she may not waste it all in house-keeping and pride, she will die or go mad, or give him no quietness."

A sad plight, certainly, for any gentleman. And again:—"What should a husband or wife do in case of known intention of one to murder the other?"

It may very reasonably be surmised that Baxter's countrymen—if ever troubled with such strange cases of conscience—are quite as likely to do the right thing as his casuistry could direct them. If we are ever to breathe the invigorating atmosphere of truth, and attain to the high dignity of Christian manhood, it must be by a diligent and hopeful cultivation of the spirit that was in Him who came to declare unto us the will of our Father in heaven.

With moral freedom is only associated moral responsibility, and this the writers of the New Testament everywhere acknowledge and enforce, knowing as they did so well that liberty in the hands of the ignorant and the vicious is only a key to licence and disorder.

Between the most conscientious and high minded there will ever be in matters relative to moral points, points of departure as well as common ground of agreement.

But there is in all of us an extraordinary amount of latent intolerance, which on occasions becomes very self-evident. Thus, especially in cases of religion and politics, our judgment may become narrowed and warped through prejudice, leaving us slaves of the most mischievous and debasing errors. Of this we have an example in the Elizabethan statesmen and prelates, who appear to have thought it a most healthful means of purifying the State from heresy and schism by consigning to prison, the block, and the stake, such unhappy Dissenters as came within their grasp; or the Commonwealth men, who, with some very notable exceptions, were no wiser nor more enlightened. The result of all such miserable blundering was that hypocrites multiplied, infidelity and formalism usurped the place of true religion, and licentiousness, curbed for a season but not corrected, speedily broke forth into wilder excesses than

ever. It may be that such historical recollections have made us strive in these present days to propagate righteousness on a more satisfactory foundation than mere acts of parliament.

Motley, the historian of the Dutch Republic, has observed that "From the mere amusements of a people may be gathered much that is necessary for a proper estimation of its character." If English society as now developed be judged by such a maxim, we have every reason for congratulation. Compare the stage (which is undoubtedly patronised by many sincerely religious persons) with what it was in the last century. If now there is less of wit and pungent satire, there is also less of coarseness and obscenity. At the same time the sensational folly which for some years past has been the main substitute for true dramatic genius is by no means an encouraging sign. This is debatable ground; the more the need, then, for the full exercise of Christian charity.

A contributor to *Good Words* has very hopefully observed that "It is hard to think that the genius of great dramatists will disappear when the moral condition of society shall have been regenerated by the influence of the Christian faith, or that the noble physical gifts and intellectual susceptibilities of great actors will then have a history only in the darker times of the human race. It may then be found that a profession which appears to be singularly perilous only from the circumstances with which it has been accidentally connected, and that the neighbourhood of a theatre may be as decent and respectable as that of a church." "Meanwhile," he adds, "it is at least safer to deny ourselves the pleasant excitement which the stage, and the stage alone, can give, rather than incur the responsibility of encouraging the evils that have so long been associated with its fascinations."

Dancing, another favourite recreation, old as the days of Homer or Moses, has called forth great controversy in the Christian world. It is the excess and exaggeration of the thing wherein lies the bane. A crowd of gorgeously dressed people assembling together at a time when their more sensible neighbours are beginning to think of dreamland, for the sole purpose of whirling each other about till early morn like so many dancing dervishes, is a sight as foolish as injurious. But who has thought that he was transgressing any of Heaven's gracious laws when seeking at some Christmas or garden party a fair partner for the first set, or Sir Roger de Coverley? Scarcely is it necessary to mention the detestable influence of those public dancing rooms where innocence and health droop and die in an atmosphere of devilry and vice.

Before the appearance of the *Waverley* novels there were but few religious households into which works of fiction could find an entrance. Now in nearly every family circle the novelist finds a ready welcome. Why this change? Is it because forsaking the *old paths* we may look upon it as one of too many signs of national declension, or is it not because the imaginative writer has learned to work on higher and more excellent ground? Compare the

writings of Fielding, Smollett, and Radcliffe with the more modern productions of George Mac Donald, Kingale, Thomas Hughes, Miss Tytler, Miss Muloch, and many others, and the change in the Christian sentiment is explained.

The late Dr. Pye Smith has very truly remarked that "there are works of fiction whose character is pure and their tendency useful, of which no judicious Christian would disapprove, and to which no man of cultivated understanding ought to be a stranger."

The strong dislike on the part of many to cards and billiards may in a great measure be traced up to the remembrance of the terrible gambling days of the Regency. Those who know anything of whist or cribbage will admit that as amusements they are fully as sensible and far more interesting than such games as draughts, dominoes, &c. If, as is too often the case, they are made the media for gambling, it is not from any necessity in the structure of the games themselves, but is due rather to moral perverseness on the part of those who use them, and who failing them would use the next handy object for the same evil purpose.

Not long since, Henry Ward Beecher suggested that the New York Young Men's Christian Association should fit up on their premises saloons for billiards and bowls; games excellent in their way, and which it would be a worthy feat in any one to rescue from the hands of the Philistines.

Cruelty must ever be one of the darkest and most abominable of sins to those who have honest faith in His words who said, "Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy." There are two stanzas in the "Rime of the Ancient Mariner," which are rich with truth though in a quaint costume :—

"Farewell, farewell; but this I tell,
To thee, thou wedding guest,
He prayeth well who loveth well,
Both man, and bird, and beast.

"He prayeth best who loveth best
All things both great and small,
For the dear God, who loveth us,
He made and loveth all."

The days of cock-fighting, bull-baiting, and prize-fighting are virtually past, no longer do they find patrons in King, Lords, and Commons. A better spirit prevails, and every year the thirst for sports associated with suffering—whether of man or beast—is growing weaker.

Concerning horse-racing, it seems an error in the judgment of many to suppose that brutality must of necessity be one of its most marked features. Admitting, that to witness a number of splendid horses striving with outstretched necks and unfaltering resoluteness to reach the winning post, and so do the work expected of them is a truly magnificent spectacle; on the other hand, the surrounding circle of profanity, intemperance, and recklessness, is

quite sufficient to keep any wise and pure-hearted man far away from its polluting boundaries.

Much has been said for and against hunting. To many the excitement may be palatable enough, but can we be as sure that the fox, hare, or stag, feel a like amount of satisfaction in the fact that so many warm and anxious friends are following in their suite? Beyond this it is a sport invariably expensive, and it seems worth the thought whether when so many poor brethren and sisters are hungry, naked and ignorant, it be the best mode of disposing of superfluous cash.

A good shot is a quick killer, and when he excludes from his list of doomed ones the sweet songsters of our land, and the rarer species which still linger in our woodlands,—merely thinning the numbers of the more fruitful kinds,—we can have but little to say against him.

But what shall be said of Master Izaak Walton's well-loved sport, of which Lord Byron thus expressed himself:—

“And angling too, that solitary vice,
Whatever Izaak Walton sings or says;
The quaint old cruel coxcomb in his gullet
Should have a hook, and a small trout to pull it.”

Those who have read the learned angler's book will scarcely wonder at the poet's vengeful desire. Fishing seems far more cruel than it really is, and much that gives pain in connection with it may be altogether avoided.

The rural surroundings and quiet excitement give it great attractions for hard-worked professional and business men, whose minds are weary of the strife and din of cities.

Beyond the various means of recreation already glanced at—and about which some amount of controversy will always exist—there still remain many almost unchallenged means of recreation.

Who has a reproachful word to say against boating, cricketing, swimming, &c.? There is, however, the danger of excess even in these physical exercises, which many careless of have paid the heavy penalty.

Professor Thorold Rogers, in a contribution to the “Church and the World” on “University Education,” protests against young men going to Oxford as if the only thing they had to accomplish consisted in making themselves athletes.

That the body, the temple of the soul, should, in honour of its fair and august guest, be kept clean, in good repair, and beautiful as may be, few will dispute. But what shall be said of the many who worship the body as the highest good?

Inasmuch as Christianity is the infusing of God's Spirit and truth into all the motives and actions of life, so far will it have consecrated to its service the power of muscle; not, however, for the mere dispersion of true force, but to subjugate and utilize to

God's glorious service this world's vast resources; for the earth was given to man that he might subdue it.

In the pursuit of recreation, the tendency to sink into mere selfishness must be guarded against. When the great Teacher sought a little rest from the importunity of the multitude, he took with Him His disciples. Here, as ever with Him, was to be seen that watchful care and love which was always planning for others' happiness, and in so doing realizing His own.

To sum up—Christianity holds very sacred the development of the higher life in the soul, and all the kindly ties of home and neighbourhood, without which, how poor will be our development!

To this end it is necessary that some few hours out of every day shall be so set apart. There are not wanting signs abroad to show that such a golden—perhaps godly age would be the more correct term—is nearer to our hearts and homes than some expect. The angels' prophetic song will then have its real fulfilment as men find their truest joy in exalting God, and in causing peace and good-will to abound among men.

F. C. S.

The Reviewer.

A Catalogue of the Books, Manuscripts, Works of Art, Antiquities, and Relics, illustrative of the Life and Works of Shakspeare and of the history of Stratford-upon-Avon, which are preserved in the Shakspeare Library and Museum, in Henley Street. London: Printed for the Shakspeare Fund.

THIS book, though it is "only a catalogue," is not without special elements of interest.

"It is issued by the Shakspeare Fund, which was established in Oct. 1861, to accomplish the following objects:—1. The purchase of the Gardens of Shakspeare at New Place. 2. The purchase of the remainder of the birthplace estate. 3. The purchase of Anne Hathaway's cottage, with an endowment for a custodian. 4. The purchase of Getley's copyhold, Stratford-on-Avon. 5. The purchase of any other properties at, or near, Stratford-on-Avon that either formerly belonged to Shakspeare or are intimately connected with the memories of his life. 6. The calendaring and preservation of those records at Stratford-on-Avon which illustrate the poet's life and the history of Stratford-on-Avon in his time. And 7. The erection and endowment of a public library and museum at Stratford-on-Avon." "This fund originated, in 1861, in an emergency which threatened the integrity of the site of New Place and the Gardens of Shakspeare." "The amount hitherto received on behalf of the fund amounts to £4,188." "The progress which has thus far been made is due in a great measure to the zeal and to the contributions of a few. Miss Burdett

Costs, with unvarying munificence, contributed £600; and the sum of £2,585 has been raised by twenty other subscribers of £100 and upwards. In addition to these gifts, and to those enumerated in the following lists, the fund has indirectly benefited by gratuitous services. Mr. Arthur J. Wood, barrister-at-law, has declined fees for valuable legal assistance. Mr. Edward Gibbs, the accomplished and well-known architect of Stratford-on-Avon, presented the amount of his costs, £55; miscellaneous expenses incurred previously to the audit of March, 1862, amounting to £105 12s., were presented by Mr. Halliwell." "In the few years which have elapsed since the establishment of the fund, three of the most important of the above-named objects have been nearly completed, and, amongst them, the formation of the valuable library and museum." "The first establishment of the library and museum is due to the well-timed liberality of Mr. O. Holte Braoebridge, of Athenstone Hall, who kindly placed the dilapidated rooms of the house adjoining the birthplace, in Henley Street, in a fit state for the reception of cases. When once a suitable repository was accessible, presents of great value soon accumulated. The rapid progress of the collection is, however, mainly due to the unwearied diligence and exertions of Mr. W. O. Hunt, whose position in Stratford-on-Avon has enabled him to secure a large number of interesting objects which would otherwise have been dispersed or lost." "The permanency of this important collection has been carefully secured. The library and museum have been conveyed to the Corporation of Stratford-on-Avon, upon trust to place their management under the control of a Board, consisting of the Lord Lieutenant of the County, the High Steward of the Borough, the Mayor and Aldermen, the Vicar, the Master of the Grammar School, and others." "The main designs at present are to complete the work commenced at New Place, and to increase the efficiency of the library and museum. The other unattained objects of the fund must remain in abeyance until these are satisfactorily accomplished. A small portion of Shakspeare's Gardens at New Place remains to be purchased. The custodian's house requires a new front, and a considerable expenditure is necessary to lay out the grounds properly, and surround them with substantial iron fencing. Independently of the question of an endowment for a custodian, the sum wanted immediately for these purposes cannot fall much short of £2,000."

Besides conveying this information, it includes a notice, worthy of wider circulation, of one of the most enthusiastic of the Stratfordian admirers of and labourers for the fame of Shakspeare.

"The late Robert Ball Wheler was born at Stratford on January 1st, 1785, in the house in Old Town, in which he continued to reside during his life, and where he died on July 15th, 1857, aged 72. His father, Mr. Robert Wheler, his predecessor in his profession of a solicitor, entered the office of Mr. Bradley, the town clerk, and a solicitor of large practice, in January, 1757. He died in August, 1819, aged 77. His son, the object of this notice, was articled to him, but, unlike most articled clerks, he served no part of his time in London, merely going there for about a month at the time of his admission. His affection for Stratford and love for Shakspearean pursuits were so intense that he never seemed to be happy out of his native town; so that, in the whole course of his long life, he spent very little portion of his time indeed out of Stratford. In early life he was a member of the Stratford volunteer corps, and he afterwards

became a commissioned officer, a lieutenant and quarter-master, in the third regiment of the Warwickshire local militia stationed at Stratford, in which capacity he was much esteemed by his brother officers and by Colonel Sheldon, then in command of the regiment.

"Mr. Wheler's first work, and that by which he is chiefly known, is the admirably compiled 'History and Antiquities of Stratford-upon-Avon,' published in 1806. His next separate production was a 'Guide to Stratford-upon-Avon, 1814,' one which is well termed by a distinguished writer, 'a very superior book to many which bear a similar title.' *Hunter on Shakspeare*, i. 107. This was followed, in 1824, by his excellent sketch of the history of Shakspeare's birthplace. Besides these works he was the writer of several articles of interest in the "Gentleman's Magazine" and other periodicals.

"His published works, however, form but a small part of the results of his labours. . . . Upon his autograph manuscripts in this collection will henceforth rest his principal title to literary distinction."

Of these collections we have a hand list given here, as well as lists of the donations of Shakspeareana made by the Stratford Shakspeare Book Club (now dissolved), by W. O. Hunt; the Royal Shakspearean Club of Stratford-upon-Avon—principally transcripts and drawings by the late Captain Saunders; by J. O'Halliwel—the chief Shakspearean of our time—and various other donors; a list of purchases; and to the whole is appended a "chronological index;" a list of subscribers to the fund, &c. It contains altogether notices of 1,148 articles more or less associated with Shakspeare, and altogether proves that Stratford may yet have a museum worthy of him who was

"Not one but all mankind's epitome."

The Secrets of Logic: its Philosophy, and the integration of Induction and Deduction. By Rev. P. MELVILLE, M.A.
Glasgow: R. Gowanlock.

THIS essay is the production of the president of the Glasgow University Dialectic Society, which meets, during the College session, in the Greek class-room each Friday evening, under the honorary presidency of Professor John Nichol. Its author is a teacher of logic, classics, and English literature in the most energetic city in North Britain, and seems to be a man of active mind and superior talents. Delivered originally as a lecture, it still retains some of the defects of that style of expressing thought. It contains a very good set of introductory observations on general logic, and, though it cannot be affirmed that it contains any original idea, the subject is presented ingeniously and interestingly. The following extracts will show the point of view which the writer takes, and may gratify some of our readers:—

"Logic is the science of correct and conclusive thinking. It sets forth on the one hand the laws of thought, and on the other the laws of nature. Thus its sphere is general criticism; namely, the scientific judgment, not only of the consistency of thought as such, and of language as its symbolic

embodiment, but also of their truth—that is, their correspondence to the realities of nature. Hence, logic is divided into two parts, which complete each other, and are so closely blended in nature that they cannot be wholly separated. These are:—

“1st. Deductive or Formal Logic, of which Aristotle was the great founder, and Sir William Hamilton the most distinguished expounder.

“2nd. Inductive, or Physical Logic, of which Lord Bacon was the great founder, and Mr. J. Stuart Mill the most distinguished expounder.

“Deductive Logic is the science of the consistency of thought—viz., of conception, judgment, and reasoning; hence also of language as their symbolic expression.

“Inductive Logic is the science of the evidence of thoughts as true—viz., as representative of realities; hence also of the laws of nature as their criterion or test.

“I.—DEDUCTIVE OR FORMAL LOGIC is the science which sets forth the most general forms of human thought, their nature, and their constant relations; hence also their laws, their tests, and, in fine, the unity of all reasoning under one supreme canon, dictum, or axiom.

“II.—INDUCTIVE OR PHYSICAL LOGIC is the science of the natural processes of thinking, their uniform phases, and the principles on which they proceed; their objective basis and test in the phenomena and laws of nature, and the methods by which they may be most correctly investigated; the theory of the laws of nature hitherto ascertained, and their unity in one universal principle; hence, in fine, the scientific calculation of every degree of probability or evidence, up to the certainty of this universal principle.”

“This we call the Integrative Method. Its basis is conception, closely corrected by observation, and completed by the concurrent agency of all our powers with all their helps. This is genuine thinking. By this method we not only detect old errors, but also their causes and occasions, and correct both. Thus also we seek to do justice to all honest thinkers, however sadly they may have blundered in their use of words. Thus the philosophy of integration is a *reconciliatio magna*, destined to become heir of the past, and to enlighten, unite, and elevate our common humanity for the better age that is to be!”

Lyra Sacra Americana; or, Gems from American Sacred Poetry.
By C. D. CLEVELAND. London: Sampson Low and Co.

CHARLES DEXTER CLEVELAND, the compiler of this little volume, is well known as the editor of many popular compends of English, American, and classical literature, author of a concordance to the poetical works of Milton, and several other aids to study. The extracts are arranged under the names of the respective authors, set down in alphabetical order. Biographical notices and annotations of various sorts are added, and the whole volume claims a very fair place among collections of religious verse. Of many of the contributors we do not know anything, but several, as Willis, Longfellow, O. W. Holmes, P. and A. Carey, G. Bethune, J. Pierpont, A. Norton, Mrs. Stowe, &c., are known intimately and valued. We quote this beautiful set of verses by the late Mrs. Sigourney:—

"JESUS OF NAZARETH PASSETH BY."

" Watcher, who watchest by the bed of pain
While the stars sweep on in their midnight train ;
Stifling the tear for thy loved one's sake ;
Holding thy breath lest his sleep should break ;
In thy loneliest hours there's a helper nigh—
 ' Jesus of Nazareth passeth by.'

" Stranger, afar from thy native land,
Whom no one takes with a brother's hand ;
Table and hearthstone are glowing free,
Casements are sparkling, but not for thee ;
There is one who can tell of a home on high—
 ' Jesus of Nazareth passeth by.'

" Sad one, in secret bending low,
A dart in thy breast that the world may not know,
Striving the favour of God to win—
Asking His pardon for days of sin ;
Press on, press on, with thy earnest cry—
 ' Jesus of Nazareth passeth by.'

" Mourner, who sits in the churchyard lone,
Scanning the lines on that marble stone,
Plucking the weeds from thy children's bed,
Planting the myrtle, the rose instead—
Look up, look up, with thy tearful eye —
 ' Jesus of Nazareth passeth by.'

" Fading one, with the hectic streak,
With thy vein of fire and thy burning cheek,
Fear'st thou to tread the darkened vale ?
Look unto one who can never fail.
He hath trod it Himself, He will hear thy sigh—
 ' Jesus of Nazareth passeth by.' "

THE ANALOGY BETWEEN THE PROGRESS OF THE FINE AND THE USEFUL ARTS.—Friar Bacon was our Heriod and he of Verulum our Homer, who first gave being and form to the gods of our idolatry—the first who fixed the belief and directed the mind of the people into the path which they have since so steadily followed. Galileo was the Theopis of our civilization ; while Kepler, Newton, and Locke, like the three great dramatists of the Greeks, moulded and brought to perfection that great branch of our glorious triumphs which Watt and Arkwright, like Phidias and Ictum, reduced to fixed and tangible shapes.—"*Westminster Review*," *Antagonism of the Ideal and the Real*.

Our Collegiate Course.

LYCIDAS: A MONODY.

For neither were ye *playing* on the *steep*,
Where your *old bards*, the famous Druids, *lie*,
Nor on the *shaggy top* of Mona *high*,
Nor yet where Deva *spreads* her *wisard stream* : 55.

52. Sporting ; hill-side.

53. Ancient singers ; are buried.

54. Wood-crowned peak ; lofty.

55. Extends ; magic waters.

52. This refers to the destruction of the native Cambrian poets by Edward I., after his conquest of Wales—a fable which forms the theme of *The Bard*, by Thomas Gray, who sung—

“On a rock, whose haughty brow
Frowns o’er old Conway’s foaming flood.”

The last of the poets bewailing his predecessors, says :—

“On dreary Arvon’s shore they lie,
Smeared with gore, and ghastly pale.”

The allusion in the text is to the *steep* of Snowdon’s shaggy side “in Carnarvonshire, North Wales, between Cardigan Bay and Conway.”

53. For the earliest and best description of Druidism, see Cæsar’s “Gallic War,” iv., 13. Other accounts are given by Diodorus Siculus, Strabo, Pomponius Mela, Pliny, &c., to which we refer the reader. This glean- ing from Strabo will illustrate the text if we remember that all learning was in the hands of the Druids, and that the two earlier stages mentioned were only preparatory stages in the training and career of the British priesthood. “Among the Gauls three classes are held in especial esteem—Bards, Ovates, and Druids. The Bards are singers and poets ; the Ovates are sacrificers and physiologists ; the Druids, in addition to poetry, study moral philosophy also.” “The Druidical Institution,” Cæsar says, “is supposed to have come originally from Britain, whence it passed into Gaul.” Cambrian Britain yet retains traces and relics of Druidism.

54. Anglesea, or Englishman’s island, is called by the Welsh *Inas Dowl*, the dark island, and was known to the Romans as *Mona*, one of the chief seats of Druidical power ; it was covered with dense forests, and wooded to “the shaggy top.”

55. The Dee, a river draining parts of Merioneth, Denbigh, Flint, Shropshire, and the West of Cheshire, which in its course nearly encircles the city of Chester, and thence passes into the Irish Sea. It was long the boundary between Briton and Saxon, by the former of whom its waters were held sacred. Spenser speaks of the

“Dee which Britons long ygone,
Did call divine that doth by Chester tend.”

*Ah me! I fondly dream,
Had ye been there: for what could that have done,
What could the Muse herself that Orpheus bore,*

56. Woes ; foolishly employ myself | 57. Any way near.
in reverie. | 58. Brought forth.

56. This is an instance of *Aposiopesis*, a figure of speech in which the sentence is abruptly interrupted—leaving the sense plain though unexpressed, and the passion-fraught mind leaps, as it were, to another idea in its haste and excitement. The sense is, “I fondly dream had ye been there” *ye would have saved him. But the thought is vain; “for what could that (presence of yours) have done,” when Fate had fixed it otherwise?* A bold instance of *Enantiosis*, combining two opposites into one strong phrase; stronger even than the *Antanaclosis*, blind leaders of the blind, Matt. xv. 14.

58. Orpheus was torn to pieces by Thracian women, who threw his lyre and his head into the Hebrus, as Virgil sings :—

“Nulla Venus, non ulli animum flexere Hymenaei.
Solut Hyperboreas glacies Tanaimque nivalem,
Arvaque Rhipaeis numquam viduata pruinis
Lustrabat, raptam Eurydicen atque irrita Ditis
Dona querens ; spretae Ciconum quo munere matres,
Inter sacra deum nocturnique orgia Bacchi,
Discerptum latas juvenem sparsere per agros
Tum quoque marmorea caput a cervice revulsum,
Gurgite cum medio portans Aeagrius Hebrus
Volveret, Eurydicen vox ipsa, et frigida lingua
A Miseram Eurydicen ! anima fugiente, vocabat ;
Eurydicen toto referebant flumine ripae.”—

“*Georgics*,” iv., 516—527.

“To hymeneal rites no more inclined,
From Love’s soft charms he turned his vacant mind,
Alone he traversed the Rhipaeian snows,
And northern plains where icy Tanais flows ;
His lost Eurydice with ceaseless strain,
Mourning, and Pluto’s favours shown in vain.
The Cicon women thought themselves despised,
While Orpheus his lost wife so dearly prized ;
And fired with rage as they the sacred rite
Of Bacchus’ orgies held at dead of night,
Piecemeal they tore the youth with murderous hands,
And scattered wide his limbs around their lands.
Yet then, even then, when from his shoulders torn,
On Hebrus’ swelling flood his head was borne ;
Still as his spirit fled, on his cold tongue
Eurydice, in faltering accents hung ;
Ah ! poor Eurydice was still his cry ;
Eurydice the hollow banks reply.”—
The “Georgics” of Virgil, translated by W. H. Bathurst.

The Muse herself, for her *enchanting* son,
 Whom *universal nature* did lament, 60
 When, by the *route*, that made the *hideous* roar,
 His *gory visage* down the *stream* was sent,
 Down the *swift* Hebrus to the *Lesbian shore*?
Alas! what boots it with *incessant* care
 To *lead* the *homely, slighted* shepherd's trade, 65
 And *strictly meditate* the *thankless* Muse?
 Were it not better done, as others *use*,
 To *sport* with *Amaryllis* in the *shade*,
 Or with the *tangles* of *Nesera's hair*?
Fame is the *spur* that the *clear spirit* doth raise 70
 (That *last infirmity* of *noble minds*)
 To *scorn* *delights*, and *live laborious* days:
 But the *fair guerdon* when we *hope* to find,
 And *think* to *burst out* into *sudden blaze*,
 Comes the *blind Fury* with the *abhorred shears*, 75

- | | |
|---|--|
| 59. Soul-subduing. | 69. Ensnaring intricacies; locks. |
| 60. All creation; grieve for. | 70. A fair reputation; inducement;
pure nature; incite. |
| 61. Raging mob; hateful tumult. | 71. Longest felt weakness (foible);
earnest souls. |
| 62. Bloody head; flood. | 72. Despise pleasures; spend hard-
working. |
| 63. Quick-flowing; beach. | 73. Enticing reward; expect; get. |
| 64. Ah me! profits; continual anxiety. | 74. Suppose that we are about; shine
forth; quick-kindled brilliancy. |
| 65. Give one's entire attention to;
humble, despised occupation. | 75. Approaches; eye-bound Fate;
hateful scissors. |
| 66. Carefully and constantly devote one's self to; ungracious. | |
| 67. Are accustomed to do. | |
| 68. Enjoy one's self; arbour. | |

59. Calliope, who was the mother of Orpheus, whose father (Eagrus was king of Thrace.

63. Lesbos, an island in the Bay of Adramyttium, the birthplace of Alcæus and Sappho.

68. Amaryllis, a shepherdess beloved by Tityrus, "Virgil's *Bucolics*," I., &c.

69. Nesera is named in Virgil's third Eclogue, but the reference here seems to be to one of the love names of Horace's lyrics,—

"Dic, et argutæ properet Neseræ
 Myrrheum nodo colibere crinem."

"Bid too Nesera speed—that minstrel maid—
 Her myrrh-bathed locks to fasten in a braid."

Odes, iii., cap. xiv., 21. (See also Epode 15.)

75. *Atropos*, one of the three Fates—

"Those who hold the vital shears,
 And turn the adamantine spindle round,
 On which the fate of gods and men is wound"

(*Arades*, 65—68)

And *slits the thin-spun life*. "*But not the praise,*"

Phœbus replied, and touched my *trembling ears* :

"*Fame is no plant that grows on mortal soil,*

Nor in the *glistering foil*

Set off to the world, nor in broad rumour lies,

80

But *lives and spreads aloft* by those *pure eyes*,

And *perfect witness* of all-judging Jove ;

As he *pronounces lastly* on each *dead*,

Of so much *fame* in heaven *expect thy mood*."

O fountain Arethuse, and thou *honoured flood*,

85

Smooth-sliding Mincius, crowned with *vocal reeds* !

That *strain* I heard was of a *higher mood* :

But now my oat proceeds,

And *listens to the herald* of the *sea*

That came in Neptune's *plea*;

90

76. Severs ; slightly twisted thread of existence ; still ; true renowned.

77. Answered ; frightened.

78. Renown ; flourishes ; death-suffering earth.

79. Sparkling leaf (of laurel, bay, ivy, &c.).

80. Daintily arranged for the eyes of the people ; wide-spread report is to be found.

81. Exists ; shoots up ; unbiassed.

82. Trustworthy evidence.

83. Decides finally ; action.

84. Acceptancy ; anticipate award.

85. Outflowing spring ; famous stream.

86. Gently flowing ; garlanded ; melodious grass-stalks.

87. Song ; loftier tone.

88. Nevertheless at this time ; pastoral song goes on.

89. Attends ; messenger ; ocean.

90. Behalf.

—who cannot be avoided ; she is usually represented with a pair of scales, a sun-dial, or a pair of scissors, as the apportioner of the time of death.

77. Phœbus, Apollo, the god of poetry, music, medicine, of all arts and sciences, who dwelt with the Muses on Mount Parnassus, is here made to rebuke a false judgment. In the "trembling ears" there is probably an allusion to Midas, the son of Gordius and Cybele, who had his ears transformed into those of an ass, for depreciating Apollo in comparison with Pan, and the suggestion is that the singer feared a similar fate, like Virgil, who says,—

"Cynthiaus aurem vellit, et admonuit"

(Apollo pulled my ear and warned me).—*Eclogue* vi. 3.

85. A famous fountain, in the island of Ortygia, near Syracuse, the city in which Theocritus lived in the reign of Hiero II., and where he composed many of his Idylls.

86. Near the Mincius, now *Mincio*, a river in Venetia, flowing from Lake Benacus (now Lago di Garda), and falling into the Po ; a little below Mantua was Andes, where Virgil was born.

"Hic viridis tenera præterit arundine ripas Mincius"

(Here the Mincius borders his green banks with tender reeds).

Virgil's "Eclogues," vii., 12.

90. Neptune, son of Saturn and Ops, brother of Jove and Pluto, god of

He *asked* the waves, and asked the *felon* winds,
 What *hard mishap* hath doomed this *gentle swain*?
 And *questioned* every *gust*, of *rugged wings*,
 That *blows* from off each *beaked promontory*:
 They *knew not* of his *story*: 95
 And *sage* Hippotades their *answer brings*,
 That not a *blast* was from his *dungeon strayed*:
 The *air was calm*, and on the *level brine*
Sleek Panope with all her sisters *played*.
 It was that *fatal* and *perfidious bark*, 100
Built in the *eclipse*, and *rigged* with *curse* dark,
 That *sunk* so low that *sacred* head of thine.
 Next, Camus, *reverend sire*, went *footing* slow,
 His *mantle hairy*, and his *bonnet sedge*,
Inwrought with *figures* dim, and on the *edge* 105
 Like to that *guanine* flower *inscribed* with *woe*.

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| 91. Inquired at; offending.
92. Sore ill-fortune; befallen; amiable shepherd lad.
93. Examined; blast; disordered plumage.
94. Rages; outstretching headland.
95. Had heard nought; fate.
96. Wise; reply; hastens to his master with.
97. Unruly outburst; prison-house escaped.
98. Atmosphere; serene; motionless expanse of the ocean. | 99. Glossy-ringleted; enjoyed themselves.
100. Destiny - marked; untrustworthy vessel.
101. Constructed; awful sunlessness; fitted out; imprecations dire.
102. Took down; worthy.
103. Thereafter; venerable father; pacing.
104. Vesture furry; cap of reed.
105. Interwoven; ornaments; hem.
106. Blood-dyed; written upon; sorrow. |
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the sea, in whose dominion the shipwreck occurred. Æolus, god of the winds, son of Hippotas, whence the patronymic here given to him, and Melanippe. See "Æneid," i., "Metamorphoses," xiv., "Odyssey," x., &c.

99. Panope, a sea-nymph, daughter of Nereus and Doris. "Panope represents the boundlessness of the ocean horizon, when seen from a height as compared with the limited horizon of the land in hilly countries, such as Greece or Asia Minor," or Wales.

103. A personification of the river Cam, or perhaps the University: the "hairy mantle" and the "bonnet sedge" probably refer to the reedy banks of the river, and the "figures dim" to the streaks and marks often seen on the flags of the Cam.

106. The hyacinth of the ancients (probably our iris), which had on its leaves what appeared to be the letters A I, the Greek exclamation of woe. Hyacinthus was killed while the guest of Apollo by the jealousy of Zephyrus, and out of his blood there sprang this flower, "the purple hyacinth." The ancient poetical hyacinth, proved, I think, by Professor Martyn, in his "Virgil's Georgics," to be the Turk's-cap lily, the only flower on which characters like the Greek exclamation of woe, A I, A I, are to be found.

"*Ah! who hath rest,*" quoth he, "*my dearest pledge?*"
Last came, and last did go.
The pilot of the Galilean lake;
Two massy keys he bore, of metals twain 116
(The golden opes, the iron shuts amain),
He shook his mitred locks, and stern bespake;
"How well could I have spared for thee, young swain,
Enow of such as, for their bellies' sake,
Creep and intrude, and climb into the fold!" 115
Of other care they little reckoning make,
Than how to scramble at the shearers' feast,
And shove away the worthy bidden guest;

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| <p>107. Alas! snatched away; fondest possession.
 108. In the rear advanced; retire.
 109. Helmsman; Sea of Tiberias.
 110. Heavy; carried.
 111. Gives admission; closes at once.
 112. Crowned tresses; severely expressed his thoughts.
 113. Readily; wanted in place of; pastor.</p> | <p>114. A multitude; greed's hire.
 115. Crawl; enter unrighteously; get over the enclosure.
 116. Holier anxiety; small concern feel.
 117. Gain the larger share; wool-clipper's banquet.
 118. Drive off; invited feast-giver's friend.</p> |
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The idea in Milton is from Moschus's elegy on the Death of Bion, which may be translated thus:—

"Now more than ever say, O hyacinth,
 Ai, Ai; and babble of your written sorrows."
Leigh Hunt's "Imagination and Fancy," p. 270.

109. St. Peter, who had been a fisherman upon that lake, and who had walked on its waters for a time, is figuratively introduced here as the Head of the Church and warden of heaven, having the power of "the keys." Milton gives him the same office in "*Paradise Lost*," iii., 484:—

"And now St. Peter, at heaven's wicket, seems
 To wait them with his keys."

Milton here adverts to the endowments of the Church, which he thought induced men to seek the clerical profession more with an eye to its emoluments than the proper performance of its sacred duties. On this subject he always held strong opinions, *e. g.*:—

"As a thief bent to unboard the cash
 Of some rich burgher, whose substantial doors,
 Cross-barred and bolted fast, fear no assault,
 In at the window climbs, or o'er the tiles;
 So clomb this first grand thief into God's fold;
 So since into his Church lewd hirelings climb."
Paradise Lost, iv., 188—198.

The Topic.

OUGHT THE REFORM LEAGUE TO HAVE BEEN DISSOLVED?

AFFIRMATIVE.

THE Reform League was established at a time when the cry for reform was unmistakeable. The motto was Manhood Suffrage and the Ballot. Society has taken another "leap in the dark," and has found itself resting comfortably on the basis of Household Suffrage. This will now be only a means to an end—a stepping-stone to another round of the democratic ladder. The Ballot, or some other means for securing the independence of the voter, is inevitable. It is now above the political horizon, ere long to be in the zenith. The programme of the League being thus far carried out, and the satisfaction of leaving the remainder in the hands of tried men, are sufficient grounds for dissolution. In fact, to have continued it, would have been to imply indirectly a mistrust in Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues. Whatever may have been its faults, social progress is somewhat indebted to its action, and in the length of time, if circumstances necessitate it, let us hope that another body will be formed for the dissemination of true principles amongst the working classes.—C. F. A. S.

"The Reform League never exercised any influence over public opinion by argument, by eloquence, or by authority. . . . Mr. Beales and his colleagues never coiled themselves up for a spring against all law, all religion, and all government. They only clamoured for the Ballot, which now finds favour in the Cabinet and the House

of Commons; and for Universal Suffrage, which is, with all its numerous demerits, a legitimate subject of political discussion. Their error consisted in their attempt to substitute force or terror for constitutional modes of action." "The debates in the council of the Reform League were below contempt, and no moral authority attached to its expressions of opinion; but for a year or two it was doubtful whether Mr. Beales and his associates might not successfully abuse the exceptional liberality of English law. In any other country in Europe their street assemblages would have been prohibited, or, if necessary, dispersed by force; but English history justifies the assumption of voluntary deference to law, although demagogues may now and then succeed in defying a society which has provided insufficient securities for the maintenance of order. When the short period of anarchy had elapsed, the Reform League, misapprehending its own resources, endeavoured to assert for itself the position which the Jacobins and Cordeliers occupied by the side of the French Assembly and Convention; but agitation languishes in times of political tranquillity, and the general election proved that the council could exercise no influence over a single constituency. . . . After devolving on a surviving committee the duty of beginning a new agitation whenever circumstances may favour the attempt, the council, in the name of its real or imaginary constituents, has dissolved itself with a final flourish to the effect

that the necessity for its existence has ended with the accomplishment of its objects." I have selected the preceding passages from a paper on the Reform League in the *Saturday Review*. These seem to me to decide most satisfactorily in the affirmative that the League was righteously dissolved.—P. A. L.

Its work was done. Reform had been gained. The means were put into the hands of the people of procuring any further change in Government they required. Why should it live on a shadowy, useless life—unless for the special benefit of professional agitators, and for the special annoyance of the public? Its secretary, Mr. Mantell, and its president, Mr. Beales, were both too sensible and too honest to continue in office longer than was necessary. The end gained, like the Anti-Corn Law League, the Reform League disappeared from among the confederations of society. It would be well if many another organisation kept as good faith with the public.—H. L. S.

That the Reform League did in some measure tend to promote the object for which it was first brought into existence, I cannot but own. The object it had at heart was, I take it, the extension of the franchise; and if it did not of its own self exercise a power over the national councils, it certainly stimulated others so to do. The agitation which ensued throughout the country was, in my opinion, of a thoroughly fictitious character, and it was invested with an importance of which it was neither worthy or deserving. But without the Reform League there would scarcely have been any agitation at all; and therefore I think, from those who hold that an extension of the franchise is an unqualified advantage, considerable thanks are due to Mr. Edmond Beales, the president, if to no other

officials of the League. But the Reform Bill is now a thing of the past; the deed is done, and we are beginning to have a better acquaintance of our surroundings, after taking that somewhat sudden "leap in the dark." Why then should the Reform League still exist? Its end has been gained, and now it has assumed its proper place, and retired into private life, from whence it came. By its continued existence it would only be a source of disquietude to the really painstaking and anxious politician, whether inside or out the House, and undoubtedly it would form a constant source of profit to the turbulent and noisy demagogue; in fact it would degenerate and become his natural platform, one ever ready and accessible to him.

I am sorry to see that an effort is being made to resuscitate the League by some of its former but less conspicuous members. May the success attending their endeavours be nil.—J. S. B.

NEGATIVE.

By no means ought the Reform League to be abolished. In the first place, the great object which by its institution it is supposed to advance, is anything but complete. An extension of the franchise has been conceded, and also a redistribution of the seats has been brought about; nevertheless the measure of Reform introduced by the Conservative Government, though having undergone most radical changes, is very unsatisfactory in many of its details; as for example, the retention of the Rate-paying clauses; and until these clauses and others which might be mentioned, are expunged from the Statute Book, and the Bill is found to be adequate to the requirements of the country, no dissolution of the Reform League should take place. In the second place, providing a

perfect measure of Reform (if such there can be) had been granted, I still think it would be impolitic on the part of the members of the Reform League to dissolve. Here we have a society established for a length of time—rules framed—possessing a vast amount of influence over a great portion of the community at large, if not over many members of the House of Commons, with an organization and machinery whereby numerous centres of operation may be set at work to agitate for the passing of any measure. Is there then at this present time no work for the Reform League to do? Can it not undertake to promote some other scheme which it might think would be for the welfare of the nation, as, for instance, the adoption of the Ballot to prevent corruption, bribery, and intimidation? Could it not advance the cause of religious equality? I think if these questions were taken into consideration, it would be found that there is still much work to be done, and which can only be done by societies (such as the Reform League), and not by individuals. I therefore think that the dissolution of the Reform League would be nothing more nor less than a waste of political power.—J. T. S.

In a country such as ours a Reform League ought to be a standing institution. There are many other things to be looked after by such a body than a mere extension of the franchise. A true Reform League ought to be a centre to which all suggestions for the improvement of the country could be sent with the certainty of their receiving due consideration, and undergoing public discussion, as well as a centre whence information could be diffused through the whole country. It ought to be to politics what the British Association is to science. Instead of having one object repre-

sented by one association, such as the Ballot, or Financial Reform, or Church Liberation; we should have a Reform League permanently organized and ready to debate, agitate, and set afoot any proposed reform, which could give reason for its activity. The great evil from which Liberalism suffers is that it requires continually to renew its organizations, and loses, strength, influence, time, and money in the process. Conservatism is always organized. Let the Reformers keep continually a nucleus of organization and of movement, to which at all times access may be had, and from which as a centre may radiate full and trustworthy information on all matters of social and civic importance.—J. W. C.

In our country, and in this age, reforms are always rising up. Hence the Reform League should have remained among British institutions as a standing assertion of the rights of men in the face of the absurd claims urged in behalf of property. Ever and anon cases are occurring to prove that a watchful organization would be a benefit, for it could come to the rescue of intimidated voters, and it could prosecute parties offending against the Election Corruptions Act. It could thus not only promote much good, but prevent much wrong. To leave reform to work out itself, when so many problems of politics are involved in it, was unwise and cowardly. It is certain that many occasions must arise in which public organization alone can properly take up and pursue questions to their right issues. The league being dissolved, and all its machinery being dispersed, new machinery and agitation will be necessary, and all the preliminary processes will require to be gone over again. This shows plainly that the Reform League ought to have been maintained.—H. W. A.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

827. I wish a copy of Raphael's cartoons. Low price is desirable. Some of your readers would oblige by saying where they may be had. I think a cheap set was some time ago announced in connection with some Art Union, but I cannot find the advertisement or particulars.—W. B. D.

828. Would any of your readers kindly recommend to me a course of mental training in mathematics, classics, &c., &c., having in view the M.A. examination of the London University?—PRIMUS.

829. Could any one inform me where I could procure a good cyclopædia of literature?—D. H. F.

830. In the interesting article on the Rev. W. A. Butler, M.A., it is stated, but no proof is advanced of the fact, that "Ireland has contributed in no small measure to the excitement and culture of philosophic thought." I should like to be informed of the facts on which this statement is based.—C. B. D.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

807. The Evangelical Unionists, or Morisonians (not Morrisonians), are a religious body deriving their title from the Rev. J. Morison, of Kilmarnock, who was suspended from his office by one of Scottish Presbyterian churches. Their church government is independent. The doctrinal views stated by Mr. Morison prior to 1841 were far from having that complete development which they soon after received from himself and followers. The point to which prominence was first given was the universal atonement, that Christ died for the sins of all men

equally, with which was naturally connected the opinion that saving faith consists simply in a man's belief that Christ died for him, inasmuch as he died for the sins of the whole world; and to the opinion that every man possesses a sufficient ability to believe the gospel, without any aid of grace but what is vouchsafed to all who hear it, and in the very fact of its being preached or presented to them; and so to the tenets which have long received the designation of Pelagian. The opposition to the standards of the Scottish Presbyterian Churches is very complete regarding the fall of man, the work of the Holy Spirit, election, and kindred subjects, whilst on the subject of justification the doctrine of imputation stated in these standards is repudiated, and the atonement is represented as a satisfaction of "public justice," not securing the salvation of any man, but rendering the salvation of all men possible. They are strongly opposed to the Calvinism of the Scottish Presbyterian churches, and exhibit in the highest degree the distinctive features both of Arminianism and Pelagianism.—D. H. F.

824. The subjects in which a candidate are examined for the degree of B.A. at the London University are as follows:—The first B.A.—English history, English language and literature, and geography, mathematics, arithmetic, and algebra, geometry, trigonometry, and conic sections, Latin (certain authors are selected two years prior to the examination in each year), and Roman history, modern languages, French, or German (at the option of the candidate). Second B.A.—

Classics, Latin and Greek (authors selected as above), and Grecian history, animal physiology, mechanical and natural philosophy, logic, and moral philosophy. The amount of knowledge required for this degree is pretty considerable, and in classics I think a candidate ought to be able to read very well indeed; he should be well up in grammar and composition, the latter of which requires great attention, and moderately well acquainted with the history and geography of Rome and Greece; in mathematics a knowledge extending, in arithmetic and algebra, to simple equations will suffice; and in geometry to the 12th book of Euclid, and a sufficient knowledge of plane trigonometry as will enable the candidate to solve all the cases of plane triangles; conics, to the conic sections referred to rectangular co-ordinates; animal physiology, mechanical and natural philosophy, and logic, and moral philosophy, so much as the candidate could learn in one course of lectures on these subjects; modern languages, translation into English and translation from English into French or German, thus requiring a full acquaintance with its grammar and composition; English, the candidate cannot be too well acquainted with the history, grammar, composition, geography, and literature, as he never knows what questions are likely to be asked until the paper containing them is set before him. If Z. were to debar himself from all pleasure and society in general, in fact, to use every spare hour he could obtain, for the next five years, I think, unless he has a pretty fair knowledge of most of the above subjects, it would be a moral impossibility for him to obtain this degree by the period he names. But, judging from the tenor of Z.'s question, I should feel inclined to think that he has entirely forgotten that

before this degree can be obtained he must pass the matriculation examination, which, in order to obtain his B.A. at the end of five years, must be done by the expiration of his third year of study, unless he can manage to take honours in it, and then he will only be required to wait six months before entering himself for the 1st B.A. examination, otherwise he cannot enter under one academical year from the former examination. The same period (one academical year) must elapse between passing the 1st B.A. and entering for the 2nd B.A.

The Matriculation Examination is not quite the same as that of the 1st B.A. There are no questions in trigonometry and conics, and the questions in geometry are limited to the 4th book of Euclid; but there is an examination in chemistry, and a knowledge of classical authors is not required to be so extensive, easier authors being selected.

The examinations are taken on different days, each examination averaging two hours. The examinations are conducted by means of printed questions, but the candidate is never expected to floor every paper, i. e., to answer every question contained in it.

If Z. will apply to the Registrar of the London University for the printed regulations, he will find in them much information which it would be impossible to insert here. I hope he will not be disheartened by what I have said, for "*il est indispensable d'étudier beaucoup pour devenir savant*," and I think five years' time, of spare hours, is but little to obtain the learning required for a B.A., if a fair knowledge of general subjects has not previously been obtained.—G. E. M.

880. The "proof" which O. B. D. desiderates shall be at once forthcoming, and will, I hope, be found sufficient to cover the statement

made with a perfect shield of facts. I the more readily assent to this because it so happens that in doing so I shall require to notice a number of works, having an intimate bearing upon one of the controversies now in currency in this serial—though, as precluded from taking active part in the debates, I must not do more than indicate the nature and worth of these publications as philosophical works, and not as a critic of their subject-matter. To go no farther back than the commencement of the eighteenth century, we find the simultaneously issued works of William King and of Henry Dodwell in 1702, initiating interesting and able metaphysical controversies. The former of these writers, though the son of a Scottish settler, was born in Antrim, 1650, and rose successively in the Church till he attained the dignity (1691) of Bishop of Derry. While he held this office he published his great and elaborate work, written in elegant Latin, *De Origine Mali*—An Inquiry concerning the Origin of Evil, and in the year thereafter (1703) he was translated to the Archbishopal See of Dublin, which he occupied till his death, in 1729. The Archbishop was a friend of Swift's, and the patron of the poets Philips and Parnell. In his treatise Archbishop King endeavoured to show that the existence of evil might be accounted for and believed in while still acknowledging the goodness and omnipotence of the Deity; and to prove that, if we grant a creation by God at all, not one of the evils or inconveniences of our system could possibly have been prevented without involving a greater one, when we regard it not in itself, but in its relation to the universe at large.

The value and ability of this treatise excited at once the admiration and hostility of the two great

foreign thinkers, Boyle and Leibnitz, who wrote in opposition to its tenets. King did not during his lifetime publish replies to their attacks, but he left, in manuscript draft answers to the reasonings of his opponents, and these were published, in 1732, by Edmund Law, Bishop of Carlisle, in his translation of the original treatise, with notes of much metaphysical acumen. In these notes Law criticised Dr. Samuel Clarke's *a priori* argument for the existence of the Deity, and thereupon a war of opinions arose and a great many disputants took part in the fray. Anthony Collin's "Philosophical Inquiry concerning Human Freedom" involved several matters of controversy with the upholders of King's doctrine, and two of the main questions of thought continue still to be difficulties in metaphysics: the possibility of reconciling the prescience of God with the freedom of man, and the omniscience and beneficence of the Deity with the existence of evil and the miseries that it involves.

The contemporary work of Henry Dodwell, "A Letter concerning the Immortality of the Soul," 1702, followed, in 1706, by a work entitled "An Epistolary Discourse proving that the Soul is a principle naturally mortal, but immortalized actually by the pleasure of God to Punishment and Reward by its union with the Divine Baptismal Spirit, wherein is proved that none have the power of giving this Divine Immortalizing Spirit since the Apostles, but only the Bishops," was even more effective in agitating the whole field of thought with contentions and debate. The "Letter" led directly to a controversy between Anthony Collins and Dr. Samuel Clarke on the topic of immortality. Dr. John Turner, Vicar of Greenwich, issued almost immediately, "Justice done to Human Souls, in a Short View of

Mr. Dodwell's late book," 1706; and in 1711 Benjamin Hampton, barrister, published "The Existence of the Human Soul after Death proved from Scripture, Reason, and Philosophy;" Wm. Assheton, D.D., Rector of Buckingham in Kent, furnished "A Vindication of the Immortality of the Soul and a Future State" in 1708, and in 1704, Wm. Coward, M.D., in an elaborate defence of materialism, entitled "The Grand Essay; or, a Vindication of Reason and Religion against Impostors of Philosophy," rendered himself so obnoxious to the popular opinion of the day that his treatise was burnt by the common hangman. John Broughton, in his "Psychologia, or an account of the true nature of the Rational Soul," maintains that reason is the sole cause of that *spontaneity* of action in which intelligence manifests itself, and on which moral responsibility rests; and we find echoes of this controversy down half the century, in 1726, in a "Brief Essay concerning the Soul of Man, showing What and how Noble a Being it is," by Robert Brage; and in 1751, in a tract by Malcolm Flemyng, M.D., being "A New Critical Examination of an Important Passage in Mr. Locke's Essay," containing remarks on Locke's opinions on Substance, Spirit, Essence, &c., and especially opposing the notion that thought may be communicated to matter.

Even while these controversies of Irish origin were sending their echoes sounding "down the corridors of time," one of the most subtle, metaphysical thinkers whose names are written in the history of speculative philosophy was preparing and producing some of the most acute and influential works of which the literature of mental science can boast; we refer to Bishop Berkeley's "New Theory of Vision,"

1709; his "Principles of Human Knowledge," 1710; and his "Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous," 1713. Round the Essay on Vision whole volumes of controversy have been piled, and as our readers have had occasion to see in our recent notices of J. S. Mill, J. F. Ferrier, Samuel Bailey, &c., the dispute continues to our own day.

"The object of both [the latter] pieces is to prove that the commonly received notion of the existence of matter is false [inaccurate?]; that sensible material objects, as they are called, are not external to the mind, but exist in it, and are nothing more than impressions made upon it by the *immediate* act of God, according to certain rules called Laws of Nature, from which, in the ordinary course of His government, He never deviates; and that the steady adherence of the Supreme Spirit to these rules is what constitutes the study of things to His creatures." The influence of these speculations on all future metaphysics and probably even upon science is scarcely yet able to be approximately estimated, and students of his works will see good grounds for agreeing with Dugald Stewart that "it is not surprising that Berkeley should have given a popularity and fashion to metaphysical pursuits which they had never before acquired in England."

One of Ireland's metaphysicians, Peter Brown, Provost of Trinity College, Dublin, and subsequently Bishop of Cork and Ross, engaged in the speculative warfare which arose regarding the philosophy of Hobbes and Locke after Berkeley had taken to the field. His work "On the Procedure, Extent, and Limits of the Human Understanding," 1729, affirms "that we have no other faculties of perceiving or knowing anything, divine or human, but our *five senses* and our *reason*;"

that the sensations which external objects yield, furnishing *notions* from the materials on which the operations of intelligence are performed, produce *ideas*. He thus discriminates between *notions*, or cognitions capable of imagination, and *ideas per se*, or cognitions of the intellect, abstract ideas incapable of mental envisagement against Locke, while he led Berkeley, in his *Alciphron*, or the Minute Philosopher, 1732, to reply to an insinuation that he had "rendered the plainest truths mysterious and unintelligible," from "the want of distinguishing rightly between the simple perceptions of sense and the simple apprehensions of the intellect." This work contains, by anticipation, opinions exceedingly similar in their results to Hume's "Treatise on Human Nature," which did not appear till 1739, though there is no reason for believing that Hume was in any way acquainted with the learned and lucid metaphysics of the episcopal castigator of the vague use of the word *idea* in Locke's great treatise "On the Human Understanding."

In 1720 Francis Hutcheson, son of a Presbyterian clergyman in the north of Ireland, acquired the friendship and patronage of Hugh Boulter, Lord Primate of Ireland, Archbishop King, &c., as well as the recognition of many thinkers, by his "Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue," which was followed, eight years afterwards, by his "Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions." After his advancement to the Professorship of Morals, in Glasgow, he prepared his "System of Moral Philosophy"—which, however, was published posthumously in 1755. Hutcheson, though rather a theoretical moralist than a philosophic metaphysician, exerted great influence in speculations on the nature and activity of

the mind. In a very lucid and perspicuous style, with much solidity and force of reasoning, he maintains, in his "*Synopsis Metaphysica*," that certain forms of thinking are *connate* with the mind itself, and that within these we must conduct all our intellectual operations and confine all our speculative deductions. His name is intimately inwoven with the history of Philosophy as a pioneer thinker whom many have delighted to follow and honour.

Dr. Hugh Hamilton, who was born at Knock, in the county of Dublin, 1729, was the author of an "Essay on the Existence and Attributes of the Supreme Being," or "The Existence and Absolute Perfection of the Supreme Unoriginated, being proved in a concise and demonstrative manner," which was first published in 1792, and republished with emendations, after the author's death—by which time (1805) he was Bishop of Ossory—by his eldest son, Alexander Hamilton, 1809. The bishop had a patient way of thinking, great sagacity, and extensive knowledge; he had a splendid mathematical genius, and as professor of natural philosophy in Dublin he contributed greatly to the advancement of knowledge. His treatise on the Being of God gave rise to much discussion, and is elaborately reviewed by the greatest living writer on that subject, William H. Gillespie, in his work on "The Necessary Existence of God," in edition 1865.

Another great initiative name in metaphysical speculation which Ireland has added to the roll of the famous is that of Edmund Burke, who in 1766 issued his "Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful"—an ingenious, striking, and brilliant essay in philosophical criticism, which, whatever may be thought of the theory itself, has been exceed-

ingly effective in raising into the prominence of controversy the mental principles upon which the delight produced by, and experienced through, the products of the fine arts depends, and has occasioned many a critical chapter in aesthetics. The Rev. George Miller, in the *Transactions of the Irish Academy*, 1798, published an "Essay on the Origin and Nature of our Idea of the Sublime," which brought him into notice. He was subsequently appointed, 1800, assistant Professor of History in the University of Dublin, and then commenced that series of "Lectures on the Philosophy of Modern History," "History Philosophically Illustrated," and a long list of historical, philosophical, and theological works, which, though they have been but indifferently appreciated by the general public, have been productive of much excitement to the thoughtful consideration of the causes and consequences of historic change. These lectures were published during the boyhood and studentship of the early lost metaphysician of whom we lately gave a sketch to our readers—a metaphysician whose "learning and

acuteness" won the approval of Sir Wm. Hamilton, and the "great scientific value" of whose lectures the Scottish Aristotle recognised. William Archer Butler, as a poet, a preacher, a controversialist, and an ethical philosopher, has gathered a fame which few, in such diverse forms of activity, can rival. As the historian of ancient philosophy, posthumous though the publication was, his work is full of "discrimination and earnestness, beauty and power, a truly philosophical spirit, and a profound conception of the true ends and purposes of metaphysical speculation." Of this man, remarkable alike in his life and his powers, for the exquisite moral purity and simplicity of his character, and for the sound and thoughtful views of ancient speculation he presented, our readers can scarcely fail to have profited if they did not enjoy our brief notice.

The foregoing induction of facts may prove to C. B. D. and our readers generally, that our statement, though unproved, is fully susceptible of proof. We thank C. B. D. for the opportunity given us of directing attention to the philosophers of Ireland.—S. N.

The Societies' Section.

LIVERPOOL ANTHROPOLOGICAL SOCIETY.

DR. HITCHMAN, M.D., F.L.S., &c. &c., of Liverpool, having given a series of lectures in the Museum, which were largely and influentially attended, "On the Correlations of Consciousness and Organization," the great interest thereby excited in subjects pertaining to the science of man has already resulted in the establishment of a new literary,

scientific, and philosophical association, called the Liverpool Anthropological Society, the objects of which are to acquire and extend a better knowledge of that complex system of intimately connected conditions, moral, psychological, and physical, on which the essence of human nature depends; and which are, certainly neither in-

aptly nor inelegantly set forth in their original heraldic bearings, designed by the founder and first president, Dr. Hitchman himself—viz., the liver or glossy ibex, which frequented the marshy pool that existed on what is now the site of the lower portion of the vast seaport; a geometrical asymptote, or line, which continually approaches a curved line without ever meeting it, illustrative, the doctor states, of the continuity of the Human with the Divine, the motto being a laconic exposition of the whole, after the manner of Terence, *Humani nil alienum*. President, Professor Piazzzi Smyth, F.R.S., astronomer-royal for Scotland; vice-presidents, Wm. Osburn, Esq., F.R.S., the author of "Linguistic Researches," "Monuments and Antiquities of the Egyptians," &c.; Bernard Davis, Esq., M.D., F.R.S.; Sir Duncan Gibb, Bart., M.D.; Thomas Inman, Esq., M.D.; Podmore Jones, Esq., M.D., F.L.S. (of the Biological Society of Paris); Rev. George Bartle, D.D., principal of Walton College, Liverpool; Rev. J. Taylor, Goodsir, F.R.S.E.; Rev. Charles Voysey, Rev. David Hirsch, and other distinguished gentlemen, holding different views of anthropology, which list displays, at least, a catholic and unsectarian spirit of inquiry in scientific accordance with the signs of the times. The new Local Council contains a goodly array of fellows of the Anthropological Society of London, in addition to other active workers belonging to various learned societies, of recognised importance in the town, together with treasurer and honorary secretaries. Dr. Hitchman, in his recent anthropological lectures, has apparently *endeavoured* to give a fair exposition of the present state

of the science of man, by doing what he conceives to be adequate justice to the difficult subjects of matter and force, as well as to the world or conscious mind; for whilst honourably admitting that the natural sciences, as such, appear to the infidel physicist to know neither a supernatural beginning nor a supernatural end, that natural phenomena, like their objective noumenon, of whatever each substratum may consist, appear demonstratively to be alike, engendering and devouring their own veritable birth and death in everlasting physical continuity, he nevertheless concludes that *self-conscious* mind, unknown to the anthropoid quadrumana, is the one correlative of all, in short, the illuminated side, which really brings into existence the three convergent lines of evidence—the physiological, the psychological, and the theological, anthropology proper. Man, a perfect being, the central organic representative of this planet, excluded from mere animality, alone, by his very completeness, morphologically, and teleologically, no vertebrate type possible beyond him; and the true and abiding characteristic of every form of the human race, ancient and modern, sage or savage, civilized or uncivilized, in truth or in error, is, according to Dr. Hitchman, *religiosity*!

PRINCIPAL LECTURERS.—The example set at Stockholm by Prince Oscar of Sweden, of giving lectures on popular subjects to working men, is about to be followed at Brussels by the Count of Flanders. The subject of the first lecture—or conference, as it is called—will be, "The Co-operative Societies of Germany." The date has not yet been fixed.

Literary Notes.

MR. WILLIAM HORNE, of Dunfermline, who recently gained the (J. Stuart Mill's) Rectorial Prize for an essay on the theory of "Inseparable Association," has just won the Gray Prize for the best essay on the "Psychology and Ethics of Hobbes." The competition was open to all the students of the previous session who had attended either St. Mary's or the United Colleges, St. Andrew's.

Robley Dunglison, M.D., LL.D., well known in Europe and America as an author of medical and physiological works, died in Philadelphia, April 1, aged 71. He was born at Keswick, England, in 1798, was educated and began the practice of medicine in London, but in 1824 emigrated to the United States, at the solicitation of ex-President Thomas Jefferson, to accept a professorship in the University of Virginia. In 1836 he removed to Philadelphia, and accepted a chair in the Jefferson College, one of the leading medical schools in the city—a post that he filled most acceptably. His works are extensive and numerous, enjoying a high reputation as text-books. He was a member and correspondent of numerous literary and scientific societies, both in Europe and America. Of late years he took great interest in the instruction of the blind, and published a dictionary for their use.

A thorough discussion of the historical evidence *in re* "Mary Queen of Scots and her Accusers"—which will contain, *inter alia*, "the hitherto unpublished book of articles produced against Queen Mary at Westminster"—is promised by John Hosack, barrister-at-law, from the press of Messrs. Blackwood.

A monograph on "The Talmud," in extension of the recent paper published from the *Quarterly*, is in preparation by Dr. Emanuel Deutsch.

A new work on "The Sennets of Shakspeare," by Henry Brown, is in preparation. It is spoken of as a work of long research, involving discoveries which clear up many of the mysteries of the poet's life.

Mr. John Forster has nearly ready a biography of Walter Savage, London, 1755—1864. It will thus link together the times of Oliver Goldsmith, 1728—1764, of which he has written so ably, with our own.

A new edition of David Hume's Philosophical Works, superintended by T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, of Balliol College, Oxon, is to be issued in four volumes, by Messrs. Longman.

Following out the line of thought contained in Mrs. Mill's "Essay on the Enfranchisement of Women," republished in his "Dissertations and Discussions," J. S. Mill has in the press a book on "The Subjection of Women."

Uniform with the series "Aids to Faith," "Principles at Stake," &c., we are to have a volume of Essays on "The Anglican Church." It will sufficiently indicate their character to state that the Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol, the Dean of Chichester, and Dr. Irons, are contributors.

A new edition of "Austin on Jurisprudence," or Positive Law—aided by notes of the Lectures as originally delivered, made by J. S. Mill, is to be issued revised and edited by Robert Campbell, barrister.

A new "Biographia Britannica" is projected and in progress.

A *fac-simile* of Caxton's Statutes

of Henry VII., the earliest printed book of English laws, is to be issued by John Roe.

A translation of Bunyan's ingenious dream, penned in the gloomy old jail beside the old bridge at Bedford, "The Pilgrim's Progress," has just been made into the Kaffir language, and issued from the Lovedale mission press at a cheap rate, under the editorship of Rev. Tayo Soga, one of the most eloquent of English-speaking Kaffirs.

On 27th August, 1870, the centenary of the birthday of George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel will occur, and it is proposed to erect a monument to his memory, to be inaugurated at that date. The collector for Britain is Dr. James H. Stirling, author of "The Secret of Hegel." Readers of the *British Controversialist* will find a life and estimate of Hegel in the number for May, 1862, and some account of "The Secret of Hegel" and its author in the issue for August, 1866.

A book bearing the title of "The Recently Discovered Writings of Daniel Defoe," with a new memoir by William Lee, is announced.

W. R. Scott has nearly ready a memoir entitled "Albert Durer and his Works."

A manuscript of Tyndale's translation of Erasmus's "Enchiridion Militis Christiani" has lately been found, but it has not yet been compared with Wynkyn de Worde's edition of 1533, or "The Handsome Weapon of a Christian Knight in Englyshe," which Lowndes states "is said to have been translated by Will. Tindal."

Mr. Hazlitt has in the press, for the Roxburghe Library, a volume of curious tracts on the stage and players of the Elizabethan and Jacobite times. Nearly the same subject has been lately treated by Dr. C. M. Ingleby, author of "Shakspeare Fabrications," &c., in

a privately printed tract, "Was Thomas Lodge an Actor? An Exposition touching the Social Status of the Playwright in the time of Queen Elizabeth."

The death is announced of Mr. J. R. Walbran, F.S.A., corresponding member of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland, honorary member of the Society of Antiquaries of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, and local secretary of the Archaeological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland. He was the author of several "Guides" to the abbey, castles, and other places of interest in Great Britain, a "History of Ripon," "Memorials of Fountains," and other works. He was in the fifty-second year of his age.

A very curious and interesting dialogue on the condition of England in Henry VIII.'s time has lately been unearthed in the Record Office by Professor Brewer. The treatise is from the pen of Starkey, one of Henry VIII.'s chaplains, and purports to report the arguments and opinions of Cardinal Pole and Lupset—both personal friends of Starkey—on the evils of the time; Lupset taking the Tory side, and defending the abuses which Pole says have prevented his taking part in political life. All the old grievances of sheep turning out men, of the raising of rents, the turning out of small farmers, the excessive waste in rich men's houses, the need of education, &c., are discussed; and, as a picture of the times, Professor Brewer puts this dialogue above Sir Thomas More's "Utopia" in value. It will probably be printed by the Early English Text Society in its condition of Tudor-England Series, or by the Camden Society. One fresh complaint we noticed in hastily turning over the pages of the dialogue—that gold had then lately been largely introduced into the ornamentation of houses.

Modern Metaphysicians.

GEORGE HENRY LEWES.

"Every public man is in some respects mythical."—*G. H. Lewes.*

PROBABLY no one would more strenuously object to being placed among "Modern Metaphysicians" than the author of "The Biographical History of Philosophy," the expositor of "Aristotle's Scientific writings," and the advocate of the principles of the positivism of Auguste Comte. He not only contemns but condemns Metaphysics. "No definition can," he affirms, "be wittier or truer, than that Metaphysics is *l'art de s'égarer avec méthode*"—the art of going astray methodically. While admitting that it has played a distinguished rôle in the drama of civilization, and that it has been the great initiator of Science, he believes that "its part is played out," and that there is no "possibility of Metaphysical certitude." It has "rescued the nobler part of man from the dominion of brutish apathy and helpless ignorance, nourished his mind with mighty impulses, exercised it in magnificent efforts, given him the unslaked, unslakable thirst for knowledge which has dignified his life, and enabled him to multiply tenfold his existence and his happiness;" but its temerities have met with no successes, and have been as ineffective as "the efforts of a child to grasp the moon." Man is an insoluble mystery to himself, and all attempts to comprehend the secrets of life, destiny, the universe and God—are Metaphysics, and, therefore, mistakes.

Notwithstanding his emphatic depreciation of Metaphysics and his renunciation of the study of philosophy as the pursuit of an impossibility, we think we are perfectly justified in our classification, and that we may rightly regard him as a modern Metaphysician. He has investigated the most prominent systems of speculative thought, and perused the works of the most distinguished inquirers into the mysteries of life and mind; he has given the world an abstract of the course and results of his Metaphysical researches, and he has offered reasoned grounds for his scepticism—in regard to the utility and possibility of Metaphysics. But it is on Metaphysical grounds that he bases his belief in the impossibility of solving Metaphysical problems. The very "limits of the knowable" within which he desires to restrain and entrench all Science are Metaphysical, and, in fact, form the first elements in the systems of Kant, Hamilton, and Ferrier. These have by careful and patient analysis of the subjective elements of thought, brought out into conscious reality some of the indiscernible con-

stituents of the cognitive acts of mind; while he—looking upon the same subjective elements—proclaims that he sees nothing in or beyond them. He encircles the whole nature of man with a wall of impossibility, on which he inscribes, Nescience Aeries, but thus far shalt thou go and no farther, for within this alone is science possible; while they, recognising the fact that all Science is Nescience subdued—push forward beyond the limits of things into the farther reaches of thoughts.

The very question, "Can man transcend Experience?"—on which he founds his history and to which he professes to give an answer, inductively gained in the negative, is Metaphysical. Is the universe around us only and altogether experience—a succession of phenomena perceived—and suggestive of nought besides and beyond? Are we ourselves only an aggregate and result of experience? Is there no thread of personality or self-consciousness on which the ideas we possess are strung; or are we only experience felt and experience reflected as one or the other side of human nature is looked at or seen? In the early ages of the world, before philosophical inquiry began, men "contented themselves with accepting the world as they found it; with believing what they saw; and with adoring what they could not see," and now positivism has brought us back to the same point in speculation, we are to accept the world (of experience) as we find it; believe what we see of it, not in it; but "to apprehend no further than this world, and square one's life according,"—so as to abandon as folly the adoring of what we cannot see; for of that we have no positive experience or evidence. *Explanation of phenomena* there can be none; co-existences, similarities, and successions may be registered and classified; but causes, and reasons, and laws, as they transcend Experience are impossibilities. "Perilous as it must ever be to set absolute limits to the future of human capacity, there can be no peril," in Mr. Lewes's opinion, "in averring that Philosophy never will achieve its aims, because these aims lie beyond all human scope. The difficulty is impossibility. No progress can be made, no certainty is possible. To aspire to the knowledge of more than phenomena—their resemblances, co-existences, and successions—is to aspire to transcend the inexorable limits of human faculty. "To *know* more we must *be* more." This seems to us to be arrant—though we may also say errant—Metaphysics. It is not only a step *beyond physics*, but in contradiction to facts which remain permanent and reliable *after physics* have been searched to their utmost. Every new light thrown by discovery on any matter makes us "know more;" but it comes as a result; it does not emerge as an indispensable condition that we should "be more." In every fresh discovery in Science, and in every fresh application of Art, we not only transcend prior, but extend the possibilities of future experience, and bring home results which experience can only approve, not verify. It is enough, however, surely, that he is the historian of speculative

thought, to justify us in classifying him as a modern metaphysician; though we must say of him what Schiller said of Goethe:—"His philosophy draws too much of its material from the world of the senses where I only draw from the soul."

George Henry Lewes was born in London, 18th April, 1817. He received the early rudiments of education in one of the schools in the City, but was sent, we believe, while yet young, to extend his studies in the grammar school of the small neat town of St. Aubyn, in the Island of Jersey, where he not only acquired a good deal of classical and literary culture, but a conversational facility in the use of the French language, which (though English is prevalently spoken in all the towns round the beautiful bay of St. Aubyn) is vernacular there. At a somewhat later period he was placed under the charge of Dr. Charles Parr Burney, at Greenwich. So taught, he completed his academical studies, and thence he was transferred to a merchant's office in the City, whose trading connection lay chiefly with the Baltic ports and Russia. This induced him to add German to his lingual store, and in a short time, as an opportunity offered, he learned some Spanish and Italian. A short experience in business served to show him that he had higher aptitudes than mere clerkly submission to that caste of gentlemen who possess "a superb British pride, redolent of Consols." He left merchandize, and betook himself to the study of medicine. It is understood that he subsequently abandoned the idea of graduating as a practitioner of physic in consequence of a nervous inability to endure the preliminary courses of surgical operations which required to be witnessed by the student at St. George's or the Middlesex. He was only in his twentieth year when he resolved to devote himself to authorship. Under the influence of the fresh sensation created in London by Thomas Carlyle, Coleridge, De Quincey, &c., about this time, Mr. Lewes resolved to make a thorough and profound study of the German language, literature, and philosophy, in fulfilment of which determination he set out in 1837 to commence a residence in Germany. During this sojourn, mutually teaching and learning, he passed through many of the capitals of German thought, saw many of the distinguished professors and *littérateurs* of that erudite race, and read many of the marked and remarkable works in which the literatures of Austria, Prussia, Saxony, &c., abound; and on his return in 1839, he began a literary career of great brilliancy and acceptance.

Unless we are very much mistaken in our judgment, formed long ago, and then based on what we believed to be good internal evidence, some of Mr. Lewes' earliest literary contributions appeared in *The London Saturday Journal*, an excellent weekly serial, began in 1839, and in which, if we remember rightly, some papers on philosophical subjects appeared in 1840 which contained the germs of some portions of his earliest book; while in a supplementary number supplying a sketch of "The Story of Margaret,"

from Goethe's *Faust*, we thought we traced the deft hand which subsequently conferred on British literature an adequate biography of the great Frankforter. He was shortly afterwards engaged as a *collaborateur* in the getting out of *The Penny Cyclopædia*, to which he contributed numerous articles on English literature, philosophy, and miscellaneous subjects. To *The Classical Museum* he made several erudite contributions on topics connected with Greek and Latin letters, and to *The Journal of Education*, we believe, he contributed reviews of works relating to the study of the Continental languages and the methods employed in teaching them.

Early in his career as an author, Mr. Lewes was welcomed as an able coadjutor by the conductors of *The Westminster Review*, many of whom had an eager interest in Positivism, of which Mr. Lewes had, soon after its completion as a *Course* in 1842, declared himself a disciple and an adherent. On or about 1843, we believe, he was appointed joint editor of this able journal of advanced thought, and he contributed many excellent and elaborate papers to its pages. Under his *regime* he endeavoured to introduce into review literature the French system of signing articles, and succeeded so far as to secure the attachment of the contributors' initials to their papers. To *The Foreign Quarterly Review* he was also an acceptable contributor, and it is not unlikely that from a series of papers in that journal on "The Early Philosophers of Greece," commenced October, 1842, by John Forster, he gained the suggestion of the subject of his earliest substantive work. He was about the same time engaged on *The Atlas* as literary and dramatic critic, and did much in that capacity to secure for that serial a character for honesty and impartiality in criticism which was somewhat rare in London at that time. At a somewhat later date he was a member of the staff of *The Morning Chronicle*, when it was one of the most ably conducted of the journals from which the British public absorbed much of its (so-called) opinions on the topics of the times. It would be impossible, even after filling pages with their titles, to give any idea of the range and discursive course of Mr. Lewes's pen in these and other journals, — *Blackwood*; *Fraser*; *North British Review*; *British Quarterly*; *The Monthly Chronicle*; *Edinburgh Review*, &c.—where his papers were always valued for their vividness and sparkle and their illustration of abstract theories by concrete examples.

In 1844 Mr. Charles Knight, the literary publisher, to whom England is so much indebted for the issue of cheap, wholesome, and instructive works, commenced an admirable series of books under the title of "The Weekly Shilling Volume." "One of the most original and important works in this series was 'The Biographical History of Ancient and Modern Philosophy,' by Mr. G. H. Lewes. The increasing reputation of Mr. Lewes as a writer of eminent ability and extensive acquirements was, in a great degree, founded upon this work, which, with large improvements, has taken

a permanent rank as being at once learned and readable." * In this small book, on a subject so great, the author has shown, with nice and intelligent selectiveness, the various phases of the progressive development of speculative thought and the more important of the opinions which are related to these phases with great clearness, singular skill, and much condensation of argument and controversy. The due exposition of the speculations of metaphysics require the utmost precision of language, and few books in philosophical literature can be compared in perspicuity of style to this admirable compend of the reasoned thought of the world's most celebrated thinkers.

It was a book which fascinated us, which fascinates us still. It is a charming manual on a subject of perennial interest. Its eloquent and graphic though brief memoirs, its lucid arrangement, its excellent and brilliant analyses, its sparkling comments, and the delicate spring-flush of poetic beauty which tinges, but does not suffuse, the diction, form a combination as a whole to which no other work on metaphysics, known to us, can be named as a rival. True, we dissent altogether from his main doctrine that metaphysics is an endeavour to compass the impossible, and of this we could produce no more potent proof than his "Biography of Philosophy," which has given a new start and interest in many minds to metaphysical thought; but this intellectual dissent does not prevent us from delighting in and appreciating the admirable powers of exposition and discussion it displays. He has the happy art of bringing the thoughts of each philosopher straightforwardly before the mind, instead of leading one on to it through the tortuous wilds of an arid technicalism and the desert of a drily artificial exposition. He does not harass or oppress us with a pedantic display of out-of-the-way references to "All such reading as is never read;" and in his clear, vigorous, and perspicuous style the very lineaments and proportions of each author's thoughts are seen as if through a transparent veil.

To the same excellent series of weekly volumes Mr. Lewes also contributed a delightful little monograph on "The Spanish Drama" in 1846. On this subject he had previously written in *The Foreign Quarterly* (No. 62), as well as on "The Rise and Fall of the European Drama" (No. 70) in the same serial. The British public had previously only Bonterwek's "History of Spanish Literature" in Miss Thomasina Ross's translation, published in Bogue's European Library, and Sismondi's "Literature of the South of Europe," which, in the main, in regard to Peninsular letters, follows the German Professor of the University of Göttingen, and was published in Bohn's Standard Library. We have since had the erudite work of Mr. Ticknor on Spanish Literature, and a small compilation on the same subject by A. F. Foster. But for liveliness, interest, and intelligent criticism, this brief book of one who had a natural love of and *penchant* for the drama is of

* Knight's "Passages of a Working Life," vol. iii., p. 11.

higher value upon the two authors with whom it is chiefly concerned—Lope de Vega, the fertile and clever, but not the philosophic playwright, a dramatist who, though distinguished, is “not one of the family of Shakspeare,” and the fecund, gloomy master of stage effect and situation—Don Pedro Calderon de la Barca. It would be impossible for us to analyse this analysis, but we quote a few sentences, picked here and there from this work, in reference to the drama, its nature, aims, and means—not only to show that Mr. Lewes understood his subject, but also to prove him to be a metaphysician *malgré lui* :—

“The richness of the Spanish drama is proverbial. . . . The Spaniards have had the honour of supplying Europe with plots, incidents, and situations. Their drama grew up in the sixteenth century; and in Lope de Vega, Moreto, Calderon, and others furnished the stage with almost every species of dramatic collision, incident, *imbroglia*, and situation. It has also furnished a few *characters*; but these bear no proportion to its other gifts. After such luxuriance of dramatic invention as it supplied, there was but little need for more; accordingly, succeeding writers were, for the most part, content in this respect to translate, imitate, and improve that which Spain had so prodigally thrown forth, covering the skeletons with flesh and blood of their own creation. . . . Take from the French, and from Beaumont and Fletcher, and their contemporaries; from Dryden, Congreve, Wycherly, Shadwell; from Goldoni, Notti, Giraud, and others all that they have borrowed directly or indirectly from Spain, and you beggar them in respect of situation and incident. Observe, I say directly or indirectly, and no other obligation is meant than such as relates to the ‘intrigue’ of a play; character, passion, wit, or poetry own no such parentage. . . . Any one desirous of throwing light on the old English drama should read extensively the less known works of the Spaniards. They would furnish him with such a crop of foot-notes as would repay all labour. Whole scenes of Beaumont and Fletcher, and of some of their contemporaries, hitherto admired as original, will be found (though altered) in Lope de Vega, Calderon, Cervantes, Moreto, Tirso de Molina, &c.

“The origin of ‘The Little French Lawyer’ is to be found in ‘Gosman de Alfarache’ (part ii., chap. 4); ‘The Spanish Curate’ and ‘The Maid of the Mill’ in ‘The Gerardo’ of Cespedes; ‘The Chances’ in ‘The Senora Cornelia’ of Cervantes; ‘The Love’s Pilgrimage’ in ‘The Dos Doncellos’ of Cervantes; ‘The Knight of the Burning Pestle’ was suggested by ‘Don Quixote’; ‘The Beggar’s Bush’ by ‘The Fuerza de la Sangre’ of Cervantes; ‘The Elder Brother’ by ‘De Una Causa dos Efectos’ of Calderon; and Webster’s ‘Duchess of Malfi’ by ‘The Mayor Domo de la Duquesa de Amalfi’ of Lope de Vega. Besides plays ostensibly adapted from the Spanish, such as ‘The Adventures of Five Hours,’ from ‘Los Empenos de Seis Horas,’ and ‘Tis better than it was,’ and ‘Worse and Worse’ from ‘Mejor está que Estaba’ and ‘Peor está que Estaba,’ both by Calderon.

“Our Shakspearean drama is a majestic oak, whose roots strike deep down into their mother earth, whose branches stretch high and wide into the air, beneath whose shade thousands may retire from the world, to contemplate its workings at their ease. This oak is the grandest of trees;

strength, beauty, usefulness, delight, variety, and grace unite in it. It is of eternal substance. The gnarled, twisted branches are tipped with leaves of unexampled grace, and amidst those leaves are clustered acorns, every one of which would, in its turn, produce a forest. It is this world within a world—this prodigality of potential existence—which is Shakspeare's endless charm. Not so the Spanish drama; it is a stem of clover, fragile, delicate, brilliant, but passing quickly away. One oak ennobles a field, and testifies the energy of nature; but the field must flush with myriad stems of clover, or it will be barren. . . . Instead of the *dramatic evolution of character and passion* which is always the aim at least of an English poet, the Spaniard rarely attempts more than the *evolution of plot*. . . . It is not, I imagine, difficult to suggest powerful dramatic situations; but to make them naturally evolve from the characters and circumstances of the play—to make them consistent with human motives—*this is the problem for the artist*, and only he deserves the name who can satisfactorily solve that problem. Sophocles does this, Shakspeare does it, Molière does it, Racine does it, in Calderon it is a rarity. Art consists in evolving from inwards organically, not in mechanical juxtaposition of materials."

From an able *critique*, entitled "Strafford and the Historical Drama," a review of John Sterling's Tragedy, contributed to the *Westminster*, March, 1844, we cull this on the same topic:—

"What is the drama, the tragic drama? Passion exhibited in action. What end does the drama propose to itself? To move, delight, and instruct a miscellaneous audience by this exhibition of passionate life. The dramatist must, therefore, bear in mind that passion (in its widest sense), expressing itself poetically, is the grand endeavour of his art; he must not let philosophy seduce him, he must shun pedantry; what historical knowledge he has must form the basis, not the monument; *couleur locale* should be preserved, but it should be subordinate. One violation of æsthetic truth will not be compensated by a thousand historical accuracies; but the work may swarm with anachronisms and inaccuracies, and yet, if its passion be real, these shall count but as motes in the sunbeam. The drama is poetry, not history; to change, as is so often done, history into poetry is useless falsification; to change poetry into history is fatal. . . . All the audience demands is, not that it be true to history, but true to art; not that such men did live, and did so act, but that they are true, and their actions natural. In a word—passion, not fact."

Already most favourably known as a writer of extraordinary talents and of wondrous versatility; one of the most astute critics and graphic essayists, as well as one of the most skilled and adroit purveyors for the press; wearing as he did the renown acquired by his sincere and clever pioneer of positivism.—"The Biographical History of Philosophy," Mr. Lewes sighed for other laurels and yearned for other victories. The actual drama and its modern substitute, the novel, excited the endeavour of his ambition.

Though in 1842 Mr. Lewes, appreciating the inflowing taste of fiction, had written a novel, opportunity did not occur for its

publication till 1847. The book was first composed in the regulation form in three volumes, but prior to its publication a taste for tales in one volume had taken the reading public, and despite the prime requirement of "ample scope and verge enough" the full proportioned tale was dwarfed to suit the publisher's sense of the advisable, i. e., the payable. Hence "*Ranthorpe; or a Poet's First Struggles*"—a novel which bears the following dedication: "To her who has lightened the burden of an anxious life this work is inscribed by her husband"—presents the appearance of a "foiled potentiality." Its object is to trace the influence of genius on the moral development of individual life, but there is little skill apparent in the structure of the plot or in the conception of any of the characters except those who held the lead. Isola and Florence are well touched in and life-like; Percy, the literary hero, is a fair sketch; and Henry Cavendish, though a little wanting in firmness, is a good specimen of a walking gentleman. The literary scenes are deftly told, and the "first night" of the representation—and failure—of *Quintus Curtius* is vividly set before the reader. The story is interspersed with—and in fact now lives by—a choice series of exquisite scraps of thought and philosophy, exhibiting a knowledge of books and of life; a few specimens of which we shall here quote:

"Men resent nothing more than contradiction on a point, which they themselves feel uneasy about. Truth may be disputed with impunity; a sophism can only be torn from out the mind with a violence that lacerates and embitters."

"The labours of philosophers, extending through centuries of observation and experiment, are amassed in books. There the student may find them, question them, and having furnished himself with their results, begin the study of nature, rich in the experience of ages." . . . "This is one of the sad conditions of life, that experience is not transmissible. No man can learn from the sufferings of another; he must suffer himself; each must bear his own burden." . . . "Experience is the bed over which must flow the lucent stream of poetry." . . . Managers fancy that alteration must be an easy matter, as all would fancy who had never tried; but every work that is really a work of art, costs infinite labour in the altering. I do not here speak of the repugnance to distort the work for the sake of theatrical precedent. I mean the absolute intellectual labour of re-arranging materials, or piecing in new portions with the old. When once a conception has been incarnated, and developed in all its ramifications, so that it has expanded into a vital whole the parts of which are *dependent yet constituent*—then indeed to 'alter;' to wrench out one scene or character; to give a different turn to this and that incident; in order to 'bring them up to a situation,' and from this mosaic to produce the whole; is not only difficulty, it is almost impossible." . . . "Genius is the happiest, as it is the greatest of human faculties. It has no immunity from the common sorrows of humanity; but it has one glorious privilege of turning its sorrows

into beauty, and brooding delighted over them ! The greatest poet that ever breathed has said,—

‘Sweet are the uses of adversity ;
Which like the toad, ugly and venomous,
Wears yet a precious jewel in his head !’

But it is only genius that can extract the jewel, and walk the path of life illumined by its light.” . . . “That the lives of men of genius are embittered by many miseries, it would be folly to deny. Bad health, bad habits, and mistaken aims—as well as those more common “ills that flesh is heir to”—are not without their stings ; but these are the accidents, and not the consequences of genius. Double them, treble them, and you will still be unable to counterbalance with them all the pleasures of a life of thought !”

This was an incident-novel somewhat of the Bulwer Lytton school ; his next venture was a character-novel after the manner of Miss Austen. It is a longer and much more skilfully constructed tale, and possesses a value and interest higher even than the excitement of the passing hour spent in reading it. The didactic passages are always astute, often profound ; they interest and instruct ; they strike one as the conclusions of a sagacious, if not always a just thinker ; sometimes they wear a paradoxical air, and often they excite a desire to controvert them or to demand their modification. Subtle insight into motive, and keenly discriminative sketching of principles and passions are evident in the work ; but the characters are rather ascribed than exhibited, and attributed rather than portrayed. The events are set rather than grow, put on the stage rather than evolved. The incidents are complicated and the love passages are perhaps too uniformly vehement, and the whole may rather be regarded as a study after Ben Jonson, than after Shakspeare. Rose, Blanche, and Violet are representatives of diverse “humours,” in the Elizabethan sense—the gay, the gentle, and the self-resolved, and the plot is so constructed as to bring out these contrasts in character. There is some exquisite satire and much truth uttered about the cant of mission and purpose, then prevalent. On the whole the feminine trine had a very fair share of the attention of library readers, and of better judges. Two eloquent and valuable passages we quote :—

“Strength of will is the quality most needing cultivation in mankind. Will is the central force which gives strength and greatness to character. We over estimate the value of talent, because it dazzles us ; and we are apt to underrate the importance of the will because its works are less shining. Talent gracefully adorns life ; but it is will which carries us victoriously through the struggle. Intellect is the torch which lights us on our way ; will the strong arm which rough-hews the path for us. The clever, weak man sees all obstacles on his path ; the very torch he carries, being brighter than that of most men, enables him, perhaps, to see that the path before him may be directest, the best—yet it also enables him to see the crooked

turnings by which he may, as he fancies, reach the goal without encountering difficulties. If, indeed, intellect were a sun instead of a torch—if it irradiated every corner and crevice—then would man see how, in spite of every obstacle, the direct path was the only safe one, and he would cut his way through by manful labour. But constituted as we are it is the clever, weak men who stumble most—the strong men who are the most virtuous and happy. In this world there cannot be virtue without strong will; the weak know the right, and yet the wrong pursue defying!

"No one, I suppose, will accuse me of obstinacy, or even mere brute will; nor of depreciating intellect. But we have had too many dithyrambs in honour of mere intelligence; and the older I grow the clearer I see that intellect is *not* the highest faculty in man, although the most brilliant. Knowledge, after all, is not the greatest thing in life; it is not the "be-all and the end-all here;" life is not science. The light of intellect is truly a precious light; but its aim and end is simply to shine. The moral nature of man is more sacred in my eyes than his intellectual nature. I know they cannot be divorced—that without intelligence we should be brutes; but it is the tendency of our gaping wandering dispositions to give pre-eminence to those faculties which most astonish us. Strength of character seldom, if ever, astonishes; goodness, lovingness, and quiet self-sacrifice, are worth all the talents in the world.

"Use the pen," says a thoughtful and subtle author, 'there is no magic in it; *but it keeps the mind from staggering about.*' This is an aphorism which should be printed in letters of gold over the studio door of every artist. Use the pen or the brush; do not pause, do not trifle, have no misgivings; but keep your mind from staggering about by fixing it resolutely on the matter before you, and then all that you *can* do you *will* do; inspiration will not enable you to do more. Write or paint: act, do not hesitate. If what you have written or painted should turn out imperfect, you can correct it, and the correction will be more efficient than that correction which takes place in the shifting thoughts of hesitation. You will learn from your failures infinitely more than from the vague wandering reflections of a mind loosened from its moorings; because the failure is absolute, it is precise, it stands bodily before you, your eyes and judgment cannot be juggled with, you know whether a certain verse is harmonious, whether the rhyme is there or not there; but in the other case you not only *can* juggle with yourself, but *do* so; the very indeterminateness of your thoughts makes you do so: as long as the idea is not positively clothed in its artistic form it is impossible accurately to say what it will be. The magic of the pen lies in the concentration of your thoughts on one subject. Let your pen fall, begin to trifle with blotting paper, look at the ceiling, bite your nails, and otherwise dally with your purpose, and you waste your time, scatter your thoughts, and repress the nervous energy necessary for your task. Some men dally and dally, hesitate and trifle, until the last possible moment, and when the printer's boy is knocking at the door, they begin; necessity goading them, they write with singular rapidity and with singular success; they are astonished at themselves. What is the secret? Simply this; they have had no time to hesitate. Concentrating their powers upon the one object before them, they have done what they *could* do."

The next substantive work on which we find Mr. Lewes's pen

employed seems rather a piece of book-making hack-work, than a self-originated labour and delight. It is "The Life of Maximilien Robespierre." It evidently takes its being from the interest re-excited in the great French revolutionary drama, by the occurrences of 1848. It is neither a work of art nor a history, but "a marshalling together of widely-scattered details, so selected as to present a view of the separate phases in the career of a remarkable man, and thus furnishing the data upon which a judgment of him may be formed. Everything about him is here collected; all his opinions are stated, and the pith and substance of almost all his published speeches translated." Of the authorities on which he relies the author makes ample citation, including "MSS. letters of Robespierre, placed at the author's disposal by his friend, M. Louis Blanc." From this work we make only two extracts, the first on Rousseau, as the precursor of the Revolution, and the second, Mr. Lewes' estimate of the character of Robespierre, whom he considered to be "a political fanatic."

"There was an air of serious conviction about Rousseau. A close and pressing logic, bold and sweeping dogmatism, and a masterly style, which if they failed to convince, at least left readers in an embarrassment whence there was no escape. No one was persuaded, yet no one could refute him. Replies abounded; even a king condescended to step into the arena; but Rousseau's antagonists did not see the absurdity of the question, and could not, therefore, see the 'initial fallacy' of his answer."

"Rousseau's position is this: Science, art, and literature are the produce and producers of all the vices of civilization. Man in a state of unlettered simplicity is healthy, brave, and virtuous. He loses these qualities in society. "The ebb and flow of the ocean have not been more regularly subjected to the course of the planet which illumines the night, than the fate of morals and probity to the progress of science and art." This aphorism is universally accepted; and Rousseau's tactic consists in boldly, and without qualification, applying it in the sense *contrary* to that accepted by mankind. He thus continues: "We have seen virtue disappear, according as the light of the sciences has risen upon our horizon, and the same phenomenon has been observed in all times and in all countries." This position, so authoritatively assumed, domineers over the whole argument. He subsequently supports it by a magnificent audacity; he gives to every science a *vice* as its origin! "Astronomy is born from superstition; eloquence from ambition, from hate, from flattery, from falsehood; geometry from avarice (!); physics from a vain curiosity; all—including morality itself—from human pride."

No sane man could seriously maintain such arguments, although this was not the first time they had found utterance. "St. Aubain" in a now forgotten work, called "*Traité de l'Opinion*," which Rousseau had studied in his youth, advanced most of the objections to be found in this *Discours*. In fact, scepticism had infested every department of human inquiry; until at last men began to doubt

whether *all* inquiry were not useless. Rousseau's paradox, therefore, although suggested by Diderot, was the legitimate product of the epoch, and hence its success."

"That Robespierre was a great or good man seems to me a conclusion little less preposterous than that he was a blood-thirsty monster, altogether infamous. It is not difficult, however, to see the grounds for such diversity of judgment. All that is great and estimable in fanaticism—its sincerity, its singleness of purpose, its exalted aims, its vigorous consistency, its disdain of worldly temptations—all may be found in Robespierre; and those who only contemplate that aspect of the man, will venerate him. But there is another aspect of fanaticism—presenting narrow-mindedness, want of feeling, of consideration, and of sympathy, unscrupulousness of means, pedantic wilfulness, and relentless ferocity, and whose contemplates this aspect, also, will look on Robespierre with strangely mingled feelings of admiration and abhorrence; . . . To go to the block for an opinion is heroism; to send others to the block because they differ from you is fanaticism. . . . He was honest, sincere, self-denying, and consistent. But he was cowardly, relentless, pedantic, unloving, intensely vain and morbidly envious. Throughout his career I have met with no single generous action, with no example of warm feeling, with no expression which seemed to come from a noble heart. It is idle to set against this his honourable poverty, his political consistency, his sagacity and his eloquence.

"History will record of him that living in an epoch abounding in examples of heroism and greatness of all kinds, and wielding a power such as few have ever wielded, backed by an influence such as few have had to support them, he performed many acts, and delivered numberless orations; but he has not left the legacy to mankind of one grand thought, nor the example of one generous and exalted action."

In the movement commenced by the members of the Museum Club, and taken up by the Shakspeare Society in 1847, to purchase the birthplace of Shakspeare, Mr. Lewes took an active part; and in the series of amateur performances for this purpose, and for the permanent endowment of a curatorship for the same, organized under Charles Dickens, Mr. Lewes performed the part of Sir Hugh Evans in "The Merry Wives of Windsor," in most of the chief towns in the kingdom. In the performances of "The Amateur Company of the Guild of Literature and Art," in 1851, he also took part, playing in Lord Lytton's "Not so bad as we Seem;" and in Ben Jonson's "Every Man in his Humour," and showing great aptitude for the interpretation of character on the stage. His long and observant study of the stage as a dramatic critic, his wide acquaintance with the literature of the drama in the classical, and modern continental tongues, as well as the theatrical eras of Elizabeth, Charles, Anne, and Victoria, united to a natural mobility of sympathy, and power of realizing character, gave him every prospect of success in Thespian affairs. He turned his mind to this subject, and not only devoted a good deal of study to practical acting—in which for a short time he employed himself—but in the produc-

tion of the acting drama, in which he was more than usually successful. We cannot refer to all his efforts in this line, but we may speak of the following two :—

In February, 1850, a drama,—one of a series of endeavours made by earnest and capable men to revive and re-invigorate the literary influence of the stage, as an intellectual agency, written by G. H. Lewes, entitled “The Noble Heart,” was produced at the Olympic Theatre, and won the commendations of a severely critical, if not a censorious audience. It was strongly cast, having Gustavus V. Brooke as the hero, Don Gomez de la Vega; Mr. Davenport as Leon, his son; the author himself, as Herman, the priest; Mrs. Mowatt, as Juanna, the heroine, &c., and it was superbly placed upon the stage,—the scenery, details, and the style of acting, having been put under the author’s own care in a great measure. Mr. Brooke made the character entirely his own, and realized the hero in such a manner as to constitute it one of the finest impersonations of the modern drama—the revived drama in which Thomas N. Talfourd, R. L. Shiel, J. S. Knowles, Douglas W. Jerrold, Henry Taylor, Leigh Hunt, E. L. Bulwer (now Lord Lytton), &c., took an active share, and sustained their parts well. Though G. H. Lewes is himself no mean histrionic, and is a thorough Shakspearean both by study and intuition, we are scarcely able to aver that there are “touches in this play which Shakspeare could not excel.” We should rather assert that if Jerrold be the Shakspeare of the modern school, and Knowles and Bulwer its Beaumont and Fletcher, Henry Taylor would be its Ben Jonson, Talfourd its Heywood, or Webster and G. H. Lewes its Massinger.

Of this play the gist of the plot is simple, and may be briefly told. Don Leon, the son and heir of a Spanish grandee, loves a merchant’s daughter, to whom, while wooing her, he has not disclosed his rank. His father, Don Gomez, has also seen the girl, and without knowing of his son’s attachment, has formed the design of gaining her as the lady of his home. On the breaking out of war, Gomez is called to do active suit and service to his king; but having reason of personal offence against the monarch, he deposes his son, Don Leon, with a body of five hundred men to take his place in the army of the sovereign. While Don Leon is absent at the wars, pecuniary embarrassments beset the old merchant, and Don Gomez—though told her heart is irretrievably given to another—formally proposes and proffers in exchange for Juanna’s compliance means of restoration for the merchant’s credit. She is forced to the altar, and the plighted union has just been completed when Don Leon returns. The lovers meet, and passionate explanation ensues, Don Gomez surprises them, clasped in each other’s arms. A stormy interview between the father and son occurs, Juanna enters, and Don Gomez discovers that his newly wedded wife is the affianced bride of his son. He resolves on such reparation as is possible; breaks his sword in token of his farewell to all the interests of the earth, and expresses his determina-

tion, after gaining a dispensation from the Pope, to retire from the world, and taste of its conflicting enjoyments no more.

The play was originally written in five acts, but to suit the exigencies of representation it was compressed into three. In the early scenes the talk is, though eloquent, a little out of place, and somewhat declamatory, with a pretty considerable sprinkling of metaphysical analysis of character; but when the tides of passion are really aflow the plot quickens, and the situations become effective. There is a considerable amount of controversial speculation on the merits of asceticism and sociality which impedes the action, and somewhat lessens the plot-interest; but even in these passages, power, beauty and appropriateness are inwrought together. Many of the most poetical portions consist rather of Metaphysics than of imagery; as for example, this on poetry, wine, and beauty:—

Gomez. It (Poetry) lives for ever with us;
All that is great and glorious in life
Is based on it;—mark how its spirit hovers
Over the world beneficent as love!
How o'er its page the impassioned youth will bend,
While gentle maidens reading through their tears
Turn, softened, to the lovers at their side.
It makes the youthful soul thrill with great thoughts—
Manhood preserve its noblest, youthful dreams—
And age remember that it once was young.

Antonio. All that is true of wine. The sparkling cup
Sends a swift rushing vigour through our veins.
Books weaken manhood, and had I my will
I'd banish every rhymer from the earth.

Gomez. Then would you banish beauty from the earth?
What brutes were we—the dullest, meanest brutes—
Blind instincts o'er our souls imperial—
Wer't not that Poetry sent quickening truths
Of heavenly light through our humanity,
And with its voice, piercing the rudest souls,
Woke up the angel that lies sleeping there."

These lines suggestive of the proper moral influence of ancestry merit quotation. Gomez, while dissuading himself from love "of a base-born girl," looks at the portraits on the walls, and thus communes with himself:—

"Oh ye great glories of our race, look down,
And bid me not forget from whom I sprang!
Ye who have lived and loved as princes should,
Who never let your passions weaken pride,
But kept unswerving on your noble course!
Eagles who never mated but with those
Who could confront the sun—lend me your strength—
Frown this too beauteous image from my heart.
I'll go, and from the story of their lives
Learn resolution worthy of the name."

Here is a passage on the philosophy of love:—

Leon. Love is divine, and acts
In a divine, unapprehended manner,
Unseen, unknown, unconsciously it comes.
We know not whence nor whether—we only know
That vaguely and imperiously it draws
Two trembling souls together—trembling in
Its painful rapture—Joy abashed by Fear.

Juanna. And wilt thou love Juanna ever?

Leon. For ever!

Juanna. When she is old and ugly?

Leon. That will never be (*Juanna shakes her head*)
Believe me never!

Juanna. (*Plucking a flower and stripping the leaves off*
as she speaks) Yes! Time will claim his own and year by year
Some charm will droop, will fall, thus, leaf by leaf,
Till nought remains but the unsightly stem
To sigh o'er with regret, and cast aside
(*Holds up the stem then throws it away*).

Leon. By thine own matchless beauty, No! Juanna!
To eyes that love the loved is ever young.

Juanna. Oh what a thrill of rapture runs me through
As that sweet thought rises within my soul!
Leon, I was alone in this drear world
Until I knew thee!—How I did live
Until I knew thee? Nay! I did not live,
For love is life—without it life were death.

Leon. Yes! "love is life"—it is the glimpse on earth
Of that immortal life our longing souls
Shall revel in in Heaven!"

We have little space for further quotation, and yet we think our readers would like to hear a word or two of the philosophizing of Mr. Lewes' favourite monk, Herman.

Men only see
The stars when night o'ershadoweth the earth
And only when dark sorrows dim the glare
Of earthly vanities and gaudy hopes,
Smiles the mild splendour of all Heavenly Truths.

There is such rapture in all loveliness;—
A calm of deep content when the soul flings
Itself in silence—there, in patient thought
To contemplate—interrogate—adore—
To know that we have suffered; that no more
Can sorrow touch us or the world disturb us!

Why do the stars for ever speak to us
 Throughout the solemn night?—Why does the sea
 Keep sounding on its multitudinous moan;
 Its many-varied resonance of love?—
 Are not these warnings from the Infinite,
 Calling us unto him?"

The play was published almost immediately after its representation, and run the gauntlet of criticism not only as an acted performance but as a literary production; for now, as in Shakspeare's time, there are "three distinct species of drama:—the first written without view to the stage; the second written solely for the stage; the third written both for the stage and the press." Written, though with literary pretensions, for theatrical success, it was perhaps somewhat impaired in each point of view from this circumstance, because, though written as a literary production in five acts, as an acting play it required to be compressed—to secure effective situations—into three acts. It was thus foreshortened in its perspective, and gained its staginess at the expense of its literature proper—its fine philosophical analysis of event and emotion.

In October, 1851, at the Royal Lyceum Theatre, "The Game of Speculation" was first performed with Mr. Charles Matthews, the most accomplished of living performers in genteel comedy or graceful farce, as Mr. Affable Hawk. It is an adaptation from *Mercedet le Faiseur* a posthumous work by H. de Balzac; the version, though written by Mr. Lewes under the pseudonym of Slingsby Lawrence in less than thirteen hours, and produced after only two rehearsals, was received with unanimous praise, and yet holds its place in the dramatic *répertoire* as one of the most taking of modern light comedies. It sparkles with wit and cuts deep into the vices of society with a keen scalpel-like healthiness, going right into the core of the wrong for the purpose of eradicating it. It is neat, crisp, telling, and full, and quite worthy of its extraordinary popularity. It is so generally known that analysis is not required.

In March, 1850, a literary organ for the cultured intellects of the more advanced members of the movement party and the advocacy of philosophical radicalism, was commenced, under the name—since appropriated by a new journal—of *The Leader*. Its master principle was the right of every opinion to its own free utterance; and it sought to give expression to the earnest convictions of those who favoured national and individual freedom in industry, thought, and action; while, in direct and unequivocal language, it discussed the questions of the day, in regard to morality, social science, economics, politics, speculation, and religion. It contained a review of the literature of the time, not only in books, but also in the events and influences of the literary world at home and abroad, accounts of the progress of science, art, and the drama, not only descriptive but critical. Of this journal Mr. Edward M. Whitty, became political editor, and to its columns he contributed his "History of

the Session," and a series of papers on "Our Governing Classes;" Mr. Lewes was installed in the critic's chair, as controller of the open column and conductor of the literary, dramatic, scientific, and philosophic departments. To this newspaper he contributed many excellent reviews and articles, of which, as deserving special attention, we may note those on "The Apprenticeship of Life," "The Philosophy of Sciences, from a Positivist point of view." Mr. Whitty, in his "Friends in Bohemia," gave a satirical account of the institution and progress of this paper under the designation of *The Teaser*. Mr. Lewes vacated his post in the management of this journal about the close of 1854, in order that he might conclude, with proper literary excellence, a work on which he had been employed, more or less closely, during the ten previous years, viz., his "Life of Goethe."

This elaborate, interesting, and highly valuable addition to the biographical literature of England appeared in 1855, under the title of "The Life and Works of Goethe, with Sketches of his Age and Contemporaries," in two large volumes, and instantly achieved a distinguished success.

There was no life of Goethe in existence when Mr. Lewes first began his in 1845. On the collection of materials—in the pursuit of which he passed a considerable amount of time in Germany, especially in the winter preceding the publication of the work—and in composition he spent nearly ten years. Though several biographies have appeared since, it is not a little to the credit of the English writer that it has been translated into German, and has taken a place in the standard literature of that land of diligence, fidelity, and exhaustiveness. The author acknowledges his obligations fully and faithfully to English and Teutonic publications, but claims for himself originality of view and aim; of method in investigating as well as in testing authorities. He has had access to special sources of information, manuscript and oral, and by actual visitation of places, has striven to catch the *couleur locale* and to seize the suggestions which scenery supplies regarding the development of the soul. He disclaims any partizanship or inducement to slur over points which might tell against his hero. "The man is too great," he says, "and too good to forfeit our love, because on some points he may incur our blame." He dedicates the book "to Thomas Carlyle, who first taught England to appreciate Goethe, as a memorial of gratitude for intellectual guidance, and of esteem for rare and noble qualities."

The mere criticism of such a work would be enough for an entire paper, and we cannot now devote to it the requisite space; but there are passages in it so full of thought and metaphysical ingenuity that, we think we may venture on citing them as unintended proofs of our just of averment that Mr. Lewes is a "modern metaphysician."

of great men have been fruitful in lessons. In all ages they have been powerful stimulants to a noble ambition. In all ages they have been regarded as the armories wherein are gathered the weapons with which great battles have been won.

"There may be some among my readers who will dispute Goethe's claim to greatness. They will admit that he was a great poet, but deny that he was a great man. . . . I do not present him as the exemplar of all greatness. No man can be such an exemplar. Humanity reveals itself in fragments. One man is the carrier of one kind of excellence, another of another. Achilles wins the victory, and Homer immortalizes it:—we bestow the laurel crown on both. . . . It is profoundly false to say that 'character is formed by circumstance,' unless the phrase, with unphilosophic equivocation, include the whole complexity of circumstances, from the creation downwards. Character is to outward circumstance what the organism is to the outward world: living in it, but not specially determined by it. Each character assimilates, from surrounding circumstance, that which is by it assimilable, rejecting the rest. . . . Man is the architect of circumstance. It is character which builds an existence out of circumstance. Our strength is measured by our plastic power. . . . Circumstance can create no faculty: it is food, not nutrition; opportunity, not character.

"In history, in philosophy, in art; there is a perpetual antagonism between freedom and despotism, spiritualism and materialism, mysticism and rationalism—or, to use our former distinction—idealism and realism. The struggle is supported by the clamorous instincts of mankind to look forward to an age of perfection, and to look backward to an age of gold. The contemplation of this antagonism, asserting itself through successive reactions, has thrown some minds into scepticism, others into indifference. The ultimate reconciliation of these antagonists will only be possible when philosophy and art shall have acquired a fixed basis. That it will then be possible may be seen in the evidence furnished us by science. . . . When philosophy has once settled its basis, the oscillating movement of progress will give place to a direct movement.

"2. *On Novel Scientific Views.*—The mass of men, simply because they are a mass of men, receive with difficulty every new idea, unless it lies in the track of their own knowledge; and this opposition, which every new idea must vanquish, becomes tenfold greater when the idea is promulgated from a source not in itself authoritative. . . . All novelty is *primâ facie* suspicious; none but the young welcome it; for is not every new discovery a kind of slur on the sagacity of those who overlooked it? When Goethe wrote upon science, he was grave as science itself. He had given the models of several kinds of literary composition, and he gave one for scientific composition. If his work was not accepted, it was because it appeared too soon for his contemporaries—he had anticipated the coming era.

"3. *On Faust.*—This wondrous poem appeals to all minds with the irresistible fascination of an eternal problem, and with the charm of endless variety. It has every element, wit, pathos, wisdom, buffoonery, mystery, melody, reverence, doubt, magic, and irony; not a chord of the lyre is unstrung, not a fibre of the heart untouched. Students earnestly wrestling with doubt, striving to solve the solemn riddles of life, feel their pulses strangely agitated by this poem; and not students alone, but, as Heine says, every billiard-maker in Germany puzzles himself over it. In *Faust*

we see, as in a mirror, the eternal problem of our intellectual existence; and beside it the varied lineaments of our social existence. It is at once a problem and a picture. Therein lies its fascination. The problem embraces all questions of vital importance, the picture represents all opinions, all sentiments, all classes, moving on the stage of life. The great problem is stated in all its nudity, the picture is painted in all its variety. . . .

"Critics usually devote their whole attention to an exposition of the idea of Faust. . . . Experience tells me that the artists themselves had quite other objects in view than that of developing an idea; and experience further says that the artist's public is by no means primarily anxious about the idea, but leaves it entirely to the critics, who cannot agree on the point among themselves. In studying a work of art, I proceed as in studying a work of nature; after delighting in the effect, I try to ascertain what are the means by which the effect is produced, and not at all what is the idea lying behind the means. . . . It is only organic analysis which can truly seize the meaning of organic elements; so long as we judge an organism *ab astra*, according to the idea, or according to our ideas, and not according to its nature, we shall never rightly understand structure and function; and this is as true of poems as of animals. . . . The rapidity and variety of the scenes give the work an air of formlessness until we have seized the principle of organic unity binding these scenes into a whole. The reader who first approaches it is generally disappointed; the want of visible connection makes it appear more like a nightmare than a work of art. . . . A closer familiarity with the work removes the first feeling of disappointment. We learn to understand it, and our admiration grows with our enlightenment. The picture is painted with so cunning a hand, and yet with so careless an air, that strength is veiled by grace, and nowhere strains itself into effort. . . . A masterpiece excites no sudden enthusiasm; it must be studied much and long before it is fully comprehended; we must grow up to it, for it will not descend to us. Its influence is less sudden, more lasting; its emphasis grows with familiarity; we never become disenchanted; we grow more and more awestruck at its infinite wealth. . . . Idioms are, of course, untranslatable. Felicities of expression are the idioms of the poet; but as, on the one hand, these felicities are essential to the poem, and on the other hand untranslatable, the vanity of translation becomes apparent. I do not say that a translator cannot produce a fine poem in imitation of an original poem; but I utterly disbelieve in the possibility of his giving us a work which can be to us what the original is to those who read it. If, therefore, we reflect what a poem 'Faust' is, and that it contains almost every variety of style and metre, it will be tolerably evident that no one unacquainted with the original can form an adequate idea of it from translation. . . . It is a reflex of the struggles of Faust's soul. Experience had taught him the vanity of philosophy; experience had early taught him to detect the corruption underlying civilization, the dark undercurrents of crime concealed beneath smooth outward conformity. If, then, we distinguish for a moment one of the two aspects of the poem—if we set aside the picture to consider only the problem—we come to the conclusion that the theme of "Faust" is the apotheosis of scepticism, the cry of despair over the nothingness of life. Misology forms a portion, but only a portion, of the theme. Baffled in his attempts to penetrate the mystery of life, Faust yields himself to the tempter, who promises that he

shall penetrate the *enjoyment* of life. He runs the round of pleasure, as he had run the round of science, and fails. . . . The mystery of existence is an awful problem, but it is a mystery, and placed beyond the boundaries of human faculty. Recognise it as such, and renounce! Knowledge can only be relative, never absolute. But this relative is infinite, and to us infinitely important; in that wide sphere let each work according to ability. Happiness, ideal, and absolute is equally unattainable; renounce it! The sphere of active duty is wide, sufficing, ennobling to all who strenuously work in it. In the very sweat of labour there is stimulus which gives energy to life; and a consciousness that our labour tends in some way to the lasting benefit of others makes the rolling years endurable."

"4. *The Death of Goethe*.—The following morning—it was the 22nd March, 1832—he tried to walk a little up and down the room, but, after a turn, he found himself too feeble to continue. Reclining himself in the easy chair, he chatted cheerfully with Ottilie (his daughter-in-law) on the approaching spring, which would be sure to restore him. He had no idea of his end being so near. The name of Ottilie was frequently on his lips. She sat beside him, holding his hand in both of hers. It was now observed that his thoughts began to wander incoherently. 'See,' he exclaimed, 'the lovely woman's head, with black curls, in splendid colours—a dark background!' Presently he saw a piece of paper on the floor, and asked them how they could leave Schiller's letters so carelessly lying about. Then he slept softly, and on awakening, asked for the sketches he had just seen—the sketches of his dream. In silent anguish they awaited the close now so surely approaching. His speech was becoming less and less distinct. The last words audible were, *More light!* The final darkness grew apace; and he whose eternal longings had been for more light, gave a parting cry for it as he was passing under the shadow of death. He continued to express himself by signs, drawing letters with his fore-finger in the air while he had strength; and finally, as life ebbed, drawing figures slowly on the shawl which covered his legs. At half-past twelve he composed himself in the corner of the chair. The watcher placed a finger on her lip to intimate that he was asleep. If sleep it was, it was a sleep in which a life glided from the world. He awoke no more."

During the summers of 1865-6, Mr. Lewes was engaged in those "seaside studies" at Ilfracombe, Tenby, and the Scilly Isles, which appeared in *Blackwood's Magazine*, and of which, in their reissued form, such a brilliant book has been made up. His "*Studies in Animal Life*" had their origin at the same time, and are a record of similar pursuits. Original research, acute observation, well conducted reasoning and experiment, fresh views and full information, ample references, bold discussion of opinions, and singularly fertile suggestiveness distinguish these studies. During a residence in Edinburgh (1856-7), he produced for Messrs. Blackwood a new and revised edition of Professor Johnston's "*Chemistry of Common Life*"—a simple and lucid work on the influences which affect health, comfort, and happiness in man's social and natural surroundings. To this he added a much needed complement in "*The Physiology of Common Life*," a popular exposition

of anatomy and physiology, in which accuracy of statement, able criticism, and a great deal of original matter add to the interest of a work intended to induce a practical familiarity with the facts of the most important of human studies, the study of man. We quote only :—

"The basis of a new doctrine of nervous action :—

"1°. All nerves have one common property—neurility—by means of which they excite contraction in a muscle, secretion in a gland, and sensation in a nerve-centre.

"2°. The property of nerves depends on their structure. The functions or uses of nerves are determined by their anatomical distribution—i. e., their connection with other parts of the organism.

"3°. All nerve-centres have one common property—sensibility—which is excited by, and in turn excites, the neurility of nerves, and thus produces either reflex movements or reflex feelings, according as the stimulus to the centre is reflected on muscles or on other centres.

"4°. The property of nerve-centres depends on their structure. The functions or uses of each centre are determined by its anatomical connections, the optic-centre being in connection with a very different apparatus from that of the auditory-centre, and so of the rest.

"5°. Every stimulus which affects a centre awakens its sensibility; but the *kind* and *degree* of sensation thus awakened are necessarily determined by the kind and degree of the exciting cause, and the structure of the organs on which that cause first acts."

At a somewhat earlier period, namely, in 1853, Mr. Lewes reissued the substance of a series of papers from *The Leader*, written then amid avocations very numerous and very conflicting, but with clearness and force. These, duly revised and extended, form his "*Comte's Philosophy of the Sciences*," a work which led him into conflict with Miss Martineau and some other advocates or friends of Positivism. Of this work—having so recently spoken at large of Comte and Positivism—we need at present say nothing, except that it was while engaged upon it that the idea arose within the author's mind of sketching "*The Embryology of Science*," and giving "*an exposition of the great momenta in scientific development*" under "*the conception of evolution as the law of life, and consequently as the law of humanity*," of which his monograph on "*Aristotle; a Chapter from the History of Science*," 1864, is a specimen and portion. We have already noticed this able and excellent work in a recent paper on "*Physics and Metaphysics*," and need here only give note of its appearance as another of the efforts of this man of wide acquirement, versatile capacity, and ingenuity of intellect.

In 1857 he reissued an enlarged and revised edition of the "*Biographical History of Philosophy*;" and again in 1867, in part rewritten and much enlarged, the same work was issued, this time in two portly and important volumes.

The historian has an insight into character; he looks on till it becomes transparent to him, and all man's feelings, habits, modes of thought, and motives of action become clear to him, and reveal

themselves, and he becomes a witness of the drama of life of which he gives us a record; but he is still only a highly intelligent spectator, whose position is outside the circle, however frequently he may have been behind the scenes. The histrionic has the wide and mobile sympathy which enables him to put himself into a character; he fills up every nook and cranny of it with his own being; he puts his spirit under the ribs of the dead visible symbols which are given to him; he feels the tremor of its passions and the purpose of its activities; he lives as, and for the time being is, the character allotted to him; he is a part, great or small, of the entire whole of the drama of which he is one of the persons; he is within the veil in regard to events as well as behind the scenes. He acts, the historian thinks, and hence the histrionic comes a step nearer to the realization of that which has been enacted. Historic similitude becomes histrionic verisimilitude, because the impressionable susceptibilities of the latter, developed *ab intra*, aggregate the mass of things into life, while the impressive constructiveness, supposed *ab extra*, of the former merely colligates them into a work. The impulses of the historic spirit move in alliance with the long results of intellectual research, those of the histrionic mind stir and exert themselves in combination with the experienced emotions of palpable life, where thought is controlled and modified by feeling.

Perhaps the most singular endowment of Mr. Lewes, and that which, it may be, gives its specific form to his literary efforts, is what we may call his histrionic faculty. This shows itself not only in his love for, his power on, and his writings for the stage; it is exhibited also in the autocratic power of envisioning imagination—the clear, distinct, and absolute perspective in which he sees all things. It is the peculiarity of the histrionic mind to be not perceptive only, but conceptive as well. Out of the merest hints and accidents of theatrical action and speech allowed to any character by the author there must arise in the actor's imagination a concrete reproduction of the person and the circumstances to which dramatic reality is to be imparted. However insignificant the *rôle* assigned may be, it must be individualized and harmonized with the characters and the plot. Intellect and feeling, imagination and logic, studied or intuitive, combine together in their operations to render real the ideal of which the author's words are but the symbol and suggestion—to organize the numerous relations to persons and events into a oneness which may be felt and seen to be a part of the great whole of the collective ideal of the author in the actual experience of the spectator. This histrionic faculty, which reinstates all the invisible surroundings and influences, which act on the one visibility with the impersonation of which the actor is entrusted, is a precious gift, and, when possessed in perfection, is one of the most wonderful manifestations of conceptive susceptibility. This is the source of the intensity and vividness of theatrical personation, of dramatic composition, and of

realism in novels, poetry, and painting. Nor is it in reality less requisite in philosophic pursuits. By the possession of this power ideas become steadied before the intellectual vision; they are not only perceived as on the surface, like a painting, but conceived as invested with all the reality which belongs to statuary, so that the very subjective operations of the mind are projected into objectivity, and are investigated, as it were, all round. When to this distinct and vivid realization of the elements of experience there is added a steadfast continuity of investigative energy, we have every reason to expect such an adequacy and accuracy of envisagement as may be truly denominated philosophical imagination. This historic conceptiveness appears not only in the manner in which "The History of Philosophy" is written, but, as it seems to us, in the very form it has assumed in the author's mind, for in it he personalizes the topic which is to engage his attention, and forms it into a distinct and special entity as a subject. This is evident even from the announcement of his purpose made in the preface to the first edition (1847). "To write the biography of philosophy while writing the biographies of philosophers is," he says, "the aim of the following work. The expression 'biography of philosophy,' though novel, may perhaps be pardoned, because it characterizes a novel attempt. . . . The rise, growth, and development of philosophy, as exhibited in these philosophical schools—in a word, the life of philosophy—has yet, I believe, had no biographer. . . . I have written the biography, not the annals, of philosophy." "The novelty of the conception of the work," its author says, "made direct acquaintance with the originals indispensable. Having to exhibit the biography of philosophy, its rise, growth, and development, I could not always have drawn my materials from writers who had no such aim, many of the passages most significant for my purpose being totally disregarded by my predecessors."

The main purpose of the work is to prove "that no metaphysical system has had in it a principle of vitality; none has succeeded in establishing itself, because none deserved to succeed. . . . Philosophy has been ever in movement, but the movement has been circular; and this fact is thrown into stronger relief by contrast with the linear progress of science, and hence philosophy is everywhere in Europe fallen into discredit. . . . Every day the conviction gains strength that philosophy is condemned, by the very nature of its impulses, to wander for ever in one tortuous labyrinth, within whose circumscribed and winding spaces weary seekers are continually finding themselves in the trodden tracks of predecessors, who, they know, could find no exit." Such, even after twenty years of life, which "have not been without their influence on the historian," or on that philosophy of which he is the biographer, is the distinct finding and deliberate adjudication of this patient inductive investigator of the course of metaphysical speculation, "from its origin in Greece down to the present day."

Along the ages of pre-Christian thought he leads the reader, interestingly intermingling memoir, exposition, and criticism, and so connecting the thoughts on the one hand with the men in whose minds they had their "birth and their begetting," and on the other hand with the questions which agitate and stir the men of our own era. He shows, by a clear and rapid survey of the past—and that with a nice and intelligent selectiveness which it would be difficult to rival—the chief additions which each successive thinker of prime position has contributed to the previous stock of human speculation in its evolution from the "beginning" of Thales to the many-sected differences of the Alexandrian school. He hastily and lightly sketches the transition-epoch of scholasticism; and then, coming down to modern times, he places, full in the reader's sight, the vital thought-seeds of the pioneer-minds which, from Descartes to Comte, have striven to unwind for us the mysteries of human life and thought, to transform the appearances of things into the realities of thought, to learn the hidden from the perceptible, and to quicken experience into wisdom. Along this whole course of earnestly ardent endeavour he discovers no effective result; barren, fruitless, and valueless are all the efforts of the noblest minds known in the annals of humanity; they have all gone the same dull, gin-horse circuit, and have not even had the spiral progressiveness which tends to and gains some specific point at last; so that the great, the wise, the thoughtful, have no other or better organon of truth than—

"The people dolorous,
Who have foregone the good of intellect"—

i. e., experience; nor can they ever have any until it is proved that "we have ideas independent of experience." Otherwise philosophy is impossible, for all modern thought "leads to positive science, and sets metaphysics aside." "All attempts to solve the problems of philosophy have ended in scepticism."

The grand central query which Lewes posits as a barrier for ever on the pathway towards Metaphysics—"Have we any ideas independent of experience?" is vaguely if not fallaciously put. It may mean either, Have we any ideas originating in sources beyond and higher than experience? or, Do the ideas originating in experience reach and teach nothing beyond or higher than experience? It is indefinite too, inasmuch as it might signify independent of (1) personal; (2) human; (3) any possible experience. Independent again may be construed as meaning (1) coequal with; (2) superior to; (3) having another origin than; (4) without relation to; and (5) not influenced by. He maintains that there can be no "organon of philosophy" unless we can have "ideas independent of experience;" and he affirms that the metaphysician must "solve that question ere he begins to speculate." The problem, however, as he puts it, is not a single one, but, as we have shown, an eightfold inquiry. I think that any one must see that to deter-

mine that we can know nothing more, else, or higher than experience, as he does in the name of positivism, is in reality to have an idea independent of experience; is to accept, without giving proof of it, a universal negative proposition. It is a fact of experience that *mendo* philosophize, that in philosophizing they find (or suppose that they find) in experience, ideas which transcend experience, and constitute it a transparency, through which *noumena* reflect themselves; or, in the conditions under which experience becomes possible to man, ideas which experience implies though it does not emphasize them. If Positivism is a philosophy of facts, it must admit and explain the fact of philosophy.

Of every philosophy, experience forms the origin and ground. Out of the experienced conditions of thinking Kant constructs his *science* of pure reason; from the experienced limits of human knowledge Hamilton elaborated "The Philosophy of the Conditioned;" taking experience as the key to what is *before* experience—from the grown estimating not only the growth, but the seed and the aim of the sower, Hegel produces from it, his Absolute. Experience gives him position, consciousness, opposition, and reflection composition. From the experience of self-knowledge in all that we know, Ferrier effects his transition from Experience to Ontology. From our experience of the constitution of bodies, Huxley himself transcends experience in his postulate of *protoplasm* as "The Physical Basis of Life." Amid the fleeting and changing phenomena of existence, J. S. Mill so far transcends experience as to define the world of matter as a *permanent* possibility of sensation. Bain, Spencer, and even Lewes himself admit the cogency of the query—

"How can we reason but from what we know?"

and Comte, too, admits that science can make inroads into the outlying wastes of Nescience in order to transform "the palpable and the familiar" into the positive, and the scientific; finding either *in* phenomena or *through* phenomena, the laws of things and learning *by means of* experience, the hierarchy and classification of the sciences—abundant evidence this surely, that philosophy beginning from, may yet transcend experience, and that positivism itself cannot exist without "Metaphysical aid."

But we must draw our paper to a close. It remains, however, to be stated that in 1865 Mr. Lewes projected *The Fortnightly Review*, and was till 1868 the editor of it. We are sorry to say that ill health, the effect of over-tense labour and anxiety has led to a remission of his management and a residence in Spain as an aid to recovery—to which we hope it may conduce. We should have liked to call attention to the admirable series of papers with which he commenced his editorial work—"On the Principles of Success in Literature." These we think are the very essence of the author's mind. We need not say how much we approve of a journal which refuses to "hamper the full and free expression

of opinion," and invites "each writer to express his own views and sentiments with all the force of sincerity."

We may mention that it is understood that Mr. Lewes is engaged in the extension and revision of a work on "Spinoza," which was originally written for Bohn's Series in 1856, and then ready for publication, but through some "hitch" was not then issued. His friends look forward to this work with great expectations. Mr. Lewes is a sympathetic and ready helper in any literary or philosophical difficulty; a courteous and obliging gentleman. His conversation is even more engaging and remarkable than his literary productions. His observation is keen, his nature poetic, his wit ready and polished, his kindness great; and, commanding as are his talents, and versatile as are his endowments and acquirements,—he is affable, considerate, and free from even the affectation of superiority. He is certainly little less than the British Goethe.

"CONTEMPORARY WARS" (1853 to 1866).—The London Peace Society, 19, New Broad Street, E.C., have just issued a very striking pamphlet with the above title, translated from a French brochure, by M. Leroy Beulieu, which has excited great interest on the continent. It contains, in small compass, a large amount of authentic information illustrative of the lamentable sacrifice of life and property involved by the conflicts amongst the Christian nations of Europe and America in the short space of fourteen years—from 1853 to 1866, inclusive,—and, in particular, by the wars in the Crimea, Germany, Italy (Magenta and Solferino) the United States, Schleswig Holstein, and Mexico. The writer derives his facts and statistics from the official returns of the nations concerned, and from the valuable researches of Baron Moltke, Dr. Chenu, Baron d'Haxthausen, Dr. Lœffleur, of Berlin; M. Michael Chevalier, Major-General Barnes (Surgeon-General of the United States Army), M. Vigo Roussillon, and other well-known statisticians. It is proved that 1,743,491 men perished in the wars of these fourteen recent years, a number exceeding the whole combined population of Manchester, Liverpool, Birmingham, Leeds, Bristol, and Oxford. The cost of these wars since 1853 was, on a very moderate calculation, £1,913,000,000, an amount which would pay for the construction of railways to an extent equal to the circuit of the globe—23,000 miles—at £80,000. per mile; or it would build and fill with objects of art and interest 1,530 such magnificent institutions as the Crystal Palace at Sydenham, at £1,250,000, each or would erect and endow 382,600 schools at £5,000 each.

The *Montrose Standard*, gives a curious calculation of the weight in gold which each of the liberated Abyssinian captives has cost the country. Ten millions sterling, reduced to weight in sovereigns, represents 78 tons, 12 cwt. 1 qr. 14 lb. 8 oz., or for each of the 60 men, women, and children released from the clutches of King Theodore an expenditure in solid gold of 1 ton 6 cwt. 23 lb. and 1 oz.

Religion.

CAN THE GOSPELS BE HARMONIZED?

NEUTRAL ARTICLE.

Continued from page 345.

IN resuming the inquiry, we must ask—

3. How far do the Gospels harmonize when they narrate the same incidents?

As already indicated, in many instances we are indebted to one writer for a portion of the facts relating to a particular incident, or for a section of a particular discourse, and to another or more than one, for our farther knowledge of it; so that only by the union of as many narratives as exist do we arrive at a full account. But on thus uniting the respective histories, are they always found perfectly consistent with other?

The first incident to which we obtain more than a single testimony is the mission of John the Baptist, including the baptism of Jesus. To this there is a fourfold witness, which completely harmonizes—though Luke adds much to, and omits somewhat from, the account of Matthew—until the last clause, in which Matthew makes the voice from heaven to be addressed to John or to the people, while Mark and Luke represent it as having been intended for the Lord himself.

In the explanation of the Baptist's imprisonment given by Matthew, he says that Herod intended to put the forerunner to death, but was afraid to do so because of the people. But Mark says that Herodias would have killed John, only she could not because Herod feared John, observed him, heard him, and in many things obeyed his precepts or followed his advice. A comparison between Matthew and Mark upon the one hand, and Luke upon the other, as to their representations of the call of Simon and Andrew, James and John, to a permanent discipleship, reveals a measure of discrepancy. According to Matthew, Jesus saw Simon and Andrew casting a net into the sea, and afterwards James and John in a ship with their father, mending their nets. From Luke, who enters more into detail, we find that Jesus saw two ships empty, for the fishermen were washing their nets. He entered into one, and taught the people. Then the nets out of Simon's ship were cast into the sea with marvellous success, and James and John were called to assist. On land all four abandoned their property and

employment to the care of Zebedee and the hired servants, and thenceforth followed Jesus.

In the healing of the man with the withered hand upon the sabbath, Matthew states that the Pharisees questioned Jesus with the view to provoke discussion; while Matthew and Mark only affirm that they watched Him, and that when He questioned them they remained silent.

According to Luke the Sermon on the Mount was spoken on a plain, after the descent from the mountain; Matthew and Mark represent the Lord as having gone up into a mountain, and there appointed the twelve apostles and delivered the discourse. I believe this difference is susceptible of a geographical explanation, albeit a somewhat singular one; but a more important variation is in the form and number of the Beatitudes, which by Luke are given in the second person, by Matthew in the third, while those to the poor in spirit, the meek, the merciful, the peacemakers, are omitted from the third Gospel, and the remainder appear with considerable modification. The "woes" to the rich, and full, and merry, and honoured among men, are added. The disjointed portions which Luke gives from the remainder of the discourse are arranged differently, and the fine logical connection of the whole as it stands in Matthew is in great part destroyed. In the healing of the centurion's servant, Matthew's Gospel represents the officer as going himself to Jesus; but in Luke the request, consistently with the noble modesty displayed through the whole scene, is made through the elders of the Jews.

Again, the grand sequence displayed in the account and discourse, commencing with the message from the imprisoned Baptist respecting the actual Messiahship of Jesus, is entirely lost in Luke, who only gives the Lord's words respecting John, and the parable of the wilful children in the market-place. The same is the case with the succession of parables following that of the sower; several are omitted by Mark, all save the first by Luke, while Matthew's account is nearly yet not quite complete. But, however, these latter are not actually discrepancies in fact, though they may truly be called such in *thought*, as a somewhat different aspect is given to the various passages by the difference in their setting.

From Matthew we learn that there were two demoniacs in the country of the Gadarenes, or Gergesenes, while Mark and Luke speak only of one, and their accounts are so clear and circumstantial as to give the strong impression that they have omitted no point of prominence or importance. In this case an explanation is easy, as the plurality of the demons might readily lead to the introduction in the writer's mind of an idea of plurality in the persons also. Quite possibly the difference is due merely to inattention on the part of an early copyist, whose thoughts were unintentionally swayed by the predominant idea of plurality.

The difference between John's Gospel on the one hand, and the accounts of Matthew and Mark on the other, respecting the depar-

ture of the people after the feeding of the five thousand and before the walking on the water, is considerable. John represents Jesus as escaping from the multitudes, who wished by force to make Him king, and; they imply that He sent them peaceably away, and then quietly Himself departed for prayer into the mountain solitude. The lesson upon true greatness from a little child is represented by Matthew as originating in a question put by the disciples to Jesus; by Mark in a dispute among themselves, which they were ashamed to acknowledge when He inquired of them about it. Luke agrees rather with the latter, but says nothing of the question or the silence.

Matthew makes the scribe and another disciple offer to follow Jesus at Capernaum before stilling the storm and healing the Gadarene demoniac; Luke represents the incident as occurring on the last journey to Jerusalem, after the Samaritan villagers had refused their hospitality. According to Matthew and Luke the distinct declaration as to the sin of divorce is made to the Pharisees themselves; but according to Mark, privately to the disciples. Matthew tells us that the disciples did ask some further questions, evidently arising out of the previous public declaration, and these questions Mark does not notice, so that he has almost certainly given the wrong portion of the Teacher's words as those addressed to His immediate followers. The anointing at Bethany is narrated by Matthew, Mark, and John; Matthew and Mark name an alabaster box of ointment, John a pound; the former two speak of the anointing as upon the head; the latter, as if by a measure of confusion with the earlier anointing narrated by Luke, speaks of it as being upon the feet, which Mary wiped afterwards with her hair. The question of the scribe who spoke discreetly, to the evident pleasure of Jesus, as we see in Mark, is by Matthew represented as put maliciously—"tempting Him." Also, Luke's notice of this questioning is confined to the scribe's approval of the answer which Jesus had given him, and appears as if spoken by several after hearing the words of Jesus respecting marriage and the resurrection. A comparison with Mark will show the true reference. In the account of the Last Supper, Matthew and Mark represent each of the disciples as inquiring of Jesus if he would be the traitor. Luke says that they inquired among themselves. John says that they looked upon one another, but did not speak, until the disciple whom Jesus loved (being in fact himself) asked, "Lord, who is it?" Then Jesus indicated that it was Judas. In Matthew's account Judas had asked the question, and was answered directly, without reservation or hesitation.

Passing over slight differences in the accounts of the prediction and fact of Peter's denial, and of the betrayal—also of the death of Judas, hereafter to be noticed—we come to the histories of the crucifixion, resurrection, and ascension. In Matthew the stupefying potion offered to Jesus before the actual commencement of His execution is described as vinegar mingled with gall; in Mark,

as wine mingled with myrrh. According to Mark and Matthew the two malefactors joined in the mockery of the soldiers and people; but in Luke we find that one mocked, and the other sympathized with, defended, and learned to love and trust the dying Redeemer.

Mark makes it appear that Mary Magdalene and the other women were so afraid after what they had seen and heard at the sepulchre, that they shunned it with haste, and told no one what had occurred. This is, of course, contrary to the other three writers, and gives the impression that the women disobeyed, in their alarm, the injunctions of the angel, until Mary had actually herself seen the risen Lord. From Matthew we should at once suppose that the ascension took place in Galilee; or rather, should not know that it occurred at all. Mark assigns no place, but narrates it continuously with the events at Jerusalem. Luke alone localises it at the Mount of Olives, after Jesus had led the disciples as far as Bethany.

Two remarks must here be added. The first is, that incidents and teachings omitted by any one of the first three evangelists, frequently appear in somewhat similar form in a totally different connection, so as to give a tolerable ground (though one I cannot myself take, believing that facts almost if not always point strongly the other way,) for supposing that they actually relate to the same, though the accounts have been greatly distorted and misplaced. For instance, the anointing at Bethany is recorded by Matthew, Mark, and John; that by the woman who was a sinner only by Luke; and John's account offers a point of union between the two, inasmuch as he (unless the fault lies with careless early copyists) erroneously states that the feet of Jesus were anointed by Mary.

The Lord's Prayer is given in one place by Matthew; in a totally different one by Luke, and with some trifling variations. The denunciation of Chorazin and the other cities is thus made to have been uttered twice. The same is the case with the lamentation over Jerusalem, detailed by Matthew and Luke, but shown to be different from the weeping over the city, inasmuch as it also is recorded by the latter. In like manner, the account of the feeding of the four thousand might have been considered as a version of the true narrative of the feeding of the five thousand, but both are shown to be correct, inasmuch as both appear fully described in Matthew and Mark. Many of the parables, and important passages of our Lord's other teachings, are given in different places by Matthew and Luke. I believe that most, though perhaps not all, were actually repeated twice; that they do not, in consequence appear twice is due to the educational purpose for which the histories were written, the thought of a complete biography not having been entertained, or at any rate its production not attempted. But the mention of this possibility of further alteration and displacement was needful to the fair presentation of the whole facts with which our inquiry is concerned.

This applies also to the second remark, that in pursuing the parallelism of Christ's discourses we find parts of them wanting (as I consider), even to the fullest account, say that of Matthew, supplied from a meagre and disjointed abstract, such as we sometimes find in Luke. For instance, Matthew, Mark, and Luke give the words of Christ respecting the sin of divorcement. Matthew and Mark agree closely, but Luke omits the first four verses in their accounts, which are followed by the express condemnation of the practice. He gives that condemnation likewise; but instead of the four verses which precede it in Matthew and Mark, he has three of his own. In my view, these should be inserted between the four others and the conclusion, and the seven together form the complete representation of the Lord's words. But it may be otherwise, and these three be really the representatives of the other four, altered in the course of their transmission to Luke, and now showing very little trace of their originals. The cases in which this is possible are exceedingly few.

The total amount of discrepancy between the two, or more, accounts which we have of a large portion of the life and precepts of Jesus Christ is singularly small (although by no means every instance of it has been quoted), when we take into account the great number of minute facts which have thus been recorded—several, at least, with each incident of the sacred story. But is this comparative freedom from contradiction evidence of a more than human memory, and mind active in the preparation and unification of these various records? I think not. On the principle before urged, a Divine Mind would have all the facts before it in their exactness, and, in a straightforward account, presenting to man the important and striking facts connected with the life of the Saviour, central ideas rather than accidental side-circumstances, as I may call them, would be presented. In the account of the death of Judas, for instance, no truly intelligent mind wishing to present the actual cause, would choose such a non-essential matter as Luke has done, upon the harmonizing theory which, by sheer force, as it were, brings together the opposite accounts of Matthew and Luke, by the supposition that the traitor hung himself over a precipice, and that the body afterwards fell headlong over the rocks, as the latter describes. The only honest explanation, it seems to me, is to be found in the admission that two distinct traditions of the event had gone abroad, and that each has found place in the Gospels. If the human mind would not thus choose extraneous instead of leading and significant facts, it may be safely assumed that a Divine Intelligence would not do so. If it could, an actual choice, from its definite infallible knowledge of mystifying circumstances, must have been made and communicated to the mind of Luke for the perplexing of inquirers into historical consistency and the nature of inspiration. In other words, provision has, with full consciousness, been made to lead men astray in their search for indications of the Divine Mind in these histories.

In our inquiries thus far, then, we have found such a measure of disagreement, or lack of harmony, between the four Gospels as effectually to overthrow, and perhaps even destroy, the common theory of a verbal inspiration; it certainly precludes the complete substantiation of, the more limited hypothesis of an inspiration as to their intellectual form, and the selection of the incidents and particulars which they record. But certainly the agreement is already seen to be such as at least to prove that the narrators were honest and sympathetic men, very unwilling to obtrude any mention of themselves, with thoughts wholly absorbed in the teachings and character of their Great Master, telling His history as it struck them and in such a manner as they were able. This naturally includes that they would, as men of ordinary intelligence, be somewhat influenced in what they wrote by the position of their intended readers, and the particular purpose which they had in view.

4. But how far do the Gospels agree in their presentation of the Person whom they set forth?

Matthew begins the history of Jesus with the assertion of His superhuman birth, and an account of some of the celestial testimonies which accompanied it. These are connected with the ancient prophecies by the assertion that the Holy Child was born at Bethlehem; and yet, through the treacherous intentions of Herod and the fear inspired by the character of Archelaus, became a denizen of Nazareth, and was called a Nazarene. The mission of the forerunner, the consecrating baptism, with its new witness from heaven, the temptation, the miraculous works, the teachings, the appointment of apostles, the institution of a permanent rite in His own remembrance as a bond of union between His followers and a quickener of their affection towards Himself, the betrayal, the condemnation, the crucifixion, and death, the witness of creation, and the triumphant resurrection, constitute, together with the grand all-embracing commission to the disciples, the continuation and completion of a life altogether in harmony with the elevation and glory of its divine beginning.

Mark says nothing of the higher origin of Jesus, but he connects Him with the forerunner, and is careful to record the descent of the Holy Spirit and the Father's accompanying words of approbation. The temptation, the missionary labours, the precepts, and exhortations, the miracles, the choice of special companions for present instruction and future work, the ordination of the Lord's supper, the betrayal, sentence, sufferings, and death, the supernatural darkness, the resurrection, the final charge to His followers, and (what Matthew does not mention) the ascension into heaven, form an harmonious and ascending series, which fully corresponds with that of Matthew.

Luke records the miraculous birth of John as well as that of Jesus, and the supernatural witnesses by which each was accompanied and emphasized; and likewise gives an account of the

teachings, works, life, death, resurrection, and ascension of the Lord, which wholly agrees in character with that of Mark.

In the Gospel by John, written most probably with a knowledge of the other three, we should certainly not expect to find much parallelism with them, but rather new matter; yet, in many instances, it exists, and in the character portrayed, and in the Saviour's words and works, sufferings, death, and resurrection, the figure is evidently copied with fidelity from the same original.

But a difference in the representation of the Lord's movements and teachings has been supposed to exist between the four narratives. A pause for examination into these will be of use.

As to the movements of Jesus with regard to locality, following the best parallelism I have been able with honesty to construct, the following outline may be presented. The baptism and departure into the wilderness are found in Matthew, Mark, and Luke; the departure into Galilee, through Cana to Capernaum, in John alone; the return to Galilee, and the preaching circuit there, in the four—Luke only giving the incidents at Nazareth, John only that at Cana, Matthew and Luke only mentioning the residence at Capernaum, though Mark evidently implies it. The same circuit is again referred to in Matthew, Mark, and Luke, and fresh incidents are given. The departure into a desert place is mentioned by the same, Matthew alone indicating that it was by sea. Matthew and Mark speak of the return to Capernaum, which is also implied by Luke. The visit to Jerusalem, during which the healing at Bethesda took place, is named by John, and the incidents of the disciples gathering corn upon the Sabbath, and Jesus restoring the paralytic hand, as given by the other three, are probably to be placed under it both chronologically and locally. The withdrawal to the sea (of Galilee), the departure into the mountain upon which the great sermon was delivered, and the return to Capernaum, are included in Matthew, Mark, and Luke. A visit to Nain is shown in Luke; another circuit in Matthew and Luke; a return to Capernaum is next implied, not definitely expressed, in the three Gospels; the departure by sea to the country of the Gadarenes, in the same; the return thence is distinctly mentioned by Mark and Luke, and understood from Matthew. The latter writer again names the circuit of which the foregoing is intended as a part, and a renewed visit to Nazareth is indicated by him, and also by Mark, while in Luke it is plainly to be presumed. After the sending forth of the twelve disciples, recorded by the three, a renewed journey through the cities on the part of Jesus himself is recorded by Matthew. Another crossing of the sea is named by Matthew, Mark, and John, and implied in Luke, and the return in the first-named three. A journey to the neighbourhood of Tyre and Sidon is next set down in Matthew and Mark, as also is the return through Decapolis to the sea of Galilee. The next notice is in Matthew and Mark, of a visit by ship to

Magdala, or Dalmanutha; and again a departure to the side from which the company had started. The same two record a visit to Bethsaida, and the town of Cæsarea Philippi; and after that they and Luke name the departure to the Mount of Transfiguration. The return to whence they had started for the mountain, and a temporary sojourn in Galilee, are indicated in Matthew and Mark, who also mention another visit to Capernaum. John's account corresponds so far as regards Galilee; but as he does not give the words of Jesus at Capernaum, that city is not separately distinguished. Luke and John then join in indicating a journey to Jerusalem, which Luke shows to have been through the midst of Galilee and Samaria; thence to Bethany and the Mount of Olives is recorded by Luke; then to Bethabara and back to Bethany, and to the "city called Ephraim," by John. A number of unlocalized teachings and works then intervene in Matthew and Luke; but Matthew and Mark join in bringing the Lord to Judea beyond Jordan; and harmonize with Luke, who states that He came through cities and villages, teaching, and journeying to Jerusalem. Matthew, Mark, and Luke again mention the going up to the holy city, and the passing through Jericho upon the way. Bethany comes next, noted by Matthew, Mark, and John; then Bethphage and the Mount of Olives by Matthew, Mark, and Luke; and finally, the entrance into Jerusalem, distinctly recorded by the whole four.*

How do the four books agree as to the works and teachings of Christ?

By each of the four historians Jesus is represented, fully and clearly, as possessed of and exercising a supernatural power over the entire domain of natural forces, and over the physical and mental nature of man. All unite in narrating instances of His raising the actually dead to life, and the fact of His own resurrection. The stilling of the storm upon the sea of Galilee is given by Matthew, Mark, and Luke, and the incident of His walking upon the water by Matthew, Mark, and John. The feeding of the five thousand has been set down by the four—also the giving of sight to the blind. The control over fever, leprosy, palsy, and other infirmities is repeatedly asserted by Matthew, Mark, and Luke. The mysterious appearances to the disciples are mentioned by Luke and John. The authority exercised over demons, and their being cast out of the bodies and from the minds of the possessed, have been amply witnessed to by Matthew, Mark, and Luke.

And just as they harmonize in setting Jesus forth as possessed

* The foregoing will show how utterly wide of the fact is R. N.'s assertion of an "active, restless, peregrinatory, bustling" Christ being characteristic of Mark's Gospel. Matthew gives most movement, Luke next, then Mark, and John least. In Matthew and Luke this is hidden to a cursory glance (such as the "higher criticism" too often contents itself with), by the much larger proportion of other matter!

of a Divine power, they also unite in showing Him as a divine Teacher, manifestly speaking with authority, and from a far higher than human plane of knowledge and understanding. In each of the four writings He is shown to claim a special relationship to God, while in John's this is emphasized into unity and equality. In the four He accepts the acknowledgment by the disciples and others of His peculiar Sonship to the Almighty, and repeatedly asserts it Himself. In Matthew, Mark, and Luke, He distinctly exercises the prerogative of the divine Ruler in forgiving sin—or at least in pronouncing it to be forgiven; and this is likewise fully implied in the teachings which John reiterates of eternal life and blessedness to be found in Him alone. The purpose for which He came into the world, to seek and to save the lost, and the fulness and freeness of His invitations, are prominent in each. So are also the transcendent importance of the life to come, and the comparative inferiority of the present. The need for salvation—entrance into the kingdom of heaven being necessary for all—is strongly implied; and Matthew, Mark, and Luke show the great Teacher as emphatically proclaiming repentance and sincerity of purpose to be pure and holy as the means of preparation for that kingdom. John does not mention repentance, but presents Jesus as insisting upon a spiritual birth from above and belief in Himself as the requisites for eternal life; while He insists upon proof of the reality of these by corresponding works. As already stated, John enters more into the spirit of man, or rather represents the Lord as doing so, than into exterior conduct; for the latter, after all, is but the product of the former. And as this apostle wrote in all probability with the other three Gospels before him, we need not seek for any uniformity of actual teachings between what he records and the accounts given by the others. But against the practical part of the teachings recorded by Matthew, Mark, and Luke, may at once be set the repeated exhortations to loving obedience, through perfect union in spirit with Christ and God, of which the beloved disciple's history is replete.

A full enumeration or even outline of the parallelism of teaching between the four Gospels must not now be given, but only the result. We find that, notwithstanding some diversity—which is very great—in the case of John's Gospel—between the four narratives with regard to the actual teachings and works recorded, there is none as to their spirit, and none as to the Person whom each endeavours to represent. He was evidently historical for a being so lifted above humanity, and yet so truly human; so symmetrical and complete, so simply and gloriously God-like; teaching, too, a doctrine harmonious, perfect, grand, as His own nature, such as fully meets man's wants, coincides in every particular with the requirements and experiences of man's mind and heart, giving that doctrine shape in a plan of action and organization of influence completely adapted to and continuous with all the principles which moral and intellectual science have shown to govern the phenomena

of individual and collective life,* so far as these are met and affected by the penetrating and diffusive influence of religion upon the spiritual, mental, and physical nature of man:—for a being like that we have presented in these narratives is beyond the power even of genius to conceive, and much more to picture with the inimitable simplicity and unconsciousness of self which characterize the writings of the Evangelists. Either there must have been one historical, actually existing Christ, or there must have been four Christs, whom the world knew little or nothing of, to draw the fourfold picture of the perfect ideal of superhuman knowledge, dignity, and love which we have learned to adore and follow as the Christ of God.

Some alleged points of contradiction must not, however, be passed without notice.

The anti-ceremonialism and anti-sabbatarianism of Jesus, even in Matthew's portraiture, is—if anything, more there than elsewhere—so strongly pronounced and intelligently based as at once to show that He was lifted far above all merely Jewish prejudices and modes of thought. Hatred to the Pharisees has often been quoted as a leading attribute of the Christ of the first Gospel. It is quite true that this represents the great Teacher as again and again returning to the subject of their hypocrisy and traditionalism, and often denouncing them in terms of the strongest reprobation. But this is not peculiar to Matthew. Luke gives almost as many such passages as Matthew and Mark is not far short of Luke in this respect. Five, eight, and ten may be taken as their approximate proportions, and these numbers also roughly represent the different degrees in which the same writers record the sayings and discourses of the Lord. Again, Matthew is speaking directly to the Jews, and the prominence given to this aspect of Christ's teachings in his pages is but natural, seeing that they were brought into continual communication in their daily life with the pretensions and self-righteous, and often basely-hypocritical, religiousness of these leaders of the people. Also, something of the kind might fairly have been expected in Matthew, for, as a "publican," his early experience of Pharisaic contempt and hatred was in all probability a bitter one. And since a hollow ceremonialism and traditionalism are, after hypocrisy, the most deadly enemies to spiritual life, it is not to be wondered at, but rather to be looked for, that Christ's wisdom, and love of virtue and of the souls of men, led Him to denounce them so strongly, both in the abstract and in the persons who manifested them most prominently and dangerously before His hearers.

In seeking for corresponding passages in John's Gospel we see—that the character assigned to the Pharisees therein is exactly such as they bear in the other histories, fitted to call forth all the indig-

* "Ecce Homo" is, in my opinion, a magnificent development of this and the foregoing ideas, and as such, a worthy addition to the great works of Christian apologetics.

nation of One who knew that sincerity and spirituality were the only bases of true worth and worship. He has not, however, recorded the rebukes administered to these professed religionists—probably because they were already known through the other three narratives, and also because of his peculiar selection of the passages of keen censure addressed to the Jews in general, for the sin of unbelief, which is the root of all hypocrisy, and which led them ignorantly to cling to the mere traditional observance of the law.

Against the supposed splenetic, vituperative Censor of the first Gospel is set the gentle loving Shepherd of the last, and they are held to be historically irreconcilable. But the Censor spoke the inimitable words of invitation, unsurpassed by any which John has recorded, "Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest." His lips uttered the "Love your enemies, bless them that curse you," which, with his own character and example, are transforming the world. It was He who wept over the foreseen doom of the holy city, who blessed the little ones, "for of such is the kingdom of heaven," who cried in bitter grief, "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem." And the Christ of John's Gospel, all gentleness and mercy, could hold many and sharp disputations with the Jews, speaking plainly to them, denouncing their unbelief, and uttering their condemnation: "Ye are of your father the devil;" "Ye believe not, because ye are not of my sheep;" "Ye therefore hear not, because ye are not of God;" "Ye shall seek me, and shall die in your sins." It is quite true, however, that the gentleness and compassion largely predominate in John's Gospel. This may be explained fully, even of the Christ of Matthew, inasmuch as it was John's purpose to present, at the later period when he wrote, the higher principles and deeper expositions of divine truth which the Lord had uttered. He strikes more deeply at the roots of sin and unbelief, in the public words which He records; but his chief additions consist of Christ's private instructions to individuals, and to the disciples, in which patience, fulness, knowledge, and love are strongly and divinely manifest. In fact, the two attributes—of meekness and tenderness on the one hand, and capacity for stern indignation on the other—are needful to a complete and God-like nature, and if one were absent the Christ would be imperfect and unreal. But if a special character could be attributed to each of the Evangelists it would be powerless to destroy their historical veracity, or our belief in the actual existence of the One original, because the Divine Being upon whom they gazed must of necessity be many-sided in His greatness and beyond the full comprehension of the narrow faculties of man. An observer can only take particular note of—or rather, will only be specially impressed by—that manifestation in another which most corresponds to or comes into contact with his own character. So if the denunciations in Matthew had been still more prominent, if the gentleness set forth by John had been

unbroken by a moment's indignation, the contrasted witness of the two could legitimately and intelligently be taken together as giving a truer record than one alone.

5. Does, then, this degree of harmony involve a special inspiration for the writers of the Gospel? On the face of it there is no necessity for this; but it will be well to examine into the differences which exist between the respective portraitures of Jesus Christ, and their connection with the purpose for which each Gospel was composed. This would, of course, be to institute again a comparison, the results of which have been already given, and which led us to the belief that a common human and almost capricious discretion had been allowed in the selection by each writer of the incidents and teachings narrated. Repetition is unnecessary, and but little addition can be made, for there are no features of our Lord's character which are peculiar to one or more of the Evangelists; but a complete outline is common to them all.* The setting and filling up are somewhat different, because of differences in the purposes of the respective histories; but no more can be said than this. Greater prominence is given to particular aspects by Matthew and John; by Matthew to the practical teaching, as bearing upon the purity and nobleness of life in the world; by John to the deeper teaching, which dealt with the inner being of man, the aspect of his soul towards God and Christ. Mark gives very little of one or the other, yet neither is wholly absent. He trusts to the winning and teaching power of the Lord's actions; his conduct towards those around him rather than to his words. Luke's account includes more of the hortative than Mark's, but not so much as those of Matthew or John. It has no special character of its own, though it adds much to the recorded words of Jesus. There is quite as much breadth and universality in the Christ of Matthew as in the Christ of Mark or Luke, and this notwithstanding the fact that Mark wrote for the Gentiles particularly, and Luke for the unrestricted church. This unlimited inclusiveness of love and purpose becomes more manifest in John; but it is in company with other great truths which, for comprehensible reasons, he alone of the four writers has presented fully.

As to the bearing of these variations, such as they are, upon the question of inspiration, it at once appears that there is no such adaptation of the mode in which the divine Son is presented to the

* R. N.'s hasty generalizations are shown by such a careful and detailed comparison as I have endeavoured to make, to possess no further value than their imaginative and epigrammatic cleverness. In addition to what is said in the text bearing upon his assertions, it may be here remarked that the force and terseness attributed to Mark's Gospel either do not exist or are shared with Matthew and Luke. It is the shortest Gospel, it is true, but this is the result of omission, not of condensation. In the narrative of any particular occurrence or discourse, which Mark has in common with Matthew or Luke, his account is usually *longest*, though often it is certain, more living, more full of action, than the others.

various sections of believers for whom the Gospels were originally written as to excite the thought of a higher than human judgment presiding over their arrangement and composition. On the other side, the matchless simplicity, the evident sympathy and understanding with which their authors wrote, their self suppression, their perfect impartiality towards each other and those around them, and the total absence of any attempt to exaggerate or show off the incidents, however majestic and important, occurring in their narratives, tend to prove that we do not owe the Gospels to human agency alone.

While in the higher historical sense the Gospels fully harmonize, they fail to do so, as we have seen in many particulars, and so present contradictions which cannot be ascribed to the Divine mind. They show wide differences in their choice of facts for record, which indicate no plan upon which the selection has been made, except after the roughest kind, such as the commonest intelligence could not fail to form when even the least outline of a purpose had been conceived. And now we see that there is no such variation, and no such agreement as to indicate a divine mind directing their arrangement.

How are these two conclusions to be harmonized? There is an inspiration, but it is not *that*. It can be felt better than it can be defined. But it may be broadly indicated as that condition of the historians and apostles in which they were placed when the Holy Spirit had taught them to comprehend and enter into the nature of Christ and His work, brought their souls into direct harmony with His and with the Father's will, and enabled them, thereby, with the quiet steadfast enthusiasm of those who knew and followed the truth itself, to calmly and intelligently record what they knew for the edification and use of men around them; that these also might be brought to look upon the Divine Being portrayed with a clear comprehension of His character, purposes, and dignity, and His claims upon the love and allegiance of every heart. Its source was thus twofold: sympathy of spirit with the great and glorious plan of redemption, and perfect honesty and nobility of soul, given (to a degree removed in strength only, not in kind, from that in which these are imparted to all who seek them) by the enlightening and sanctifying Spirit; and adoring enthusiastic affection for the Divine Saviour whom they had known and followed upon earth, and now knew to be ascended into the heavens, and who would be ever present with them in all their labours and trials. John appears to have shared it most fully: to him seems given a deeper insight into spiritual truth and into the nature of Christ and God than is shown by any of the others, and perhaps by any New Testament writer except the great Apostle of the Gentiles.

Thus inspired with human memories, and powers, and imperfections, with human limitations of intelligence, tact, and culture, they wrote the four histories of the Lord; and the harmony of the separate representations of His unique character, and the reality

which breathes through all are such, that by a consideration of the imperfect nature of the *media* through which He is seen, our conceptions of the force and fulness of His influence, and our ideas of the striking glory of His life are immensely elevated and strengthened, and thus the foundations of our hope in Him as the ever-living and triumphant Saviour become increasingly more rational and sure.

The writer has hearty sympathy with the central conceptions of the evangelical interpretation of the truth, and feels it to be a solemn fact that only by union of the affections and will to Christ are oneness with the Divine Father, and true safety and happiness, possible to any soul; but to him at least these doctrines, and all his most cherished hopes, depend, not upon an assumed infallibility of the words of Scripture, or the supernatural veracity and origin of its narratives, but solely upon the historic fairness and truthfulness with which it presents the living picture of God manifest in the flesh, reconciling the world unto Himself, approved by happy experience of the rich grace with which the invitation and promise have been fulfilled to him—"Come unto Me, and I will give thee rest."

Oswestry.

W.

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

THE idea of a literal, actual, chronological, and theological harmony of the Gospels has probably never been entertained by any person possessed of the power of ordinary thought. Such an absolute joining together of passage with passage, and fitting in of phrase to phrase, such a collocation and collection of facts, acts, events, and sayings, would infallibly suggest collusion and combined deception. The Christian church has never taught anything like this. It has never gone farther than to declare that as to the purport of the whole, the utmost harmony prevailed among the Evangelists; and that—in regard to the main elements of gospel faith—the eternal Sonship, earthly birth, holy life, beneficent activity, sympathetic character, exemplary dutifulness, sacrificial death, glorious resurrection, celestial ascension, and the matchless doctrines of the Lord Jesus Christ; the Scriptures contributed to mankind a record which possessed all the requisite harmony which characterises trustworthy evidence. That these should fit in link to link and particle to particle is a foolish demand, and to propose to affirm that such a harmony as that existed among, and was traceable in, the Gospels is only to lay open to attack the unassailable arsenal of the Church. That they form an existent whole and a consistent whole is all that is meant by the harmony of the Gospels.

We possess a harmony of the Gospels such as any one may make easily for himself by purchasing two copies of the Gospels like these which are issued by the "Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge." On becoming possessed of these we took a blank book, and ruling it with two columns on the left for notes of Time and

Place, we arranged columns for each of the four Evangelists in order; and on the right margin left a wide space for annotating remarks and jottings upon coincidences with the sacred narrative in secular history. This being done, the Gospels were cut up in sections, and the several verses of each Evangelist bearing on the several topics as they arose, were pasted into the columns allotted to each author.

Section I. is *prefatory*—till the ministry of John.

II. Christ's childhood and youth—till his baptism.

III. The ministry of Christ till John's death.

IV. The Lord's ministry till the institution of His memorial ordinance—the Eucharist.

V. Our Lord's betrayal, trial, and passion.

VI. The resurrection of Jesus, and His appearances to His disciples.

VII. *Sabbatic*.—The ascension of Christ, and the mission of His apostles as the Church.

When this *Consensus* of evidence is read, it leaves on the mind an impression of marvellous unity and completeness such as few could imagine who have not absolutely put the matter to the proof.

I feel convinced that if R. N. were to set himself earnestly and perseveringly to the maturing of such a *diatessaron*, he would find his scruples quite vanish and forsake him. It is the cursory and disjointed chapter by chapter perusal of the Gospels that causes so many to imagine that it wants consecutiveness and harmony; indeed, if R. N. would think of it, he would see in this one fact that that book has been exposed to a style of division and perusal, which would destroy the efficacy and associative unity of any book, and entirely prevent it from being understood, a great evidence of the Divineness of the Scriptures.

But we have not to argue the question of the inspiration and the immutability of the Gospels; we have only to direct attention to the one practical matter, Can the Gospels be harmonized? and in the favour of the affirmative of that debate, we have a very effective presumption in the continued faith that they are capable of essential harmony, which has been maintained by the Church militant, and the possibility is farther enhanced by the many successful endeavours to realize it, made by many earnest believers. It may be true that the authors of these differ in minute points one with another, but R. N. must be shrewd enough to see that the differences of the harmonists are not Gospel differences.

The subject has been discussed with so much reference to and mastery of detail, and the writers are so thoroughly agreed on the great main question that it is scarcely fair to either side to call the writers opponents. We have not claimed a precise, plenary, infallible, punctilious harmony, and they have not denied a large amount of impressive similarity, and such a consent of material as may justly be held to admit the main question in the affirmative.

In regard to religious debates, we should constantly remember

that reasoning neither destroys nor creates facts; it only changes ideas, so that the conclusions we arrive at in regard to them are only effective in us, not on the Gospels, no matter what we decide. It is well, however, to note that in the whole progress of this debate it appears that only in dates, numbers, relative incidents, and minute circumstances, is there any pointedly asserted discrepancy. In considering these things, thinkers ought always to remember that interpretation is one half of history, and that in every interpretation there are two factors—the thing interpreted, and the person interpreting. One of these we know to be liable to mistake and fallibility, to precipitancy and presumption, and, hence, we ought to be careful that we do not throw the fault of the observer on the thing observed.

In reading the Scriptures and attempting to harmonize them we ought to remember the signal brevity of the narratives, and the full conception of the character and work of Jesus, which they have communicated to the Church, and we ought to refrain from hastily assuming that whatever we cannot explain to ourselves must be inconsistent or contradictory in itself—*possibly* the fault may be more in us than in the Gospels. As the designs of the several Gospels differ from each other, it is presumable that this should cause a seeming want of harmony to a superficial reader; but this may often on examination be found to afford higher evidence of harmony, when properly understood. Some people are apt to think that somewhat similar events are the same, and to call all their differences inconsistencies, and that things which have been related for one purpose by one Evangelist, and by another for a different purpose, because the mode of presentation is slightly different, there is a discrepancy in the narratives and between the writers. These are obviously fallacies in our minds, not errors in the Gospels. On the fullest examination, both by friends and foes, the Gospels have stood the test of criticism for nearly eighteen centuries, and we may therefore safely conclude that they may be harmonized.

A. S. P.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

WITHOUT being, in our own opinion at least, anything too egotistical, we believe we have good reason for thinking that our paper which has now been nearly ten months before them for criticism, has had scanty justice meted out to it by the writers on the opposite side. The late R. S. alone seems to have felt able to grapple with any of the points brought forward for review in my paper. Even his excellent article, however, can scarcely be regarded as a reply to my opposition, except by anticipation, as I am led to infer from the beautiful and touching pages appropriately dedicated to his memory in this serial from a pen whose writings are all precious to us; for he met his melancholy end only a few days after my paper had been issued. I cannot venture to combat his arguments for an Eirenicon between Scripture and Scepticism, not

only because of the fatal change which has "taken him up higher," but because I believe he has misconstrued the question, which was not one directly dealing with the inspiration of Scripture, but merely applying the critical faculty to the Gospels as they stand, inquiring, "Can the Gospels be harmonized? If this is settled in the affirmative, I concede that it will go far to strengthen the common idea of inspiration, though even then a difference might arise; but even if it were settled in the negative, the question of Inspiration would still avail—perhaps prevail.

On the two points which R. S. has taken up, which refer to matter contained in my paper, viz., these on (1) harmony of purpose, and (2) harmony of incident or narration, I am bound in honesty to admit that he has said some effective things, and shown a just conception of the critical difficulties which an inquiring spirit feels in regard to what must at least be called the seeming discrepancies of New Testament history. At the same time I feel that a certain amount of straining after reconciliation has been requisite, and that he speaks as a special pleader, but not at all as a consciously dishonest one—quite the reverse. He evidently had sincerely made up his mind in regard to these matters, and overruled his reason by his faith. I could well have wished that I could have made the admission to himself that he had cleared up one or two difficulties in my thoughts. He has, however, written as if the only persons who doubt that the Gospels can be harmonized are religious sceptics in the common, not the proper meaning of the term. This, however, is not the case, as may be shown by the single fact that a person who has "evidently had personal experience of the divine strength vouchsafed to prayer" has issued a very elaborate and interesting book, entitled, "If the Gospel Narratives are Mythical—What then?" the gist of which is to show that the facts of our spiritual nature would compel our acceptance of the moral philosophy of Christianity and of the divine faith it teaches, though we had no reason to believe in the supernatural history which our Gospels relate. The work, which is confessedly one of great beauty, accuracy, and earnestness of thought, and full of an intensely vivid force, may not meet the views of those who regard themselves as orthodox; but its publication proves that there are minds which can accept of Christianity and its teaching independently of the historic narrative at all; and therefore, that to treat opponents or advocates of the negative as Infidels, or impugnors of the faith, is wrong. I do not, for instance, believe that the "Gospels can be harmonized" so as to be construed in accordance with the canons of authentication which have been adopted in regard to civil history; but I may humbly claim to be, I hope, a believer in the Christ of the Gospels. Faith in him does not involve, in my opinion, necessitate, imply, require, or make imperative, a belief in the Evangelists as infallible, though it does call for the formation of some opinion on the trustworthiness of the Scripture witnesses. The application of the critical faculty to the examination of the

facts of the Gospel records, and their consistency and harmony one with another, suggests difficulties in connection with their historic accuracy which may or may not affect the theological faith of the crisis, and may only lead to the clearing up of these difficulties by proper consideration.

Inspiration need not imply infallibility; it need only lay claim to the power of originating certain desirable opinions, sentiments, and faiths. It need not necessarily imply exact and precise harmony; for it may be one of the aims of inspiration to accommodate itself to many minds. Besides absolute certainty, which (perhaps?) absolute harmony would produce, would not give room or scope for inquiry, or afford place for faith. I am of opinion that we err greatly in demanding explicit harmonies. It is not requisite that such close and literal interweavings of events and circumstances as to take in the very particles of connection as inspired elements in the sacred record as is sometimes done should be advocated. It is quite enough that, like all other historical records, the individual records should agree in giving the same general outline and living graphicness of character. To press for more is to press the Gospel into the service of infidelity. We have no fellow-feeling with those who disbelieve the Gospels because they cannot see that all mysteries are made plain in them. The demand for explanation made by Rationalism is quite as absurd as the assumption made by the hyper-orthodox that all the events, circumstances, elements, and parts of the Gospels must not only cohere, but be capable of being intertextured into a Christiad in which all the writings of the Evangelists shall be harmonized like the parts of a child's puzzle map.

I have read with pleasure and profit all the articles that have appeared on this topic, and am glad to see so much freedom of thought, tolerance of speech, and Christian courtesy in the carrying on of this debate; but the lengthy and able disquisition which W. has presented to the reader—the latter part of which I have, through the kindness of the editor, read in proof—puts the various views so succinctly and strongly before the reader, that I do not even take exception to one or two hits at me in his notes. I only take exception to his being called a neutral article. In my opinion it is the ablest contribution to our side of the question, for if discrepancies occur at all, the Gospels cannot be harmonized. But it is not right to fight merely for victory. Much has been gained when so large an amount of original investigation is set in operation as has been done by this instructive debate. D. S. writes with a good deal of critical sagacity and moderation, but he too ought to have been upon our side. S. S. deals harshly with his opponents in classing them as enemies of Christianity. As O. P. Q. has explained, the love of truth is, in reality, the love of Christ, who is the way, the truth, and the life; and yet S. S., like ourselves, only believes in, or at least advocates a substantial not a uniform and explicit harmony. Harmonized they may be

to faith and reason, but harmonized they cannot be by literists and conveyancers; could they be so, they would not exhibit the infinite wisdom of the Most High.

R. N.

DO THE SCRIPTURES FAVOUR OR OPPOSE THE IDEA OF THE NATURAL IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

"THE wages of sin is death;" and the declaration is emphatic and explicit,—*"the soul that sinneth it shall die."* It seems impossible that clearer expressions could be employed, or that more unequivocal language could be uttered. "All have sinned and come short of the glory of God," and "death has passed upon all men, for that all have sinned." These words cannot mean "eternal misery," for St. Paul assures us that the wicked "shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord" (2 Thess. i. 9).

The wages of sin—the preordained and appointed reward and result of sin—is death, dismissal from life, and "everlasting destruction." Destruction cannot be everlastingly inflicted, but being *once* inflicted on the *soul* it is eternal in its effects, results, and consequences,—conscious, personal being and existence will not be revouchsafed to those who have continued impenitently in sin—even in the hope that grace would abound. The unquenchable fire of God's wrath is an everlasting fire, but though its smoke is to go up for ever, it is not asserted or implied that the sufferers in that burning lake shall endure its torments for ever, for even Death is to be swallowed up in the victory of Christ; and hence, even if we were to grant that this second death of the soul did mean a being literally turned into a very and real lake of fire, even this fire of death must be swallowed up before all the enemies of Jesus can be put under Him, for even Death is to be destroyed.

A well-informed student of Scripture, S. S., has been misled upon this point, not by the statements of the Bible, but by the dogmatics of a theology which has been based on a misinterpretation of the texts relating to the subject of the future life. If S. S., unrestrained by his theological dogma of the soul's threefold death—(1) *temporal*, or being withdrawn from this life in time; (2) *spiritual*, or being cast off from the mercy of God; and (3) *eternal*, being exposed to the endless and relentless wrath of the Divine Being,—had read the passage he refers to in Isa. xxxiii. 14, he would have found his own question answered in his heart on the side of the debate we take. Isaiah's words are,—*"Who among us shall dwell with the devouring fire? Who among us shall dwell with everlasting burnings?"* This evidently implies that none can so dwell, remain, continue, abide, inhabit, or tarry, but that any one

placed in such circumstances must be, as the context has it, "as thorns cut up shall they be burned in the fire," and therefore speedily consumed. The duration of the fire of God's wrath and fiery indignation against sin is, as indeed it must be, everlasting, the powers which he has endowed with efficacy to destroy sin, whether worm or fire, exert themselves for ever, but neither the bodies nor the souls of those who sin can endure burning everlastingly; and everlasting punishment can no more mean a punishment continually renewed and never-ending, than eternal redemption can mean a redemption continually repeated, and everlastingly carried on.

S. S. unjustly affirms that, in Rev. xx. 10, it is declared of the wicked (of the human race) that they shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever. Those who are stated in this poetical book as about to be so tormented are the Devil, the False Prophet, and the Beast. In chapter xiv. 11, the succession of individuals rather than the individuals themselves seems meant. Unquenchable fire is fire that no power, except God's own, can extinguish; not fire which shall not and never can be quenched. In such a fire the wicked who are "chaff" and "tares" are consumed; for the wrath of God is that not of a tormenting but a consuming fire. Hence Jesus says (Matt. x. 28), "Fear not those which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear Him which is able to *destroy* both body and soul in hell;" "for he that soweth to his flesh, shall of his flesh reap corruption; but he that soweth to the Spirit, shall of the Spirit reap life everlasting," Gal. vi. 8. "When the wicked spring as grass," says the Psalmist, "it is that they shall be *destroyed for ever*" (Psa. xcii. 7). "All the wicked will He *destroy*" (Psa. cxlv. 20). Jeremiah only wishes that his foes may be "*destroyed with a double destruction*," (xvii. 18); he does not affirm that such a second death as he desires for them is possible, while St. Paul distinctly says that the wicked are "those who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of His power" (2 Thess. i. 9). Everlasting destruction cannot signify everlasting punishment in misery. The last enemy that shall be destroyed is Death as the wages of sin, and there shall be no more death because there shall be no more sin; but in the traditionary theory of a threefold death which S. S. advocates, Death cannot be destroyed, but it must be alive for ever, and that is a contradiction in terms.

Man is dead in sins with a spiritual death which keeps him from gaining the gift of God, eternal life, so long as he continues in impenitence and sin; but if he turns to God in penitence and faith, seeking true righteousness, he is made alive again from the death of sin; and then, though death assail the body, it cannot assail the soul, for God has implanted a new spirit in man, and has renewed the life which was taken away from man because of sin's entrance into the world. On receiving this gift of the Holy Ghost, Death is swallowed up in victory, and to him who overcometh the Death

of sin Christ will give the crown of life; for, according to the plan of salvation, "if one died for all, then were all dead." We see from this that the opinion of S. S. is not consistent with Reason or Scripture, and that he is mistaken in maintaining that the Scriptures assert or even imply that the soul of man is now naturally immortal.

D. U. M. enters into a long philological and philosophical debate about the threefold nature of man, which seems to me just about as hypothetical as S. S.'s theory of threefold death. I am no adept in Hebrew lore, and know only the things most surely believed among men as gospel through the faithful rendering, as it is reported to be, of the authorized version. I do not think it can have been intended to be essential to the salvation of the souls of men that they should all know minute and critical points in Hebrew and Greek lore. If such is the gospel of D. U. M. it is not that which Deity has defined to be so plain that he who runs may read, and reading may understand. Nice points there may be, nay, nice points there must be, or the gospel could not be the word of the infinite wisdom of the infinite God; but these, though they may add confirmation to the plain doctrines and straightforward statements of Holy Writ, cannot be deemed essential to man's salvation. Not only from inability to follow him into the intricate realms of Hebrew scholarship—a fellow-reader of the *British Controversialist* profanely criticised the passage on p. 287 by saying, "Ah! D. U. M. is playing on the Jews' harp,"—but from my inability to feel the force of his argument on the point, I cannot controvert the statements of D. U. M., but I think I am warranted by the express statements of Scripture to say that Death has become the natural fate of man; that as all have sinned they cannot now possess or enjoy everlasting life by nature, but only of grace. That Jesus died in order that those who, through faith and patience did or endeavoured to do the works of righteousness, might inherit the promise of life through Him. By Him not only life but immortality are brought to light in the gospel. That the cause of rejoicing which the believer has is that he has life in and through Christ communicated to him; while the terror that the ungodly man lies under—as those who by the fear of Death are all their lifetime kept in bondage,—is the loss of that life,—not of present delight in sin, but of any delight at all which overhangs them. They barter for the pleasures of sin and sense an eternity of bliss, while the righteous receive in exchange for the self-denial of faith a conscience at peace and void of offence during life here, and hereafter a far more exceeding even an eternal weight of glory,—life for ever in Christ, and by His gift in whom the fulness of all perfection dwells.

P. W. B.

Politics.

OUGHT WE NOW TO HAVE THE BALLOT?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

SEEING that, though called into the field by general order of our Commander-in-Chief of the Forces, the leader of our van, G. M. S., has been unable to put in an appearance, I have been applied to *in extremis* to review the contest, and to say the closing words on the affirmative side of this great argument.

I begin by admitting that O. N. U. S. has made a great hit, argumentatively in the *burden* of his objection that the time-element has been too much left out of consideration in the debate. But I would remark on his first thesis (p. 360), that it is entirely to secure the practical advantages of reform that the ballot is wanted *now*. We have the *gift* of the franchise, but we have not the *use* of it now; to the *second*, that we cannot now press financial reform for want of the ballot, because those who are interested in withholding financial or any other reform keep the ballot from us that they may coerce such votes as may work in their favour, and so wound us with our own weapon; to his *third*, the law has been found to favour our opponents, not to aid us; to his *fourth*, education has not made the bribers and corrupters honest,—how then can we escape from their oppressions but by the ballot *at present*; to his *fifth*, the press *forms* public opinion, and it does not enable us to *express by vote* the opinion formed which the ballot would; to his *sixth*, the bribery law does not *prevent* the act, but only threatens to punish it when so clumsily done as to be discovered and proved; to his *seventh*, the law is all on the side of the force of bribery (unless it be proved), but all against the force of the mob, so that the “screw” is available effectively to the former only, not to the latter.

Against A. J. G.’s reign of suspicion, we would place the actual state of deception and dodging; and we affirm that no state that can be imagined under the full play of the ballot is equal in vile-ness to that which exists without it.

J. S. M. has an excellent theory of voting; but can he get it put into proper working order? Can we get it declared to be high or even petty treason to tamper with votes?

I shall not retire from the front, and bring forward a young lieutenant who has not yet got trying his sword in this action, and whom our commander commends to my consideration. I am sorry, however, that I am not at liberty, through conditions of disposable space assigned to me in my ground plan, to bring all his forces

into the action; but E. E. shall display his mettle in the fray in a worthy manner, notwithstanding:—

I shall confine myself chiefly to the objections of S. S.

If S. S. had succeeded in proving all the points contained in his opening paragraph he would have established the negative, but in that I think he has failed; for, firstly, he seems to imagine that the advocates of the ballot expect it to accomplish all that they could wish, while they expect only that it will be a *great improvement* on the present system, notwithstanding the minor disadvantages which may accompany it.

The quotation from Sidney Smith is full of assumptions, which doubtless look well upon paper, but at the same time will not bear the test, as far as the working classes are concerned, and *they* are the people who *chiefly* require the protection of the ballot. It is said that "the concealed democrat who voted against his landlord must talk to the wrong people, subscribe to the wrong club, huzza at the wrong dinner, break the wrong head, and lead a long life of lies between every election."

Now, those landlords who do not scruple to eviscerate their tenants care very little, if anything, as a rule, what the political opinions of their tenants may be; all they want is the vote. I should here like to ask which is the greatest crime, for a man to vote against his conscience or to vote contrary to his professions? The latter is urged against us as one of the inevitable evils of the ballot system. The argument, then, that the man who votes against his landlord "must always be talking to the wrong people" may hold good in *some* cases, but not in the majority.

There is no doubt some truth in the quotation, but I think the author has struck his key-note too high; he refers mostly to *imaginary* evils, and all great questions which have been brought before the country have met with the same kind of opposition—they were all to result in the destruction of the Constitution.

S. S. seems to think that the man who carries on bribery at elections would be foolish enough to bribe a voter on his simple promise, while, at the same time, he could have no possible guarantee that the man would record his vote according to his promise; this argument, again, is a mere *assumption*; experience tells us that very few men, if any, would act so foolishly.

Personal canvassing by party agents is certainly not desirable; I can therefore assure S. S. that I should be glad to see the end of it, and I believe the majority of the advocates of the ballot also disapprove of it.

"The ballot is unnecessary," says S. S., "because a genuine Englishman does not need or desire it for his protection." That word "genuine" is admirably fitted in to serve a purpose, but it is a pity he did not give us a definition of the term, in order that we might comprehend his meaning. If it is meant that a "genuine Englishman" is one who is entirely independent of everybody else for his support, of course such a man would not desire the protection of the ballot for himself, but how many (if any) English working men and tradesmen are there who are in such a position?

Where has the cry for the ballot come from but from the people? S. S. thinks that the ballot is not desirable "because there is greatly needed a reverence for public opinion, strong enough to keep all persons of every class and position from daring to interfere with its development, in the fullest, freest, and most honourable way." In reply to this I must remind

my friend that nothing but the love of God in the heart will keep every class in its proper position, and that we shall ~~never~~ find public opinion strong enough to effect that which he desires, and supposing it may eventually have such influence in society, how long are we to wait for such a state of things? It has, moreover, not yet been shown to us wherein the ballot *does* discourage the reverence for public opinion, and until S. S. produces facts to prove his assertion, we must condemn his argument as futile. If we are not to have the ballot, and if we are to wait until the influence of public opinion shall become irresistible, then the only alternative we have is to content ourselves with living all our days in the midst of corruption; but this we do not mean to do.

S. S., while quoting the remarks of Sidney Smith, evidently endorses his opinions in this respect, and as the quotation is an unmeasured attack on the *secrecy* of the ballot system, it seems that S. S. towards the close of his article has fallen into a net of his own manufacture; he says that the ballot "would enable voters of a certain character to indulge revenge or some personal pique *without its being known to others*," thus establishing beyond doubt the *secrecy* of our system. "Opportunities for doing evil," continues our friend, "are the occasions of temptation to do evil." I cannot see the force of this argument, and even if I could, the ballot could not afford any "opportunities for doing evil;" it simply enables a man to record his vote unobserved, and what evil is there in that? I contend in opposition to S. S. that the ballot would *not* be "injurious to the morals of the people," and that it would not afford the "temptation to gratify selfishness, malice, rivalry, prejudice, and other evils," which he seems to think it would.

As to the objection that "the ballot would be to a great extent an abolition of manliness and of the sense of personal honesty," I remark, Do not the people of England ask for this protection in order that they may be able to give an *honest* vote? How then can it be said that it would destroy the sense of personal honesty?

I have already admitted that the system of voting by ballot is not without its disadvantages; but, at the same time, I can see very clearly that the advantages arising therefrom would far exceed the disadvantages; therefore, I say, let us have it by all means, and if at all, why not now? R. E.

I think upon the whole that is fair and able fighting, and with only a few remarks this question may be closed.

That the present Parliament contains so few changes in class proves that freedom of voting has not been co-extensive with the widening of the franchise; while the fact that in many places where liberal opinions are known to abound, Conservatives have been returned, proves the same fact. Again, the courts established for the regulation of elections have not proved proper safeguards. They have only given new developments to electioneering trickery. It is essential that the ballot should be tried to make bribery a profitless waste of money; still more, to make intimidation impossible the ballot is necessary; and still more necessary now, when we see that through the power of wealth and territorial influence so many of the country's best men are set aside and disbanded. Let me assure the reader that the great power exercised, and the eagerly

plied bribery of the higher classes is an evidence of the great stake they feel they are likely to lose if free voting were granted. All that they fear to lose the people would gain now if they could attain the ballot. Wherefore, let every friend of freedom of thought, action and speech, co-operate by all means in an agitation to get the ballot, and to get it at the earliest possible date.

SECONDUS.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

"Something, I confess, it is to be ashamed of evil-doing in the presence of any; and to reverence the opinion and the countenance of a good man rather than a bad, fearing most in his sight to offend, goes so far as almost to be virtuous; yet this is but still the fear of infamy, and many such, when they find themselves alone, saving their reputation, will compound with other scruples, and come to a close treaty with their dearer vices in secret."—*Milton*.

ALL our opponents have advocated the advisability and the necessity of the *concealment* of votes; we, on the other hand, have contended for the *revelment* of votes; they give their voice in favour of a policy of dishonesty; we for a policy which would extinguish dishonesty, either in the voter or the candidate, the canvassers or the canvassed. We ask the legal enfranchisement of opinion, and the suppression, whole and entire, of any tampering with the absolute freedom of voting by the force and might of legislative enactment, and by the formation of a public opinion so strong and healthy as to enable even the slightest attempt at pressure on voters to be resisted, and negatived, and punished. We wish the glorious privilege of free thought and free vote to grow like a healthy plant out in the daylight, while our opponents desire to train it like a sickly and weak thing in the dark. They wish to introduce dishonesty and chuckling knavery into elections; we wish to maintain absolute honesty and holy independence, and cry for a sweeping and searching legal power to deal with that worst of all hypocrisy—being unfaithful to oneself, one's Queen, one's country, to truth, and to God, by offering or taking a bribe, by coercing or being coerced—in such a manner as to cherish in men's hearts "the glorious privilege of being independent" in thought, act, life, faith, and vote. Freedom in voting, alike from intimidation or coercion exercised by landlordism, bribery or corruption used by candidates or canvassers, illegitimate influence employed by customers or patrons, and from the rows and rowdyism displayed by what Mr. Browning calls

"The blind bull front of the brute-force world."

We wish the law to apply "the screw" to all and sundry who shall, in any form, mode, way, manner, fashion, or style whatsoever, interfere with, coerce, or revenge the free and full exercise of the elective franchise, and our claim is free will for the enfranchised. Our negativists wish to make the pressure and incidence

of the screw to be invisible, and therefore impossible to be guarded against, and so to

“Let concealment, like a worm in the bud,”

eat the life out of the Constitution before we can know the spot where the “eating canker” has its seat. It is a dangerous maxim that secrecy is the safeguard of the voter. It would shield alike the honest and the dishonest; and were we quite certain that honesty would thrive under a legislation in favour of dishonesty, we might even run the risk; but we know how wide-spread and rank is the evil effect of opportunity, even on those who have fair principles to start with and to act upon, and who have a formal, if not a real, responsibility ever before them. We cannot consent to the legalization of safeguards for dishonesty, which would virtually legalize any means whatever, which could change the ballot box into an engine of success.

I am not minded to enter elaborately into the arguments of G. M. S., for they all resolve themselves into the fear of the hunted beast for its individual safety, and hence its advocacy of hiding holes and burrows. We, on our part, by the abolition of hunting, would prevent the need of multiplying hiding-places, and the need for the concealment required.

Government gives the right to vote as a personal duty to each elector. It is the duty of Government to protect its servants in the honest and faithful discharge of their duty. Every elector is a servant of his country. He is an adviser of the Queen and the Government. To interfere with the exercise of this duty is a treason-felony, and ought to be punished as such, so that the full and vile criminality of interfering in any way with the holding and the expression of opinion—except formatively by suasion—should be entered on our law books definitely, that our sense of it may be incorporated with the common life of the people. The sacredness of truth and honesty—especially the sacredness of voting as an act of suit and service to the Crown and the people—are great principles which ought evermore to be pressed upon men’s minds. The principle is irrefragable that only on the guarantee of some sort of trustworthiness is life endurable, that it seems to be worthless to argue it; but our opponents, by determining to accept bribery, intimidation, corruption, and undue influence as inevitable and cureless, seek to buy the curse, and caress it, instead of attempting its repression and cure. Public opinion, as the safeguard of conscience, is a nobler help to freedom of vote than any mode of ballot, however secret and impenetrable. Let us stand up for the formation and legal protection of honest and fearless public opinion and its legitimate expression—especially in the exercise of the franchise.

This question has been so fully and elaborately treated during the currency of this volume that its merits and demerits have been more completely considered than any similar one in the pages of

the *British Controversialist* for some time. I am reminded here that in my paper opening the debate I did not fully enter into the question of the immediate adoption of the ballot. I argued that the ballot was sought on a wrong principle, that it violated one of the permanent laws of thought and morality, and could not but think that, if it ought *never* to be adopted, it ought not to be so *now*. O. N. U. S., in his brief and appropriate paper, showed me, and I doubt not the readers of that capital article, that a good point had been missed in not saying more upon the *present aspect* of the question.

The state of culture and independence of mind to which men have now attained, the strong majority Liberalism has achieved, and the freedom which the press and the public meeting enjoy, give special grounds for opposing the ballot now. What has been won in the daylight might be lost in the darkness; and there is, at any rate, good encouragement before us to keep to the present system, seeing how vast has been the progress of enlightened political thought in the country, and how great has been the victory of truth and honesty, even when opposed by all the wiles and artifices of those who wish men to palter with their conscience while voting.

"R. D. Robjert" does not seem to see that if, under the present system, "a man gets elected who, if the electors generally had their own choice, would not have been so" (p. 104), we know how it happens, and can work for a remedy; but with the ballot we could neither know *that* it occurred nor *how* it happened; we should be enveloped in a self-originated mist, and would require to drift on in our ignorance.

"Georgius" endeavours to be very hard on "Philomathes," but not very efficaciously. Under our view of the case, the man who should enter St. Stephen's by dishonest means would have no honour in taking his seat, would receive the cold shoulder in the House, and disgrace out of it; and, if legally convictable, would be ineligible from ever exercising a public vote, place, or function again, and his confederates would suffer proportionate punishments. They would exercise no influence upon votes or men, for they would be known as Mock Parliamenters.

"Rowland Hill," by showing that "conversion" to the ballot has originated in interested motives, has destroyed any argumentative force to be derived from the fact that many M.P.'s have gone over to the affirmation of the necessity of the ballot *now*.

H. S. founds his whole argument on the hypothesis that "society is not what it should be." If it were so, the ballot would be unnecessary; but it is not; therefore, letting society remain as it *is*, "not as it should be," confer the ballot. Is there not "a more excellent way?" Try to make society what it should be.

"Samuel's" argumentation is vitiated by the same mistake, though some of his remarks are not only judicious, but clever. He claims the right to *vote* according to conscience; but he does not claim the right to think, speak, and write—in fact, to be honest

according to conscience, seeks, in fact, the right to pretend to vote one way and vote another, i.e., to be unconscientious.

A. B. is wrong in saying that the ballotist holds as a "first truth" the right to vote according to conscience. He claims the power of voting according to his own convenience—to sham this and be that, but to keep his sham free from the shame due to it.

O. N. U. S. has written an able paper, and A. J. G. justly repudiates, in the name of the honest voter of England, the introduction of such a law for the sake of the exceptional few whose votes can be tampered with. J. S. M. has made a special hit by his use of Mr. Bright's good idea, and showing that it leads quite away from the ballot; while S. S. has gone in boldly for the teaching of the people to form and to hold, to use and to show, honest opinion, and to suffer all for truth's sake. T. B. P. has urged the same thing well, and H. S. S. has insisted on the proper course—let Government protect the voter in his vote, whatever his side may be, against any invasion of his public right or interference with his public duty. We want truth, integrity, and courage; not the ballot, and dishonesty, and hypocrisy, and more than all now—when truth is triumphing—we do *not* want the ballot.

PHILOMATHES.

Literature.

ARE PROVERBS WORTH STUDYING?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—VI.

FROM the very nature of the subject, our opponents in this debate are in great danger of deceiving themselves. It is very easy to collect a number of foolish, meaningless proverbs, and to say, These are senseless, worthless collections of words, therefore proverbs are not worth studying; but such an argument would be mere futile reasoning from a part to the whole. H. W., jun., has admirably gathered together a goodly array of proverbs worth studying—proverbs, some of them which contain a hidden meaning not to be seen at a glance, and if we were to say, These proverbs are full of meaning, therefore proverbs are worth studying, that would be an argument much more to the point.

The article of "Anti-P." is full of high-sounding declamation, but it contains very little sound argument. He commences his article by saying, "Common-place vulgarity is abominable; and proverbs are only common phrases told and retold ten thousand times, and so made vulgar." This has a specious appearance, but

it is nullified by the fact that the words *vulgarity* and *vulgar* are in this one sentence used to denote two different things. In the first part *vulgarity* denotes coarseness, impropriety, lowness; and, in the second, *vulgar* merely signifies common, in frequent use. It is only *vulgarity* in the sense of coarseness that is abominable, and proverbs are only made *vulgar* through being oft repeated in the sense of being common. If proverbs are not intrinsically coarse, they cannot be made so by being "told and retold ten thousand times;" and if there is no inherent impropriety in a proverb, no frequency of repetition can make it coarse or abominable. Thus this argument is altogether invalid through the words *vulgarity* and *vulgar* being used in the same sentence to denote two different things. "Anti-P." tells us that the Spaniards and Italians employ a larger number of proverbs than any other nation of Europe, and then says, "Thus the two countries which contribute least to the intelligence of Europe, supply the largest quantity of proverbs." But the intellectual condition of Spain and Italy was not always what it is now, and the argument of "Anti-P." does not show that proverbs are produced by the unintelligent, nor does it prove that proverbs are not worth studying; because the proverbs employed by them are the concentrated wit and wisdom of their intellectual ancestors, and not the inane productions of the degenerate Spaniards and Italians of the present day. The fact that these proverbs have not been produced by the degenerate Spaniards and Italians of the present day, "Anti-P." himself virtually admits, by saying that "there are more new books issued in Germany than fresh proverbs coined in Spain and Italy."

W. H. expatiates largely upon the senselessness, emptiness, and dulness of proverbs in general, and quotes many as illustrations of his assertions. Besides this, we can only find one argument in his article, viz., That the majority of proverbs "give a depreciating view of human character," so "as to make a book of proverbs essentially a libel upon mankind, and a manual of all uncharitableness," and that it is not wise "to reveal the pollution that lies in the inner chambers of the heart." That proverbs do afford a means of opening up the secret depravity of the heart of man we admit, but we do not look upon that as altogether an evil. We believe that he spoke wisely who said, "Man, know thyself." If we know the secret evils of our own hearts, we know what we have to contend with from within, and we know what we ought to strive against, but if ignorant of these we shall be more easily carried away by them. Proverbs often teach us truths concerning human nature, better than mere moral disquisitions could do. For instance, if one were to say that with a large number of mankind the desire to receive a goodly accession of wealth at the decease of one's father is so great, as to make them careless whether that parent is in joy or misery after death, few would believe the assertion, but we are compelled to believe it when we know that the remarks, "Alas for the son whose father goes to heaven," and

"Happy the son whose dad goes to the devil," are so often repeated that they have become proverbial expressions among the Portuguese and Scotch.

Some of the proverbs which W. H. quotes as nonsensical, are very significant expressions; e. g., "What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander," teaches us that what is wrong in one is wrong in another under the same circumstances. "The least said is soonest mended," teaches us that if we wish our quarrels to be short-lived, our words should be few to those who contend with us. Even the apparently contradictory expressions quoted from the proverbs of Solomon, "Answer not a fool according to his folly," and "Answer a fool according to his folly," teach us that in some cases it is best to fight an opponent with his own weapons, whilst in other cases it is necessary to answer coolly.

Several years ago we met with a lecture of Stowell Brown's on "Proverbs," and if any of our opponents should have an opportunity of reading it, we would recommend it to them as an excellent illustration of the value of proverbs. The fact that a divinely inspired writer, and one of the wisest of men, uttered "three thousand proverbs," a collection of which forms part of Holy Writ, proves that the proverbial form of expression is well adapted to convey instruction. "Brevity is the soul of wit," and much of the value of proverbs arises from their brevity and pointedness. One proverb justly exhorts us to "strike the iron while it is hot," and proverbs often enable us to do so when the warmth would vanish and coldness follow, whilst we were attempting to strike by means of roundabout expressions. Proverbs are often more forcible, more pointed, more decisive, than any circumlocutory observations could be, and therefore they are worth studying.

An anecdote or picture often gives an idea of what we desire to convey much better than a dry statement could do, and many proverbs both state a truth, and also give an illustration of it in the same sentence. Thus, for instance, when we say that a man has jumped "Out of the frying-pan into the fire," we imply that he has gone from bad to worse, and also, at the same time, mention a practical illustration of making such a change. Again, if we laugh at a man for what he is doing, and say, "You might as well carry coals to Newcastle," we imply that he is doing something which does not need to be done, and also at the same time give an example of an unnecessary action. To be able thus to give a statement of a truth, and an illustration of it in the same sentence, is a valuable acquirement; therefore proverbs are worth studying.

The peculiar proverbs of a nation afford a key to the knowledge of the hereditary characteristics of that nation, because these expressions would not have become proverbial, if they had not been in accordance with the sentiments of a large section of the community. Therefore the study of proverbs would yield much valuable information, and by ascertaining the general tenor of a nation's proverbs, we should gain an insight into their more pro-

minent national characteristics. Sometimes you may without danger express sentiments by means of a proverb, when to speak plainly and fully would give offence. For instance, a friend points out to you a fault, and reproves you for it; you are strongly tempted to say, "Don't talk to me, you are as bad as I am," but you think that most likely such a remark would offend; however you venture to observe gently, that "The pot ought not to call the kettle black," or "One ass ought not to call another long ears;" and then, in all probability, the hint is taken, the desired effect is produced, and no offence given. For these reasons we maintain that proverbs *are* worth studying, notwithstanding all that our opponents have said to the contrary.

SAMUEL.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—VI.

"He who wishes clear water should go to the fountain head," says the proverb; but that supposes the source to be pure. An indubitable authority has suggested the query—"Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean?" and has also supplied the answer, "Not one." The advocates of the worth of proverbs do not ground their praise on the worthiness of them, but on their being got, at first hand, out of the mouth of the people, and therefore direct from their hearts. We do not believe that it would be a blessing to any one to see unveiled that awful thing a sinful human heart, and therefore we do not think that it can be advantageous or beneficial to study that which is the nearest and most unvarnished expression of the evil, that it is the heart; still more when this hardness and impenitence of heart has been aggregated and countersigned by the general consent of man. For example, what good—true good—can be got from the study of such a forth-word or ready word as this, "six feet of earth makes us all equal?" Does it speak more of the inevitableness of death than of the vanity of life, and of the worldly-mindedness which closes the eye to all that lies beyond the grave. Does it imply warning against wrong-doing so much as encouragement to eat, drink and be merry? "He who lives well, dies well," is no more a praise of godliness than of jollity, and contains not a whit more truth or wit than the common jest phrase, "he who eats longest, lives longest."

"By hook or by crook" is now synonymous with "by means fair or dishonest;" formerly it meant, "in the most honest manner." It had its origin in the days when the gatherers of dead wood in the forest were allowed to gather such wood as would break easily by being pulled down with a hooked stick, or broken off by making a crook in the branch; but were prohibited from taking any sharp instrument with them, lest they should destroy growing wood. This shows the depravity of the hearts of men, and how they turn good into evil; and therefore proves that the study of the words which come most directly from men's hearts "are deceitful"—like the hearts whence they issue—"above all things,

and desperately wicked." "Like a spalpeen" has undergone a similar deterioration. *Spal*, in Irish, signifies a scythe, and *pen*, a penny. *Spalpeen* is a penny-a-day harvester, but now is equivalent to *rascal*; just as *knave* has ceased to mean a boy, a page, a servant, as *villain* has changed from being a tiller of the soil, and both now mean deceivers and vagabonds. What benefit can be got from the study of "Go to Jericho, to Hong-kong," &c., of "as clever as a Levant whaler;" "as sober as a Dutchman, a judge, my lord," &c., or of "when a tree has fallen all run to make logs"? "Silence was never written;" "the rich have many friends," &c.? Does it tend to edification to know that in almost every language men say, "I am my own most excellent friend"?

I think the advocates of proverbs—and indeed the deniers of their being worthy of study too—have greatly erred in this debate in not settling as a previous question what sort of things are worthy of study? This is a principal feature in the debate, and has been altogether overlooked. If we decide that everything is worthy of study on which the mind of man can employ itself, the whole discussion is closed by a foregone conclusion. If we grant that some subjects are unworthy of study, we should next determine what are the characteristics of those things which are worthy of study, and thus test proverbs by reference to these.

We contend that all things on which man may use his intellect are not worthy of study; for instance, we read the other day of an exhibition before the heads of the police force of a machine for breaking open bank safes and other places of security, and this we deem an illegitimate object of study. Again, we contend that the only proper objects of study are pointed out to us by the apostle Paul when he tells us—"Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, if there be any praise, think upon these things" (Phil. iv. 8). S. S. will agree with me that this is a proper test; but if we apply the test to proverbs, how will they stand in the time of trial?

Are they *true*? Let these answer. "To be rich one must have friends in the devil's house; rags heal wounds; women are wise on a sudden, and fools on reflection; a common shipwreck gives joy to all," &c. Are they *honest*? "With awls one must be a bodkin; do at Rome as Rome does; better cheat than be cheated; beat the poor, and he'll be your friend. Are they *just*? "No one says that his granary is full; in prosperity no altars smoke; an honest man has a hairy palm." Are they *pure*? "Women withstand everything but opportunity; gold sets apart even the gates of the heart; trust no one at home with the light out; candles keep many chaste," and others which we dare not quote. Are they of *good report*? "As stale as a proverb; as true as a byword; as vile as a soothsaw," &c. Are they *lovely*? "Every cock crows best on his own dungstead." But we cannot defile these pages with them except in Latin as "In ratio-

nem locat vis. Qui adverso vento mingit subuculem madefacit," &c. Without citing more we may just ask if there is any *virtue* in these, and do they deserve any *praise*? If they do not stand these tests we are not to think of them, and therefore must not *study* them: unless we wish to do our minds and souls injury, we shall learn enough of them in every-day life, without studying them, to sully our minds and to hurt our hearts. A. R.

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

WE are called upon by our editor to close a capital debate—one which not only possesses an every-day interest, but a literary, moral, and social value besides. I know not how it may be with others, but I know that to myself these papers on proverbs have been very attractive and instructive; and I do devoutly wish that it had fallen into other hands to pen the reply paper. When I wrote my slight contribution on this question, I had no idea that the editor would put the lead in my hands; I rather expected to be shelved and set aside. Since, however, "must be must be," and "necessity has no law," we can only make ready to do our best to bring to a conclusion a discussion which has yielded us monthly matter of thought as the brief but piquant articles came out on each side.

"Anti-P." has done very little to settle the question. His outcry about "vulgarity" is scarcely worthy of attention. The vulgar commonplaces of life are food, clothing, shelter, love, companionship, and thought; but even "Anti-P." could scarcely venture to aver that these are all "abominable." It is greatly to be regretted that such rash and unguarded statements get pushed into so many discussions. Many people appear to think that strong assertions are as valuable as powerful arguments, but this is by no means the case. Better are a few words of sound logic than many words of sounding rhetoric.

Writers on the affirmative side have been challenged by C. J. A. to equal, by quotation of proverbs, a number of choice phrases, &c., from the poets. This we think an unfair argument. Proverbs are popular phrases, often the outgrowth of the homely good sense and good taste of the commoner ranks. If these are poetical, they are *unintentionally* so, while those extracts which C. J. A. made are *intentionally* so. Taking this difference duly into consideration, we shall quote one or two felicities of form and of imagery which has been attained by these wise words of the common people; *e. g.*,—

"Through one sinner a ship is lost."

"One thread of kindness draws more than a hundred kine."

"A sack of green intentions does not weigh a pound of dry deeds."

"Vainglory flowers, but does not fruit."

"Hope is the bread of the wretched."

- "Summer is a mother to the poor."
 "Under the white ash the live coal burns."
 "One ear does not make a wheat-sheaf."
 "No leaf moves unless God wills it."
 "Pence stand—cap in hand."
 "Words are female, deeds male."
 "Our shroud is made without pockets."
 "Men are all clay; God is the potter."
 "Friends have their purses tied with a spider's thread."
 "Work in jest, want in earnest."
 "Heart is of greater worth than blood."
 "Courtesy is a flower."
 "Truth is God's daughter; and therefore,
 "Truth may droop, but never perish."

I am glad to be able to quote from a paper forwarded to me by the kindness of the editor, who regretted that it had reached him after the announcement had been made that the discussion would close a good rejoinder to the pith of O. B.'s article. C. F. A. S. says:—

"O. B. complains that he finds some proverbs diametrically opposed to each other; and where he is acting by the one, another appears which points out a totally different course. Now the study of proverbs is not necessarily confined to applying them to a system of guidance for our thoughts and actions, and, as it were, to live by rule of thumb. 'Heaven helps those who help themselves.' We must not expect to find everything out and dried for us. We must examine for ourselves, and discover whether, in the particular case, 'Delays are dangerous,' or 'Look before you leap,' would be the more suitable; whether 'Slow and sure,' 'Now or never,' or 'Keep moving,' would be the most applicable. We must acquire the power of discrimination, a degree of self-confidence, of pre-science, of independence of spirit, and then, as Lessing says, 'Think wrongly if we please, but think for ourselves.' To break the shell of the acorn, and admit the living protoplasm, is what nature does to rear the stately oak. Let us then take proverbs, remove the outer covering, as it were, and examine by the light of investigation their concealed truths; then we shall soon build up a column of ideas and thoughts, and admire it with amazement that so much could come out of so little."

This is well put, and it is equally applicable to the objections made by W. H. and C. J. A. in regard to the (seemingly to them) non-sense in which proverbs abound. We know that the eye only "perceives what it has the power of seeing," and that "a rat is a bad judge of a nightingale's singing."

The paper by "Georgius D. E." deserves careful thought, and is very effective against "Anti-P." S. S. speaks, as he always does, with sense, judgment, and discretion, and in quite a different spirit from that of his opponent, J. M. D. A. J. G.'s paper com-

pare very favourably with O. B.'s; and on the whole, though our opponents have done their best, it may be affirmed that our side has had the best of it.

Proverbs are full of homespun wisdom and practical good sense, of moral sentiment and graphic fancy; they are the results of experience expressed in shrewd terms, and they inform us of the permanent moral convictions of men concerning the ordinary and every-day affairs of human thought and interest. They are distinguished for pith, brevity, soul, and playfulness, and they are highly valuable as preserving and embalming many quaint idiomatic expressions and terms of thought. Here we are reminded by C. F. A. S., too, that Emerson has said that language is "fossil poetry." So some proverbs are the inorganic remains of language, the fossils of its history, growth, and development; others are the remnants of moral philosophy; others give the key to national character, manners, &c.

I may quote here, much more as curiosities than as illustrations, the following Coptic proverbs, which I have the opportunity of extracting from a very rare book in that language at present in my hand. This will, I hope, give an interest to my paper over and above that which the opinions it contains may supply, as it will increase the knowledge of the reader in regard to proverbs, while it will prove how widespread is the tendency to use them—making one more ostensive instance in proof of our assertion that we have the verdict of the universal custom of mankind in favour of our opinion that proverbs are worth studying. The following are the Coptic proverbs (translated) to which reference is made above, viz.:—

"Whatsoever thou hast undertaken to do, do it so as thou mayst speedily finish it."

"Do not hasten when it is not yet the time."

"Determine quickly, for opportunity is soon past."

"Turn away from that thing which thou shalt not soon obtain."

"Draw not upon thyself temptation, for strength is not in thee."

"Remember thy vow that thou mayst perform it."

In conclusion, I appeal, even to "Anti-P.," to admit that proverbs are worth study, had the study had no other effect than bringing out so many papers of ability on the subject as have appeared since this debate was opened by himself and by E. A.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

OUR good editor has admonished the present writer that his reply is expected to be given in speedily, and must be brief. Brief it shall be; but as it must be hastily put together, its "brevity" is not likely to display much of "the soul of wit," and it may be thus an argument in the negative. Isaac Disraeli has said that "a book of proverbs is a book of the world for worldlings." If a man is

known by the company he keeps, his character may also be pretty shrewdly guessed at by his studies. The study of proverbs is the study of worldliness, and is therefore not profitable for instruction. "Close thoughts and open face" writes hypocrisy down as the whole duty of man. "God helps merry fellows" is a lie and a libel; a snare and an incitement to sin.

Proverbs are ambiguous, and have no fixed meaning. "Time is an inaudible file" may mean ever so many things, if you read them into it, or insert them, as the soothsaw is, between the lines. "All waters go to the sea" is very plain prose to be called wisdom. "The miser does good when he dies" is false political economy or wretched morality, besides being cynical.

Proverbs are often employed to conceal thought or the want of it, instead of being used to express some definite truth. "Man is of few days, and full of trouble;" "Man is but a leaf upon the tree of life;" "A hundred years hence thou wilt be as good as flax," &c., look like sage saws, but they are really evasions of true thoughtfulness. Besides, proverbs are familiar phrases, and does not the proverb itself say, "Familiarity breeds contempt"?

Archbishop Whately's illustrative letter, quoted by E. A., will amply satisfy the reader who examines it that proverbs are ambiguous, contradictory, shuffling, and low-pitched in their morality. E. A.'s argument, from the frequency of the use of proverbs to the worth of studying them, would equally prove that oaths were worth studying, and sins were the proper studies of man.

H. W. Jun.'s paper, in so far as the argument of the proverb being the fruit of thought, would require him to prove that all the fruits of thought are worthy of study, which would lead one a long way from the right and the true. W. H. is really much nearer the truth when he says proverbs are the gospel of Satan; and in this connection we may as well ask, "Can men gather grapes from thorns, or figs from thistles?"

Is not the assertion of S. S., that because a part of the book of God "consists of proverbs," proverbs are worth studying, an instance of the manner in which the unwary wrest the Scriptures to their own destruction? for are not these worthy of study, not because they are proverbs, but because they are given by inspiration of God, and are profitable for instruction? The history in proverbs, of which S. S. makes mention, is, I am afraid, very worthless, if, like "perfidious Albion," it is not "a lying spirit." The fallacy of his remarks about the absence of immorality from proverbs has already been dealt with by J. M. D. He might as well plead the innocence of the ball-room, because there is no vice observable in the mazy dance.

C. J. A.'s excellent induction of much more beautiful passages and phrases in the poets contains an excellent idea, and is a highly original contribution to the debate. Culture is putting proverbs out of fashion, because, instead of the mere commonplace of small talk, it can now get the finest thoughts of the finest wits to use in

its stead. Poetry has superseded proverbs, as the steamship and train have superseded the cart and the sledge.

I quite agree with A. J. G. in one remark of his, when a slight addition is put to it. "The study of proverbs is the study of man"—at his worst! and therefore I contend that they are not worth studying. O. B. has justly made merry with the meaning or rather the no meaning and nonsensicality of proverbs, but he has not given enough of emphasis to their mischievousness. I could much wish our opponents would think only of the evil wrought by this one phrase, "One slip's none;" or, "One devil does not make hell."

While I am gratified at the ability shown by the defenders of the negative, and struck with the versatility and width of information displayed by our opponents, I am sorry to see so many proverbs of doubtful utility and influence brought into sight, for, as I said in opening, commonplace is abominable, but vulgar commonplace is still more so.

I am done now, and hope that I have spoken some wholesome truth on this subject, even though I have been so brief.

ANTI-P.

The Reviewer.

Atheism or Theism. London: Houlston and Wright.

WE have had, since our previous notice of this able and interesting contribution to religious and philosophic controversy, four other parts. In the eighth part the first division, containing prefatory, preliminary and preparatory matter, and forming as it were the first act in the drama of Responses, closes; and in the ninth the curtain rises, as it seems to the settled and definite business. It has not as yet manifested the high literary attractions of the debate on the Being of God, by Bachelier and Owen; nor the variety, width, or vagueness of that between Townley and Holyoake; but it exhibits greater definiteness of phrase, more point, and takes a higher philosophic flight than either. This, however, is only a provisional and temporary estimate.

Sir Thomas More's Utopia. Edited by E. ARBER.

London: A. Murray and Son.

MORE'S *Utopia* is a work which every one must wish to read. This number of the English Reprints places that pleasure within the reach of every one, as it provides for one shilling this rare and valuable book, with introduction, notes, and bibliography annexed, in the early translation, by Ralph Robinson, 1531. It is, perhaps, to be regretted that the editor did not afford his readers an opportunity of comparing this version with the Swift-like one of Bishop, G. Burnet, 1684, and the elegant modern one by Arthur Cayley, 1808.

Our Collegiate Course.

LYCIDAS: A MONODY.

*Blind mouths ! that scarce themselves know how to hold
 A sheep-hook, or have learned aught else the least 120
 That to the faithful herdsman's art belongs !
 What reck's it them ? What need they ? They are sped ;
 And, when they list, their lean and flashy songs
 Grate on their scrannel pipes of wretched straw ;
 The hungry sheep look up, and are not fed, 125
 But, swoln with wind and the rank mist they draw,
 Rot inwardly, and foul contagion spread ;
 Besides what the grim wolf, with privy paw,
 Daily devours apace, and nothing said :*

- | | |
|--|---|
| 119. Untaught instructors ; manage. | 126. Puffed up ; air ; unhealthy vapour ; inspire. |
| 120. Acquired other endowment. | 127. Grow corrupt internally ; shook-
ing infection. |
| 121. Dutiful shepherd's business. | 128. Not to speak of ; gaunt ; self-
seeking grasp. |
| 122. Matters to ; require ; worthless. | 129. Destroys quickly ; objected to
it. |
| 123. Do duty ; empty ; showy
preachings. | |
| 124. Sound harshly ; screeching. | |
| 125. Food-requiring flocks ; satis-
fied. | |

128. In his sonnet to Cromwell Milton exclaims,—

“ Help us to save free conscience from the paw
 Of hireling wolves, whose gospel is their maw.”

Dante represents the meretricious and venal church of his time under a similar symbol :—

“ A she-wolf too ; who, ravenous and lean,
 Seemed by innumerable wants possessed,
 And had of multitudes the ruin been.”

“ Her ravenous wants she ne'er can satisfy,
 And food but serves to whet her hunger still.”

“ *Inferno*,” i., 49—51, 91, 92.

*But that two-handed engine at the door
Stands ready to smite once, and smite no more."
Return, Alpheus, the dread voice is past,*

130

130. However; double-edged sword;
gate.

131. Prepared to strike a single blow.

132. Come back; terrible denunciation;
hushed.

131. "In these lines," Warton says, "Milton [writing in 1637] anticipated the execution of Archbishop Laud (10th January, 1644) by a two-handed engine, that is, the axe; insinuating that his death would remove all grievances in religion, and complete the reformation of the Church." May the passage not be read with greater poetical effect without this literal explanation, as signifying the Puritan's trust in "the word of God," [which] "is quick and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of the joints and marrow, and is a discernor of the thoughts and intents of the heart"? (Heb. iv. 12). Is not this "the sharp two-edged sword" (Rev. i. 16), "the sharp sword with two edges" (Rev. ii. 12), which guards, like another Eden, the true church of the gospel, "as a flaming sword which turned every way, to keep the way of the tree of life"? (Gen. iii. 24).

132. That is St. Peter's voice, which hushed the heathen pastoral song, and brought out the Christian pastoral invective, causing the former, like the river of Alpheus in the fable, to disappear for a time, and again to reappear, and so at once securing the unity of the song by making the incidents of Camus and St. Peter an episode, and yet securing to these a prominence from their exceptional introduction which they could not otherwise have attained. By this skilful touch—a true *callida junctura*—Milton obviates any charge of incongruity, such as that of Dr. Johnson, that with the "trifling fictions" of pastoral poetry there "are mingled the most awful and sacred truths;" and avoids any "approach to impiety," while he justifies the introduction at the close of Christian, consoling hope.

"That renowned flood, so often sung,
Divine Alpheus, who by secret sluice
Stole under seas to meet his Arethuse."

Milton's "Arcades," 29—31.

Alpheus is the chief river of Peloponnesus, rising in the south-east of Arcadia, and falling into the Ionian Sea. In some parts of its course this river flows under ground, and on this circumstance the poets have built the fiction that Alpheus (the god of the river) was enamoured of the nymph Arethusa, who, while eluding his pursuit, was, by favour of Diana, changed into a fountain, which sprung forth in the island of Ortygia, near Syracuse, where Alpheus, having persisted in his course from Elis under ground, emerged near the same spot.—See Homer's *Odyssey*, xiii., 470; Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, v.; Virgil's *Æneid*, iii., 692, &c.

"At the voice of Thy thunder they hasted away; they rise over the hills, they go down into the valleys."—Psa. civ. 7.

That *shrink* thy streams ; return, Sicilian Muse,
 And *call* the vales, and *bid* them hither cast
 Their bells and *flowerets* of a thousand hues. 135
 Ye valleys low, where the *mild whispers* use
 Of shades, and *wanton* winds, and *gushing* brooks,
 On whose *fresh lap* the swart star *sparsely* looks,
 Throw hither all your *quaint enamelled eyes*,

133. Caused to retreat in affright.

134. Invoke ; invite ; throw.

135. Blossoms ; dyes.

136. Gentle murmurs dally.

137. Self-delighting ; over-swelling
 streamlets.

138. Ever-new surface ; seldom.

139. Curiously variegated.

133. Theocritus was the creator of bucolic poetry among the Greeks; his idyls are of a dramatic and mimetic character, and are pictures of the ordinary life of the common people of Sicily. He was a native of Syracuse. His writings are remarkable for poetic grace and homely quaintness, soundness of judgment and truth of character, appropriateness of phrase and simple love of nature. Hence Quintilian calls him "admirabilis in suo genere Theocritus," i. e., Theocritus admirable in his own style of poetry.

138. The dog-star (Sirius), the star of the hot summer season, the dog days, between July and September, forty days, in which August was included. The term dog-star was also used to denote Procyon, a bright star in Canis Minor, whose heliacal rising differs only by a few days from that of Sirius. Horace says (Odes, iii., 29, 18—20),—

"Jam Procyon furit

Et stella vesani Leonis,

Sole dies referente siccos ;"

which Sewall translates thus :—

"New Procyon maddens, and the star

Of frenzied Leo, while the sun

Again the days of drought brings on."

It is probably here called "swart star" by metonymy, using the effect for the cause.

139. Compare with this rich passage on flowers—the pets of the poets—the following quotations from Shakspeare :—

"Daffodils,

That come before the swallow darts, and take
 The winds of March with beauty ; violets dim,
 But sweeter than the lide of Juno's eyes,
 Or Cytherea's breath ; pale primroses,
 That die unmarried ere they can behold
 Bright Phoebus in his strength ; . . .

. . . bold oxlips and

The crown imperial ; lilies of all kinds,

The fleur-de-lys being one. Oh, these I lack

To make you garlands of, and my sweet friend !

To strew him o'er and o'er."—"The Winter's Tale," iv., 2.

That on the green turf suck the honeyed showers, 140
 And purple all the ground with vernal flowers.
 Bring the rath primrose that forsaken dies,
 The tufted crow-tee, and pale jessamine,

140. Fresh sward imbibe; swains.

141. Earth; spring hues.

142. Early; love-lorn decays.

143. Bunchy; whitish.

"I know a bank whereon the wild thyme blows,
 Where oxlips and the nodding violet grows;
 Quite over-canopied with luscious [*lush*] woodbine,
 With sweet musk-roses and with eglantine."
"A Midsummer Night's Dream," ii., 2.

"With fairest flowers,
 While summer lasts and I live here, Fidele,
 I'll sweeten thy sad grave; thou shalt not lack
 The flower that's like thy face, pale primrose; nor
 The azure harebell like thy veins; no, nor
 The leaf of eglantine, whom not to slander
 Outsweetened not thy breath."—*"Cymbeline,"* iv., 2.

140. "There is an awkwardness of construction between this and the preceding line, which hurts the beautiful idea of the flowers 'sucking the honeyed showers,' by seeming to attribute the suction to their 'eyes.' There might, indeed, be learned allowance for such an elipsis; and we hardly know where to find the proper noun substantive or predicate for the verb if it be not so; but the image is terribly spoilt by it."—*Leigh Hunt's "Imagination and Fancy,"* p. 272.

142. *Primrose*, the botanical *Primula*, a species of herbaceous perennial, having generally only radical leaves, and the flowers in a simple umbel. Many of them are among the finest ornaments of our meadows and groves, and even our mountain slopes. Their fine colours and soft delicate beauty make them great favourites, and from the earliest times they have been cultivated for the garden. The *Primula veris* is a delicate and modest little flower, a favourite both for its beauty and sweet scent in our native pastures and green lanes. *Rath* signifies early, the opposite of *sear*, late: we now use the comparative *rather* as an adverb, with the general meaning of *preferably*.

143. *Crow-toe*, the dillcup or yellow cress, which blooms in the middle of May,—the *Ranunculus arvensis*, or crowfoot, as it is otherwise called; in Tennyson's line, for instance,—

"The cowslip and the crowfoot are over all the hill;"

not the "crow-flowers," or buttercups,—*Ranunculus bulbosus*. The order of plants to which jasmine or jessamine belongs contains about 100 species, some of which are climbing plants and many bear fragrant flowers. The common jessamine (*Jasminum officinale*) grows from six to ten feet high, has evergreen pinnate leaves and fragrant white flowers. The Earl of Carlisle, in his "Lines to a Jessamine Tree in the Court of Naworth Castle," characterizes it as "slight and slender," "wild and winsome," "free and feathery;" and says,—

The white pink, and the pansy *freaked* with jet,
 The *glowing* violet,
 The musk-rose, and the *well-attired* woodbine,
 With cowslips *wan* that *hang* the *pensive* head,
 And every flower that *sad embroidery wears* :
 Bid *Amaranthus* all his *beauty shed*,

145

144. Speckled; black.

145. Brightly coloured.

146. Handsomely robed.

147. Pale; droop; over-heavy.

148. Grief-denoting ornaments shows.

149. Elegance resign.

"I ask not, while I near thee dwell,
 Arabia's spice or Syria's rose;
 Thy light festoons more freshly smell,
 Thy virgin white more purely glows."

144. This we take to be the *Dianthus deltoides* of the botanists, the pretty maiden pink, a sweet common species growing in grassy, gravelly, and sandy soils, having a white eye surrounded with a purple ring, and rose-coloured flowers spotted with white.

145. The pansy or heart's-ease, *Viola tricolor*, derives its name from the French (*penser*, to think), probably because the drooping attitude of the flower is suggestive of thoughtfulness,—a circumstance which Shakspeare notes when he makes Ophelia say, "And there is pansies, that's for thoughts;" and perhaps because they require so much thought in their culture to keep them from relapsing to their wild form, in which state they may be seen—

"Gleaming like amethysts in the dewy moss,"

in the hedgerow, or in the corn-field. "The glowing violet," we presume, is *Viola odorata*, whose fragrance is so pleasant in full-blown flower, purple and bright in the sunshine; unless we regard it as an explanatory phrase in apposition to pansies. He uses these names to express different flowers in "Paradise Lost," ix., 1039—1041 :—

"Flowers were the couch,
 Pansies and violets and asphodel
 And hyacinth, earth's freshest, softest lap."

146. The *Rosa moschata*, a native of North Africa and the south of Spain. It has white fragrant flowers, disposed in rich corymbs; and since the end of the sixteenth century, when it was introduced into this country, it has been a favourite flower. The common honeysuckle or woodbine (*Lonicera periclymenum*), so remarkable for its beautiful whorls of deliciously scented cream-coloured flowers, is perhaps the same as "the twisted eglantine" of Milton's "Penseroso." If in its growing this plant meets with the branches of another shrub or tree, it twines round them from right to left; but if it takes hold of shoots of its own sort, they twist together; the one turning to the right, the other to the left.

149. *Love-lies-bleeding*. This plant, whose dry red bracts retain their freshness for a long time after being gathered, has been employed by the poets very frequently as an emblem of immortality :—

And daffodillies *fill* their cups with tears, 150
 To *strew* the laureate hearse where Lycid lies.
 For, so to *interpose* a little ease,
 Let our frail thoughts *dally* with false surmise:
 Ah me! whilst thee the shores and sounding seas
 Wash far away, where'er thy bones are hurled, 155

- | | |
|---|--|
| 150. Brim; calyces; signs of sorrow. | 153. Slight; trifle; deceptive imaginings. |
| 151. Cast upon; honoured bier; reposes. | 154. Woe is; coasts; noisy ocean. |
| 152. In some measure; introduce. | 155. Carry out; cast. |

"Immortal amaranth, a flower which once
 In paradise, fast by the tree of life,
 Began to bloom."—"Paradise Lost," iii., 353.

150. Daffodillies, whose large early yellow flowers, coming out as they do in the spring, blooming when nothing else blooms, have their name from a corruption of the Latin *asphodelus*, lily-shaped, having a large bell-like flower-cup of a deep yellow hue; hence it is called "the golden daffodil;" and Milton, in "Comus," 851, speaks—

"Of pansies, pinks, and gaudy daffodils."

The ancients planted asphodels near graves.

"It may interest the reader to know that there are signs in the Cambridge MS. of Lycidas, that Milton composed this beautiful passage with much care, and not all at once. As originally written, the line 141—

'And purple all the ground with vernal flowers,'—

ran on with the line 151—

'To strew the laureate hearse where Lycid lies;'

and the ten intermediate lines, which gather the separate flowers together by their names, are an exquisite afterthought, progressively elaborated. Perceiving, as it would seem, the opportunity of some such poetic enumeration of flowers at this point of the monody, Milton writes on a blank space on the opposite page a passage, beginning 'Bring the rath primrose,' &c., marking where it is to be inserted; but even the passage so written is not exactly what now stands in the printed text (see the various readings to 'Lycidas' in Todd's Milton), but considerably inferior. In the interval between writing it and the publication of the printed text Milton had evidently hovered over the passage with fastidious fondness, touching every colour and fitting every word, till he brought it to its present perfection of beauty."—D. Masson's "*Life of Milton*," vol. i., p. 614, note.

155. Thomas Keightley says, "By *wash far away* must be meant *lave at a great distance*; but the expression is ambiguous, for the proper meaning of *wash away* is to remove by the action of water." This latter meaning, which is certainly the correct one, emerges immediately on reading the pas-

Whether *beyond the stormy Hebrides,*
 Where thou, *perhaps,* under the *whelming tide,*
Visit'st the bottom of the monstrous world;
 Or whether thou, to our *moist vows denied,*
Sleep'st by the fable of Bellerus old, 160
 Where the *great vision of the guarded mount*
Looks toward Namancos and Bayona's hold;
 Look homeward, *angel, now, and melt with ruth:*
 And, O ye dolphins, *waft the hapless youth.*

- | | |
|--|--|
| 156. Far past; tempestuous. | 160. Restest beside; myth; ancient. |
| 157. Perchance; submerging waves. | 161. Mighty apparition; fortified. |
| 158. Goest to; strange - creatured deep. | 162. Projects in the direction of; fort. |
| 159. Sad prayers refused. | 163. Spirit; soften; compassion. |
| | 164. Bring homeward; unfortunate. |

sage in grammatical order, "Whilst the shores and sounding seas wash thee far away."

156. Hebrides, the general name given to the 490 islands, small and large, which are strewed along the western coast of Scotland. They are commonly spoken of as the Western Isles, Hebrides being their literary designation.

158. The ocean full of monsters, as in Horace, Odes, I., iii., 18:—

"Quem mortis timuit gradum,
 Qui siccis oculis monstra natantia
 Qui vidit mare turgidum," &c.

(At what approach of death appalled was he,
 Who floating monsters saw below
 With tearless eyes, who saw the billowy sea.)

161. *St. Michael's Mount* who does not know,
 That wards the western coast?" &c.
Spenser's "Shepherd's Calendar," vii., 41.

St. Michael's Mount, at the Land's End, in Cornwall, anciently called Bellerium, as if from Bellerus, which Milton seems to have invented as the name of one of the fabulous old giants who, according to Geoffrey of Monmouth, possessed Britain in the days of old. It is a steep rock in Mount's Bay, accessible from the land at low water. The story is that the archangel Michael, "of celestial armies prince," appeared to some hermits on the rock by Marazion, in Mount's Bay, which bears the archangel's name. This apparition gave occasion to the building of a monastery there in connection with which there was a fortress, and beside which there was "a craggy place called St. Michael's Chair." The mount is thus doubly guarded, by the fortress and by "the princely hierarch whose seat is there." "The great vision of the guarded mount" is obviously a periphrasis for St. Michael. Finisterre, the Land's End (*finis terræ*), at the N.W. extremity of

Weep no more, weeful shepherds, weep no more, 165
For Lycidas, your sorrow, is not dead,
Sunk though he be beneath the watery floor ;
So sinks the daystar in the ocean bed,
And yet, anon, repairs his drooping head,
And tricks his beams, and, with new spangled ore, 170
Flames in the forehead of the morning sky :
So Lycidas sunk low, but mounted high,
Through the dear might of Him that walked the waves ;
Where, other groves and other streams along,
With nectar pure his oozy locks he laves, 175
And hears the unexpressive nuptial song
In the blest kingdoms meek of joy and love.
There entertain him all the saints above,
In solemn troops and sweet societies,
That sing, and, singing, in their glory move, 180
And wipe the tears for ever from his eyes.
Now, Lycidas, the shepherds weep no more ;
Henceforth thou art the genius of the shore

165. Sorrow ; sad ; grieve.

166. Because ; object of lamentation.

167. Departed ; sea's surface.

168. Declines ; couch.

169. Soon thereafter raises again ; disappearing.

170. Arranges ; rays ; fresh-glittering gold.

171. Flashes ; brow ; early heavens.

172. Descended ; ascended.

173. In consequence of ; beloved power ; strode along.

174. Woods ; waters.

175. Celestial ; watery tresses ; bathes.

176. Listens to ; unspeakable ; wedding lay, epithalamium.

177. Happy realms adoring.

178. Farther his delight ; angel hosts.

179. Holy bands ; pleasant companions.

180. Rejoice ; supernal blessedness glide.

181. Delicately remove.

182. By this time ; mourn.

183. From this time onward ; guardian angel.

Spain, being the coast lying due south of St. Michael's Mount, two places in that direction, across the troubled waters of the English Channel, are named, which, in consequence of our trade with Corunna, were probably more familiar in Milton's days than in ours, viz., *Namannos* and *Bayona*. In the map of Gallisia, in Mercator's Atlas (then a common work, known to all persons of education), we find, in the peninsula of Finisterre, near the site of the present Muxio, "*Namannos T.*" i. e., Turris : Bayona lies south of this, a little to the north of the Minho.

178. Christ, who walked upon the waves of "the Galilean lake."

176. Unexpressive, i. e., "unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter" (2 Cor. xii. 4), sung "at the marriage supper of the Lamb" (Rev. xix. 7, 9). The termination *see* is active, *ble* is passive ; here by poetic licence the former is used for the latter.

183. The presiding and superintending guardian.

In thy *large recompence*, and shalt be good
To all that *wander* in that *perilous flood*. 185

Thus sang the *uncouth swain* to the oaks and rills,
While the *still morn* went out with *sandals grey*;
He *touched* the *tender stops* of *various quills*,
With *eager* thought *warbling* his *Doric lay*:
And now the sun had *stretched out* all the hills, 190
And now *was dropt* into the western bay:
At last he rose, and *twitched* his mantle blue:
To-morrow to *fresh woods*, and *pastures new*.

184. Great reward; kindly.

185. Journey; dangerous sea.

186. In this style; uncultured shepherd.

187. Silent; buskins dun-coloured.

188. Fingering; musical; different reeds.

189. Ardent; singing; song.

190. Unrolled.

191. Had declined; haven.

192. Gathered round him.

193. New groves and meadows.

187. Warton observes that "from the regularity of his pursuits, the purity of his pleasures, his temperance and general simplicity of life, Milton habitually became an early riser, hence he gained an acquaintance with the beauties of the morning, which he so frequently contemplated with delight, and has therefore so repeatedly described in all their various appearances," as in this line and line 25, &c.

189. Sicilian pastoral or "rural minstrelsy."

193. This line refers to the Continental journey which Milton was preparing for at the time the poem was written, and which he did take in April, 1638, shortly after the small quarto which contained it was issued.

A CONFERENCE OF TRADES' UNIONS is to be held in Birmingham in June next, and the following twelve subjects have been selected as those on which papers should be read or resolutions proposed:—1st. Justification of trades' unions; 2nd. Legislation of trades' unions, and the commissioners' report; 3rd. Trades' unions, political economy, and foreign competition; 4th. Reduction of the hours of labour beneficial to the nation; 5th. Limitation of the number of apprentices; 6th. Strikes and lock-outs, their cause and effect; 7th. The necessity of assimilating the Factory and Workshops Acts of 1867; 8th. How far will co-operative production and industrial partnerships assist in settling the conflicting interests of capital and labour? 9th. The necessity of trade unionists having representatives at the meetings of the Social Science Association; 10th. Primary education; 11th. The best means of securing the direct representation of labour in the House of Commons; 12th. The necessity for working class newspapers, and the best means for their establishment.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

881. Can any reader of the *British Controversialist* give me the title and publisher's name of any good and cheap book of instructions to "Executors"?—J. J. M.

882. I lately read an article in a magazine, headed "Whence cometh Evil?" The article, which I presume was only an extract, was independent in thought, frank in statement, clear in argument, and keen in analysis. In a foot-note it stated that it was taken from a book published by Blackwood, Edinburgh, 1828. Could any subscriber kindly furnish me with the title of that book, and the author?—DIAMOND.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

810. Skottowe's Shakspeare is, for the time of its appearance, a very fair book. It follows almost all the old traditions, and wearisomely reiterates the statements of those who had guessed at probabilities instead of inquiring into the known, and interpreting it. The new school of Shaksperians is realistic; it believes in facts, not fictions; and it lays down as a canon of criticism that any supposition hazarded must not only harmonize with, but help to elucidate the known actual and documentary facts of the dramatist's life. Skottowe is the best of the old school biographers, but the vast stride in Shaksperian interpretation since his day has almost superseded his book. It is one, however, which ought to be valued for its painstakingness and research in literary points of interest connected with the works of Shakspeare, and so leading the

way to the union of scholarship with Shaksperian study which now prevails.—S. N.

811. Improvement in writing as a mechanical process may be greatly facilitated by the use of J. A. Cooper's "Penmanship; or, the Art of Writing." Observation, practice, constancy, and care, are the chief requisites to a rapid and beneficial progress in the attainment of a thorough good style of penmanship.—R. M. A.

819. An Annual Register is published regularly, I think, by Messrs. Rivington. The Companion to the Almanack, issued by Charles Knight, serves most of the purposes of such a Register. Year-books of Facts are becoming numerous of late, but they are often too special. I think "A Monthly Historian" a great want in serial literature. Were such a record kept always up to date, and issued thereafter in volumes, it would supply a felt want. Newspapers expand everything, while life unfortunately contracts apace.—J. D.

818. See "The Young Debater," "The Debater's Handbook," and "Public Meetings, and how to Conduct them," by Samuel Neil. A series of papers on this subject have been promised in the *British Controversialist*.—X. Y.

821. Read Neil's "Culture and Self-culture," and then ask special advice on any point required.—X. Y.

822. This query should have been addressed to a scientific journal; but see article Gold in Chambers' Encyclopædia.—X. Y.

820. The best authoritative works on Colonization are the second

vol. of "England and America," by Edward Gibbon Wakefield; 1833, "View of the Art of Colonization," 1836, by the same writer. The critiques of these works contained in the leading Reviews have much interesting matter and thought.—X. Y.

827. One of the following works may suit the querist.—Great works of Raphael, price £1. 11s. 6d. Bell and Daldy. "Expositions of Raphael's Bible," by Rev. R. H. Smith, 10s. 6d. Arthur Miall. I believe there is also a work by the latter author, specially devoted to an exposition of the Cartoons, presumably by the same publisher, and at a somewhat similar price. This, and the "Bible," are illustrated by means of photography, from the original pictures.—W.

"Fac-similes of Original Studies by Raffaele in the University Galleries, Oxford," comprising a hundred plates etched in the most spirited manner, by Joseph

Fisher, of Oxford, with introduction and descriptions, were issued in quarto in 1866; perhaps these are the prints W. B. D. inquires after. We saw in a very recent catalogue (May, 1869) issued by W. J. Smith, North Street, Brighton, a copy for sale, priced at £1. W. B. D. might write to that worthy bibliopole, as it may not be sold.—E. M. A.

829. Chambers' Cyclopædia of Literature; G. L. Craik's History of the English Language and Literature; and Cleveland's Cyclopædia of English Literature, are valuable works. So are Angus's books on English Literature, issued by the Religious Tract Society, and Shaw's works on English Literature, published under the editorship of Dr. Wm. Smith, by Murray. An excellent work for those who can read French readily is Bouillet's "Dictionnaire Universel des Sciences et des Lettres," published by Hachette at £1 1s.—E. M. A.

Literary Notes.

THE 400th anniversary of the birth of Machiavelli was celebrated at Florence on the 3rd May. The ceremony was very simple. Signor Peruzzi, ex-Minister, delivered a speech at Machiavelli's tomb, describing the great epoch of Italian history during which Dante Michiavelli, and Michael Angelo lived. A marble tablet was then uncovered, on which is the following inscription by Mamiana :—"To Machiavelli—the brave and enlightened precursor of the unity of the fatherland, the creator of the national force which has taken the place of foreign mercenaries—this memorial was dedicated by independent and united Italy on the 3rd of May, 1869, the

400th anniversary of his birth." A meeting took place in a summer-house in the park of Ruscellai, where Machiavelli had read some of his works. Here it was announced that a prize of 5,000 lire would be given for the best essay on Machiavelli. In the evening his translation of the "Andria" of Terence was played at the theatre.

Vol. III. of Freeman's "History of the Norman Conquest" is in the press. Two vols. of Froude's "History of England," concluding the reign of Elizabeth are to be issued in the winter.

"Tristram and Yseult" is to be the subject of a new poem, by Mr. Swinburne.

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
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BARTHOLOMEW CLOSE.

PREFACE

LORD CARNARVON, in an address recently delivered at Birmingham, while alluding to the antagonism of feeling, interest, thought, and creed, which excite the minds of men to controversy, spoke as follows :—" Travellers tell us that in some of the Eastern seas, where those wonderful coral islands exist, the insects that form the coral within the reefs, where they are under the shelter of protecting rocks, out of the reach of wind and wave, work quicker, and their work is apparently, to the eye, sound and good. But, on the other hand, those little workers who work outside those reefs in the foam and dash of the waves, are fortified and hardened, and their work is firmer and more enduring. And so I believe it is with men. The more their minds are braced up by conflict, by the necessity of forming opinions upon difficult subjects, the better they will be qualified to go through the hard wear and tear of the world, the better they will be able to hold their own in that conflict of opinion which, after all, it is man's duty to meet." It certainly seems as if, in this country, those views of the beneficiality of controversy, in stimulating the energies and bracing up the powers of the intellect, which we have been urging and endeavouring to exemplify for nearly twenty years, were now about to be practically assented to, and that the day for depreciating controversy has gone by. When man's craving for truth has become not only passionate and earnest, but conscientious; and when his whole moral nature is quickened with the desire to know, believe, and do what is right, he cannot but seek, with a strong love for freedom of thought, to find the means of instituting a comparison, not only of arguments for, but also of objections to, the tenets which claim his attention and practical sympathy. Looked at thus, the closing year acquires great interest in the eyes of those who believe that it is the moral duty of man to search diligently till he find Truth.

1869 has been a period of more than ordinary activity in controversy. The echoes of the discussions held at the elections of 1868 resounded through the newspapers and the political magazines, till the splendid gladiatorialism of parties in Parliament supplied fresh topics for consideration. The threatened collision of Houses intensified the interest taken in the grand questions debated in our Imperial Assemblies; and the energies of the Church in Ireland and in England were strongly put forth in the early contests of the Session. Besides the terrible turmoil of ecclesiastical reorganisation, Ireland has been disturbed by the Amnesty agitation and the advocacy of Land Tenure Reform. In the whole of Britain education has been a theme fertile in controversial thought, and in England it has given origin to two gigantic organisations, whose forces must be expended in intense if not embittered debate. Welsh evictions and ecclesiastical matters have kept the Cymry in a high state of mental excitement; and English workmen have had much animated discussion on trades unions, reciprocity, emigration, and the state of the poor law. In politics, the ballot, finance, and international relations have created no slight stir. Science even has had its contests, not in the metaphysical arena, as usual, but in the very practical questions of life, health, organisation, and natural laws. Moral and religious disquisitions on disputed points have been more than usually abundant.

In our country civil, social, political, and religious changes are always preceded by a powerful and persistent agitation of public opinion, as a preliminary to and a preparation for legislation, and this has been *annus mirabilis* for the amount of controversial thought which has been brought prominently and perseveringly before the public mind by assemblies, alliances, associations, conferences, congresses, commissions, convocations, leagues, meetings, parties, societies,

synods, and unions, on matters of high import and general concernment. Nor is it surely unmeet to notice here the gathering together of a vast deliberative and debating concourse such as the world has not witnessed for upwards of three centuries, the Œcumenical Council, or to quote the words of the Pope himself, in expressing his desire that matters of dispute should be brought to the test of controversy—"so that even out of the contest of a discussion undertaken solely with the desire of finding out the truth," men "may receive a more abundant light to guide them to it."

This power of controversy to set ideas in various lights, and so to afford greater opportunity for thorough investigation, and its value, not more as an educating agency, quickening the mind to a perception of the comparative force of arguments, than as a moral influence, tending to free the soul from the intoxication of prejudice, this serial was established to maintain and exemplify; and we may surely, with pardonable pleasure, note the signs of the times which indicate the practical progress of our opinions and aims.

In reviewing the contents of the volume now passing from our hands, we feel it incumbent on us to express our own feeling—and that we believe of our readers too—of thankfulness to the several contributors to the debates, for their earnest and able papers on the various topics passed under critical examination, and for their general adherence to the subjects in hand and the courtesies of debate; to the essayists for the products of their toil of mind; and to the purveyors of the miscellaneous matter in the *Inquirer*, the *Societies' Section*, the *Literary Notes*, and *Our Collegiate Courses*. Besides the debt of gratitude due to the constantly trusted and long-tried writer whose papers have occupied a place of honour in our Magazine since its first pages were issued, we have to give special acknowledgment to Dr. C. M. Ingleby for his able and informing paper on Sir William R. Hamilton, and several other evidences of friendly interest in our scheme for promoting and extending cultured thoughtfulness. Of the other departments of the Magazine special mention need scarcely be made. On the whole, we are inclined to believe that, for interest, if not for variety, and for amount of information, moral earnestness, and intellectuality, this volume will not compare disadvantageously with its numerous forerunners, and may be regarded, we hope, as worthy of the place claimed for it on the shelves of the zealous student intent on self-culture, the thoughtful seeker after truth, the earnest sympathizer with efforts made for the improvement of others, or the aspirant towards the companionship of men of mind.

Our ministrations in literature have always been so shaped—at least in intent and endeavour—as to lead to the acceptance of our serial by young men of intellectual bent, as a friend, a comrade, and a guide; to have it regarded as one of the nobler and ennobling influences operating upon them through the press of our age; and we have ever been zealous in our efforts to make it worthy of a valued place among those purpose-guided agencies—

"That keep down the base in man;
That teach high thoughts and amiable words,
And courtliness, and the desire of fame,
And love of truth and all that makes a Man."

We hope in the coming year to steer our course to the same end, with the aid and favour of our old friends, and with the added expectancy of many more, to whom we hope to be introduced by those who have so far loved our enterprise and approved our labours.

THE BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST.

Modern Historians.

JAMES ANTHONY FROUDE, M.A., LL.D.,

Lord Rector of the University of St. Andrew's, &c.

On 22nd August, 1485, at the plain of Redmoor, about a mile southward of Market Bosworth, an epoch in the annals of England was closed by the death of Richard III.; and the beginning of the modern history of our country takes its date from the time when Lord Stanley, on Crown Hill, at the close of the scarce-cold battle of Bosworth Field, placed the royal diadem, battered in the hot fight as it was, on the head of Henry Tudor, Earl of Richmond, as Henry the Seventh, in the hope that thereafter "the purple testament of bleeding war" should remain unopened, between divided York and Lancaster, and that the Tudor dynasty in long succession should

"Enrich the time to come with smooth-faced peace,
With smiling plenty and fair prosperous days."

This was the great necessity in England then; the one desire of all good and noble spirits was to see an end of the dissensions which destroyed all the happiness attainable in life and kept the country ever on the dangerous edge of war. The time had come when "peace at any price" became a thing men sighed for, and hence the eager energy with which they hastened and pressed on in their endeavour

"To reap the harvest of perpetual peace
By this the bloody trial of sharp war."

Henry VII. was skilled in kingcraft. He was a master in the policy of states, astute and wily, cautious and wilful, keen to detect and quick to rectify any false step he made, and excessively sharp in taking advantage of any slip made by another. He knew the worth of wealth, and that he who had treasure at his command had war at his beck, though he grew to love money more for itself afterwards than for the power of which it is the sign.

Henry VII. was, as Bacon judged, one of the *tres magi* of the kings of his age; and the skill with which he managed the preliminary concerns on which depended his kingly position, title, and predominance, the ability with which he manœuvred with his contemporaries

in the sovereignty, the popularity he won to himself among the people, and the success with which he conducted the affairs of a nation full of the elements of discord, in the midst of ambitious and jealous rivals, justify the ascription to him of the praise of being "a wise man and an excellent king" when "the times were rough and full of mutations and rare accidents." He was the consolidator of the English sovereignty, and the inaugurator of that modern policy of the balance of power among the states of Europe which still endures, as well as of that artful balancing of the rivalries of party which has promoted, in a great measure, the development of order and progress in England under the sovereign dynasties who knew the craft and policy of rulership.

"After the decease of that wise and fortunate king, Henry VII., who died in the height of his prosperity, there followed, as useth to do when the sun setteth so exceeding clear, one of the fairest mornings of a kingdom that hath been known in this land or anywhere else. A young king, about eighteen years of age, for stature, strength, making, and beauty, one of the goodliest persons of his time. And though he were given to pleasure, yet was he desirous of glory; so that there was a passage open in his mind by glory to virtue. . . . He was the first heir of the White and Red Rose; so that there was no discontented party now left in the kingdom, but all men's hearts turned towards him; and not only their hearts but their eyes also, for he was the only son of the kingdom. . . . And for the people and state in general, they were in such lowness of obedience as subjects were like to yield who had lived almost four-and-twenty years under so politic a king as his father; being also one who came partly in by the sword, and had so high a courage in all points of regality, and was ever victorious in rebellions and seditions of the people. The crown extremely rich and full of treasure, and the kingdom like to be so in a short time; for there was no war, no dearth, no stop of trade or commerce. . . . It may truly be said, there had scarcely been seen or known in many ages such a rare concurrence of signs and promises, and of a happy and flourishing reign to ensue, as were now met in this young king—called, after his father's name, Henry the Eighth."*

The sixteenth century was a time of stir and change. The spread of learning, the increase of commerce, the progress of maritime discovery, the consolidation of the power of sovereigns in consequence of the alliance of kings with people against the great feudal chiefs, the terrible arbitrament of war, the corruptions of ecclesiastical life, the arrogance of the papal pretensions, and the Saracenic irruption into Europe, quickened men's minds, and excited the activities of thought upon questions of truth and right. It was a time of fierce wars and terrible commotions, of momentous disputations and striking events. In short, it was a period of revolution and reform. Autocratic might and popular influence both simultaneously increased; and action and reaction, resulting in a

* Bacon's "Henry VIII."

surging and intense stir of thought, induced a gradual ripening of mind, and brought into effective and vital correlation with the age, various, though, for the most part, stern and grave thinkers, noble actors, and men of calm endurance of the hardness of the time with the hardness of lofty spirits.

In such a period great men are essential to history, and it is in such circumstances that great men appear and act; it is especially so with rulers who must stand the test of their times, or fall before the events which hasten to their consummation. Nor in this conjuncture of time and circumstance did their rulers belie the hopes of the English people. "On the whole," says Mr. Froude, "they were ruled as they preferred to be ruled; and if wisdom can be tested by success, the manner in which they passed the great crisis of the Reformation is the best justification of their princes. The era was great throughout Europe. The Italians of the age of Michael Angelo; the Spaniards who were the contemporaries of Cortez; the Germans who shook off the Pope at the call of Luther; and the splendid chivalry of Francis I. of France, were no common men. But they were all brought face to face with the same trials, and none met them as the English met them. The English alone never lost their self-possession, and if they owed something to fortune in their escape from anarchy, they owed more to the strong hand and steady purpose of their rulers." To the Tudor dynasty England was indebted for its training in the heroism of self-restraint, the nobleness of nationality, and the possibility of exercising at once freedom and faith.

It is difficult for us in modern days to estimate the changes which have been wrought in human life by the initiation of self-government and personal manliness, by the ennoblement of self-helpfulness in combination with a fervent faith in God, to which the Tudors gave their sanction and their aid, and by the invigoration of the personal conscience through the enfranchisement of the private judgment.

"The Reformation, the Antipodes, the American Continent, the planetary system, and the infinite deep of the heavens, have now become common and familiar facts to us. Globes and orreries are the playthings of our school days; we inhale the spirit of Protestantism with our earliest breath of consciousness. It is all but impossible to throw back our imagination into the time when, as new discoveries, they stirred every mind which they touched with awe and wonder at the revelation which God has sent down among mankind. Vast spiritual and material continents lay for the first time displayed; opening fields of thought and fields of enterprise, of which none could conjecture the limit. Old routine was broken up. Men were thrown back on their own strength and their own power, unshackled, to accomplish whatever they might dare. And although we do not speak of these discoveries as the cause of that enormous force of heart and intellect which accompanied them (for they were as much the effect as the cause, and one reacted on the

other), yet at any rate they afforded scope and room for the play of powers which, without such scope, let them have been as transcendent as they would, must have passed away unproductive and blighted.*

This is the great theme for which a new historian was required—the origin, progress, and incidents of the Reformation, that notable crisis in history in which “a nobler order of conviction” arose in men’s souls, as the ruler of life; and worship and holiness by proxy, were found and declared to be untenable in a healthy state of the human relationships of men, or the proper subordination of human life to divine law.

An historian arose who had himself known something of the controversies which arise in an age when the concrete creed of the Church had failed to satisfy the consciences of men, and a terrible *perhaps!* struck terror of spirit into the minds of inquirers, while a strong assertive dogmatism and an insinuating plausibility were plied by the advocates of orthodoxy among men of thought. The revival of Catholicism, under the name of Tractarianism, was raising again the question of corporate or individual Christianity; and Mr. Froude was brought into the presence of thought, on the one hand freighted with idolatry of the past, and on the other with bright auguries of the future, and he set himself to consider in history the time when personal morality struck down the claims of Church piety.

The special point of view which gives interest and originality to Mr. Froude’s new endeavour to narrate the story of our island’s progress is, that he looks on events as the issue of the moral and emotional nature of man, on life as a development of individuality, and law as the written evidence of man’s loftiest moral conceptions in any given age. The mere diffusion of traditionary creeds, of verbal knowledge, of physical comforts and political prosperity, does not blind him to the facts that underlie all these external things—what manner of men and women dwelt in England then; what lives did they lead, what faiths did they hold, and what hopes sustained them; what, in short, was their standard of duty. It is, according to his view, “precisely in the debatable ground of low motives and noble emotions—in the struggle, ever failing, yet ever renewed, to carry truth and justice into the administration of human society; in the establishment of states and in the overthrow of tyrannies; in the rise and fall of creeds; in the world of ideas; in the character and deeds of the great actors in the drama of life; where good and evil fight out their everlasting battle, now ranged in opposite camps, now, and more often in the heart, both of them, of each living man—that the true human interest of history resides.”† “The address of history is less to the understanding than to the higher emotions. We learn in it to sympathize with what is great and good; we learn to hate what is base.”‡ In the

* “England’s Forgotten Worthies.”—*Westminster Review*, 1852, 167

† “The Science of History,” in *Short Studies on Great Subjects*, p. 23.

anomalies of fortune we feel the mystery of our mortal existence; and in the companionship of the illustrious natures who have shaped the fortunes of the world we escape from the littlenesses which cling to the round of common life, and our minds are tuned to a higher and nobler key."* "It is a voice for ever sounding across the centuries the law of right and wrong. Opinions alter, manners change, creeds rise and fall, but the moral law is written on the tablets of eternity."†

The great epoch of moral change in England; if not in Europe, was coincident with the Tudor dynasty, as the great epoch of political change occurred under the Stuarts; the great epoch of fiscal change took its rise under the House of Hanover, and the great epoch of commercial change is slowly evolving itself under the House of Brunswick, to be followed probably and summed up in a great religious change, in which a true faith shall incorporate itself with all life—personal, national, social, commercial, political, legal and ecclesiastical—shall dwell in the heart and operate in every act. It is a common error, as we think, to call the Reformation in its essence a religious movement. It was a moral revulsion rather than a religious revolution. That is implied in its name, the Reformation. Religious enfranchisement is yet to come. Individual conviction is yet to be revered in all civil and social relations, and the sovereignty of Christ in the Spirit is to be declared supreme over all other dominions and principalities.

Mr. Froude had prepared himself for the laborious duties of an historian by the sedulous culture of distinguished talents, by the acquisition of much learning, by the exercise of careful habits of research, and by the diligent study of human nature, not only in the ethical system of Aristotle, the study of which had been made popular in Oxford by Hampden and Whately; but in the higher modern works on morals in which England has been somewhat rich, and in the loftiest and noblest course of the philosophy of the right to which man has had access—the Gospel. Having fixed in his mind the prime principles of moral science, Mr. Froude determined to surround himself in his re-constructive imaginations of the past—as far as possible—with the moral atmosphere of that past; to think and feel not only of, but with the several great actors in the Drama of History; and, as much as in him lay, to receive his impression of the characters of those, of whose doings he was about to become the narrator, from themselves, or their contemporaries and equals. He maintains that "when historians have to relate great social or speculative changes—the overthrow of a monarchy or the establishment of a creed—they do but half their duty if they merely relate the events."‡ Hence he says, "whenever possible let us not be told about this man or that, let us hear the man himself speak; let us

* "The Science of History," in *Short Studies on Great Subjects*, vol. i., p. 34.
 † *Ibid.*, p. 26. ‡ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

see him act, and let us be left to form our own opinions about him: The historian, we are told, must not leave his readers to themselves. He must not only lay the facts before them, he must tell them what he himself thinks about those facts. In my opinion, this is precisely what he ought not to do.* "The philosophy of history, which resolves events into the action of organic and necessary laws, conceals from us the perplexities of the living instruments by which those events were brought about. We see what actually happened; we imagine that we discern the causes which determined the effects; and in assuming a necessary connection between them; we smile at the needless fears, we ridicule the needless precautions of kings and ministers; we despise them as short-sighted; we censure them as arbitrary and tyrannical; failing to perceive, or else failing to acknowledge, that if the results were inevitable, the characters which assisted to produce those results were inevitable also. By a subtle process of intellectual injustice, we convert the after-experience of facts into principles of reasoning which would have enabled us to foresee these facts; and we infer, with unconscious complacency, the superiority of modern intelligence. 'Knowledge of the result,' a wise man once observed, 'has spoiled the composition of history.' A just moral appreciation of conduct is made impossible by it. The remedy, so far as there is a remedy, is to look wherever we can through the eyes of contemporaries from whom the future was concealed."† Mr. Froude has, in pursuance of this plan, examined every contemporary document within his reach; and read it in conjunction and comparison with the facts as they are handed down in the records of the time and age. He had the aid, too, of Sir F. Palgrave, through whose kindness he was enabled "to consult a great number of MSS. relating to the Reformation, hitherto all but unknown to the public," and he constantly refers to these papers, now fortunately rendered easily accessible through the intelligent co-operation of the Master of the Rolls. "Mr. Froude's chief text-book seems to have been State Papers and Acts of Parliament. He has begun his work in the only temper in which a man can write accurately and well; in a temper of trust towards the generation whom he describes. The only temper, for if a man has no affection for the characters of whom he reads, he will never understand them; if he has no respect for his subject, he will never take the trouble to exhaust it. To such an author, the statutes at large, as the deliberate expression of the nation's will and conscience, will appear the most important of all sources of information; the first to be consulted, the last to be contradicted; the canon which is not to be checked and corrected by private letters and flying pamphlets, but which is to check and correct them.' . . . If these 'public documents are not to be admitted in evidence before all others, we see no hope for the faithful and earnest historian; he must give himself up to swim as he may on

* "The Science of History," in *Short Studies on Great Subjects*, p. 34.

† *History of England. The Reign of Elizabeth*. chan. xvii., p. 406.

the frothy stream of private letters, anecdotes and pamphlets, the puppet of the ignorance, credulity, peevishness, spite of any and every gossip and scribbler."*

This theory of judging of and testing men and events from the inner light of their conscience, rather than from hypotheses formed regarding their policy and motives by the historian, has much to commend it—especially this, that, as men commonly place the best ostensible motives which they can conceive before others, and even before themselves, as justifications of, or reasons for their conduct, and require to keep as near to these, in fact, as they can, we run little risk of judging them with unrighteous judgment; whereas, if we, looking at the affairs of history in the light of after-events, seek to interpret them as a sequence of intentionally produced results, there is every probability of our adding in our interpretative exposition elements which did not arise in the intentions of the actors. At all events, it cannot be denied that this new method of reading history has special merits, and we cannot but suppose that some notice of the life and works of such an original, able and popular historian as we now speak of, is likely to be acceptable to our readers.

James Anthony Froude was born in the ancient manor-house of Dartington, in Devonshire, near the old historic archidiaconal town of Totness, which stands on a hill slope beside the river Dart. In this tenement, built in the reign of Richard II. about the end of the fourteenth century, dwelt the Ven. Richard Hurrell Froude, Archdeacon of Totness, himself known well in the church of which he was an accomplished dignitary, but perhaps now more widely known as the father of "Richard Hurrell Froude, the only Confessor of Oxford Catholicism, who has yet taken his place in ecclesiastical biography,—born on the Feast of the Annunciation, 1808, and died in 1836. He was an Etonian; a Fellow of Oriel College; a priest in Holy Orders; a writer of journals, letters, sermons, and unsuccessful prize essays; an occasional contributor to the periodical literature of his theological associates; and during the last four years of his life, a resident alternately in the south of Europe and the West Indies."† His third son, J. A. Froude, born in 1818, is known wherever English literature is studied as one of the most notable of modern historians, and one of the most original and cultured essayists who use the language of Bacon, Addison, and Hume. After acquiring "a little country grammar knowledge," he became a scholar in the illustrious historic College of St. Peter's, Westminster, commonly known as Westminster School, which owed the first draft of its modern constitution to the royal pen of our historian's hero—Henry VIII., 1540, and that of his daughter Elizabeth, Regina, 1560.

Within the precincts of the old abbey, under the impress of

* Kingsley's *Miscellanies*, vol. ii., p. 89.

† *Edinburgh Review* July, 1888, p. 525.

masters famous for scholastic lore, and amid memories of those who had added lustre to the place of their up-bringing, the names they bore and the land of their birth, Froude took his part in the studies and amusements of his time—slept in its dormitory, dined in its fine old Abbatical hall, conned with his "helps," contested for place under the master's eye in the challenges, and acted his part in the theatrical performances which form so large an interest in Westminster school life. From Westminster with the splendid classical attainments of an Upper Westministerian, James Anthony Froude passed onward to Oxford, to add University culture to academical training. In school he had acquired habits of industry, punctuality, obedience, and the art of endeavouring to do his best among his compeers; besides a good stock of information so imparted as to develop the intellectual powers, and to discipline the taste, he had acquired a considerable amount of general knowledge, and had learnt to take pleasure in the attainment of the results of patient research as the truest rewards of scholarship. To good natural feeling and a gentlemanly deportment he added the culture of moral principle, and that elevation of the character which springs from religious tendencies, and trainings sedulously improved, and home influences which are rare, even in the homes of England in which pure womanly holiness abounds with such effect.

The period at which Mr. Froude went up to Oxford to undergo the special training of University life was one of great stir and activity, of change and research. In the Common Room of Oriel College, Copleston, Davison, Whately, Arnold, Keble, Hawkins, Hampden, &c., had inaugurated a period of earnest, investigative ardour. Newman, Pusey, Baden Powell, Hinds, Denison, Eden, and Wilberforce, continued the course of inquiry and the persistent pursuit of intellectual controversialism. Out of Oriel there had risen the intense movements which issued respectively in Ritualism and Rationalism. It was the very "head-centre of the Tractarian movement, into the very vortex of which Richard Hurrell Froude had been carried, and out of whose life and memorials that party strove to find sympathy and strengthening in their efforts to sacerdotalize the Church. But at the very side of it, and having its root-source in the same Common Room there went off from it quite an opposite movement, of which Hampden, Baden Powell, A. H. Clough, Hinds, F. W. Newman, Fellowes, H. B. Wilson, E. V. Neale, Jowett, and others took the lead—developing to the other extreme the reason, as the former sectary had developed faith. In the very heat and ardour of the intense activities and rivalries of that era of commotion, James Anthony Froude went up to the same college as his eldest brother had been a member of, with so much honour and peculiar distinction, and which his other brother William was about to leave, after having taken classic and mathematical honours, to receive Deacon's orders as the first step in his clerical career.

With a temper much less morose and self-castigating than the earliest Saint in the Calendar of Tractarianism, with an intellect less abstractive and sedulous than his immediate fraternal predecessor in the Oriel Common Room, but with an ambition not less earnest and vigorous, and a mind of more varied powers and sympathies, he took his place among the young spirits of the University, when the great forces of Conservatism and Liberalism, Ritualism and Rationalism were fighting hand to hand in the great Hampden case, and Oxford was astir and aglow with the claims of Dissenters on the one hand, and the demands of the Orthodox (as they averred they were) on the other. It could not but be a trying time for a mind of quick apprehension and genial sympathies, with a good deal of self-contained individuality and single-heartedness. The great controversy of Sacramentarianism was stirring every spirit, and into the very heart of that discussion, the name, life, character, private opinions, letters, journals and sermons of his brother were put forward with emphasis, under the editorship of John Henry Newman, as showing the value of Ritualistic Christianity. A great degree of noticeability was conferred on the young Orielist in consequence of this, and an extra amount of reflectiveness was excited in him concerning the first elements of Religion. The indiscreet activity of the Oxford School provoked a reaction in many minds, and beside the intense Ritualism it advocated, there arose an intense Rationalism to countervail it.

This reactionary spirit exhibited itself in some singular incidents, as for instance, the highly-pitched Catholicity, in its Romanized form, of J. H. Newman; and the resolute Scepticism of his brother Francis Wm. Newman; and scarcely less remarkable was the direction of mind taken into the spirit of good, scholarly, and ascetic Richard H. Froude, than that vigorous independency of thought which James Anthony Froude asserted to himself, and the sturdiness with which he advocated and practised the right and duty of personal investigation on all points of religious doctrine, and of holding as sacred the conclusions of the individual conscience in matters of evil, error, or wrong, and righteousness, faith, or truth.

At the Easter term, 1840, James Anthony Froude graduated B.A., with second-class honours in Humanity, being the only person then up for examination from Oriel who took honours, and he was almost immediately thereafter elected Fellow of Exeter, of whom eight are chosen preferentially from the archdeaconries of Exeter, Totness, and Barnstaple. In 1842 he received the Chancellor's prize for an English essay on "The Influence of the Science of Political Economy on the Moral and Social Welfare of a Nation," and recited it in the Sheldonian Theatre in June with considerable applause from the distinguished auditory.

He acted, subsequently, as tutor in Exeter College, and devoted himself to the culture and development of his mind, to literary improvement and historical reading. In 1844 Mr. Froude, having graduated M.A., took deacon's orders, but, having formed opinions

which he thought inconsistent with the pursuit of the ministry of the Church of England as a profession, he halted in his course priestwards, turned his mind to literature, and began to consider the propriety of looking out for scholastic preferment. About this time it was proposed to found and endow a Collegiate Institution in Campbell Town, in the County of Launceston in Tasmania, and instructions were received from the Colony, addressed to some gentleman of influence at home and attached to colonial interests abroad, to make inquisition for a suitable person to occupy a position of so much importance in the colony as the headship of an institution which was to be affiliated to, and modelled, in some measure, after the colleges of England. Among those whom the nominators viewed with favour, after due consideration of their respective merits, no one stood higher than James Anthony Froude, M.A., Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford, and it was accordingly determined to recommend him for the appointment to those with whom the formal filling-up of the vacancy legally rested.

Just about the time that this scholastic scheme was mooted, Mr. Froude, following the bent of the age towards the production and perusal of controversial works on political and religious questions, and so inducing an illogical and unreasoning public to take an interest in the inner sorrows of the living present, and the promised delights of proposed change, issued, in 1847, a volume of short stories, having for their object an exposition of the difficulties experienced in the conflict of opinion under the title of "The Shadows of the Clouds." The work was remarkable for the vivid emphasis of its style, its intense emotional power, the delicate expressiveness of its descriptive portions, and the almost feminine tenderness and pathos imparted to its searching analysis of the secret feelings, impulses, impressions, and passions of the spirit under the shadows which are seen in, or are flung back on, the gazer from the clouds which carry in their bosom the very brightness of the sun. The work was at once accepted as the firstling of a writer of no common merit. When, however, in two years afterwards the shadows had deepened into a darkness that could be felt, and the grave grief of a solemnly entertained and serious scepticism had issued from his investigations of the clouded heaven of dogmatic theology, and he published the "Nemesis of Faith," he was quickly assailed as a propagator of "unbelieving belief and Christless Christianity." Having found the extreme doctrines of the Sacramentarians fail, upon trial, to support and transport his spirit, and having proclaimed them to be hopeless, heartless, insufficient, and false as the ice on which the skater gracefully plays, but over which the burdened pilgrim cannot walk, he affirmed that the fate of such faith was failure in the hour of the soul's deepest need.

The immediate result of the issue of this work was the loss of his Fellowship at Exeter, and the appointment which he had received in Tasmania, was cancelled—proceedings which led to the publication of a second edition of the work with an explanatory

preface. But the *μήνυς οδλομένη*—"unhappy rancour" of theologians is unappeasable. A doubt of them is tenfoldly more criminal than doubt of reason, truth, or even of the Spirit of truth. Rational piety is to the dogma-mongers "a thing impossible." A man *wishes* to disbelieve, and hence he does it, the *sons et origo malorum* being the deceivable unrighteousness of human inclination. They cannot comprehend the solitary contests of the soul with doubt, the dull, dead fall upon the spirit of a mighty darkness, and the voiceless sorrow which strikes into the innermost nature of a thoughtful man when the faiths of his early days fall off like the masks of phantoms, and seem no longer truths which are "crystallized for ever." They have no sympathy with the man who sees "The Shadows in the Clouds," or fellow feeling for one who speaks of "The Soul, its Sorrows, and its Aspirations;" they limit all right thinking to those who keep within the narrow pale of their petrified orthodoxy, anathematize the learning and research which throw light upon their bigotries, and hate the tolerance which sees in a man who is honestly striving to conquer his inward nature to reverence and fidelity, and to convert the blindly adopted dogmas of his youth into the living growths of his own spirit and the fruits of the good seed of heaven cultured in his own soul, with a holy desire to offer unto God "reasonable service" and spiritual worship. Nor do they seem to see that if in those who cannot take their short cut to certainty—the acceptance of a certain series of doctrines as infallibly true—"the wish is father to the thought" in which doubt arises, the wish may be equally present and prevailing with those who abnegate the rights of reason, and implicitly submit their judgment to the decrees of certain sovereigns of thought, as if they were absolutist and despotical decrees, having power to abrogate the divinely given personal duty of personal inquiry and personal faith—the delight of replying to the invitation, "Come unto Me,"—"Lord, I believe, help Thou mine unbelief;" or rising to a loftier height of well founded faith, saying; "Unto whom can we go but unto Thee, O Lord, Thou hast the words of eternal life?"

What has been called "The New Oxford Infidelity" was profoundly reverential. It did not sneer, or scoff at, or satirize, or caricature the religious opinions which had excited in them the questioning spirit. This modified form of scepticism was the natural reaction of the Ritualistic modification of Romanism promulgated at Oxford—that faith alone was the true light of the Christian life—and so forcing the thoughtful to make choice of reason, freedom, and Infidelity, or faith, submission, and Popery. This was a false issue; for—we now use the words of Henry Rogers—"God has created 'two great lights,' the greater light to rule man's busy day—and that is reason; and the lesser to rule his contemplative night—and that is faith. But Faith herself shines only as she reflects some faint illumination from that brighter orb—reason."

It is as an exposition to the imagination of the idea that faith must not only be the ruling principle in, but the despot of the soul that the Nemesis of Faith appears to us to have been written. Its hero is a convert from the orthodox Christianity of the Thirty-nine Articles to the new beliefs of the rationalistic thinkers; but feeling that faith darkens as reason's light shines on the holy page of the systematic theology in which he was brought up, he resolves to close with his perplexity and weakness by accepting that faith and submitting to that Church which is the sanctuary of the soul and the one ark of salvation in the sea of faith, when there is no bounding coast-line of reason, with its beacons and lighthouses, its charted courses and accessible havens, allowed to meet the eye of the soul in its voyage of life; and he disappears into a monastery. The manner in which it relates the struggles of the soul as the light of the old faiths grows dim, and the indecisive gleams of new ones arise; the passionate yearnings for certainty, and the gloom of picturesque asceticism with which his soul cannot rest satisfied, is profoundly interesting, and must in some of its phases be actual, not imaginary; but as both of these early productions of the author's university years have since been called in, we should not be justified in bringing out into prominence by quotation any portions which, in our opinion, might be thought to be possessed of any autobiographical interest. We note their publication here as incidents in his life, not as giving glances into the state of his spirit.

It is perhaps worthy of note that at the time when "Peter Jones; or, Onward Bound;" Newman's "The Soul; its Sorrows and its Aspirations;" Foxton's "Popular Christianity;" Donaldson's "Christian Orthodoxy," the prevalence of German rationalism and the advent of "Positivism" as a speculative topic among the thinkers of the age made men quake with terror at the apparent approach of a coming reformation, Charles Kingsley championed the Exeter delinquent who forgot that Truth was crucified; and that martyrdom lies in the life-path of world reformers.* Kingsley's

* We have said in the text "who forgot," perhaps we should have said who despised and disregarded the fact; for in a paper in the *Westminster Review* in 1853, since republished, we find him giving a beautiful passage on this great truth in history:—

"They knew the service which they had chosen, and they did not ask the wages for which they had not laboured. Life with them was no summer holiday, but a holy sacrifice offered up to duty, and what their Master sent was welcome. Beautiful is old age—beautiful as the slow-dropping mellow autumn of a rich, glorious summer. In the old man, Nature has fulfilled her work; she loads him with her blessings; she fills him with the fruits of a well-spent life; and, surrounded by his children and his children's children, she rocks him softly away to the grave, to which he is followed with blessings. God forbid we should not call it beautiful. It is beautiful, but not the most beautiful. There is another life, hard, rough, and thorny, trodden with bleeding feet and aching brow; the life of which the Cross is the symbol; a battle which no peace follows this side the

article appeared in *Fraser's Magazine* 233, p. 445. Shortly afterwards, James Anthony Froude became, by his marriage with the daughter of the late Pascoe Grenfell, Esq., successively M.P. of Truro, and, subsequently, of Great Marlow, the brother-in-law of the author of "Alton Locke," and "Yeast," Curate of Eversley, &c. As *confères* and *collaborateurs*, in serial writing they were brought much together, and, as it seems to us, no little of the merit of the summary of principles which Charles Kingsley, as Professor of Modern History in the University of Cambridge, inculcates with such force and *verve* upon his hearers is due to his admiring esteem for Mr. Froude's moral system as an historian, and his registration of the supremacy of conscience in any attempt to comprehend or explain the motives of men. It was a bold and generous act in these times to uphold a man to whom University and Church were alike unsparing, and it causes the heart to warm to see such practical "Christian socialism" in one of the chaplains to Her Majesty the Queen.

In 1850, when *The Leader* was commenced, Mr. Froude accepting it as an organ of advancing opinion, occasionally contributed to its columns, and especially wrote in it an exposition of "The Philosophy of Catholicism," and several other papers of which we have no note, but some of which have been republished. About the same time, too, he became connected with *Fraser's Magazine*, whose contributors form a literary republic and a sort of close corporation. In this serial, which once rejoiced in the *Nom des Lettres* of "Regina," there appeared, during the period of his early connection with it, a splendid article on "Homer," bringing out the moral lessons of the "Iliad" and the "Odyssey," showing their differences and their similarities as (probably) two parts of one progressive whole in thought; some papers in vindication of the moral character of Queen Elizabeth; a critical and philosophical article on "Reynard the Fox;" and many other contributions. In or about 1856, the historian of England during the Tudor dynasty became editor of *Fraser's Magazine*, and thereafter enriched that serial with many papers of profound interest and great value.

When, in 1851, *The Westminster Review* changed proprietors, and became the recognised literary organ of thought, free from the conventional fetters of party and of creed, devoted to the consideration of questions in the light of what has been called "The Progress School," a new staff of thoughtful, earnest, reflective, and able writers required to be collected together, to form the band of the

grave; which the grave gapes to finish before the victory is won: and strange that it should be so—this is the highest life of man: look back along the great names of history; there is none whose life has been other than this. They to whom it has been given to do the really highest work on this earth—whoever they are, Jew or Gentile, Pagan or Christian, warriors, legislators, philosophers, priests, poets, kings, slaves, one and all, their fate has been the same—the same bitter cup has been given them to drink."—"England's Forgotten Worthies."—*Westminster Review*, 1852.

trustworthy, on whom the conductors could rely for the proper preparation of papers adapted to the end in view, Mr. John Chapman invited the aid and co-operation of Mr. Froude, in the contest against precedent and prejudice in social life, political advocacy, literary criticism, philosophic speculation, and religious or ecclesiastical affairs and cares. Cast from the anchorage of a verbal creed, cut off by exclusion from the dominant parties in the Church, and feeling the benefit and the necessity of a free course of inquiry, as an awakening from a dead, and a preliminary to a living faith, Mr. Froude accepted the offer, and became a *collaborateur* with Harriet Martineau, Sarah Hennell, Maria Evans and F. P. Cobbe; Bain and Spencer, Lewes and Coulthard, Newman and Williams, Mackay and Morley, Greg and Toulmin Smith, Nichol, and Foxton, who had been brought into the editor's company of high and earnest minds, capable of dealing with the various phases of thought and fact, science and letters, history and life as a coalition of independent thinkers. With the year 1852 the new Series of the Review began, and feeling his avocation towards history stirring within him, Mr. Froude furnished to the July number a paper on "Forgotten English Worthies,"—being a notice of the lives, doings, sufferings, and discoveries of the Seamen of the Tudor Times, and the First James, whom he denominates "the base son of a bad mother." From this paper we cull a specimen, the interest of which is detachable from the context:—

"We wonder at the grandeur, the moral majesty of some of Shakspeare's characters, so far beyond what the noblest among ourselves can imitate, and at first thought we attribute it to the genius of the poet, who has outstripped nature in his creations. But we are misunderstanding the power and the meaning of poetry in attributing creativeness to it in any such sense. Shakspeare created, but only as the spirit of nature created around him, working in him as it worked abroad in those among whom he lived. The men whom he draws were such men as he saw and knew; the words they utter were such as he heard in the ordinary conversations in which he joined. At the "Mermaid" with Raleigh and with Sidney, and at a thousand unnamed English firesides, he found the living originals for his Prince Hals, his Orlandos, his Antonios, his Portias, his Isabellas. The closer personal acquaintance which we can form with the English of the age of Elizabeth, the more we are satisfied that Shakspeare's great poetry is no more than the rhythmic echo of the life which it depicts."*

To this passage we may append another from a different paper on the same engrossing theme:—

"It is in this characteristic that we are accustomed to say Shakspeare's supreme *truth* lies. He represents real life. His dramas teach as life teaches—neither less nor more. He builds his fabrics as nature does, on right and wrong; but he does not struggle to make nature more systematic than she is. In the subtle interflow of good and evil—in the unwarred sufferings of innocence—in the disproportion of penalties to desert in the seeming blindness with which justice, in attempting to assert itself, over-

* "Short Studies on Great Subjects," vol. ii. p. 104.

whelms innocent and guilty in a common ruin—Shakspeare is true to real experience. The mystery of life he leaves as he finds it; and, in his most tremendous positions, he is addressing rather the intellectual emotions than the understanding,—knowing well that the understanding in such things is at fault, and the sage as ignorant as the child.*

He continued his contributions for several years, and among the papers which we believe may be attributed to his pen we may mention the following: 1853, *Mary Tudor* (Jan.); *John Knox* (July); *The Book of Job* (Oct.); 1854, *Cardinal Wolsey* (July); *History; its Use and Meaning* (Oct.); 1855, *Spinoza* (July); 1856, *Rise of the Dutch Republic* (April). In 1856 the "Oxford Essays" were begun, and to this projected University annual Mr. Froude contributed one of the most interesting of its papers, that namely "*On the Best Means of Teaching English History*," an able and suggestive tractate, well written, bold, original, and instructive.

It had been for some time known that Mr. Froude was engaged on a work which would illustrate his opinions on the method and spirit in which history ought to be written, and that he was applying his utmost industry and thoughtfulness to the elucidation of a period of history which was at once important and intricate. That period was the Reformation, a period which might be regarded as roughly synchronous with the sovereignty of the Tudor dynasty. Under the sway of these monarchs the Reformed doctrines had their rise into public view and effectiveness, and under the first of the Tudors the spirits and habits of men were prepared by obedience and submission, by confidence and reverence, to accept a nobler idea of duty and life, and to act upon loftier principles with personal energy and effective virtue. Among modern historians this period, well defined though it was in the persons, the dynasty, the events and the purposes of which it treated, had not received that attentive consideration which seemed essential to a full comprehension of its influence on the moral life of the nation. Lingard systematically suppressed or depressed the nobler traits of the Tudors and their ministers, and brought carefully into prominence such portions of their active times as might suggest or inspire depreciative comments. This led to a controversy between himself and his critics. Sharon Turner's "*History of England during the Middle Ages*," which he ultimately extended to the close of Elizabeth's reign, is written with a conception of the dignity of history somewhat after the fashion of Gibbon, and is, though full of varied information and original matter, cast altogether in a form too secular to satisfy the moral requirements of the student of the Reformation, who wishes to understand its principles not less than its progress. Mr. Hallam's "*Constitutional History of England*" is a work so calm, impartial, cold, and temperate as to affect the spirit with a sense of grandeur. But the old story of our great

* "The Science of History," in *Short Studies on Great Subjects*, vol. i., p. 27.

movement towards freedom is criticised by him from views, practices, and forms of political speculation which are modern, and, to some extent, inapplicable to the ruder times and graver exigencies of the Reformation; so that his very judiciousness disqualifies him for being a recorder of the passionate years of the Tudor times. Lord John Russell misestimates the Reformation as an outburst of partizanship, determined to put an end to the folly and ferocity of the pre-constitutional ages, and as having its moral significance in the political results at which it arrived and the practical settlements it involved; and Macaulay regarded, or seemed to regard, the Reformation of the sixteenth century as of quite inferior historical interest to the Revolution of the seventeenth. Carlyle alone of modern writers prior to Froude, appears to have felt the ethical value of the Reformation; but even "to him," as Mr. Froude remarks, "the greatness of English character was waning with the dawn of English literature; the race of heroes was already failing. The era of action was yielding before the era of speech." To Mr. Froude we owe the recognition of the heroism of moral character in modern history, and of the might of opinion over men and events.

Two principles, articulately set forth, chiefly govern the narrative of the historian of the Tudors, viz. (1), that the history of a country is most truly and most satisfactorily to be gathered from and studied in the public record of its public acts, as they are found in the statute-book and other authentic registers of events, and the grounds on which they were transacted—these being the accounts rendered to the conscience of the nation, of what it aimed at, or strove to avoid, and of what it accomplished or failed in. Hence all those accounts of historical occurrences which have been handed down to us by men who, in subsequent times, under the impressions and feelings of after experiences, have given their interpretation of them, are to be laid aside, and all idea of a secret history of a great nation ought to be put out of court. Each age should be permitted to interpret itself. On this account it is that Mr. Froude's history teems much more than is usual with extracts and quotations from public (though often unpublished) documents, and that upon these he grounds his record of the ages; (2) that the actors in history ought to be credited with the aims they set forth, as those upon which they acted, unless direct (or singularly trustworthy) evidence can be produced to the contrary; and that they honestly entertained the ideas and aims they sought to work out as, "it is happily incontestable; both from universal experience and from a profound study of human nature, that a really superior man has never been able to exert a powerful action on his fellows without being first intimately convinced himself."

This writing of the history of England from the inner convictions of men, as borne witness to in public documents and acts; this recognition of the heart and brain of men as the origin and source of the stir and movement resulting in events, occasions a

conspicuous difference between Mr. Froude and his more immediate predecessors; and in nothing is this more remarkable than in the new light thrown upon the moral relations and the lives and characters of the eminent individuals who transacted the chief business in the history of the times, and the new readings of character which are thus made possible. In his pages the lights and shadows are altered, and, though the events and results portrayed are similar in their details and issues, the tone of the whole is altered, and the moral perspective is, as he affirms, corrected and revised.

In the spring of 1856 the first and second volumes of Mr. Froude's "History of England, from the Fall of Wolsey to the Death of Elizabeth," were published. They immediately attracted the attention of critics, and in nearly every serial of note they formed the topic of laborious articles. Approval and disapproval were of course freely bestowed, as must always be the case when old prejudices are opposed and new views are shown to be not only possible but probable. The power and ability of the work were almost always conceded, and the value of the materials which he had brought to light was on all hands admitted.

In April, 1858, the third and fourth volumes of the "History of England" were published; and about a month thereafter a second and revised edition of the first and second volumes was issued to gratify the desire experienced by the public to read the complete record of Henry VIII. as a sovereign-reformer, which, with so much ingenious industry, and such remarkable originality of thought and material, Mr. Froude had collected and reproduced,—if with some tendency to paradox and partiality, not, also, without good sound sense and moral charity in judgment, and yet with an almost, if not altogether, feminine delicacy and tact which made the book readable even in family circles, in which the perusal of the gross humours formerly attributed to "Bluff King Hal"—the (traditionary) Bluebeard of history—could not have been tolerated. Of this great personage he presents an entirely different view from that which had become customary among historians. "Thoroughly awake to the fact that the Reformation was the new birth of the British nation, it has seemed to him a puzzling theory which attributes its success to the lust of a tyrant and the cupidity of his courtiers. It has evidently seemed to him paradoxical that a king who was reputed to have been a satyr, instead of keeping as many concubines as seemed good to him, should have chosen to gratify his passions by entering six times into the strict bonds of matrimony, religiously observing these bonds. It has seemed to him even more paradoxical, that one reputed to have been the most sanguinary tyrant who ever disgraced the English throne, should have been not only endured, but loved and regretted by a fierce and freespoken people." * He had gone to the study of the period with the old views strong within him, but with a resolute endeavour to

* Kingsley's "Miscellanies," vol. ii. p. 37.

comprehend the times in their inner spirit as well as their outward aspect; and he was compelled by the force of the evidence he saw accumulated before him to alter these opinions materially in regard to the character of many of the leading actors in that grand consecution of events which in their entire series constitute the Reformation. This was especially the case with the king under whom it took form. On this subject he makes the following observation:—"As it would be affectation to seem to be unconscious that the character of the king as presented in these volumes is something different from that which modern tradition has ascribed to him, so for my own sake I desire to say that I have not advanced any novel paradox or conjectures of my own. The history of the reign of Henry VIII. is a palimpsest, in which the original writing can still be read, and I have endeavoured only to reinstate the judgment upon his motives and his actions which was entertained by all moderate Englishmen in his own and the succeeding generation, which was displaced only by the calumnies of Catholics and Antinomian fanatics when the true records were out of sight, and when, in the establishment of a new order of things, the hesitating movements, the inconsistencies and difficulties inevitable in a period of transition, could no longer be understood without an effort."

The proverb asserts that "second thoughts are best," but Coleridge objected to the accuracy of this saw. He affirmed that *third* thoughts are best, because they turn out in most cases to be the original first thoughts recurred to, not under the impulse of feeling, but in subordination to the decisions of the reason. Froude's history is curiously enough an indubitable instance of the accuracy of this remark, of reasoning setting right the second thoughts of men, and compelling a recurrence to the first thoughts only now certified to be more trustworthily believed in, because tested and examined. Of course "the second thoughts" cannot thus at once be put to silence; and as an illustration of this we may note that a vigorous polemic against the accuracy of Mr. Froude's view of the character of Henry VIII. appeared in the *Edinburgh Review* for July, 1858, and that to this sharp and bitter critique the historian—breaking through the usual course—replied in his own name in *Fraser's Magazine* for September. The reader would do well to peruse these two papers, if he would rightly comprehend the controversy of history in regard to the seventh Henry, of whom it is now time we should present the character as drawn by Mr. Froude. The skill of presentation, the aptness of the facts collated, the just, yet unexpected point of view taken, the moderation of tone maintained, the allusive grace with which history is suggested rather than detailed render this passage a very favourable specimen of modern historical composition.

"If Henry VIII. had died previous to the first agitation of the divorce, his loss would have been deplored as one of the heaviest misfortunes which had ever befallen the country; and he would have left a name which would

have taken its place in history by the side of that of the Black Prince or of the conqueror of Agincourt. Left at the most trying age, with his character unformed, with the means at his disposal of gratifying every inclination, and married by his ministers when a boy to an unattractive woman far his senior, he had lived for thirty-six years almost without blame, and bore through England the reputation of an upright and virtuous king. Nature had been prodigal to him of her rarest gifts. In person he is said to have resembled his grandfather, Edward IV., who was the handsomest man in Europe. His form and bearing were princely, and amidst the easy freedom of his address his manner remained majestic. No knight in England could match him in the tournament, except the Duke of Suffolk; he drew with ease as strong a bow as was borne by any yeoman of his guard; and these powers were sustained in unfailing vigour by a temperate habit and by constant exercise. Of his intellectual ability we are not left to judge from the suspicious panegyrics of his contemporaries. His state papers and letters may be placed by the side of those of Wolsey or of Cromwell, and they lose nothing in the comparison. Though they are broadly different, the perception is equally clear, the expression equally powerful, and they breathe throughout an irresistible vigour of purpose. In addition to this he had a fine musical taste, carefully cultivated; he spoke and wrote in four languages; and his knowledge of a multitude of other subjects, with which his versatile ability made him conversant, would have formed the reputation of any ordinary man. He was among the best physicians of his age; he was his own engineer, inventing improvements in artillery, and new constructions in shipbuilding; and this not with the condescending incapacity of a royal amateur, but with thorough workmanlike understanding. His reading was vast, especially in theology, which has been ridiculously ascribed by Lord Herbert to his father's intention of educating him for the Archbishopric of Canterbury; as if the scientific mastery of such a subject could have been acquired by a boy of twelve years of age, for he was no more when he became Prince of Wales. He must have studied theology with the full maturity of his understanding; and he had a fixed and perhaps unfortunate interest in the subject itself. In all directions of human activity, Henry displayed natural powers of the highest order, at the highest stretch of industrious culture. He was 'attentive,' as it is called, 'to his religious duties,' being present at the services in chapel two or three times a day with unflinching regularity, and showing to outward appearance a real sense of religious obligation in the energy and purity of his life. In private he was good-humoured and good-natured. His letters to his secretaries, though never undignified, are simple, easy, and unrestrained; and the letters written by them to him are similarly plain and business-like, as if the writers knew that the person whom they were addressing disliked compliments, and chose to be treated as a man. Again, from their correspondence with one another, when they describe interviews with him, we gather the same pleasant impression. He seems to have been always kind, always considerate; inquiring into their private concerns with genuine interest, and winning, as a consequence, their warm and unaffected attachment. As a ruler he had been eminently popular. All his wars had been successful. He had the splendid tastes in which the English people most delighted, and he had substantially acted out his own theory of his duty. . . . He had more than once been tried with insurrection, which he had soothed down without bloodshed, and extinguished in

forgiveness. . . It is certain that if, as I said, he had died before the divorce was mooted, Henry VIII., like that Roman emperor said by Tacitus to have been *consensus omnium dignus imperii nisi imperasset*, would have been considered as formed by Providence for the conduct of the Reformation, and his loss would have been deplored as a perpetual calamity. We must allow him, therefore, the benefit of his past career, and be careful to remember it when interpreting his later actions. Not many men would have borne themselves through the same trials with the same integrity; but the circumstances of those trials had not tested the true defects in his moral constitution. Like all princes of the Plantagenet blood, he was a person of a most intense and imperious will. His impulses, in general nobly directed, had never known contradiction; and late in life, when his character was formed, he was forced into collision with difficulties with which the experience of discipline had not fitted him to contend. Education had done much for him, but his nature required more correction than his position had permitted, whilst unbroken prosperity and early independence of control had been his most serious misfortunes. He had capacity, if his training had been equal to it, to be one of the greatest of men. With all his faults about him, he was still perhaps the greatest of his contemporaries; and the man best able of all living Englishmen to govern England, had been set to do it by the conditions of his birth.

"Henry had many faults. But his position was one of unexampled difficulty; and by the work which he accomplished, and the conditions, internal and external, under which his task was allotted to him, he like every other man ought to be judged. He was inconsistent; he can bear the reproach of it. . . . Henry brought Ireland within the range of English civilization. He absorbed Wales and the Palatinate into the general English system. He it was who raised the House of Commons from the narrow duty of voting supplies, and of passing without discussion the measures of the Privy Council, and converting them into the first power of the State under the Crown. . . . His personal faults were great, and he shared, besides them, in the errors of his age; but far deeper blemishes would be but as scars upon the features of a sovereign who in trying times sustained nobly the honour of the English name, and carried the commonwealth securely through the hardest crisis in its history.

The following passage "On the condition of England in the Reign of Henry VIII." we quote for its instructive facts, and for the evidence it supplies of extensive reading, careful preparation, useful summarizing, and ability in the grouping of facts:—

"Wheat, the price of which necessarily varied, averaged in the middle of the fourteenth century tenpence the bushel; barley averaging at the same time three shillings the quarter. With wheat the fluctuation was excessive; a table of its possible variations describes it as ranging from eighteen-pence the quarter to twenty shillings; the average, however, being six and eight-pence. When the price was above this sum, the merchants might import to bring it down; when it was below this price the farmers were allowed to export to the foreign markets; and the same average continued to hold, with no perceptible tendency to a rise, till the close of the reign of Elizabeth. Beef and pork were a halfpenny a pound—mutton was three farthings. They were fixed at these prices by the 3rd of the 24th of Henry VIII. But this Act was unpopular both with buyers and with sellers. The old

practice had been to sell in the gross, and under that arrangement the rates had been generally lower. Stowe says, 'It was this year enacted that butchers should sell their beef and mutton by weight—beef for a halfpenny the pound and mutton for three farthings; which being devised for the great commodity of the realm (as it was thought), hath proved far otherwise: for at that time fat oxen were sold for six-and-twenty shillings and eightpence the piece; fat wethers for three shillings and fourpence the piece; fat calves at a like price; and fat lambs for twelvence. The butchers of London sold penny pieces of beef for the relief of the poor—every piece two pound and a half, sometimes three pound for a penny; and thirteen and sometimes fourteen of these pieces for twelvence; mutton eightpence the quarter, and a hundredweight of beef for four shillings and eightpence.' The Act was repealed in consequence of the complaints against it, but the prices never fell again to what they had been, although beef sold in the gross could still be had for a halfpenny per pound in 1570. Strong beer, such as we now buy for eighteen-pence a gallon, was then a penny a gallon; and table-beer less than a halfpenny. French and German wines were eightpence the gallon; Spanish and Portuguese wines a shilling. This was the highest price at which the best wines might be sold; and if there was any fault in quality or quantity, the dealers forfeited four times the amount. Rent, another important consideration, cannot be fixed so accurately, for Parliament did not interfere with it. Here, however, we are not without very tolerable information. 'My father,' says Latimer, 'was a yeoman, and had no lands of his own; only he had a *farm of three or four pounds by the year* at the uttermost, and hereupon he tilled so much as kept half a dozen men. He had walk for a hundred sheep, and my mother milked thirty kine. He was able, and did find the king a harness with himself and his horse. I remember that I buckled on his harness when he went to Blackheath field. He kept me to school, or else I had not been able to have preached before the king's majesty now. He married my sisters with five pounds, or twenty nobles, each, having brought them up in godliness and fear of God. He kept hospitality for his poor neighbours, and some alms he gave to the poor; and all this he did off the said farm.' If 'three or four pounds at the uttermost' was the rent of a farm yielding such results, the rent of labourers' cottages is not likely to have been considerable. I am below the truth, therefore, with this scale of prices, in assuming the penny in terms of a labourer's necessities to have been equal in the reign of Henry VIII. to the present shilling. For a penny, at the time of which I write, the labourer could buy more bread, beef, beer, and wine—he could do more towards finding lodging for himself and his family—than the labourer of the nineteenth century can for a shilling. I do not see that this admits of question. Turning, then, to the table of wages, it will be easy to ascertain his position. By the 3rd of the 6th of Henry VIII. it was enacted that master carpenters, masons, bricklayers, tilers, plumbers, glaziers, joiners, and other employers of such skilled workmen, should give to each of their journeymen, if no meat and drink was allowed, sixpence a day for half the year, fivepence a day for the other half; or fivepence halfpenny for the yearly average. The common labourers were to receive fourpence a day for half the year, for the remaining half threepence. In the harvest months they were allowed to work by the piece, and might earn considerably more, so that, in fact (and this was the rate at which their wages were usually estimated), the day labourer received on an

average fourpence a day for the whole year. Nor was he in danger, except by his own fault or by unusual accident, of being thrown out of employ; for he was engaged by contract for not less than a year, and could not be dismissed before his term had expired, unless some gross misconduct could be proved against him before two magistrates. Allowing a deduction of one day in the week for a saint's day or a holiday, he received, therefore, steadily and regularly, if well conducted, an equivalent of twenty shillings a week—twenty shillings a week and a holiday; and this is far from being a full account of his advantages. In most parishes, if not in all, there were large ranges of common and unenclosed forest land, which furnished his fuel to him gratis, where pigs might range, and ducks and geese; where, if he could afford a cow, he was in no danger of being unable to feed it; and so important was this privilege considered, that when the commons began to be largely enclosed, Parliament insisted that the working man should not be without some piece of ground on which he could employ his own and his family's industry. By the 7th of the 31st Elizabeth it was ordered that no cottage should be built for residence without four acres of land at lowest being attached to it for the sole use of the occupants of such cottage."

Here are two passages descriptive of the two countries whose diverse and wonderful histories he relates prior to their becoming the one country of Great Britain, which the Plantagenets strove to make them, and the will of Elizabeth Tudor made actual—by the accession of the Stuarts:—

"England as it appeared to its own teiling children in the hours of their trial, with its lights and shadows, its frozen prejudices and sunny gleams of faith; when day followed day and brought no certain change, and men knew not whether night would prevail or day, or which of the two was most divine,—night, with its starry firmament of saints and ceremonies, or day, with the single lustre of the gospel sun. It is idle to try to reproduce such a time in any single shape or uniform colour. The reader must call his imagination to his aid, and endeavour, if he can, to see the same object in many shapes and many colours, and sympathize successively with those to whom the Reformation was a terror; with those to whom it was the dearest hope; and those others—the multitude—whose minds could give them no certain answer, and shifted from day to day, as the impulse of the moment swayed them."

"Scotland, that marvellous country, so fertile in genius and chivalry, so fertile in madness and crime, where the highest heroism co-existed with preternatural ferocity, yet where the vices were vices of strength, and the one virtue of indomitable courage was found alike in saint and sinner. Often the course of this history will turn aside from the broad river of English life to where the torrents are leaping, passion-swollen, down from the northern hills. It will open out many a scene of crime and terror; and again from time to time it will lead us up into the keen air, where the pleasant mountain breezes are blowing, and the blue sky is smiling cheerily. But turn where it may in the story of Scotland, weakness is nowhere; power, energy, and will are everywhere. Sterile as the landscape where it will first unfold itself, we shall watch the current winding its way with expanding force and features of enlarging magnificence, till at length the rocks and rapids will have passed—the stream will have glided down into

the plain—to the meeting of the waters, from which, as from a new fountain, the united fortunes of Great Britain flow on to their unknown destiny."

We close our quotations with a splendid passage on the phases of Faith as credence and creed, and shall reserve for a future paper a notice of the controversies which Froude's "History of England" suggests; an account of the chief matter of the subsequent volumes and such other biographic matter as we have yet to place before the reader:—

"When I look through the writings of Latimer, the apostle of the English Reformation, when I read the depositions against the martyrs, and the lists of their crimes against the established faith, I find no opposite schemes of doctrine, no 'plans of salvation;' no positive system of theology which it was held a duty to believe; these things were of later growth, when it became again necessary to clothe the living spirit in a perishable body. I find only an effort to express again the old exhortation of the wise man,—'Will you hear the beginning and the end of the whole matter? Fear God, and keep His commandments; for that is the whole duty of man.' Had it been possible for mankind to sustain themselves upon this single principle without disguising its simplicity, their history would have been painted in far different colours than those which have so long chequered its surface. This, however, has not been given to us; and perhaps it never will be given. As the soul is clothed in flesh, and only thus able to perform its functions in this earth where it is sent to live; as the thought must find a word before it can pass from mind to mind; so every great truth seeks some body, some outward form in which to exhibit its powers. It appears in the world, and men lay hold of it and represent it to themselves in histories, in forms of words, in sacramental symbols; and these things, which in their proper nature are but illustrations, stiffen into essential fact, and become part of the reality. So arises in era after era an outward and mortal expression of the inward, immortal life; and at once the old struggle begins to repeat itself between the flesh and the spirit, the form and the reality. For a while the lower tendencies are held in check. The meaning of the symbolism is remembered and fresh. It is a living language, pregnant and suggestive. By and by, as the mind passes into other phases, the meaning is forgotten. The language becomes a dead language, and the living robe of life becomes a winding-sheet of corruption. The form is represented as everything, the spirit as nothing. Obedience is dispensed with. Sin and religion arrange a compromise; and outward observances, or technical inward emotions, are converted into jugglers' tricks, by which men are enabled to enjoy their pleasures and escape the penalties of wrong. Then such religion becomes no religion, but a falsehood; and honourable men turn away from it, and fall back in haste upon the naked elemental life."

Religion.

DO THE SCRIPTURES FAVOUR OR OPPOSE THE IDEA OF THE NATURAL IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

"It" (the soul) "is taken for that spiritual, reasonable, and immortal substance in man, which is the origin of our thoughts, of our desires, of our reasonings, which distinguishes us from the brute creation, and which bears some resemblance to its divine Maker. . . . This substance must be spiritual, because it thinks; it must be immortal, because it is spiritual."
—*Dr. Cruden.*

"Such is the nature of the human *soul* that it must have a God, an object of supreme affection."—*J. Edwards.*

"The blessed will enjoy eternal life and happiness, and reprobates be cast into eternal fire; the happiness of the one and the misery of the other will never have an end."—*Dr. Cruden.*

THE discussion of the present question will necessarily be very cramped, as its subject is confined within very narrow limits, for the proposition itself admits that the soul of man is naturally immortal, and only raises a controversy on the point whether the Scriptures favour or oppose that admission. It in point of fact asks this question,—Do the Scriptures say that the soul of man *of itself* must live for ever, or do they say that when man is born he has no immortal principle in him at all?

That the whole human race, both the lost and the saved, will at the last day be called before the judgment-seat of God to receive judgment, is the universal Christian belief founded on the Scriptures, and this one fact points strongly to the conclusion that the soul of man is naturally immortal, otherwise the lost could not appear, they not being partakers of that new life which, we are taught by the Bible, is bestowed upon the saved.

Therefore the advocates of the other side will see that to make out that the Scriptures favour their view they will also have to show that the same writings favour the opinion that when the body of the lost dies it dies entirely and for ever, which would again involve the opinion that there is no state of future punishment, which is certainly foreign to the whole teaching of the Bible. There are theologians who advocate the belief that the punishment of the wicked is not eternal, but even they do not go so far as to attempt to

fix a period when it will cease, but rest content with the theory that it will not last *for ever*, so that practically even according to their view it is eternal.

Immortality is of the essence of the soul, and it is a principle which has obtained recognition in almost all the religious creeds of antiquity,—for instance, the Egyptian, the Hindoo, and the Greek. Socrates gives us some very beautiful sentences on this subject: he says, “The soul, the immaterial part, being of a nature so superior to the body, can it, as soon as it is separated from the body, be dispersed into nothing and perish? Oh, far otherwise. Rather will this be the result:—if it take its departure in a state of purity, not carrying with it any clinging impurities of the body, impurities which during life it never willingly shared in, but always avoided, gathering itself into itself, and making the separation from the body its aim and study—that is, devoting itself to true philosophy, and studying how to die calmly; for this is true philosophy, is it not?—well, then, so prepared, the soul departs into that invisible region which is of its own nature, the region of the divine, the immortal, the wise; and then its lot is to be happy in a state in which it is freed from fears and wild desires, and the other evils of humanity, and spends the rest of its existence with the gods.”

But with the Christian religion it is a fundamental doctrine that the human soul is naturally immortal.

I propose to deal with the subject in the following manner:—

1. To show that to carry out the expressed and universally admitted intentions of the Scriptures towards mankind, nothing less than the possession by man of an inherently immortal soul would suffice, and that God bestowed upon the first man at his creation a soul of this nature, which all his posterity likewise possess.

2. To bring forward passages of Scripture in support of this view.

To see whether or not the Scriptures assert and maintain the proposition of the natural immortality of the soul, it would be well, in the first place, instead of searching for individual passages which support that view, to endeavour to understand and in some measure to define what the purport and intent of the Bible are.

Man was created, and after receiving animal life, we are told in Gen. ii. 7, that God breathed into his nostrils, and “man became a *living soul*,” which shows that at the creation of the first man he received a living or, as it may be termed, without at all diverting the word from its strict meaning, an *ever-living* or immortal soul.

It may possibly be here contended that the breathing of God into man's nostrils was merely to bestow upon him the principle of animal life, and not the principle of immortality. But I ask, How does it happen that God created the animals and gave them life, without there being any record to the effect that God breathed into their nostrils? Their animal life was created with them and as a part of them. And so, as to the animal life of Adam, the

former part of this same verse tells us that "the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground."

But to make the groundwork still more secure, let us go further back than the second chapter of Genesis, and ask the reader's attention to the first chapter of the same book, where in the 26th verse of that chapter we shall find the following words:—"And God said, Let Us make man in Our image, after Our likeness." And then in the 27th verse comes the consequence: "So God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him; male and female created He them."

That the Scriptures declare that God in His nature and attributes is immortal is beyond question, and it may therefore be fairly inferred, that as He created Adam in His own image, or, in other words, exactly as He himself was, Adam by virtue of this creation possessed an immortal principle which we call soul.

It may fairly be considered, therefore, that the argument is started on a sound basis, viz., that the Scriptures show that the first man was created with a naturally immortal soul, and that Adam's posterity in consequence possess the same.

Man, however, disobeyed God's command and forfeited his state of happiness by his fall, thus involving the whole human race in his ruin. But we are nowhere told, nor is it even suggested, that by this transgression he destroyed his immortality, although, except for what happened, its consequence would have been to have consigned man to never-ending punishment. A plan of salvation was, however, framed, under which the sin of man was expiated by an immortal Substitute, and thus relieved from the otherwise natural consequence of their forefather's sin, those of the human race who are chosen by the Almighty for that exaltation are consecrated to a never-ending or immortal happiness, while the rest of mankind, the victims of sin, endure in their own immortal souls the consequence of that sin, which consequence we are taught to believe is also eternal.

Thus it will be seen that in the whole of the scheme of the creation, blessing, and punishment of man, there is no trace of any other than bodily mortality, but, on the contrary, every indication that the body which man received was endowed with a principle which was of itself immortal, that his sin entailed upon him and his posterity consequences which none but an immortal being could undergo, that those consequences having been undone, and man's crime expunged, a portion of the human race was set apart for a state of eternal enjoyment, while the rest were doomed to eternal punishment.

I have already cited two passages from the Book of Genesis, viz., chap. i. 26, 27, and chap. ii. 7, in part proof of the point in question, and now ask attention to a few extracts from other parts of the Scriptures.

In the 116th Psalm, and the 8th verse, we find the following:—"For thou hast delivered my soul from death," meaning the

eternal death above referred to as the punishment for sin, for the delivery from the consequences of which sin the psalmist then returns thanks. In Dan. xii. 2 are the following words:—"And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt."

From this it is evident that both the punishment and the reward are to be eternal; and I ask if the punishment be eternal, what effect would this eternity have if the soul upon which it is to be inflicted were not everlasting too?

Passing on to the New Testament, we find in Matthew that Christ, in giving His charge to the disciples, said to them, "Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear Him" (alluding to the Almighty) "which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell." Here the immortal nature of the soul itself is clearly indicated—"not able to kill the soul."

In chapter xv. of the same book of Matthew the evangelist depicts the last judgment in striking language, and pictures the great Judge as saying, "Depart from Me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels;" and concluding with the words, "And these" (the wicked) "shall go away into everlasting punishment: but the righteous into life eternal."

Here again the punishment and the reward are declared to be for ever, but inasmuch as "everlasting fire," "everlasting punishment," and "life eternal," could not have their due effect on a being whose existence could last but for a time in consequence of its mortality, and could but be appreciated by a "spiritual body," or, in other words, immortal soul; and because it cannot be imagined that the "fire" referred to is tangible fire, or that the life mentioned is more natural life, it is plainly to be inferred that the fleshly body is put off, and cannot be reassumed, and that the everlasting soul is brought under, in the one case, immortal punishment, and in the other, immortal glory.

"Why should this worthless tegument endure
If its undying guest be lost for ever?
Oh let us keep the soul embalmed and pure
In living virtue! that when both must sever,
Although corruption may our frame consume,
The immortal spirit in the skies may bloom."

The eternity of the punishment of the wicked is repeatedly announced by Mark, chap. x., ver. 43—48, where that evangelist reports Christ to have said on several occasions relative to the lost, "Where their worm dieth not, and their fire is not quenched."

If the Scriptures show that the soul of man cannot die, that is equal to showing that it is naturally immortal. In the passages which I am now about to quote, this is specially laid down. In Luke, chap. xx., ver. 34—36, Christ declares that "the children of this world marry, and are given in marriage: but they

which shall be accounted worthy to obtain that [viz., the heavenly] world, and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry, nor are given in marriage: *neither can they die any more*: for they are equal unto the angels; and are the children of God, being the children of the resurrection."

The Scriptures do not contradict themselves, therefore it cannot be contended that the death here referred to is intended to mean natural death, but as the context shows its meaning is, that having suffered their mortal death, they, by virtue of their immortal life or soul, *cannot*—the phrase is a strong one—*die any more*.

The apostle Paul recognises the principle for which I contend when, in the 6th chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews and the 2nd verse, he declares the doctrine of "eternal judgment," meaning, of course, not that the judgment itself shall be proceeding for ever, but that the consequences of the judgment are everlasting.

Jude in his Epistle has several references to the same subject, e.g., "Even as Sodom and Gomorrah, and the cities about them in like manner, giving themselves over to fornication, and going after strange flesh, are set forth for an example, suffering the vengeance of eternal fire."

Paul in his Epistle to the Hebrews, to which reference has already been made, says, in the 11th chapter, and 5th verse, "By faith Enoch was translated that *he should not see death*; and was not, because God had translated him."

The account given of his translation in the 5th chapter of Genesis is exceedingly simple:—"And Enoch walked with God: and he was not; for God took him."

The translation of Enoch, and the translation of the prophet Elijah, strongly confirm the opinion I have been endeavouring to advance; that of the prophet Elijah in particular.

I take the account of this event from the 2nd chapter of the 2nd Book of Kings: "And it came to pass as they" (Elijah and Elisha) "still went on, and talked, that, behold, there appeared a chariot of fire, and horses of fire, and parted them both asunder; and Elijah went up by a whirlwind into heaven. And Elisha *saw* it, and he cried, My father, my father, the chariot of Israel, and the horsemen thereof. And he saw him no more: and he took hold of his own clothes, and rent them in two pieces. He took up also the mantle of Elijah that fell from him, and went back, and stood by the bank of Jordan."

I cannot, I think, be contended in either case that the natural bodies of Enoch and Elijah were caught up into heaven. The position which such an opinion would involve would be entirely untenable. And yet Elisha *saw* Elijah borne away from him, so that no other conclusion can be arrived at than that the earthly body of the great prophet of Israel was in a moment overcome by the full development of the inherently immortal principle or soul within him, and he then became the "spiritual body" of which Paul speaks.

H. K.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

"My grandmother would say, for example, 'Whatever sin is committed against an infinite Being is an infinite evil. Every infinite evil deserves infinite punishment.'

"Then uncle Bill, on the other side, would say, 'No act of a finite being can be infinite. Man is a finite being; therefore no sin of man can be infinite. No finite evil deserves infinite punishment. Men's sins are finite evils; therefore men's sins do not deserve infinite punishment. When the combatants had got thus far they generally looked at each other in silence.'"
—*Mrs. H. B. Stowe, in "Old Town Folks."*

SUCH, I apprehend, will be the result of this debate, if, following the lead of S. S., we go off the line, and discuss "the doctrine of the Scriptures concerning the eternal duration of the punishment of sin," instead of that which has been set for us—"Do the Scriptures favour or oppose the Idea of the Natural Immortality of the Soul?" Between *this* question and *that* there is a wide difference. That is a question of dogmatic theology, but this is one of interpretation and philosophic interest; what the nature of the punishment of sin is, or will be, we must infer; what statements the Scripture makes about the soul in its natural state we ought to know: the one we should arrive at by direct investigation, and the other we can reach only indirectly, by a logical (or illogical) process of what we like to call reasoning.

"If a man die"—unrenewedly and unregenerate, without being a partaker of grace, and without receiving the gift of God in Christ,—"shall he live again?" is a scriptural topic of thought, which was long ago Job (xiv. 14) brought before the minds of men; and speculations upon that subject have occupied a large amount of human reflection. With these human speculations, whether of metaphysicians like Plato, or theologians like the composers of our Thirty-nine Articles, we have nothing to do. We are called upon to refer "to the law and to the testimony;" and what say the Scriptures? is the query put before us.

Life is the gift of God. "God said, Let Us make man." "He was made;" and life was granted to him on condition of obedience. "In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die" implies, as its correlative, that, so long as they continued in obedience, they should continue in life. But the life spoken of was the life we live on the earth. It was in the essential nature of man's being that "the soul that sinneth, it shall die," for then it no longer bore "the image of God." By the very fact of sin death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned. True, God, in His mercy, did not exact instant death, but death passed upon the soul. Its principle of life was gone, and unless that principle was granted again through the grace of God, death became the only possibility of the soul. Its life was God's image, by the loss of that holy and pure likeness death was incurred, and that penalty must be paid. This is not a mere inference, it is an express statement. The statements

of Scripture are placed before us like the facts in nature. They are both revelations of God to us. The same method of study must be applied to both. There is not one logic of science and another of theology. The facts of nature require to be observed, comprehended, and interpreted, and they then become science. The statements of Scripture require to be noted, understood, and interpreted, and they then become theology, and supply us with our creeds, articles, confessions, and catechisms. We reverse this order to our own injury. We get our catechisms, creeds, confessions, and articles put on our minds like coloured and peculiar spectacles, through which we look at the statements of Scripture, and thus read Scripture under conditions which render it impossible to know it aright. If we did the same with nature (and when we did the same with nature), we would (and indeed did) form the most erroneous opinions concerning nature. The statements of Scripture are the facts on which our theology must depend, and out of which our creeds must be extracted; but we must make sure that we have the absolute and real statements of Scripture properly understood before our eyes, before we begin to form hypotheses and construct confessions; and I think that this question has been placed before us for debate that we may be induced to search the Scriptures in themselves—not the Scriptures as explained in creeds. S. S. has in this matter “greatly erred; not knowing the Scriptures,” apart from his theological prejudices and prepossessions; nor recognising the power of God in granting new life, life from the dead to those who, through faith in Christ, have had righteousness imputed unto them, regenerating grace imparted to them, and acceptance given unto them as righteous, only for the righteousness of Christ. It is a new life Christ gives, not an extension of the old one. We have “life in the risen Saviour,” not as an endowment, but as a gift which He bestows. The gift of God is eternal life, through Jesus Christ our Lord.

If God, as the very condition of eternal life, demanded eternal obedience, then man is not naturally immortal. His soul, even originally, only had the power of life so long as the will to obey was present and active; in his state, by nature, now, man is much less capable of obedience, and, therefore, much less likely to be possessed of an immortal soul. “The wages of sin is death;” and, therefore, the Scripture, as it proclaims all under sin, proclaims all under death. In this it most distinctly opposes the idea of a natural immortality of the soul. If the life that we have is an everlasting one, why are we told so emphatically that Christ, as our Redeemer, is the giver and source of eternal life? Is it not as the result and consequence of faith in Him that everlasting life is bestowed?

All the speculations of philosophers have failed to produce any proof that man is naturally immortal. Nor does it appear to us at all in accordance with the Scriptures to make such a statement an article of our creed; for it results from our theoretical and

speculative interpretations of Scripture rather than from anything that appears to countenance it in the written Word.

The express declaration of Deity in the Scriptures concerning man by nature is, "Dust thou art; and unto dust thou shalt return" (Gen. iii. 19). "All flesh is grass, and all the goodliness thereof is as the flower of the field. The grass withereth, the flower fadeth: because the spirit of the Lord bloweth upon it: surely the people is grass" (Isa. xl. 67). "As a flower of the field, so he perisheth" (Psa. xo. 15). "They perish *for ever* without any regarding it. Doth not their excellency which is in them go away? they die" (Job iv. 20, 21). "As the cloud is consumed and vanisheth away: so he that goeth down to the grave shall come up no more" (Job vii. 9). "The dead praise not the Lord, neither any that go down into silence" (Psa. cxv. 17). "In all points as he came, so shall he go" (Eccles. v. 16). In all these instances, and many more, the natural immortality of the soul of man is denied and opposed.

But "the redemption of the soul is very precious," and God has provided a ransom, in whom is life, and who giveth life unto them that call upon Him out of a true heart fervently, who is, in fact, the Lord of life. Those who can say, "I know that my Redeemer liveth," and "in my flesh shall I see God," must acknowledge, "Thou hast redeemed me, O God" (Psa. xxxi. 5); hence is it that "precious in His sight is His saints' death" (Psa. cxvi. 15), and thus it comes to pass that "whether we live, we live unto the Lord; or whether we die, we die unto the Lord: whether we live therefore, or die, we are the Lord's" (Rom. xiv. 8). "By grace are ye saved through faith, and that not of yourselves: it is the gift of God" (Ephes. ii. 8). "That as sin hath reigned unto death, even so might grace reign through righteousness unto eternal life by Jesus Christ our Lord" (Rom. v. 21). "The law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus, hath made me free from the law of sin and death" (Rom. viii. 2). And St. Paul exhorts, "If ye live after the flesh, ye shall die: but if ye through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the body ye shall live" (Rom. viii. 13).

These statements, brought together from Scripture, prove that man, being sinful, "hath not eternal life abiding in him" (1 John iii. 15), but must die, so that sin and death may alike be conquered by Jesus; but that those who accept the mercy offered to sinners, through Christ, partake of His everlasting life, by grace, as a gift; and hence it follows, as a fact, that the Scriptures oppose, and do not favour the idea of the natural immortality of the human soul.

F. W.

DOES FREE THOUGHT LEAD TO INFIDELITY?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"The spirit of criticism is not the spirit of religion. The spirit of criticism is a questioning spirit; the spirit of religion is a spirit of faith, of humility, and submission."—*J. A. Froude*.

"The superstition of science scoffs at the superstition of faith."—*J. A. Froude*.

ABOUT five years since the following question was debated in the pages of the *British Controversialist*:—"Does Civilization necessitate Demoralization?" Had we taken part in that debate, it must have been on the affirmative side, believing, as we do, that certain evils are the necessary consequence of civilization; yet we are not on that account opposed to civilization, nor would we on any account advocate a return to barbarism. So with free thought. We believe that it leads to infidelity. Yet we are not enemies of, but friends to free thought.

Infidelity is want of faith; and the question naturally arises, Infidelity is a want of faith in what? In the present discussion the term can only signify a want of faith in the declarations of Scripture, a disbelief of the assertions of the Bible. The fact that the present debate is placed under the head of Religion will show this, as by those who acknowledge the divine inspiration of the Bible that book is allowed to be the standard of appeal on all religious subjects. In a religious point of view, therefore, infidelity must signify a disbelief of the statements of Scripture and such disbelief must constitute infidelity. If, then, we are able to show that free thought leads to a disbelief of the assertions of Scripture, we shall establish our point.

1. That free thought leads to infidelity will, we believe, appear clear if we watch the processes of our own minds. If we do this, we shall observe that scientific knowledge, an insight into fresh discoveries, and an apprehension of the workings of nature, giving rise to thought and reflection, afford opportunity and scope for infidel reasonings and questionings like—"Can such things be, and our beliefs be founded on reason?" An acquaintance, for instance, with the marvellous connection between body and mind, with the wonderful influence of one upon the other, raises a question as to how an immaterial soul can be acted on by matter, have knowledge conveyed to it by organs that are material, and express its emotions by those material organs. A knowledge of the fact that the matter of decomposed human bodies is often taken up by vegetation, that vegetation afterwards becoming food for animals, and those animals again are eaten by human beings, and becoming incorporated into their substance, makes the doctrine of the resurrection of the selfsame human body, whereby a man "shall in his flesh see God"

in the future life, appear unspeakably mysterious, and gives rise to infidel thoughts, creates doubts and doubtful speculations. And the more we know of and reflect upon such subjects, the more room we find to be thereby given within us for infidel questionings of the statements of the Bible, notwithstanding all our abhorrence of such questionings, and all our self-restraining struggles against them.

2. When we observe what class of persons it is in whom infidelity is strongest, we feel we have ground for our assertion that free thought leads to infidelity, for the latter certainly is the most powerful in minds where thought is the most unrestricted and expanded. Many of this class have openly avowed their disbelief of the records of Scripture. Some have set aside the scriptural account of the deluge as mistaken, or false, or imperfectly accounted for, while others have given an exposition of the creation, or rather formation, of man different from that given in the early pages of the Bible. That free thought leads to infidelity is plainly evidenced by the circumstance that Mr. C. Darwin, in his "Origin of Species," page 484, asserts that "probably all the organic beings which have ever lived on this earth have descended from one primordial form, into which life was at first breathed." This assertion is directly opposed to the declaration of Scripture, which tells us that "the Lord God made the earth and the heavens, and every plant of the field *before it was in the earth*, and every herb of the field *before it grew*" (Gen. ii. 4, 5); that "God created great whales, and every living creature that moveth, which the waters brought forth abundantly, after their kind, and every winged fowl after his kind;" also that "God made the beast of the earth after his kind, and cattle after their kind, and every thing that creepeth upon the earth after his kind;" also that "God created man in His own image" (Gen. i. 21, 25, 27.) "Essays and Reviews" were avowedly the fruits of free thought. Let us just observe whether they do or do not give any evidence that free thought led their authors to infidelity. One of these authors (Dr. Williams) says, "The avenger who slew the first born may have been the Bedouin host;" also, "In the passage of the Red Sea, the description may be interpreted with the latitude of poetry;" and again, speaking of Daniel, "Those portions of the book supposed to be specially predictive are a history of past occurrences;" and yet, again, writing of the Scriptures, he says they consist of "narratives inherently incredible, or precepts evidently wrong." These are plain specimens of the infidelity to which free thought leads. On the other hand, the very ignorance of the illiterate with the absence of reflection in them, saves them from many infidel reasonings which more inquisitive and reflecting minds are the subjects of. The greatest infidels have been such men as Hume, Spinoza, Hobbes, Gibbon, and Colenso. How then can we avoid the conclusion that there is a close connection between free thought and infidelity?

3. Infidelity and superstition are contraries. They are the opposites of each other. That which fosters superstition counteracts

infidelity. Infidelity is fostered by that which counteracts superstition. An uninquiring, unreflective habit of mind fosters superstition, and therefore counteracts infidelity. Infidelity is fostered by freedom of thought, and consequently by the same superstition is counteracted. Superstition is promoted by allowing others to think and judge for us, by not investigating that which is proposed to us for our belief. Thus the restriction of thought leads to an over-credulous disposition of mind, a delivering up of one's self to an unquestioning belief in certain articles of faith at the dictation of others. It is in the very nature of superstition to be produced by the want of thought, reflection, and investigation. The natural and necessary effect of allowing our beliefs to be formed for us, of not searching into the ground of our belief, is superstition, or over-credulousness. So infidelity is produced by freedom of thought, by an unrestrained investigation of all grounds of belief, by a disposition of mind which will not admit the truth of any doctrine, proposition, or theory without proof. Thus unrestricted thought often leads to a disbelief of that which is based on good foundations. It is in the very nature of infidelity to be induced by free thought. The natural and necessary effect of believing nothing without a demonstration of its truth is infidelity.

4. During the present century thought has acquired and exercised a greater freedom than ever before. Men have cast off the trammels of authority. A great spirit of inquiry has been stirred. Men have far more than formerly thought and investigated for themselves. In throwing aside these restraints, many have cast off not only the authority of philosophers, of men eminent in science, of divines, of church creeds, of doctrinal standards, and of generally received opinions, but even the authority of Scripture, as is instanced in the cases of Bishop Colenso, and the writers of "Hesays and Reviews." The exercise of thought, unfettered by any human restrictions, the act of a man's thinking and judging for himself, not receiving any opinions on any human authority, but investigating all subjects for one's self, is highly desirable and beneficial. But free thought has largely degenerated, first into latitudinarianism, and thence into that free-thinking which is the boast of persons who avow their disbelief of the statements of Scripture. In these persons we see free thought rampant, breaking all bounds, and to this state free thought naturally tends, so much so that infidelity has become one of the prominent features of the present age. It is therefore, evident that free thought leads to infidelity.

A reverent homage for the testimony of the Scriptures, a becoming feeling of awe towards the Bible as the inspired word of God—of its being which there are incontrovertible proofs,—a hearty belief in its statements will, put a restriction on the freedom of thought. The Bible asserts the being of a God, who is self-existent, eternal, and self-sufficient. It asserts the creation of all things by His power. It reveals a Trinity of Persons in the Godhead, and the union of divinity and humanity in the Person of Jesus Christ.

It declares the absolute sovereignty of Jehovah, in perfect harmony with the responsibility of man, the resurrection of the body, a final judgment of all mankind, and the eternal existence of the soul. If these Scripture statements are heartily believed, there is at once a restraint put upon free thought. A hearty belief in the assertions of the Bible and latitudinarianism are incompatible. It is an impossibility for a hearty believer in Scripture doctrines to be a latitudinarian, and it is equally impossible for a latitudinarian to be a hearty believer in the declarations of the Bible. The disbelief of the Scriptures, to which free-thinking leads, is infidelity.

5. Free thought and reasoning, when brought to bear on the doctrines and statements of the Bible, lead to infidelity, through the very nature of the subjects reasoned upon, those subjects being superior to reason, and designed by the divine Author of the Scriptures, not to be reasoned about, but to be believed in. They are subjects for faith, not reason. If the doctrines of the Trinity, the complex Person of Christ, and the resurrection of the body be even so freely thought over and carefully reasoned upon, they will still be to reason an insoluble mystery; and the same may be said of many of the narrations of occurrences which the Scriptures contain. True faith *believes* these things, but the effect of mere *thinking* and *reasoning* upon them is to reject them on account of their mysteriousness and seeming impossibility. Thus, free thought leads to infidelity.

Finding, then, as we do, that free thought in ourselves affords scope for infidel suggestions, observing that many persons eminent in science, philosophy, and literature have avowed the infidelity to which free thought has led them, and regarding the fact that some who acknowledge their infidelity glory in the name of free-thinkers, thus confessing to what free-thinking has led them, we are compelled to the belief that free thought leads to infidelity. S. S.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"It is very possible for doubt—searching and sceptical doubt—to be merely intellectual; the scrutiny of a mind which, whilst on general grounds it holds immovably fast to faith and revelation, is yet resolved to examine truth on every side, and to its very foundations, and is especially resolved to understand the difficulties of the honest doubter. . . . The man who is called and qualified to accomplish this work, although he is a profound doubter, is so far from being an unbeliever that, of all men, he possesses the deepest, firmest, and noblest faith. And such men must be reckoned among the most devoted friends of truth and the most gifted and honoured servants of the God of truth."—James H. Rigg, D.D.

THERE could not be a greater libel on God or on Christianity than to affirm that "free thought leads to infidelity"—if by infidelity we are to understand distrust of revealed truth.

Infidelity is negation, and thought is never free that is imprisoned in a round of cannots or shall nots. Indeed, thought is

affirmative,—so affirmative that it has an inclination to make even its negations positive, and to form a creed out of its distrusters. There is properly no "Logic of Atheism," for logic is the exercise of thought in the discovery of positive truth, of facts as they are, and the lessons that they teach. That substantive thing infidelity, which is simply *no belief*, is a proof against itself that free thought spurs the boundaries of uncertainty and doubt. Atheism asserts that there is no God, most foolishly, for a negative is never capable of being asserted universally until every possible and conceivable affirmative has been tested and found wanting. Atheism is an impossibility, simply because it proclaims that as a truth for man's soul which man can never, at least till he becomes infinite, assert—that there is no trace of God in the spirits of others, and in the farthest off regions of space, no revelation of Deity in any character, whether of those which he can or cannot read. Free thought can never give up the idea of God, however frequently baffled in its search, for it can never affirm that all has been searched and nothing has been found. This has been ably shown by John Foster in the following excellent passage:—

"The wonder then turns on the great process by which a man could grow to the immense intelligence which can know that there is no God. What ages and what lights are requisite for ~~this~~ attainment! this intelligence involves the very attributes of divinity, while a God is denied. For, unless this man is omnipresent, unless he is at this moment in every place in the universe, he cannot know but there may be in some place manifestations of a Deity, by which even he would be overpowered. If he does not know absolutely every agent in the universe, and does not know what is, so, that which is so may be God. If he is not in absolute possession of all the propositions that constitute universal truth, the one which he wants may be that there is a God. If he cannot with certainty assign the cause of all that he perceives to exist, that cause may be God. If he does not know everything that has been done in the immeasurable ages that are past, some things may have been done by a God. Thus, unless he knows all things, that is, precludes all other divine existence by being Deity himself, he cannot know that the Being whose existence he rejects does not exist."—Foster's "Essays," p. 35.

The proper object of thought is to attain to truth, and truth is an accurate knowledge of *what is*. Infidelity is distrust, denial, doubt either of *what is* or of *what is not*. If it denies *what is*, it is wrong, and it does not do what free thought aims at accomplishing—discover accurately what is. If it denies *what is not*, so also does truth, in so far as it affirms *what is*. But free thought, in its investigations, does not make affirmations regarding what is not, except in opposition to a pre-existing error, and even then it confines itself to the assertion that *that* is not. Infidelity, as deciding upon what is not, closes up and imprisons itself within a circle of denials, through all of which free thought wishes to break. Free thought is faithful to all that is, and cares only to know that. It has no anxiety to learn anything of what is not, except as a clue

and guide to affirmable truth. Free thought is most trusting as well as most trustworthy, for it accepts all as matter to be examined and tried; it distrusts nothing, disbelieves nothing, until affirmation is possible of the truth, when, of course, all necessity for distrust vanishes. Infidelity is the very antagonist of free thought. It would bind the hands and blind the eyes of reason, saying, work not here and look not there; but free thought desires to be open-eyed and to have unchained hands. Of infidelity claiming to be called free thought we may well exclaim with Dryden,—

“Free! what, and fettered with so many chains?”

I grant that free thought is not favourable to the acceptance of doctrines, dogmas, confessions, and systems of science, morals, or theology, without investigation. That it hesitates to close at once with the invitation of the sectary of whatever school, to sign—eye-bound and manacled—the attestation of its faith in all that is written in the articles aforesaid, whatever these may be. It demands the right to read, to examine, to test, by appeal to vouchers, and by the touchstone of fact.

Free thought signifies thought employed in all possible methods of activity, in all directions, and in search of all truths. As “God is over all, blessed for ever,” as all that can be “truly known” is what God has made or done, caused or permitted, all that can be known is truth, all that man can learn rightly is in accordance with the Divine Mind, and hence free thought cannot lead to infidelity. Unless, therefore, the writers on this topic juggle with the phrase, and define free as licentious thought—in doing which they would insert the idea they should prove, by implication in the phrase in which the question is stated,—they cannot but allow that, however freely thought may exert itself in investigation, it cannot lead to infidelity,—unless they assert that there is a lying spirit in the universe more powerful and more widely prevailing than the God who granted to man as his birthright both free thought and free will.

The Scriptures do not oppose free thought. “Search the Scriptures” for the things on which Scripture is an authority; and, whatever the opinion promulgated by men, the Scriptures affirm that it is noble to have “searched the Scriptures daily, whether these things were so.” “Come, let us *reason* together,” is surely an invitation to the freest thought—is a perfect enfranchisement of reason. “Bring forth your strong reasons, saith the King of Jacob.” Thus we see God reasons with man; Jesus reasoned; the apostles, who had been in the first discipleship with Jesus, reasoned; St. Paul reasoned. Samuel asked the people to “stand still, that I may reason with you before the Lord,” in order that he might teach them “the good and the right way.” It is a “reasonable service” God asks from man. God provides that man “may see, and know, and consider, and understand together.” He wishes that “they shall wisely consider of His doing.” He

calls on us to "consider the work of God," to be "of an understanding heart;" and the gospel is declared to be sent to men "that their hearts might be comforted, being knit together in love, and unto all riches of the full assurance of understanding, to the acknowledgment of the mystery of God, and of the Father, and of Christ, in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge." Of this, too, it commands us to "let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind."

There is no book so favourable to freedom of thought as the Bible, no religion so distinctly and avowedly dependent on the exercise of free thought as Christianity. To all men it expresses the desire that "they might be filled with the knowledge of God's will in all wisdom and spiritual understanding; that they might walk worthy of the Lord unto all pleasing, being fruitful in every good work, and increasing in the knowledge of God; strengthened with all might, according to His glorious power, unto all patience and long-suffering with joyfulness; giving thanks unto the Father, which hath made them meet to be partakers of the inheritance of the saints in light: who hath delivered them from the power of darkness, and hath translated them into the kingdom of His dear Son: in whom we have redemption through His blood, even the forgiveness of sins" (Col. i. 9—14). It will accept no faith which is not grounded and settled in the very convictions of the believer. It does not look with favour on the undiscerning and indiscriminate reception of its truths. It has set before men "the controversy of Zion." It calls upon them to hear "the Lord's controversy;" for "the Lord hath a controversy with His people;" "the Lord hath a controversy with the nations, He will plead with all flesh," so that man may "consider his ways and be wise," and "apply his heart unto wisdom."

There can be no recognition of the rights of thought more thorough-going, fuller, or indeed more peremptory than these. Controversy is a contest of reasonings, and God invites us to a controversy with Himself. He does not stipulate that religious controversy should not be indulged in. He does not withhold His ways, His character, His doings, His doctrines, His laws, or His salvation from the scrutiny of reason. He does not fear that the fullest and freest examination of religious truth will lead to infidelity. "Think upon these things;" pause, reflect, consider; "understandest thou what thou readest?" It is after examination had that He expects us to believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, that we may be saved. Our Lord, who condescended to provide the proof which Thomas, who was called Didymus, regarded as that alone which would convince him, is not likely to be adverse to free thought. He wrongs God, while he greatly wrongs his own soul, who closes the Scriptures from criticism, examination, and free study. It is a libel on Deity to affirm that the noblest faculties which He has given us are not to be exercised upon the noblest manifestation of Himself that He has given, but that these should

"rust in us unused," except upon the policy of this world. We believe that free thought leads to truth; that truth is not infidelity, and we do not believe that free thought can lead to infidelity. We shall close with this extract from Milton:—

"The very essence of truth is plainness and brightness; the darkness and crookedness is our own. The wisdom of God created understanding fit and proportionable to truth, the object and end of it, as the eye to the thing visible. If our understanding have a film of ignorance over it, or be blur with gazing on other false glistenings, what is that to truth? If we will purge with sovereign eye-salve that intellectual ray which God hath planted in us, then we would believe the Scriptures, protesting their own plainness and perspicuity, calling to them to be instructed, not only the wise and learned, but the simple, the poor, the babes—foretelling an extraordinary effusion of God's Spirit on every age and sex—attributing to all men and requiring from them the ability of searching, trying, and examining all things, and, by the Spirit, discerning that which is good."*

L. L.

Politics.

IS AN HEREDITARY HOUSE OF LEGISLATURE DESIRABLE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

On the negative side of this question a great deal of clap-trap and commonplace argument may be vented. I am glad to think that the readers of the *British Controversialist* hate reasonless commonplace and love reasonable common sense. If this debate is to be entered upon, and pursued with the consideration it deserves and demands, it cannot fail to be interesting and instructive; for it involves principles of the highest practical value, as well as the gravest theoretical importance. The whole question of legislation is opened up by such a discussion as this, and requires to be considered and regarded from a much more difficult point of view than that which a first glance reveals. Constitutionalism, and by constitutionalism I do not mean Conservatism, is at stake in the decision we come to; and the entire science of politics would require reconstruction were it to be decided that "a hereditary house of legislature is not desirable."

I am perfectly aware that the adoption of this side of the debate will expose me to the attacks of those whose political creed begins — "I believe in Bright, the Birmingham member, reformer of Church and State, and in William Gladstone, his honest pupil, our Premier," &c.; but ridicule is a cheap article, and a great deal of it

* Milton's "Of Reformation in England."

at present retailed is of the "Brummagem" pattern—it has the sparkle, perhaps, but not the worth of the genuine gem.

I state, as my first proposition towards proving the affirmative of this debate, namely, that "a hereditary House of Legislature is desirable," this plain and unmistakable principle:—

1. One of the chief requisites for securing beneficial legislation is *considerateness*.

The House of Commons is not now, as it used to be, a deliberative assembly; it has come much nearer to the etymological signification of its name, *parliament*,—a speaking—we shall not say palavering—institution. No such thing as unbiassed discussion goes on in it. Party carries everything before it there. It is a well-known fact that the best of speeches are ineffective in changing votes. Most of the members of that House have condescended to become delegates, not representatives—they hold their seats as factors, to obey the behest of their masters, and to carry out their schemes; they do not hold an independent and uncontrolled position, in which they might reflect on and examine the points at issue, they enter the House as the instruments of carrying out a foregone conclusion, and, however palpably mistaken the course of public opinion may be, if it has force enough, they cannot withstand the passing of rash and precipitate measures, or secure due thought for legislative proposals. The members are in such hot haste to enact, that they do not take time to consider. In fact, they go to do, not to consider about what ought to be done. They have pledged themselves, neck and heels, to gain an entrance into the House.

But the House of Lords acts as a restraint upon this hurried and flurried legislation. They demand that a good case should be made out for change, and for such a change as is proposed. They scan and criticise, and, though they may not often originate measures, they certainly often make valuable suggestions and provide many saving clauses, without which the Bills of the Commons would often be unworkable, and sometimes worse than waste paper—mischievous, impracticable interferences with the *status quo* without commensurate advantages. The hereditary legislators are not pledged—do not enter the House as the mere workers out of the popular will. They call for evidence, and demand reasons, and very frequently any little show of discussion held in the House of Commons is so made, more from the effect which it is judged it will have in "another place," than from any effect it can have on the members who vote. Hence to foreknow a man's pledges and to know his character, is to know how he will vote, or to know what will induce him to vote—apart from argument—as he is wished; and this is the way parliamentary majorities are counted up by party "whips." The House of Lords is a breakwater against the destructive effects of the precipitate rush of the tides of public opinion, which so often "flows like the Solway and ebbs like its tide," being to-day in the ascendant on one side, and, lo! to-morrow the majority is all the other way.

2. *Independence* is requisite to the proper fulfilment of the duty of a legislator.

Our constituencies are now so engrossingly eager for change—for it is a peculiarity of the thoughtless and the uninformed to fancy that change must be improvement—that they will not elect a man who proffers himself as a candidate who will give full, impartial, and deliberate thought and consideration to any of the measures which may be brought into the House. A definite statement of definite principles is not enough to satisfy the electors; there must be specific guarantees and pledges given to vote for certain specific measures, and without this no seat is for a moderate man to be had. An impartial consideration of questions of policy in the light of the whole facts, when laid before the legislature, is thus rendered all but impossible. The members of the Lower House, too, are always exposed to interference and to deputations of their constituents. But the nobility, who hold their seats as hereditary legislators, have no such bond upon their souls, they are free to come to the consideration of the facts impartially, and to determine as the facts—not as the faction—direct; and, though courteous to deputations, they need not be slavishly abject to them, as the Commons too often are. Hence again, we see that *independence* is secured by a hereditary house of legislature.

3. *Moderation* is very desirable in legislation. Almost the chief recommendation for election to the House of Commons is, that the person should be a partizan—in many cases a violent partisan, or, as it is vulgarly but expressively called, an “out-and-outer;” but a hereditary legislator does not require to proclaim and publish himself as this or that to acquire notoriety, and get thrust into the Parliament. His seat is secure without the degradation of asking the favour of the suffrages of the people while under the excitement and commotion of contest, when the balance is in the hands of the hottest and most rampant of the populace, for they, of course, affect the ultimate issue of the contest most. Political integrity and consistency, honest adherence to principle, and thoughtful impartiality of judgment are, in a general election, put up to auction, and the man who bids *lowest* has the best chance of being chosen. Principles and measures are thus proclaimed to be almost nought, while the *nostrum* of the hour agitates so many. In the hereditary house, the particular measures brought up for consideration can be looked upon as portions of the whole system of legislation, and may be defended or opposed, not because the members are so pledged, but because they are found, or are believed, to be beneficial or injurious to the State.

4. *Judiciality* as well as *judiciousness* are much required in legislation.

The Throne is executive and administrative. It is the active actor in behalf of the nation in carrying its will into effect. The Commons are mobile, and reflect the changing opinions and fashions of the time. If there were no third element,—no calm, independent,

serene, and generally Conservative friendly counsellor to arbitrate between the Crown and the Commons, we must have either collision or collusion—collision if the Throne did not yield to the demands of an imperative vote; collusion to keep the House of Commons in trim till the purpose of the Crown was served. But a hereditary house, having constant recruitment from the Commons, and yet having a stability, in some measure, as dynastic as the Crown, can bring these double sympathies to bear on any crisis, and, judiciously as well as judiciously, prevent any contest of principles. A popularly elected Commons cannot effectively mature legislative enactments, because it is almost all for movement, while the *status quo* also has its claim; besides, a house of review is particularly requisite in legislation. It has been found that independence is essential to judicialeity, and I think that there is in every worthy government ample use for a House of Lords, as a hereditary house of legislature.

The means which have been employed by extreme partisans to produce disaffection in the State in regard to the Upper Assembly, and the endeavours made to excite mutual animosity between the two houses of legislature, and to induce popular distrust in the nobility, is very much to be deprecated. A spirit of insubordination and pernicious agitation is thus encouraged, and the safeguards of the nation are loosened. We have political as well as moral reasons for upholding the House of Lords, and especially at this crisis. It is unquestionable that there has been little or no truthful and dispassionate debate in the legislation on the great question of the day. Dictation and intimidation are the order of the period, and the mere numerical majorities are held to count for everything; but rash and precipitate legislation is really inimical to the country, and the House of Lords can prevent that, and claim that an unmistakable case should be made out for the changes proposed, that it may not only defend and uphold the Throne, but defend the people from themselves and the effects of their rashness, until it has been quite decidedly made to appear that there are good grounds for action. As a constitutional house, arbitrating between the Crown and the Commons, and securing the medium way, which is that of safety, "a hereditary house of legislature is desirable."

M. C. N.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE—I.

THE announcement of this topic for debate two months ago is a good illustration of the foresight and prescience which the conductors of this serial exercise in connection with the choice of subjects for discussion. Often debated hitherto as a question in theoretical politics, it has even while we write forced itself into prominence as a practical matter which the nation ought wisely to consider. The House of Lords has hitherto been wonderfully free from any agitations affecting their interests; and while the Lower

House of Parliament has undergone a pretty thorough adaptation to the requirements of the age we live in, the Upper House has been left in a terribly unreformed state. No wise man seems to have arisen among the members of our intelligent and cultured aristocracy to commend to them the wisdom of setting their house in order. They have trusted in their titled and territorial influence, in the supineness of the public, in their generosity to public functionaries, and in their snobbish love for lords. While throne and representation were all taking heed of the course and tendency of the age, and had the good sense to see that constitutionalism is a vain defence, if that which arrogates such a title holds itself aloof from the progress of the times and remains stationary within the old landmarks while all else is moving.

No defence for the necessity and desirability of a hereditary House of Parliament can be effectively made, unless it can be proved that wisdom, patriotism, worth and nobleness of character are hereditary, and hereditary too, it must be remembered, in defiance of the accidents of succession. We do not think any such opinion can be sustained by argument. With all the advantages of culture and monopoly, the House of Lords is a woeful catalogue of declensions, until one almost wonders if there can be any mockery greater than that by which a descendant of a noble and patriotic man bears his historic title, and yet is remarkable only for being as unlike as diamonds and beans. The "idle state" which the wearers of coronets lay claim to, is strangely contrasted with the "idle state" which they usually display themselves when any movement has to be made for good. Among any equal number of men, where shall you find so few who are animated by great thoughts, who pursue noble achievements, who labour in good causes, who contribute so little to the general good of mankind, as the hereditary members of the legislature? Is it not a fact that, taking them all in all, they are far less remarkable for talent, worth, patriotism, genius, self-sacrifice than the Commons, and (after deducting a few honourable exceptions) do they not seem caricatures, rather than representatives, of men of high character, endeavour, and deed?

Again, we object that no good and splendid achievement performed by one man in a given age can possibly be of such great and inestimable price to all time, as to justify the elevation of the heirs male of that person to an indisputable seat in the legislative halls of a country for ever, no matter what they might turn out to be, no matter how much at variance with the mind of the nation their thoughts and habits might become, and without guarantee at all to the nation, that the inheritance thus bestowed shall be used with gratitude and employed with good sense. But this becomes all the more preposterous when we know that by far the larger number of modern commitments to the Upper House are given as the reward for services to party, past or prospective, or to supply the means of overcoming an obstacle which stands in the way of the progress of the nation, and not at all necessarily as a recognition

of good deeds done to the country. Of all the men to be entrusted with the management of the political business of a country, partizans are the worst; but by far the larger majority of our modern creations of peers have been among partizans, not patriots, and the selection has been made often more for the convenience of cabinet ministers than the good of the country.

Of all the recommendations that a person can have for being a legislator, surely the most indispensable is fitness. This would be plain enough in any other affair, even to the most doltish of men. Suppose we were to have a hereditary house of engineers, by whom all our railway traffic should be conducted; a hereditary house of navigators, of bishops, of warriors, of newspaper editors! But a hereditary house of legislators is even more dangerous than this; for the Lords claim to be the only uncensored and uncensurable body in the State. The Commons must appeal to the people, and be chosen by them; the Sovereign must rule by and according to the wishes of the people, as expressed through the Commons, and impressed thus on the Prime Minister. But the House of Lords have only the election of birth, and only the control of death to make vacancies; they can exercise as a constitutional right the rejection of any measure, and the evil effects of this hereditary and monopolist legislation becomes periodically so outrageously impracticable, that they require to have an irruption of barbarians every now and again—like a suspension of the Bank Act—to bring matters into something like a normal state again.

Would we then, our opponents may say, abolish the House of Lords, and leave the country no defence against the onflowing tides of democracy? Would we reduce the whole inhabitants of the land to the same dull level of life and state? Would we strike the word aristocracy out of the dictionary, and the fact out of existence? Would we have no barrier between the throne and the mob? Would we have no man raised to honour and dignity, and no allowance made for the love of his descendants in a good man's heart, one who had been a benefactor to the country and the race? These are very fine questions and well put, because they are all heaped on one another, as if they all meant very much the same thing, and were all synonymous with the advocacy of the negative of this question. We shall answer honestly. We would not abolish the House of Lords, but we would reform it—reform it, so as to bring it into harmony with the age. We would introduce peerages for life or some grave offence—scandals have been rife in high circles, remember!—and we would have peerages which should extend to three lives, granted on account of special desert; but we should have none to extend beyond that, except as a fresh grant for fresh services by the holders of the old title.

I would have a succession granted of right to cabinet ministers who had served their country well, and deserved honourable retirement from the more arduous duties of political life; and I should have power vested in the Commons to vote an address to the sove-

reign, requesting the conferring of title and legislative rights on such as the people desired to honour. I would insist on every legislator having some definite claim on the gratitude of the country, and some sense of his responsibility to it. A hereditary house, however, is quite out of place among modern institutions, and is altogether an anomaly. It is one of the last remnants of the barbarism of caste; it is unnatural, and opposed to all the dictates of prudence and utility; it is unreasonable and injurious; it is unnecessary and disadvantageous. Hence it is not desirable. The abolition of the hereditary tenure of legislative right would in no case involve the loss of possession or office justly gained and held, but it would necessitate in all claimants of the honour of sitting in the Upper House to acquire some fitness by doing some work, and undergoing some preparatory toil. In our enlightened age, and at this advanced stage of life and thought, a hereditary house of legislators is not desirable.

E. L. B.

THE PENTATEUCH.—The Bible of the Old and New Testaments is the book of the divine revelations, the collection and aggregate of those sacred records which intimate to us the will and purpose of God, with the acts and dispensations by which it was developed. Prophets, apostles, and holy men, enlightened by his spirit, have communicated it from time to time in written documents to mankind. The second division of the Bible, the New Testament, presupposes the first, or the Old. As is natural, promise precedes fulfilment, the law, the gospel, and the preparation and clearing the way for the kingdom of God, its actual establishment and spread: Just as without the Old Testament the New cannot be rightly understood, inasmuch as the New is foreshadowed in the Old, and the Old at last manifest in the New; even so the five books of Moses constitute the necessary foundation for the remainder of the Old Testament. Upon them the whole history of the Kingdom of God in that Testament reposes in the same manner as upon the Old Testament reposes the history of the self-same kingdom in the New. . . . Without them, in fact, the Bible would be a house without a foundation, an holy temple suspended in the air, and any person reading it for the first time, and commencing with the book of Joshua, would be compelled to say that here some impious hand must have cut off the basis of the whole. And yet this initiatory and fundamental position of the Bible, which was esteemed as peculiarly sacred by the Jews, and which the free-thinkers among that nation, and even the Samaritans themselves, held in reverence, proves to many a special occasion of offence. Both within and without the domain of science, men of little faith and men of none have assailed the books of Moses with all possible doubts and objections. We, however, believe that which Jesus Christ and his apostles acknowledge to be the Word of God, a divine revelation, a record of the acts and dispensations of the Most High—books which, when closely investigated and rightly understood, bear upon their face the stamp of truth and divinity—books which, by all that they contain, and by the spirit which they breathe, avouch themselves so clearly to be a first and essential link in the chain of the Divine plan of salvation, as to be raised far above all doubts and assaults, whether of vulgar or lettered unbelief.—*W. C. Barth's Bible Manual.*

Boiling Upward.

DOUGLAS WILLIAM JERROLD.

NOVELIST, DRAMATIST, ESSAYIST, WIT, AND JOURNALIST.

HUMOUR and wit, from the earliest ages, have been reckoned among the *choicest* possessions of man. That piquant *aroma* of the mind, so subtle, versatile, effervescent, evanescent, is "nine times folded in mystery." No satisfactory exposition of its secret essence and inner elements has yet been given. Wit can still twit metaphysics with one "insoluble problem." Though humour was an everyday companion of Socrates in the market-places of Athens, and that "varlet of all crafts," wit, was the boon friend of Aristophanes, they would tell none of their mystic marvels to Plato or Aristotle. The gorgeous imagination of the one, and the irresistible dialectics of the other, alike failed in subduing those nimble, glittering, fantastic Ariels to surrender to their "intimate questionings." Though the Greeks were good-fellows, who laughed, like others, at and with their friends, they have supplied but a scanty share of the literature of mirth. The Romans—although those kings of Latin wit, Horace and Juvenal are theirs,—have not given much heed to the quirky and multifarious ambassadors of Momus: the jocularities of the scholastics, even in their merriest "mood," would cut but a sorry "figure." Their "apprehension" would require a considerable exercise of "judgment," and would scarcely enliven our "discourse;" and, though we were to quote their quibbling "syllogisms" to boot, the experiment would be bootless; for it would be difficult to convince our readers of the "method" in their madness. We shall neither press Luther nor Erasmus, Jeremy Taylor nor Sir Thomas More, Plato nor Bacon, Horace nor Cowper, into our service to prove that a little nonsense now and then is relished by the wisest men, or to make manifest that wit is not wickedness, nor is laughter always like the crackling of thorns under a pot. A fool's laughter is stupid, a bad man's wit is wicked; but there is an enjoyable, exhilarative, delicate lucidity of mind which transmutes the baser elements of human life into the ludicrous, the humorous, and the witty, and either laughs them out of countenance or hurls them off contemptuously from the presence of thinking men. Montaigne and Rabelais have set the frisky phantom—Fun, sitting about in mazy jinks and brisk junketings, glittering in *equivocque*, quaintness, jocularities, and satire. Molière, with skilful brilliancy and broad farcicality, with strokes of wit more efficacious than the most sententious syllogisms, castigated the vulgarities, affectations, and absurdities of his age. The irony of Bayle, the dissectiveness of Le Sage, the ribaldry of Grand-

mont, the clear-cut sarcasms of Voltaire, are specimens of that now almost extinct attribute, French wit and humour. The comicalities of Boccaccio, the serio-laughable fables of Pulci, the airy sportiveness of Ariosto, afford types of Italian wit in former days; while the numerous epigrammaticisms of Bondi, the lively satire of Signorelli, and the much-meaning smartness of Dall Ognaro, exhibit the wit—which trembles to a tear—in the Italy of modern times. The happy ludicrousness of Cervantes, the multitudinous burlesquery of De Vega, the cynical adroitness of Quevedo, and “the infinite jests” of Father de l’Isle preserve a place for Spain among the laughter-raising volumes of a good library. There is a flavorous pungency in Lessing’s writings; Richter’s powers of grotesque suggestive humour are widely admitted; the many-sided Epicureanism of Goethe lead him to give vent to mirthful wit; but Heine, for piquant intellectuality, daring jocularity, delicious felicity of humour, and ripe (sometimes *over-ripe*) luxuriance—shall we not rather say pruriency?—of imaginative wit excels all German authors. Of wits and humorists, however, no country has been more prolific than our own. Chaucer has a rich, burly tone of laughing wisdom in his merry “tales.” Shakspeare had a nimble, fiery, delectable wit—as the “admirable fooling” of Falstaff, the keen causticity of Mercutio, the waggery of Touchstone, the fantastic moralizings of Jacques, the gay and voluble quips of Rosalind, the pathetic simplicity of Shallow’s commonplace, the saney mouthing in “The Taming of the Shrew,” and all the vagaries of Nym, Pistol, Bardolph, Sir Toby, Gadshill, Feeble Mouldy, Wart, Silence, &c., may hint to our remembrance. Ben Jonson possessed a more flavorous but less savoury wit than Will, of Avon—it is, like Flemish eggs, too far-fetched. Suckling’s wit is gay, easy, *debonnaire*. His muse wears it “Like jewels in her crisp jet hair.” Butler exhibits the intensest effrontery of mirth—his whole poem flashes with eccentricity, startling juxtapositions, odd and unaccountable contrasts, grotesque imagery, outrageous fun, and is a rich and exquisite concentration of frolicsome play of thought and fancy. Then we have the broad, mischievous, *double-entendre* of Wycherley, the salletish inventiveness of Vanburgh, the rognish, rattle-brain, sparkling malice of Farquhar, and the shamelessly hoyden merry-making of Congreve. An age somewhat nearer brings within range the fierce, dazzling, retaliative, scornful sarcasm of Swift; the polite flirting, yet genteel raillery of Addison—the Rhadamanthus of peccadilloes, peculiarities, bibs, tuckers, eye-glasses, wigs, gold-canes, and hoops; the reckless, rakish, prodigal, liquor-tinged, though felicitous, laughabilities of Steele; the Horatian nerve of Prior, the loose man-about-town-ism of Gay, the viticolic, envious, and remorseless satire of Pope; the ingenious, enjoyable, romantic humour of Fielding; the scampish, yet passionate, rollick and frolic of Smollett; the hypocritical artisticality and manufactured sentimentalism of Sterne; the genuine merit of the thriftless, foible full, absurd, lovable, romping, droll, “good-

natured man," Oliver Goldsmith; and the terrible irony of Burns! In the early part of our own century, and even in that country, which he has had the hardihood to nickname "that garret of the earth, that knuckle-end of England, that land of Calvin, oat-cakes, and sulphur," Sidney Smith early displayed his kaleidoscopic jocularly—that voluminosity of ridicule which won him the name of a wit—and lost him the reality of a bishopric: under the very dome of St. Paul's, the quaint drolleries and punning pleasantries and singular sallies of banter—The Ingoldsby Legends were thought out. The boisterous buffooneries of Theodore Hook have had their passing hour; but the pun sparkling, sage epigrammatic comicalities of Hood—which always had a double-edge of sense and satire, are treasured as memorials of a sad heart's laughter. The genial Lambe, the vivacious Leigh Hunt, wondrous Haslitt, pawkie Galt, dashing Marryatt, the great-souled mystery of mirth and wisdom—Christopher North, are all upon Britain's bead-roll of wits and humorists. Our own day can boast of the rub-the-gilding-off the trickeries of life of Mayhew, the perceptive quaintness of Dickens, the flash and fervour of Lever, the terse, telling vigour of Sala, the carefully pointed polish of Brookes, the glee and glamourie of Thornbury, the parodying power of Yates, the subtle incisiveness of Lewes, the pithy proverbiality of George Eliot, the thistly persistency of B. H. Horne, the *bonhomie* of Aytoun, the perilous edginess of Lemon, the (*to imitate and illustrate his own style of "doing it,"*) "punstrosities of J. H. Byron, the steel-filings of Charles Reade, and the burly burlesques of Blanchard. But we have lost the scathing irony of Thackeray, the joke-making magistrate, Gilbert à Becket, the humorous Reach, the mirth-maker of all work Albert Smith,—and England's right-famous modern wit—Douglas William Jerrold.

Douglas William Jerrold was born in London, 3rd Jan. 1803. His father, Samuel Jerrold, was manager of a theatrical troupe, whose performances—such as they were—delighted the rustics of Kent, the watering-place frequenters of Southend in Essex, and the sailors'-ashore in Sheerness. His mother, Miss Reid, was an actress in the York circuit, and became the second wife of Mr. Jerrold, at Wirksworth, in Derbyshire, in 1794. Two sons, Robert and Charles, whose mother had been a Miss Simpson before her advent in the *ménage* of the manager, occupied places at the family hearth; and "the young wife" had presented her "old husband" with two daughters prior to the birth of Douglas William, the Joseph and the *pen*—ultimate member of the family! Mrs. Jerrold had been endeavouring to add to the family income and reputation by a London engagement when she was called to add a unit to the mighty city's population. She had too many parts to play to be able to enact "The Nursing Mother!" So he was packed off to Cranbrook in Kent, even in his swaddling clothes, to be cared for by his grandmother, whose maiden name, Douglas, he bore. Amid hop-fields and by sheep-walks, on soft knolls of pasture-land

specked with wild flowers and rich with the mirth music of agriculture, Jerrold, during his childhood, absorbed into his spirit the mystic beauty and melody of rural life. But before sunset and the home-going sheep-bells he required to be tucked up alone in his tiny bed, while his grandmother fulfilled the duty of money-taker at the theatre-door. Only occasionally would he obtain respite from this "early to bed" necessity when Edmund Kean or other star of the theatrical firmament shed a light on Sheerness stage, and "a child's part" was in the bills. Then on the tawny tiger's hide which clad the shoulders of *ROLLA* might he be set astride, and through the flare and the flicker of tallow, over the wooden rocks and through the canvas crevices, be borne in wide-eyed amazement before a gaping crowd, whose busy hands made music much less pleasing to the younger than the elder mimic of the life of man. He had not then learned the secret of the palms. When he had grown up to petticoats and pinafores, his grandmother still caged her pet-bird snugly in the attic, but he early learned to look out of its windows over the great broad ship-studded and sail-flapped sea, and the child's instinctive dream and longing was to wing over its surface in those floating palaces which met his gaze. An actor—Mr. Wilkinson—began to teach Jerrold his letters in his sixth year, and pot-hooks and hangers became a passionate occupation in his long lone evenings. He read and thumbed in his boyhood Geesner's "Death of Abel,"—a butter-soft, and honey-sweet sort of German prose Idyll; and Roderic Random, the earliest novel and masterpiece of one who had no small influence on the after life of Jerrold—the wit, novelist, dramatist and *littérateur*—Tobias Smollett. After rather more than a year's private up-bringing he was sent to one of the chief public schools in Sheerness, and in five years left it, having reached the third or fourth rule in arithmetic. He was woundily given to fighting; and delighted to lead his schoolmates in their mimic imitations of warfare, while the streets rang with a noise

"Of horns and pans and dogs and boys,
And kettle-drums, whose doleful dub
Sounds like the hooping of a tub."

These were the days of Britain's naval and military glory, when she stood against a world in arms, when the glow of conquest and the greed of blood were uppermost in every mind; when mothers prayed for hero-sons, and children longed for the hour when they could stand beneath their country's flag on shipboard or on battle-field. The war-fever seized Jerrold; but it was of the *sea-green* pattern, and in December, 1813, through the intervention of Captain Austen, brother of the novelist, Jane Austen, he set his foot on the guardship off the Nore, in the dignity and dress, as well as with the commission, of a midshipman of the *Namur*, a 74-gun ship. In "Jack Runnymede" he afterwards sketched this part of his life. Clarkson Stanfield, then a foremast man, but afterwards a celebrated painter and

1869.

Jerrold, formed their friendship here. Here they got up plays and rollicked about. But in 1815 Jerrold was transferred to the brig *Ernst*, which was to convey transport troops and stores to Ostend, in aid of the great war then raging. She entered port a few days before "the crowning mercy or glory" of Waterloo, and cruised about in the German Ocean till 10th July, when she received on board part of the battle-broken remains of that mighty carnage, which blazoned Britain's name over the world, and left a thousand cargoes of carcasses upon the field. Jerrold never forgot what he had seen and suffered in pursuit of that "bragging, fantastic lie," military glory,—Cain in uniform. Though he did not think gunpowder heaven's choicest frankincense, he did not love "peace at any price," but regarded chains as worse than bayonets. The law of national glory, he thought, was this—ask for nothing but what is right, and submit to nothing that is wrong. There is more true strength, more real, enduring power in that sentence than in the destructive roar of broadsides, or the mortal belching of artillery.

Peace came. The upstart dynasty of Buonaparte ceased. "St. Helena's dungeon-keep" received the hero of selfishness; and the hero of duty, Wellington, sheathed his sword. All men began anew to cultivate peace, goodwill, and—shopkeeping! Jerrold became a "Middy Ashore," whose services the State required no longer. Blue jackets and ducks grew scarce at Sheerness, and Jerrold senior, like Napoleon I., was forced to abdicate his theatrical throne. Eclipse overcast the fortunes of the family; but the indefatigable mother again tempted fortune in London, wherewith Douglas William made his *second* entrance—coatless, amid damp and fog—holding his sister's hand, on the cold, raw morning of New Year's day, 1816. Well did he say, in after life, "There is a golden volume yet to be written on the first struggles of forlorn genius in London, magnificent, miserable, ennobling, degrading London. If all who have suffered would confess their sufferings,—would show themselves in the stark, shivering squalor in which they first walked her streets,—would paint the wounds which first bled in her garrets, what a book might be placed in the hands of pride! What stern rebuke for the spoiled sons of fortune! What sustaining sweetness for the faint in spirit!" The thrill of reminiscence quivers through that sentence.

Broad Court, Bow Street—a poor court, one where poverty does not skulk, but walks about as a matter of course—became the residence of the Jerrolds. Foodless famine not unfrequently grinned in at the door, and old Samuel, stricken down by calamity, became moping, melancholy, and maundering. Young Jerrold was spirited and shiftily,—the gentlemanly "middy" did not contentedly mingle with the riff-raff of Broad Court, or succumb to the noisy, brawling, pugnacious malcontents who lodged in its dingy, high-built intricacies. The sea, the service poverty, had not drilled the heroism of life out of him. He sought and got work,—as "a printer's devil." In the "Heads of the People" he describes the duties and doings of

this unsaintly and unsavourily named creature thus :—"In the printing office the devil is a drudge. There is no employment too dirty for him ; no weight too heavy for his strength ; no distance too far for him to walk,—no, not walk, but run, or fly. . . . The vulgar errand-boy may saunter on the road, but the intelligent devil, he who fetches and carries precious thoughts, he, the light porter to the brain, the go-between of the author and the press, may not lounge and tarry like a common messenger ; he in his motion must approach as near to flying as is permitted to the human anatomy." "To give the devil his due," he is an important functionary, and is, after all, a very superior drudge, who attends "the chapel" diligently, arranges "formes," and distributes "pie," and is thoroughly acquainted with *Typology*. He is an indispensable agent in the production of books, and, of course, the devil's doings are in all the newspapers !

The love of books became Jerrold's passion. When the sun rose he rose ; and a self-taught student, in secret yet sacred labour, he unwound the mysteries of Latin grammar. French, German, and Italian were subsequently mastered. Then he pored over Shakspeare with such glowing earnestness, that scarcely a line he had written was unfamiliar to his memory. The greedy delight of reading was gratified by pinching the grosser appetites ; and as Scott's gorgeous panorama of romance, Byron's vivid page, or Shelley's marvellous poesy, made his heart throb ; as his eye glistened at the energetic censoriousness of Cobbett, or laughed at the political satires of Hone, the thought that he, too, might become an author rose in his soul, and spurred him on impulsively "to wreak his thoughts into expression."

There were then, as now, vast shoals of struggling magazines, whose circulation was so languid as to threaten dissolution at each issue, and ready to snap at any offering in which a single flash of thought was in any way fittingly expressed. In some of these, at the age of fifteen, Jerrold gained a welcome, and his first precious foretaste of immortality—*print!* Sonnets, rhymes, queer, quaint, quizzical sketches, epigrams, &c., flickered from his quill-nib at night, while by day he worked as a compositor in a printing office.

His connection with the press and his theatrical descent gained him access to the drop-scene, the footlights, and the crowd-thronged pit ; and he began to yearn to lighten up the stage with *his* wit, and flash the great broad joy of mirth into the hearts and faces of an audience. In 1828 he forwarded to Mr. Arnold, of the English Opera House, the first of a set of dramatic efforts which, for originality, brilliancy, piquant allusiveness, stage effect, and continuous as well as deserved success, have been unparalleled since the days of Fielding, Foote, Goldsmith, and Smollett. Though written in that year, it was not, however, performed till 1831, when his boyhood's tutor and his father's old friend, Mr. Wilkinson, played the part of "Popeseye," a cowardly bully of a butcher, in the now-popular farce of "More Frightened than Hurt." Before this time Jerrold's master had failed, and he became a "turnover" appren-

tice in the office of Mr. Bigg,—a gentleman who had a lengthened connection with cheap literature, from *Bell's Life* and the *Sunday Monitor* to the *Family Herald*. In the *Sunday Monitor*, Jerrold found the opportunity of exchanging the compositor's stick for the composer's quill. "I began the world," said he, "at an age when, as a general rule, boys have not laid down their primers; the cockpit of a man-of-war was at thirteen exchanged for the struggle of London; and appearing in print ere the meaning of words was mastered, no one can be more alive than myself to the worthlessness of these early mutterings." This being his own opinion of his earlier writings, it would ill become us to resuscitate them for criticism; and, indeed, but for the lesson of untiring industry, dauntless perseverance, and invincible determination, as well as for a more melancholy lesson, to be afterwards referred to, we should not here have mentioned them. He wrote criticisms of the actors in the minor theatres, under the punning title of the "Minorities," for the *Mirror of the Stage*, and, with his fellow-apprentice, Leman Blanchard, warbled sweet nothings of mellifluous sound, and "little or no meaning" in *La Belle Assemblée*. For four dramas, in 1823, he received £30. His father died before his earliest piece had won the stage; yet, even then, though he wore the printer's paper cap and canvas apron, the managers of the "Minorities" kept their weather-eye open when he hove in sight. Though not exactly "reduced to the outline of a bone," he was occasionally in the condition of his own Goliath Spiderlimb, who, when his angry master cries out, "Why, you rascal, don't I keep you?" replies, "I can't persuade my stomach that you do." About this time a Mary Swann got mingled with his other MS., and engaged his devotion as much as

"The souls of bards, the thoughts of sages,
The truths of life, the dreams of ages."

and he had scarcely completed his majority when, by marriage, this dear MS. became wholly his. Even then (1824), Leman Blanchard, in an exquisite epithalamium, could say—

"The time shall be
When men shall find a music in thy name
To rouse deep fancies and opinions free,
Affections fervid as the sun's bright flame,
And sympathies unfathomed as the sea."

In 1825 printing was abandoned, and an engagement at £4 per week was entered into at the Coburg—now the Victoria Theatre—to supply it as occasion required with squibs, farces, pantomimes, &c., and an eke was got by writing for magazines, newspapers, and periodicals. Davidge, the proprietor, was harsh, peremptory, and keen of cash; and when Jerrold asked an increase in salary from him he flew into a passion of invectives against his audacious ingratitude. They parted. The author carried with him in his pocket that of which, had Davidge known the worth, he would have gone on his knees to ask forgiveness of the offended dramatist, whom he did not in reality

expect to lose by his objurgatory onset. That work was "Black-eyed Susan"—the finest sea-piece in any language, and one which never fails to win the sympathetic admiration of all who trust in "hearts of oak." Jerrold went to the Surrey—then managed, or rather mismanaged, by the most versatile of British actors, Robert William Elliston, at that time at the very ebb-tide of fortune. An engagement was made at £5 per week, and the bargain was instantly honoured by the dramatist's placing his new play on the table. It was "a hit, a very palpable hit." It ran 150 consecutive nights. The receipts rose at a bound to £600 per night. By frequency of use the scenery required to be replaced. It was performed in every theatre in Great Britain, and the author's whole reward was less than £70. The play had the music of the heart in it, the very breeze of the sea, and the rough, honest, hearty manliness of "the true British sailor." T. P. Cooke, who performed "William," became the lion of the day, and the author was thought of as a *drudge*, when thought of at all!

Besides being playwright for the Surrey, he became hack for Sadler's Wells and editor of *The Weekly Times*. A wag once greeted him as the *Surrey* Shakspeare. The *sorry* Shakspeare, I'm afraid, was his reply. By the time he was twenty-six he had written nearly a hundred dramas, melodramas, pantomimes, burlesques, interludes, &c. &c.; besides innumerable prose and poetical contributions to serial literature, all exhibiting

"The play of fancy and the flash of mind."

Higher ambition dawned upon him, and he attempted, in 1829, "A native drama, on a native theme." The play was "Thomas-a-Becket;" in it he successfully made "English manners, habits, and history, rise," and left the fame acquired by his "Ambrose Gwinnett," "John Overy," "The Flying Dutchman," &c. far behind. Miss Mitford says, it "gained a hearty, genial, enthusiastic welcome."

The following extracts from the preface deserve quotation:—

"It has been the chief purpose of the writer to delineate the character, in all its various modifications, of *Thomas-a-Becket*, when appearing as the champion of his order, wielding the bolts of the Church as weapons of his ambition, and when subdued, exalted, and hastened by meditation and long converse with the acts of men. . . . *Becket*, though 'standing on the forehead of the age' in which he lived, became, towards its close, enamoured of the agonies of martyrdom: he wore his mitre, but to put it off for a crown of thorns. Of an active and fervent mind, when driven from the midday splendour of his office, he assayed in his little hermitage the substance of earthly grandeur—touched it with the test of fiery fanaticism, and found it dust. . . . As to the leading events of the life of *Becket* they have been somewhat scrupulously attended to. . . . History is not to be degraded or sported with by an impertinent alloy of invention. . . . It forms alike the business and the difficulty of the dramatist to condense as much as possible the lengthy details of history, and at the same time to display, in all its strength and radiance, the spirit which they engender.

The writer must prize historical facts as we value fints—not for their bulk, but for the light and heat which may be struck from out them.”

From this play, a few extracts may not be thought unacceptable, especially as the original edition is rare. We begin with a quotation on physiological psychology in the days of Gall and Spurzheim, George Combe, and James Mill.

“*Swart.*—Yes! Fetch me the brain of one of our great men—of those who rise above the feeble thousands, as the palm aspires above the nettle; fetch me the brain of worldly greatness, and thou and I, like two apes on the movements of a watch, will sit in judgment on it;—look for the springs of true nobility, the chain of passion round the wheels of guilt; the little pins, the stops of whim and interest; look to solve the action of the instrument, until, like the poor page with the dial, despairingly we cast it down,—owning that of all riddles human nature is the greatest.”

This Swart's sister is condemned to death by the Bishop of London, and he intercedes for her life; this is a part of their colloquy:—

“*Bishop of London.*—Policy and Religion demand her death.

Swart.—Religion!—is blood her livery?—Is the blazing pile her glory?—are the shrieks of women, the hollow groans of old men, her hymn of praise? does Religion weave her crown from the sufferer's heart strings? If such be Religion, oh! take away the Dove and let the red-beaked Vulture be her ghastly symbol!

Bishop of London.—Such pleading for a sister well becomes thee, yet—

Swart.—For a sister! for human nature! He hath but half a brain—the shadow of a heart, who doth not think and feel for all that breathe, but wraps him in a household selfishness, nor listens to the wail of misery, so he and his are calm. My lord—

Bishop of London.—I must not listen to thee.

Swart.—Do not. I give praise that Heaven is readier to hear, than we poor worms that try to ape its mercies. I will take my suit to *Another!*”

Here is that Romance of History, Thomas à Becket's mother's story; told briefly with a moral:—

Becket.—Woman hath no constancy! Wrong not her who bore me by such censure. Hear a short tale, their own the charge untrue. My father was a soldier of the Cross, and fought in Palestine. He was taken—enslaved,—a hero of the faith, he wore his bonds as garlands. His master had one lovely girl; my father taught the young heretic by stealth our creed. She would weep over the Christian prisoner, gemming his clanking chains with her tears. My father gained his freedom, reached his home, the girl remained among the terrors of war,—a tender floweret in a soldier's helm. At length, urged by uneasy thoughts, guided, as by a wand of flame, by her new faith, she left her golden clime; nor did the terrors of the wilderness, or the billows of the sea restrain her, till, with a heart brimful of hope—her Saracenic tongue enriched with but one poor word of English, Gilbert,—my father's name, (he had taught her to breathe the syllables, blithe music in his late captivity)—she found herself in London—yet how to find my father? With untired feet from morn till darkness, she would tread each street and suburb; and, at every step, as the dove broods in one note o'er its hopes,—so with her one word of English—‘Gilbert,’ would she tell her story. ‘Gilbert!’ ‘Gilbert!’ fell from her lips, as down a

coral shelve drop follows drop. A cherub heard the word, and bore it to my father. Angels sang when they did marry. Say not again woman hath no constancy!"

The Dramatic Copyright Act was not then in operation; actors were legally only rogues and vagabonds; and playwrights being only their abettors in their lawless calling, plays were unprotected by legislative enactments from unprincipled piracy, and Jerrold seriously thought of relinquishing the drama. But after the appearance and success of "*Thomas à Becket*," Drury Lane, then the home of the legitimate drama, was ready to receive him; and there he produced "*The Witch-finder*," Dec., 1829. It was unsuccessful. Before the curtain rose Jerrold was nervously anxious, A fellow-author, whose plays were, like half of the British fleet, at that time—"taken from the French"—advised calmness, instancing himself on a first night. "You may well be cool," says Jerrold, "your pieces have *all* been tried before!" "I beg your pardon," replied he, "you remember in '*Ask no Questions*?' my *Baroness* was *original*. I never saw a piece of yours which did not show your *original barrenness*, was the retort. In 1830, "*The Devil's Ducat*" gained the ear of the frequenters of the Adelphi. It had, as all Jerrold's subsequent plays had, a moral as well as a dramatic purpose, and the lesson may be guessed from this character of gold:—

"Look abroad—

Doth it not give honour to the worthless;
Strength to the weak; beauty to withered age,
And wisdom to the fool? As the world goes,
A devil with a purse wins more regard
Than angels empty-handed."

At Drury Lane, in 1831, he made a new and luckier venture with "*The Bride of Ludgate*." He was asked to write again, and the "*Rent Day*"—that vigorous and telling revivification of Wilkie's celebrated pictures, presentation proof impressions of which the gratified dramatist kept in his study—was produced early in 1832. Clarkson Stansfield, his old shipmate in the *Namur*, having painted the scenery. Other rich, ripe wisdom-fraught, taking, teaching, and touching domestic dramas—of which class of writings he was the originator—flashed from his pen, *e. g.*—"Neil Gwynne" and "*The Housekeeper*," in 1833; "*The Wedding Gown*" and "*Beau Nash*," in 1834; "*The Hazard of the Die*," "*The Schoolfellows*," "*Doves in a Cage*," &c., in 1835, besides two unsuccessful pieces, entitled, "*The Factory Girl*" and "*The Man's an Ass*." These various plays sparkle with something like the quaint, vivid wisdom and wit of the ancient dramatists, and have a smack and spruceness, a racy felicity and point in the dialogue, rare original inventiveness in the plot, a noble purpose underlies, and invigorates the incidents. The wit is supple, spontaneous, and subtle, the unflagging effervescence of a prodigal and marvellous facility of humorous thought.

The Essayist.

THE SACRED POETRY OF THE XVII. CENTURY.*

As a specimen of Herbert's more fantastic mood in dealing with his holy themes, I may cite the little poem entitled

PEACE.

Sweet Peace, where dost thou dwell? I humbly crave,
 Let me once know.
 I sought thee in a secret cave,
 And ask'd, if Peace were there.
 A hollow winde did seem to answer, No :
 Go seek elsewhere.

I did ; and going did a rainbow note :
 Surely, thought I,
 This is the lace of Peace's coat :
 I will search out the matter.
 But while I lookt, the clouds immediately
 Did break and scatter.

Then went I to a garden and did spy
 A gallant flower,
 The Crown Imperiall : Sure, said I,
 Peace at the root must dwell.
 But when I digg'd, I saw a worm devour
 What show'd so well.

At length I met a rev'rend good old man ;
 Whom when for Peace
 I did demand, he thus began :
 There was a Prince of old
 At Salem dwelt, who liv'd with good increase
 Of flock and fold.

He sweetly liv'd : yet sweetnesse did not save
 His life from foes.
 But after death out of his grave
 There sprang twelve stalks of wheat : †
 Which many wond'ring at, got some of those
 To plant and set.

* Continued from page 386.

† The twelve Apostles and their doctrine, elsewhere compared to "pipes of gold," and their doctrine to "cordial water."

It prosper'd strangely, and did soon disperse
 Through all the earth :
 For they that taste it do rehearse,
 That vertue lies therein ;
 A secret vertue, bringing peace and mirth
 By flight of sinne.

Take of this grain, which in my garden grows,*
 And grows for you ;
 Make bread of it : and that repose
 And Peace, which ev'ry where
 With so much earnestness you do pursue
 Is onely there.

We give a few specimens of Herbert's conceits :—The following, upon the mystical meaning of our Saviour's wearing the Crown of thorns, is in his happiest vein. *Christus loquitur* :—

"So sits the earth's great curse in Adam's fall
 Upon my head ; so I remove it all
 From the earth unto my brows, and bear the thrall."

This again, (if strictly speaking a *conceit*) upon Judas and the thirty pieces of silver :—

"For thirtie pence he did my death devise,
 Who at three hundred did the ointment prize,
 Not half so sweet as my sweet sacrifice."

Very happy, also, is his paranomasia upon the name Iesu—"I ease you."

His "Anagram" upon the name Mary, which by transposition of the letters, gives the word Army, affords a specimen of quaint ingenuity :—

"How well her name an *Army* doth present
 In whom the Lord of hosts did pitch his tent!"

In reference to Christ's miraculous indwelling in the womb of the Virgin Mary. The idea here was, probably, suggested by the description of the Church in the "Canticles." "Who is she that looketh forth as the morning, fair as the moon, clear as the sun, and terrible as an army with banners?" †

In his most fantastic and extravagant mood is his lament upon "Church Rents and Schismes." Lamenting her unhappy divisions, he thus apostrophizes the Church :—

* The Church, the heavenly as opposed to the earthly garden above mentioned (*vide stanza 3*).

† Canticles vi. 10. Cf. 4. 13.

"O Mother deare and kinde,
 Where shall I get me eyes enough to weep,
 As many eyes as starres?
 Would at least I might
 With these two poore ones lick up all the dew
 Which falls by night, and poure it out for you!"

Notwithstanding the wild extravagance of the conceit, the idea involved in the comparison of eyes to stars, those ever-watchful eyes of night, is worthy of a true poet. Of more questionable taste is the conceit of "licking up the dew."

Such are a few specimens of Herbert's conceits, which, if they do not approve themselves to our judgment, may at least please our fancy by their ingenuity.

"That Herbert's poetry has many of the characteristics of the metaphysical poetry of Donne and Cowley, cannot be denied, but it is redeemed by the fervent spirit of devotion breathing in every line. It is not the expression of a well-disciplined imagination, but is rather instinct with fancy. With all its peculiarities—to use a kinder term than faults—I had rather take it as it is, as one of the many tones of English poetry, than that its distinctive features should have been done away by stricter poetic discipline. It is curious to observe that Herbert has himself alluded to his participation in the over-wrought fashion of poetry, in a few lines which indicate its faults better, I think, than criticism has ever done, and close, too, with a statement of the best and most universal theory of poetic art, loyalty to nature in her own simplicity.

JORDAN.*

"When first my lines of heav'nly joyes made mention,
 Such was their lustre, they did so excell,
 That I sought out quaint words, and trim invention;
 My thoughts began to burnish, sprout, and swell,
 Curling with metaphors a plain intention,
 Decking the sense, as if it were to sell.

Thousands of notions in my brain did runne,
 Off'ring their service, if I were not sped:
 I often blotted what I had begunne;
 This was not quick enough, and that was dead:
 Nothing could seem too rich to clothe the sunne,
 Much lesse these joyes which trample on his head.

As flames do work and winde, when they ascend;
 So did I weave myself into the sense,
 But while I bustled, I might hear a friend
 Whisper, *How wide is all this long pretence!*
There is in love a sweetness ready penn'd:
Come out early that, and save expense."

* As indicating the period of his first entering (spiritually) into the promised land, whence the title of the poem.

Herbert is one of the many minor poets to whom we are indebted for the sacred poetry of the seventeenth century, which is so voluminous that it has been truly said a history of it might be regarded as an elaborate preface to the 'Paradise Lost.'* Another writer, deprecating the undeserved neglect in the present day of Herbert's poetry, thus sums up,—“After all, it cannot be denied that Herbert, as a poet, never will and never can be a general favourite. The want of poetic diction, and it must be remembered that in his day the language of poetry was not yet recognised, by tacit consent, as distinct in many points from that of prose, the quaintness of his thoughts, and the homeliness of his phrases, are grave faults in the eyes of most people. Even the multiplicity and compression of his ideas make him unpopular, though it may satisfy a more critical taste, just as a thorough musician enjoys a closely compacted fugue more than flowing airs and melodies. His subject, too, is against him. The very names of some of his poems,—‘Faith,’ ‘Prayer,’ ‘Virtue,’ ‘Obedience,’ ‘Conscience,’ to say nothing of other titles positively ludicrous to our modern ears, are a stumbling-block on the threshold, except to those who approach in a devout, or, as Coleridge preferred to say, ‘devotional spirit.’ To all others, the pervading sense of the unseen world in every line is as an unknown tongue, an unintelligible rhapsody. His words are, as the old Greek dramatists say, ‘eloquent to those who go along with them,’ but to none else. They are not likely to attract the uninitiated; their influence is rather in deepening and quickening religious feelings already existing. Like music in a minor key, his poetry does not command attention by a full burst of sound, but quietly instils congenial musings into the attentive ear. All these causes are more than enough to relegate Herbert into the class of poets whose lot it must be ‘to find audience fit though few.’ He would himself gladly acquiesce in such retirement, in the same spirit as that in which Wordsworth sings:—

“Shine, poet; in thy place, and be content.”

Herbert's poetry can never be popular. But all true lovers of poetry will find hidden treasure there, if they have patience to search below the surface. There is the difficulty. It must be read *leisurely* to be appreciated. The eager, bustling spirit of our times is incapable, without some self-constraint, of comprehending those compressed utterances, the result of undisturbed meditation. Just as, in a dimly-lighted room, any one, who gives only a hurried glance, may turn away disappointed from a really fine painting, so it is only after a mental effort of fixed attention, that the latent beauties of poetry like Herbert's can be described. Then, and not till then, what seemed confused and meaningless comes out in light and shadow, disclosing the significance of even the minutest details.”†

* Reed's Lectures on the British Poets.

† Christian Remembrancer, No. cxvii.

Such is this writer's just, acute, and appreciative estimate, of Herbert's poetry.

Of Henry Vaughan's poems, published under the title of "*Silex Scintillans*," (Sparks from the Flintstone), poems less known than they deserve to be, it has been well said, that, 'Preserving all the piety of George Herbert, they have less of his quaint and fantastic turns, with a much larger infusion of poetic feeling and expression.' A tender, melancholy pathos is the pervading tone of Vaughan's poetry. We may cite, as an instance, the following beautiful and touching lines from the poem entitled "*Departed Friends*," that on which, perhaps, his fame principally rests,—lines which have breathed comfort and resignation to many a mourner :—

"DEPARTED FRIENDS.

They are all gone into the world of light !
And I alone sit ling'ring here !
Their memory is fair and bright,
And my sad thoughts doth clear.

It glows and glitters in my cloudy breast,
Like stars upon some gloomy grove,
Or those faint beams in which this hill is drest
After the Sun's remove.

I see them walking in an air of glory,
Whose light doth trample on my days ;
My days, which are at best but dull and hoary,
Mere glimmering and decays.

O holy Hope ! and high Humility !
High as the Heavens above !
These are your walks, and you have shew'd them me,
To kindle my cold love.

Dear beauteous Death ; the jewel of the just !
Shining no where but in the dark ;
What mysteries do lie beyond thy dust,
Could man outlook that mark !

He that hath found some fledg'd bird's nest may know
At first sight if the bird be flown ;
But what fair dell or grove he sings in now,
That is to him unknown.

And yet as Angels in some brighter dreams
Call to the soul when man doth sleep,
So some strange thoughts transcend our wonted themes,
And into glory peep.

If a star were confined into a tomb,
Her captive flames must needs burn there ;
But when the hand that lockt her up gives room,
She'll shine through all the sphere.

O Father of eternal life, and all
 Created glories under Thee!
 Resume Thy spirit from this world of thrall
 Into true liberty!

Either disperse these mists, which blot and fill
 My perspective still as they pass;
 Or else remove me to that hill,
 Where I shall need no glass."

Very tender and beautiful also, notwithstanding its one imperfect rhyme (line 4), is the following

"MORNING ADDRESS TO A BIRD.

Hither thou com'st. The busie wind all night
 Blew through thy lodging, where thy own warm wing
 Thy pillow was. Many a sudden storm,
 For which course man seems much the fitter born,
 Rain'd on thy bed
 And harmless head;

And now as fresh and chearful as the light,
 Thy little heart in early hymns doth sing
 Unto that *Providence*, whose unseen arm
 Curb'd them, and cloath'd thee well and warm.
 All things that be praise Him; and had
 Their lesson taught them when first made."

His address to "The Timber," once glorious in green array, the pride of the sylvan grove, now leafless and sere, breathes the very spirit of pensive melancholy:—

"THE TIMBER.

Sure thou didst flourish once! and many springs,
 Many bright mornings, much dew, many showers
 Past o'er thy head: many light hearts and wings,
 Which now are dead, lodg'd in thy living bowers.

And still a new succession sings and flies;
 Fresh groves grow up, and their green branches shoot
 Towards the old and still enduring skies;
 While the low violet thrives at their root.

But thou, beneath the sad and heavy line
 Of death, doth waste all senseless, cold and dark;
 Where not so much as dreams of light may shine,
 Nor any thought of greenness, leaf, or bark."

The very cadence of these lines, slow and dirge-like, is onomatopæic!

The following lines, from a poem on "Childhood," may remind the reader of some of Wordsworth's tenderest, thoughtfulest strains :—

"Dear harmless age! the short, swift span
Where weeping virtue parts with man;
Where love without lust dwells, and bends
What way we please without self-ends.

An age of mysteries! which he
Must live twice that would God's face see;
Which *Angels* guard, and with it play,
Angels! which foul men drive away."

With the lines on "Departed Friends," before cited, may be fitly compared the following on

"BENEFICENCE."

Silence and stealth of dayes! 'tis now,
Since thou art gone,
Twelvemundred houres, and not a brow
But clouds hang on.

As he that in some cave's thick damp,
Lockt from the light,
Fixeth a solitary lamp,
To brave the night.

And, walking from his Sun, when past
That glimm'ring ray,
Cuts through the heavy mists in haste
Back to his day;

So o'er fled minutes I retreat
Unto that hour,
Which shew'd thee last, but did defeat
Thy light and pow'r.

I search and rack my soul to see
Those beams again;
But nothing but the snuff to me
Appeareth plain.

That, dark and dead, sleeps in its known
And common urn,
But those fled to their Maker's throne,
There shine and burn.

O could I track them! but souls must
Track one the other;
And now the Spirit, not the dust,
Must be thy brother.

Yet I have one *Pearle* by whose light
 All things I see;
 And in the heart of Earth and night
 Find Heaven and thee."

There is much of pensive beauty in these lines. Truly poetic is that simile of the "Solitary lamp" hung in a gloomy cave, emblematic of "the memory of the departed" glimmering through the mists of the Past!

The poem entitled "Time's Book" has quite a Tennysonian ring and cadence, recalling, as if they were echoes, the strains of "In Memoriam." The poet, like the Laureate, mourns a young friend, one loved and untimely lost.

"TIME'S BOOK.

As Time one day by me did pass,
 Through a large dusky glasse
 He held, I chanc'd to look,
 And spyed his curious Book
 Of past days, where sad Heav'n did shed
 A mourning light upon the dead.

Many disordered lives I saw,
 And foul records which thaw
 My kinde eyes still, but in
 A fair white page of thin
 And ev'n smooth lines, like the Sun's rays,
 Thy name was writ, and all thy days.

O bright and happy Kalendar!
 Where youth, shines like a star
 All pearl'd with tears, and may
 Teach age the *Holy way*;
 Where through thick pangs, high agonies,
 Faith into life breaks, and death dies.

As some meek night-piece which day quails,
 To candle-light unveils:
 So by one beamy line
 From thy bright lamp did shine
 In the same page thy humble grave,
 Set with green herbs, glad hopes and brave.

Here slept my thought's dear mark! which dust
 Seem'd to devour like rust:
 But dust, I did observe,
 By hiding doth preserve,
 As we for long and sure recruits,
 Candy with sugar our choice fruits."

O calm and sacred bed, where lies
 In death's dark mysteries
 A beauty far more bright
 Than the noon's cloudless light;
 For whose dry dust green branches bud,
 And robes are bleached in the *Lamb's* blood.

Sleep, happy ashes! blessed sleep!
 While haplesse I still weep;
 Weep that I have out-liv'd
 My life, and unreliev'd
 Must, soul-lesse shadow, so live on,
 Though life be dead, and my joys gone.*

As a specimen of his (Vaughan's) more lively and cheerful mood—a rare mood with him—we give the airy and graceful spring-song entitled—

THE REVIVAL.

Unfold! unfold! Take in His light
 Who makes thy cares more short than night;
 The joys, which with his day-star rise,
 He deals to all but drowsie eyes;
 And (what the men of this world miss)
 Some drops and dews of future bliss.

Hark! how the winds have changed their note;
 And with warm whispers call thee out.
 The frosts are past, the storms are gone,
 And backward life at last comes on.
 The lofty groves in express joyes
 Reply unto the turtle's voice;
 And here, in dust and dirt, O here
 The lilies of his love appear!

How every line of this unpremeditated lay rings, as it were, with the prelusive notes, "the herald melodies of spring!"

Again, to take another example. What more charming in its sweet grace and simplicity than the exquisite little poem—a gem without a flaw—entitled "The Shower!"

THE SHOWER.

Waters above, eternal springs!
 The dew that silvers the Dove's wings!

* Sleep sweetly, tender heart, in peace;
 Sleep, holy spirit, blessed soul,
 While the stars burn, the moons increase
 And the great ages onward roll.

Sleep till the end, true soul and sweet,
 Nothing comes to the new or strange.
 Sleep full of rest from head to feet;
 Lie still, dry dust, secure of change.

Tennyson's Poems.—To J. S.

O welcome, welcome to the sad!
 Give dry dust drink, drink that makes glad.
 Many fair evenings, many flowers
 Sweetened with rich and gentle showers,
 Have I enjoyed, and down have run
 Many a fine and shining sun;
 But never till this happy hour
 Was blessed with such an evening shower!"

The poem "Looking Back" is radiant with the beauty of the morning, and sparkles with beams of orient light.

"LOOKING BACK.

Fair, shining mountains of my pilgrimage,
 And flowery vales, whose flowers were star!
 The days and nights of my first happy age,
 An age without distaste or warra!
 When I by thought ascend your sunny heads,
 And mind those sacred midnight lights,
 By which I walked, when curtained rooms and beds
 Confined or sealed up others' sights;

O then how bright and quick a light
 Doth brush my heart and scatter night!
 Ohasing that shade, which my sins made,
 While I so spring, as if I could not fade.
 How brave a prospect is a traversed plain,
 Where flowers and palms refresh the eye.
 And days well spent like the glad East remain
 Whose morning glories cannot dye."

Such are a few specimens of Vaughan's happier mood, rays of light, bright, transient gleams, breaking ever and anon from the clouds that overshadow his horizon.

To revert once more to the class of poems of a distinctively religious character. As a companion to Herbert's poem on the same subject, though differing widely in their respective modes of treatment, we give the poem entitled "Peace."

"PEACE.

My soul, there is a countrie
 Afar beyond the stars,
 Where stands a winged sentrie
 All skilfull in the wars.
 There, above noise and danger,
 Sweet Peace sits, crown'd with smile,
 And one born in a manger
 Commands the beauteous files.
 He is thy gracious Friend
 And (O my soul awake!)
 Did in pure love descen'd,

To die here for thy sake.
 If thou canst get but thither,
 There grows the flowre of peace,
 The rose that cannot wither,
 Thy fortress and thy ease,
 Leave then thy foolish ranges ;
 For none can thee secure,
 But One who never changes,
 Thy God, thy Life, thy Cure."

This, it has been truly said, rises above the ordinary level of sacred poetry, nor are other examples of the kind wanting.

Finally, as a specimen of his more fantastic mood in the religious kind, after the style of Herbert, we may cite the poem entitled "The Hidden Flower." The flower, earth-buried through the winter, is here taken as a type of the future resurrection. The same idea, not, indeed, a very recondite one, is, we may observe, to be found also in Tennyson's "In Memoriam."

"THE HIDDEN FLOWER.

I walkt the other day, to spend my hour,
 Into a field,
 Where I sometimes had seen the soil to yield
 A gallant flowre ;
 But Winter now had ruffled all the bowre
 And curious store
 I knew there heretofore.

Yet I, whose search lov'd not to peep and peer
 I' th' face of things,
 Thought with myself, there might be other springs
 Besides this here,
 Which, like cold friends, sees us but once a year ;
 And so the flowre
 Might have some other bowre.

Then, taking up what I could nearest spie
 I digg'd about
 The place where I had seen him to grow out ;
 And by and by
 I saw the warm Recluse alone to lie,
 Where fresh and green
 He lived of us unseen.

Many a question intricate and rare
 Did I there strow !
 But all I could extort was, that he now
 Did there repair
 Such losses as befel him in this air,
 And would ere long
 Come forth most fair and young.

This past, I threw the clothes quite o'er his head,
 And stung with fear
 Of my own frailty dropt down many a tear
 Upon his bed ;
 Then sighing whisper'd, *Happy are the dead !*
What peace doth now
Rock him asleep below !

And yet, how few believe such doctrine springs
 From a poor root,
 Which all the winter sleeps here under foot,
 And hath no wings
 To raise it to the truth and light of things ;
 But is still too
 By ev'ry wand'ring clod !

O Thou ! whose Spirit did at first inflame
 And warm the dead,
 And, by a sacred incubation, fed
 With life this frame,
 Which once had neither being, forme, nor name ;
 Grant I may so
 Thy steps track here below,

That in these masques and shadows I may see
 Thy sacred way ;
 And by those hid ascents climb to that day,
 Which breaks from Thee,
 Who art in all things, though invisibly !
 Shew me Thy peace,
 Thy mercy, love, and ease !

And from this care, where dreams and sorrows reign,
 Lead me above,
 Where light, joy, leisure, and true comforts move
 Without all pain ;
 There hid in Thee, shew me his life again,
 At whose dumbe urn
 Thus all the year I mourn !”*

How nobly is the quaintness—a quaintness not in itself unpleasant—of the earlier portion of the poem redeemed by the fervent outburst of devotion at the close !

The characteristics of Vaughan's poetry are thus summed up by

- * Cf. “ Mother ! the long, long year I mourn ;
 But thy mute presence is an urn,
 Replenished from above,
 Whence yearly there distils a dower
 Of deep absolving peace, a shower
 Of benediction,—right and power
 For penitential love.”

(Faber's Poems—*The Easter Guest.*)

a warm, yet discriminative admirer, himself too—a sacred poet* of no mean order—the author of that beautiful hymn—

“Abide with me: fast falls the eventide!”

“His (Vaughan’s) poems display much originality of thought, and frequently likewise much felicity of expression. The former is, indeed, at times condensed into obscurity, and the latter defaced with quaintness. But Vaughan never degenerates into a smooth versifier of common places. One, indeed, of his great faults as a poet is the attempt to crowd too much of matter into his sentences, so that they read roughly and inharmoniously, the words almost elbowing each other out of the lines. His rhymes, too, are frequently defective, and he delights in making the sense of one line run over into the line following. This, when not overdone, is, doubtless, a beauty in versification, and redeems it from that monotony which so offends in the poets of Queen Anne’s time. Yet even this may be pushed to excess, and become, by its uniformity, liable itself to the imputation of monotony.” Upon a total estimate of his poetical claims, with all allowances and abatements made, the critic concludes by saying:—“Indeed it may with truth be said of Vaughan that his faults are in a great measure those of the age he lived in, and the master (George Herbert) he imitated, while his beauties are all his own. That he will ever become a thoroughly popular poet is scarcely to be expected in this age. But among those who can prize poetic thought, even when clad in a dress somewhat quaint and antiquated, who love to commune with a heart overflowing with religious ardour, and who do not value this the less because it has been lighted at the earlier and purer fires of Christianity, and has caught a portion of their youthful glow, poems like those of Henry Vaughan will not want their readers, nor will such readers be unthankful to have our author and his works introduced to their acquaintance.”

B. C. H.

FOUR GOOD HABITS.—Punctuality, Accuracy, Steadiness, and Despatch. Without the first, time is wasted, those who rely on us are irritated and disappointed, and nothing is done in its proper time and place. Without the second, mistakes the most hurtful to our own credit and interest and that of others may be committed. Without the third, nothing can be well done; and without the fourth, opportunities of advantage are lost which it is impossible to recal.

CAUSES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES.—Remember that lofty trees grow from diminutive seeds; copious rivers flow from small fountains; slender wires often sustain ponderous weights; injury to the smallest nerves may occasion the most agonizing sensation; the derangement of the least wheel or pivot may render useless the greatest machine of which it is a part; an immense crop of errors may spring from the least root of falsehood; a glorious intellectual light may be kindled by the minutest sparks of truth; and every principle is more diffusive and operative by reason of its intrinsic energy than of its magnitude.—*Dr. Gregory.*

* The late Rev. H. F. Lyte.

The Reviewer.

The Science of Arithmetic. 12th edition.

The School Arithmetic. 9th edition.

By JAMES CORNWELL, Ph.D., and J. G. FITCH, M.A.

London: Simpkin, Marshall, and Co.

ARITHMETIC is a study of so much importance in a commercial country and a commercial age, that proper guidance in and aid to the acquisition of a proficient knowledge of it may be said to be almost invaluable to any one who is engaged either in the arduous task of self-culture, or in preparing others for the due occupancy of any business situation. In its theory arithmetic forms a sort of introduction to all the sciences in which reasoning is employed; in its practice it enters into the every-day life of everybody. The power to calculate is an all-prevalent requisite of life, and the art of ciphering possesses an importance second to few of those to which in school instruction we are generally introduced. When, therefore, a judicious and excellent work can be properly recommended as fitted to initiate the pupil easily, and carry him on prosperously, it is right that it should be done; still better is it when the same commendation can be extended so as to point to the means of a complete mastery of numerical reasoning and computation, of intuitive and inductive calculation. The books which are named at the head of this article have been known to the writer for more than a dozen years, and have been well tested during that time as aids in tuition, guides in self-culture, practical helps to a knowledge of numbers, and efficient means of training to a thoughtful use of figures. We have employed them in individual cases and in class-practice, and we have frequently, with the best results, commended them to the attention of those who were taking a course of self-training in the science and art of numbers.

In the "School Arithmetic" the course is *inductive*. The copious examples given are so stated and arranged as either to suggest, illustrate, or substantiate some distinct truth in or property of numbers; and the exercises which follow rise by slow but sure gradations from the simpler elements under each rule to the more complex, the earlier exercises in each section being *oral*, and the subsequent ones *written*. At every important stage in the progress from part to part miscellaneous exercises requiring a combination of processes to be used in gaining the answer, test the fitness of the pupil for being set forward on his course or being set to revise those portions which have been found to be neglected. These examinative test-questions are very well arranged, and are not only various but interesting and informing.

The utility of this book as an aid in self-culture has been greatly enhanced by the issue of a **KEY**, in which all the questions given in the text and test-book are worked out in full, and practical directions are given in regard to each rule, to induce thoroughness in study, and simplicity in working the sums. Besides this, an introduction supplies some admirable hints on how to *teach*, and of course on how to *study* arithmetic most easily and most satisfactorily. This **KEY**, if *properly* used, would be found of great advantage to self-educators. We recommend that it be employed thus:—In each case study the explanatory example and the rule thoroughly, and in no case pass on to the working of any sum till these be clearly understood: proceed then to do the whole of the sums contained in a section before looking at the *answers*; when these have been done mark off all those which have been incorrectly performed, and do these all over prior to checking them off. If any remain unsolved, in a proper manner try again after due reflection, and not till baffled in *this* attempt should the **KEY** be turned to. Having taken the **KEY** study *one* sum as given there in full, and then try the others (if any) over without help of the **KEY**, in all cases endeavouring to make the knowledge acquired in doing one sum useful in doing the next. *Never* make use of the **KEY** till after full trial of and repeated failure in your own plans of working.

Thus employed with honest self-restraint the **KEY** will give the help really needed, and yet not discourage or destroy the power of the mind to apply itself to the duty on hand. The *hints* and *suggestions* supplied in the **KEY** would be found highly useful to students as well as to teachers, though they are primarily designed for the latter.

"The Science of Arithmetic" is a work of a higher grade. It is more a student's and a teacher's book, and one for the higher forms of schools and colleges. It speaks to minds somewhat mature. It is both inductive and demonstrative, and it teaches to reason on arithmetic. The examples to be worked out are well-chosen, excellently arranged, nicely varied, judiciously graduated, and convey besides a considerable knowledge of valuable facts. Its explanations are very full, minute, and explicit; and the forms of calculation which it suggests are highly valuable. As a help to teaching either oneself or others it contains "Questions on each Section," to which, by students of this book, we would strongly advise the writing down of answers in full, to be compared with the text afterwards. It would be a great boon to self-educators if there were a **KEY** provided for this admirable text-book, in which there are not a few trial and trying questions.

The books are in their ninth and twelfth editions respectively, and we may note that some few errors which we had marked while using copies of the earlier editions are in these diligently corrected, and altogether we may safely and honestly commend these works as admirable, excellent, and honourable additions to educational literature.

Our Collegiate Course.

THE BARD.

A PINDARIC¹ ODE².

BY THOMAS GRAY.

"This ode is founded on a tradition current in Wales, that Edward I., when he completed the conquest of that country, ordered all the bards that fell into his hands to be put to death," in this following the example of the Romans, who massacred the Druid-bards to hinder them from keeping alive in the hearts of their countrymen the love of liberty and independence.

[Thomas Gray (1716—1771) was born in London, educated at Eton and Cambridge, became the travelling tutor of Horace Walpole, with whom, however, he quarrelled. On his father's death, Gray returned to Cambridge, and pursued his studies, varying his literary, scientific, and historic labours with occasional excursions into Scotland, Wales, the Lake District, &c. He first appeared as a poet in 1747, by the publication of his "Ode on Eton College;" in 1750 his "Elegy on a Country Churchyard" was issued; he was offered the laureateship in 1756, but declined it. He was subsequently appointed Professor of Modern History, though he did not lecture. He died at Cambridge after an illness of six days, 30th July, and was buried, by his own desire, in Stoke Pogis' churchyard, beside his mother, "Dorothy Gray, widow, the tender mother of many children, one of whom alone had the misfortune to survive her." His Pindaric odes, "The Progress of Poetry," and "The Bard," were issued in 1757 as the first fruits of the Strawberry Hill printing press, which Walpole, his former pupil, had set up, but they were not popular. They were burlesqued by Lloyd and Coleman,

1. "Of the nine Greek lyric poets Pindar is the chief in spirit, in magnificence, in moral sentiment, and in metaphor; most happy both in the abundance of his matter and of his diction; and as it were with a certain torrent of eloquence, so that Walpole says no man can imitate him" in his "profound, immeasurable song." From the foregoing character of Pindar's poetry, which is extracted from Quintilian, the rhetorician, it will be seen that a "Pindaric Ode" is an ambitious performance; here as an adjective it signifies, after the manner or in the style of Pindar.

2. An ode is a lyric poem (*i. e.*, a composition fitted to be sung), which expresses feeling in a high state of excitement, and with the vividness and vigour of present emotion. It consists of unequal verses in stanzas or strophes. Its language should be abrupt, concise, and energetic, while the high-wrought passion it expresses compels the animation and personification of almost every object and feeling; and great art is required to adapt the cadence and versification to the varying passions in their rapid sweep.

depreciated by Dr. Johnson, reviewed early and somewhat favourably by Goldsmith, who wisely observes that as a preliminary to enjoying them, "the reader must largely partake of the poet's enthusiasm in order to taste of his beauties," which are rich personification, lyrical variousness of verse, interlinked associations, happy imagery, expressive and picturesque phrases, dramatic subtlety of transition, and evolution of plan or plot.]

The subject of this magnificently grand ode is the malison of a Welsh bard, who had escaped the massacre of the patriotic minstrels of Wales, which had been ordered by Edward I., as essential to the security of his conquest of Cambria. In the author's common-place book the rough draught plan of the poem is thus noted:—"The army of Edward I., as they march through a deep valley, are suddenly stopped by the appearance of a venerable figure, seated on the summit of an inaccessible rock, who, with a voice more than human, reproaches the king with all the misery and desolation which he had brought on his country; foretells the misfortunes of the Norman race, and with prophetic spirit declares that all his cruelty shall never extinguish the noble ardour of poetic genius in this island; and that men shall never be wanting to celebrate true virtue and valour in immortal strains, to expose vice and infamous pleasure, and boldly censure tyranny and oppression. His song ended, he precipitates himself from the mountain, and is swallowed up by the river that rolls at its foot." The careful reader will see how admirably imagination has improved on the original suggestion, and how the associative faculties have inwrought with the tissue of the original idea a splendid, though concise epitome of the chief facts in the history of the early dynasties of England, and with what exquisite suggestiveness he has set in a few phrases a history of English poetry.

"There is not another ode in the English language," says Matthews, "constructed like this,—with such power, such majesty, and such sweetness, with such proportioned pauses and just cadences, with such regulated measures of the verse, with such master principles of the lyrical art displayed and exemplified, and at the same time with such a concealment of the difficulty, which is lost in the softness and uninterrupted flowing of the lines in each stanza, with such musical magic that every verse in it in succession dwells on the ear, and harmonizes with that which has gone before." Southey calls this "the most popular ode in the English language," and even G. L. Craik, who does not, like Mason, recognise

"A Pindar's rapture in the fire of Gray,"

admits that "the gorgeous brocade of the verse does not hide the true fire and fancy beneath, or even the real elegance and taste which has arrayed itself so ambitiously." Thomas Campbell affirms that "when we give his beauties reperusal and attention, they kindle and multiply to the view. The thread of association that conducts to his remote allusions or that connects his abrupt transitions ceases then to be invisible. His lyrical pieces are like paintings on glass, which must be placed in a strong light to give out the perfect radiance of their colouring."

How grand this opening is—dashing in *medias res*—how the wild, abrupt, unearthly sounds, startle and arrest! Indeed, as Mason truly remarks:—"This abrupt execration plunges the reader into that sudden, fearful perplexity which is designed to predominate through the whole. The irresistible violence of the prophet's passions bears him away, who, as

he is unprepared by a formal ushering in of the speaker, is unfortified against the impressions of his poetical frenzy, and overpowered by them, as sudden thunders strike the deepest."]

I. 1.

"RUIN seize thee, ruthless King!
 Confusion on thy banners wait!
 Though, fann'd by Conquest's crimson wing,
 They mock the air with idle state.
 Helm, nor hauberk's twisted mail,
 Nor e'en thy virtues, Tyrant, shall avail

Interpretative prose paraphrasing.

"Violent and complete destruction arrest thee in thy course, merciless Monarch! May disaster attend upon thy standards, which, though they flutter in breezes caused by the flapping of the blood-dyed pinion of oppressive, victorious force, yet really flaunt before the eye as an illusion, filling the atmosphere with unreal and worthless magnificence. Neither head-guard nor the interkint steel of the breast-plate, nor yet thy valorous deeds, Despot, shall have power to preserve thine inmost spirit from the

(1) *Ruin*, in its etymological sense, includes the idea of rushing with violence, noise, tumult, and speed, as well as that of destruction. Perhaps there is a sort of echo in these lines from Milton's—

"Such a numerous host
 Fled not in silence through the frightened deep,
 With *ruin upon ruin*, rout on rout,
Confusion worse confounded."—"Paradise Lost," ii., 993-6.

Ruth is an old English word, signifying compassion or sympathy, also sorrow and mournfulness, and *ruthless* means without pity, unmerciful, cruel. The word is connected with *Rue*, to mourn, lament, repent, from which also comes *rueful*, in the sense of sad. "There's *rue* for you."

(2) *Banners*, military standards, flags, or streamers, as—

"Ten thousand *banners* rise into the air
 With orient colours waving."—"Paradise Lost," i., 545.

(3) "A perfect conquest of a country reduces all the people to the condition of subjects."—Sir John Davie's "Discourse of the State of Ireland."

(4) *Mock*, raise a false appearance in. *Idle state*, empty show.

(5) *Helm*; morion, covering for the head, crested cap. *Hauberk*, a texture of steel ringlets or links, interwoven so as to form a coat of mail, which fitted close to the body, and was so pliant as to adapt itself to any movement of the body. *Mail*, a mesh of network, with small metal rings.

(6) *Virtues*, in the old sense of valorous qualities, from Latin *Virtus*, manliness.

(7) "The Greeks had no abhorrence of *Kings*; the descendant of a hero-race, ruling over a people whom his fathers had ruled from time immemorial, was no object of obloquy, either with the people or with the philosophers. But a *Tyrant*, a man of low or ordinary birth, who by

To save thy secret soul from nightly fears,
 From Cambria's curse, from Cambria's tears !"
 Such were the sounds, that o'er the crested pride
 Of the first Edward scattered wild dismay,
 As down the steep of Snowdon's shaggy side
 He wound with toilsome march his long array.
 Stout Glo'ster stood aghast in speechless trance ;

"To arms !" cried Mortimer, and couch'd his quiv'ring lance.

terrors of the darksome hours, from the imprecations of Wales, from the retribution due to the cause of the griefs of the Cymry." These were the words which spread intense fear over the plumed grandeur of Edward I., while down the precipitous paths of Snowdon's heath-clad slope he led his numerous armed men round the hill in a fatiguing journey. The brave Earl of Gloucester halted appalled in silent affright ; and Edward of Mortimer putting his trembling spear in rest, exclaimed,—"Advance to battle."

force or fraud had seated himself on the necks of his countrymen to gorge each prevailing passion of his nature at their cost, with no principle but the interest of his own power—such a man was regarded as a wild beast that had broken into the fold of civilized society, and whom it was every one's right and duty, by any means or with any weapon presently to destroy."—*Arnold's "History of Rome."* A lordly, master ruler, who uses his power oppressively.

(8) *Cambria*, the ancient name of Wales ; the word is derived from the *Cymry*, or *Cimbri*, the name by which the Welsh (*Cymrraeg*) have always called themselves.

(9) *Crested*, plumed, perhaps heraldic ;—from Latin *crista*, through the Italian *cresta*, a cockscomb, a tuft. The heraldic arms, which noblemen bear, constitute their *crest*. The word is probably used here figuratively for loftily courageous.

(10) Edward I. (son of Henry III.), born at Westminster, 1239, reigned from 1272 to 1307. The first military operations of his reign were directed against the Welsh, whose prince, Llewellyn, when summoned to do homage had contemptuously refused. The contest thus begun was waged with varying incidents, till Llewellyn was slain at Llanfair, 1282, and David, his brother, was barbarously executed as a traitor, 1283. Thereafter Wales was made a dependency of England, having as prince the heir to the British throne. The massacre of the Bards is a myth.

(11) *Snowdon*, a mountain-range in Carnarvonshire, North Wales, stretching from near the head of Cardigan Bay to the neighbourhood of Conway. It was called by the Welsh *Cragian-eryri*, Eagle's crag. The district of Snowdonia was made a royal forest by Edward I., but was disafforested in 1649.

(12) *Array*. Troops set in order of battle.

"A general sets his army in *array*

In vain, unless he fight and win the day."—Sir John Denham.

(13) Gilbert de Clare, surnamed the red, son-in-law to Edward I., Earl of Gloucester and Hertford, and one of the Lords of the Marches of Wales.

(14) Edmond de Mortimer, Lord of Wigmore, another of the Lord Marchers, whose lands lay on the borders of Wales.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

832. In the first half-yearly volume of the *British Controversialist* for 1868, on p. 310, are two queries of mine, answers to which have not as yet forthcome, viz., that comprised within the first nine lines of Number 764, and that within the first six lines of Number 766. Will any well-informed reader kindly help me in this little matter?—O. D.

833. Can any of your readers tell me who and what GOODWYN BARMBY was or is?—W. R.

834. I have been told that "the abolition of property" was advocated by Plato, and that Aristotle had refuted his arguments. Is this so?—P. N.

835. Could you oblige by giving a little information about "Cary, the Translator of Dante?"—B. S. W.

836. Which of the great writers of France inherited a fortune from an ancestor who was a professional conjuror?—HISTORICUS.

837. Can any of the readers of the *British Controversialist* inform me where I can procure a copy of Robert Ferguson's "Northmen in Cumberland and Westmoreland," and at what price; as I understand that the London booksellers have returned their copies to the author. If some one would kindly give Mr. R. Ferguson's address or place of residence (if living), all difficulty in the matter would be ended.

NORTHEMAN.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

832. It would be injudicious, if not indeed quite impossible, to de-

cide *ex cathedra* in the Inquirer section on a subject so momentous as that of Trinitarianism v. Unitarianism, in the manner apparently desired by O. D. There are so many shades and grades alike of Unitarianism and of Trinitarianism that they may be said to flow into one another like the motion of a pendulum—being at the extremes clearly and unambiguously opposed; being near the perpendicular, little if at all marked from each other. The Athanasian Creed gives Trinitarianism in its most explicit and elaborate form. Ancient *Arianism* is considerably different from modern *humanitarianism*. Religiously, the sects of both are very numerous; perhaps, philosophically, they do not stand so far apart. Oneness of Nature and Essence lies at the root of both, but whether the energies of that Infinite Oneness are manifested by distinct *persons*, or distinct *forms* or *modes*, has been disputed. The Library of Controversy accumulated around this question amounts to thousands of volumes. L. L.

832. Up till the second century doctrinal and dogmatical Christianity was unnecessary and unthought of. The practical life attracted the chief attention. When experience showed how truly practice follows belief, Creeds were found to keep faith right, in order that life might be thereby properly ruled. Thus the fixed faith of the Church cannot be definitely settled by documents; only by inference, and in its inference there is always one fallacious element—man himself. L. L.

The Topic.

ARE THE MAY MEETINGS THE BEST AGENCIES FOR PROMOTING THEIR OBJECTS?

AFFIRMATIVE.

THE "May Meetings" have been one of the best means for uniting the different sections of the Christian Church in Christian fellowship, love, and work; and are thus one of the most strenuous and powerful antagonists to break down the barrier of bigotry,—the great stumbling block to *progress*. This year the May meetings have been a grand success, and the warmest interest and liberality have been shown by the thousands and tens of thousands, from different parts of the United Kingdom, who arrived in the metropolis to attend them. Our societies, both missionary and philanthropic, on the whole, have very flourishing reports. The influence of these special meetings, or amalgamation of meetings, in May, will never in this world be fully realized, but it sufficeth to say that the greatest interest is manifested throughout the world; in fact, they are one of the greatest demonstrations for the glory of God.—GEORGIUS D. E.

It is scarcely possible to give a distinct and definite answer to the present topic. There are few of the advocates of the objects for the promotion of which the May meetings are gathered together, who feel that they have already attained and have become altogether perfect in the means they employ for the attainment of their respective purposes. This, I should suppose, is not the point however to which the topic

directs attention. It seems to have a sort of backward vision to a recent question about the Reform League, and appears as if it meant, "Ought our May Meetings to be Abolished, be Dissolved, and Vanish?" To this we cannot assent. The May meetings are revolutionary; they want, as a general rule, to work a radical change, and to bring about a reform,—but they seek to do this by suasion, quiet effort, Christian kindness, and the gentler convictions which spring up in the renewed heart, or the endeavour to subdue sorrow by the hand of kindness, and to overcome the misfortunes of life by providing the means of mitigation. The May meetings are agencies for showing the power of Gospel charity, and are not at all to be reckoned with the leagues and associations which desire the strong hand of popular clamour to be raised to accomplish their desire. The May meetings are the outspread branches of the visible Church, bearing their fruits for the healing of the nations.—H. R.

Christian activity and sympathy concentrates and intensifies itself in our May meetings, which might be called the parliamentary season of the practical Christianity of the age. What a power of fellowship there is brought together in our May assemblies! What a fusing of Christian minds into friendship! What an argument for the unity of the Church! Apart altogether from the Christian contributions for

charitable and religious purposes collected at these gatherings, I hold that the "communion of spirit" elicited and enjoyed is a mighty Christian blessing and privilege. To comfort, enlighten, and strengthen one another in holiness and holy effort, are surely great things and good things. But the question is perhaps too general for a fairly affirmative reply. If the query refers to the general purpose and method of our May meetings, I am certainly entitled to affirm that their general adoption is proof enough that, so far as has yet been discovered, they do constitute the best means of attaining their object. In regard to the special details of particular societies, and so on, I do not think this question could be fairly argued in the space usually allotted to contributions in this department; besides that, it would be invidious to select special associations for such criticism. As heart-cheering, soul-encouraging, and thanks-inspiring agencies, the May meetings have been highly blessed to many earnest souls.—F. F. L.

No advocacy of any object can be so effectively accomplished as by concentration and continuity. Hence the power of association has become a marked feature of our age;—a feature peculiar to Christian effort in the early times, though now borrowed from them, and made use of against them by the enemies of the faith that gives freedom. The Christian Church is a voluntary association of believers for worship, counsel, and help. Associations of Christians have, time after time, arisen to combat with the errors or the evils of the age. With a fine perception of the power of enthusiasm, they have almost unanimously felt that, while the earth was assuming its renewing fruitfulness, and while the memory of the Easter hymn, "Christ hath arisen," is

strong within them, they should meet for the renewal of fellowship and effort, and sow in the hearts of each other renewed endeavours after fulfilling the holy law of love, and for the casting into the treasury of the Lord of their fulness. The May meetings have accomplished much good; they have brought together the small rills and the mighty rivers, together to flow into an ocean of charity, love, helpfulness, and sympathy. What can the heart desire more gratifying than to attend the May meetings?—one thing only,—the universal success of their efforts, under the blessing of the God and Father of us all.—D. O. C.

The Church is missionary, and every good cause feels that if it would take the right course it must become missionary too. On this account it is that assemblies of earnest thinkers and workers have become so incorporated with our civil life. The advocacy of the good has always been by teaching so as to inform, exhortation so as to reform, and by association so as to enable men to conform to what is right. The May meetings unite all classes in Christian effort; they produce intense effects on the frequenters. This enthusiasm is reproduced by the reports circulated through the press, and is more powerfully propagated by the personal convictions which the frequenters of them carry into their several circles. Each meeting is the centre of a great store of special thought and feeling, every speaker being a gatherer and distributor of force and enforcement; and this power of sympathetic thoughtfulness stirs the minds and hearts of those who are there, who hear, or who read. So that out of each centre there goes forth a notable Christianizing agency, which, like the rain, is caught up from the great reservoirs and diffused through all the inland places, refreshing

where it passes, and increasing again the reservoir whence it is. And God grant that a proper use of the May meetings in London and the provinces may enable them to promote their holy objects.—S. B.

NEGATIVE.

No more woeful evidence of Christian variance and sectarianism can be than our May meetings. The early Christians were of one heart and of one soul, and had all things in common; but now professing Christians hate one another so much that they cannot even do their charities in peace and unity, in love and concord, and the wars of sects are imported into the works of charity. Surely this ought not to be so, and while it is, our May meetings cannot be the best agencies for promoting their professed objects,—the glory of God and the good of man.—JACOB.

When we look at the enormous number of meetings, breakfasts, dinners, teas, anniversary services, conferences, &c., that clamour for attendance and subscriptions; and when we reflect that each of these has an organization of officials who subsist on the funds as a permanent burden, whose claims must first of all be attended to, we cannot avoid heaving a sigh for some means of economizing the charity of the age, and wishing that the Systematic Benevolence Society would act up to its name, if not its aim, and show us how the immense sums of money reported as collected at the May meetings could be disencumbered of three-fourths, at least, of the cumbersome machinery of officialdom, and be made truly available for the purpose for which it has been given. Formerly May could accommodate all the charities which demanded attention; now we have outgrown May altogether, although every hour, from seven, a.m., to eleven,

p.m., besides "Midnight Meetings," has its charity to be advocated, and we begin our May meetings about mid-April, and can scarcely get closed with them when the longest day has come. There is a great waste of sermonic oratory, valuable time, useful enthusiasm, and hard metallic cash involved in all this; but there is also a great mistake given currency to by it; for Christianity is individual and not associative. Corporate charity implies corporate responsibility; but Christian responsibility is individual, and consists of *thou* shalt.—S. P.

The art of talking is too much in the ascendant at the present time. The May meetings encourage that; and because we know that not every one who saith, Lord, Lord, but those who do the will of the heavenly Father is acceptable, we think that the May meeting flux of speech ought to be intermitted.—B. W. B.

"Salt is good, but if the salt has lost its savour, wherewith shall it be salted?" and oratory is good, but if it has been made a mere trick for attraction, how can it be useful or utilised? Talking is good, giving is better, but doing is best. Let practical Christianity take the place of talkative Christianity; and excellent action that of eloquent oratory, and listening to the voice of the poor and needy rather than of the powerful speaker and the greedy official, and we shall have a better brotherhood of men than May-talk produces. "Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, *do* it with all thy might;"—do not listen about it, speechify about it, subscribe to it, petition for it, organize a scheme about it, issue florid reports about it. "Act, act, in the living present," then we may dispense with nine-tenths of our May meetings.—D. G. R.

That lords and eloquent clergy should be so diligently sought out

as taking "touters" for our May meetings, proves that we are not thoroughly imbued with the spirit of that Gospel which commands Christians to study to be quiet and to do their own business.—M. F.

The association of Christianity with bunkum and bosh is a great evil, which the May meetings tends much to encourage. "Telling" reports, almost as carefully got up as the prospectuses of a limited liability company about to be set afloat; "telling" speeches of incredible windiness and inflation; "telling" narratives, meant to illustrate the proverb that truth is stranger (though not stronger) than fiction; "telling" posters (we shall not employ a prefix), announcing noble, episcopal, reverend, alphabetised gentlemen, or esquired chairmen; "telling" advertisements in the leading (or misleading, or leaden) papers of the day; and "telling" accounts of the meetings so held in supplementary (and complimentary) numbers, come out as regularly and as profusely as May-blossom, making summer-time the harvest-time of the men who must "make their salaries out of the thing, you know." Dawdling doddies listen to twaddling boobies, and get the steam up to a tremendous pitch. Then the chink of sovereigns is expected, and the cheques to flow into the exchequer, to aid the sadly chequered state of man. But all these societies have more cheque-takers than check-takers, and not unfrequently the reports of the one association expressly state as facts what others as expressly lead one to doubt. We need a thorough over-hauling of our conventional charities, and we would propose a convention of May-meetings, to consider how best the

May meetings may be utilised, or, if need be, abolished. They have increased, they are increasing, and they ought to be diminished.—W. E.

I think it would be easy to suggest something better than our May meetings in London. To venture on a hint,—let there be founded an association of practical philanthropy, similar to that of the British Association and the Social Science Association. Let its paid officials be few, and its honorary and honourable volunteer officials many. Let the leaders of the various schemes for the advancement of human welfare—social, personal, and religious—plead before its assemblies the wants and woes they propose to relieve or mitigate, oppose and suppress. Let estimates of the revenue required for the several purposes be carefully got up and given in, and let the assembled delegates of this association, as the almoners of the nation, distribute, in such proportions as seems good to them, the sums intrusted to their care by the charitable and accruing from the subscriptions of its members. Let the reports of this association be thoroughly and indubitably honest,—like the reports of Parliamentary commissions; and let the meetings be migratory annually, so as to stir and keep alive the flame of brotherly love throughout the land. Were this done in a properly responsible style, benevolence would be made more useful and less expensive, and the charitable having some sense of the trustworthiness of the delegates to this congress, would give more fully, with less talk about it. This is our contribution to this excellent topic.—BARNABAS.

Literary Notes.

"THE City-Friends of Shakspeare, with some account of John Sadler and Richard Quiney, druggists and grocers, of Bucklersbury, and their descendants," is in preparation by B. B. Orridge, late chairman of the Library Committee of the Corporation of London, as a sort of first fruit of researches made in the archives of the City companies. It appears that these friends of the Shakspeare family migrated from Stratford-upon-Avon about 1600.

Dr. Moberly has undertaken to edit "Selections from the Correspondence of the late John Keble."

John James Tayler, principal of Manchester New College, author of "A Retrospect of the Religious Life of England," &c., died 28th May.

A Harleian society is to be added to the publishing associations of the country. Heraldry, Genealogy, and Family History are to be its *specialities*.

A Memoir of "Robert Owen, the Founder of Socialism in England," is announced by A. J. Booth, M.A.

F. W. Newman will publish "Fragments on Logic," in his volume of "Miscellanies."

"A Dictionary of Contemporary Biography," by Frederick Martin, is in preparation.

At length, "The Life, Letters, and Poems of A. H. Clough" are promised.

Two volumes by Professor Huxley are announced—"Lay Sermons and Addresses," and "Lectures on Elementary Geography."

"An Introduction to Metaphysics," by Dr. C. M. Ingleby, favourably known by his "Outlines of Theoretical Logic," and as a

Shaksperian scholar, &c., has been published.

Count Bismarck is about to publish a translation of the first six books of the *Aeneid* into German, done about a quarter of a century ago.

A cheap edition of *Goethe's Werke* in 36 vols., bound in cloth, as 18, with introduction by K. Godeke, is to be had from Asher and Co.

Renan's *St. Paul*, which extends from his first mission, A.D. 45, till his arrival in Rome, A.D. 61, is now out.

Upwards of 70,000 vols. of *Poems* by Jean Ingelow, have, it is said, been sold in America.

Mr. Hargrave Jennings, author of "Indian Religions: or the Results of Bhuddism," has in the press an Historical and Traditional work on "The Rosicrucians."

"The Poetical works of the Wesleys," in 12 vols. are in course of publication by the Wesleyan Book Committee.

M. Alexis Pierron, institutor of "La Méthode a Pierron," translator of the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle, editor of a "Key to Homer," (*La Clef d'Homere*) &c., has issued the first volume of a new edition of "The Iliad," with introductions and annotations.

The Transactions of the Academy of Moral and Political Philosophy (February—March, 1869) contain an Essay on the Life and Works of Victor Cousin, the French Eclectic, by the Secretary, M. F. Mignet.

Miss Harriet Martineau (b. 12th June, 1802) is engaged in extending her *Autobiography*, which must be most interesting, for the press.

Modern Metaphysicians.

CLEMENT MANSFIELD INGLEBY, M.A., LL.D.,

Author of "An Introduction to Metaphysic," &c.

CONSCIOUS thought is the mystery of humanity. Man not only feels, desires, and thinks, but knows that he does so. To him ideas present themselves, and in him they represent themselves; he is the conscious subject of thought. Life and organization unite in him, as in other objects of the animal creation, but conscious thought exists in him as a speciality, and constitutes that personal power of thinking which is summed up and expressed in the one word, Mind. Organization, life, and mind have each their phenomena, their inter-relations, and their laws, and supply us respectively with the sciences of physiology, psychology, and metaphysics; while the higher truths which these separate branches of knowledge realize are gathered together into a new combination, as philosophy. Physiology details the phenomena, explains the laws, and informs us regarding the results of organized structure in a living state; Psychology shows us how the passive phenomena of sensation transform themselves into experience, and transfigure themselves in thought, states to us the laws by which the implicit contents of individual sensations coalesce into a unity of association and become explicit as ideas, and determines the conditions and the laws of the thought-forces, whose instrument is the brain; Metaphysic investigates thought in its essence and activities, its phenomena and results, processes and laws, as the high and specific force whose actions, interactions, and reactions, constitute an ever-varying, dynamic, overruling organization, ordering life, effective in history, and the source and fountain-springs of art, literature, and science: but philosophy, accepting all the results to which all these specific investigations of the phenomena of existence lead, seeks by inference and analogy to gain, from the facts which observation and experience supply, a knowledge of man's relations to all that existence seems to imply and suggest. In the philosophic sphere of mental activity we rise to the highest and noblest abstractions in thought, and we strive to attain the loftiest and grandest generalizations concerning realities, to which the soul can aspire. Philosophy, in short, endeavours to sum up and represent in one ideal the entire contents and constituents of the real.

It is because the reach of Philosophy is so high, and the instruments she employs are so abstract, that most men pursue with

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reluctance the speculations to which she invites them, or treat with disdain the far-fetched inferences she deduces from the peaks and pinnacles of thought. Philosophy is so recondite and so impractical, concerns itself so little with our every-day life, and leads us so directly into the cloudlands and mists of the supra-sensible, that we cannot perceive its utility, or recognise its adaptation to the human interests of the present time. Physics we can comprehend, for among its phenomena we live and act; and out of them we must construe our industrial processes, and construct our material comforts. This is the scornful estimate of philosophy prevalent in our age, and yet it is but an issue of the pride of ignorance.

It is not more certain that the laws of force, as Statics, regulate and affect the construction of lighthouses; as Dynamics, overrule and operate upon motion and locomotion, and all the agencies by which these are produced; and as Chemistry, are presupposed in and are effective upon the production of "autumn's golden wheat-sheaves," than that the laws of thought exercise an influence, of a regulative and efficient sort, on wages and rent, trade and traffic, population and industry, taxation and government, art and religion, nay, even on social life and domestic customs. It is just as essential to the true progress, real comfort, and ultimate happiness of man, that questions of pure metaphysic should be worked out in their loftiest and most abstract form, as that problems of pure mathematics should engage attention and gain solution, in order that industrial machinery may be improved, the cost of transit may be economized, and that the prices of the necessities of life should be as nearly as possible equalized throughout the globe. Abstract science, mathematic or metaphysic, makes possible, originates, or improves, all the practical processes of life, from the making of a pin to the settlement of a jurisprudence, and from the calculation of profit to the construction of a creed. Mathematics might, in general, be regarded as the regulator—however unconscious man may be of its legislative supremacy—of *productive* industry; and metaphysics, in the same way, might easily be proved to be the magisterial sovereign over every species of *executive* industry or activity.

Yet it is a fact that some men, priding themselves in their practical impracticality, condemn metaphysics and despise philosophy; though, in reality, it would be less foolish to scorn agriculture and slight chemistry because we can buy bread ready made. This ignorant resting in the things we see, this short-sighted wisdom of practical men, is the chief reason why the study of metaphysics has fallen into disrepute, and why philosophic thought is paralyzed by neglect, and arrested in its progress by sneers and scoffs. "Metaphysic" is a word of abhorred sound in our country. He who pursues the study of it does so at his peril—risks the scarcely disguised contempt of friends, the undisguised neglect of readers, the total disregard of publishers, and the unquestionable emptying of his purse. Philosophy has become a byword, psychology is

declared to be "a delusion and a snare," but metaphysic—oh! "in the lowest deep a lower deep" here "opens wide;" blank, and measureless despair overhangs it, and threatens instant destruction to those who enter that "holy jungle," which is "with danger and with darkness compassed round."

Milton does indeed make one of the student brothers in "Comus," with pedantic and poetic enthusiasm, exclaim,—

"How charming is divine philosophy!—
Not harsh and crabbed as dull fools suppose;
But musical as is Apollo's lute;
And a perpetual feast of nectared sweets,
Where no rude surfeit reigns."

But men are wiser now than to delight themselves in threading the labyrinthine mazes of metaphysic. The age is too practical and too enlightened to waste its intellectual energies on the insoluble problems of speculative philosophers, and has on its hands besides speculations enough, and more than enough, of quite a different sort—not unfrequently having their own species of insolvency as well—to manage and conduct.*

Despite of this dislike to, if not inaptitude for, metaphysical studies, there are thinkers among us so thoroughly alive to the importance of a proper comprehension of the sources of intellectual and moral convictions, as well as of a correct knowledge and accurate following out of the true processes of thought; so interested in tracing the mystery of intellection into its inmost recesses; and so expressly fitted by nature to observe, experiment upon, and describe, with the particularity of a diagnosis, the ebb and flow, the change and recurrence, the source and course of thought in its evolutions, that they can resist the terrible pressure of the atmosphere of public opinion, which opposes their metaphysical flights, the popular disregard of the common reader, whose highest idea of that special power is that of its being a means of enjoyable recreation, the suspiciously courteous discourtesy of those friendly

* The idea in the text is thus beautifully though sadly expressed in the closing sentences of "An Introduction to Metaphysic:"—"In England philosophy has no proper life, though by virtue of its alliance with history and philology on the one hand, and with physics and physiology on the other, its catalepsy is not yet mortal. They whose faculties and leisure have been devoted to the abstractions of philosophy will have little fruition from an incommunicable discovery, or from a success which they can only celebrate 'like children sitting in the market-place.' Nevertheless the few who, undismayed by the certainty of neglect, have made philosophy a life-long labour, and who, after much groping in an inner twilight, shall at length strike into the path of transit from the natural to the spiritual, will assuredly not keep silence, though their words are doomed to perish speedily, or to contend painfully and slowly with an outer darkness, far more hopeless than that of the tomb."—(P. 206.)

advisers who admire their genius (as a periphrasis for ingenuity), but would like to see it applied to something practically useful, and can even endure "to pay the costs" demanded of them in the case of independent thought, *versus* accepted opinion, rather than be false to their faith and their nature. Among such men we reckon C. M. Ingleby, of whose life and works we now propose, so far as our knowledge admits and our capacity permits, to give a brief account and estimate.

Dr. Ingleby has chosen, as his special field of investigation, the border-lands which lie between sensation and thought. His researches have led him to perceive that the chief problems of psychology and metaphysic are to be found in the interspace between the primary appulse on the senses and the ultimate impulse of the will; the spheres of cognition and causation occupy the consciousness, and he has resolved, in order to comprehend fully the nature of the activities of the mind, to study the psychology of the senses and of the understanding, that thereby he may attain unto a metaphysic which shall reconcile all the possible oppositions of dialectic, shall explain to thought itself "all that can manifest itself by imparting sensation to us, and thus provoking intuition in us," and that "aims to show that Materialism and Necessity are the obverse of a medal which has the eternal image and superscription of spirituality and freedom." To a concise outline of the ideas of such a thinker we are much mistaken if our readers do not give an attentive hearing, and a consideration which may lead them to closer conversancy with the writings of which the outcome is intended to be an exposition and review of the whole course and process of thought, both from the side of observation and from the side of the interior consciousness.

The Inglebys are an old and distinguished family, giving their name to, or perhaps rather getting it from, the parish of Ingleby (Arnccliffe), in Yorkshire, but hiving off a secondary branch, which took up its residence in Derbyshire, giving their name to the village of Ingleby, near Repton. Of this branch Joseph Ingleby, Esq., of Panton Hall, Holywell, is the representative. The Derbyshire Inglebys had been for four or five generations closely connected with the mining interest, and this circumstance doubtlessly led in the course of time to the removal of one of their scions to the head-quarters of the industries connected with mines and mining—Birmingham. Clement Ingleby was the son chosen to break ground for the family in Warwickshire, and this he did effectively, establishing himself speedily in the position of the leading solicitor in Birmingham during the early period of steam power and its applications, canal extensions and railway projects, being legal adviser for the boards of several companies, having among his clients many of the landed and industrial aristocracy, and being, as a general practitioner, a considerable favourite. He had the rare reputation of being an honest lawyer, was generous and liberal in his dealings, and was particularly esteemed, and therefore frequently employed as an arbitrator.

On his death, in 1859, he was honoured by a public funeral—a recognition of worth similar to that which his fellow-townsmen conferred on the Rev. John Angell James, and Joseph Sturge.

Clement Mansfield Ingleby was born 29th October, 1823, at Edgbaston, Birmingham—that great town which, lying near the very centre of England, is the capital of the hardware manufacture, and is, as De Quincey affirms, and as our own experience confirms, a place in which enlightened tradesmen abound, and in which more unaffected good sense and more elasticity and freshness of mind are to be found than is common in the provinces. Burke could indeed once justly call it “the toy-shop of Europe,” but now it may be more properly regarded as the chief centre of “what,” as Matthew Boulton said, “all the world desires to have—power.” In practical, political, social, industrial, and religious effort it is second to none of the manufacturing towns of England. If Manchester was the birthplace of “The Anti-Corn Law League,” Birmingham originated “The Political Union,” which at least hastened the enfranchisement granted by the Reform Bill of 1832. During the youth of C. M. Ingleby, Birmingham was the scene of many agitations, and has taken a part in the bringing about of many changes of a most important nature in the social, political, and religious state of the nation; and it has itself undergone very considerable change; especially, since the passing of the Reform Bill, it has been an active and energetic contributor to the progress of thought, freedom, and liberality.

The wife of Clement Ingleby, Esq., solicitor, and the mother of C. M. Ingleby, metaphysician, logician, Shaksperian, &c. (who still, we believe, survives in a good, healthy old age), was Elizabeth, eldest child of John Jukes, Esq., of Bordesley, Birmingham, and granddaughter of Joseph Jukes, the friend of William Hutton “the English Franklin,” and fellow-sufferer with him in the Birmingham “church and king” riots in 1791. Her eldest brother’s son, Professor Joseph Beete Jukes, is Director of the Geological Survey of Ireland, author of the article “Geology” in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, the “Student’s Manual of Geology,” &c.

C. M. Ingleby’s uncle, John Tomlinson Ingleby, M.D., was the most successful midwifery practitioner in the midland counties, and was the author of several professional treatises which held a high place in the literature of the healing art.

Not being on the foundation, as the son of a native of Birmingham or of the parishes touching upon or adjacent to the same, C. M. Ingleby had not the right to receive instruction in the free grammar school of King Edward VI., established in Birmingham for the education, institution, and instruction of boys and youths in grammar; and besides, during his boyhood, the school was in a state of transition, being under the consideration of the Court of Chancery, which was for several years engaged in devising a plan for its greater efficiency and usefulness. His upbringing was therefore

entrusted to private tutors. Under these agencies he acquired a fair education in history, letters, and the branches of learning in connection with commerce, arithmetic, book-keeping, writing, and French,—for these were most in demand; but in the higher scholarship which is indispensable in professional life, he had been much, if not shamefully neglected. About 1841, the necessity of classical training to enable him to take proper advantage of a university education became strongly felt, and he was placed as a private pupil under two of the assistant masters of King Edward's school, then under the magistracy of Dr. James Prince Lee, now Bishop of Manchester. He here shared in the studies and sports of the young gentlemen who boarded with the masters, and who, like himself, were being prepared specially for the universities. He laboured assiduously, and studied with care—making up lee-way quickly in a knowledge of the text of the classics usually studied with reference to collegiate residence. In 1843 he entered Trinity College, Cambridge, of which Dr. William Whewell was then master. Here he read classics, mathematics, and metaphysics, and in 1847 graduated B.A. as a *Senior Optime*, a position which did not adequately represent his reading. He still pursues with interest the progress of thought and discovery in mathematics, being, or having been, a contributor to *The Educational Times*, on mathematical topics, as well as to *The Oxford, Cambridge, and Dublin Messenger of Mathematics*. He has also furnished to the "Transactions of the British Association for the Promotion of Science" a paper on "Arithmetical Division," containing several ingenious views, and is now a Fellow of the London Mathematical Society, on the Council of which he had a seat. In classics his repute was good, and he even yet delights to while away a little leisure in the company of the Greek and Roman writers, having a peculiar knack, it is said, of throwing off graceful and flowing translations of choice portions of the classical writers, particularly the poets. Metaphysics he had learned to love in his youth by the perusal of Butler's "Analogy," which he read with eagerness, but with such dissatisfaction with the argument employed as to doubt the power of philosophy to allay the scepticism to which it offered to reply. He read the letters which Butler wrote to Dr. Samuel Clarke on the Being and Attributes of God, with an appreciation of their acumen, but hesitation as to their conclusiveness; and this led him to a thorough study of the Boylean Lectures of Dr. Samuel Clarke, which contain the celebrated *à priori* argument which that early and distinguished Newtonian gave forth as "A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God," against the reasoning employed by Spinoza and Hobbes. But C. M. Ingleby, not regarding the work as being what Bishop Hoadley averred it was—"one regular building erected upon an immoveable foundation, and rising up from one stage to another with equal strength and dignity,"—determined on testing the matter for himself more thoroughly, and for this purpose re-wrote the whole argument with textual care as to

the precise meaning and import of the phraseology in passing from proposition to proposition, and found, as his result, that the celebrated demonstration, however imposing in its synthetic unity, could not bear the searching tests of the watchful analyst. Passing next to the investigation of the argument *a posteriori*, he studied Paley's "Natural Theology," and this in its own form, he, in his opinion, found to be equally unsatisfactory. Pleased with the excitement of these metaphysical sallies rather than delighted with their results, he was prepared, when he had to read philosophy in the university, to derive enjoyment from the perusal of the authors' "set," if he did not find instruction in them. This appreciative foretaste of the exquisite gratification to be gained from the exercise of the critical faculties of the intellect, inclined him to devote himself with assiduity to his metaphysical studies, and this specific energy of his mind was still farther stimulated into activity by the stir occasioned in the philosophic world by the issue, in 1846, of Sir William Hamilton's "Edition of the Works of Thomas Reid," and the interest excited in the Universities regarding the reputed "thorough-going" beauty, harmony, and completeness given to logical science by one who had "at length arisen—able to recognise and complete the plan of the mighty builder, Aristotle—to lay the topstone on that fabric, the foundations of which were laid more than two thousand years ago by the master hand of the Stagyrite."

Under these influences—and with perhaps just a little bit of that pride of youth which inclines the student mind to set authority at nought, C. M. Ingleby became an eager Hamiltonian, a disciple of that Hamilton who had expended a lengthy *Edinburgh Review* article in criticism, if not quite in condemnation of certain academical opinions entertained and published by "the Master of Trinity." This love of the Hamiltonian metaphysic has coloured much of Ingleby's after-thoughts, and influenced him not a little both in his efforts, and in the direction his studies have taken. Chiefly, it set him to re-study Aristotle with critical care and philosophic relish, and to become acquainted with the Kantian criticism, in which such a pertinent and important distinction is drawn and demonstrated between *reason* as static and formal, and *reasoning* as fluent through these forms, with its dynamic power increased and directed by the concentration of the synthetic principles of the understanding in cognition and reflection. Perhaps, however, though impressed by Sir William Hamilton more nearly to the inner springs of consciousness, there can be little doubt that Dr. Whewell has been an efficient agent in making C. M. Ingleby so thoroughly, as he is, an experimental psychologist and an inductive metaphysician. To see and know, to live in the presence of, and to come into contact with the author of the "*Novum Organum Renovatum*," was to be affected by an intellectual force whose influence was irresistible. For good sense, indefatigable industry, honesty of purpose, diversity of talent, and independence of thought, no master could be compared to Dr. Whewell, and we know, from the accredited

writings of Dr. Ingleby, that he "loved the man," as Ben Jonson did Shakspeare, "on this side idolatry, as much as any."

It is an incident worth notice, and interesting, that the Senior Dean of Trinity, in selecting declamants in English, brought together in contest the since justly favourite sacred poet, Edward H. Bickersteth, now vicar of Christ Church, Hampstead, and author of "Yesterday, To-day, and For Ever;" a poem in twelve books, whose epic verse comes nearer to rivalry with that of Milton than any other writer of our day; John MacGregor, of Rob Roy Canoe celebrity; and Clement M. Ingleby, who recited their declamations in the order stated, and who, we have been informed, stood very closely in merit. Ingleby declaimed on "The Crusades," but MacGregor gained the prize. C. M. Ingleby passed M.A. in 1850, having passed with credit his college and Tripos examinations.

As he had studied for the legal profession, C. M. Ingleby commenced practice in Birmingham along with his father, and duly performed his share of endeavour in carrying on the affairs of their clients with acceptance and favour. In 1850 he married the daughter and heiress of Robert Oakes, Esq., who was not only the oldest magistrate, but also the oldest inhabitant of Gravesend. On settling down to professional life, and feeling that there was scope for effort, in Birmingham, in the furtherance of many agencies by which, it might be hoped, the town would be improved, by being adapted to the conditions of the age, C. M. Ingleby began to interest himself in the various schemes of usefulness in operation in the town, and quickly acquired a high reputation for activity of mind and earnest application of thought to the duties which arose in the varying circumstances of such associated labours. As a master of clear and eloquent speech, methodical thought and scholarly training, his opinions had weight and influence, and his zealous devotion to whatever he undertook, heightened the popular estimate of the young philosophic lawyer, who was so willing to impart aid, counsel, and encouragement to all who had recourse to him.

It was about this time that he took the first step towards enrolling his name among "Modern Metaphysicians." M. Antoine, C. G. Jobert, a French geologist and metaphysician, and a fair writer on both topics, had, under the influence of the publication of the Philosophical Essays of Sir William Hamilton in France, composed a tractate "On Ideas," in which he endeavoured to oppose the Hamiltonian views, and to defend the philosophy of the polytechnic school. To this work C. M. Ingleby wrote a rejoinder, which won for him a highly complimentary note from the eminent author of "The Discussions in Philosophy," whose able notes on Reid had strongly excited Ingleby's admiration. On 20th February, 1850, Sir William Hamilton wrote, "It gives me great pleasure to find that my views have obtained so acute a defender, while it affords me an additional confidence in their correctness that they should not have disapproved themselves to one so capable of dis-

criminating truth from error. Nothing, in my opinion, can be more cogent than your refutation of M. Jobert, and I trust we may look forward to more important contributions from a thinker of so much philosophical and literary talent." M. Jobert a short time afterwards, in a note to a pamphlet entitled "Are Sounds Pure Sensations?" replied to Ingleby's objections, and the controversy thereafter lapsed—not, however, without leaving an impression, even in the France of Cousin's time, that a noticeable writer had emerged from the Hamiltonian school of thinkers.

To his small work, which was entitled "Remarks on Sir William Hamilton's Notes on Dr. Reid's Works," the author refers, in the following terms, in a dedication to the Professor of Logic in Edinburgh, in the next of his publications known to us—a pamphlet which not only attracted attention in England, but also received notice in America, entitled "The Stereoscope considered in Relation to the Philosophy of Binocular Vision," being an attempt "to sketch out such modifications of the theory of double vision as appear to me to be entailed in the *rationale* of the stereoscope:"—"The corroboration thus indirectly afforded to the principles of your philosophy of perception will, I doubt not, persuade you rather to forgive than to weigh any faults into which I may have fallen in the treatment of so difficult a subject. To the kind encouragement which you from your high philosophical eminence gave to my *remarks* upon your celebrated *notes*, and your expressed conviction that I thereby successfully vindicated your philosophy from the assaults of a literary opponent, is mainly due the confidence which has induced me to give the following essay publicity."

This able and concisely written treatise will amply illustrate what we have already called Ingleby's distinctive speciality, that of being an inductive psychologist and metaphysician.

The stereoscope was first suggested by Professor Wheatstone in 1838, as a means of illustrating the phenomena of binocular vision, and in 1849 was, owing to the invention of the lenticular stereoscope by Sir D. Brewster, made a source of practical joy to many households, as well as a serviceable agent in explaining the principles of physical and theoretical optics. But Ingleby saw in it a higher and more recondite utility. He perceived in this scientific semi-toy the means of bringing to the test of experiment the antagonism of Samuel Bailey and J. S. Mill, to the idealism of Berkeley and of Ferrier, which was mainly founded on the phenomena connected with the sense of sight, and saw in it an instrument for deciding the problem raised by psychologists regarding the primary and secondary properties of matter. Physiology only concerns itself with the eye—its structure, processes, and laws. "To pass beyond the mere analysis of the organ of sight, and to take a first step in the theory of vision, the metaphysician is called into operation. To the research of a Hunter must be added the analogical faculty of an Oken; to the comprehensive grasp of a

Hartley or a Gall must be added the discriminating penetration of a Coleridge or a Hamilton." In this use of the stereoscope as an instrument of exact experiment, under certain conditions, in regard to the problems of psychology and metaphysic, he arrived at the following considerations as his results :—

"A review of the application of the stereoscope gives us but one alternative as to the reality of external objects.

"1. Either there exist in the universe objects of three dimensions, of particular configurations, and in particular positions (secondary qualities being now by all intelligent men treated as subjective), from which light is reflected to the eye, whereof phantoms are produced which, in the normal state of a healthy subject, mathematically correspond in size, shape, and position with the real objects. Or,—

"2. Nothing that has size, shape, or position exists out of mind, but that the universe consists of an extra-organic energy, whose immediate effect on the organism, as extended, configured, or posited, is the object of perception. . . . In both these hypotheses it will be observed that the existence of an external world is taken for granted, so that, whichever is ultimately decided for, there is no danger of merging matter in the general consciousness, and thus falling into the dogmatic idealism of Berkeley, Fichte, or Hegel."

"The mind and the double organ of sight have a power of creating all kinds of possible configurations of three dimensions, and that, where the experience of the so-called physical world ceases, the mind yet can from within establish, through the optic nerves, an ideal experience embracing every possible form, whether found in the material universe or not. . . . Reason as we will, we are constantly met by the audacious fact, that what we dignify with the name of objects are nothing but phantoms; and this incontrovertible fact is not in the least degree affected by the supposition that there are real objects of three dimensions in space; for after all, the object is not the phantom, though it be the indirect cause of it. . . . The adjusting power of the organ of sight, which may now be exalted into a stereoscopic sense distinct from mere vision, reveals to us, in strictly subjective form, *primary* properties; but so far as this new sense is concerned, these primary properties are but properties of a phantom. By means of the touch and the muscular sense, the *secundo-primary* properties of matter are brought into play, and nothing else. By means of the single eye, the ear, and the nose, the *secondary* properties of matter are disclosed. We are, then, in this position, viz., that shape, size, and distance are evidenced by one sense only, and by that sense are announced as the properties of a phantom. It remains, then, to determine whether, from any of the other functions of our organism, we can derive any evidence of the fact that the extra-organic energy which affects them has any property in common with the phantoms created by the organ of sight. The reply to this question being one which cannot be derived from the phenomena of vision, lies, of course, beyond the scope of this essay.

"But the fact that there is an external universe remains unshaken. To this universe, however, we must be careful not to attribute in conception any properties except those denominated *secundo-primary*. The existence of a *somewhat* that resists our organism, and as such is independent of it, is manifested to us by the consciousness that accompanies perception.

We are conscious that the change in our organism is no self-resolution, but a disturbance from without. The same faculty which tells us that any organ is affected tells us also that it is affected by something distinct from itself. In fact, it is only by means of this disturbance from without that we have any self-consciousness at all. Self-consciousness, as Kant has incontrovertibly shown, is a mere *rapporé*. If the resisting or disturbing somewhat were annihilated, man's self-consciousness would vanish also. Mutual relation between the soul and the universe is the life of the man; and our very self-consciousness is the best evidence we can have that we are not alone with the Creator, but that along with the *me* and the *thou* there must also be an *it*."

Perhaps one of the finest schemes for the popularization of the education of self-culture was the institution of the Birmingham and Midland Institute. It sought to combine in one many of the chief features of mechanics' institutes, people's colleges, schools of art and industrial science, museums, and evening classes. It was projected to consist of (1) a literary branch—libraries, reading-rooms, and courses of lectures; (2) an industrial museum and fine arts gallery, with records of mining and manufactures, and lectures in exposition of their processes and progress; (3) an educational department, in which distinct courses of instruction should be pursued in classes of a popular nature, but of a strictly scholarly character; (4) a public meeting and discussion section, in which original communications and suggestions could be read and considered, and the common sense of the more intelligent of the inhabitants of the town could be brought to bear on the topics of the times with thoughtfulness and sympathy. It was believed that by such an institute the general culture would be largely improved; a knowledge of practical science would be increased, and industrial education would improve the handicraftsman, while the co-operation of all classes in one general scheme for the diffusion and encouragement of intelligence and thoroughness would greatly tend to the amelioration of the condition of the labouring masses in the town.

In these hopes C. M. Ingleby shared, and in this scheme he concurred, and he bore a part in the labours by which the plan was advocated, inaugurated, and to a certain extent consummated. The Institute in a preliminary form was set on foot, while preparations for giving it a local habitation were in progress. The foundation stone of the building in which it was to be housed was laid by his Royal Highness Prince Albert, amid great demonstrations of interest and joy, 22nd Nov., 1855. On its formation within the premises provided for it, C. M. Ingleby accepted the duty, in succession to Dr. Charles Badham, Greek scholar, Platonist, and Shaksperian, of giving class instruction in logic and metaphysics in the industrial department of the Institute. We have been informed, on good authority, that by some inadvertence the inaugural lecture with which C. M. Ingleby was to open his course on Logic,

the subject of which was "The connection between logic and metaphysics," was advertised for the same evening as that on which Rev. C. Badham, D.D., then head-master of the Birmingham and Edgbaston Proprietary School (now Professor of Classics and Philosophy in the University, as successor to the late John Woolley, D.C.L.), was to open the English class with a "Lecture on Shakspeare." Unable to alter the night of lecture without inconvenience to others, and Dr. Badham having the prior right to the theatre of the Institute, Ingleby was compelled to change the place of his meeting to the lecture-room of King Edward's School, kindly granted to him for the occasion. Notwithstanding this difficulty a large audience attended the lecture on logic and metaphysics, while (though Lord Hatherton was president) a small if select audience attended the prelection of the reverend and scholarly expositor of Shakspeare, whose Oxford essay on the text of that poet has since won him much consideration among the students of the dramatist.

The class for the study of logic and metaphysics was fairly attended, and great interest was taken in the course of thought employed. Ingleby did not follow the usual old-fashioned Aldrich-Kett-and-Whately diffusive style of teaching. He brought before his students the newest thought of the time, and even procured from Sir William Hamilton an outline of his unpublished improvements of logic, in addition to that which the works of William Thomson (now Archbishop of York) and T. S. Baynes (now Professor of Logic and English Literature in St. Andrews University) contained. His earnestness excited the earnestness of his students. His style was clear, methodical, and forcible; the proficiency and accuracy of his knowledge was shown in his mastery of details and his familiarity with principles, as well as in the concise and precise sentences which he dictated to his class as the main and chief matters to be noticed in logical study. His class preferred a request that he should print for their use and benefit a few of the more important of those statements of principles and of formula with which he was, after the manner of Sir William Hamilton, in the habit of furnishing them by dictation. This led him to consider the advisability of publishing a work designed to form the basis of class instruction, and likely to aid in the diffusion of a knowledge of and an interest in the modern developments of logical science. This was the origin of the "Outlines of Theoretical Logic, founded on the New Analytic of Sir William Hamilton," issued in 1856, and designed as a text-book in schools and colleges.

"The peculiar characteristics of this treatise are (1) the doctrine of extension and intension; (2) the quantification of the predicate; (3) the solution of opposed propositions; (4) the reduction of the thirty-six moods in each figure to nine essential moods; (5) the evolution of all additional moods caused by the introduction of the sign of partial quantity on the one hand, and by the ultra-total quantification of the middle term on the other; and (6) the doctrine of induction. The treatise is likewise characterized

by the exclusion therefrom of the doctrine of modals and of enthymemes and sorites."

We call, with slight rearrangement to suit our expository epitome, the following extracts from this able though small work, as likely to be interesting and improving to the reader, and as explanatory or suggestive of the groundwork of the author's system of logical instruction:—

"Theoretical logic is the science of the laws of thought. Thought is conversant with—1, conception; 2, judgment; 3, reasoning; 4, science. The mind, in performing the act of conception, forms a concept of every object of thought. Conception is the process, the concept is the product. A concept is the cognition or idea of the general attribute or attributes in which a plurality of objects coincide (*Hamilton*). This process of conception obviously involves the perception of a number of objects—their comparison, the recognition of their points of similarity, and their subjective union by this common attribute (*Baynes*). A concept can afford only a partial knowledge, and has only a relative existence. It can only afford a partial knowledge, since it embraces some only of the many marks by which an object is known. It has only a relative existence, since this knowledge is not given absolutely, but only in connection with some one of the objects to which the concept is related. (For a notion though potentially applicable to all the objects which it contains, can only be truly known on occasion of its being actually applied to some one of these objects. This is at once the test and the evidence of its relative character; and this being its character, it is obviously altogether dependent on the objects from which it is formed.) A concept has thus in its totality a purely subjective existence destitute of any objective reality. Being what it is, namely, an ideal whole, subsisting only by relation to the objects whose resembling parts it embraces, it is obvious that, as it has no independent existence, it can convey to us no independent knowledge; and that if we destroy the objects, we destroy the resembling attributes in each; and destroying the resembling parts, we annihilate the whole which they together constituted (namely, the concept). As, however, a concept has only a subjective being, existence and knowledge are here identity. If no qualities be discriminated in objects as similar, we have no knowledge of a concept, that is, no concept exists. If we cannot say that it does or does not belong to any concept, we do not understand or comprehend it. We think an object, that is, recognise it to be what it is, only as we think it under some concept. Accordingly, a concept may either refer to an individual or to a species (that is, a class comprehending several individuals), or to a genus (that is, a class comprehending several species), or to higher classes.

"Judgment is the act of referring one concept to another. The result of such action put into words is a sentence expressing the relation between two concepts. The concepts in such a sentence are called the terms, and the sentence itself is called the proposition. Concepts being thus formed, the great pre-requisite of logic is, that they shall be expressed in language. In every part of logic grammar is called upon to express everything that is contained in thought, whether impliedly or not. The triumph of language is the expression of a perfect analysis of thought. Concepts considered through the medium of a name are called terms.

"A proposition is an expression (indicating) that two notions or concepts

can or cannot be reconciled (*Thomson*). For all purposes of logic a proposition may be considered as simple, and as such may be defined to be the expression of our judgment, that two notions or concepts do or do not agree. It accordingly consists of two terms, and a sign of relation is or are, which is called the copula. The one notion being affirmed (or denied) of the other, the leading term of which the other is affirmed (or denied) is called the subject; and the other term so affirmed (or denied) of the subject is called the predicate. Of the subject it is easy to see that if it stand for a class (and not for an individual) we may affirm the predicate of some indefinite part of it; while, on the other hand, whether it stand for a class or an individual, we may affirm the predicate of all the subject. The subject, then, has always a quantity definite or indefinite, and for all purposes of logic this quantity must be distinctly expressed in words, and in such case the subject is said to be quantified.

"Reasoning is concerned with the relation that subsists between two propositions. The two being compared, the result is the generation of a third proposition. In certain cases an inference expressed in words is called a simple illation; in other cases, a syllogism. A system of such illations and syllogisms, concatenated according to the laws of logical progression, is called an organon. An organon may be either for the discovery of truth or for imparting it to others. Logic is not concerned with the philosophy of language, or in any way with the means of expressing what is thought. Language expresses [or should, though it scarcely ever does, express] all that is thought. Logic is the instrument of which language is the material and philosophy the result. As the pre-requisite of philosophy is logic, so the pre-requisite of logic is language. Logic abhors an ellipsis. When an ellipsis is presented to logic, logic demands whether the ellipsis is an ellipsis of thought, or of language merely; whether there is in point of fact an uncertainty in thought which language has faithfully expressed, or whether the thought is simple, sure, clear, and language has introduced the ellipsis as an idiom merely. If the thought is uncertain, logic applies itself to deal with the ellipsis which is the faithful exponent of that thought; but it may oblige language to eliminate the ellipsis for the sake of clearness and precision. If, however, the ellipsis is one of language merely, the thought being explicit, logic will not deal with the ellipsis at all, but will demand, as the pre-requisite of its action, that the ellipsis should be eliminated, and the implicit thought should be rendered explicit in language. In all cases logic deals with what is thought, and with that only.

"Logic does not concern itself with any existing real objects, nor with the content or matter contained in any term or proposition. As language deals with the representation of thoughts, with a view to the communication of them from one thinker to another, philosophy regards only the matter, the content of those thoughts, and the evolution of practical truth. Now logic being the instrument that enables philosophy to deal with language, it is an intrusion for logic to pretend to deal with the matter or content of thoughts. Philosophy requires logic to furnish the formal organon for the investigation of practical truth, *i. e.*, the determination of facts. In all cases, then, logic deals with the form of what is thought, with concepts and their relation in judgment and inference. A term may apply to an actually existing thing, or to a class under which several objects are subsumed. But logic has nothing to do with the concrete object, that is,

the object considered in itself, but solely with the concept of which the term is the sign. So also the proposition may be true or false, or it may express a contingent truth or an apodictic truth (a universal and necessary truth). But logic has nothing to do with these things; it is concerned only with the form of the proposition. Accordingly, the only fallacies of reasoning that logic can take cognizance of are departures from the formal laws of syllogism; all other fallacies belong to physics or to metaphysics.

"Illation is that kind of inference which is direct and immediate, and we confine the term syllogism to that kind of inference which is indirect and mediate. . . . Syllogism means the expression of an argument in which it is necessary to compare two terms with a third term, in order to determine the relation between those two terms. . . .

"Not only must every syllogism contain three terms and no more, and three propositions and no more, but of the premises one at least must be affirmative. Moreover the consequence must express the worst relation of the two terms with the middle term. If one of the premises be negative, the consequence must also be negative. The comparison of each of the two terms must be with either the whole or some part of the middle term. Neither term must be distributed in the consequence (that is, universally affirmed or denied), unless it be so in the premiss involving it. . . . In any syllogism the process of reasoning and the evidence of its validity is the same, and it is the following: the middle term is the mean or measure; in the first place one extreme is compared with the middle term, and seen to agree with it *so far*; and thereupon this identity of agreement is affirmed. But in either case, if I do not know the extent of the term compared (cannot take it, that is, in some definite extent), I cannot tell whether the term to be compared agrees with it in extent or not,—whether it is part, or whole, or none. The predicate notion, however, in every reasoning, is one of these terms, and stands in one of these relations. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary to the validity of the reasoning that the predicate should always be quantified (*Baynes*). The incidents of the syllogism are—1. Subordination of propositions. 2. Figure. 3. Mood. 4. Action (or motion)."

The issue of this work in July, almost immediately after the demise of Sir William Hamilton (May, 1856), naturally led to a criticism of the worth of Sir William Hamilton's contributions to philosophic logic, when reviewing the work of his avowed disciple. This was conspicuously the case in the *Literary Gazette*, in two articles (Nov. 29th, Dec. 27th, 1856), in which the author was somewhat severely handled for totally ignoring Prof. De Morgan. This circumstance, together with the issue of Dr. Latham's "Logic in its Application to Language," which appeared to C. M. Ingleby to lend itself to "the farther diffusion of the old system of logic," and its farther confusion by the introduction of a "leaven of De Morganism," brought him into the field as a pamphleteer in "Certain Phases of Logic Contrasted and Harmonized" (1857). Here "the Mnemonics of Logic" are made the subject of an able discussion, in which the activity of a subtle and discriminating intellect is clearly discernible, and his power of logical fence

and defence is exhibited in exercise. It is worthy of remark, as honourable to both parties, that this debate, as between Latham and Ingleby, resulted in a fast and firm friendship, the chivalrous exchange of good offices, and the enlargement of the happiness of both.

In this same busy year of 1856 he was engaged in preparing a translation of M. Jules Michelet's history of the remarkable career of the Maid of Orleans, "Jeanne d'Arc," and under the great Shakspeare excitement of 1856, occasioned by the Collier-Perkins *folio*, he too was affected to productiveness. To the members of the Birmingham and Midland Institute he delivered a Critical Lecture on the *Notes and Emendations*; and in the *Critic*, the *Literary Gazette*, *Notes and Queries*, &c.; he opposed the reception of these suggestions into the text of Shakspeare as in any sense genuine, and called attention to the apparent untrustworthiness of the account given of their discovery and recovery; so that, greatly owing to his persistency, the *folio* was submitted to the test of experts. The whole results of his efforts and investigations were given forth in "The Shakspeare Fabrications," 1859, which attracted much attention, and an excellent and valuable history of the entire circumstances and incidents of this important literary event was published by him in his "Complete View of the Shakspeare Controversy; concerning the authenticity and genuineness of the manuscript matter affecting the works and biography of Shakspeare." Of this work, on the occasion of its appearance, we spoke at some length. (See *British Controversialist*, August 1861, pp. 57—61.)

Though we are in this paper more concerned with Dr. Ingleby as a metaphysician than as a Shaksperian, yet we may as well here mention, so far as we know them, his contributions to the proper appreciation, comprehension, and criticism of the sovereign dramatist, and on cognate subjects. He has enriched *Notes and Queries* with a large number of apposite contributions on Shakspeare, and on the literature of the sixteenth century generally.

In April, 1864, he contributed to *Once a Week* a racy satire on conjectural emendations of Shakspeare, under the title of "Marshal Storck,—who was he?" in which, by an ample array of cross-evidence, he claims from the phrase "Marshall Staulke" to have recovered a new character among the *dramatis personæ* of Hamlet. In 1865 he contributed three erudite critical papers to the *Englishman's Magazine* (Jan.), on "The Test of Shakspeare" (April), "The Obsolete Phraseology of Shakspeare" (Nov.), "Some Peculiarities of Shakspeare's Language." All these contain matter of worth and moment, worthy of the careful study of those who wish to make themselves full possessors of the "riches fineless" of "our Shakspeare." To the Berlin *Jahrbuch* of 1867 he contributed, under the quaint title of "The Still Lion: an essay towards the restoration of Shakspeare's text," which, as the *Saturday Review* justly says, "abounds in robust, pithy sense, jocose humour, and felicitous

illustration." From this rare paper we make the following philosophico-philological extract:—

"It is convenient to consider phrases under three heads,—idioms, idioms, and idiasms, which may be briefly explained as follows:—All living languages are in a state of continuous change. Not only words fall into disuse, and other words accrue to the general stock; not only do the orthographical forms in which they are presented to the eye undergo change, but each several word is ever more or less changing its meaning in scope and force. Some words (like *shy*, *secure*) obtain a signification directly contrary to their former meaning; or (like *let*, *prevent*) retain two contrary meanings at once. Others (like *piece*, *lewd*) pass from a respectable to a disreputable sense; while others (like *liberty*, *occupy*) more rarely lose their ill association, and become decent symbols of speech. The literal sense of some wholly gives way to the figurative, and more rarely the reverse; and a word which is one part of speech becomes another. But not only do words thus change, but all kinds of expression, written and spoken, change also. The normal affinities of parts of speech constitute the idiom. The singular phrase, which affords no analogy of construction, is the idiotism. There remain phrases and words peculiar to some creative writer, these we call idiasms. The idiom is a grammatical, the idiotism a proverbial, and the idiasm a private and peculiar mode of phraseology."

This excellent contribution to the elucidation of "the tongue which Shakspeare spoke," is likely, we believe, to be republished in England with large additions in a separate volume. Dr. Ingleby is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature, and is a member of their council. Among his communications to their "Transactions," we find (December, 1866) "Some Account of an Italian Miracle Play of the Sixteenth Century on the 'Legend of Cecilia.'" Of the contents of the paper—itself an analysis—we cannot venture on giving an abstract, but the following philosophic passage from the close we deem worthy of quotation:—

"We live under a twofold rule; we are constrained by a chain of natural laws, whose rigour no ingenuity of science and art, no passion of devotion, can mitigate or avert. That is an iron bond which we cannot escape, and whose laws we *must obey*. They are, on the whole, beneficial. In a word, these laws, which we must obey, do general good and partial harm, involving us in sorrow, pain, madness, in a word, *disease*. But we are also placed under an obligation (of a very different sort) to obey moral laws which have no rigour on us, save through the choosing will and the motives which determine its choice. These laws we *cannot perfectly obey*; and by their *breach* we are plunged in a passion of anguish, which, according to the case, is called remorse, attrition, contrition, and repentance. Coleridge says, 'Remorse is the creed of the guilty.' It is also (as *Æschylus* says) 'as goads to the wise.' How can it be wondered at that our rude forefathers should have represented the creator, ordainer, and sustainer of this twofold system as 'an austere man, reaping where he had not sown, and gathering that he had not straved'? Can we wonder that they should have depicted him as creating that which, like a watch with too weak a balance-spring, did not fulfil the divine idea? And when they felt that the creation was—

“Not answering the aim,
And that unbodied figure of the thought
That gave 't surmised shape,”

and thus seemed to deserve punishment; and that the very laws of its being brought down twofold punishment on the living creatures who constituted so large a part of it; can we wonder that they invested that great Being with unutterable wrath at the failure of His own work, and believed Him to set the Furies at the heels of the sinner here, and *ἔπο γὰρ* to deliver him over to the *μίσσῳ*, or eternal avenging fiend? Once let such a fetich be the object of man's belief, and of necessity would the propitiation of that dreadful Being be an object of the greatest moment to every living creature; and among all the means at man's command, what more commendable to his nature than voluntary self-sacrifice—the sacrifice of all that nature has made sweet and grateful to human reason and human sense? With the vantage which we have gained from positive science, we are able to obtain a larger and a juster view of the great scheme of things, and to see that beneficence is its prevailing character. We look upon the great Upholder as the friend of man, and fear only two things, the sin and the blunder. Not that we look for special judgments so much as for the ordained and inevitable consequences of our actions. We are enabled to say, with Ruskin, ‘Men help each other by their joy, and not by their sorrow.’ They are not intended to slay themselves for each other, but to strengthen themselves for each other. . . . The one thing that a good man has to do, and see done, is justice.”

A very searching and valuable paper appears in the same series (June, 1867), “On the Unpublished MSS. of Samuel Taylor Coleridge,” in which,—after *proving* that wilful lying and imposture must have gone on to a fearful extent, or there must exist, in whole or in part, works by Coleridge on (1) Logosophia; or, Dynamic Philosophy, (2) Logic, (3) Assertion of Religion, (4) Lectures on the History of Philosophy, (5) Fly-catchers; Notes, Theological and Critical, (6) Fragments, Logical and Grammatical, (7) Marginalia,—he concludes,—“I hold the family of Coleridge wholly without excuse if they do not make some attempt to issue at least the more important of his unpublished MSS.” In October, 1867, he discusses the question, “Was Thomas Lodge an Actor? An exposition touching the social status of the playwright in the time of Queen Elizabeth,”—deciding against J. P. Collier in the negative; and in January, 1868, he supplies remarks on “Some Traces of the Authorship of the Works attributed to Shakspeare,” as a contribution to the solution of the question, Was Shakspeare the writer of the plays usually represented to be his? He thinks no other name entitled to the credit awarded by common consent to William Shakspeare, although he admits that a large proportion of the plays commonly assigned to him have been founded on old plays which he rewrote, revised, and improved. The following is the conclusion of this paper:—

“If I might venture to express my opinion on this difficult inquiry, I

should say that in all probability several of the comedies strictly so called, and of the tragedies, 'Macbeth,' 'Coriolanus,' and 'Julius Cæsar,' are not indebted to any older plays on the same subject; and that 'Antony and Cleopatra,' 'Troilus and Cressida,' and the 'Tempest,' are, in the profoundest sense, original compositions; the entire structure, as well as the architecture of each play, being wholly due to Shakspeare's incomparable art. Look at those three plays only; unless, indeed, my judgment has been warped by the force of habit, I there discern the figure of a poet who was of a more 'select and generous chief' than any of the imaginative writers of Elizabeth's reign. Hazlitt, who proclaimed Shakspeare's intellectual and æsthetic superiority to the men of that day, qualified his verdict by saying that 'it was a common and a noble brood.' With Mr. Alexander Dyce let me say that 'falsar remark was never made by critic.' That the times were curiously favourable to genius may be allowed; and we may agree with Goethe's opinion, that much of what the giants of those days became and achieved was due to the 'stimulating atmosphere' in which they lived. None can say to what forest trees the garden flowers of our days, such as Tennyson and Browning, might have waxed, had they been planted in Elizabethan soil. But if so much be due to man's surroundings, we must also admit with sorrow that the direction into which the energies of Englishmen have been diverted is so unfavourable to artistic life, that an artist of Shakspeare's stamp will never more be possible among us; that we 'ne'er shall look upon his like again.'"

We may not, perhaps, be overstepping the limits of literary etiquette in saying here, that we have been informed by an authority on the subject, that Dr. Ingleby has prepared a "Supplement to the Complete View of the Shakspeare Controversy," embracing, amongst other matters, seven charges of fabrication and imposition in regard to—1. A MS. Book of Ballads (pseudo-antique); 2. Seven Lectures by Coleridge on Shakspeare and Milton (held to be spurious); 3. A Letter of Izaak Walton's and other MSS. (thought to be fictitious); 4. An Account of "The Famous Historie of Petronius Maximus" (a fiction); 5. A MS. Canto of Spenser's "Faerie Queen" (reputedly discovered, but not now forthcoming); 6. An Addition to the Diary of Philip Henslowe; and, 7. A (falsified) Letter to Lord Hunsdon from Philip Henslowe. We have heard besides that Dr. Ingleby has in progress "A Complete Critique on the Language of Shakspeare." From all that we have heard and seen of the Shaksperian contributions of Dr. Ingleby, we are inclined to believe that if we could have a "National Edition of the Writings of Shakspeare," to which all known Shaksperians should be invited to contribute, Dr. Ingleby should be placed at the head of the commission, with J. O. Halliwell as secretary, and the Cambridge editors as assessors. But are we not suggesting that that should be done now, which only the next centenary celebration shall lead men to think might be set about in process of time?

Our readers will be gratified to know that Dr. Ingleby still sympathizes with those who are engaged in self-culture, and the following extracts from a lecture on the "Mutual Relations of Theory

and Practice," delivered to the Birmingham Young Men's Mutual Improvement Association in 1860, will be read with interest:—

"Of the problems which defy the powers of the social speculator, how many are constantly meeting with a practical solution at the hands of a simple-minded worker, who, in love to CHRIST, and to those whom He came into the world to save, lay out their lives heartily in the work of converting sinners and evangelizing the world. When duty speaks, you and I must not waste our days in speculating on the best mode of doing it; *ars longa, vita brevis*. There are men specially endowed for the elaboration of theories. The practical man enters into their labours, and works with their instruments. But the more complex problems of social economy have not yet received any scientific solution. There is a work which is to be done, but how to do it we find not. So it is done, *quocunque modo*, as it may be; and thence springs the penalties of mistakes: for—

‘Evil is wrought by want of thought
As well as by want of heart.’

The fear of mistake, however, and of its consequences, is too often made the pretext of ignoble inaction. How many of us are given to murmur at the state of things among which we live, instead of manfully setting to work to do the little that in us lies for the well-being and advancement of our race! All of us have, at one time or another, reflected on the cause of an evil state of things, and said to ourselves, If that one circumstance had been otherwise, all this mischief might have been spared us. Is not this to credit ourselves with the foresight requisite for theorizing on the circumstances that would be still left us, when we are, in all probability, entirely overlooking the fact that one circumstance cannot be thus eliminated in practice without some new circumstance, which we cannot anticipate, taking the place of the one got rid of? I am speaking not of what you or I can conceive, but of what is realized in the experience of life. The fact is that all such theorizing is vain, because we are speculating with a portion only of the elements of the problem; and our result, though it may make us discontented, or possibly afford us consolation, as the case may be, is certain to be very wide of the truth. Such theories are simply false (p. 32).

... ‘Before you invest your powers in production, be first of all sure that what you are about to produce is worth production; and if so, that it has not been already produced by some one else. The only safeguard against the waste of mental capital in repetition is a preliminary investment of it in mastering the history and literature of the speciality in the department of which the producer is about to labour. Coincidence in discovery cannot always be avoided. NEWTON and LEIBNITZ independently invented (or rather discovered) fluxions. JAMES WATT and LAVOISIER ought to divide the honour of discovering the constitution of water. FOX, TALBOT, and DAGUERRE have equal credit in the discovery of photography. ADAMS and LEVERIER contemporaneously discovered the planet Neptune, by a purely theoretical process, though their methods were different. France somehow manages to divide the merit with England. Let us not grudge her that honour. But these are exceptional cases. Among such as you and I discovery is an improbable contingency. Our first business, whether in theory or practice, is to become familiar with what has been done by the great who have lived before us or have wrought around us.

When that labour is performed, we close the epoch of self-sufficiency and begin that of humility, which is the true pioneer of progress' (p. 85).

It would be impossible, without making this paper a mere catalogue, to note all the subjects on which Dr. Ingleby has written, or all the serials to which he has contributed. He has, we know, written in the *Saturday Review*, the *Critic*, the *Literary Gazette*, the *Guardian*, the *Illustrated London News*, the *Parthenon*, among newspapers, besides being an extensive contributor to the Birmingham local press; among magazines, *Once a Week*, the *Shilling Magazine*, the *Englishman's Magazine*, the *Medical Critic* and *Psychological Journal*, the *Churchman's Family Magazine*, and our own columns, have received enrichment from his pen. Among the topics to which he has given attention we may specially notice papers "On the Relation of Statistics to Moral Freedom," in the Transactions of the Social Science Association; and on "The Law of Bankruptcy" in the Transactions of the National and Provincial Law Association—which had some effect on recent legislation; to these we may add contributions to the *Fortnightly Review*, on "Mr. John Stuart Mill, and the Nebular Hypothesis," which excited considerable attention for its outspokenness; "From Fable to Fact," tracing the progress of the practical adaptations of science from *desideria* to realization; on "The Ideality of the Rainbow," an endeavour to turn the teaching of the rainbow to the account of psychology, as showing the path of transit from idealism to realism, from phenomena to conscious percipiency.

On this latter topic, one confessedly of the most difficult questions in psychology, we understand Dr. Ingleby has composed a treatise of great value, in the fashion of Plato, Berkeley, Hume, and Helps, entitled "Iris: five Dialogues on the Philosophy of Vision." The competent voice of G. H. Lewes is opposed to the use of the dialogue in philosophical writing, and restricts it only to the drama, wherein it tends to the evolution or explanation of the plot; yet we think that, as a means of exciting the controversial faculties of a man to the study of a topic, the philosophic dialogue has its use. The plan affords the variety amid sameness, as well as the unity and interest of the kaleidoscope. The characters of course are mere personifications of opinions, but that very personification imparts liveliness to the discussion of the topic. The object of these dialogues is, I understand, to unfold the doctrine of perception in such a way as to show that the senses are primarily instructed by reality, but that reality is formally constructed by the consciousness giving rise to the phenomena which seem to be projected on it, or presented to it by sensation. The publication of the treatise has been delayed in consideration of, as Samuel Bailey says, "the tardy and limited encouragement extended to such works." Its repute, however, has reached us in such a way as to incline us to regret that the paralyzation of neglect should so often and so effectively hinder or prevent the issue of works of such a highly finished and truly philosophical character.

We have little more to tell of our author. It will have been observed that we have spoken of him repeatedly as Dr. Ingleby. He did, in fact, in 1858, receive the degree of LL.D. at Cambridge—having written, as his “Exercise,” an elaborate dissertation on Bailments. In 1859 he retired from his professional engagements on a competence, and has since devoted himself to the culture of metaphysics and logic, literature and linguistics, poetry and music, scientific experiment and social intercourse. He has some acquaintance with German and Italian, and translates with grace, fluency, and effectiveness from each. He bears no small reputation, among those who know him well, as a humorist of an original turn. In 1863, he was a candidate for an examinership in logic and moral philosophy in the University of London; and when, in 1866, Dr. Hoppus resigned his professorship of the philosophy of mind and logic in University College, he became a candidate for that office,—though, having been travelling when it occurred, he had difficulty in forwarding substantiations of his merits until the time allowed had all but expired. He was unsuccessful in both these efforts. His latest and best work, which we are now about to notice, has been sadly interfered with by failing health. The first part of it was published in 1864, and received criticism and commendation from several of the leading thinkers in France, Italy, England, and America; the latter portion has only been finished a few months ago, and the whole is now issued in one volume, as “An Introduction to Metaphysic.”

This interesting and able work, going back to the Kantian initiative, “sketches out the principles of psychology, both as it concerns the senses and the understanding. The great moments of its scope are sensation, imagination, intuition (in space and time), and correlation by the principles of the understanding.” In the course of the work the author glances at some of the higher problems in philosophy, and criticises the doctrines of various writers of repute, whose works form a permanent part of the history of philosophy. In particular, the writings of Berkeley, Reid, Kant, Hamilton, and J. S. Mill, are reviewed at length, and “the grounds for the acceptance or rejection of their doctrines are carefully stated.” Many of these discussions in philosophy are full of fresh thinking, and all of them are apt and profound. Indeed, the work is almost cyclopædic in its range of philosophical topics. Sir Wm. Rowan Hamilton, one of the most original minds of this century of men of gifts, and one of the most universal in his erudition and attainments, in the latter part of his life wrote a critique on the earlier part of this work, and we cannot help feeling the value of the steps taken by Dr. Ingleby to make experimental psychology the handmaid to a new and comprehensive metaphysic, in which reason and reasoning shall be brought into harmony, and philosophy shall be seen to include all thought and all truth.

We subjoin the following quotations as indications only of the highly excellent contents of this notable book:—

"In the fact of vision there are three elements—the intelligent who sees, the object that is seen, and the faculty or organ by means of which that commerce between the intelligent and the object is effected. According to the doctrine of common sense, the intelligent is spiritual, and the object is material; while the mediatorial agency is either material or spiritual, according as it is regarded as itself an object of the senses, or as a mental impression. As an object of the senses we call that agency an organ, specifying it as the eye; as a mental impression we call it a faculty, specifying it as the faculty of vision, or the sense of sight, being one of some five or six senses appertaining to our bodily organism. . . . To the self-consciousness, the agency which mediates between the seer and the thing seen is immaterial, while to the senses it is, like any other external object, material. . . . The physicist thus judges of the question by an analysis of the thing seen, while the physiologist does so by an analysis of the organ of sight and the nervous system, so far as that organ and nervous system, and the phenomena accompanying them, are manifest to his own bodily organs. . . . The intellect is essentially sceptical; it will take nothing for granted but itself. . . . Scepticism, it is obvious, may take either of two forms: it may present itself as a doubt whether things are as they seem, i. e., whether the world of the senses is not a mere appearance, and if not an illusion, yet a mere subjective representation occasioned by an underlying and unknown world; or it may present itself as a doubt whether there be any world at all besides the world of the mind, the soul being the only existing species distinct from God. Doubtless there have been conscientious men holding every form of doubt or even unbelief; yet it must be conceded that many of the leaders of scepticism and idealism have been rather ingenious speculators than sincere converts to a system. Neither Hume, Leibnitz, nor yet Fichte believed the conclusions which they deduced with so much rigour of demonstration. Those probably were the sincerest philosophers whose labours, like those of Kant, were rather critical than dogmatic. Notwithstanding these admissions, notwithstanding the fact that the men of real eminence in philosophy found it hard to thoroughly convince themselves of the actual truth of their own systems, we have abundant evidence that they were sincere in their original doubts, as they were earnest in their search after a system of philosophy which would meet and solve them; and our own experience, if we rightly question our minds, will satisfy us that under the most respectable conventionalities lurk uneasy doubts which we cannot entirely resolve or entirely suppress. . . . The physicist assumes that matter is, and is as we perceive it to be; the physiologist knows of no organic structures but what are revealed to his own senses, and he knows them only as he thereby perceives them. Consequently all inquiries respecting the mode of perception, and the objectivity of the things perceived, are in vain addressed to either the physicist or the physiologist. It is to the metaphysician that such inquiries should be brought. . . . Metaphysicians have agreed to designate the intelligent by the term Ego, and the manifold objects of perception by the correlative term Non-ego." "Of the organism itself we know nothing save through the senses, else were physiology and psychology but one science." "Imagination is the faculty which mediates between the organic sensation and the object by the senses; it is the warp on which thought weaves its reflective fabric." "The presence of a sensation determines the imagination to construct, and only in the absence of objective sensations is the imagination the prey of subjective sensations."

"The law of reciprocal causation" which arises thence is a fine modification of the pre-established harmony of Leibnitz in this case, however reasoned out, not hypothetically posited.

The following quotations are made from the second book, on "The Psychology of the Understanding:"—

"There are, in fact, three elements to be considered: (1) the mode of acquiring, or the acquisition of knowledge; (2) the knowledge acquired; (3) the thing known,—distinctions which are so admirably differentiated by the Greek terms *γνώσις*, *γνῶμη* and *γνώριον*. It is with the first moment of these three we have to deal, and that not in the sense of feeling, inclination, opinion, or moral assurance, but of knowing, to the exclusion not merely of doubt, but of error. Knowledge is, in this sense, cogitable as derived (1) from the *positive* energy of the mind in dealing with the presentations of sense, (2) from the *negative* energy of the mind by reason of its limitations in the same sphere of operation, (3) from a *presumed* capability (either as a faculty or as a capacity) of arriving at truth concerning the supersensuous.

"All living words are in a state of growth or decay. Arrest this, and they become the fossils of thought. Then, and not till then, can they acquire that rigid, arbitrary definitude which is demanded in the terms of logic. A language of words so defined would, indeed, be a perfect logical instrument; but for all the purposes of life it would be cumbersome and inefficient; for it would be out of tune with nature, whose deputy it is. Words are "the slaves and signs of power;" but emptied of life, become tyrants over both the intellectual and the moral nature of man. It is this fitting of words for the ends of logic which degrades them from their rank, as the 'very seals and impresses' of mind and nature, to that of *idola fori*. 'Stick to words' (*haltet euch an Worte!*) was the fiend's advice to the student in *Faust*. In algebraical science, however, the symbols employed are, from the very nature of that which they denote, of a definite or definitive import, for which reason but little danger is incurred in combining them without reference to their meaning. In the use of common language it is never safe to dispense with that reference. A blind use of words is the fruitful source of fallacy; and yet the risk must be run, for if we were obliged to realize the precise meaning of every word we employ, we should be so hampered in expressing our thoughts that for very irksomeness we should keep silence. The distinction between a blind and a significant use of words must have been often taken before the time of Leibnitz, but to him belongs the credit of first turning that distinction to account in philosophy. He broadly discriminated between intuitive and symbolical thinking (*cogitatio*), and this distinction was further developed and illustrated by Wolf. The nomenclature appears to me highly objectionable, and the distinction, as left by Wolf, to have but little value. Had either of those great men perceived that from this distinction, in its ultimate development, emerges the separation of the intuitive from the discursive faculty, the labours of Kant would have been lightened."

"Logic, as prescriptively taught, requires that the relation of subject to predicate shall be not only constant, but one of simple identity. If it presents us with the judgment, Socrates is a man, the copula *is* expresses the identity between the Greek sage and a particular man. If it tells us that 'all men are mortal,' what is meant is that 'all men' are identical

with 'some mortals,' each one being identical with a particular mortal. This being the case, logic is incompetent to deal with philosophy; for philosophy distinguishes *noumena* and *phenomena*; substance and attribute; cause and effect. If then the subject stands for the true substance, and the predicate for the true attribute, the copula that joins them cannot be a copula of *identity*; since a true subject and its phenomenal attribute are disparate and exclude each other. Yet the copula in this case may be the copula of attribution, of which let logic make what use it may. Unhappily, both copulas are expressed by the same sign (*is* or *are*), a practice which occasions much paradox. For example, Kant tells us that it is only the permanent (substance) that is subject to change; while the changeable suffers no change, but rather alternation. Paradoxical as this appears, it is admirably expressed and as true as an oracle. But a careless or a sophistical writer might have worded it thus:—(1) Substance is subject to change, (2) though substance (as permanent) is not subject to change; and (3) *phenomena* (as changeable) are subject to change, (4) though *phenomena* are not subject to change: and, to all appearance, these are two conflicting pairs of contradictories. The solution of the paradox is this. In (1) and (4) the copula is that of attribution; and in (2) and (3) the copula is that of identity. Again, (1) and (4) are synthetical judgments; while (2) and (3) are analytical judgments."

"Dialectical antitheses in the spurious forms of contrary and contradictory oppositions arise on various other grounds, all of which present the character of a 'hog in armour;' logic stultified by its own incompetency, and made ridiculous by its *prociuitus*. For example, we think a multitude of thoughts only as related to that which is given in an intuition. *Phenomenon* is the *sinon non* of objective thought. We can only think of substance as (1) manifested by its *phenomena*, (2) not itself being identical with those *phenomena*. Consequently the attempt to think pure substance ends, as Kant shows, in forming the empty concept, and we find that nothing is the limit of pure being. But to affirm that pure being is identically nothing, is to confuse two copulas which are radically distinct. In the proposition, substance is pure being, "is" stands for the copula of identity; but in the proposition, substance is not affected with phenomena, *i. e.*, is no-thing, "is" stands for the copula of attribution. By confounding these two copulas it is readily made to appear that since substance is pure being, and substance is nothing, therefore pure being is nothing."

"In all thought, in all reasoning, concerning objects, we may distinguish two kinds of form; logical form and intuitional form." "The understanding and intuition are both formal powers, the one being the faculty of formal representation, the other the faculty of formal presentation." "The understanding works by conception; intuition by imagination. The product of conception is a concept; the product of imagination is an image." "We cannot imagine a concept—nor conceive an image." "There must be a *tertium quid* which is both sensuous and intellectual. This is a schema."

The second part of this ingenious work, on which the author is engaged, despite the pressure of illness, will treat of *Material Logic*, and in it the doctrine of schematism falls to be unfolded. We hope for the author a due amount of appreciation for the part of the work already accomplished, and the requisite amount of mental and bodily health to finish fittingly his praiseworthy task.

Religion.

DO THE SCRIPTURES FAVOUR OR OPPOSE THE IDEA OF THE NATURAL IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

WE are now called upon to discuss a profound and all-important topic. We have all an interest, yea, a great interest, in knowing whether, when we come to the margin of "that bourne from which no traveller returns," and are about to die, our living powers will be destroyed with our bodies; if, when men die, they cease to exist. This subject has engaged the attention of men in all ages of the world's history. Philosophers have not been unmindful of this sublime doctrine, but have sought to comprehend the mystery by their reason; some of them even went so far as to believe in the pre-existence of the soul; though some could not see their way clear to believe in the future state. But Socrates, as Plato intimates, believed both. Poets, too, have sung some of their sweetest melodies on the joys of the saved in heaven; and not only those, but of the pains also of those who are lost,—not destroyed, but suffering the punishment of their sins. Volumes have been written, and will continue to be written, till "time shall be no more," *pro* and *con*. In nature we find many things to suggest a future state. No man has been able yet to define what is the bulk of his living powers, but we know they can be suspended without the person ceasing to exist; for instance, a person in a swoon is dead for the minute or few minutes, persons may lose the greater part of their material body without their soul being injured, they are still the same persons. We believe firmly the soul will not be liable to be dissolved at the dissolution of the body, and therefore it will be naturally immortal. But I must stay and arrest my course; I am not asked to prove it from proud philosophy, the poets, or nature, but from that good old Book which has been a guide to so many an earth-plodding traveller, and which, I trust, will be our guide till we enter the land of truth.

The opponent to my views who wrote in April does not appear to deny the everlasting happiness of the Christian, but he denies the future existence of the sinner; so I must try and prove from God's word that the wicked will never cease to exist, but that they have an immortal soul the same as the righteous. "Man became a living soul" (Gen. ii. 7). Abraham was said to be "gathered to his

people" (Gen. xxv. 8). Now Abraham was not buried with his people; so we conclude that this means another state, namely, to "the souls (or spirits) of just men made perfect." Again, the same is said of Isaac (Gen. xlix. 33). And of Rachel it is said, "As her soul was leaving her" (Gen. xxxv. 18). Stephen prays God to receive his spirit (Acts vii. 59); and the Saviour commends His spirit into His Father's hands (Luke xxiii. 46). These, and the proofs which have been quoted in the April number, prove the resurrection of the dead, and that the soul exists without the body; but I think we find in the Old and New Testaments passages enough to prove that no man is destroyed, annihilated, or ceases to exist, but remains for all eternity either being punished or being blessed. Read Isa. xxxiii. 14: "Who among us shall dwell with the devouring fire? who among us shall dwell with everlasting burnings?" To Daniel it was revealed that "many of them that sleep in the dust shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt." And turn to the evangelical prophet: "For their worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched" (Isa. lxvi. 24). I wish now to call attention to several parts of the New Testament where the same doctrine is propounded. The words of our Saviour are very clear upon this point. After the judgment, this sentence is to be pronounced on the wicked:—"Depart from Me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels" (Matt. xxv. 41); and in case any one should, like our friend P. O. S., think that the fire would destroy, consume, or annihilate the wicked, the following words appear to be added:—"And these shall go away into everlasting punishment: but the righteous into life eternal" (ver. 46).

Now it appears to me that these two must stand or fall together; for when the eternity of divine punishment is denied, it will not be long before people deny the eternity of rewards. The Saviour thrice declares that sinners shall exist "Where their worm dieth not, and their fire is not quenched:" (Mark ix. 44, 46, 48). And it is certain this alludes to the unending duration of the punishment of the wicked into the "fire that shall not be quenched:" (ver. 43). And again, "And shall cast them into a furnace of fire: where shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth:" (Matt. xiii. 42). And in the parable of the rich man and Lazarus the same truth is taught: "And in hell he lift up his eyes, being in torment:" (Luke xvi. 23). St. Paul, too, teaches the same thing: "The Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven, taking vengeance upon those who know not God, and that obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ: who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of His power" (2 Thess. i. 7, 9). St. Jude assures us that Sodom and Gomorrah are "set forth for an example, suffering the punishment of eternal fire" (Jude 1). And St. John says, "The smoke of their torment ascendeth up for ever and ever: and they have no rest day nor night, who worship the beast and his image."

I think, from these passages, if we believe in the Book, that divine revelation teaches that all men, whatever their state may be, saint or sinner, are possessed of an indestructible soul; for I find no passage to directly contradict this; the absence of texts clearly proving the opposite view is certain evidence that the Holy Ghost intended them to be understood as they are written. The nature of sin, and the influence it exercises upon those who are under its power, are demonstrative of the unending punishment of the lost.

Sin is the transgression of the law, and while a man is unforgiven and under condemnation he cannot be released from punishment. The law demands that it should be kept; it makes no provision for those who do not keep it, but punishment. And in the grand scheme of man's redemption I can find no provision made for a sinner to come to Christ in a future state. The only conclusion I can arrive at is that there is no mercy for a lost soul, but that all who die in their sins will be punished in hell for ever. And those who have accepted of Christ, and have had their sins forgiven, will dwell with God in heaven for ever. As we do not know what good things the Lord hath prepared for those who love Him, we are likewise ignorant in many points of the misery of those who are not saved. But let it be ours to seek to eat of the new tree of life in the midst of the paradise of God.

"How long art thou, eternity?
As long as God is God—so long
Endure the pangs of sin and wrong;
So long the joys of heaven remain.
O endless joy! O endless pain!
Ponder, O man, eternity."

A. S.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

THE idea of eternity, whenever it forces itself upon us (for forced it is), whether whilst reading, cogitating, or dreaming, produces a marked impression in a very short time. We are involuntarily drawn into the consideration of the subject, and consequently all our voluntary contemplations must be grafted upon the thought which arose as strangely, as rapidly, and as mysteriously as the gourd of Jonas. Like the light too that fell from heaven upon St. Paul, the thought of immortality is usually alarming; it brings not with it a glorious prospect of the golden gates of the eternal city, with its marvellous glittering pillars and glistening pavements, thronged with celestial immortals, but paints in all its horrors the dreadful agonies of the damned and the ghastly picture of hell. Hence arises a natural tendency to shrink from the future; we would far rather "bear those ills we have than fly to others that we know not of." We feel our immortality without daring to define it. We cannot disbelieve nor doubt it, but both the lights

and shades of eternity pain the eye of the mind for a time, so that we can hardly dwell but for a moment upon it. Nature, therefore, appears to declare with a still small voice that man is naturally immortal.

Upon so interesting a subject it is reasonable that many papers will be written. The subject, however, has been so admirably handled on the affirmative by H. K., the points of whose argument appear so irrefragable, and who has written with so much clearness and skill, that we fain would have let the matter rest, confident that it is not in the power of our antagonists to oust us from our position. But on consideration we determined, although forestalled in the major argument by H. K., to weave into a connected theme a few minor points and correlatives which had previously been jotted down and which appeared worthy of notice. Physicists and metaphysicians agree in maintaining that no material thing has an end; that it may change, but that its particles are not destroyed, a metamorphosis being the only result. Philosophers and even theologians have also embodied the same idea in relation to the particles of man. Thus, in the epitaph lately discovered and attributed to Milton, we find,—

"Then pass on gently, ye that mourn,
Touch not this mine honoured urn;
These ashes which do here remain
A vital tincture still retain;
A seminal form within the deeps
Of this little chaos sleeps;
The thread of life untwisted is
Into its first existences;
Infant nature cradled here
In its principles appear."

But this discussion introduces no element of personal belief, but depends upon logical inference based upon scriptural data. And here we must take exception to an implied definition of immortality as laid down by P. O. S. This controversialist appears to attach a very unusual, nay, extraordinary meaning to this word. The term has not, as he would convey, any goodness or sanctity inherent in it. A man, humanly speaking, may achieve immortal fame or immortal shame. Samuel has gained the one, Judas as assuredly the other.

The quicksand on which our opponents all appear to sink is in mistaking that which was spoken of the mere body as applied to the soul. Thus great emphasis is laid upon the phrase, "Dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return." It must be remembered that the whole context shows that God spake of natural subjects. The ground was cursed, so that it should bring forth thorns and thistles, whilst man himself was doomed henceforth to the necessity of winning his bread by the sweat of his brow. The whole passage conveys incontestably to the mind of the observant

reader the idea that every topic touched upon is entirely material. To the Jews the natural immortality of the soul must necessarily have been part of their belief. For to them it was commanded that they should keep the law which God had given to Moses. Now this law contained no promise of future immortality consequent upon a belief in a promised Saviour, therefore we can only fall back upon two things: either they must have believed that as the beast dies, so dies man; or that man was naturally immortal. But it is palpable that the former was not their creed; for if such had been the case, who can doubt but that during the weary journeyings in the wilderness, after being assured that they should never see that good land flowing with milk and honey, but that they were doomed to perpetual wanderings, they would gladly have died by the sword of their fellows, or by the serpents, or by their own hands, rather than endure so many years of suffering, when so simply they could have obtained eternal rest. Yet we find that they did not seek death, fully believing that man's soul is naturally immortal.

In the passages, moreover, which our antagonists have culled from Job, the gist of them is applicable, not to the spirit of man, but rather to the body or to moral and intellectual qualities. The passages instanced by F. W. bear no more upon the subject than moralizings of a kindred nature by essayists in all ages and climes. If this be not so, how can the quotations given by him be reconciled with the following?—"The wicked is reserved to the day of destruction; they shall be brought forth to the day of wrath" (Job xxi. 30).

Our antagonists appear to adopt as their belief that immortality is the result of Christ's death and resurrection, and that this principle of eternal life is only conferred upon those who believe. Thus P. O. S. says, "The eternal immortality of wicked spirits, however brought about or permitted, would be the eternity of evil, a possibility which we cannot entertain in regard to a time when God the Father shall put all things in subjection under God the Son, Jesus Christ." From which we infer that nought savouring of evil can exist in subjection under the Son. But we know from Scripture that at the sound of the awful trump all shall appear at the judgment seat of Christ, and that they which have done evil shall go away into everlasting punishment; that He (Christ) shall "burn up the chaff with unquenchable fire;" that He shall say to those on His left hand, "Depart from Me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels." Thus if Christ is the source and giver of eternal life, He must confer eternal life upon the unjust as well as the just, eternal misery must be awarded by Him as well as eternal happiness. An anomaly consequently arises which those who take the negative side of this question must clearly elucidate before they can be entitled to bear the palm of victory.

The doctrine of redemption as laid down in the Scriptures is simply this: Christ by dying hath redeemed us from death, that is,

from the *sting* of death. Now the sting of death is sin, therefore He hath redeemed us from the punishment which had been decreed upon those who commit sin, thus changing immortal misery into immortal happiness. The sting of death has been withdrawn, and the nature of the result of sin only has been changed. A penalty has been transformed into a privilege, for it is possible, by passing the portals of temporal death, to usher the never-dying soul into the realms of immortal bliss.

Yet some, it would seem, adopt the doctrine that the soul unregenerate is not immortal; what then becomes of it? The Scriptures tell us that "all must give account of the deeds done in the body." To go still further, how can those who reason thus surmount the difficulties of the following?—"All manner of sin shall be forgiven unto men, but the sin against the Holy Ghost shall *never* be forgiven." If after judgment the wicked are simply annihilated, the threat cannot have its force, for annihilation includes cessation of feeling. Or turning to the translations of Enoch and Elijah, we are not told that they possessed any natural qualities above their fellows, nor that on them were bestowed endowments of an immortal character. When did they cease to be mortal and become immortal? Did they become immortal by being removed to regions of immortal bliss? Then is the redemption of Christ not necessary. One, Elijah, we are told, was seen to go bodily, leaving only his ephemeral clothing behind him. All that was God-like was taken, the earthly only left behind. Looking to the various sects who profess the Christian religion, which one of them adopts the tenet that man is not naturally immortal? I have endeavoured to find one, but all in vain. Strange it must be if so many denominations, differing greatly in their views of Scripture interpretation, should coincide in their manner of understanding this subject, and yet all be misguided. The fact that so many searchers of the Scriptures think that man is naturally immortal speaks loudly in favour of that belief.

A. J. G.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

"That problem which, measured by its interest to man, by its dependences, by the infinite jewel staked upon the verdict—we should all confess to be the most solemn and heart-shaking that is hung out by golden chains from the heaven of heavens to human investigation—viz., Is the spirit of man numbered amongst things naturally perishable? The doctrine of our own Dodwell (a most orthodox man) was, that naturally and *per se* it was perishable, but that by supernatural endowment it was made immortal. Apparently the ancient oracles of the Hebrew literature had all and everywhere assumed the soul's natural mortality."—*Thomas De Quincey*.

WARBURTON, in his "Divine Legation of Moses," found it a proof that the Pentateuch was a revelation from God, because it was silent on the doctrine of a future state, and held "not only that

Moses did (as a fact) assume the mortality of the soul, but that as a necessity he did so, since upon this assumption rests the weightiest argument for his own divine mission. "That Moses could dispense with a support which Warburton fancied all other legislators had needed and postulated, argued, in the bishop's opinion, a vicarious support, a secret and divine support." It is quite evident that this eminent divine had formed the opinion that the Mosaic books did not favour, if they did not oppose, the doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul.

H. K. affirms that the natural indestructibility of every human soul is a fundamental doctrine of the Christian religion, but he has nowhere stated in what passages of Scripture this fundamental doctrine is to be found clearly and unmistakably revealed. His interpretation of the passage Gen. ii. 7, containing the words "Man became a *living* soul," as meaning "an ever-living soul" (p. 25), is evidently an overstrain. We note one fact in refutation of this view. While Jesus was on earth there was a sect called Sadducees, who said that there is no resurrection. If the books of the Jewish church had explicitly stated that man possessed an ever-living soul they could not have doubted the resurrection; for that must have been inevitable to "an ever-living soul."

Again, on page 26, H. K. says, God "created Adam in His own image, or, in other words, exactly as He himself was!" This is surely a strange statement. When H. K. goes to a photographer's to get "his own image," he gets something "exactly as he himself is;" it can live, think, speak, write, act, and controvert! It is not only *like* his appearance, but it is also exactly what he is! God is an eternal, infinite, all-wise, unchangeable Spirit, to whom no bounds of time or space can be assigned. "God created Adam exactly as He himself was," therefore Adam was an eternal, infinite, all-wise, unchangeable Spirit, to whom no bounds of time or space can be assigned. Such is the syllogism on which H. K. bases his proof "that the Scriptures show that the first man was created with a naturally immortal soul, and that Adam's posterity in consequence possess the same" (p. 26). One who was logically sand-blind could see that the foundation is insecure, and the minor premiss is entirely unsubstantiated.

H. K. quotes Psa. cxvi. 8, in which David says, "Thou"—meaning Jehovah—"hast delivered my soul from death," as a proof of the natural immortality of the soul,—strangely overlooking, as it seems to us, the plain fact that if man's soul is naturally immortal, his soul could neither be delivered *to* nor *from* death. *To* death it could not be delivered, for it *is* immortal, and not subject *to* death; *from* death it could not be delivered, for it is not, according to H. K.'s idea, liable to death. It could not be delivered from that which it was impossible could happen to it.

I am indebted to a well-read friend for the following extract in explanation of the doctrine of the Church upon the subject of the soul's immortality. As it was written without any design of being

used in such an argument as this, it is all the more likely to be trustworthy; as it comes from the pen of that historian of whom the readers of this serial have lately been getting such an interesting account, it will be read with interest and attention. This is J. A. Froude's exposition of the doctrine of regeneration:—

"Unless the body could be purified, the soul could not be saved; because from the beginning, soul and flesh were one, man and inseparable. Without his flesh man was not or would cease to be. But the natural organization of the flesh was infected with evil, and unless organization could begin again from a new original, no pure material substance could exist at all. He, therefore, by whom God had first made the world, entered into the womb of the Virgin in the form (if I may with reverence say so) of a new organic cell; and around it, through the virtue of His creative energy, a material body grew again of the substance of His mother, pure of taint and clean as the first body of the first man was clean when it passed out under His hand in the beginning of all things. In Him thus wonderfully born was the virtue which was to restore the lost power of mankind. He came to redeem many, and therefore He took a human body, and He kept it pure through a human life, till the time came when it could be applied to its marvellous purpose. He died, and then appeared what was the nature of a material human body when freed from the limitations of sin. The grave could not hold it, neither was it possible that it should see corruption. It was real, for the disciples were allowed to feel and handle it. He ate and drank with them to assure their senses. But space had no power over it, nor any of the material obstacles which limit an ordinary power. He willed and His body obeyed. He was here, He was there. He was visible, He was invisible. He was in the midst of His disciples and they saw Him, and then He was gone, whither who could tell? At last He passed away to heaven; but while in heaven He was still on earth. His body became the body of His Church on earth, not in metaphor, but in fact—His very material body, in which and by which the faithful would be saved. His flesh and blood were thenceforth to be their food. They were to eat it as they would eat ordinary meat. They were to take it into their system, a pure material substance, to leaven the old natural substance and assimilate it to itself. As they fed upon it, it would grow into them, and it would become their own real body. Flesh grown in the old way was the body of death, but the flesh of Christ was the life of the world, over which death had no power. Circumcision availed nothing, nor uncircumcision—but a *new creature*,—and this new creature, which the child first put on in baptism, was born again into Christ of water and the Spirit. In the eucharist he was fed and sustained, and went on from strength to strength; and ever as the nature of his body changed, being able to render more complete obedience, he would at last pass away to God through the gate of the grave, and stand holy and perfect in the presence of Christ. Christ had indeed been ever present with him; but because while life lasted some particles of the old Adam would necessarily cling to every man, the Christian's mortal eye on earth could not see Him. Hedged in by 'his muddy vesture of decay,' his eyes, like the eyes of the disciples of Emmaus, are holden, and only in faith he feels Him. But death, which, till Christ had died, had been the last victory of evil, in virtue of his submission to it, became its own destroyer, for it had power only over the tainted particles of the old substance, and

there was nothing needed but that these should be washed away, and the elect would stand out at once pure and holy, clothed in immortal bodies, like refined gold, the redeemed of God. . . . We lie down and seem to decay—to decay, but not all. Our natural body decays, being the last remains of the infected matter which we have inherited from Adam; but the spiritual body, the glorified substance which has made our life and is our real body as we are in Christ, that can never decay, but passes off into the kingdom which is prepared for it; that other world where there is no sin, and God is all in all.”

The passage which we have just quoted occurs in a paper on “The Philosophy of Catholicism,” which, though written originally in 1850, has so far received the impress of its author’s reiteration as to have been republished in “Short Studies on Great Subjects” (vol. i., pp. 186—191).

The two points which have been made manifest in what we have now laid before the reader in this paper are, 1st, That the natural mortality of the human soul is assumed, if it is not expressly asserted in the Scriptures. 2nd, That Scripture distinctly and authoritatively declares that the immortality of the human soul is an express gift of God, dependent on the acceptance and fulfilment of certain conditions fixed by the Giver. In the Scriptures it is “Christ who is our life” (Col. iii. 4); and it is only thus promised “He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life” (John iii. 36). It is only “Christ” (not nature) who “hath abolished death, and hath brought life and immortality to light in the gospel” (2 Tim. i. 10); while it is as expressly declared that “he that hath not the Son of God hath not life” (1 John v. 12); “but he is cast forth as a branch, and is withered” (John xv. 6).

I do not suppose that it is necessary to pursue the argument farther at present. I trust that due consideration will be given to the subject *as it is stated*, namely, as a fact of inductive interpretation, not as a figment of creed and inference. Most of all I hope the question will be kept free from the certain fallacy of asking—If we decide that the Scriptures do not teach that the soul is everlasting and naturally immortal, what will the consequences be? If we can find out the truth, the consequences cannot be very dangerous, for the way of the truth is that of safety. It is certain that the Church has for a long time dealt in loose and unmeasured language in regard to the terrors of the law, but this ought not to induce us to strive to go to the opposite extreme. The only right way to pursue this debate to a satisfactory conclusion is to inquire, What saith the Scriptures? So far as we have been able to examine their plain statements, they seem to affirm that the penalty of death has passed upon all men, and that they are made immortal, if at all, by the grace and mercy of the Saviour, who came to be the light and life of the world—to redeem us from the curse of the law, that is, *death*, and to raise us to *newness* of life.

S. F.

Politics.

IS AN HEREDITARY HOUSE OF LEGISLATURE DESIRABLE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

"I do believe that the House of Lords is disposed in all respects to place itself in harmony with the feelings of the people of England. It is not a caste, it is not an isolated body, it is not separated from the common feelings of the people of England, but a body into which new blood is continually finding its way by those who, like myself, have risen from the general mass of the people by labour and industry; and, on the other hand, those who descend from the proudest families in that House, by gradual degrees again descend and mix with the mass of the people."—*Lord Hatherley.*

INTELLIGENCE and power are the governors of nations. Intelligence to know what is best to be done, and power to insist on its being done, and to persist in the doing of it. But the governing intelligence and power must be independent and autocratic, in fact, sovereign. Our House of Commons is a deliberative assembly. It is called together to advise on, not to enforce, legislation. It has of late been encroaching on the higher functions of government, and has been taking upon itself quite an undue share in the affairs of the nation. It is an undoubted fact that the Commons' House is elected to represent the opinions, desires, and wishes of the people. It is in no sense of the term an executive power. It is a mediatorial agency—a means by which the sovereign may be informed of the claims which the Commons are inclined to make; and the duty of its members is to consider the best compromise which can be made between the persons who represent things as they are, and their constituents, who seek to make things as they think they should be. The Commons are too much the representatives of the agitations of the masses and the changes they wish. We require some stable and resisting power as well as a moving one. The Lords preserve the status *in quo ante* while it is tenable; the Commons assault it in the interests of change, and a wise series of concession and compromise preserves order along with progress.

Men have not only an instinctive desire for hereditary honours, but have an instinctive respect for those who bear them. It is true that this latter affection sometimes leads to snobbism; but this only the more strongly proves our assertion. Now it is a good thing to give human instincts scope so far as they are beneficial in their

action. An hereditary House of Legislation gives such scope. It holds out to men of might and genius a reward for their exertions, which gratifies the thirst of the soul for remembrance and recognition among posterity; and it involves the love of parents and benefactors to influence to high and honourable purposes the lives of those who succeed them. In this way there is a high and noble use of hereditary titles and property; which, though it may be liable to abuse, does not cease to be desirable. If we think of it aright we shall find that we cannot limit the affections of men by the base utilitarianism of the most beneficial for the passing hour. Men's desires flash beyond their own puny life, and men will do that for the future which they would never think of doing for the short favour of the present.

Had we not an hereditary House of Legislature in which power, property, prominence, and permanence are represented, we should have a far greater amount of evil attendant upon our parliamentary elections. We talk at present of the bribery, corruption, and intimidation of voters—if there were no way of holding out against the innovations of agitators by such a plan as an hereditary House, we should have the entire wealth, energy, power, and ingenuity of the aristocracy arrayed against us in elections, and there would be a terrible tyranny over every voter established, to keep him from opposing the nominees of the rich. Our Commons' House would become, in fact, a House of Lords, for the aristocracy would pack it with their representatives, and there would be no chance for popular reforms at all. Not only would the aristocracy try to get the largest possible number of seats, they would colleague also to bribe the greatest possible number of those who got in as the representatives of the people. So that the abolition of the hereditary House of Legislature would make matters worse instead of better, and we had better keep the ills we have than fly to others that we know not of. Power and wealth can secure representation, and they would secure it, so that it is preferable to have a House that is fairly amenable to law and order, than one built upon bribery and corruption.

Wealth can co-operate so much more readily and more effectively than numbers, that the class who hold property and money could easily defeat the aims of the irresolute and fickle people. They could buy up not only votes, but men. And the greatness of the interest at stake would make them not only unscrupulous in the means they employed to gain votes, but also in the use they made of the power which they had acquired in the House of Commons. To avoid this terrible war of classes for parliamentary power, it is desirable that an hereditary House should exist; for this makes it possible to warn off the trespassers on the rights of the people by anti-bribery laws. If we allow you your House to yourselves, then you must, we can say, leave the people theirs to themselves. If you touch our freedom of election, we must consider your right to hereditary parliamentary power; therefore hold off from any inter-

ference with the elections of Commoners, or it may be the worse for you. It would be impossible to say anything of that sort effectively if the House of Lords were abolished as an hereditary house, for the interests of men are always stronger than general principles—especially than such principles expressed in human laws.

Hence it is that we are led to think that an hereditary house of legislature is highly desirable. It is desirable, in the first place, because it secures a large highly cultured class to give thought and to devote attention to the best methods of conducting public affairs,—men who are, in general, possessed of wide experience in regard to the forms and fashions of society, of extensive acquaintance with the results of laws, and of trained and cultured minds. To such men the questions of the day do not come, it is true, with the same intense and pressing demand for immediate action in the direction of change as to those who are in the very midst of the struggle of life, with all its anxieties to distract them from the truth and to attract them to any hope of relief. They are withheld from the fierce and terrible fight of popular politics, and are able in some measure to observe the progress of events with the calmness of on-lookers. It is always of importance to have a full view of every question taken. It is especially important to get unimpassioned and impartial thought on matters of moment; and I am inclined to think that it is much better to have a class thus set apart, who are above the briberies of parties, than to let politics fall into the hands of a band of political busybodies, who would seek political capital in all their ways and propositions, and require pay for their pains.

We do not lay much stress upon the legislation for ever and in continuance, upon the ages along which the power of the peers is allowed to extend. The peerage is hereditary. It consists of picked men. The men of a picked race are in general distinguished from others by rare gifts, and these gifts are absolutely entailed by nature on their descendants, unless they wilfully violate the provisions of nature for their transmission. When, however, they do so, the race decays, dies out, and the peerage shifts to a new branch of undecayed capacity. In the long run, therefore, the hereditary principle sets itself to rights. An hereditary House of Legislature is desirable because it preserves this strife of races to hold the first position. It has the same effect on the breed of men as the prizes at agricultural and horticultural shows have on cattle and flowers. There is always amongst the posterity of these choice specimens a fair per-centage of individuals superior to the common run, unless the forcing process has been too vigorously pursued. The application of special culture to the race of men is quite as essential as it is to breeds of cattle. Hence our aristocracy, the prize-takers in life's lottery, and their descendants, is a good and beneficial institution, which it would be unwise to annul or abrogate.

It is never desirable that one set of men should have the decision of such important questions as those which belong to legislation

dependent entirely upon their own will. When men begin to think that they only need to determine and a thing is done, they are very apt to become conceited and tyrannical. It is a good thing to know that others have to be thought of; that greatly restrains the desire of men to innovate unreasonably and injudiciously, and leads to a considerateness in decision, so that what is determined upon may be as sensible and as little offensive as possible. If it were for nothing else than for the amount of deliberation which the existence of an hereditary house renders necessary in the House of Commons, it would be desirable to have it amongst our institutions.

There is a great cry made now-a-days for the representation of majorities; one of the best arguments that could be used for that purpose is the existence and use of a House of Lords—which is a representation of a minority in numbers. If for no other purpose than to be a standing proof that a country can only be well and wisely governed when minorities are represented, the Radicals should uphold a House of Lords.

PH. M.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

THE House of Lords has been put upon the defensive. It has opposed the supreme law of modern legislation—the popular voice, and straightway it has been voted a nuisance, an obstruction, and a delusion. It is scarcely worthy of reform, all that it needs is destruction. Wisdom cries aloud in the streets with such energy and intelligence, through the reform in the Representation of the People Bill of 1868, that suddenly it has been found out that in reality the democracy is the aristocracy, and that, if we would truly inaugurate the rule of the best, we must find it among that class of society which has least leisure, least culture, least power of applying thought to actuality, least capacity of seeing beyond the desires and designs of the hour—the possessors of tenements of higher annual value, exclusive of poor's rates, than four pounds sterling. It was prophesied of old time, "Many shall go to and fro, and knowledge shall be increased;" and the time and season so spoken of has now surely arrived, for the populace are our best guides in politics, and our proletaires are the overrulers of our parliaments.

It is quite evident that the public opinion of a people who have not been educated to self-restraint and impartial thought ought not to be flattered, so as to make it impatient of honest thought, or in any way be induced to put itself on a par as a power with the educated reflectiveness of a class who have been trained for legislative duty.

E. L. B. objects that in an hereditary house we cannot secure hereditary wisdom. This is a point on which it is much easier to declaim than to reason. A great deal can be said in favour of

the hereditary transmission of qualities. We all know not only that pride of birth is an ingrained instinct in man; we are all proud of our ancestry, and we are all fond to believe that none of our posterity will disgrace their "forerunners." We are all inclined to look favourably on any one who comes to us recommended as "the son of his father," and we credit such a one with a good many graces and qualities on the assumption that he is like his father. Few parents can restrain a feeling of pleasure when they can introduce into the notice of others favourably one whom they delight to commend as "my son." Now all these feelings of human sympathy are active in the members of the House of Lords and in their families, and all the forces of education are usually employed to fit them for their position in the world. We have, therefore, in our hereditary aristocracy "the principles of natural selection" in acting, as well as the effects of training, to an extent to which Charles Darwin himself would not despise to assign a large influence; but E. L. B. spurns at these things in the spirit of the illegitimate Savage's savage line,—

"The tenth transmitter of a foolish face."

E. L. B. fails to see, too, that his argument fails, even though we should grant him his supposed fact that sons are not always certain to be wise or great because their fathers have been or are so; and we see many men rising into the ranks of the peerage from the lower ranks of life, while others decline into them, and peerages become extinct. Because he has not estimated the effect in cherishing aspirative effort, and of inducing men to strain their capacities to the utmost, which is due to the fact of the existence of a House of Lords as an hereditary legislative assembly; nor has he allowed for the operation of the average of accidents in a house of hereditary legislators when he claims that every scion of the houses whose leaders sit there should be a superior person in birth, health, and talents. Even taking the House of Lords head by head, it will be found that the men are superior on the whole—in every particular of comparison—to the members of the House of Commons; while it must be remembered that these are only the accidental heads of about 400 families, while the Commons are the picked men out of millions. Let E. L. B. reflect how large a percentage of the Commons are nobles voluntarily serving an apprenticeship to politics in the Lower House, as a general proof of the actual personal superiority of the aristocracy of hereditary legislators.

Let E. L. B. and our readers look upon and regard the hereditary House as a special organization for the upholding before men's eyes the highest forms of life and culture, and these applied freely and fully to the conduct of public business and the management of state affairs. Here is an example of patriotic devotion, of sedulous endeavour, and of careful training, which those who desire to engage in political life must in part emulate and rival, if they

wish to cope with or excel them. What a mighty force is this! to induce in all who aim at stirring the hearts of men on political affairs to devote themselves to lead laborious lives as a freewill offering to the nation. Were it only that we might have such a *standard*, the hereditary house of legislature is highly desirable.

E. L. B.'s depreciative estimate of the aristocracy is exceedingly fallacious. He forgets that it is the essence of a noble character "to do good by stealth, and blush to find it fame," and therefore the good deeds of the aristocracy are not blazoned abroad as those are which are done by those who have a name to make. Besides, we expect a great deal more from the aristocracy; and when they do anything, we lay little stress on it, because it is just what was to have been expected.

We suppose E. L. B. has been misled, by the circumstances of the times in which this debate comes before us, to discuss "The Life Peerage Bill," and to give us his views on the improvements he would propose and carry out—if he had the power—in the Peers' Chamber. We shall not follow him in this discussion into the details of any such measure; we shall conclude our paper by affirming that a hereditary House of Legislature is desirable,—

1. Because it is the inheritor and transmitter of the historic glory of Great Britain.

2. Because it provides a lofty standard of political life, patriotism, and culture.

3. Because it provides a noble object of just ambition to statesmen, and men who have served their country.

4. Because it provides a fresh set of minds to look at political questions in a light which is free from the deep agitations, and the immediately pressing influences which ruffle parliamentary life in the Commons.

5. Because it supplies an occasion for the expository debates of the House of Commons.

6. Because it forms a barrier round the Crown, keeps up a due safeguard against rash innovations, and induces a reconsideration of the policy of agitators.

E. J.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

"True nobility is of the mind,
Not given to chance, and not to chance resigned."

No more decisive proof of the importance and interest of this question could be given than the fact which we believe is now publicly stated, namely, that, on the 8th of July, the House of Lords rejected Earl Russell's Life-Peerage Bill by a majority of twenty-nine, not because they were absolutely opposed to the principle of the bill, but because they were unwilling to submit the consideration of the constitution of their House to discussion in the House of Commons, as they were afraid that, in the present state of public

opinion, they would find scant courtesy from the members of what is sometimes called the Lower House—the House, namely, which represents the people. But this is not a time in which any fact can be withheld from investigation, or in which any institution can hold itself sacred from scrutiny. Our age is all eyes. The press is an Argus, and there is nothing hid that has not a great likelihood of being revealed. It is certain that the importance of this question will more and more press itself upon the minds of men, and must be discussed. Every sign of cowardice will be marked, and every turn taken by “the stupid party” who claim a right divine for everything that is—especially that is theirs—will be noted and made an element in the consideration.

The country has great toleration for those institutions which are progressive, self-developing, and willing to keep pace with or adapt themselves to the requirements of the time. It is patient with the bad if they are penitent. See how tenderly it has dealt with Oxford and Cambridge; how long it has borne with the Irish Church; how jealous it is for the conservancy, as far as possible, of vested rights; and how laboriously it strove to attune the House of Commons to self-reformation. The country is neither ungenerous nor unjust, but it will not bear for ever the want of generosity towards it, and a continued and hardy perpetration of injustice. The House of Lords has been a house, not of legislation, but of opposition. Its main action has been, not wise suggestions and considerate improvement, but resistance to progress and sullen yielding to change when it could no longer be prevented except at the risk of revolution. All important social changes in legislation have been forced upon them by surcharging the House with new members, who effect the purpose of the time by their votes, but almost immediately fall into the ranks of the let-well-alone, rest-and-be-thankful peers, and become the antagonists of farther change, and the opponents of projected improvements—a house of irresponsible and therefore careless dabblers in legislation.

An hereditary house of legislation is not desirable, in the first place, because the principles on which promotion to that house is given are not likely to procure for the country the best men as the founders of the best families—the aristocracy. Men are not elevated to the peerage by the voice of the nation or the nation's representatives. They are “committed” to the House of Lords when their presence in the House of Commons has become inconvenient; when the construction of cabinets demands the shelving of some marplot, or the getting rid of an unworkable; when the exigencies of debate, or of votes, or of influence make it advisable that a new star should gleam in the hemisphere of the aristocracy. Promotion is often the bribe for the betrayal of entrusted advocacy, or political trickery, subserviency, and treachery; sometimes it is the result of the shuffling of the cards of party interest, at others the effect of a desire to gain a present end. A very frequent means of procuring an increase in the peerage is the working of the legislation of the

country into such a condition that a standstill is threatened and danger lies ahead. In such a case a creation of peers is made, not because of the urgency of the merit of the parties so raised, but on account of the exigency into which legislation has been brought. But why, for the mere sake of gaining a present vote, the nation should be saddled with the entire progeny of those who are thus raised for a mere temporary purpose, for all time coming as the controlling powers of legislation, I cannot see. The payment required to attain the end is, in our opinion, too high. That a man should throw himself—Curtius-like, shall we say?—into the House of Lords to save his country, by an act of heroic self-sacrifice, may deserve that, for the one single favour done to the country, we should suffer him to take his own way in all time coming so long as his natural life extends; but that we should require to accept of and rejoice in all his primogenitural descendants,—let them do whatever they please and become whatever they like,—that I can neither find rhyme nor reason in. It seems to me that, whether creations are made by the sovereign or by the cabinet, these creations ought only to last for the natural life of those who have laboured for, suffered for, turncoated for, or “lied abroad” for the nation, and that the grant should extend no farther than one life, unless under ratification by the nation or the nation’s agents—the Commons House of Parliament. We can have a House of Lords without its being an hereditary house. Let us have a house of the meritorious as our modern aristocracy—men whose fame gives a title, not whose title acts like fame.

An hereditary house of legislature, constituted as ours is, is not desirable, on account of the influence it exerts on the legislation of the Lower House. Measures, when they are produced in the House of Commons, are not produced with regard to what is right, what is commendable, what is honourable and just; but they are laid before the House as the best which are likely to gain a favourable hearing “in another place.” The thought of the Upper House overhangs, like an incubus, the Lower House, and that, not because it is a supreme legislative assembly, but because it is an hereditary legislative assembly, where certain ideas prevail and cannot be countervailed by discussion, and where certain rights are exercised by the members without even the courtesy of discussing or listening to the discussion of the topics involved. The House of Commons is a deliberative assembly, in which discussion is employed to convince and persuade, and as a means of eliciting the truth on a question; but the general eloquence of the Upper House is of a different sort. It always looks on the *status quo* as a thing not to be disturbed, if it can possibly be avoided; and hence it does not question the righteousness of any proposal, but how it will interfere with rights reserved; and it makes legislation rather a question of the right of majorities than of the right and the just.

I object again to the having of an hereditary house of legislature, such as our House of Lords is, on account of its irresponsibility.

It is amenable neither to the Crown nor the Commons. Far worse, it is not influenced or controlled by public opinion. The high mightinesses who have hereditary seats in our Imperial Parliament keep their heads too lofty to be disturbed in the serene air of their Olympus by anything so contemptible as the opinions of the people as a power to move them. The desires of the people, the comforts and enjoyments of the common herd, why should they—even as an act of grace—stoop to attend to these things? This sense of irresponsibility leads them to use legislation as a privilege sometimes, which they may avail themselves of when they like and disregard when they dislike, sometimes as a toy to amuse themselves with and to while away the tedium of their life; but sometimes, too, as a mischievous agency by which they disarrange the harmonies of the state, and by their obstructive disregard of right—in the defence of rights—disturb the progress of the country in peace and industry. They undergo no election, they cannot be brought to book, they can do as they like, they are not bound to the performance of any duty, and they are thus an irresponsible body. In our age such a body is not desirable.

I have no objection, *a priori*, to hereditary titles and honours; even hereditary privileges I could tolerate, and I really do not see why such things do not exist apart from legislative powers; but I do certainly think that of all the possible undesirable things, an hereditary house excels them, and I firmly believe that there is no argument a hundredth part so strong against hereditary monarchy as there is against hereditary legislative assemblies. Life peerages are those alone which should be granted; but I would always admit a candidature in the heir for the continuance of the honours won by his father, so as to present a constant stimulant to the successors of any worthily great man to aim at gaining, by consent of the Crown, the cabinet, and the country, the reversion of the titles and the peerage of his ancestors. With such a recognised lapse of the honour conferred, unless a good case could be made out for its continuance, there could be no harm, but rather much good, in retaining our House of Lords, for it would then be a house of the genuine aristocracy,—men whom the sovereign and the country alike delighted to honour; but an hereditary house of legislative lords is not desirable.

B. M.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

Two facts tend to make this debate very instructive and interesting. The Life Peerage Bill, now passing through the Legislature, and which is a step in the negative direction of this debate; the consideration of the Irish Church Bill, which is occupying nearly the whole of the attention of the country, and which has called forth many bitter attacks upon the Upper House. The attitude which their lordships assume, and the concessions the Government are willing to make respecting the latter measure, will greatly

decide the course those reforms will take which are suggested by these attacks.

We write under the fear of falling into that clap-trap and commonplace argument, of which the opener of this debate on the opposite side kindly, but uncourtously and unnecessarily, reminds the readers of the *British Controversialist*,—kindly, because he warns us of dangers; uncourtously, because such an injunction ought to be a conclusion rather than an assumption; and unnecessarily, because he admits their love of common sense, and their hate of commonplace.

M. C. N. urges four propositions to prove the affirmative. He affirms that as considerateness, independence, moderation, and judiciousness, are attributes of an hereditary House of Legislature, therefore it is desirable. Now does he forget that these qualities belong in general to any body of men, that they are not confined even to an hereditary aristocracy? A House of Legislature not directly responsible to the people, nor hereditary, would possess them. It is not because a house is hereditary that it exclusively has a right to them, and nobody else. He assumes, perhaps truly, that because a house is elected by the people it cannot have these qualities, as it is hurried on by an irresistible force. This is one point of the difficulty. Surely if an assembly more closely connected with this force cannot withstand the pressure, it is madness for one more remote to attempt to resist it. The House of Lords, as at present constituted, moves too slowly, it is stuck too fast in that Conservatism which its members, in a great many cases, inherit with their fortunes; it does not move with the spirit of the age, it does not understand its demands, and therefore, in endeavouring to run counter to it, fails. Let it be thoroughly alive to, and comprehend modern ideas, let it move faster, then these qualities will be of the utmost value. To do this reform is necessary. The independence of an hereditary House of Legislature is often stretched beyond the limits of independency, so that it comes to mean stubbornness and obstinacy; and moderation means a do-nothing policy.

M. C. N., under his fourth proposition—judiciality and judiciousness,—says that as the House of Commons is mobile, and the Upper House calm and serene, this hereditary assembly is a safeguard against collisions between the Crown and the representatives of the people. Surely he must be a modern Rip van Winkle, who has been sleeping for some years, to talk about collisions with Crown and Commons now-a-days. Let me remind him that the day has long since gone by when the sovereign dared to exercise the prerogative of *velo*. Sovereignty, as a governing power, is virtually dead, it is absorbed into a cabinet of ministers, responsible to the people.

To abolish the House of Lords would be to undermine our Constitution. To reform it would be to strengthen our system of government. The principle of our Constitution—King, Lords,

and Commons—as it is at present carried out, is a nullity. Nay, it is something farther and worse, it creates “crises,” and puts the country into a state of chronic disturbance and alarm. And why? Simply because the House of Lords does not harmonize with the people. The people is the source of all strength, the Lords possess only a component part of it; the consequences are plain. The Upper House was created for a purpose, but that purpose is not fulfilled. If the business is to check hasty legislation, to amend the work of the other House, and to introduce measures themselves, it is impossible to carry this out as it is at present composed. The events of the last few years prove this. On every vital point of legislation, when the House of Lords was the forlorn hope of Constitutionalists, its opposition has always been overridden, or it has been forced to materially alter its views. And so the exercise of those qualities which M. C. N. attributes to them is set at naught.

New blood must be infused into the Upper Assembly. In these times, when things are moving so fast, thoughts and ideas are transitory and changeable, and what is desirable is, that these should be represented, unbiassed by family ties and class prejudices, in order that there may be more harmony between the branches of the Legislature, and between these and the people. The creation of peers from members of the other House is not on a sufficiently large enough scale to have much effect. Again, the House of Lords is looked upon in our day, more or less, as a place for old, worn-out politicians, who have fought hard in the political arena, and are now to rest on their laurels. They go there as to an honourable retirement, not to achieve other victories, but as a reward for past services.

When reform takes place, of which, as we before mentioned, the Life Peerage Bill is a commencement, it must not be in a direction convenient to the interests of its noble members only. They form a very small minority of the people, and we must recollect that the House of Lords was made for the benefit of the people, and not the people for the House of Lords.

Let us anxiously look forward to the time when the desired reforms will be completed. Let us hope they will set the Upper House on a surer and more satisfactory footing, increase sound legislation, make this branch of our Legislature a solid fact, not an empty show, and in every way conduce to the peace and welfare of this country. C. F. A. S.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

“THE real glory and prosperity of a nation does not consist in the hereditary rank or titled privileges of a very small class in the community—in the great wealth of the few, and in the great poverty of the many—in the splendid palaces of nobles, and the wretched huts of a numerous and half-famished peasantry. No!

such a state of things may give pleasure to proud, ambitious, and selfish minds, but there is nothing here on which the eye of a patriot can rest with unmingled satisfaction."

Before proceeding with the question, "Is an hereditary House of Legislature desirable?"—as all legislation is only a means to an end—it is advisable, we think, to consider the end; that is, the object of legislation, and then the best means of attaining that end.

We consider that the object of legislation is to do the greatest amount of good and the least amount of evil to the largest number of people in the state. If this be accepted as the object of legislation, then the next step will be to take into consideration what are the best means to accomplish that object?

According to our way of thinking, the best means of accomplishing such an object is by having the people represented in the legislature by the best and ablest men in the state, or, in other words, by having the entire legislature to be the elect of the nation. By this method we would always have the ruling body to act in accordance with the nation's wishes—we would always have talented and able men as our legislators. It stands to reason that no one portion of the community would elect a man to serve as their representative in a legislative assembly, who is foolish, or dishonest, or opposed to their particular interests.

Supposing that an hereditary House of Legislature were established, consisting of the ablest and wisest statesmen in the kingdom;—as talent is not hereditary we could not expect to find the same amount of ability and wisdom in each succeeding generation of hereditary legislators. In such a House we may have, at first, the best and ablest legislators in the realm, but as mere descent does not insure to the inheritors of the paternal estates any of the abilities of their progenitors, then we may have them with power, yet destitute of the ability to use that power aright; and, as a consequence, they gradually lose the power they did possess to those who are elected to legislate for the interest of the nation. The inference is plain that an hereditary House of Legislature is not desirable, because of its inferiority to an elective legislative assembly.

History bears testimony to the truthfulness of our statements. Originally the hereditary house arose out of the power and importance of the barons—they did good service in the earlier part of their existence for the cause of freedom, by resisting the encroachments of the king; but they, infringing on the rights of the people, and disobeying the voice of the nation, were in turn resisted by the people. Such was the case with the bill known as the Reform Bill of 1832. The Lords refused to pass that bill, though sanctioned by the Lower House and backed by the voice of the people. The people then put forth their strength and resisted the obstinacy of the Upper House, compelling them to pass the bill much against their will. Their conduct on that occasion has not been forgotten, and as a result their power has been curtailed into very narrow limits. So useless have they become,

that, as a legislative body, they are incompetent to transact the business of the day, and they are becoming more and more intolerable to those who have the welfare of the people at heart. They cannot be entrusted with any power over the taxation of the country. Their influence, once all-powerful, is now almost nothing. Certainly there are yet some able men in the Upper House, but their unnatural position nullifies their abilities; and to have such a House of Legislature is not desirable, in consequence of the talent which is thrown away.

The question presents itself to our mind, What is the object of an hereditary House of Legislature? Is it to serve as a check on any hasty legislation of the Lower House? If so, then—as a representative House of Legislature is superior to an hereditary one—it is not desirable to have an inferior legislative assembly when we can have a superior one. Indeed, an hereditary house cannot possibly serve as an effectual check on the deliberations of the Lower House, because of its unrepresentative character, it having little or no power in the kingdom to back out its decisions as a checking power.

Again we come to the question, What is the object of an hereditary House of Legislature? Is it to serve as a reward to those who have done some great deed in the cause and for the honour of their country? Is it to confer honours on those who, by their literary, scientific, or political acquirements, have become known to the nation at large? If so, it is most unjust—unjust in conferring power on those yet unborn, unjust in crowning those yet to come with honours not their due, unjust that by the mere circumstance of birth one should have so much power over another; and, since it is so unjust, it is not desirable. Indeed, the injustice appears so great to our mind that we wonder at the hereditary house being tolerated, it being such an outrage on common sense and the equal rights of mankind. It seems, at most, as if it were permitted to exist as an ancient institution, and as long as it does not thwart the wants of the nation. And as soon as it does oppose the will of the nation we may expect its downfall.

An hereditary House of Legislature is of no practical use: it is in principle opposed to national reform; and when a measure of reform is brought before it by the nation through their representatives, it is, as is quite natural, opposed by the members of that House, and they are only prevented from accomplishing their purpose by the probable total loss of their fast waning power.

In conclusion we ask our opponents, Is it desirable to have a House of Legislature of no practical value? Is it desirable to have a Legislative Chamber for mere show? Is it desirable to have a Legislative body with nothing but pedigree to recommend it? Is it desirable to have a Legislative Assembly who are representative of none but themselves, and who always place themselves in antagonism with the wishes of the nation? All these things, and many more, are inherent in an hereditary House of

The Essayist.

THE SACRED POETRY OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.*

OF Richard Crashaw we know not how precisely to speak. His poetry has too much of the passionate warmth and effusion of the Italian,—breathes too much the language of earthly love in dealing with things divine,—to please our colder and severer English taste; to which such language, however devotional, savours of irreverence. That this was the fault of the age in which he wrote, and not of the poet as a man, is testified by his friend and fellow-poet Cowley's graceful tribute of affection to his memory,—words even more applicable to the poet (Keble) whose earthly resting-place, revered and beloved by all, is still green among us,—

"Poet and saint! to thee alone are given,
The two most sacred names of earth and heaven;
The hardest, rarest union which can be,
Next that of Godhead and humanity."

That Cowley is right, and that it is rare indeed to find the characteristics of the poet and of the saint in the same person, cannot be denied. The causes of this are obvious. "The subjects which sacred poetry aspires to handle transcend inevitably the poet's capacity; and the mind, intent on things unseen, is sometimes dull to the perception of material beauty, image, and reflection, though it be of that which is invisible. Besides, the passionate and fervid temperament of the poet is exposed to dangers peculiar to itself, and liable to aberrations which are no temptation to others."† With all his faults of style and manner, the careful and judicious reader may find much to admire in Crashaw. His thoughts, for instance, in "Charitas Nimia; or, the Dear Bargain," only require a modern setting to please the fastidious taste of modern critics:—

CHARITAS NIMIA; OR, THE DEAR BARGAIN.

Lord, what is man? why should he cost Thee
So dear? what had his ruin lost Thee?
Lord, what is man that Thou hast over-bought
So much a thing of nought?

Love is too kind, I see, and can
Make but a simple merchantman.
'Twas for such sorry merchandise
Bold painters have put out His eyes

* Continued from page 68. † The late Rev. H. F. Lyte.

Alas, sweet Lord! what were't to Thee
 If there were no such worms as we?
 Heav'n ne'ertheless still heav'n would be.
 Should mankind dwell
 In the deep hell,
 What have his woes to do with Thee?

Let him go weep
 O'er his own wounds;
 Seraphim will not sleep,
 Nor spheres let fall their faithful rounds.

Still would the youthful spirits sing,
 And still Thy spacious palace ring;
 Still would those beauteous ministers of light
 Burn all as bright,

And bow their flaming heads before Thee;
 Still thrones and dominations would adore Thee;
 Still would those ever-wakeful sons of fire
 Keep warm Thy praise
 Both nights and days,
 And teach Thy loved name to their noble lyre.

Let froward dust then to its kind,
 And give itself for sport to the proud wind.
 Why should a piece of peevish clay plead shares
 In the eternity of Thy old cares?
 Why shouldst Thou bow Thy awful breast to see
 What mine own madnesses have done with me?

Should not the king still keep his throne
 Because some desperate fool's undone?
 Or will the world's illustrious eyes
 Weep for every worm that dies?

Will the gallant sun
 E'er the less glorious run;—
 Will he hang down his golden head,
 Or e'er the sooner seek his western bed,
 Because some foolish fly
 Grows wanton, and will die?

If I were lost in misery,
 What was it to Thy heaven and Thee?
 What was it to Thy precious blood
 If my foul heart called for a flood?

What if my faithless soul and I
 Would needs fall in
 With guilt and sin,
 What did the Lamb that He should die?
 What did the Lamb that He should need,
 When the wolf sins, Himself to bleed?

If my base lust
 Bargain'd with death and well-~~esse~~eming dust,
 Why should the white
 Lamb's bosom write
 The purple name
 Of my sin's shame?

Why should His unstain'd breast make good
 My blushes with His own heart-blood?

O my Saviour, make me see
 How dearly Thou hast paid for me,

That, lost again, my life may prove
 As then in death, so now in love!

Verily, captious and cold of heart would be that critic who could see no soul of beauty shining through these lines. The following lines, from a poem on the death of a young gentleman of rank and fortune, afford a fine instance of the moral sublime. Musing on the common lot of humanity,—the doom which none can evade—he exclaims—

“Come then, youth, beauty, blood! all ye soft powers,
 Whose silken flatteries swell a few fond hours
 Into a false eternity.”

This may remind us of the oft-quoted lines in Gray's famous “Elegy”—

“The boast of heraldry, the pomp of power,
 And all that beauty, all that wealth e'er gave,
 Await alike the inevitable hour—
 The paths of glory lead but to the grave.”

Yet in pregnant force and simple grandeur of expression we think the lines of the earlier poet have a decided superiority over those of the later, which, beautiful as they are felt to be in *themselves*, seem tame and feeble in comparison. Most striking of a truth is that expression, “A false eternity.”

In a still higher strain, musing on the awful mystery of the Incarnation, he expresses his wonder and admiration:—

“How a pure spirit should incarnate be,
 And life itself wear death's frail livery—”

“That a vile manger his low bed should prove
 Who thunders on a throne of stars above—”

“That glory's self should serve our griefs and fears;
 And free eternity submit to years.”

Such are some specimens of Crashaw's sublimities. We may also instance in point a poem of his, noted by Archbishop Trench—viz., a very noble translation, or rather reproduction, of the “Dies

Iræ,"—a hymn which has found many modern versifiers, English and Continental; amongst the former, Sir Walter Scott, of whom that affecting incident is recorded by his biographer—"How in those last days of his life, when all of his great mind had failed, or was failing, he was yet heard to murmur to himself some lines of this hymn, an especial favourite with him in other days." In a celebrated work of fiction of recent times, we find some verses of this hymn put into the dying lips of one of the principal characters there portrayed,*—an idea originally suggested, it may have been, by the incident above-mentioned. The following is Crashaw's version:—

THE HYMN "DIES IRÆ, DIES ILLA." IN MEDITATION OF THE DAY
OF JUDGMENT.

Hear'st thou, my soul, what serious things
Both the Psalm and Sibyl† sings,

* *Vide* the description of St. Clair's last moments in "Uncle Tom's Cabin."

† "An unwillingness to allow a Sibyl to appear as bearing witness to Christian truth, has caused that we sometimes find this third line (as it stands in the Latin original, 'Teste David cum Sibyllā') omitted, and in its stead 'Crucis expandens vexilla,' as the second of this triplet (for 'Solvēt sacchum in favillā'). It rests on Matthew xxiv. 30; and on the expectation that a cross in the sky would be 'the sign of the Son of man in heaven' there spoken of. It is, however, a late alteration of the text; and the line as above is quite in the spirit of the early and mediæval theology. In those uncritical ages the Sibylline verses were not seen to be that transparent forgery which indeed they are, but were continually appealed to as only second to the sacred Scriptures in prophetic authority; thus on this very matter of the destruction of the world, by Lactantius. . . . It is not too much to say that these Sibylline oracles, with other heathen testimonies of the same kind, were not so much subordinated to more legitimate prophecy as co-ordinated with it, the two being regarded as parallel lines of prophecy,—the Church's and the world's—bearing consenting witness to the same truths. Thus is it in a curious mediæval mystery on the Nativity. . . . It is of simplest construction. One after another, patriarchs and prophets and kings of the old covenant advance and repeat their most remarkable words about Him that should come; but side by side with them a series of heathen witnesses. Virgil (on the ground of his fourth Eclogue), Nebuchadnezzar (Dan. iii. 25), and the Sibyl; and that it was the writer's intention to parallelize the two series, and to show that Christ had the testimony of both, is plain from some opening lines of the prologue:—

'O Judai, Verbum Dei
Qui negatis, hominem
Vestree legis, testem Regis
Audite per ordinem.
Et vos, gentes, non credentes
Peperisse Virginem,
Vestree gentis documentis
Pellite Caliginem.'

Of a sure Judge, from whose sharp ray
The world in flames shall fly away?

O that Fire, before whose face
Heav'n and earth shall find no place;
O those Eyes! whose angry light
Must be the day of that dread night.

O that Trump! whose blast shall run
An even round with th' circling sun,
And urge the murmuring graves to bring
Pale mankind forth to meet his King.

Horror of nature, hell and death!
When a deep groan from beneath
Shall cry, "We come, we come," and all
The caves of night answer one call.

O that Book! whose leaves so bright
Will set the world in severe light.
O that Judge! whose hand, whose eye,
None can endure, yet none can fly.

Ah, then, poor soul! what wilt thou say?
And to what patron choose to pray,
When stars themselves shall stagger, and
The most firm foot no more can stand?

But Thou giv'st leave, dread Lord, that we
Take shelter from Thyself in Thee;
And with the wings of Thine own dove
Fly to Thy sceptre of soft love!

Dear Lord, remember in that day
Who was the cause Thou cam'st this way.
Thy sheep was stray'd, and Thou wouldst be
Even lost Thyself in seeking me!

Shall all that labour, all that cost
Of love, and even that loss, be lost?
And this loved soul, judged worth no less
Than all that way and weariness?

Just Mercy, then, Thy reck'ning be
With my price, and not with me;
'Twas paid at first with too much pain,
To be paid twice, or once in vain.

And such is the meaning here—"That such a day shall be has the witness of inspiration, of David; and of mere natural religion, of the Sibyl;—Jew and Gentile alike bear testimony to the truths which we Christians believe."—"Sacred Latin Poetry." *Archbishop Trench.*

Mercy, my Judge! mercy, I cry
 With blushing cheek and bleeding eye;
 The conscious colours of my sin
 Are red without and pale within.

O let Thine own soft bowels pay
 Thyself, and so discharge that day!
 If Sin can sigh, Love can forgive;
 O say the word, my soul shall live!

Those mercies which Thy Mary* found,
 Or whot† Thy cross confess'd and crown'd,
 Hope tells my heart the same loves be
 Still alive, and still for me.

Though both my prayers and tears combine,
 Both worthless are, for they are mine;
 But Thou Thy bounteous self still be,
 And show Thou art by saving me.

O when thy last frown shall proclaim
 The flocks of goats to folds of flame,
 And all Thy lost sheep found shall be,
 Let "Come, ye blessed," then call me!

When the dread "Itē" shall divide
 Those limbs of death from Thy left side,
 Let those life-speaking lips command
 That I inherit Thy right hand!

O hear a suppliant heart all crush'd
 And crumbled into contrite dust!
 My hope, my fear! my Judge, my Friend!
 Take charge of me, and of my end!"

There is a grandeur and sublimity about this hymn, as rendered by Crashaw, truly Miltonic, shaded and softened with more than a Milton's tenderness and pathos.

As a specimen of the tender and pathetic (purely and simply), we give the following lines from a poem of Crashaw's, entitled "The Weeper." There, speaking of the tearful Magdalene—the Magdalene of the Gospels—he says:—

"Not in the evening's eyes,
 When they red with weeping are
 For the sun that dies,
 Sits Sorrow with a face so fair.
 Nowhere but here did ever meet
 Sweetness so sad, sadness so sweet.

* Mary Magdalene (Luke vii. 47—50).

† The penitent thief (Luke xxiii. 40—42.)

" Sadness, all the while
 She sits in such a throne as this,
 Can do nought but smile,
 Nor believe she sadness is ;
 Gladness itself would be more glad
 To be made so sweetly sad.

" Well does the May that lies
 Smiling in thy cheeks confess
 The April in thine eyes ; *
 Mutual sweetness they express.
 No April e'er lent softer showers,
 Nor May returned fairer flowers."

Notwithstanding their somewhat quaint and antiquated garb, all true lovers of poetry will, we think, recognise and appreciate the beauty of these lines. It is, surely, no mean tribute to Crashaw's muse that such poets as Milton and Pope did not disdain to borrow some of his ideas. We may add that our own laureate has been, apparently, not a little indebted in this way to these early poets—the last-named included. Almost a third part of Crashaw's published poems consists of short Latin pieces, chiefly on sacred subjects, in a variety of metres. His ease and felicity in this way may excite the envy even of Lord Lyttelton and Mr. Calverley. Crashaw was ejected from his fellowship at Cambridge for refusing to take the covenant, in the year 1644. He subsequently went to France, where he became a Roman Catholic. He died, a canon of Loretto, in 1650. Many of his poems bear evident traces of the influence of his adopted creed. He seems to have led a life of rigid austerity.

The sacred poetry of the eighteenth century will need no more than a passing notice. Familiar as household words are the names of Young, author of the "Night Thoughts,"—a poem now perhaps unduly neglected, yet containing many fine and striking passages; of Cowper, Newton, Watts, Wesley, and Toplady, author of that sublime hymn, "Rock of Ages," which we may remark, by the way, it were to be wished had been left as it originally stood, unspoiled by tasteless alterations†—a practice this of which "A. K. H. B." feelingly complains.‡ With this cursory notice of the sacred poets

* Cf.—

" And hopes and light regrets that come
 Make April of her tender eyes."
Tennyson.—"In Memoriam."

† Thus, not to mention other changes, the closing line of the first stanza—"Cleanse me from its guilt and power"—is in some versions of this hymn, merely for the sake of mending a defective rhyme, altered to the tame and feeble—"Cleanse from guilt and keep me pure."

‡ *Vide* "Autumn Holidays of a Country Parson." Chap. xvi.—"Concerning Cutting and Carving," &c.

and poetry of the eighteenth, we pass to the nineteenth century. And here, amid lesser lights, *one* name shines like a star of purest radiance in the empyrean of sacred song,—the name of him so lately taken away from us—the saintly Keble, poet of the “Christian Year.” Of him might we truly say, in his own words—

“ Thus saints, that seem to die in earth’s rude strife,
Only win double life ;—
They have but left our weary ways
To live in memory here, in heaven by love and praise.”

B. C. H.

GROWTH.—That there is decrease as well as increase is characteristic indeed of all growth. If we take the case of natural life, for instance, we find certainly growth, but yet, in many respects, we find a loss of qualities (or perhaps it might be more strictly called a change of properties) between the period of immaturity and that of maturity. Thus, as we advance in years from boyhood to manhood and old age, we lose the enthusiasm, the warmth of affection, the sensibility, the sympathy, the ardour of early youth—attributes which, however engaging and delightful, are, from the nature of things, transitory and evanescent, not capable of being sustained, much less increased. We lose these even as we lose youth’s smooth cheek, its bounding pulse, its elastic tread,—

“ The thoughtless day, the easy night,
The spirits pure, the slumbers light,
That fly the approach of morn.”

Yet we grow notwithstanding. Our advance—up to a certain period of life at least—is a real advance upon the whole: an advance from less to more, from immaturity to maturity, from a lower to a higher state. Unavoidable decrease of the grace and vigour of youth is more than compensated by the increase of wisdom and experience. If our affections are less warm, they are not so apt to be misplaced on trifling or unworthy objects, being more under the control of prudence and a knowledge of the world. If in the business of active life we cannot do the same things as the young, we are able to take our part in much more important transactions. If our senses are less acute, and our feelings less keen, our judgment is more ripe. Age, in fine, is an advance upon youth, not in every particular quality—i.e., not in those qualities which peculiarly belong to the period of youth,—but in more important qualities, and upon the whole.

The Reviewer.

Memoir of Sir William Hamilton, Bart. By JOHN VEITCH, M.A.,
Professor of Logic and Rhetoric in the University of Glasgow.
Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons.

PROFESSOR JOHN VEITCH (who is a native of Peebles, born about 1821) at an early period of his literary career translated from the French, Descartes "On the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason, and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences," to which he prefixed a learned, admirable, and excellent, though concise, introduction. To this he added a translation from the Latin of Descartes' "Meditations, and Selections from his Principles of Philosophy," to which a thoughtful preface is prefixed, and some learned notes are added. He was for some time, we believe, connected with a literary and philosophical newspaper, published in the Scottish metropolis under the name of the *Edinburgh Guardian*, and being a favourite pupil of Sir William Hamilton, he was selected by the Messrs. Blackwood, on the suggestion of Sir William Hamilton's family, to act along with Dr. H. L. Mansel as co-editor of the lectures on logic and metaphysics of that great master. On the death of William Spalding in 1859 (see *British Controversialist*, December, 1863), John Veitch was appointed, in succession to him, professor of logic, metaphysic, and rhetoric; and on the resignation of Dr. Robert Buchanan, he was translated as his successor to the professorship which he now occupies—that of logic and rhetoric in the University of Glasgow. He has contributed a few philosophical papers to the *North British Review*, and his inaugural discourse has been published. He is known to be a learned, laborious, scholarly gentleman, whose students respect and love him. If he has not the massive intellectuality of his master, he has caught much of his spirit of thoroughness, as well as, perhaps, a considerable share of his devotion to thinking within, rather than writing out, what he has thought. His power of search and of research is indefatigable, and his mind is fastidiously circumspect, almost to making investigation an excuse for abstinence from exposition. In other words, he delights in mere thought more than in the reproduction of thought, and hence has done, as his friends, think all too little for behoof of that philosophy which he loves and cultivates.

This memoir of Sir William Hamilton has been anxiously looked for long years ago; for Hamilton died thirteen years since, and among the other services to metaphysics expected of Prof. Veitch was a defence of the metaphysics of natural realism against sensational-

ism and positivism on the one hand, and idealism on the other. We have now, it will be seen, got the memoir—a good piece of good work well done; although on the whole it is a great deal more a biography of the man and the scholar than of the philosopher—a narrative of the incidents and studies of his life rather than of the course of thought, speculation, and philosophic progress of the Scottish Aristotle.

It may be conceded that a biographer has the right to fix and pursue his own purpose, and it was quite competent therefore to Professor Veitch to determine that it would be no part of his design “to expound his (Sir W. Hamilton’s) philosophy, far less to attempt a critical estimate of it;” but as Sir William Hamilton’s chief interest to the world is as a philosopher—an opener up of new views on mind and its operations, on man and his functions as a thinker—the just expectation of the public was that he would be exhibited in his really important character, and that we should have his place as a thinker noted, if not fixed. Especially was this desirable—ought we not to say to be expected? when the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton had become a mighty question among thinkers, and in the presence of the recent publications of Dr. James Hutchison Stirling, J. S. Mill, T. Collyns Simon, Dr. McCosh, &c., in which his philosophy—the philosophy of which, perhaps, no living man knows so much as Professor Veitch—has been so seriously impugned. While acknowledging the author’s right to choose his own field and work, and while commending the interest, value, excellence, and beautiful purity of the style in which it is composed, we look upon it as somewhat strange that the biography of a man known only as a thinker should have his life written by a metaphysician with so little reference to the one grand distinction of its hero.

The analysis of thought and of all that thought implies; the examination, not only of the processes, forms, and laws of the thinking intellect, but also of the conditions antecedent to logical reflection, and of the trustworthiness of the results of formal thinking; the investigation of the primary requisites to successful reasoning, and of the nature of the being who possesses the capacity of inferential or of absolute ratiocination, are usually considered as the true duties of a metaphysician. But, really, all thought, and therefore all knowledge, inasmuch as that it shall be thought is implied in its being knowledge (though the converse by no means holds that it is knowledge because it has been thought), is metaphysical. So soon as it passes into consciousness it has gone out of the realm of physics, and has entered into a new field of observation, and is *metaphysical*. As thought, knowledge cannot possibly be physical; for thought is physics, that is the simple experience of that which lies without, transfigured and translated into conscious experience as a matter of personal interest in the human soul. It is excursive from physics, incursive in metaphysics, and discursive in logic. Of experience we are first recipient, then percipient, but in science

and in metaphysics the mind is concipient. It unifies that it may comprehend. Disdain metaphysics as we may, we cannot escape them, therefore, perhaps, we had better try to explain them.

Kant, with his keen, clear, observant, analytic intellect, saw that it was possible to improve at once the logic of metaphysics and the metaphysic of logic—by criticising the forms of the discursive faculty, and gathering into a system the laws which regulate the procedure of the mind in thinking. With the subtlety and acuteness of a psychological anatomist, he reinvestigated the Aristotelian and scholastic system of logic in the light of an induction, which confronted every dogma of the schools with the fact of which it claimed to be the representative and took note of the differences and deficiencies which became apparent in the course of this reflective examination. Fichte, while consenting to criticism as an element preparatory to any possible metaphysic, cared less for the revelations attainable by it in the region which lay *within* the intellectual consciousness than for the implications whereby it was seen to be knit to regions *beyond* consciousness, but effective upon and affecting the moral nature of humanity; and hence he chiefly aimed at an ethical analysis of the spirit of man. Hegel sought the method of thought not as a logic only, or as an ethic merely, but as an encyclopædic, a supreme all-involving, all-evolving unity, explanatory alike of nature, man, and deity, and forming at once a theology, a teleology, an ethic and a logic; logic being the root of his system and his science, and all knowledge being but branches of the tree which sprang from that one sole root.

Sir William Hamilton looked at the matter from a point of view somewhat different. He did not encircle all life with logic like Hegel, and bind it in inexorable fetters; least of all did he circumscribe by formal thought the mighty formative Essence and Origin of being. Nor did he, like Fichte, transcend consciousness, and surround himself and his race with a supra-conscious Absolute—in which Schelling and Cousin coincided with Fichte—but he strictly limited knowledge to consciousness so far as regarded man knowing and thinking. To him that which could not and did not impress the consciousness of man was the inconceivable to man, and therefore the unknowable. Hence his offence at the doctrine of Ferrier, which interwove with every possibility of thought, not only the thinking ego, man, or deity, but also the thought of non-ego, on which man or deity reflected. Hamilton, like Kant, held that man is twofoldly endowed with reason and faith, that reason wrought out the formal results of thought into an ultimate dichotomy of which faith accepted the one extreme—both being simultaneously unbelievable. He was essentially Kantian in his primary views, in the form of his philosophy, though neither Aristotle nor Kant could really control the splendid ratiocinative force and clearness of his own strong and pellucid intellect.

Sir William Hamilton's intellect was essentially *controversial*. He could never be contented with looking at or seeing only one

side of any question—with one single exception perhaps, viz., “The theory of the quantification of the predicate.” His mind evolved objections and his philosophy was constructed—or we should rather say conceived—as the necessary, as he conceived it, reply to the posing difficulties which arose within the intellect on any topic. The principle of contradiction was so strong in him that he erected the principle of non-contradiction into the chief criterion of truth, as conditioning every accepted and acceptable result of thinking. The conceivable is the not-impossible; the believable is the non-contradictable. It is, perhaps, a peculiarity of the controversial mind, that it inclines men, instead of drawing arguments into a stereoscopical unity, to keep the views asunder in intensified dissimilarity, and to induce in an unguarded mind a dogmatic contradictiveness. In some instances Sir William Hamilton seems to have given way rather too much to this controversial vehemency of unocular vision. His idea of the impossibility of having a logic based otherwise than on the principle of non-contradiction was perhaps carried too far; as, indeed, any criticism of his philosophy would lead us now were we to venture upon it.

The work in which the “Life of Sir William Hamilton” is given, with fulness and effectiveness as a life, is replete with a healthy interest and a vigorously stimulant power over the sympathies and affections, and cannot be perused without benefit and gratification. As we have already in our pages given an outline of the external circumstances of his life, and an epitome of his opinions, we do not intend to give any general abstract of the contents of the work. We intend rather to exhibit some of the peculiarities of Sir William Hamilton as a student, and to supply some notices of his unfinished undertakings, after which we shall sum up our estimate of the biography and the biographer. In the meanwhile, however, that we may put the reader in harmony with our aim in this arrangement we shall quote from this genuinely and honestly written work, an able passage containing the reminiscences of Thomas Carlyle, concerning the successor of Finlayson and Bruce, and the predecessor of A. C. Fraser.

Mr. Carlyle writes, in a communicated memorandum:—

“Well onward in my student life in Edinburgh—I think it may have been in 1819 or 1820—I used to pass most mornings on my way college-ward by the east side of St. Andrew Square, and a certain alley or short cut thereabouts called Gabriel’s Road, which led out to the very end of Prince’s Street, directly opposite the North Bridge—close by the place which afterwards became famous as Ambrose’s Tavern. Both Gabriel and Ambrose I find are now abolished, and the locality not recognisable; but doubtless many remember it for one reason or another, as I do for the following.

“Somewhere in Gabriel’s Road there looked out on me from the Prince’s Street or St. David Street side, * a back window on the ground-floor of a

* There is an inaccuracy here respecting the locality of the house. At this period Sir William was living in Howe Street.

handsome enough house; window which had no curtains; and visible on the sill of it were a quantity of books lying about, gilt quartos and conspicuous volumes, several of them; evidently the sitting-room and working-room of a studious man, whose lot, in this safe seclusion, I viewed with a certain loyal respect. 'Has a fine silent neighbourhood,' thought I, 'a fine north light, and wishes to save it all.' Inhabitant within I never noticed by any other symptom; but from my comrades soon learned whose house and place of study this was.

"The name of Sir Wm. Hamilton I had before heard; but this was the first time he appeared definitely before my memory or imagination; in which his place was permanent henceforth. A man of good birth, I was told, though of small fortune, who had deep faculties and an insatiable appetite for wise knowledge; was titularly an advocate here, but had no practice, nor sought any; had gathered his modest means thriftily together, and sat down here with his mother and sister (cousin, I believe, it really was), and his ample store of books; frankly renouncing all lower ambitions, and indeed all ambitions together, except what I well recognised to be the highest and one real ambition in this dark ambiguous world. A man honourable to me, a man lovingly enviable; to whom, in silence, I heartily bade God-speed. It was also an interesting circumstance which did not fail of mention that his ancestor, Hamilton of Preston, was leader of the Cameronians at Bothwell Brig, and had stood by the covenant and cause of Scotland in that old time and form. 'His baronetcy, if carried forward on those principles, may well enough be poor,' thought I; 'and beautifully well may it issue, in such a Hamilton as this one aims to be, still piously bearing aloft, on the new terms, *his* God's banner intrepidly against the world and the devil.'

"It was years after this, perhaps four or five, before I had the honour of any personal acquaintance with Sir William, his figure on the street had become familiar, but I forget, too, when this was pointed out to me, and cannot recollect when I first came to speak with him, which must have been by accident and his own voluntary favour, on some slight occasion, probably at the Advocates' Library, which was my principal or almost sole literary resource (lasting thanks to it, alone of Scottish institutions!) in those obstructed, neglectful, and grimly forbidding years. Perhaps it was in 1824 or 1825. I recollect well the bright, affable manners of Sir William, radiant with frank kindness, honest humanity, and intelligence ready to help; and how completely prepossessing they were! A fine firm figure, of middle height, one of the finest cheerfully-serious human faces, of square, solid, and yet rather aquiline type; a little marked with small-pox,—marked, not deformed, but rather the reverse* (like a rock, rough hewn, not spoiled by polishing); and a pair of the beautifullest kindly beaming hazel eyes, well open, and every now and then with a lambency of smiling fire in them, which I always remember as if with trust and gratitude. Our conversation did not amount to much in those times, mainly about German books, philosophies, and persons, it is like; and my usual place of abode was in the country then. Letter to him, or from, I do not recollect there ever was any; though there might well enough have been had either of us been prone that way.

* This impression is not correct. Sir William's face had no marks of small-pox.

"In the end of 1826 I came to live in Edinburgh, under circumstances new and ever memorable to me; from then till the spring of 1828—and still more, once again in 1832-33, when I had brought my little household to Edinburgh for the winter—must have been the chief times of personal intercourse between us. I recollect hearing much more of him in 1826 and onward than formerly; to what depths he had gone in study and philosophy; of his simple, independent, meditative habits, ruggedly athletic modes of exercise, fondness for his big dog, &c., &c.; everybody seemed to speak of him with favour, those of his immediate acquaintance uniformly with affectionate respect.

"I did not witness, much less share in, any of his swimming or other athletic prowesses. I have once or twice been on long walks with him in the Edinburgh environs, oftenest with some other companion, or perhaps even two, whom he had found vigorous and worthy; pleasant walks, and abundantly enlivened with speech from Sir William. He was willing to talk of any humanly interesting subject; and threw out sound observations upon any topic started; if left to his own choice, he circled and gravitated naturally into subjects that were his own, and were habitually occupying him;—of which I can still remember animal magnetism and the German revival of it, not yet known of in England, was one that frequently turned up. Mesmer and his four academicians, he assured us, had *not* been the *finale* of that matter; that it was a matter tending into realities far deeper and more intricate than had been supposed—of which, for the rest, he did not seem to augur much good, but rather folly and mischief. Craniology, too, he had been examining, but freely allowed us to reckon that an extremely ignorant story. On German bibliography and authors, especially of the learned kind—Erasmus, Ruhnken, Ulrich von Hutten—he could descant copiously, and liked to be inquired of. On Kant, Reid, and the metaphysicians, German and other, though there was such abundance to have said, he did not often speak; but politely abstained rather, when not expressly called on.

"He was finely social and human in these walks or interviews. Honesty, frankness, friendly veracity, courageous trust in humanity and in you, were charmingly visible. His talk was forcible, copious, discursive, careless rather than otherwise; and, on abstruse topics, I observed, was apt to become embroiled and ravelly, much less perspicuous and elucidative than with a little deliberation he could have made it. 'The fact is,' he would often say; and then plunging into new circuitous depths and distinctions, again on a new ground. 'The fact is,' and still again,—till what the essential 'fact' might be was not a little obscure to you. He evidently had not been engaged in *speaking* these things, but only in thinking them for his own behoof, not yours. By lucid questioning you could get lucidity from him on any topic. Nowhere did he give you the least notion of his not understanding the thing himself; but it lay like an unwinnowed threshing-floor, the corn grains, the natural chaff, and somewhat even of the straw still unseparated there. This sometimes would befall, not only when the meaning itself was delicate or abstruse, but also if several were listening; and he doubted whether they could understand. On solid realistic he was abundantly luminous; promptitude, solid sense, free-flowing intelligibility, always the characteristics. The tones of his voice were themselves attractive, physiognomic of the man; a strong, carelessly melodious tenor voice, the sound of it betokening seriousness and cheerfulness; occasionally

something of slightly remonstrative was in the under tones, indicating well in the background possibilities of virtuous wrath and fire; seldom anything of laughter, of levity never anything; thoroughly a serious, cheerful, sincere, and kindly voice, with looks corresponding. In dialogue, face to face with one he trusted, his speech, both voice and words, was still more engaging; lucid, free, persuasive, with a bell-like harmony, and from time to time, in the bright eyes, a beaming smile, which was the crown and seal of all to you.

"In the winter of 1832-33, Captain Hamilton, Sir William's brother, was likewise resident in Edinburgh; a pleasant, very courteous, and intelligently talking man, enduring, in a cheery military humour, his old Peninsular hurts, and printing his Peninsular and other books. At his house I have been, of literary parties—one, at least, which I still remember in an indistinct but an agreeable way. Of a similar party at Sir William's I have a still brighter recollection, and of his fine nobly simple ways there; especially of one little radiancy (his look and his smile the now memorable part of it) privately addressed to myself on the mode of supping I had selected; supper of one excellent and excellently boiled potato, of fair size, with salt for seasoning,—at an epoch when excellent potatoes yet were. This evening was altogether pleasant, the talk lively and amusing; the captain, I remember, quizzed me, and obliquely his brother, in a gay, good-humoured tone, on Goethe's 'Last Will:' the other Edinburgh figures I have entirely forgotten, except a Mr. * * *, newspaper editor, author of some book on the *Highlands*, whom I otherwise knew by sight and rumour (called at that time 'Captain Cloud' from his occasionally fabulous turn), and who died not long after.

"I think, though he stood so high in my esteem as a man of intellect and knowledge, I had yet read nothing by Sir William, nor indeed did I ever read anything considerable of what has sent his name over the world;—having years before, for good reasons of my own, renounced all metaphysical study or inquiry, and ceased altogether (as a master phrases it) to 'think about thinking.' One evening I recollect listening to a paper on *Phrenology*, read by him in the Royal Society; in deliberate examination and repudiation of that self-styled science. The meeting was very much larger than usual; and sat in the deepest silence and attention, and, as it gradually appeared, approval and assent. My own private assent, I know was complete; I only wished the subject had been more important or more dubious to me. The argument, grounded on cerebral anatomy (osteology), philosophy, and human sense, I remember, went on in the true style of *vires acquirit*; and the crowning finish of it was this: 'Here are two skulls' (or rather, here *were*, for the experiment was but reported to us), 'two noteworthy skulls; let us carefully make trial and comparison of them. One is the skull of a Malay robber and cut-throat, who ended by murdering his mistress and getting hanged; skull sent me by so-and-so' (some principal official at Penang); 'the other is George Buchanan's skull, preserved in the university here. One is presumably a very bad specimen of a nation reckoned morally and intellectually bad; the other a very good, of a nation which surely reckons itself good. One is probably among the best of mankind, the other among the worst. Let us take callipers, and measure them bump after bump. Bump of benevolence is so-and-so, bump of ideality,—and in result, adding all, and balancing all, your callipers declare the Malay to transcend in goodness the Buchanan, by such and such

a cipher of inches. A better man, in intellect and heart, that Malay, if there be truth in arithmetic and these callipers of yours!' Which latter implement, it seemed to me, was formally closed and done for. I said to Sir William next time we met, 'Were I in your place I would decline to say another word on that subject, Malay cut-throat *versus* Buchanan; explain me that; till then I say nothing.'

"In April, 1833, we left Edinburgh; next year went to London; and I think Sir William and I never met again. For the next thirty and odd years I rarely came to Edinburgh, and then only in transit, and usually at a season when all my friends (of whom he surely was the chief there) were out of town. From time to time there passed little mementos between us; sometimes accidental, unintentional, and of a mute nature, which to me were very precious, from a fellow-soldier whom I took to be on the same side with me, and always well assured of my regard as I was of his. In Fife once or twice I heard with regret that his health was failing; once that he *had been* lately within reach of where I now was, but had left and was gone. We were to meet in this world no more."

We extract the following from a characteristic letter of Carlyle's, addressed to Sir William from Chelsea, under date 4th July, 1834:—"My dear Sir,—The hope of ever seeing you at Craigenputtock has now vanished into the infinite limbo. We have broken up our old settlement, and, after tumult enough, formed a new one here, under the most opposite conditions. From the ever-silent whinstones of Nithsdale to the mud-rattling pavements of Piccadilly there is but a step. I feel it the strangest transition; but one uses himself to all.

"Our upholsterers, with all their rubbish and clippings, are at length handsomely swept out of doors. I have got my little book-press set up, my table fixed firm in its place, and sit here awaiting what time and I, in our questionable wrestle, shall make out between us. The house pleases us much; it is in the remnant of genuine *old* Dutch-looking Chelsea; looks out mainly into trees. We might see at half a mile's distance Bolingbroke's Battersea; could shoot a gun into Smollett's old house (at this very time getting pulled down), where he wrote 'Count Fathom,' and was wont every Saturday to dine a company of hungry authors, and then set them fighting together. Don Saltero's coffee-house still looks as brisk as in Steele's time; Nell Gwynne's boudoir, still bearing her name, has become a gin-temple, not inappropriately; in fine, Erasmus lodged with More (they say) in a spot not five hundred yards from this. We are encompassed with a cloud of witnesses, good, bad, indifferent.

"Of London itself I must not begin to speak. I wish you would come and look at it with me. There is a spare bed here, ample room and verge enough; and, for welcome, I wish you would understand that to be for you infallible at all times.

"Literature seems dying of thin diet and flatulence, but it is not quite so near dead as I had calculated. In all human things there is the strangest vitality. Who knows how long even bookselling may last? Even, too, among these mad maelströms swims some little casket that *will* not sink. God mend it!

"Mrs. * * * often speaks of you, but seems to have no recent news. She has got much deeper into the vortex than when I saw her last; dines with chancellors; seems to sit berattled all day with the sound of door-knockers and carriage wheels, and the melody of drawing-room common-

place, perennial as that of the spheres; for the rest, a most loveable woman, to whom I could wish a better element.

"There is some uncertain talk here about founding a new periodical, on another than the bibliopolic principle, with intent to show Liberalism under a better than its present rather sooty and gin-shop aspect. I was asked whether your co-operation might be possible. I answered, Possible. If it go on, you will let me write to you farther about it.

"Meanwhile, I am actually going to write a book, and perhaps publish a booklet already written: the former is my enterprise till perhaps spring next. Wish me well through it."

The Topic.

UGHT "OFFICIATING CLERGYMEN," OF WHATEVER DENOMINATION, TO TAKE THE "OATH OF ALLEGIANCE?"

AFFIRMATIVE.

ALTHOUGH it is not the immediate duty of clergymen to interfere with political questions, the pulpit has now-a-days assumed a right to enter into such subjects. By a large number of people, persons in Holy Orders are still looked up to as guides and examples. They are supposed to get as near as it is possible for human nature to get, to purity of thought and living. How many of them fail is not the point. Thus being considered as different in certain respects from other men, their opinions and deeds are set up as standards to be copied and followed. The influence which clergymen must then have over a tangible number of their congregations is a fact of great weight and interest in our social and political life. Numbers in our day bear down intelligence. We are not all forced to think, and if we can obtain the opinions of any person whom we respect, and who will express them, we take them as our own, and act thereon as strongly as if we had gained them by conviction. Clergy-

men thus left unfettered to preach treason and sedition as they choose, bound by no pledge to their sovereign, limited by no oaths of allegiance, might, and can do an immense deal of mischief among their flocks; mischief upon which the law would have an insufficient hold, and which would not be easily counteracted.—C. F. A. S.

I guess, as the Yankees are said to say, though I do not calculate, that this question has had its origin in the stir about the Irish Church Bill, and what are likely to be the consequences of its passing into law. It is well known that the Catholic priesthood own allegiance to a foreign monarch—a temporal ruler, and yet spiritually the lord of all the earth—the embodied promise of Christ,—“Lo, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world.” Ought this to be, and ought we to give the right of teaching, and of enforcing with the pains and penalties of religion, to a class of men who not only owe such an allegiance to a foreign potentate, but are under no obligation to conform to, observe, or obey, the behests of

the sovereignty of this land. Such seems to us to be the meaning of this topic, and I am gratified that the topic has been so promptly and suggestively put before us. Can we hand over the government of the people of Ireland to priests—

“Swearing allegiance, and the love of soul,
To stranger blood, to foreign
royalty”?

Or must we take means, by insisting on an oath of allegiance as a condition of permitted teaching, to arrest “this inundation of mistempered humour”? I think, as a measure of rightful policy, it should be insisted upon that every person assuming priestly functions, should give guarantee of his subjection to the laws of this realm by subscribing “the oath of allegiance.”—K. J.

The state has an irrefragable claim to the allegiance of all its subjects. In the case of most persons this is held to be implied; but in the case of those who are to assume such important functions as those implied in becoming the accredited teachers of a people the security of the state ought to be provided for by some definite demand, and some actual undertaking on the part of the individual, who claims the protection of the law in the administration of his office, to give obedience to the law. This is eminently requisite now, when the Government has been made, as far as possible, co-ordinate with the people. For allegiance now means, in reality, conformity with the will of the people as incorporated in law. Those who are to exercise the right to teach, and who are to occupy the position of pastors, hold a power so great that it seems essential that they should be especially brought to acknowledge, by promise of assent and consent, to submit to and to act in accordance with the law within the limits of the constitution. I

would reserve and preserve all their rights as citizens, but I would claim from them an express declaration that they regarded themselves as true members of our commonwealth, and withheld their civil allegiance from any other power.—B. P.

“Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers” is, as I understand it, one of the indisputable directions given as a duty in the religious life. I infer thence that a religious teacher, as an example and a power, ought to show himself to be subject to the higher powers, and to put it out of doubt that he is so. Hence I conclude that every officiating clergyman, of whatever denomination he may be, ought to take the oath of allegiance as a preliminary to his holding any teaching office whatever. Only thus, as it seems to us, can he justly claim freedom of teaching. To the state that guarantees him the freedom of teaching he gives the assurance that he shall not employ that freedom abusively. The state has a right to some safeguard from the preaching of insurrection, rebellion, and revolt, under the guise or disguise of Christian preaching. I think this a very important practical question; but while I am an advocate for the freedom and independence of the whole Church of Christ, I would regard it as perfectly right to secure from the clerical faculty a moral responsibility to submit to and obey the constitutional authorities as represented by and summed up in the Crown.—E. E. C.

It has been decided now to make all the religious bodies in Ireland equal, except in one point, that is, that the clergy of every denomination, except the Roman Catholic priesthood, are under, and owe express allegiance to, the Crown and country; but the priests owe theirs to the Pope. This ought not to be.—L. N.

NEGATIVE.

My acquaintance with ecclesiastical affairs, arising from the fact that I have heretofore made them one of my chief studies, emboldens me to say that the present topic is raised altogether on wrong premises. The oath of allegiance required by the Act 21 and 22 Vict., c. 48, s. 1 (26 July, 1858), would never have been so required, had there not been a church connected with the State, the clergymen of such church being looked upon as servants of the State. Being an advocate for the separation of Church and State, I take the negative side of this topic, because I think that ministers of the gospel ought not, in virtue of that position, to swear allegiance to any earthly sovereign; their office is a divine one, and therefore no king or queen has any right, in a New Testament point of view, to claim the headship over them. But I object, in a legal sense, to the use of the term "clergymen," as applying, strictly, to other than those in the Established Church. A dissenting "clergyman" is altogether a mistaken expression, and so is a Roman Catholic "clergyman;" the former is usually called "minister," and the latter "priest." The word "benefice" has legal application particularly to "ecclesiastical livings" belonging to the Establishment. If Church and State be separated, the subject of this topic could never apply, and the real bearing of it to the present state of things I am at a loss to understand. I look forward, however, to the pleasure of being enlightened by those who may write on the affirmative side.—R. D. ROBERT.

State control over the Church can-

not in the present day be asserted over the pastors of any congregation of Dissenters. Liberty has been purchased at a price too high for Non-conformists to enter voluntarily into State bonds. "My kingdom is not of this world," and therefore it cannot be subjected by its clergy to the kingdoms of this world. The allegiance of the Church is due to Christ alone. Why should the Christian teachers of the Church be made slaves to the State? and who should resist the tyranny of States over the consciences of men, if it be not the followers of Jesus? It is surely a preposterous question this to put. Can any sane person suppose that any "act of conformity" is possible in Victoria's reign? The whole tendency of the movements of the world is to separate Church and State, and we cannot put back the dial now, and get into the Middle Ages again; besides, men have lost their faith in oaths. They everywhere recognise rights and duties, and the clergy could scarcely preach freely from the command of Christ, "Swear not at all," if each was sworn to submit to all that the State chose to impose. Against conviction, and against the necessities of the time, "the strongest oaths are straw;" and hence we say, do not attempt to impose on the clergy any such fettering impediment.—T. S.

Not at all. The clergy must retain the liberty wherewith Christ maketh His people free. Enslave the priesthood, and you will shortly be able to fetter the people. This is the age of unloosing, not of tightening bondage. We want fewer, not more subscriptions; no more oaths, but much more honesty.—J. C.

Toiling Upward.

DOUGLAS WILLIAM JERROLD,

NOVELIST, DRAMATIST, ESSAYIST, WIT, AND JOURNALIST.

(Continued from page 55.)

A GREAT part of these splendid and mirth-provoking dramas were composed amid the sad pressures and pinching pains of poverty, and the overstretched racking of the toiling brain. He sub-edited the *Ballot*, under the late Mr. Wakley; filled the *New Monthly* with amusing papers; pierced by his genius, Radical as he was, into a leading place in *Blackwood*; and established *Punch* in London—an experimental forerunner of the Fleet Street jester, who is now becoming soberer by age. But evil days had fallen upon him; “he strove against it manfully, and hoped for better times, but ruin came at last;” and he was forced to enter France, in 1855, as a fugitive from creditors. Here he pluckily worked off his burdens by the production, in one year, or little more, of four plays; six of those sketches which, under the title of “Men of Character,” were republished from *Blackwood’s Magazine*; several Shaksperian papers, and a large number of minor contributions to almost all the serials of the day. Redeemed from present difficulties by this tremendous stroke of industry—which, however, broke his health, and ever after tortured his days with sciatica and neuralgia,—he returned from Paris, and, in conjunction with his brother-in-law, W. J. Hammond, became lessee of the Strand Theatre. During his managerial co-partnery he composed four new pieces, the best of which is “The Painter of Ghent,” in which the author personated Roderick, but with so little success that he did not again place himself on the stage—except during the performance of “Every Man in his Humour,” for the purchase of Shakspeare’s house, in 1847. When Charles Dickens performed Bobadil and Jerrold Stephen in the fine masterpiece of rare Ben Jonson’s, Jerrold performed his part with a delicacy and kindredness of humour which elicited unbounded admiration. The speculation in the Strand failing, he “let go the painter,” as the sailors say, and republished, in 1838, a selection from his contributions from periodicals—the illustrations to which were the workmanship of the worthily renowned W. M. Thackeray, who at that time used a graver tool than he afterwards did, and etched for fame. These volumes have been translated into German and Russ. In 1839 he issued a biting squib, “The Handbook of Swindling;” and in 1840

took off "The Heads of the People," in a serial of which he was editor, with Thackeray, R. H. Home, Peake, Gore, Howitt, Lauran, Blanchard, &c., for contributors, and Henry Meadows as illustrator. In the same year he visited the Rhine, and the next he spent in Boulogne, occupying the house in which Mrs. Jordan, the actress, and morganatic wife of William IV.

"A changeful thing, half gloom, half light,
Child's heart and woman's form,"

had lived and died in wretchedness, poverty, and neglect. Here, within sight by telescope of Shakspeare's Cliff, he roamed by the loud-resounding sea—"the best thing" (he said) "between France and England," and startled the French with the hardy assertion that the word "fox" was unknown in the English language, adding, "We have a few duties, to be sure, but with Englishmen *duties* are *pleasures*." In Boulogne, besides writing for the magazines and contributing to the *Morning Herald*, he wrote "The White Milliner"—unsuccessful; "The Prisoner of War," and "The Bubbles of the Day," in which he speaks of a man whose "thoughts are like the omnibuses,—there's hardly one of them that doesn't go to the Bank;" of "wise philanthropists who, in a time of famine, would vote for nothing but a supply of toothpicks;" says, "The great art of life is to pass off our ignorance with such confident grace that people shall take the counterfeit for the real thing;" and explains the philosophy of bazaars and fancy fairs as simply this,— "to ask six times the worth of an article, and never give change." In it he describes "a smile that lies upon the cheek like moonlight on a statue."

On 17th July, 1841, *Punch* was started. Jerrold was in Boulogne, but without him it could not get on. His first contribution, "On the Bedchamber Plot," appeared in No. 2. Among the earlier contributors to that periodical were Mark Lemon, *now* its editor; Stirling Coyne and Tom Taylor, dramatists; Henry Mayhew, Jerrold's son-in-law, its projector; and his brother, Horace Mayhew; Gilbert à Becket, Percival Leigh, Maginn, Hood, Thackeray, Tennyson, and the present Archbishop Trench. The sledge-hammer hitting, the merry-wise and richly abundant satire of Jerrold ripened *Punch* at once, and it became the Gog of comic periodicals, for whom no Magog has even yet been found. His articles, signed Q., were curious, quaint, queer, quotable, quirky, and quizzical. In the autumn of 1841, rheumatism in the eyes seized him, and for more than two months he was blind; the death of a niece in Boulogne, too, grieved him inexpressibly. But the *press* and the *theatre* are tyrants that wait on no one's ailments; he must toil on or be thrust aside; and though wife, children, and home are poetry to the sustaining arm and the teeming brain, they are rack and torture to an ailing body and an out-worked mind. Jerrold accepted his fate.

"Curved is the line of beauty,
 Straight is the path of duty:
 Walk by the last, and thou shalt see
 The other ever following thee."

So *Punch*, the *Morning Herald*, and the stage had their quota of copy, even in those days when the light of life burned dim. The "Q." papers were continued, and "Punch's Letters to his Son," a dry, ironical, knowing, yet tender set of papers, full of happy metaphor and jocose story,—as were also the "Jenkin Papers," the "Pick-sniffery Papers"—severe squibs, full, ay, bushel-full, of jokes and all provocatives to mirth and thought. While talking of *Punch*, we may as well mention among his contributions to its pages the tender moralizings, the graceful imagery, the fine taste, the thoughtful philanthropy and deep-piercing sarcasm of "*The Story of a Feather*;" the sparkling, graphic, dramatic, social life of England and revelations of "Mrs. Caudle's Curtain Lectures;" the scornful, indignant, tearful, though laughing "Complete Letter-Writer." Besides these, "Mrs. Bib's Baby," "The Female Robinson Crusoe," "Our Honeymoon," "The Fireside Saints," &c., &c., indicate the width, the range, the kindly yet stern method of the wit of Douglas Jerrold. In the thirty-four volumes to which he contributed the very pith of the work is his!

Charles Dickens calls "*The Story of a Feather*" a "wise and beautiful book." "No mere wit," says John Forster (of Goldsmith and of Commonwealth fame), "could have written it any more than he could have written the funeral service." The drollery of Caudle, read beside tea and toast, is unequivocal; its hits are exquisite, and its marking off, by tone and style, the difference between sulks and displeasure is inimitable. The whole, too, is so mazy and vagrant,—here story, there cajolery; now a titter of playful allusion or a storm of hissing reproach, then an outburst of hysterical passion, a fit of turtle-dove-ry, or the croaking of a raven; here irony, there moralizing; now a Jack-a'-lantern flash of humour, and then a whole heap of fresh, impulsively out-heaved bitterness—a bitterness like that of quinine, disagreeable but health-giving. Roses grow on briars, so that you see beauty and sharpness are not incompatible. Don't we require smack, flavour, and tone as well as body in wine? Pepper, salt, mustard, and pickles add a relish even to venison and turtle; even *Punch* is improved by (Mark!) lemon-juice, and salad is eaten with vinegar; so wit is the flavour of thought—a pungent essence, adding a precious daintiness, mordancy, and zest to the ordinary viands of discourse. Gall removes musty fables from the palimpsest, and brings out old truths glowingly. Similar was the use that Jerrold made of wit.

Fame, the parrot, got hold of Jerrold's name, and after a struggle of quarter of a century he found himself possessed of that which (to an author) is a talisman to draw gold from a publisher's pocket—a work as difficult, with reverence for truth be it spoken, as

pulling sharks' teeth—*reputation*! Talent is idle, industry is vain, merit is nonsense, and worth a mere *ostracism*; but, strange enchantment! let reputation breathe upon it, and it becomes—a *choice diamond*!

In 1843 the late Mr. Herbert Ingram entrusted Jerrold with the origination, organization, and editorship of the *Illuminated Magazine*, an attempt to work out the idea of uniting authorcraft and artistcraft of first-rate order in mutually illustrative co-operation. It was for a time a great success. In it Jerrold began that cosy "Acre of Paradise," created by the spirit of Fable, in an idle, extravagant mood, when Eden and the Mint were lying contiguously, and Fancy put this little bit of Eden into the Mint, and the rich coin has now become current. Wherever there is a man hardy enough in this purse-wearing world to spend an hour where the ringing of shillings is unheard or unheeded, let him hie to the hostelry of "As you Like," and meet the "Hermit of Bellyfulle" in "Clovernook." In this magazine also appeared "The Order of Poverty," "The Folly of the Sword," &c.; it existed nearly two years, and died at last of—kindly-heartedness!

Rheumatism, overwork, and disappointment sent him during the summer of 1844 to Malvern, on whose breezy slopes he sought health, vigour, and repose. The *Daily News*, started in 1845, gave him employment as leader-writer. In January of that same year Douglas Jerrold's *Shilling Magazine* appeared. "St. Giles's and St. James's," "The Hedgehog Letters," &c., were contributed by the editor; and it gave R. H. Horne, author of "Orion," peace of mind instead of a twelvemonth of struggle and doubt, perhaps disappointment, and probably a thousand vexations of spirit in dismal highways of the battle of life, by the publication in monthly chapters of his novel, "The Dreamer and the Worker."

Punch occupied him still, and at Haymarket his "Time works Wonders," in April, 1845, spread pungent pleasantness among the playgoers by humour of the freshest, truest, and most vigorous kind; it sparkles like the bayonets of a regiment of British soldiers, and like them abounds in *sharp points*. From first to last it is full of condensed brilliancy—as a diamond is only intensified coal. Its closing lesson is a wise one which we all need, viz., "However bitter the draught may be, however heavy the load, let's swallow it with patience, let's bear it with a smile—hopeful in the belief that, however dark the present, 'time works wonders.'"

On 7th May, when presiding at a *conversations* of the Birmingham Polytechnic Institute, he was overwhelmed with an ovation. It was his first appearance in public as a speaker. The chairman expressed a hope that he would favour that meeting extemporarily with a new week's *Punch*, and he, the maker of books, who could speak with lightning force and brilliancy in the quiet of his study, stood paralyzed, unnerved, and mortified—amid acclamations and a crowd. Like Adam Smith, Edmund Burke, Jeffrey, Lockhart, and Disraeli, he failed in his first attempt at public speaking.

In the summer of 1846 "the Radical literature of England" received a powerful auxiliary in the establishment of *Douglas Jerrold's Weekly Newspaper*. Of the proprietary he had about three-fourths; £1,500 were expended on starting. It reached a circulation of 9,000. The editor laboured unremittingly until compelled, by congestion of the brain, to slacken his rate of production, and to relax the strain upon his thoughts. This intermission brought heavy loss. The racy wit, chastened by delicate humour, and full of strong-pulsing moral life, no other brain could produce. The editorial throne he had founded was dynastic, and no regent could be a fitting substitute. His absence was noted, and the sale fell. This fall was aggravated by an absence at Guernsey, where "death had given a runaway knock" at his daughter's (Mrs. Mayhew's) home, and by a sea accident which renewed his own illness; and Rheumatism wrote "To be continued" on his articles. Still he struggled on, going to Paris to chronicle the 1848 revolution for the paper; but a sickness of the heart came over him, and he was obliged to give up his office to Mr. George Hodder. An invincible sadness irked him, vague ideas of death and pain haunted him; he became unfit for regular business, and his name was withdrawn from the paper. He was saddled with a heavy debt for life by this blow.

It is the sad hap of the professional speciality in which Jerrold had attained fame, that mirth must be ground out of the soul though madness and misery hold the mastery. Hood's death-bed was dyed with the blood which burst from his overwrought brain while he sat coining puns into pennyworths of bread for his children.

Hooke and Magrim are other instances of men who daily died for daily bread; so the hypochondriac Jerrold begat mirth in pain, and the "cat's-paw" was produced. It is an ill-set brilliant. The plot is disagreeable, and the application of the moral offensive. It took, but not well; yet there are capital touches in it. Here are six maxims equal to any in Rochefoucault, viz.,—

"Time makes life, and money gilds it."

"Really to enjoy life, one should have no more emotion than an oyster."

"In all the wedding cake, hope is the sweetest of the plums."

"Honest bread is very well, it's the butter that makes the temptation."

"Law is so big that no man with any other stuff in his head has room for it."

"Self-defence is the clearest of all laws; and for this reason, the lawyers didn't make it."

In 1851 he "Retired from Business" at the Haymarket, though "A Heart of Gold" of his was kept locked up in the property chest of Mr. Charles Kean, in revenge for some wicked squabbles about the upholstery of the drama he had set ablaze in *Punch*. In

"Retired from Business" the rival gentilities of the *Bill* and the *Till*, with jocose yet withering irony; the wit dazzles by its brilliancy, and scorches by its corrosiveness. Here are five compressive bits scattered up and down this comedy:—"As bitter-sweet and as plentiful as blackberries,"—such is his description of a country town, where "raw wool doesn't speak to halfpenny balls of worsted, tallow in the cask looks down on sixes in the pound, and pig iron turns up its nose at tenpenny nails;" his sea-compliment to a lady as a "lord high admiral of a woman," or his mention of self-respect—"Why, it's the ballast of the ship! without it, let the craft be what it will, she is but a fine sea-coffin at the best." The moral is solemn, full of grave purpose and serious intent. This is the *text* of which the comedy is the *pretext*,—"Life has its duties ever; none wiser, better, than a manly disregard of false distinctions—made by ignorance, maintained by weakness. Resting from the activity of life, we have yet our daily tasks—the interchange of simple thoughts and gentle doings. When, following these already passed, we rest beneath the shadow of yon distant spire, then, and then only, may it be said of us, 'Retired from Business.'"

Following the example of Dickens, Thackeray, Lever, &c., Jerrold began as a serial in shilling monthly numbers—to please this world of bank paper—"A Man made of Money," his finest, completest, and most characteristic creation. A mystic air of allegory enfolds and enwraps the reader; a composite twilight of reality and fancy reveals, yet hides, the wondrously tragic and mysterious singularity of the life of the hero—a man whose *soul* becomes bank notes, and whose every thought, movement, or feeling lessens the brief sum of the life which with his wife and daughters he enjoys. A strange sense of real unreality startles us in this book.

Towards the close of 1851 he received the offer of the editorship of *Lloyd's London Weekly Newspaper*,—free from business cares and details; free, too, to tell his own views outspokenly and honestly to the world, unhampered in tone or in style. The sum proffered was *one thousand a year*. This he accepted, and the success was astonishing. His politics were a good heart, an honest, clear-seeing intellect; and this had then got the name of *radicalism*,—as indeed it ought, for these are the root of all true political progress, stability, or reformation. He stood "A 1 at Lloyd's." His paper was his delight; he dandled and fondled his thoughts for it. It was his wife's dependence, his children's bread, his own haven of peace, plenty, and pleasure.

On the 21st January, 1853, a comedy, entitled "St. Cupid, or Dorothy's Fortune," written at the request of her Majesty, was performed at Windsor. The author received *no* invitation to attend. He had still to do *one* thing ere the wide circle and the profound depth of his genius were to be fully acknowledged; that "*one thing* was—to die." Dead authors are *so* much more easily managed than live ones; they are *so* much quieter. This play was very successful at Windsor and on the London boards, whereupon

Charles Kean produced "The Heart of Gold." The scenes in the latter comedy are like the milky way, all sparkle, glow, and brilliancy. The wit *doubles* and redoubles like the echoes at the Lurley on the Rhine. A careless housemaid is called by her mistress, "A girl who would break the Bank of England if she put her hand upon it;" and she, after committing a huge breakage, says, "There, I'll wipe my eyes, be a woman, and look as if nothing had happened." "Wishes" are said to be "the easy pleasures of the poor." Misers are spoken of as those who "look in the bowels of the earth for the stars of heaven, and in the circle of a guinea behold the great world." "When the world," it is said, "lies all before a young lone girl, don't I know how it lies!" Any one who has visited London, and topped St. Paul's, may answer for the accuracy of the following interpretation of feeling:—

Maude.—The monument. Up and up, and round and round we went, for all the world like little tiny ants climbing a corkscrew.

Widow.—Well, you got to the top?

Maude.—The topmost top, but that was nothing. No, the top of all is the top of St. Paul's. Oh, when I got there, and when I looked under me and round me, my heart filled of a sudden, and I broke into crying!

Weevil.—Deary me! What about?

Maude.—Oh, it was such a dream by daylight—such a dream, and yet so true! All was so little, and I was still the same. The streets were millions of dolls' houses; and along the streets, little specks moving—moving, sometimes in twos and threes, and then altogether, in one long, black, gliding thread. And then the cattle and the horses! I felt that I could take up the biggest of them, like shrew mice, in my fingers—look at 'em and set 'em down again. And then the smoke! The beautiful smoke! Oh, in millions of silver feathers, it came from the chimneys up and up; and then somehow joined in one large shining sheet; and went floating, floating over houses and church steeples, with hundreds of golden weathercocks glittering, glittering through! And then the river and the ships! The twisting water, shining like glass! And the poles of the ships, as close, and strait, and sharp as rushes in a pond! And then, far off, the hills, the dear green hills; with such a stir below, and they so beautiful and still, as though they never heard and never cared for the noise of London—a noise that, when we listened, hummed from below; hummed for all the world like a hundred bumble-bees, all making honey, and all upon one bush!"—"Heart of Gold," p. 9.

Those who have not seen this may say with *Michaelmas* in the play, "Thank'ee, I've never yet seen St. Paul's; and now I'll save my twopence!"

Wit is an essence so volatile, so electrical, that it can only *once* produce its fine provocation and precious bewitchment. Any reproduction of it is like recalling the memory of the fragrance of a rose, the sting of a nettle, or the purity of a snowflake fresh from heaven. It is like life, and will not endure dissection; like a mathematical point, it defies analysis. This Cynthia of a minute is a mystery! Describe a rainbow intelligibly to a blind-born man;

convince a mere mathematician of the utility of poetry; win over a would-be poet to the belief that any other verses are better than his; get an epicure to bless the soul of a crab apple; dissuade a pretty woman from the use of a looking-glass; and when *all these* have been accomplished, an answer to the query "What is wit?" may be reckoned among the possibilities.

"A thousand differing shapes it bears,
Comely in thousand shapes appears;
Yonder we saw it plain; and here 'tis now
Like spirits in a place we know not how!"

Yet, like the beauty of a summer day, it may be enjoyed, like the light of the stars, it may be perceived, although it is not understood.

Man has been characterized by Byron as "a pendulum between a smile and a tear." There are two provisions in human nature for the relief of an over-absorbed life, and arresting the ordinary syllogistic process of thought—tears and laughter. The former is the discontinuant of long and pressing emotion, the latter the agent by which the overfraught intellect gains surcease and remission. Wit is a lawful exercise of the intellect. It puts a break upon intensity of thinking, and enables it "to take a new reckoning." It makes use chiefly of resemblance and contrast, but in its use of them there is always an unexpected surprise and jerk of thought. It is a singular, sinuous, swift juxtaposition of ideas, the *legerdemain* of the mind. The remoter analogies of ideas are brought, at once and at one bound, into convergency; and we are startled, yet gratified, at the ready dexterity by which the noose is flying across the chasm of incongruity, so as to capture a free thought and unite it to that which has been held in due syllogistic subervience. A gratifying surprise, occasioning the arrest and cessation of consecutive thought by linking together two incongruous ideas, might perhaps form an approach to such a definition of wit as might be logically unobjectionable. But then how far is it from implying the brisk effervescence of laughter which immediately results, and which any one with a perception of wit unmistakably recognises, though no definition has ever been present in his thoughts? Jerrold seriously looked upon wit as a useful and beneficent agency for informing and reforming our social relations. So he says, "Take a sulkily fellow with a brow ever wrinkled at the laughing hours, let them laugh never so melodiously; who looks with a death's-head at the pleasant fruits of the earth heaped upon his table; who leaves his house for business as an ogre leaves his cave for food; who returns home toyless and grim to his silent wife and creeping children; take such a man, and, if possible, teach him to joke. 'Twould be like turning a mandrill into Apollo." "A hearty jest kills an ugly face." Goethe and Carlyle both regard laughter as a sign of character, and wit as a lawful exercise of thought.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

838. I want a copy of Young's "Night Thoughts;" could any one tell me the best edition, publisher, and price?—D. H. F.

839. Be so kind as to inform me in what subjects one must pass in order to become a Certificated Master, and whether the different classes of certificates depend upon the number of subjects taken up, or the manner in which one passes one uniform standard of examination; also where the examinations are conducted.—J. H. W.

840. In the course of my reading I lately met with the following remark:—"The celebrated Donald Cargill." Who was Donald Cargill? and what was he celebrated for, or as?—S. S.

841. A brief sketch of the "History of Geology" would be a favour.—HORACE BARRINGTON.

842. Under what circumstances did Hugh Miller commit suicide, and when?—HORACE BARRINGTON.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

835. "A Memoir of the Rev. H. F. Cary, M.A.," was published by his son, Rev. H. Cary, in 1847. Cary was born in Birmingham, 1772. In 1787 he issued "An Irregular Ode" to General Elliott, and a small collection of "Sonnets and Odes" in 1788. In 1790 he entered Christ Church, Oxford, as a commoner. While there he not only studied Latin and Greek, but French, Italian, and English literature. He took his M.A. degree in 1796, and

in the same year was presented by the Marquis of Anglesea to the vicarage of Abbot's Bromley, Staffordshire, a living worth £187 per annum with a residence; and to this time too belongs the issue of his "Ode to General Kosciuszko." In 1806 his translation of Dante's "Inferno," which had engaged the leisure and labour of upwards of eight years, appeared, but met with little or no success. In 1813 he offered the completion of the work to the booksellers, but so unfortunate had been the fate of the previous venture, that no one would run the risk of publication. At his own cost, when he was ill able to afford it, the work was carried through the press. This involved him in difficulties, which, added to others arising from family affliction, broke his health and impaired his mind. He was ordered to give up his duties and to take rest and relaxation; in 1818 he went for these to reside at Littlehampton, near Worthing. Here, while walking on the sands with his son, whom he was training in classics, he was accosted by Coleridge, and a friendship sprung up between the two poets. Coleridge had even then not heard of the translation of the great poem of the "transition age of Europe's history." Coleridge got a copy from the author, was charmed, and in a course of lectures delivered by him at the Royal Institution, spoke in raptures of Cary's Dante. The *Edinburgh* and *Quarterly Reviews* then followed suit, and re-echoed the Coleridgean opinions with so much effect on the public, that in three

months a new edition of the entire work was called for. Cary was speedily introduced to literary life—Hazlitt, De Quincey, Cunningham, Carlyle, Hood, Barry Cornwall (Proctor), Darley, Charles Lamb, &c., became his intimates, and he was speedily a coadjutor with them in contributing to the *London Magazine*, for which he wrote those notices of the early poets of Italy and France which afterwards became substantive works. He produced translations of "The Birds of Aristophanes," and of "The Odes of Pindar." He was appointed assistant librarian in the British Museum in 1826, and held that office till 1837. He acted as editor of editions of the poets—Milton, Pope, Thomson, Young, and Cowper, and composed a series of "Lives of the Poets," intended as a supplement to Dr. S. Johnson's work. He was pensioned with £200 per annum in 1841, died in 1844, and was buried beside Dr. Johnson in the Poet's Corner, in Westminster Abbey. To his son's "Memoir" there is added his Literary Journal and Letters, which contain matter of much interest.—S. N.

836. I suppose the person meant is Ledru Rollin, author of "The Decline of England," born 1806. His grandfather was a celebrated conjuror or *prestidigitateur* named Comus, a wonder-worker in magic, whose performances attracted crowds everywhere in France and Germany when Napoleon I. held the imperial seat on the Continent. Of his descendants in a direct line Ledru Rollin was his favourite, and when grandfather Comus died the greater part of a fortune, immense for France, was found to be bequeathed to young Rollin—a sum yielding about £4,000 a year. Rollin got every advantage education could bestow, was a student of law, and was called to the bar about 1830. He became proprietor of *La Réforme*, and lost money by it. He became chief of the Revolutionists in 1847, and was a member of the Provisional Government in 1848. His subsequent place in politics is well known. He is not connected with the old historian, Latin poet, and rhetorician, Charles Rollin (1661—1741), as many suppose.—R. M. A.

IS ENGLAND DECLINING?—Let us have the masses of England Christianized, fully brought under the power of the gospel, and then we have no fear of England's decline. Let them tell us, if they like, her day is already gone; it is not gone yet. It is the morning twilight of her history. It is the twilight which gilds the hill-tops with the coming light, and tells that the sun is on his march to fill the horizon. She is but just entering upon her great career. Declining! Far from this; she is struggling up into a nobler life. There are no wrinkles on her brow; her steps do not totter amongst the nations: kindling her eyes in the light of God, and drinking deep of the inspiration of heaven, she lifts her head high among the rulers of the earth, and is spreading her commerce on the waters of every sea, is carrying the fame of her science to the ends of the world, and is diffusing the rich influence of her laws over remotest provinces. And, what is to us more than all, she bears in her hand the cross of Christ, and she will plant it yet on all the islands of the sea; she will plant it yet in the heart of the great kingdoms of the East, and on the remotest shores (God hasten the day!) she will plant it. So that the missionaries of Christ, like watchmen on their lofty towers, shall shout to one another all round the world, "The morning cometh."—W. Jones, Birmingham.

The Societies' Section.

ON THE FORMATION OF CHARACTER.

An Address delivered before a Mental Improvement Society.

WE do not intend to echo the sentiments of those books on self-made men, the greater part of which seem to us to inculcate a spirit of mammon-worship, as though the accumulation of wealth or the attainment of position were the end of life. The moral of Dick Whittington and his cat has been enforced too often, and we are in danger of making everything subservient to worldly success. This in our opinion has nothing to do with the formation of character, although it may ultimately result from it. "Man shall not live by bread alone," neither can we all become Lord Mayors of London. We prefer, then, looking at character as a good thing in itself, and as its own reward. All men cannot be great, for distinction implies standing out from the common multitude, and necessarily is the privilege of the few. He whose only idea is to rise in the world, stints the natural growth of character. Character should be developed for its own sake as an end in itself, not as a means to an end. Man as man is great even if he does not stand out as distinguished from other men. Disinterested self-culture—the education of all those faculties of the soul which all men possess—is the only means of raising us in the scale of being to the true elevation of character. Now this may be done in the most ordinary spheres of life, and by it the most common avocation in life may be made in reality uncommon and sublime. Of what then does this culture consist, and what are those faculties of the soul

the cultivation of which produces the highest type of human existence?

We answer, firstly, we have an *intellectual* character to form. In popular conception and in common parlance, intellectuality is usually confounded with intelligence—the intelligent, the well-informed man, is taken to be intellectual. Now this is a mistake, for while intellectuality certainly implies intelligence, the converse is not necessarily true. A man may have acquired vast and various stores of information, he may be intimately conversant with the whole range of physical science, and extensively read in classical literature, the panoramic retrospect of history may be clearly mirrored in his memory, and his mind be an encyclopædia of general knowledge; and yet, valuable and important though these acquisitions undoubtedly are, he may not be an intellectual man. This is only to be a receptive being. Intellectuality does not consist in absorbing the thoughts of other men, but in thinking for ourselves. The information we accumulate should be assimilated to the mind, and become part of ourselves by conscientious reflection. To exercise a force of thought, to turn it at will upon any subject, to rise from facts to general laws and universal truths, to construct principles by the association of ideas, and by the exercise of wide comprehensive thought; to view things in their relations to each other; to study the past that we may comprehend the present and anticipate the future; to trace the thread by

which the physical, intellectual, and moral universe, the immense web of being, is woven into one consistent tissue,—this is true intellectuality, and these are powers the exercise of which all are capable of in a greater or less degree. All will not reach the same intellectual stature—it is not desirable that they should. But by a cultivation of the powers with which we are endowed, all will, according to their individual capacity and in their respective gradations, be worthy to rank among the honourable order of intellectual men.

But to the complete cultivation of the *intellectual*, another element of character is necessary. In fact, so intimately united are they, that to the proper unfolding of each they must make progress together. We refer, secondly, to the *moral* character. In our natures we have to recognise two opposing elements. In the one we discover desires, appetites, and passions, which terminate in self-gratification. In the other we recognise decision and energy, duty and conscience. The cultivation of the moral character teaches us to keep the former in subjection. We must see in ourselves something more than a being intended to go through a round of pleasant sensations. Disinterestedness must keep under control the selfishness of our nature—duty must be enthroned over passion, and conscience must be accepted as the guide to point out the path of duty.

We have characterized true intellectuality as *force of thought*; we may regard true morality as *force of principle*. And it is only by these two forces going together in harmony, just as all parts of the plant are unfolded together, that we can attain to the stature of the perfect man.

Again, we must culture and attend to the formation of the *religious* character. And is not this more important than all, inasmuch as it

includes and embraces the other two? Does not the religious principle generously cultivated fertilize the intellect? Is not this the foundation on which the superstructure of the intellectual and moral should be reared? and can these other faculties of the soul be cultivated and unfolded unless we are in sympathy with the fountain of all intellect and virtue? Coleridge has said, "Morality is the body of which faith in Christ is the soul;" and the simile is a good one, for morality without religion is like a shell without a kernel, it is hollow and lifeless, it possesses not the principle of growth and expansion. The religious and intellectual, to realize their true power, must exist together. If the intellectual man be thoroughly sincere in his religious profession, his intellectuality naturally coalesces with his religion; they react upon each other, and are thereby reciprocally helpful. Neither existing apart from the other can be said to be in a healthy state. The merely intellectual man is of necessity an unhappy man. Deny and obscure it as we may with specious sophistry, it nevertheless remains an axiomatic truth, that religion is necessary to human happiness. Intellectual culture kindles in the soul boundless desires, aspirations, and longings, which can only be satisfied with divinity itself, and which, apart from religion, will react upon the soul to its injury and disquiet. On the other hand, the religious separated from the intellectual is too much dependent upon the fluctuating impulses of emotion, and liable to be blown about with every wind of doctrine. Without some considerable degree of intellectual culture religious people are apt to be unstable in their faith, and more accessible to evil influences.

The proper formation of character consists in the united, harmonious

unfolding and development of every faculty of the soul, and the cultivation of all the powers with which we are endowed. We have spoken of the faculties of the soul as consisting of three elements. In reality they are only one. All that is immortal in man pertains to the soul's essence; and that intellectual, moral, and religious men are destined to an endless existence there will be no question. Let us then endeavour to realize this in ourselves, and see to it that the intellectual controls the physical, and that the intellectual is controlled by the moral, and that both are held in subjection to the religious. Let the mind govern the body, let the conscience govern the mind, and let God govern the conscience. We shall then realize the true dignity of manhood—the perfection, the ideal of humanity.

In this good work a Mental Improvement Society will assist you just as much as you assist it. You must take part in its exercises to realize its benefits. It is not enough, I had almost said it is worse than useless, for you to be a passive member of an association like the present. If you wish to strengthen your own mind you must bring it into contact with other minds. We need friction to keep our blood in

circulation. Like flint, we must strike against each other if the sparks are to fly off. Like knives, we get blunt unless we are brought into mutual contact; for "as iron sharpeneth iron, so a man sharpeneth the countenance of his friend." Resistance is the element in which the faculties grow strong. Those of you who enrich our stores shall be enriched yourselves. In point of fact, our motto is that *he who gives, gets; and from him that giveth not shall be taken even that which he hath.*

One word of warning. Do not let the class absorb you. What we mean is, exercise independence of thought, and do not be swayed about by the various opinions that may be expressed here. Be always open to conviction, but have settled ideas on given subjects, defend them to the best of your ability until you find them no longer tenable, and then make an honourable surrender.

Thus let us hope that the history of each session may record many a good fight; and may we grow strong in the conflict. May our characters be more fully formed, intellectually, morally, and religiously, and may we devote the powers so obtained to the glory of God.

J. S. B.

Literary Notes.

MR. JAMES GREENWOOD, "the Amateur Casual," is to publish a new work under the title of "The Seven Curses of London," which he enumerates as—1, Neglected Children; 2, Professional Thieves; 3, Professional Beggars; 4, Fallen Women; 5, The Curse of Drunkenness; 6, Betting Gamblers; and 7, Waste of Charity.

Miss Harriet Martineau (born 12th June, 1802) is engaged in extending her *Autobiography* for the press.

An edition of Spenser's Poetical Works, with Notes, by R. Morris, is to be added to the Globe Series.

Gavin Douglas's *Poems*, edited by J. Small, M.A., Librarian to Edinburgh University, are promised.

The old German legend of "The

"Quest of the Holy Grail" is said to be the subject of the Laureate's new poem.

The "Lectures and Speeches" of Elihu Burritt (who has retired from the Consulship at Birmingham) have been published.

A popular edition of John Bright's "Speeches on Questions of Public Policy" has been issued.

A volume of "Sermons bearing upon the Questions of the Day," by J. H. Newman, is announced.

Napoleon III.'s biennial prize (£800), for the best historical production during the two years which elapse between the grants, has been awarded by the Institute of France to M. Henri Martin, for his "History of France."

Rev. E. A. Abbot, head master of the City of London School, has just issued a "Shakespearean Grammar"

Lord Ravensworth is busy with a translation of "Homer."

A new translation of Dante has just been published for private circulation, by Dr. Johnston, of Bath.

The librarian of St. Mark's, Venice, Mr. Joseph Valentini, has issued the first volume of the Catalogue of Latin Manuscripts in the library.

A translation of Dante's "Inferno" into Hebrew—the language of Ezekiel's vision—has been published at Trieste, from the pen of the Orientalist, Cavalier Formeggine.

It is reported that the *Athenæum* is to lose its enthroned king, W. H. Dixon, who departs on a tour to Russia. Autocrats love autocracy.

The Jewish Theological Society in Germany has resolved to prepare an "Encyclopædia of the Talmud."

In addition to the six essays on Congregationalism issued under the title "Religious Republics," and in opposition to the "Essays on Church Polity," edited by Mr. Clay, we

hear that a volume of essays "On the Theological and Ecclesiastical Position of the Free [from State control] Churches of England" are about to be issued, under the editorial superintendence of Rev. Dr. Reynolds, President of Cheahunt College.

W. E. Gladstone has in preparation a Dictionary of the Facts in Homer.

Professor Reinhold Pauli has in the press a new series of his "Essays on English History."

The entire MSS. of M. Littré's splendid and extensive Dictionary of the French Language is now in the printer's hands, and the publication is approaching its completion.

William Jerdan, author of "Men I have Known," in his early days editor of the *Literary Gazette*, died 11th July, aged 88.

The *Court Journal* says that Messrs. Strahan & Co., the publishers of *Good Words*, placed £5,000 to the credit of Dr. Guthrie, for the purpose of his going to the Holy Land, and there writing a commentary on the Bible, to be published in penny numbers.

"A History of the Battle of Bannockburn" is in progress, under the hands of Robert White, the historian of "The Battle of Otterburn," &c.

The National Bible Society of Scotland has undertaken to publish at Madrid an edition of the New Testament, in Spanish, of 10,000 copies.

Of a series of contributions on The Origin and Development of Religious Beliefs, by S. Baring-Gould, author of "Curious Myths of the Middle Ages," "Post-Medieval Preachers," &c., the first part, on "Heathenism and Mosaism," is in the press.

Modern Metaphysicians.

THE LATE SIR WILLIAM ROWAN HAMILTON, LL.D.,
M.R.I.A., Hon. F.R.S.E., &c.

The Philosophy of Mathematics.

BY C. M. INGLEBY, M.A., LL.D.

"His name . . . will undoubtedly be classed with those of the grandest of all ages and countries, such as Lagrange and Newton."—*Prof. P. G. Tail.*

SPACE and time are the formal conditions of experience; that is to say, we can have no experience that does not involve both. Whence do we derive our conceptions of space and time? Evidently we come by them in the course of experience. But apart from those conceptions (which are, for the most part, reflex thoughts) we have a perception of the concrete realities, space and time, in the very act or reception of experience. How do we come by that perception? To this question many answers have been given. At present we are mainly concerned with one; viz., that of Kant, who teaches that this sense-perception is not given, as sensation itself is, in an empirical experience, but that space and time are *Anschauungen*, i. e., intuitions, envisagings, or perhaps still better, perceptions, which come from within, which we impart to sensation, and whereby, under the stimulus of sensation and the formative energy of the intellect, we constitute that which we call experience.

Kant was first led to this conclusion, under the stress of his mathematics. He saw that arithmetic and geometry were *a priori* sciences, and as such could not be generalizations from experience. Therefore he inferred that time, which is the basis of arithmetic, and space, which is the basis of geometry, must be known to us as totalities—not indeed independently of experience, but on a higher voucher than that of observation. Till the result of recent mathematical researches had been arrived at, it was somewhat carelessly believed that the Mathematics were allied sciences of quantity. But there were even then extensive spheres of speculation which refused to conform to so arbitrary a definition—spheres in which the leading notion was *order* rather than *quantity*. The discoveries of Sir W. R. Hamilton, Professor Cayley, and Professor Sylvester have sent that definition to *limbo*. Every new discovery goes farther and farther to identify algebra with the science of order in Time and Space, i. e., *Tactic*.

The linear order of time, and the tri-dimensional order of space, present, as might be anticipated, very striking and important analogies. It is by virtue of these that in Sir W. R. Hamilton's hands Algebra was made to administer to Geometry, and in Professor Sylvester's hands Geometry has been forced to administer to the more pressing wants of Algebra and the Calculus. The most remarkable instance of the latter is Sylvester's theory of Reducible Cyclodes, in which the properties of the continued Involutives of the circle are used as instruments for the resolution of algebraical questions of the utmost difficulty.

Metaphysics and logic have usually been cultivated by one class of minds, and mathematics and physics by another. The certainty of the methods employed by the mathematician and the physicist stands in marked contrast to the explorations, generally *not* conformable to strict logical method, and offering *no* analogy to the processes of mathematics, which offer so great a charm to the metaphysician. There has been a great division of labour in these vast fields of research; till at length it came to pass that each class looked upon the other with ill-disguised contempt. De Morgan has been undervalued by the metaphysician, because of the great and really beneficial effect of his mathematics on his logical speculations; and Brodie (the chemist) has been the mark of the mathematicians' satire, on the ground that his mathematics have been spoiled by his metaphysics. Sylvester is too big a man to be laughed at; yet he even has, perhaps, laid himself open to ridicule by the intense philosophical cast of his mathematical works, and the intrusion into them of remarks which savour more of the metaphysician and the poet than of the mathematician. Truth to speak, philosopher and poet he is. Some few minds of past ages have helped to bridge over the gulf; such as Descartes, Leibnitz, and Kant. The greatest achievement, however, in this work was destined for the subject of this memoir. Sir William *Stirling* Hamilton, the Edinburgh Professor of Metaphysics and Logic, in a celebrated article, and in subsequent appendices to it, gave a very decided and somewhat dogmatic opinion adverse to "The Study of Mathematics as an Exercise of Mind." Even while he was disputing the merits of mathematics as a factor in a *liberal* education, George Boole was elaborating his "Mathematical Analysis of Logic," and indirectly proving that two out of three of the principles of algebra were also principles of his logical calculus; and Sir William *Rowan* Hamilton, the Dublin Professor of Astronomy, was constructing out of pure metaphysics some of the most marvellous mathematical edifices of which this century can boast. By such means a considerable advance has been effected in the reconciliation of the two great scientific factions—the metaphysical and the mathematical.

The list of titles which we have appended to Sir W. R. Hamilton's name at the head of this paper, might have been greatly extended; but after three we have "cut it short," in

deference to the excellent dictum of De Morgan,—“These things are the distinctions of the individual while he lives, but after death the honour attaches to those who gave them.” It is often a fond and foolish fancy which nicknames a great man after an equally great predecessor. More than one Teutonic philosopher has been called “the German Plato.” In this manner has Hegel been compared to Aristotle, and Michel Chasles has been sometimes called “the French Newton.” So it happened to Hamilton; he was called “the Irish Lagrange,” and not without reason; for his mathematical writings, like those of Lagrange, are distinguished by a rare mastery over symbols, and by the purity and beauty of their style. Besides, in Dynamics, Hamilton extended and completed the general equations of Lagrange’s “*Mécanique Analytique*.” Such, however, is the rapid advance of mathematics, that already much of Hamilton’s work in this department of science has been superseded. The propriety of this appellation (viz., “the Irish Lagrange”) is, however, questionable, not by reason of the substantive comparison, but of the adjective prefix. An Irish Christian name, such as Rowan, does not make the bearer of it an Irishman, nor yet the accident that he was born in Ireland. By his father’s side Hamilton was Scotch. Scotland was the native country of his grandparents, but Ireland was the country of their adoption. In Dublin were born to them two sons, one of whom, Archibald, became a solicitor, and married Miss Sarah Hutton. They had one son, and two daughters, one of whom Miss E. M. Hamilton, became eminent as a writer of poetry. The son, William Rowan, was born in Dominick Street, Dublin, on 4th August, 1805. Precocity of a kind and in a degree equally extraordinary marked his intellectual growth. Like Leibnitz he early excelled in languages, philology, poetry, mathematics, and philosophy. At an age when most boys can barely prattle their native tongue this admirable genius could read thirteen languages! In this department of knowledge his precocity was as great as that of Sir Henry Wotton, who, on graduating at Cambridge at the age of thirteen, passed a good examination in thirteen languages, comprising Latin, Greek, Hebrew, Arabic, Syriac, &c. The order in which Hamilton learned his languages was this,—Latin, Greek, Hebrew, Syriac, Persian, Arabic, Sanscrit, Hindostani, and Malay; the modern languages, viz., French, Italian, Spanish, and German, being, for the most part, acquired later. By his own account, he used to read the first five of these better than German. That his knowledge of these tongues must have been considerable is proved by two facts,—that at the age of seven he stood an examination in Hebrew by Dr. Meredith, of Trinity College, Dublin, and that at fourteen he wrote a letter in Persian to the Persian ambassador, Mirza Abon Hassan Khan, who was then (1819) on a visit in Dublin. His early education he received from an uncle, the Rev. James Hamilton, of Trim, an eminent classical scholar, imbued with a taste for science; but in mathematics, like

his countryman, Robert Murphy (of whom see a biographical sketch in the series of papers under the title of "Toiling Upward," in the *British Controversialist* of September, 1867, pp. 202-206), he was mostly self-taught.

Having accidentally fallen in with a Latin copy of Euclid when about ten years of age, he speedily became immersed in the study of geometry. He had already acquired a liking for and great skill in arithmetical calculations; so much so, that Zerah Colburn, the American calculating prodigy, who was then exhibiting in Dublin, and Hamilton engaged in duels of expertness. He had also acquired a taste for algebra, and between twelve and fifteen made himself familiar with the various other branches of mathematics, pure and applied, not only as taught in the ordinary treatises on these subjects, but in the best works of the authors of greatest note in each.

His course was rapid and brilliant. He had mastered Euclid's "Elements" at the age of twelve, when he took up Newton's "Universal Arithmetic." At seventeen, like George Boole, he had mastered Newton's "Principia;" thenceforth he gave his days and nights to Laplace's "Mécanique Céleste." At this time he was brought under the notice of Dr. Brinkley, the Andrews' Professor and Royal Astronomer. It happened in this wise. The adventurous youth of seventeen had detected a serious mistake in Laplace, and a friend, Mr. G. Kiernan, laid the case before Brinkley. The veteran astronomer sent for Hamilton, who, on presenting himself, submitted to Brinkley an original paper on a case of Osculation, entitled "Contacts between Algebraic Curves and Surfaces." Brinkley was astounded, and came to the conclusion that his visitor was a mathematical genius of extraordinary power, to whom, accordingly, he gave every encouragement. In the following year, Dr. Brinkley imparted to a friend his deliberate opinion of his *protégé*, in these memorable words:—"This young man, I do not say *will be*, but *is*, the first mathematician of his age." Hamilton's progress was now meteoric. He entered the University of Dublin in 1823, and the following year his first paper was read by Dr. Brinkley before the Royal Irish Academy. It treated of Caustics, the name given in optics to a peculiar species of curve, formed by the intersection of reflected or refracted rays of light; and it displayed so great a mastery of the mathematical theory of optics, and treated the difficult thesis with such splendid originality, that he was invited by the Council to develop it further. It was this paper which ultimately appeared in the "Transactions," under the title of a "Theory of Systems of Rays." It was presented to the Academy in 1827, while Hamilton was still an undergraduate. He soon after achieved the distinction of an *optime* in Greek and in Physics, which corresponds, though it is hardly equal, to a double seniority at Cambridge. He also obtained a somewhat similar honour for Hebrew, and carried off two Chancellor's medals for English poems, the subjects being "The Ionian Islands," and

"Eustace St. Pierre." He had not yet taken his degree, when, on Dr. Brinkley's resigning the Andrews' Professorship of Astronomy, the university elected Hamilton to the vacant chair, and he became Royal Astronomer of Ireland. All this took place in the year 1827, when the young hero was but twenty-one years of age. It thus came to pass that, by virtue of the conditions of Bishop Law's will, the new Professor, though an undergraduate, had to examine candidates for mathematical honours who had already taken their degrees.

The young professor was at this time one of the ablest and most enthusiastic members of "The Porch," an association of choice spirits connected with the University of Dublin, which met during the winter months for literary improvement, discussion, and social intercourse—a society to which the *Dublin University Review*, and subsequently *The Dublin University Magazine*, owed their origin. To the latter of these Hamilton was an extensive contributor, especially of poetical compositions, some of which have great elegance of diction, depth of thought, and reach of imagination.

He now took up his residence at the Observatory, which is at Dunsink, six miles from Trinity College. It is admitted on all hands that Hamilton's professional lectures on astronomy, delivered to the college classes, were the best ever heard within the walls of Trinity College, uniting in themselves consecutive thinking, logical statement, sound philosophy, exact science, moral truth, and splendid poetical imagination—all blending together so thoroughly as to form the highest and most attractive intellectual treat. It was on the peroration of one of these lectures that Mrs. Hemans founded her beautiful poem, "The Prayer of the Lonely Student."

This work, and his own original researches, fully occupied the long days of this gifted and industrious man. The routine work of the Observatory was mainly performed by an assistant. Hamilton was better employed thus than in making observations with the obsolete instruments of the Observatory.

In 1833 he married Miss Helen Maria Bayly. By that lady, who survives him, he had two sons and a daughter, who are all alive. Sir W. R. Hamilton was an active member of the British Association, which he joined at its second meeting in 1832, at Oxford. At various early meetings he gave expositions of his dynamical and optical methods; and when, in 1835, it met at Dublin, under the presidency of Dr. Lloyd, Sir W. R. Hamilton held the office of local secretary, and delivered an address, published in the "Transactions" of the body, on "The Power of Social Sympathy as an Impulse for the Promotion of Science." On this occasion Lord Normanby, then Viceroy of Ireland, in the library of the University of Dublin, in presence of the Association, conferred on the representative man of Irish science the honour of knighthood—an honour similar to that which, as Dr. Whewell then remarked, had been conferred at another Trinity College, a

hundred and thirty years before, on another mathematician of the highest excellence in optics and astronomy, Sir Isaac Newton.

In 1837 he was elected President of the Royal Irish Academy, though Archbishop Whately was put in nomination against him. In the meanwhile gold medals had been showered upon him by the learned societies; but though holding the gold medal of the Royal Society, he never became a F.R.S.!

He retained his professorship for eight years only, but he did not resign his appointment (of Royal Astronomer) at the Observatory, where he continued to reside till his death, which happened on September 2, 1865, in his sixtieth year. He was buried on the 7th, in Mount Jerome Cemetery, and the fellows, scholars, and students of Trinity College, together with the council and members of the Royal Irish Academy, and a great number of private friends, followed his remains to their resting-place.

We will now proceed to give a few anecdotes illustrating the character of the man; some extracts from his poetical works shall follow; and, lastly, we will endeavour to give our readers a general notion of Hamilton's greatest achievements in science.

"Extremes meet," says the proverb; and so it happens that the subtle and the simple are sometimes combined. It was so with our hero. As a rule, all great mathematicians are simple-minded men. We can hardly call to mind an exception. Hamilton used to speak of himself with childlike candour; some might say with excusable vanity; but the phrase would convey a very false impression. On being called "the greatest British mathematician," he earnestly disclaimed the imputation. "I think you flatter me there," said he. "I should say either Cayley or Sylvester is the greater mathematician; but if I am not the greater *mathematician*, perhaps I am the greater *man*. It is the *combination* which, in my case, is extraordinary. I am a poet." Sir John Herschel is said to have been an astronomer by bent, and a chemist by birth. So Hamilton said, on another occasion, "I *live* by mathematics, but I *am* a poet." He had all Wordsworth's *amour-propre*, and love of conversation. Wordsworth was fond of oiting and reciting his poems, which he did with childlike complacency. So Hamilton used to refer with great gusto to his achievements as an orator, and was wont to recite from memory part of an after-dinner speech he had delivered at Oxford in 1832, which was at the time allowed to be a model of oratory.

We quote from a letter written by the Rev. R. P. Graves, curate of Windermere, an account of the meeting of a brilliant company in the Lake District, in July, 1844, which can scarcely fail to interest our readers, bringing into view, as it does, a number of men famous for intellect, imagination, eloquence, wit, knowledge, and culture.

"One of those walks deserves a special record, both on account of the distinguished persons whom it united in enjoyment, and the full realization it afforded of all that might be expected of the quality of the enjoy-

ment to which such men were the contributors. The party consisted of Mr. Wordsworth, Archdeacon Hare, Sir William R. Hamilton, Professor Butler, and two ladies, both by name and mental qualities worthy of the association, besides myself. The day was brilliant, and continued so throughout, as we ascended one of the ravines of Loughrigg Fell, opposite to Rydal, crossed over the fell, descended to the margin of Loughrigg Tarn, and returned to the social circle of Rydal Mount by the western side of Grasmere and Rydal lakes, enjoying the perfect view of the former lake to be seen from the green terrace of Loughrigg, and the equally advantageous aspect of Rydal Mere and Nab Scar, which this route presents. I remember that not only poetry and philosophy, with other lighter matters, formed topics of conversation, but that religious subjects also, and especially the doctrine of the resurrection, were spoken of with a reverent and cordial interest. Our eminent countrymen excited admiration from all by the ample share they contributed, in the way both of original remark and brilliantly apposite quotation, to the fund of intellectual treasure then poured forth. The day was additionally memorable as giving birth to an interesting minor poem of Mr. Wordsworth's. When we reached the side of Loughrigg Tarn (which, you may remember, he notes for its similarity, in the peculiar character of its beauty, to the Lago di Nemi—Dianæ speculum) the loveliness of the scene arrested our steps and fixed our gaze. The splendour of a July noon surrounded us and lit up the landscape, with the Langdale Pikes soaring above, and the bright tarn shining beneath; and when the poet's eyes were satisfied with their feast on the beauty familiar to them, they sought relief in the search, to them a happy vital habit, for new beauty in the flower-enamelled turf at his feet. There his attention was attracted by a fair smooth stone, of the size of an ostrich's egg, seeming to embed at its centre, and, at the same time, to display a dark star-shaped fossil of most distinct outline. Upon closer inspection this proved to be the shadow of a daisy projected upon it with extraordinary precision by the intense light of an almost vertical sun. The poet drew the attention of the rest of the party to the minute but beautiful phenomenon, and gave expression at the time to thoughts suggested by it, and which so interested our friend Professor Butler, that he plucked the tiny flower, and, saying 'that it should be not only the theme, but the memorial of the thoughts they had heard,' bestowed it somewhere carefully for preservation. This little poem, in which some of these thoughts were afterwards crystallized, commences with the stanza—

'So fair, so sweet, withal so sensitive,
Would that the little flowers were born to live,
Conscious of half the pleasure that they give!''

In his early days Hamilton was a staunch Berkeleyan. Full of *The Principles of Human Knowledge* and *The Minute Philosopher*, he went to Highgate, and called on Coleridge. The two poets met that once—the veteran who had versified the asses' bridge, and the youth who, with the grace and dignity of poetry, was soon to construct the high *priori* bridge which should span the gulf of time and space. Of course the talk turned on philosophy. Coleridge soliloquized, as was his wont; at length, having got in a few words edgeways, Hamilton declared his adherence to Berkeley's *Principles*. Coleridge's answer was, "Oh, sir, you will grow out of that;" as ac-

ordingly it came to pass. Of late years it was Hamilton's practice to read Plato and Kant as a relaxation from severer labours! In reference to this he alleged that "change of labour is, to a studious man, a relaxation."

"Extremes meet" sometimes with a vengeance, as where the sublime and the ridiculous clash and commingle. Hamilton was a zealous Christian, and a sincere member of the evangelical section of the Established Church. We have heard of a mathematician calculating the number of possible factions in a house where three were divided against two, "our Lord having given but three cases out of *forty-two*." This was nothing to Hamilton's speculation concerning the Ascension of Christ. Christians do not all hold the Dædalian, or material explanation of the event; *e. g.*, Dr. Horace Bushnell takes the Ascension to be an externalized symbol of a spiritual act. Hamilton held the grossest form of what we may call *Dædalianism*. He believed that Christ not only visibly departed from earth, but that he travelled through the planetary spaces into the stellar spaces, and beyond the sidereal universe into a celestial realm; and that He performed this journey in *ten days*—*i. e.*, between the Resurrection and the day of Pentecost. Hence it is easy to determine the lower limit of our Lord's average velocity, since we know the lower limit of distance, say the distance of the star 61 Cygni! We do not affirm that Hamilton pushed his calculation to this point; but obviously this is the mathematician's necessary inference from the assigned premises. Alas! like Newton, he was as weak in theology as he was strong in mathematics. Hamilton's investigation, which was published in 1842, in the *Irish Ecclesiastical Journal*, provoked a highly gifted sceptic (himself a poet) to reply, "What an exquisite *reductio ad absurdum*!"

In our opinion no great mathematician is a *mere* mathematician. Hamilton was deeply and widely read in metaphysics. One day, as he and Southey were walking in the country, Hamilton fell into one of his Coleridge-like monologues on a point in metaphysics. The resemblance struck Southey, and he said, "If you had been Coleridge, you would have talked to that ploughman just as you have been talking to me!"

The following three sonnets, by Sir W. R. Hamilton, will serve as samples of his poetic genius:—

AN ASPIRATION.

O brooding spirit of wisdom and of love,
Whose mighty wings e'en now o'ershadow me,
Absorb me in thine own immensity,
And raise me far my finite self above!
Purge vanity away, and the weak care
That name or fame of me may widely spread:
And the deep wish keep burning, in their stead,
Thy blissful influence afar to bear,

Or see it borne! Let no desire of ease,
 No lack of courage, faith, or love, delay
 Mine own steps on that high thought-paven way
 In which my soul her clear commission sees :
 Yet with an equal joy let me behold
 Thy chariot o'er that way by others rolled!

THE TETRACTYS.

Of high Mathesis, with her charm severe,
 Of line and number, was our theme; and we
 Sought to behold her unborn progeny,
 And thrones reserved in Truth's celestial sphere :
 While views, before attained, became more clear ;
 And how the One in Time, of Space the Three,
 Might, in the Chain of Symbol, girdled be :
 And when my eager and reverted ear
 Caught some faint echoes of an ancient strain,
 Some shadowy outlines of old thoughts sublime,
 Gently he smiled to see, revived again,
 In later age, and Occidental clime,
 A dimly traced Pythagorean lore,
 A westward floating, mystic dream of FOUR.

TO ADAMS (DISCOVERER OF NEPTUNE).

When Vulcan cleft the labouring brain of Jove
 With his keen axe, and set Minerva free,
 The unimprisoned maid, exultingly,
 Bounded aloft, and to the heaven above
 Turned her clear eyes, while the grim workman strove
 To claim the Virgin Wisdom for his fee,
 His private wealth, his property to be,
 And hide in Lemnian cave her light of love.
 If some new truth, O Friend! thy toil discover,
 If thine eyes first by some fair form be blest,
 Love it for what it is, and as a lover
 Gaze, or with joy receive thine honoured guest :
 The new-found thought set free, awhile may hover
 Gratefully near thee, but it cannot rest.

This we must allow is the pearl of Hamilton's sonnets. The last six lines are indeed transcendently lovely.

It may not be uninteresting to the reader to see a sonnet by his sister, E. M. Hamilton, on the new planet (Neptune), 1846 :—

Immortal Newton! did thy glory seem
 A dewdrop quivering in the light of noon,
 Whose prism of splendour was to perish soon
 'Neath the strong sunbeams? Did they fear or dream
 Thy genius not a spark from the Supreme—
 King of those myriads? Lo! unto the skies
 Men lift their watching and unsleeping eyes—

Waiting for what?—an unborn planet's beam!
 And look! in truth the prophesied one breaks
 Forth 'mid its 'lustrious brethren on their sight.
 Welcome! oh, unimaginably far!
 Eloquent planet! truth-attesting star!
 In whose deep silence the Eternal speaks—
 "I am the Prophet—fount of genius and of light!"

Hamilton composed but two separate works for the press: the first of these was the portly octavo volume called "Lectures on Quaternions," 1853 [Preface (historical), pp. 64; contents, pp. lxxii.; text, pp. 736]; and the second, "Elements of Quaternions," 1866, published after his death. His other writings were contributed to magazines and the Transactions of three learned societies, viz., the Royal Irish Academy, the British Association for the Advancement of Science, and the Royal Society. In the Transactions of the Royal Irish Academy are twelve dissertations by Hamilton, some of which would respectively fill a large octavo volume. Those in the Transactions of the British Association for the Advancement of Science are numerous; while there is but one contribution from his pen in the Philosophical Transactions, viz., "On a General Method in Dynamics," 1834-5.

This paper produced quite a sensation among mathematicians; Jacobi, of Königsberg, expanded and extended the purely mathematical portion, several of the most profound mathematicians of France have commented on its principles and elaborated its applications—all of them uniting to praise the affluent genius of the original discoverer. On account of these researches, the rare and much coveted distinction of Honorary Member of the Imperial Academy of St. Petersburg was conferred on the (so-called) "Irish Lagrange."

The rest of his writings will be found in the second, third, and fourth series of the *London, Dublin, and Edinburgh Philosophical Magazine*, the *Dublin University Magazine*, the *Cambridge and Dublin Mathematical Journal*, and the *Irish Ecclesiastical Journal*. The great majority of these miscellaneous writings are on subjects strictly mathematical, of which it would be hopeless to attempt to convey any popular notion, with, perhaps, the exception of his optical predictions. We will give a brief account of these, and then attempt a necessarily meagre and imperfect sketch of the origin of that Algebraical Method by which Hamilton will be remembered so long as mathematics are cultivated among men. Hamilton enjoys the high desert of having proved the truth of the Undulatory Theory of light. According to Newton's hypothesis, light is an aggregate of minute corpuscles, radiating with enormous velocity from their sources. The opposition hypothesis, which was first developed by Huyghens, and continued by Fresnel, Airey, Hamilton, &c., is that light is a minute vibration of an exceedingly rare medium. One of the tests to which it was put was the theoretical determination of

the centre spot in Newton's rings. By the undulatory theory it should be black; by Newton's theory it should be white; and black it really is. In the course of his researches Sir W. R. Hamilton lighted upon a much more delicate and decisive test than this. In calculating according to the Undulatory Theory, the course of a single ray of light passing, under certain conditions, through a biaxial crystal, he determined two cases of conical refraction. Only two refracted rays had ever been observed; but according to Hamilton's calculations the incident ray ought under one condition to be broken into an infinite number of rays, and to emerge as a cone; and under another condition to be broken into an infinite number of rays, and after forming an internal cone to emerge as a cylinder. The predictions will be found in Vol. xvii. of the Transactions of the Royal Irish Academy, in a paper read January 23 and October 22, 1832. As we understand the matter, no such results would be countenanced by the corpuscular hypothesis. Dr. Humphrey Lloyd undertook to verify these predictions by very delicate experiments on a crystal of arragonite, and for the first time the two cases of conical refraction were rendered visible! Dr. Lloyd's paper, which will be found in the same volume at p. 145, was read January 28, 1833.

We have already said that Hamilton was a metaphysician. He had read Kant in the German, and was early imbued with the doctrine of Kant's "Transcendental Æsthetic," to the effect that space and time, as perceived in the use of the senses, are *anschauungen*, or perceptions not derived from the sensible world, but from the nature of the sentient person. Both becoming thus known *à priori*, each should be the sphere of an *à priori* science. From space, accordingly, we have derived pure geometry. What pure science has time given us? Kant indeed answers this question; but his commentators are yet divided as to the meaning of his answer. We hold that answer to mean that arithmetic rests on pure time, and therefore algebra, *so far as it is pure*. It seems highly probable that when Hamilton asked himself the question, What pure science has time given us? he did not trouble himself with Kant's answer; but answered it for himself in the most satisfactory way; viz., by eliciting from pure time all the science it was able to give. The result was his magnificent dissertation "On Algebra as the Science of Pure Time," which was the porch to the main edifice, "The Theory of Conjugate Functions." These papers were read, or at least presented, to the Royal Irish Academy on November 4, 1833, and June 1, 1835, and are printed in vol. xvii. of their "Transactions;" following, in fact, the essay on "Conical Refraction." This was a *fruit*; that a *germ*.

Time having but one dimension, it is plain that there are but two ways of regarding a given moment of time; we may regard it as *past* or *future* to the present moment. We have to consider also the time which has elapsed, or will elapse, between the two moments. Let that moment be *past*, we look back on it through such and such an elapsed time; let it be

future, we look forward to it through such and such a time which is to elapse. By thus feigning any given moment to be past or future to another, we may consider all moments in *couple*, and determine formulae expressing their relations to each other: as, for instance, we may say, in words, from A to B is the converse of from B to A; which Hamilton writes,—

$$(B - A) + (A - B) = 0.$$

We thus come to consider the passage in thought from one moment to another; $B - A$ is the *step* from A to B; and $A - B$ is the *step* from B to A; and these two steps neutralize each other, or generate a *real* step. In the course of constructing this theory, which at length becomes very complex, Hamilton found he was constructing an algebra of pure time, which ran side by side with common algebra. But there were great differences between them: in particular the expression $\sqrt{-1}$, which in common algebra expresses an impossible operation or result, is possible and real in Hamilton's new algebra. This expression signifies that a square number or quantity may have a negative sign; whereas in arithmetic and algebra all squares are positive. In the algebra of pure time, the couple (a, b) if operated on by the symbol i becomes $(-b, a)$; and $(-b, a)$ if operated on by the same symbol becomes $(-a, -b)$, which is written $i^2(a, b) = (-a, -b) = -1(a, b)$. If we now separate the symbols of operation from the couple operated upon, we see plainly that $i^2 = -1$. Hence we may safely conclude that i is equivalent to the expression $\sqrt{-1}$, and is a perfectly real operation in the algebra of pure time.

From considering *couples* Hamilton studied *triplets*, and finally sets of four moments, or of four steps, which he called *quaternions*. The magic symbol i operating upon a set (a, b, c, d) regarded as two couples would convert it into $(-c, d, a, b)$; but regarded as a quaternion it converts it into $(b, -a, d, -c)$; and this in like manner becomes $(-a, -b, -c, -d)$ which is $-(a, b, c, d)$; so that here, as in the case of couples, $i^2 = -1$. But that is not all. In considering four moments or steps Hamilton found he needed two other symbols of operation, which he called j and k . The symbol j turns the quaternion (a, b, c, d) into $(c, d, -a, -b)$, and the symbol k turned it into $(d, c, -b, -a)$: whence he concluded that $j^2 = -1$, and $k^2 = -1$. He thus obtained the following relations between i, j , and k : $i^2 = j^2 = k^2 = -1$; and i, j , and k are three roots of negative unity.

Up to this point there is absolutely no difficulty. We have found that if we consider (say) a set of four steps in time (which set is called a *quaternion*), we have three kinds of transformation of the quaternion, the symbols of operation being these wonderful letters, i, j , and k . Hamilton's intellect now went through the most wonderful change that ever came over mind of man. It is only with the utmost difficulty that we can follow it in its lawful mazes.

In this complex system of transformation of moments and steps in time, Hamilton discerned the dim outline of tridimensional space! In these three symbols, i, j, k , he saw the three rectangular axes of solid geometry; and it at length occurred to him that in this algebra of pure time lay couched a new and most powerful, because *natural*, geometry. So he thenceforth bent his genius to the enormous task of constructing a new algebra of space, or triple algebra (as De Morgan calls it). He con-

constructs three rectangular axes; suppose one directed northwards, another eastwards, and another upwards, representing three *axis lines*, i , j , and k . If we turn the northward line about the eastward line as axis, we operate with i on j , and thus get $ij = k$. Performing the operation a second time we get $i^2j = ik = -j$; or $i^2 = -1$. Similarly we get $j^2 = -1$, and $k^2 = -1$, AS BEFORE, and we have attained to the perfect symmetry of representation—all three axes being represented by a negative root of unity. With this for foundation Hamilton constructs his great and imperishable theory of quaternions, or *algebra of pure space*.

The analogy of *signs*, in passing from pure time to pure space, is very easily apprehended. The analogy of time to linear space is self-evident; so is that of $+$ and $-$ (*plus* and *minus*) in time to $+$ and $-$ as indicating the directions of a straight line. The transition from $+$ to $-$, or from $-$ to $+$ in space implies the rotation of a line through 180° ; but this is impossible in time, since a point in time can *look but two ways*: to the past or to the future. Now the symbols i^2 , j^2 , k^2 , do respectively turn $+$ into $-$ in operating on moments or steps in time; i , j , and k respectively indicating an operation of half the extent, cannot make any subject-moment or subject-step rotate *at all*, so it cannot turn it, though a quadrant. Accordingly, in Hamilton's "Algebra of Pure Time," where the couple (a, b) is the subject, the effect of i upon it is to reverse *one* only of the moments or steps, and transpose them. So, where the quaternion (a, b, c, d) is the subject, the effect of i , j , or k upon it is to reverse *two* only of the moments or steps, and effect a transposition among them. In each case the double operation changes the sign of the set from $+$ to $-$. In pure space, on the contrary, the act of the rotation becomes possible, and i , j , and k respectively effect a quarter revolution on the subject-line, and in that quadrantal rotation is subtly involved a complex act strictly analogous to the effect of i , j , or k on a set of four moments or steps. In the theory of quaternions, then, as an algebra of space, the term quaternion is still significant. Its use, however, has there reference rather to the fact that *four* data are required to turn one directed straight line into another, viz., the ratio of their lengths (which is a number, or algebraic quantity), the angle between them, and the two elements which determine the plane in which they lie. When these two straight lines are at right angles to each other, or parallel to each other, the quaternion degenerates; and in the one case is a triplet, in the other a number, or algebraic quantity. The general problem of turning line into line is that which is met and thoroughly solved by this masterly calculus.

The moment when Sir W. R. H. seized the fundamental equations of the theory of quaternions, as an instrument for geometrical investigation, was in the course of the 16th October, 1843 (to quote from a private letter published by Professor Tait), "as I was walking with Lady Hamilton to Dublin, and came up to Brougham Bridge, which my boys have since called the Quaternion Bridge; that is to say, I then and there felt the galvanic circuit of thought *close*; and the sparks which fell from it were the *fundamental* equations between i , j , k , exactly such as I have used them ever since."

We do not propose to attempt further explanation of it, the details being unsuited to the popular pages of the *British Controversialist*. We have given enough to show the nature of the speculation and its

stupendous importance. In the course of developing this theory, Hamilton struck upon a very curious fact, viz., that the differential calculus of Leibnitz is inapplicable to it; so that he was constrained to have recourse to the abandoned theory of fluxions, as left by Newton, in which fact the Anti-Leibnitz party see one of the revenges brought about by time, for the long-successful fraud of the great German! "Justice is sure though slow."

"Rarò antecedentem scelestum
Deseruit pede Pœna claudo."

The whole history of mathematics, so far as it has been studied by us, does not afford another instance of such a growth as the theory of quaternions, where the calculus grew in the most orderly fashion out of exact metaphysics. The success, too, promises to be commensurate with the merit of the performance; for already is the theory of quaternions an accepted part in the university curriculum of Cambridge, Dublin, and Edinburgh.

Professor Tait, in an admirable memoir of Hamilton, which we shall specify at the end of this paper, describes two of Hamilton's mechanical inventions, viz., *The Icosian Game* and *The Hodograph*. As we are acquainted with these only through Professor Tait's paper, we will give his own words. "The Icosian game is played on a plane diagram, which represents a distorted projection of a pentagonal dodecahedron (a solid enclosed by twelve faces, each of which has five sides). This diagram consists of 30 straight lines (representing the edges of the dodecahedron), and 20 points, where 3 straight lines meet. 'The game is played by inserting pegs numbered 1, 2, 3 . . . 20, in successive holes, which are cut at the points of the figure representing the corners of the dodecahedron, taking care to pass only along the lines which represent the edges. It is characteristic of Hamilton that he has selected the twenty consonants of our alphabet to denote these holes. When five pegs are placed in any five successive holes, it is always possible in two ways, sometimes in four, to insert the whole twenty, so as to form a continuous circuit. . . . This is only the simplest case of the game.' Mr. Jaques, of Hatton Garden, has the copyright.

"The Hodograph is a contrivance for giving 'a graphic representation of the velocity and acceleration in every case of motion of a particle. The easiest illustration we can give of this is a special case, the hodograph of the earth's motion in its orbit. In consequence of the fact that light moves with a finite, though very great, velocity, its apparent direction, when it reaches the eye, varies with the motion of the spectator. The position of a star in the heavens appears to be nearer than it really is to the point towards which the earth is moving; in fact, the star seems to be displaced in a direction parallel to that in which the earth is moving, and through a space such as the earth would travel over in the time occupied by light in coming from the star. This is the phenomenon detected by Bradley, and known as the *aberration* of light. Thus, the line joining the true place of the star with its apparent place represents at every instant, by its length and direction, the velocity of the earth in its orbit. We are now prepared to give a general definition. The hodograph, corresponding to any case whatever of the motion of a point, is formed by drawing, at every instant, from a fixed point, lines representing the velocity of the moving point in

magnitude and direction. One of the most singular properties of the hodograph, discovered by Hamilton, is that the hodograph of every planet or comet, however excentric its path may be, is a circle. A star, therefore, in consequence of aberration, appears to be described as an *exact* circle surrounding its true place, in a plane parallel to the plane of the ecliptic; not merely, as seems formerly to have been assured, an *approximate* one. But, unless the earth's orbit were exactly circular, the true place of the star will not be the *centre* of the hodograph."

Hamilton's last contribution to the *Philosophical Magazine* (fourth series, vol. xxvii., p. 124) was "On Röber's Construction of the Heptagon." As no diagram is given, it is almost impossible to understand the construction. The heptagon (or regular figure of seven equal sides) cannot be constructed by Euclid's allowance of means—viz., right lines and circles only. Röber's construction, employing no other means, is a *very close* approximation to the true heptagon. The seventh part of two right angles is $25^{\circ} 42' 51'' 4 \dots$; Röber's approximation to it is $25^{\circ} 42' 51'' 39 \dots$. For all *practical* purposes Röber's approximation (which, after all, may not be very complex) is all that can be desired. He seems to have had a touch of the Egyptian mania of John Taylor and Piazzi Smyth; for he believed that some of their temples, as the Temple of Edfu, were designedly constructed so as to convey to the initiated, and thus perpetuate, this very method of describing the heptagon. The style of Sir W. R. Hamilton's paper is provoking enough. The greatest living Algebraist of our day was both perplexed and provoked by it, and at last threw down the number in which it appeared, with the remark, "Why can't Hamilton write like any one else?" Hamilton's practical illustration of Röber's construction, in order to exhibit to the popular mind the closeness of the approximation, is worthy of him. "Let us imagine," he says, "a series of seven successive chords inscribed in a circle, according to the construction in question, and inquire *how near* to the initial point the final point would be. The answer is, that the *last* point would fall *behind* the first, but only by about half a second (more exactly by $0.506''$). If, then, we suppose, for illustration, that these chords are *seven successive tunnels*, drawn *eastward* from station to station on the *equator of the earth*, the last tunnel would emerge to the *west* of the first station, but only by about *fifty feet*."

After publishing this, Hamilton's time was almost wholly taken up in completing his last work, "The Elements of Quaternions." He had actually finished the text, and revised all the proof sheets, and was working on the admirable index which is appended to the treatise, when he fell into a dangerous illness, of a gouty nature, we believe, but seriously affecting the brain. He recovered from this attack in a measure, and regained his usual mental vigour. But his vitality was exhausted, and he died at his Observatory, only three days before the meeting of the British Association, (held in Birmingham in September, 1865), in which he had fully intended to have taken part.

Four memoirs of him have been published. The first appeared, when he was but thirty-seven, in the number of the *Dublin University Magazine* for January, 1842: i. e., a year and three-quarters before the invention of Quaternions. This was from the pen of Hamilton's friend, (brother of the present Bishop of Limerick), the Rev. R. P. Graves, and was accompanied by a portrait. The next two memoirs were published *immediately* after his death, viz., one in the number of the *Gentleman's Magazine* for January, 1866, from the pen of Professor De Morgan; and one in the *Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society*, February 9th, 1866, by their then president, C. Pritchard, Esq. The last and most able, though not the most detailed, recording Hamilton's life and writings, was from the pen of Prof. P. G. Tait, of Edinburgh, and appeared in the number of the *North British Review*, for September, 1866.

Besides the copper-plate engraving prefixed to the first of these memoirs, there is a daguerreotype of Sir William, and his lady and family, in the possession of his widow; and there are marble busts of him in the possession of Lord Dunraven, and Lord Talbot de Malahide. All these have been photographed as *cartes de visite*.

The brain of Hamilton was enormous. The forehead, inadequately shown in these portraits, was broad and massive. The eye was full and imaginative, and the orbits protruded with phrenological power, giving hints of linguistic, artistic, and mathematical talent. "Casualty" was large, "Comparison" and "Veneration" very large. The development is of the highest type of *pure* mathematical power, of which the heads of Cayley, Sylvester, and W. K. Clifford, are also remarkable examples. The last, though but a young man of six and twenty, is of the foremost rank as a geometer, and gives promise of being the Hamilton of the future. May he, like his great predecessor, labour, and be fruitful. It is understood that a life of Hamilton, by the Rev. R. P. Graves, will shortly be published. It will certainly be of the highest interest, as well for a literary merits as for the unique and splendid genius whose life, character, intellect, and works it will commemorate.

Religion.

DO THE SCRIPTURES FAVOUR OR OPPOSE THE IDEA OF THE NATURAL IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—VI.

ONE of the first things necessary in discussing a question like this is a definition of terms. For want of this the present debate has been marked by much confusion and irrelevancy.

The term *soul* is used in at least four different senses in the Scriptures. First, it designates the thinking, reasoning, non-material part of man—the part that survives the death of the body, as in Rev. vi. 9, and Rev. xx. 4. Secondly, it is used in the sense of man, person, individual, as in Lev. v. 1–5, where the words *soul*, *man*, *he*, *him*, are used as the equivalents of each other. Thirdly, it is used in the sense of *life*—i. e., the life of the body (Matt. x. 39; xvi. 25; Luke xvii. 33; John xii. 25). In all these places the Greek word is *ψυχη*, *soul*, rendered in our translation *life*. Fourthly, it is used to designate a human being when dead. Thus, Numb. vi. 6, “He shall come at no dead body,” is, in the Hebrew, “no dead soul;” Numb. ix. 6, “And there were certain men who were defiled by the dead body of a man,” is in like manner, “by the dead soul of a man.” In which of these four senses, then, is the term *soul* used in the question under debate? Most certainly in the *first*, and in that only, and not in any one of the other three. Consequently those passages of Scripture in which this term is employed in the second or in the third sense have no bearing on the question, and the arguments founded thereon need no other answer. And hence D. R. M. need not have troubled himself to establish a difference between *soul* and *spirit*, because, for the purposes of this debate, they are synonymous; they both alike designate the thinking, reasoning, non-material part of man.

Immortality. A definition of this term is necessary to the clearness of discussion, and especially after the strange connections in which it has been placed by some of the writers. Thus, P. O. S. talks of the “immortality of sin!” and “the eternal immortality of the wicked!” And another gravely tells us, “The immortality taught in the Scriptures is a new life!” while a third speaks of “immortal punishment!” As one who takes the affirmative of the question under consideration, I mean by *immortality*, not *indestructibility*, not *eternity*, not *endless duration*, not *future happiness*, not necessarily *endless existence*; but simply non-liability to death,

or an *adaptation* to endless conscious existence. By *natural* I mean that which arises out of the attributes of man's nature as created. So that by "natural immortality" I mean an adaptation to endless existence, arising out of the attributes of man's nature, and which will necessarily issue in endless conscious existence, unless prevented by some preternatural cause.

This definition consists of two parts, and they are both endorsed by the writers who take the negative. First, they admit that the soul of man, as it came from the hands of its Creator, was naturally immortal. Secondly, they maintain that a preternatural cause has intervened to prevent this issue of the natural powers of the soul.

On the first point P. O. S. writes:—"Man, originally gifted and endowed with an immortal soul which God breathed into him, transgressed," &c. Again, "The soul has lost its immortal nature through sin." F. W. says, "Its life was God's image; by the loss of that holy and pure likeness death was incurred." Inasmuch, then, as the soul of man was *created* in God's image, this "life" was natural to it—i. e., it was naturally immortal. Further quotations are unnecessary. We all agree on this point, that the soul of man, as it came from the hands of its Creator, was naturally immortal.

The debate, then, is now narrowed to the second point; and on this our opponents take the affirmative. Here, then, we ask, first, what cause has intervened to prevent the natural powers of the soul issuing in endless conscious existence? Secondly, when did it so intervene? Thirdly, why did it so intervene? To the first inquiry they answer, "God." And we grant that if the soul has been deprived of its natural immortality, it must have been by the intervention of the Deity; for, as none but He could have conferred such a prerogative, so none but He could have taken it away. We, however, deny that He *has done* any such thing, and fearlessly assert that not a single passage in the Bible will, when fairly interpreted, warrant the opinion that He *has*.

To the second and third questions the answers of our opponents are confused and contradictory. First, they assign the sin of Adam as marking the *time* and showing the *reason* why God deprived the soul of its natural immortality. But in the same breath, and even in the same sentence, they assign *our own sin* as the reason for this punitive intervention. Thus P. O. S. assigns Adam's sin in the following words:—"If we accept the doctrine of the Scriptures, that by the first sin the natural immortality of the soul was forfeited, that thereafter all men became 'dead in trespasses and sin.'" But in the following sentences, if his words have any meaning, he assigns both Adam's sin and our own,—"*As all men inherit this sinful nature, all men inherit this soul of death. Thus, those who sin, or inherit a sinful nature, and practise sinful works, lose the power of life, and go down to the grave as the blackness of darkness for ever.*" What is the meaning of "sinful nature"? I know what is meant by sinful man, sinful action, sinful thought, &c.; but *sinful*

nature, as Dr. Payne says, "is an anomaly in thought, and a solecism in language." The same with "soul of death." What does it mean? Why not lay aside such incongruous combinations of words, and write plain English? But if we "inherit this soul of death" because we "inherit this sinful nature," which means, I suppose, that our souls are mortal—doomed to die, in consequence of our natural connection with Adam; then how can "the power of life" be lost by those "who sin and practise sinful works"? How can they *lose* what they never possessed? Does not P. O. S. see that the two reasons assigned by him for the loss of the soul's natural immortality are contradictory? If it were lost for the whole human race by the first sin—the sin of Adam, then it has never been in the possession of the race since, and consequently no man has ever had the least chance of losing it by any "sinful works" of his own.

P. W. B. falls into the same contradiction; indeed, it is involved in the whole of the reasoning employed on the negative side, as far as it bears on this part of the subject. He says, "I think I am warranted by the express statements of Scripture to say that death has become the natural fate of man; that as all have sinned they cannot now possess or enjoy life by nature, but only of grace." By *death* being "the natural fate of man," I understand him to mean that death has passed upon all men as the result or consequence of the one man's sin. *That* is the cause to which it is always assigned in the Scriptures, "in Adam all die." But P. W. B. understands this of the soul as well as the body; and thus traces the death of the soul, or the loss of its natural immortality, to the sin of Adam. When, however, he adds, "that as all have sinned they cannot now possess or enjoy everlasting life by nature," he assigns another reason,—viz., the sins of each particular man, as the reason why everlasting life, in the sense of endless conscious existence, cannot be naturally possessed by him.

Now these gentlemen are at liberty to take which of these positions they choose, but they cannot take both. They may attribute the loss of the natural immortality of the soul to Adam's sin, or to our own; but as the positions are mutually destructive, I presume they will see that they cannot defend both. I am satisfied they cannot defend either; but, certainly, one must be surrendered.

Judging from the general tenor of their papers, I conclude that our opponents will prefer the position so distinctly enunciated by P. O. S., "That by the first sin the natural immortality of the soul was forfeited," &c.; and by F. W., "Its life was God's image; by the loss of that holy and pure likeness death was incurred;" and thus will attribute the mortality of the soul to the sin of Adam rather than take the other ground, and attribute it in every instance to our own. They will thus escape a difficulty, arising out of the case of children who have never sinned.

In taking their stand upon the sin of Adam, then, they surrender the other part of their argument, and thereby admit that all the

passages of Scripture which they have quoted in support of it, such as, "The soul that sinneth, it shall die," are irrelevant and misapplied, and are therefore withdrawn. A refutation is thus rendered unnecessary.

The whole question, then, is now narrowed down to this: Was the natural immortality of the soul forfeited by Adam's sin? Our opponents say "Yes." In addition to previous quotations, I again adduce F. W. He writes, "By the very fact of sin 'death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned.' True, God in His mercy did not exact instant death, but death passed upon the soul." This is a fair specimen, both of their Scripture quotations and of their reasoning. What St. Paul wrote (Rom. v. 12) respecting the body they, contrary to all sound exegesis, apply to the soul; and, not content with the reason he assigns for that death,—viz., the sin of Adam, "By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin;" "By one man's offence death reigned," they introduce another—our own sin, under cover of the words, "For that all have sinned." They do not seem to perceive that they are making the apostle contradict himself.

Let any one who can, turn to the Greek of Rom. v. 12, and he will find $\epsilon\phi'$ $\tilde{\epsilon}\mu$ translated "for that;" but a little consideration will show that it is a mistranslation. These words cannot point to a reason for what has just been stated—viz., "Death has passed upon all men," because the reason of that has been already assigned—a reason which this would contradict. $\epsilon\phi'$ $\tilde{\epsilon}\mu$ mean, upon which, beside which, in addition to which, and are equivalent to *moreover*; and they introduce a new statement—a further part of the apostle's argument. The passage, then, should stand, "And so death passed upon all men. Moreover, all have sinned; for until the law sin was in the world," &c., and thus the passage is relieved of an apparent contradiction, and our opponents of a proof-text, which has only helped to confuse them.

But, in their anxiety to prove that the death to which the whole human race is subjected through Adam, includes the soul as well as the body, they have forgotten that "as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." That, consequently, the life in Christ is co-extensive with the death in Adam; that, as the latter includes the race, so does the former; that, if the one includes the soul, so does the other; and that, if our own personal acts and deserts had nothing to do with causing the one, then they can have nothing to do with procuring the other. As St. Paul says (Rom. v. 18), "Therefore as by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life." Whatever, then, in the shape of life, the race lost in Adam it has regained in Christ, and more, as I believe: for "where sin abounded, grace did much more abound," says St. Paul; but "not so," say our opponents; for they maintain that the sin of one man deprived us of our natural immortality six thousand years before we were born, or had

done good or evil; and they deny that Christ restores it to any except the few who believe in Him. Does not this show the unscriptural character of their theory? Where does grace abound in it?

But, says F. W., "Its life was God's image; by the loss of that holy and pure likeness death was incurred." Supposing, then, God's image to be lost, how does F. W. prove that that loss involves the loss of the natural immortality of the soul any more than it does the loss of its rationality? We know that its rationality was not forfeited by the loss of God's image; on what ground does F. W. conclude that its immortality was? He appears to have gained this conclusion by a jump. "I know," he says, "it was in the very essential nature of man's being that the soul that sinneth it shall die; for then it no longer bore the image of God;" but "the very essential nature of man's being" is to me a heap of words, of which I can make nothing, except by rejecting one-half of them. And, then, the reason he assigns why "The soul that sinneth it shall die"—viz., "for then it no longer bore the image of God," proves nothing for him, unless F. W. can first show that while the "image of God" includes the immortality of the soul it does not include its rationality. I, however, maintain that it does, and that a being created without reason, no matter what its shape and other attributes, cannot bear the image of God. F. W.'s statement, then, if it were true, in the sense in which he makes it, would be capable of standing thus: "It was in the very essential nature of man's being that the soul that sinneth it shall lose its rationality, for then it no longer bore the image of God." And the fact that it would be glaringly false when so placed shows what truth there is in it now.

But where did F. W. learn that man has *lost* the image of God? He professes *not* to look at the Scriptures through "catechisms, creeds, confessions, and articles, put on our minds like coloured and peculiar spectacles." Yet he evidently looks at them through some distorting medium. I find St. Paul saying (1 Cor. xi. 7), "For a man indeed ought not to cover his head, forasmuch as he is the image and glory of God." And St. James says, chapter iii. 9, "Therewith bless we God, even the Father, and therewith curse we men, which are made after the similitude of God." St. Paul uses the word *εἰκών*, *image*; St. James uses *ὁμοίωσιν*, *likeness*. These are the very two words employed in the Septuagint (Gen. i. 26); so that between them the two apostles assert that man is still in the "image and likeness of God." What, then, becomes of the argument that we have lost our natural immortality through losing the image of God? It is a failure every way. The image of God was not so faintly impressed as F. W. and others suppose; and the natural immortality of the soul is as safe now as it was before Adam sinned; and they who maintain the contrary maintain not a scriptural truth, but a figment of their own imagination.

The very foundations of their reasoning being thus removed, their superstructure of Scripture passages falls of itself. J. C.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—VII.

"The rejoinder [Jesus's] to which will bring a just sentence upon both parties, by giving justly to those that have done well an *everlasting fruition*; but allotting to the lovers of wicked works *eternal punishment*. To these belong the *unquenchable fire*, and that without end, and a certain fiery worm never dying, and not destroying the body, but continuing its eruption out of the body with never-ceasing grief."—*Josephus's dis. con. Hades.*

IN considering the above it will behove us to be very careful and to keep strictly to the subject,—that is, the "natural immortality of the soul." It is not for us to ask, "If a man die, shall he live again?" or whether, when a man's body crumbles in the dust, shall he in a material or other form live for a limited time? On this point we are agreed: those who do not believe that the Scriptures favour the idea of the natural immortality of the soul will not deny the general resurrection of the *just* and the *unjust* at the day of judgment. But rather, if a man die shall his soul or spirit live (in the fullest sense of the word) for *ever and ever*? We of the orthodox school believe the language of our blessed Saviour—"Marvel not at this: for the hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves shall hear His voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil unto the resurrection of damnation" (John v. 28, 29); "Come, ye blessed of My Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world. Depart from Me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels" (Matt. xxv. 34, 41), to mean, in the fullest sense, that the just shall at the resurrection morn "inherit the kingdom," with its many mansions, and enjoy perfect happiness and peace, and live for ever with Him, their Saviour, "who liveth and was dead." At the same time we also believe that the righteous judgment, and the sentence pronounced upon the unjust, in the fullest sense, that the wicked "shall come forth unto the resurrection of damnation," which is to "depart into *everlasting fire*," and to live, or rather, to have an eternal existence with the devil and his angels. In short, we believe in an everlasting life of joy and happiness for the righteous, but for the wicked a life of pain, "eternal damnation" (Mark iii. 29), and "everlasting burnings" (Isa. xxxiii. 14). Those of the opposite opinion agree so far as the immortality of the righteous are concerned, but differ concerning the wicked. They say "that the just anger, punishments, and judgments of God, as expressed in the above quotations and others, signify and support the belief of an everlasting punishment of annihilation, that is, an eternal punishment that shall ultimately end in the annihilation of the soul of unregenerate man." It is then, when we approach the solemn account of the day of judgment—when Christ the Judge says to the wicked, "Depart from Me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire," using the strongest expression to describe the per-

petuity of the punishment—that a difference of opinion arises, and those of the opposite opinion begin to doubt, and exclaim, “Surely this cannot be. Man in his natural state is mortal. If so, then surely this awful denunciation, ‘*into everlasting fire*,’ must mean in a limited sense a period or age which shall end in annihilation.”

“If we accept the doctrine of Scripture that by the first sin the natural immortality of the soul was forfeited” (says P. O. S., p. 290). If this was the doctrine of Scripture we would accept it, but I am prepared to say that it is an error, a *false doctrine*, which opposes the profound and awful truth of eternal punishment. It is admitted that man in his primeval state of purity was immortal. And we have every reason to suppose had our first parents not broken the commandment of God they would have lived. But in an evil hour, Satan, in the form of a serpent, in subtle but in winning words, excited vain curiosity in the mind of Eve, and then said, “Ye shall not surely die,” in direct opposition to the word of God, “In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die.” We know the consequence of the above deceit of Satan, but how was the word of the Lord fulfilled? The ground was cursed, and the Lord said to Adam, “In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, *till thou return* unto the ground; for out of it wast thou taken; for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return.”

It is very evident from this that no sentence was passed on Adam's immortal existence, no farther than a separation from God; but even here he had a hope of a future reconciliation with God, through a Mediator, who should come of the seed of the woman. Was his soul or spirit annihilated? No. The sentence of God, “Thou shalt surely die,” will be seen clearly to refer to the body, which became mortal, and returned, in due time, to the dust from whence it came. Satan, the father of lies, used an expression which could be rendered in two different ways; and in one sense was strictly true, and as a *truth* used to convey a *lie*. “Ye shall not surely die,” said he, intending to instil into the hearts of our first parents, that should they eat the fruit they should remain as they were before, with the additional knowledge of being like unto gods. The bait took, and man became subject to natural death of the body. Yet, still, “Ye shall not surely die” was true so far as it related to the spirit, the essence of life, the breath of God, in man. The spirit either would live for ever in separation from God, under eternal damnation, or through the great mercy of God in sending Christ our Saviour, that we might be joint-heirs with Him, and partakers of “eternal life,” which is a “new spirit and a new heart,” to live with Him for ever and ever.

Not only do the Scriptures here favour the idea of the natural immortality of the soul, that even the opposite opinion would deny that Christ has made a *full* atonement for sin. If man, through original sin, lost his immortality or eternal existence, how can Christ make a *full* atonement? how can He *pay* our debt? how can He *bear* our punishment? Surely our Saviour did not suffer

annihilation, which *is said* to be *our* punishment? But rather, is it not, as the Scriptures have it, "For what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh" (Rom. viii. 3); "And being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross" (Phil. ii. 8); "For verily he took not on him the nature of angels; but he took on him the seed of Abraham. Wherefore in all things . . . to be made like unto his brethren . . . to make reconciliation for the sins of the people" (Heb. ii. 16, 17); "Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned" (Rom. v. 12.)

So that if we believe that there is only one sacrifice for sin, and that a full atonement has been made, it clearly proves that the punishment for sin was, that the natural body should die, but the spirit should depart from the presence of God.

There is one verse in the Scriptures, which perhaps above all others at first sight seems to favour the view of the non-immortality of the *soul*, and has, as such, been brought forward by P. O. S. (p. 289); it is, "the soul that sinneth, it shall die." The word here rendered *soul* does not mean the *spirit* of the man independent of the body, but *the man* in his natural form, and might have been rendered *person*, as in the following:—"When a man or woman shall commit any sin that men commit . . . and that person (soul) be guilty" (Numb. v. 6); "A man that doeth violence to the blood of any *person* (soul) shall flee to the pit" (Prov. xxviii. 17); and also in the following the same rendering is used, and it will be seen clearly to mean *person*,—Abraham took "the *souls* that they had gotten in Haran" (Gen. xii. 15); "Few, that is, eight *souls* were saved by water" (1 Pet. iii. 20). Even suppose, for sake of argument, that the word rendered *soul* means man's *spirit*—his existence—what is gained by the expression, "it shall die?" Nothing. Scriptures *nowhere* teaches that to die is annihilation. The death of the righteous is spoken of as a *sleep*, or as the putting off an old garment preparatory to putting on a new one (*see* 1 Cor. xv. 18, and 2 Cor. v. 1—4); that of the unrighteous as dying in their sins, without hope, and rising again to judgment. And even the judgment on the wicked of "*eternal death*" does not favour the non-eternity of *their existence*. God in his revealed word, in the strongest as well as in the most definite language, which it is possible for us to understand, declared that the punishment of the wicked is eternal—without end; consequently is a sound argument that the Scriptures favour the idea of the immortality of the natural soul of man. It is written, "I saw the dead small and great stand before God. . . . And the sea gave up the dead which were in it, and death and hell (the grave) delivered up the dead which were in them. . . . And death and hell were cast into the lake of fire" (Rev. xx. 12—14) "burning with brimstone"

(Rev. xix. 20); "It shall not be *quenched night nor day*; the smoke thereof shall go up *for ever*; from *generation to generation* it shall lie waste; none shall pass through it *for ever and ever*" (Isa. xxiv. 10). The same figure is used, and the same truth is clearly and emphatically set forth in Revelation:—"And the smoke of *their* torment ascendeth up *for ever and ever*; and *they* have no rest day nor night" (Rev. xiv. 11). In fact, our Saviour has clearly shown in the most explicit and forcible language this sad and awful truth, that not only will the punishment of the wicked be eternal, but that man's existence will also be eternal. Our Saviour, in His reply to John, gives a caution, no less than *three* times, to beware of that place "where *their* worm *dieth* not, and the fire is not quenched." What more solemn and awful truth could we gather from these words than the above, that man's existence is eternal? What language is more antagonistic to the idea of annihilation than the above text? I maintain that this *alone* is sufficient to prove that man's soul—his existence—"the worm"—is immortal!

It is said by P. O. S. (p. 200), "The eternal immortality of wicked spirits, however brought about or permitted, would be the eternity of evil," and argues that "if all things are made subject to Him," they must either "be made good, or else all that is not good must die, disappear, and become as though it never had been." I agree so far with P. O. S. when he says, "To suppose that all souls would, after a lapse of ages, be made good, would be either to reinstitute purgatory or to advocate universalism;" but with his former view I decidedly disagree. I am no advocate for universalism, and I am inclined to think that P. O. S. is nearer that view than we are. The very argument he uses contradicts his statement, "If they are made subject to Christ." How can there be sin? "For *sin* is the transgression of the law" (1 John iii. 4). They are not in the position to transgress against the law; they are not "the sin," but only the former workers of iniquity, who are now suffering eternal punishment. But the most important of all is, that the same expression—the very same words, are used to denote the eternal existence of Almighty God, His saints, and the duration of the punishment of the wicked. In support of this I give an extract:—

"The following texts are selected out of many, showing that the three different words or modes of expression in the Greek Testament, which are translated 'eternal,' 'for ever,' and 'for ever and ever,' are, each of them, used to express the eternity of God's existence, the believer's blessedness, and the punishment of unbelievers and of wicked spirits in hell:—

'I. *αιωνιος*.—Eternal, or everlasting.

'The commandment of the *everlasting* God.' (Rom. xvi. 26.)

'God who hath given us *everlasting* consolation.' (2 Thess. ii. 16.)

'To be cast into *everlasting* fire.' (Matt. xviii. 8.)

'*Everlasting* fire prepared for the devil and his angels.' (Matt. xxv. 41.)

‘II. εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα.*—For ever.

‘The Son abideth *for ever*.’ (John viii. 35.)‘Whoso eateth of this bread shall *live for ever*.’ (John vi. 51.)‘To whom is reserved the *blackness of darkness for ever*.’ (Jude 13.)

‘III. εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων.—For ever and ever.

‘God, who *liveth for ever and ever*.’ (Rev. xv. 7.)‘They shall *reign for ever and ever*.’ (Rev. xxii. 5.)‘The smoke of their torment ascendeth *for ever and ever*.’ (Rev. xiv. 11.)‘The devil—shall be *tormented for ever and ever*.’ (Rev. xx. 10.)

“From the testimony of these scriptures the conclusion is inevitable, that any attempt to limit the duration of future punishment involves the limitation of God’s existence, and of His people’s blessedness.”—(“Eternal Life or Eternal Punishment.” Partridge, 9, Paternoster Row.)

Even as the doctrine of universalism teaches that punishment of the wicked will be only for a limited period, and then they shall be delivered from their torments and made partakers and joint-heirs with Christ; and thus nullifies the awful punishment for sin, makes little of the heinous guilt of sin, degrades the great atonement made by Jesus on account of sin, and, more important than all, makes men to become careless about the salvation of their souls, and is in reality a *religion of procrastination*. So is the view that the soul of man is *mortal*—that it has no eternal existence, like the above doctrine of universalism. What a great encouragement to sin! Maintain the doctrine of annihilation, and what is there to fear? What a beautiful dream to imagine that, after having been one of the most licentious and profligate characters here, we should be annihilated—“to become as though we never had been”! (p. 290). The aim of both these *dangerous doctrines* is to lighten and nullify the *justice and judgment* of Almighty God!

Although the natural soul of man has *eternal existence*, yet it has not in the scriptural sense “*eternal life*.” Christ, having paid the full penalty for sin, becomes our Mediator between God and man; He alone brings in the fullest sense “immortality to light,” that even the natural body of His saints, in which sin has entered into the world, when “it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body,” though “sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption,” and made like unto His glorious body that knew no sin.

GEORGIUS D. E.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

“It is most remarkable,” says an elegant and able writer, “how the alternative of *life or death* is broad-stamped upon the Scriptures, Old and New, from the fall: ‘in the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die,’ to the declaration of Paul, ‘the

* This form of the word is not used in the New Testament in reference to the punishment of the devil.

wages of sin is death,' the reward, 'eternal life.'"^{*} Life is, in Scripture, always contrasted with death, as two opposites having dependence on the holiness on the one hand, or the sinfulness on the other, of the responsible creature, man. Love is the law of life, and love to God in Christ Jesus is the very life of the soul. Every soul by sinfulness becomes dead in proportion to its power over or its dominion in the soul. Everything that properly fulfils its object in creation lives and improves, but everything which is left to rust unused or is misemployed, deteriorates and dies—so that it is literally the law of God, patent to observation, that "to him who hath shall be given, and from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath."

"Sin," say the Westminster divines, "is *any* want of conformity unto, or transgression of, the law of God." The laws of God are ordained unto life, and are only found to be unto death unto those who break them. Bodily death to those who do not observe the laws of bodily sanity, and spiritual death to those who neglect the laws of the spirit's life. If God did not take pleasure in His work, it would be to rob Him of His omnipotence to suppose that he could not bid it cease to exist. Science tells us that arrested force transmutes itself into flame. The rapidity of a condemnatory decree would equal that of "Let there be light." It is by His power put forth in love that the universe as a whole, and in its separate parts, moves in harmony and joy. If the opinions of S. S. were to prevail, what could man think of the Deity? Evil would be declared to be eternal, God would not be All in all. The spirits of evil would vanquish divine love. Sin would be eternal; it would no longer be an accident of humanity, but an essential and integral portion of the universe of God. Now, "who can dwell in everlasting burnings?" has been asked by a prophet, and may be asked with profit. If God can destroy evil and will not, can he be the God of love, even of everlasting love? If He will and cannot, is He the Almighty? This is the dilemma into which we get by accepting the doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul. But if we do not accept that doctrine of philosophy, but the plain scriptural statement that holiness is the life of the soul, and while possibilities of holiness exist, the soul is spared; that sin is death, and that when the soul is wholly given over to sin, it perishes; we avoid any such incongruity in thought.

The fact is that the doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul of man is a Platonic corruption of Scripture teaching. The early Platonists were not willing, in their arrogance, to submit to the plain teaching of Scripture, and to learn "what the Spirit saith unto the churches," but they so modified their doctrines as in some instances to supersede Christianity; they stooped to conquer, and did so for a time, but they have since been conquered and compelled to stoop before the might of those who, like St. Paul, "reasoned with them out of the Scriptures." This intermixture

^{*} Gilbert Sutton, "Science and Faith," p. 214.

of the speculations of philosophy with the vital doctrines of the Christian faith has worked much evil among men, has given rise to philosophical, not Christian but anti-Christian, speculations on predestination and election, heaping clouds upon clouds of misty commentary on the plain words of the Most High, who spake as never man spake, not only with authority, but with clearness. Scripture represents men as dead in their sins, and as made alive again through the righteousness of Christ, if they are His disciples. Life is originally a gift, not a right, and now the life eternal is also a gift and a privilege, and death is no more death, because of the far more, even the exceeding weight of glory which the Saviour bestows upon those who rejoice in Him.

S. S. has been singularly infelicitous in quoting Gen. ii. 7, as having any influence in this argument; and D. U. M., the opener of the debate, is equally unfortunate in his reference to the same passage, as an authoritative foundation for his thesis. The passage has been misunderstood by these writers, because they have impressed on the words of Scripture their idea of the word *soul*. But the word in the original, which is in this verse translated *soul*, is in the same chapter ii., at verse 19, rendered "living creature." We have the same Hebrew phrase, in the first chapter of Genesis, translated "creature that hath life" (ver. 20), and "living creature" in verses 20 and 21 in relation and with reference to the lower species of animals. We see, therefore, that this passage does not refer to the *rational* or *reasoning* spirit of man, that portion of his nature which distinguishes him from the brutes, and links him in nature to the higher intelligences; it refers to the capacity of organic motion and sensation, to animal not spiritual life. The action of breathing, therefore, simply refers to God's imparting to man natural life, making him, not a dead inanimate mass of dust, but "a living creature." In regard to this passage, the theory of S. S. and of D. U. M. is not at all supported by Scripture; and H. K. is still further wrong when he affirms that what was then given to man was "an everliving soul." If this were so, H. K. would require to accept as a rider to his argument that all the other beings whom God constituted as "living creatures" were also possessed of a natural immortality, and hence that the future state is reserved for all the "living creatures" which "live, move, and have their being" on the earth.

But we may well ask our opponents now one or two questions which may bring them to estimate the proper state of the debate as it stands. If man's soul was naturally immortal, why did God plant in the garden of Eden "a tree of life," having such power that those who ate of it should live for ever, even in opposition to the desire (if we may so say without profanity) of the Divine Being himself? For it was lest our first parents should put forth their hand and take of that tree and live that God drove them from the garden, and planted His cherubim as guards to keep it every way. Does this not prove that Deity dreaded (shall we

say ?), at least, foresaw and wished to prevent the possibility of the evil of sinners having immortal life; and show that man was not, even as at first created, endowed with an immortal soul? If it does not, how can we account for the guarding of the tree of life to prevent him from being able to live for ever, if he was already endowed with "an everliving soul"? "Death came by sin," sin is the *sting* of death, but the spirit was only allotted life so long as it remained free from sin, and so "death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned." This is the state of the soul now if it abide in sin, and have no part in the inheritance of the Lord Jesus Christ, communicated to believers as a gift of grace, and not as a matter of right. Of every such soul the doom is this, "Dying thou shalt die;" no more life shall be granted to failures in God's vineyard, cut it down, why cumbereth it the ground? The principle of natural life is obedience, that of spiritual life is faith; those who believe in Christ shall do so to the saving of their souls—from what? from the death which awaits all those who do not live the life of faith.

Life is granted to man for a purpose, not a punishment. The purpose of human life is God's glory. But God's glory cannot co-exist with the eternal existence of evil. Christ is not only to be "All" but "in all." He cannot be so in the wicked, who are outcast from His presence into a life of such a sort that it can have no part or lot in the redemption of Jesus offered to sinners who confess and believe. So it is that "the wicked is reserved for the day of destruction; they shall be brought forth to the day of wrath"—they cannot see God and live.

If man was immortal by prerogative of creation, his immortality remained in him notwithstanding his sin, and could neither be increased nor replaced by eating of the tree of life; but if he was immortal only conditionally on obedience, and had sinned, there was danger. The Scriptures show that if he obeyed, Adam was to live; if he disobeyed, he was to die; and this was the law for himself and his posterity. He did sin, and therefore became mortal or subject to death. This is singularly confirmed by the statement regarding the tree of life and the need of taking precautions lest by any means these sinners should become immortal, and so perpetuate the existence of sin in the presence of God. Besides, in Gen. ii. 17, God says, "In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die;" how could Deity so represent matters if man's death was an impossibility, on account of the immortality granted to him at his creation and inherent in his nature? If we take the Hebrew phrase in its literal rendering, this becomes even more pertinent; for then the phrase runs "dying thou shalt die," i. e., having ceased to be, no after life shall be vouchsafed. "Dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return,"—there is no promise of soul life after death, but an utter and entire exclusion of any idea that Adam possessed any inherent natural immortality of soul.

TH. N.

DOES FREE THOUGHT LEAD TO INFIDELITY?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

"For though it is highly right, and the most pious exercise of our understanding, to inquire with due reverence into the ends and reasons of God's dispensations, yet when those reasons are concealed, to argue from our ignorance that such dispensations cannot be from God is infinitely absurd."—*Bishop Butler*.

"For it is not reason, but experience which instructs us."—*Bishop Butler*.

If there is one subject more than another that should be free from dogmatical expressions and conclusions, it should be the above. I was exceedingly sorry to read the following:—"There could not be a greater libel on God or on Christianity than to affirm that 'free thought leads to infidelity,' if by infidelity we are to understand distrust of revealed truth" (p. 35). Surely our opponent, L. L., must have forgotten that there were *two sides* to the question; both of us are seeking the truth, and I am sure if L. L. had considered his statement for a few moments, he would not have so positively affirmed that we, who assert that "free thought leads to infidelity," libelled not only Christianity but God. I would as soon have taken the *negative* side of the question as the affirmative: if the former, I should have maintained that freedom of thought, *governed* by the "word of God" as the *rule of faith*, and tried by an *impartial* judgment, was the most powerful antagonist to infidelity; but, on the other hand, if we take "free thought" in its fullest sense, unrestricted by any rule of faith or standard, with the exception of the *free-thinker's* often-repeated query, "Is it a fact?" which, if tested at all to his satisfaction, must be something to be seen—something *real*, and might be summed up in "seeing is believing," it consequently leads to the infidel theory of materialism, which denies the existence of spirit; therefore of necessity "free thought," left to wander in the region of imagination, is a sure *route* to infidelity. Although infidelity is a negation, which denies and doubts the truth of revelation, yet still it will substitute some theory in the place of that rejected, which it affirms to be the truth. The old school of Atheism is almost entirely supplanted by a new school of "religious thought," upheld by such men as Newman, Maurice, Theodore Parker, Rénan, and their German compeers the Neologists, who represent the Bible to be a merely human production, written at different periods of time by men who desired to improve and elevate their fellow-men in knowledge and morals—by devout men who desired to impart more correct, worthy, and influential views of God, but at the same time were fallible and erring. In fact, the general definition of infidelity—that it is the unbelief of salvation—is not sufficiently definite to explain fully the meaning of modern infidelity. These modern *free-thinkers* do not absolutely deny that there is a God, neither do they disbelieve all revelation; but that the Bible is not the word of God, though the

word of God in greater or less proportion forms part of the composition of the Bible; or as the Rev. Dr. Henry B. Wilson, one of the authors of "Essays and Reviews," writes,—“The word of God is contained in Scripture, whence it does not follow it is co-extensive with it.” It will be seen from this that the infidelity of these “Christian Deists” (men of the highest intellectual powers, profound thinkers, and holding high positions in the Christian Church) consists in their denying the Bible to be entirely the word of God, its infallibility, and its sufficiency as the rule of faith. And as they came to this conclusion after a professedly critical examination and inquiry, I think it is a strong proof that free thought unchecked leads to infidelity.

How can L. L. make these assertions *agree*? He says (p. 36), “That substantive thing, infidelity, which is simply *no belief*, is a proof against itself that free thought spurns the boundaries of uncertainty and doubt.” Yet he states immediately before the above, that thought is so affirmative, it makes “its negations positive, and forms a creed out of its distrusts” (*its doubts*). The first part I think I have proved is not entirely a *no belief*, but a mixture of truth and error, and what L. L. has applied to *thought* I can with equal truth apply to infidelity. So that my third proof, that “Free thought leads to infidelity,” is that *both* free thought and infidelity tend to “make *their* negations positive, and to form a creed out of their distrusts.”

How far, I would ask L. L., can *free thought*, a *free idea*, or a *free imagination* go? Is there anything *too deep* in this world that free thought *would not* fathom? or any theory it *would not* investigate? If not, then surely *infidelity* is not so far off, that “however freely thought may exert itself in investigation,” it would not enter into *its domains*. Yea, I believe had free thought the power it would be *ready* to search and examine that which God has evidently kept back for some wise purpose.

“ Shall foolish, weak, short-sighted man
Beyond archangels go,
The great Almighty God explain,
Or to perfection know?”

There are many themes in Scripture which we now only see “through a glass darkly;” and it is the usual activity of free thought to investigate those subjects which *are not* so clearly revealed to us, and to bring them, if it were possible, to the *thinking* of the puny *reason of man*, forgetting that “God’s thoughts are higher than our thoughts,” that *free thought* opposes God, whereas even in investigation it should be *held in subjection* to His almighty wisdom; consequently in this free thought leads to infidelity. “For vain man would be wise, though man be born like a wild ass’s colt” (Job xi. 12). And well might Zophar the Naamathite ask, in answer to Job’s complaint and self-justification, the query, “Canst thou by searching find out God? canst thou find out the

Almighty unto perfection? It is as high as heaven; what canst thou do? deeper than hell; what canst thou know?" Yet if we maintain the affirmative side of the question, L. L. says we must of necessity hold "that there is a lying spirit in the universe more powerful and more widely prevailing than the God who granted to man as his birthright both free thought and free will." I must say *free thought* has led L. L. to some very strange conclusions; for it must have been *very free thought* that led L. L. to imagine that they who believed that free thought leads to infidelity were of necessity *also* to believe that there was a lying spirit more powerful than God. No one could have entered into this discussion, either *pro* or *con.*, without acknowledging the word of God as our standard and rule of judgment; and as Holy Scripture emphatically teaches, so we believe in what God said, "I am the first, and I am the last; and beside Me there is no God (Isa. xlv. 6).

That God gave man "as his birthright both free thought and free will," I admit; but this is no sound argument in favour of the negative side of the question; it does not prevent man with *his free will* from sinning, or *free thought* from infidelity, neither does it justify him in so doing. Perhaps we have not a greater scriptural illustration of the above than in the case of man's fall in the garden of Eden. When Satan, in the form of a serpent, *reasoned* with Eve, and said, "Ye shall not surely die," what were the thoughts of Eve? Were they not reasonable (according to man's reason)? Had she not a right, as a *free* agent, and as a possessor of a *free thinking power*, to investigate and try whether what the serpent had said was true? Eve's free thought told her "that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise." I need not repeat the consequences which followed, we all know these too well; but it is wise to learn the lesson which the above teaches and shows, that free thought leads to infidelity. Had Adam and Eve kept free thought in subjection, under restraint to the "word of God," it is possible sin would not have entered into the world.

Do the Scriptures oppose free thought? If free thought investigates the truth of a statement by man's reason *only*, then the Scriptures oppose it; but, on the other hand, if free thought appeals to "the law and to the testimony—if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them," or to "Thus saith the Lord," and even when reason or understanding fails to comprehend the meaning or to explain the cause, we still hold to "the Word;" then Scripture does not oppose free thought. It is in the latter sense that the texts quoted by L. L. refer; in fact, L. L. in his first quotation and comment has very clearly set this forth; he says (p. 37), "'Search the Scriptures' for the things on which the Scripture is an authority." If L. L. had only tested each of the texts quoted, and his comments upon them by his first rule, "on which Scripture is an authority," I am certain he could only have said the following, that "'Come, let us *reason* together ;'

is surely an invitation to the freest thought—is a perfect enfranchisement of reason,” in a modified sense, like I have advocated, and not in its fullest and unrestricted sense.

It is now for me to prove, in conclusion, that the Scriptures oppose free thought when it appeals to man's reason *only*, or at least when it brings, *if it is possible*, the mysteries of God to the crucible of man's understanding, and believes or rejects it accordingly. “Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?” Here we have strong evidence that we are not to question or reason with God on the things which he has made, for “His ways are past finding out! For who hath known the mind of the Lord, or who hath been his counsellor?” Who are those of whom Peter said, Brother Paul referred to in all his epistles? “In which are some things hard to be understood, which they that are unlearned and unstable wrest, as they do also the other Scriptures, unto their own destruction;” but those of whom Paul speaks to Timothy, that they are “proud, knowing nothing, but doting about questions and strifes of words, whereof cometh envy, strife, railings, evil surmisings, perverse disputings of men of corrupt minds, and destitute of the truth.” Paul also warns Titus to “avoid foolish questions, and genealogies, and contentions, and strivings about the law; for they are unprofitable and vain.” God, when he by His mighty works convinceth Job of ignorance, said, “Who is this that darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge? Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? declare, if thou hast understanding.” But we have to answer with Paul, “The wisdom of this world is foolishness with God. For it is written, He taketh the wise in their own craftiness. And again, the Lord knoweth the thoughts of the wise, that they are vain” (1 Cor. iii. 19—20).

GEORGIUS D. E.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

“Let the truth be permitted to come to your ears in the way of private writings. She asks no favour for her cause, because she wonders not at her lot; she knows that she lives as a pilgrim upon earth,—that among strangers she easily finds enemies; but she has her birth, her home, her hope, her favour, and her glory in heaven. One thing meanwhile she longs for—not to be condemned unknown.”—*Tertullian's Apologeticus*.

FREE thought—if these terms be taken in a right sense—can never be ultimately prejudicial to the interests of truth. This is our first position, and the inference which we draw from it, is that if the religion of the Bible be of God, and therefore truth, free thought can never lead to infidelity. At this point, then, we join issue with those of our opponents—for probably there will be such—who imagine that in upholding the affirmative in this debate they are “doing God service,” and lending their support to revealed religion. To many, free thought is a term significant of all evil, especially in matters of religious belief. They dread it, they shrink

from it as from pestilence, they discountenance it wherever they think they can detect it. It is in this spirit that young men are warned against the perusal of infidel or sceptical books, and urged to close their ears to every infidel objection and discussion. A sharp line of distinction is drawn between faith and knowledge, and the mistake is made of supposing that they can only exist in inverse ratio. All this we regard as a mistake. We maintain that the tendency of free thought is the very opposite of what it is here affirmed to be, and that free, unfettered, though reverent, inquiry always or at least generally ends, not in religious doubt, but in a stronger because more enlightened faith.

Let it be noticed that *free* thought is not to be confounded with *reckless* thought. It is here that in such discussions as these an ambiguity enters which always proves a fruitful source of misapprehensions. Those who run down "freedom of thought" take a meaning from the phrase which we who defend it do not acknowledge. They mean by it a freedom which, "breaking all bounds" (p. 34), indulges in a spirit of reckless negative criticism, and makes a boast of its very lawlessness. We who defend free thought mean by it, I presume, something very different. Whatever the freedom implies—and we understand by it freedom from the authority of dogma—freedom, *i. e.*, to inquire into the grounds and value of all received opinions without let or hindrance from others. There are yet some restraints from which legitimate thought never can and never should be free. Thought has fixed laws, and these legitimate thought must carefully observe; just as little should it disregard the restraints, cautions, and obligations which modesty, earnestness, and a sincere regard for the truth necessarily lay upon it. We assert the right of man to think, but we cannot forget that he is under obligation to think well. Just as freedom in action is not to be identified with caprice, so freedom in thought must be distinguished from a right to assert whatever the thinker pleases. His thought in being free, is not to be lawless. He is under law to the truth. He is not bound to believe what other men believe, simply because they chance to believe it; he is a slave if he does this; but neither has he a right to assert a contrary belief unless he has first of all obtained reasonable grounds for it. He is bound, even as a free thinker, to think calmly, candidly, cautiously, feeling his ground, making sure of his starting point, and testing his reasoning step by step. If it is implied in the free thought of which our opponents speak, that even these restraints are to be done away with, then certainly we are at one with them. Free thought of this kind may lead to any absurdity—well, therefore, may it lead to infidelity. But let these necessary limitations be understood, and how can it be said that free thought tends to error rather than to truth? This surely cannot be maintained without at once undermining the ground of *all* certitude. We only know truth through the affirmation of our faculties. If, then, these are of such a nature that their exercise is essentially misleading, how

can their assertions in any case be depended on? Supposing it is said that it is only in religion that they thus mislead, yet even this is enough, so to speak, to destroy their character. "*Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.*" We conclude, therefore, that legitimate free thought tends, *not* to error, but to truth. But by that class of opponents with whom we are now reasoning, our religion is admitted to be truth. So far as they are concerned, therefore, our position is made out—free thought does *not* lead to infidelity.

Another class of opponents may seek to use this very reasoning as an argument against ourselves. Free thought, they will say, leads to truth: granted: but the *facts* show (see the paper of S. S., p. 33) that free thought leads to infidelity, for infidelity is most prevalent amongst thinking men. It follows, therefore, that religion—the religion of dogma, based on Scripture—is not true. So it may be reargued. But here again we believe the ambiguity is in the use of the term *free thought*. That our age is characterized by, and prides itself on, its *intellectualism* is true; but that it is marked by thought of the *calm* and *reverent* stamp, we are not prepared to admit. Its thought is indeed free enough from all the restraints of dogma, but unfortunately it is largely free at the same time from a consciousness of its own limitations and fallibility. Yet after all, the fruits of the free thought of the age are not *altogether* on the side of infidelity. It is the very impudence of scepticism to suspend its judgment as to the fairness and candour of a man's inquiries until it hears the result, and then to pronounce him either a free-thinker or a bigot, according as he does or does not side with itself. At no previous time, we venture to affirm, was there so much *enlightened* faith in the facts and doctrines of Christianity as at the present hour. We are too apt, in comparing the present with "*tempora acta*," both to overrate the fidelity of the past and the infidelity of the present. If the voice of the sceptic was seldom louder than it is at present, certainly the church, on the other hand, was never seen spreading herself so widely in the world, or heard speaking to that world in her literature, more distinctly and intelligently. There is not even a book of any importance on the side of infidelity which has not as soon as it came forth been deluged with replies, many of them at least quite equal to the necessity. All this must be remembered in reflecting on the question before us.

A few words now on the paper of S. S. (pp. 32—35). He appeals in the first place to consciousness. "If we watch the processes of our own minds we shall find that free thought in ourselves affords scope for infidel suggestions." Is it so? It is true that the first effect of free thought on *any* subject is to bring out the difficulties which attach to it. But a sense of difficulty is not *infidelity*; it is, as the quotation from Dr. Rigg (p. 35) well shows, compatible with the profoundest faith. But even grant that these difficulties, in every case, assume the form of genuine doubts, it yet remains to be shown that the free thought which started them also *ends* with

them. We believe this cannot be done. Doubt is after all only a stage in the search for truth, and a little further inquiry will generally lead the candid thinker past it. At our first entrance into a tunnel the darkness grows denser and denser. Were we to stop there we would always be in darkness, but we press on, and the tunnel ends after all with light. Free thought, like Achilles' spear, heals its own wounds. Infidelity is not its true and legitimate goal.

Another of his remarks is, "Infidelity and superstition are contraries." True; and so are infidelity and religion, but religion is not therefore superstition, as his paragraph throughout assumes it to be. "It is the very nature of superstition to be produced by the want of thought, reflection, and investigation." If so, then it can have nothing to do with Christianity, which exhorts, "*Prove all things, hold fast that which is good.*" "Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind." "Be ready always to give an answer to every man that asketh you a reason of the hope that is in you" (1 Thess. v. 21; Rom. xiv. 5; 1 Pet. iii. 15). What could S. S. be thinking about when he penned this paragraph on superstition?

We are told again that the doctrines and statements of the Bible are "designed by the Divine Author of the Scriptures, not to be reasoned about, but to be believed in. They are subjects for faith, not reason." But does this prove, even if it were true, that faith and reason are contradictories? There are doctrines, it may be, that reason cannot prove to be true (*e.g.*, the Trinity, Resurrection, &c.); but can reason show them to be false? If it cannot, and if we have the word of a "*divine* author" for their truth, surely this is not an unreasonable ground for faith! It remains therefore to be shown that reason can demonstrate these "doctrines and statements" to be untrue, and this has never yet been done. The alleged contradiction, *e.g.*, in the case of the doctrine of the Trinity, has often been exploded. Even philosophy is now professing to recognise a rational basis for the doctrine. And so with the other instances referred to by S. S. Men's faith in the Scriptures will not collapse so readily as he seems to think it must do. We are only sorry to see that while his own language is respectful to the Scriptures, where he directly mentions them, yet the real tendency of his paper is to hold them up to contempt. But perhaps this was not his object, and "Charity hopeth all things."

Glasgow.

J. O.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

TIMID men, looking out on the world of thought, are alarmed at the freedom in and to which it is growing; orthodox men deprecate the extreme views which are taking hold of it; men of shallow minds cannot appreciate its tendencies; and bigoted men treat this (to them) unnatural growth with scorn. These, one and all, examine, as best they can, its attainments, and pronounce the verdict on free thought as tending to infidelity. A verdict given without sym-

pathy or pity, although it is as difficult to think rightly as it is to act rightly. Although they all agree that free thought is an inevitable course to infidelity, they more or less all disagree as to the meaning of the term infidelity. Where must the line be drawn to mark distinctly the limits of fidelity? To what height might thought ascend, to what distance may it extend, without entering the territory of infidelity? These are questions they all answer differently. Some allow a very small scope, and some an equally large one, "ample room and verge enough," they think. Some allow a certain elasticity in their limit; some adhere to it with an obstinate rigidity. Some will allow a slight divergence from their interpretations of Holy Writ, suggested by science; others admit of no divergence, and accept the Bible as their infallible guide on all questions, be they scientific or doctrinal, ceremonial or ethical, dealing with time or referring to eternity.

No doubt our opponents will urge that, no matter what may be the individual opinion of men on infidelity, anything which tends in the direction of any one opinion which they think wrong must be infidel, the smaller suggesting the larger. They will argue that, because the accuracy of the Mosaic vision respecting the creation is doubted, when compared with the revelations of modern geology, therefore the existence of a God will equally be subject to doubt. But what is the relation existing between a disputed geological fact and religion and faith? Are we, because science says this and the Bible that, to allow this to shake our faith in a redeeming Saviour? And if we would only recollect that we are not expected to look for science in the Bible, nor seek for salvation in science, there would not be half the wrangling which now exists among us.

S. S., in a comparison of superstition and infidelity, takes the two extreme phases of thought, and argues that whatever counteracts the one fosters the other, and *vice versa*. He affirms that when superstition is in labour, instantly the issue, whatever it may be, breathes the spirit of infidelity. Instantly any person begins to think for himself, his thoughts are of an infidel tendency. In other words, we all succumb to the yoke of superstition, or rise (?) to the position of infidels. But superstition is itself a product of free thought. It is the consequences of the speculations of the mind. From the period of its creation it has been handed down through successive generations, which have in some cases subtracted from, and in others added to, the original. Some superstitions have been so freely interpreted as to have their meaning so entirely changed, as to be hardly recognisable. Thus to be superstitious is to believe in the fruits of free thought, which, perhaps (as our opponents are endeavouring to show), leads to infidelity; therefore, all our thoughts must be infidel, unless there is any difference, as far as infidelity is concerned, between a belief in the free thoughts of others or indulging in those of our own.

The natural characteristic of the mind is freedom. To exercise it freely is only to use its ordinary functions. As it was created

for a purpose by an all-wise Deity, may we not reasonably presume that that purpose is the unfettered exercise of its properties? No doubt the minds of most people are influenced by minds either of superior calibre, or by those which run in a different groove. Every individual person has an individual mind, and if it were intended that each should not exert its functions, but be thoroughly overruled by a predominant mind, mayhap we should find apologies for men—not men, animals with the attributes of men, but living by instinct, not by reason.

History teaches us that the human mind has been progressive. It also points out its periods of reaction and retrogression, and its stages of halt, as if waiting for renewed vigour. The events which are taking place around indicate the same characteristics of the present as history does of the past. Reflecting on this, and appreciating the innumerable benefits which have been bestowed upon man, the conveniences in his mode of life, the luxuries which he is enabled to partake of, the discoveries and inventions which have conduced to the general happiness and comfort of mankind, and last, but not least, those great intellectual benefits which we enjoy from the free outgoings of mind, does it not appear contradictory to reason to think that beneath all these blessings there has been a tendency to infidelity? What a consummation for the genius, industry, and thought, which, after many generations of weary toil, that after many years of battle against oppression, with alternate successes and reverses, that after shaking off the yoke of tyranny, we find ourselves combating with God, engaged in a conflict with the Creator of all things; fighting hopelessly a fight which must inevitably end in discomfiture!

Through the long periods of the primeval and mediæval ages man's knowledge of the Deity was dwarfed and stunted by the religions of men; geology had not opened up her records of the geologic periods; astronomy had not revealed the wonderful workings of the planetary systems. But now science is removing all unnecessary impediments, so that man is enabled to recognise the Almighty with his own eyes, and not through the eyes of others. He is considering the unwisdom of the enterprise, in the words of the American poet, James Russell Lowell:—

“That with thy idol-volume's covers two,
Would make a jail to coop the living God.”

Man only acknowledged the Supreme Being through the Bible and the interpretations of it by man. His mind was lost in the mist of prejudice, and bewildered in the confusion of sects. He saw through a fog, which deceived him, as it does the sailor when making the land. The Divine Light reached him, not by its direct influence, but came to him distorted and refracted by the dogmas of creeds. It was not observed in its integrity; it was only a reflection of it. But now free thought is clearing away the haze. It is teaching

man to look beyond the prejudices of sect. Science is leading him—

“Far from the rich folds built with human hands,
The gracious footsteps of His love to trace;”

and in contemplating the works of nature, the soul of man rises in awe and reverence to its Creator. C. F. A. S.

Politics.

IS AN HEREDITARY HOUSE OF LEGISLATURE DESIRABLE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

THE terms of the question before us bind us to give particular consideration to that quality in a house of legislature which consists in its members possessing seats and votes in the House *by inheritance*. At the same time it will be requisite for us to observe the other special characteristics of our own House of Lords, that being *the* House of Legislature to which the question now debated doubtless has a particular reference.

One great advantage of an hereditary House of Legislature is, its being independent of all electors and electoral contests. Its members therefore are not pledged to any particular line of voting as the members of the House of Commons often are to those by whom they are elected, and who form their constituents.

An hereditary House of Legislature is a restraint on the popular love of change, and on the progress of revolutionary principles. This restraint is specially valuable at the present time, which is characterized by great eagerness for alterations in political and social affairs, the nature and issues of which do not seem to have been sufficiently reflected upon by those who advocate them.

If we can succeed—as we believe we can—in showing that our own House of Lords has important uses, we shall at the same time show that an hereditary House of Legislature is desirable. To the fulfilment of this task we now proceed, and, in the first place, quote from a recent number of a periodical:—

“The House of Lords has a place in the constitution, though not the most important place, and performs duties which may sometimes be of great service to the nation, although those duties are not of a character to convert Great Britain into a country dominated by hereditary legislators. The Lords subject every question decided by the Commons to review. They have absolute power to throw back upon the Commons their decision;

in order that it may receive ampler consideration. When the nation's will has not been ascertained, they can practically compel a Government to ascertain it by a general election. So long as it can be maintained, either that a matter has not been sufficiently argued, or that the will of the constituencies has not been finally pronounced, the Lords not only have a constitutional right, but are constitutionally bound to resist measures. Their function is to preserve us against the dangers of precipitate legislation. We are not of those who think that the House of Lords is superfluous or that its functions are imaginary. Its grand duty we hold to be that of checking any sudden impulse, of forcing the nation to make up its mind deliberately, of representing in one word, the *patience* which characterizes all strong men and all strong peoples. The general usefulness of the peers in correcting hasty legislation, in initiating measures of social reform, and in assisting to watch the conduct of the executive government cannot be gainsayed, and their action in private legislation, and on account of their greater leisure is usually beneficial. Before people talk of destroying the House of Lords, therefore, let them consider if what they want cannot be done without this. The Upper House could not be swept away without a complete revolution, for it would never be a party to its own abolition, which must therefore be accomplished by unconstitutional and violent means."

In past times the barons of England have occupied a position and fulfilled functions which have been favourable to the promotion and extension of civil and religious liberty, as *Magna Charta*, with its successive renewals; the revolution under Charles I., and that of 1688, clearly show. The wealth and education of the peers specially fit them to be hereditary legislators, the means of facilitating their qualification for the duties of legislators being at their command; and the great stake they possess in the prosperity of the country forms an additional qualification.

By their position the hereditary peers of this realm are fitted for attaining in the diplomatic service a knowledge of the laws and customs of other states, which peculiarly qualifies them for the discharge of legislative duties at home, by giving them not only knowledge but experience of such a nature as could not otherwise be easily attained.

The political education which is obtained by the heirs of the peers, while acting, as they generally do, as members of the House of Commons, gives them experience and greatly fits them for the deliberative and legislative duties of the Upper House. Great ado is sometimes made about the superiority of the House of Commons as a legislative body, yet it is from this body that the House of Lords is, for the most part, from time to time recruited.

If, then, the House of Commons is adapted in so superior a degree for legislation, a portion of that superiority must be continually passing into the House of Lords, unless it can be shown that the fact of a man's being the heir to a peerage necessarily proves that he must be an incompetent legislator.

The advantages of the House of Peers as occupying a position between the Sovereign and the people cannot be too highly valued

or, indeed, be adequately expressed. On the one hand the peerage constitutes a restraint on the regal tendency to tyranny and oppression, on the other it curbs the popular inclination towards anarchy and revolution. Our constitution provides for a due balance of power. Should the Houses of Parliament pass laws tending to subvert the royal power and prerogatives, the Sovereign can negative them by a constitutional veto. At the same time this power cannot be arbitrarily used, for an attempt so to do would cause Parliament to exercise its right of refusing the supplies necessary to carry on the government. Should the Sovereign seek to contract the power and privileges of the people, the House of Lords, seeing that its own rights would be thereby endangered, would unite with the people in withstanding the Crown. Should the people seek to encroach on the prerogatives of the Crown, the peers would rally round the monarch.

The recent extension of the suffrage renders an hereditary House of Legislature more than ever desirable. Its existence is more than ever necessary to counteract the hasty action of the prejudices and passions of the lower orders, and if it be maintained that the peers also have their prejudices, it yet must be admitted that they are very different from, and in a great measure counteractive of, the prejudices of the lower classes, and of their representatives.

Should the hereditary House of Legislature be abolished what could be substituted for it? An elective Upper House is worthless. There is a *natural* aristocracy in every community, and it is hereditary. There is in society an upper ten thousand, and their children will have the social rank and influence of their fathers.

In America the Senate is elected by the State legislatures, and what a terrible power of mob rule, and what outbursts of violence are there exhibited!

E. L. B. writes as follows:—

“Among any equal number of men, where shall you find so few who are animated by great thoughts, who pursue noble achievements, who labour in good causes, who contribute so little to the general good of mankind, as the hereditary members of the legislature? Is it not a fact that, taking them all in all, they are far less remarkable for talent, worth, patriotism, genius, self-sacrifice than the Commons, and (after deducting a few honourable exceptions) do they not seem caricatures, rather than representatives, of men of high character, endeavour, and deed?”

In reply to these queries of E. L. B., we would point him to *many* members of the House of Lords who have been animated by great thoughts, pursued noble achievements, and laboured in good causes, reminding him that seats in the hereditary House of Legislature have been occupied by a Chatham, a Bacon, a Clyde, a Brougham, a Macaulay, a Nelson, a Mansfield, and a Wellington, and that all these, with many others, have owed their position as peers not to their birth—for none of them inherited a peerage—but

to their abilities and achievements, thus clearly showing that in the House of Lords, abilities, worth, genius, and patriotism are to be found in as large a measure as in the House of Commons.

On this point, of the abilities of the Lords, we again quote a recent number of a periodical not at all given to partiality to the peers.

"Every person who is fond of political eloquence, and is anxious to see the dignity of Parliament maintained, must, after the recent debate in the Upper House, have felt inclined to utter the now historical sentiment, 'Thank God we have a House of Lords!' For real earnestness, for grandeur of style, for worthiness of the occasion, the debate has never been excelled; and the praise is heightened, rather than qualified, by the fact that the peers achieved a double victory. They have surpassed the House of Commons in the grandeur of their eloquence, and proved to the nation that they legislate without allowing their private feelings and interests to obtain the upper hand. The Bishop of Peterborough, if he never address the House again, will have achieved for himself the very highest place in the roll of Parliamentary orators. Except in a few appropriately solemn sentences, one lost sight of the fact that he was a dignitary of the Church. Rather did he seem like one of the gladiators we have read of as belonging to the last century—there were giants in those days, whose eloquence we are taught to believe has never since been equalled. For a pure model of elocution we need no longer dive into the records of the last century, since we have it now, as it were, in the flesh, based on modern aims and aspirations, 'decked out in living green.' His speech was one full of 'thoughts that breathe, and words that burn.' The address of the Bishop of St. David's was the perfect embodiment of the wisdom of statesmanship and the religion of humanity. If the Bishop of Peterborough's speech will always be remembered as a grand specimen of eloquence, the Bishop of St. David's will be treasured as the best instance of political wisdom existing in the annals of Parliament. Altogether the debate was one for the country to be proud of."

E. L. B. writes again:—

"Suppose we were to have an hereditary house of engineers, by whom all our railway traffic should be conducted; an hereditary house of navigators, of bishops, of warriors, of newspaper editors."

Now if the descendants of engineers, navigators, and newspaper editors received an education to fit them for the occupation of their fathers, why should they not follow it? We have shown that commonly the heirs of the peers receive an education which fits them for a seat in the hereditary House of Legislature, and if the same were the case with engineers and others, it would follow that an hereditary house of such persons would be as suitable as individuals scattered amongst a number of houses. We believe that we have now set forth the advantages of an hereditary House of Legislature sufficiently to show that such a House is desirable.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

"The government *of* the people *by* the people and *for* the people."—*Proverb.*

MANY of the arguments used by those who have taken the affirmative side in this debate apply more to the "second chamber" question generally, than to that of an *hereditary* second chamber. And, considering the difficulties of their case, this is not surprising, for the loss at which they must be for sound arguments naturally causes them to resort to those which are irrelevant. In debating this question, however, we ought not to forget that we have not to discuss whether a second chamber is desirable, but whether an *hereditary* second chamber is desirable.

We believe that the proverb we have quoted as the motto of this paper should be a supreme canon in the constitution of all states, and that no government which is not based upon it is just, nor can be permanently prosperous and powerful. Hence we object to hereditary legislation, because it is opposed to the great principles which this proverb contains. But as the discussion of these principles would alone occupy much space, and we can well afford to be liberal in debating this question, we will content ourselves with the use of minor arguments; believing that they alone are amply sufficient to prove that an hereditary House of Legislature is *not* desirable.

M. C. N. informs us that "independence is secured by an hereditary House of Legislature;" but although we do not deny that, according to the theory of our constitution, such is the case, we believe that practically the House of Lords no longer possesses this independence. Our Upper House is far from being independent now. The Lords may delay, but the time has for ever gone by when they can prevent any measure from becoming law which the people have determined upon. The Lords dare not absolutely refuse to pass a bill sent up to them by the House of Commons, backed by large majorities, and hence they are not really independent, but are obliged to yield to the popular wishes as expressed by the Commons. It is absurd to say that the House of Lords is independent when history affords us so many examples of their passing laws which they believed to be bad, and even opposed to their own interests. The emancipation of Roman Catholics, the Reform Bill of 1833, the repeal of the Corn Laws, and, last of all, the Irish Church Bill, are plenteous witnesses to the fact that the House of Lords is no longer independent; that when the people determine on a certain measure the Lords *must* pass it, however dangerous, objectionable, or revolutionary they may consider it, or it may seem to be. But even if we admit that an hereditary House of Legislature does secure that independence which M. C. N. considers such an advantage, the question then arises—Is such independence desirable? We think not. For whilst we do not contend that our legislators should be mere delegates, voting machines, who do

as they are bid, like the members of the States-General of the Dutch United Provinces, we do think that legislators ought to be in such a position as to be obliged to consider and respect the wants of those for whom they legislate.

Perfect independence is too great a power to be entrusted to any body of law-makers, for it tends to make them a selfish class of legislators. Self-interest is a most powerful mover of mankind. And if our law-makers were so independent as not to be compelled to comply with the desires and requirements of the nation at large, it is more than probable that their enactments would only tend to promote their own individual interests, and not be for the benefit of the people generally. Hence we believe that independence amongst legislators is undesirable, and that for the national welfare, to prevent selfish class legislation, the law-makers ought, to a certain extent, to be subject to those who have to obey the laws. History too supports us in this belief, and, if space permitted, we might adduce many instances of the evils resulting from legislators being too independent, and might prove by abundant examples that legislation is always the most just and wise when the law-makers are *not* independent of those who have to submit to the laws.

Although our hereditary legislators are obliged to comply with the wishes of the people, they do, however, possess a certain small amount of independence which is far from beneficial in its effects. For it results in a dull, languid attention to public affairs, strongly contrasting with that vigorous political life displayed by the House of Commons; that House which does *not* possess even the small amount of independences which the Lords enjoy. Let those who support the affirmative in this debate ask themselves which displays the larger and more regular attendance of members, the more prompt attention to public affairs, and the greater desire to reform rather than retain abuses—the Lords or the Commons? We feel confident that the answer to this question alone proves that even the little independence possessed by the Lords is far from being of advantage to the nation; and that if they had still more independence (as much as the theory of our constitution and M. C. N. assign to them) the evil would be proportionately greater.

The great argument used by the supporters of an hereditary House of Legislature is that it is a check upon the House of Commons. But, as we have already shown, there never has been a great measure in modern times, however radical in its character, sent up to them by the Commons, which the House of Lords has not been obliged to pass. How then can the Lords be said to be that “stable and resisting power” which Ph. M. mentions? Perhaps it may be argued that the House of Lords is useful to retard, although it does not actually prevent, a measure from becoming law. But, apart from the moral right of any governing body thus to disregard the wishes of the vast majority of those who are governed, we do not think that this delaying power, which the Lords possess, and sometimes exercise, is beneficial in its operation. It invariably

causes intense political excitement, great commercial depression, fearful riots, and many other evils, besides exposing the Lords themselves to contempt and ridicule when they do yield, and thus prove their weakness when opposed to the people; but we are unaware of any good effect which results from the exercise by the Upper House of this power to retard the progress of popular measures.

And it should be remembered that almost all of those great measures which have become law against the wish, and notwithstanding the opposition, of the House of Lords, have proved eminently wise and successful, although their lordships prophesied that much evil would result from them, showing that our hereditary Legislature, the "highly cultured class," as Ph. M. terms it, with all its wisdom, does not possess that foresight and political skill which the Commons ever evinces.

Perhaps the most extraordinary reason ever given for an hereditary House of Legislature is one contained in the article of Ph. M. That gentleman says, "It" (*i. e.* an hereditary House of Legislature) "has the same effect on the breed of men as the prizes at agricultural and horticultural shows have on cattle and flowers." Nothing more conclusively proves the weakness of the affirmative cause than the introduction of such an argument as this, if argument it can be called. They must indeed be at a great loss for arguments who have to support that august hereditary body which meets at Westminster by an argument based on an assembly of another character held at Islington. Even if we admit the validity of this argument, and that the "breed of men" is improved by the existence of the House of Lords, to have to submit to all the evils and inconveniences caused by hereditary legislation is almost too much to pay for even so important an advantage.

Ph. M. informs us that "it" (the peerage) "consists of picked men." "The men of a picked race are in general distinguished from others by rare gifts, and these gifts are absolutely entailed by nature on their descendants, unless they wilfully violate the provisions of nature for their transmission." This assertion is not, however, supported by facts, and we doubt if a single instance can be found in the House of Lords where those gifts which Ph. M. says are "absolutely entailed" have descended to the eldest son. How is it, if mental gifts are so entailed, that we have so few really great men in the House of Lords? Every Premier sends some few men of talent to the Upper House, but yet, notwithstanding this entail of mental gifts, the number of those distinguished for statesmanship, eloquence, or power of thought, does not permanently increase. In fact, this entail of gifts only exists in the imagination of those who support hereditary legislation. Real genius does not descend in certain families. God has never ordained that mental gifts should be subject to any human laws of descent. The son of a peasant is as likely to possess *natural* gifts as the son of a peer. If this were not the case, if mental gifts did descend, as Ph. M.

would have us believe, instead of the House of Lords containing, as it now does, but a few orators, statesmen, and great thinkers, we should have a House abounding in men possessing these qualities. Genius and talent would then be as common in the House of Lords as dulness and obstinacy now are. To us the principle of hereditary legislation seems absurd; for, as O'Connell so plainly put it,—we might just as reasonably expect to have good hereditary tailors, as to expect a man to be a good legislator because his father was.

The majority of the members of our Upper House are simply rich landowners. Their purses and their acres are all but their only qualification for ruling over the people. Brought up with all the ridiculous pride of birth and rank, and imbibing all the sentiments and prejudices of the aristocracy, taught to regard themselves as almost a superior order of beings, and that the masses of the people are vastly inferior in every respect, having no sympathy, no fellow-feeling, with the nation at large, the House of Lords has ever been the greatest enemy of popular progress and general education. The peers have ever been ready to enact any law, however unjust, to increase their own wealth or power, but have always opposed such great measures as are calculated to benefit the people generally. Take the case of the corn laws for an example. In 1804 the Lords readily enacted that cruel law, to increase the price of corn and thus enrich themselves, which caused so much distress and misery in this country. But when afterwards it was proposed to repeal this law, because it was found to be injurious to the masses of the people, the Peers refused to listen to the cry for cheap bread, and were as active in their opposition to the repeal of the corn law as they had previously been in its enactment. And so it has been with many other great reforms; the Lords have opposed them as long as they dared, they have delayed them until riot, and almost revolution, have made further delay dangerous to their own safety. Never have they gladly and gracefully passed a popular measure, never have they paid the slightest regard to the popular wish, until they feared the popular indignation. Even education has been retarded by their opposition. And what is the reason for this conduct on the part of our hereditary legislators? Simply this, their interests are not identical with those of the people. Nay, more, the interests of the one are directly opposed to those of the other. The Peers know that the stronger the people become, the less influence they possess; that all the power gained by the former is lost by the latter. Hence, whilst ready enough to enact any measure, however unjust, to promote their own interests, they oppose all reform likely to increase the power and influence of the people; and they retard educational measures because they see that where education spreads amongst the masses, Radicalism soon follows.

It is high time that such a state of things was abolished. The interests of rulers and people should always be identical. When

they are not, good legislation is much retarded and often prevented. In the present day, when the struggle for superiority amongst the civilized nations of the world is so general and so severe, when numerous social reforms are so greatly needed, England cannot afford time for the delays caused by a body of legislators whose self-interests lead them to oppose measures which are urgently required, and which the people desire. She must not submit to the constant and useless checks to her national progress and prosperity which our hereditary legislators impose. John Bright has truly said,* "A house of hereditary legislation cannot be a permanent institution in a free country." Our ancestors declared it to be "dangerous and unnecessary." And England, if she desires to maintain her position amongst surrounding countries, to increase in power and prosperity, must abolish hereditary legislation, as she has other relics of feudalism, and rule herself solely by the principle contained in the proverb we have quoted above,—principles of justice, reason, and good policy, principles which have made many other countries prosperous, and which are the foundation of all truly free and wise governments. GEORGIUS.

SOUTHEY AND CHARLES DICKENS.—Mr. Crabb Robinson has preserved in his diary some playful lines by Southey, but he has not given them accurately, nor has his editor added a circumstance which would not have diminished their interest. They were written in the album of Mrs. S. C. Hall, and the opposite page contained the autographs of Joseph Bonaparte and Daniel O'Connell, a circumstance which suggested what the Laureate wrote:—

"Birds of a feather flock together,
But *vide* the opposite page;
And thence you may gather I'm not of a feather
With some of the birds in this cage.

ROBERT SOUTHEY, 22nd October, 1836."

Some years afterwards, Charles Dickens, good-humouredly referring to Southey's change of opinion, wrote in the album, immediately under Southey's lines, the following:—

"Now if I don't make
The completest mistake
That ever put man in a rage,
This bird of two weathers
Has moulted his feathers,
And left them in some other cage.—Boz."

When these last lines first appeared in the *Art Journal*, a friend of Southey's, "good-humouredly referring" to the change of style between "Pickwick" and "The Mutual Friend," wrote in the margin of the periodical,—

"Put his *first* work and *last* work together,
And learn from the groans of all men,
That if he's not altered his feather,
He's certainly altered his pen."

The Essayist.

SOLITUDE AND SOCIETY.

"O sacred solitude! divine retreat,
Choice of the prudent, envy of the great!
By thy pure stream, or in thy waving shade,
We court fair Wisdom, that celestial maid."—YOUNG.

"Hail, social life! into thy pleasing bounds
Again I come, to pay the common stock
My share of service, and, in glad return,
To taste thy comforts, thy protected joys."—THOMSON.

MAN is a social being. All his faculties and powers are fitted for contact with his fellows; and it is only when so brought into contact that they attain their highest perfection. But it would never do if he were to live constantly in society; if he were continually moving about, and associating with his fellowmen, and never knowing what retirement is. For in such a case his would be only a butterfly sort of existence, a kind of intellectual dissipation. There are some plants which depend upon the sunshine for their existence; and, on the other hand, there are some which can flourish only in the shade, and which would soon droop and wither if transplanted into the full light of the sun. And as it is in the natural world, so is it in the mental. There are some powers of the mind which require the sunny influences of society for their preservation and growth, and others which can be fostered and strengthened only in retirement. We do not here refer to ministers or literary men, and all those who live by the sweat of their brains; for to them lengthened solitary study is indispensable. But we refer to that occasional solitude or retirement which every human being requires for his or her mental growth. The mind has the faculty of receiving impressions from the world without; but if these impressions were to be incessantly poured in upon it, they would become confused and indistinct, and it would have no opportunity of assimilating them to itself. The mind must have time to think, to try these impressions, and to store up its thoughts and recollections in the chamber of the memory; and it can only have the opportunity of doing this in occasional solitude. Both solitude and society in their due proportion are necessary for the cultivation of the mind. Either of these by itself, or in excess, has an injurious influence; and, as we find in the material world alternations of heat and cold, light and darkness are necessary, so are both solitude and society needful in the formation of a perfect character.

At the same time the proportion of each may vary greatly. The effect which either the one or the other has upon the mind depends entirely upon each man's constitution. His mind may have an affinity to this one or that one; and it is only by following this natural predilection that each one knows what is best for himself. Hence both solitude and society may be spoken of as relative terms. One man may feel himself as much in solitude in the heart of a crowded city as if he were alone on a desert waste; having no fellowship with those around him in their thoughts, and no sympathy with them in their pursuits. Another may be far beyond the reach of human voice, and yet feel no lack of society; for he can hold loving converse with Nature at her inmost shrine. He feels that the plants, the trees, and the rocks that meet his eye speak to him with ten thousand tongues more eloquent than humankind; and that the rustling of the wind among the trees, and the murmur of the waves on the ocean shore, whisper the sweetest music to his soul.

It follows, therefore, that the effects of solitude and society upon different men vary according to their dispositions; but, as a general rule, it may be said that solitude forms a *contemplative* character, while society nurtures an *active* one.

The old philosopher's injunction, "Man, know thyself," can be carried out only in retirement. It is only there a man can hold communion with himself; there he will look into the depths of passing affairs, there he will call a halt in the onward march of his life; and away from the excitements of society and the ceaseless cares of business, he will nerve himself to future achievements, and fit himself better for carrying on his work. In solitude, by means of books, he will become acquainted with the illustrious dead, and learn the great truths which past history unfolds to his view; and in the very act of grappling with the philosophies propounded by the sages of antiquity, his own mind will become stronger and clearer, and he will be better prepared to become a successful warrior in the great battle of life. As Milton says,—

"Wisdom's self

Oft seeks for sweet retir'd solitude,
Where with her best nurse Contemplation,
She plumes her feathers, and lets grow her wings."

The thought of solitude thus becomes very pleasant. When the mind is jaded and harassed with cares and disappointments, it naturally has a desire to shrink back within itself, and to rid itself once for all of these cares and annoyances. Then it seems, indeed, an enviable life to retire into some vast solitude, and alone with nature, and alone with one's own spirit, to spend the time in meditation and peace. But solitude is pleasant for its own sake, for only there can the pleasures of thought be enjoyed, and the triumphs of intellect achieved. In the midst of society it is hardly possible to pursue anything like continuity of thought. Distrac-

tions of one kind or another constantly occur, and the votary of society is compelled to skim over the surface of affairs without ever searching into the depths of thought. The *solitaire*, on the other hand, has nothing to disturb him; and he is drawn, as it were, by an irresistible impulse, into the regions of thought, and invited to ruminate on the great problems of his being. He finds himself standing face to face with Nature, and on the threshold of her secrets; but the farther he advances, the more she eludes his grasp. He gazes with wonder on the eternal hills and their snow-clad summits, and feels that Nature has mysteries which his intellect altogether fails to reach. He stands on the banks of a beautiful lake, and as he looks upon its placid bosom he finds the same truth mirrored there, and confesses to himself that she has depths where his mind is altogether lost in their profundity. He sees life in its various forms all around him. There it is in his own body, in the vital fluid coursing through his veins, and causing the pulsations of his heart. The eagle, soaring amid the loftiest clouds, has it too; so also the nightingale that charms him with her song, and the tiny insect that begins and ends its little span within an hour. There also is life in yon mighty oak that has braved the stormy blasts of centuries, and which, by its gnarled trunk and sturdy limbs, promises to withstand them for centuries more. It is there in the floweret that blooms and withers at the road-side, and in every blade in all that grassy carpet that clothes the ground on which he treads. And he asks himself the question, What is life? Where is it? Whence comes it? Whither does it fly? He wishes to look into the recesses of his own mind, and to explore the labyrinths of his memory. He desires to probe the depths of his soul, and to peer through the cloud that obscures his future destiny. He finds revolutions and changes going on among the nations of the world; dynasties are overthrown; crowns and sceptres lie trampled in the dust. He would know the reason of these. He looks over all the phases of human life, and there are none of which he does not wish to know something more.

With such thoughts as these surging through his mind, how can the lover of solitude avoid acquiring the habit of contemplation? He meditates, and meditates, until he loves meditation for its own sake. He becomes the more averse to tread the busy haunts of men. He loves the more to sit among his books, or wander by the river-side and by the ruined walls of some old abbey or castle, and there muse upon his favourite topic; or, if he be a poet, he will revel in that ideal world which his imagination has summoned into being. He feels some great truth welling up within him, or some great discovery dawning upon his mind. That truth must be fully thought out and enunciated, and that discovery perfected; and these can only be done in solitude. Then he emerges from his retirement for a season, and enriches the world with the product of his thought; and returns to it again with greater zest than

before, feeling that he has now become so wedded to contemplation that he is happy nowhere but in solitude.

Great, however, as are the advantages of solitude, it would never do if all men were to give themselves to it. The mechanism of the world would be dislocated, and its whole work would come to a standstill. The world has been fitly compared to a workshop, in which its inhabitants are engaged in the various branches of industry, all tending to their mutual advantage, and adding to their common possessions. It must necessarily be so. While there are many thinkers there must also be many workers; and while there are many who love to meditate in solitude, there are still more who rejoice in society, and who mingle in the ranks of its active workers. It is a happy thing for man that individual minds differ from one another. As there is no uniformity in nature, so there is none among the minds of men. If no two leaves are exactly alike, and if "one star differeth from another star in glory," how can it be expected that the human mind—that wondrous, powerful, but invisible thing—should be cast in the same unchanging mould? The natural aptitude of some men is towards solitude, and that of others towards society; and, in the same way, the reciprocal effect which these two have upon the mind is entirely different. The tendency of solitude is towards contemplation, but the tendency of society is towards action.

It is not difficult to understand the reason of this. The mind is so constituted that it is extremely susceptible of external impressions. Indeed, the very slightest thing affects it. Like the wind blowing through the strings of a harp, and gently coaxing out melodious murmurs, a little incident is enough to make the mind vibrate with pleasure or quiver with pain. How often does some trifling annoyance which a man meets with in the morning, keep him irritable and restless all forenoon! and how easily does a kind salutation, or a little joke, keep one in the best of spirits for hours afterwards! A man, therefore, in entering into society, brings this impressibility within the range of almost countless influences. Mind acts upon mind, and heart upon heart. The great tide of human life rolling on around him carries him along with it, and he soon learns to act and think with those around him, whether he will or no. The great characteristic of society is undoubtedly action. Every one seems to have business to do, and is intent upon the doing of it. Each man has some object in life, some goal to reach, or some desire to accomplish; and he is constantly working towards its realization. Any man who enters society throws himself into this scene of action, and becomes active too.

The causes which produce this action in society may be classed under two heads,—first, the desire to influence others; and second, the power of sympathy. The desire of influencing others is characteristic of all minds. Each man naturally thinks his own mode of action or manner of thinking the best, and would like others to follow him; and when he himself follows some great model, he

desires to imbue others with a like impulse. All books are written with the purpose of influencing a community; some to instruct, and others only to amuse their readers; but the most of them are written to draw the minds of men into a particular mode of thought, or towards a special plan of action. Cobden and Bright stirred up the British nation to demand free trade and the repeal of the corn laws; for they themselves felt the necessity of these changes. Mr. Gladstone felt that the disestablishment of the Irish Church was imperatively required. He asked the nation to sanction the measure, and Parliament to carry it out; and, by the resistless charm of his eloquence, and the convincing logic of his argument, he won over a large majority to his side. But it is not by living in solitude that such men as these fit themselves for their work. They mingle freely in society, and it exerts a reflex influence on their minds. The fires of genius are fanned into a flame by contact with other minds, even although these are inferior. By the influence of active society around, such minds are roused up into irrepressible action, and carry other men along with them in an irresistible stream.

The scientific man makes a new discovery, and he persuades the world to recognise it. He invents a new machine, and induces the world to use it. The clergyman preaches righteousness, and persuades to holy thoughts and deeds. All these men have their minds expanded by society. They are excited to action themselves, and they persuade others to act with them. It is different, however, with men who devote their days and nights to study, and who seldom cross the threshold of their libraries. They are singularly unfit for business, easily imposed upon by the fraudulent, and absent-minded and unsocial in company. An English minister was described by his biographer as one who seemed to spend the whole week in the heavenly world, in the company of the Divine Being, and who came back to the earth on the Sabbaths to tell men what he had seen and learned, returning thither again till another Sabbath day came round. Whatever else might be said of such preaching, it certainly could not have been of a practical nature. However beautifully he may have discoursed on a future life, his hearers would learn little to assist them in their daily contact with the world; for he himself would belong to the contemplative order of minds, not the active, and would be deficient in the power of persuading to action.

This tendency towards action in society is further caused by the power of sympathy. While men are naturally anxious to influence others, the human mind is conscious of a desire to imitate great and noble minds, from sympathy with them.

" 'Tis well for us to imitate
The virtues of the wise and great."

When we read of the great events in history, of the noble deeds achieved by our ancestors, and the great work performed by the

world's heroes, we are thrilled with excitement, and burn with a contagious desire to follow in their footsteps. What was the origin of the Crusades but sympathy with the Christian pilgrims, who were refused admission to the Holy Sepulchre and the Holy Land, and the desire to free the land from the dominion of the Saracens? How did Peter the Hermit rouse Western Christendom to such a pitch of enthusiasm but by the power of sympathy? How did he fill the breasts of so many thousands with chivalrous emotions, gather such extraordinary numbers round his standard, and excite them with such an unquenchable desire to give even their lives to the cause he advocated, but by rousing their sympathies, and appealing to their valour, their indignation, their compassion, their common Christianity? Every one knows the sympathetic influences of mirth and sorrow, earnestness and indifference, hope and fear. We show our sympathy in the books we read, in the friends with whom we associate, and in our instinctive attachment to the beautiful, the good, and the true. It is seen also in the electric thrill which a great orator communicates to his audience. Cold must be the heart of the man who can listen to his eloquent appeals, and mark the earnestness welling out in his features, tones, and gestures, and who yet can find no response to it within himself, but turns away unconcerned and unmoved. This sympathetic impulse can be exerted only in society. Man receives these impulses everywhere, and always; but where they come from, or how they originate, he cannot tell. Society is moving, and ever progressing onwards; and he who lives within it cannot help sympathizing with those around him, and acting along with them.

If we were asked to quote two men who might represent solitude and society, and whose works might also illustrate their effects, we could not do better than mention the poet and the novelist. The former deals with fancies, the latter with facts. The one speaks to us of things as they might be, the other of things as they are. The one thinks and moves in an ideal world of his own creation; the other carries us about from scene to scene in the actual world, and forms his pictures of the daily lives of living men. True, the poet has also these facts and actual occurrences lying ready to his hand, and he uses them also; but he employs them only as the substratum of his thoughts. He passes them through the crucible of his imagination, and, with the magic wand of a wizard, he transforms them into an altogether new creation. The novelist also sometimes invents incidents; but he takes care to invent only what might have happened, for he knows that "truth is stranger than fiction." Our best novels are made up of scenes that have actually occurred, and are drawn from the records of real lives, only modified in form, or brought into new connections. As we have already attempted to show, the great effect which solitude has upon the mind is inducing habits of contemplation. Now this habit of contemplation or cogitation is essential to the very being of a poet. Without it he is like a Samson shorn of his strength, or an Apollo

divested of his beauty. He descends from his lofty standpoint if he lays it aside, tears the laurel from his brow, and becomes like other men. He cannot assume his singing robes amid the active energies of society, or in the busy hives of industry, for these robes are of too delicate a texture to bear contact with the multitude, or endure the winds and storms that ever and anon ruffle the surface of society. We may perhaps be reminded here of Crabbe and some other poets, who mingled freely in the business of the world, and who described the activities of life as novelists do. But such men are not poets in the high sense in which that term is understood, and they only employ verse as a more artistic method of relating their stories. We speak of men falling into a brown study, or indulging in day-dreams; and, for the time being, they are in solitude, wherever they are. The poet, too, has these reveries, and he shows his power by grasping them ere they vanish away, giving them a visible embodiment, and making them "things of beauty and a joy for ever." In the same way, as society trains to activity, so the novelist must have this quality, or he will fall far short of success. He must walk through the world ever on the alert to seize what may feed his energies, or supply him with materials for his work. He must study men and things. He might retire into solitude, and "evolve out of his inner consciousness" a book which might be interesting as a psychological study, but which would not be what we expect in a novel. He must be familiar with the streets and lanes of the city, and the villages of the country, and the better he is able to give us photographs of active life the greater will be his success.

If we were further asked to name two men as representatives, and whose works should illustrate these principles, perhaps none better could be named than Wordsworth and Dickens. Wordsworth was pre-eminently the poet of nature. He loved solitude; he loved meditation; his finest descriptions are of nature in solitary grandeur; and his meditations are seen in the philosophic tone which pervades everything he wrote. He, indeed, sings of common life, and introduces simple, every-day incidents into his poems; but they are all in settings of his own idealism, and bear marks of his meditative nature. His pedlars and waggoners are not men of real life, but metaphysicians and philosophers in disguise. He was ever in sight of the unchanging hills, and he was a constant worshipper of Nature in her solemn temple. The silence around him seems to have moulded his character, and he spent his life in quiet contemplation.

But not so with Dickens. He is a man of action. He has seen life in all its aspects, and studied character in all its varieties. He is equally at home in describing noblemen and tramps, merchants and showmen, millionaires and beggars, honest men and thieves. He has seen life at theatres and railway stations, on the race course and amid contested elections. He takes his readers to the crowded streets of the metropolis, and through the shady lanes and green

fields of the country. He can do all this because he lives in society and knows it thoroughly, and because it has trained him to active life.

Our greatest living poet, Tennyson, may also be quoted as an instance of one whose character has thus been influenced by solitude. He lives in the Isle of Wight, in great retirement, and takes no part in public life. He publishes seldom, but his thoughts are expressed in language of the rarest beauty. They are polished like an exquisitely cut gem, and are hardly capable of higher finish. His poetry shows him to be distinctively meditative, and his references to nature show that his subtle and far-reaching intellect is nurtured in retirement.

Charles Lamb may also be adduced as an instance of the active influences of society. He lived always in London, and was never happy anywhere else. He occasionally visited Coleridge at Stowey, or Wordsworth at Rydal Mount; but he never stayed with them long, and always yearned for the roar of Fleet Street and Temple Bar. He had little sympathy with the meditative pursuits of Wordsworth, although he was a poet himself; and he felt quite out of his element beneath the shadow of Scafell or Helvellyn. His telling us that he preferred his lodgings near the police court, for the sake of seeing life, and the references, in his delightful essays, to such people as beggars and chimney-sweeps, show how fond he was of active life. When he retired from the India House with his pension, and "went home for ever," as he expressed it, he felt his retirement exceedingly irksome for a time, and felt that he had been in society so long that he could be happy only in active life.

The effect, however, will be different in the case of those who are not naturally adapted for solitude, or in those cases in which the state of isolation is complete. Then contemplation will be overshadowed by melancholy, and even insanity. Of these many instances might be adduced. Dr. Combe, in his treatise on insanity, for example, mentions the case of a young officer, who was sent with a detachment of soldiers to a remote station in Canada, where, having no society of his own rank, he was obliged to spend his time in listless sauntering, fishing, and shooting. The consequence of this compulsory apathy was, that when he returned home after three years of such life, his nervous system had become so weak and irritable that he was afraid even to meet the members of his own family, and he would never venture out to take necessary exercise, except in the dark. Several months elapsed before his mind regained its usual healthy tone. It is not difficult to understand how such should be the case. The mind cannot remain passive. It is fitted for action, and if it is not employed in a right direction, it will certainly act in a wrong one. If it has little to employ it, undue importance will be attached to many things, and little faults will be brooded over till they appear like great crimes. David Brainerd, the missionary to the North American Indians, is also a case in point. He lived amongst them quite alone—for these savages could afford him no

companionship,—and he was as much in solitude as if he had lived in a desert island. He loved meditation passionately, and he speaks in his letters of the many nights in which he sat alone, thinking. The consequence was that his mind became unsettled, he fell into a state of chronic melancholy, and died at a comparatively early age. The case of Zimmermann is well known, who published four octavo volumes on “Solitude,” and who died in a state of insanity, fostered, if not altogether produced, by the solitude in which he lived, and which he lauded so much.

The effect of complete solitude is graphically painted by the poet-laureate, when he describes the condition of Enoch Arden, after he had been for some years on a desert island; and from the accounts we have of similar cases which have actually occurred, we cannot doubt its truth:—

“Downwards from his mountain gorge
Stept the long-haired, long-bearded solitary;
Brown, looking hardly human, strangely elad;
Muttering and mumbling, idiot-like it seemed
With inarticulate rage, and making signs,
They knew not what.”

It might be thought that the solitude of a convent would be highly beneficial, and that, as its inmates go there of their own free choice, they must surely be very happy. But the glimpses we occasionally get of convent life show that the life of a monk or a nun, although nominally one of religious retirement, is not generally of a beneficial character; and that such dispositions as pride, hatred, and ill-will flourish as much in the cloisters as they do in the world.

There are some cases, however, in which entire solitude seems to be perfectly congenial and innocuous. Washington Irving is a good example of this class. He was naturally of a contemplative disposition, and averse to a life of excitement. The description he gives of his life in the American prairies shows him to have been a man naturally adapted for it; and in noting the scenes through which he passed, and the incidents of forest and prairie life which he encountered, he had sufficient occupation for his mind. We read often of hunters and sportsmen wandering alone over the prairies for months at a time, and who seem to enjoy it greatly. But we must remember that these men have their attention fully occupied with the chase, and have no time to brood or turn melancholy. Besides, it is only for a comparatively short time, and when they do get back to the settlements, they make up for their solitude in gaiety and society.

On the other hand, and in contrast to this melancholy sometimes produced by solitude, it is found that society makes men cheerful as well as active. There is no better way of securing cheerfulness than by keeping the whole system, body as well as mind, in perfect working order; and this can never be done in solitude. The con-

stitution of man fits him for society; and he has many powers which can be exercised only there, therefore if he leads a solitary life these powers must remain in abeyance. It is well known that, in nature, anything unemployed for a time soon loses its power and becomes useless. Indian devotees, for instance, have often tied one of their arms to their sides, and never used it for years; and the consequence has been that, when the strappings were removed, the arm has been found to be perfectly useless, and only so much dead matter. And on the other hand, when anything is used almost exclusively, or is more exercised than others, it becomes unusually strong, and indirectly weakens everything else. The blacksmith's arm thus strengthens with use. The same principle holds good with regard to the mind. When any faculty, such as that of contemplation, is used much more than others, it acquires unnatural force, and the growth of the others is interfered with. The mind is then thrown off its balance, and equanimity, so necessary to cheerfulness, is entirely destroyed. But in society man finds employment for all his powers. The succession of incidents prevents him from worrying over the cares and troubles of life; and he finds his happiness in the performance of active work.

It might be said also that solitude leads to sectarian feelings. If a man confines himself to a certain form of thought, or associates only with a particular class of people, he will acquire the family features, so to speak, of that class, and feel himself a stranger anywhere else. But when he mixes freely in society he becomes more sympathetic, feels that everything good is not contained within his immediate circle, and he learns to recognise true nobility wherever he sees it. Solitude may also make a man selfish, and lead him to think only of his own comfort and welfare. But society will help to make him more benevolent, teaching him to feel for the distresses of others, and to love his neighbour as himself.

We have thus endeavoured to prove that solitude trains the mind to habits of contemplation, and that in excess it leads to melancholy, and is apt to induce habits of sectarianism and selfishness. Further, that society trains to activity, and is accompanied by cheerfulness, wider sympathies, and benevolence. It may be added in conclusion that the highest development of the mind can be found only in the union of both. Solitude perhaps could more easily be dispensed with than society, but both are needful. Although Cowper praises retirement, he speaks in the following terms of society, and with the quotation of these lines we shall close:—

“Man in society is like a flower
Blown in its native bed; 'tis there alone
His faculties, expanded in full bloom,
Shine out; there only reach their proper use.”

The Reviewer.

Faith and Science. By GILBERT SUTTON. London: Bell and Daldy.

THIS is a work of much excellence and value, profound yet simple, acute, ingenious, and original. It consists of twelve papers, which are all new to us, and we have no intimation that they are a republication, although they are of the nature of review papers of the best class, those, namely, which, taking the topic from some work on a great subject, discusses the question from a fresh point of view, in a discursive but interesting manner. We have no clue to the authorship of the volume, but he is well-read, thoughtful, and master of a pellucid and attractive style. The subjects of the various essays are—(1) Christianity and Science; (2) English Positivism, chiefly a critique on Buckle; (3) Has moral philosophy been labour in vain?—a review of the history of philosophy; (4) Had the Jews a philosophy?—answered in the affirmative—a paper based on M. Franck's interesting monograph, *La Kabbale*; (5) Was Jesus the Christ?—may perhaps have been suggested by "Ecce Homo," but is distinctly in favour of the divinity of our Lord—an admirable paper in spirit, style, and execution; (6) St. Paul and the Apostolic Faith—an article which may very well be read as an anti-Roman contribution to theological letters; (7) Love, the Law of Life—in which the writer maintains that love so rules everything that "all things live by the divine love. That which he ceases to love must cease to be;" (8) Equal demand of Intellect and Feeling—a dissertation of sweet and mellow philosophic tone and temper; (9) The Instrument and the Agent is a splendid exposition of the difference between the subject of study in physiology and that in psychology; (10) The Mysteries of Nature—giving a beautiful argument from the most recent discoveries in science, for the Being of God and the propriety of prayer; (11) The Future Rest discusses Immortality and Heaven; (12) Robertson, of Brighton—an able and genial critique, by one who seems to have read the inmost spirit of the apostle of the Kentish health-resort. We give the following extracts from the book to indicate its quality, and to confirm our estimate that a wise, good, judicious, loving, living book has been written, and that Gilbert Sutton has herein shown himself to be a worthy suggestor of an *Irenicon* between the three intellectual graces, whose union would constitute a perfect trinity of beauty,—science, philosophy, and religion. Let us hope that, animated by the spirit of light and sweetness, Mr. Sutton may go on giving the benefit of his high, holy, and honourable thoughts to the world that now is, and may reap the reward of

his labour of love in the Master's kingdom, where science and faith are one.

"The history of Christianity is marked by absorption of the obstacles which have successively arisen in the way of its progress. By its soundness it has assimilated and turned unwholesomeness into nutriment. We first see pagan temples and pagan rites subdued to Christian uses; then the Church took to itself the outward pomp and splendour of mediæval times. It wrested terror from absolute kings and feudal lords, holding in dependency the mighty tyrannies on which all were dependent. It collected the all-prevailing internecine strifes into one grand stream of holy adventure. Out of an ever-threatening disorganization it created the most wondrous organization the world had ever seen. Society itself was its work. Then came the revival of letters, threatening to be a return of pagan civilization without the pagan gods—a lettered atheism, in fact. Christianity was not to be extinguished thus; and the Reformation met the *Renaissance* with a higher learning and profounder light. In this our day appears what many regard as a great danger. Science disputes the Mosaic account of the creation. Criticism lays an unsparing hand upon sacred books. Will Christianity do as she has done before—take the results of society to herself, or succumb? Will she not say, All these things are witnesses to the truth of that which I told you ages ago, touching the immortal Spirit's identity with that of the Father? You have found the force into which matter is resolvable; and the will which is the force of mind—the supreme force not demonstrable by yourself, but recognisable when revealed. 'Even that I reveal unto you. Be not afraid, for lo! I am with you even unto the end of the world.'"—*Christianity and Science*," pp. 31, 32.

"We shall be, understand the true meaning of laws recognising that its essential element is restraint. The divine law imposes restrictions upon the natural inclinations and unruly appetites. Human laws respecting human liberty, and in the very name of liberty, draw the line of free action at the point where its indulgence would be hurtful to the fellow-subject. Without law there would be anarchy. . . .

"Free trade, facility of intercourse, peaceful meetings of the world's industry, gas, steam, electric telegraphs, telescopes penetrating the milky way, mathematics reaching to Neptune in the security of his countless millions of distance, geology working through the millions of years of the earth's history, the sun brought within the analysis of the spectrum, and made to tell us that he is of like material—our own flesh and blood as it were—we have made him artist too. The sea has no secrets. The whole universe is revolved into forces. There seems hardly aught to be learned; and no matter what may be ascertained or ascertainable, we know this much, that judging by results, the reformation of the heart of man is not to come through any such discoveries. To soften, purify, humanize that heart is assuredly the purpose of religion. To bind man to man in love; to hold society together in bonds of affection and charity is its aim."—*English Positivism*," pp. 52, 81.

"The metaphor wherewith men of letters are likened unto stars is singularly apt. The Homer of ages and ages ago is steadily fixed in the firmament of the world's literature. The starry system itself is not more a present reality than is that galaxy of literary lights composed of the great

writers of all times and all nations, of which no single one could be removed without making a woeful breach in the association, which revolves as one glorious whole to every well-read mind. Every true work of genius, whether poem, or history, or philosophy, has wrought an abiding influence, not limited to the language in which it has been written, but extending throughout the whole realm of literature, an undying member of the universal republic of letters. As our own Shakspeare, mightiest of the mighty, drew from Italian and Spanish sources, as well as from the higher founts of antiquity, so did Italian, and Spanish, and French, speak the spiritual dialects of the people, of whose tongue their own was each a modification. Without the poets of Greece and Rome, with Dante and Petrarch, would our Milton have been the temple dedicated to sacred song that he was, in whose harmonious composite all orders of divine poetry blended?"—*English Positivism*, p. 77.

"Compared with the world in which he dwells, what is man? Physically a grain of sand—a creature dwarfed even by the work of his own hands—a fly upon one of his own monuments, whether Egyptian pyramid or St. Paul's. What is the earth itself? A grain too in the infinitude of star-peopled space. Nevertheless, man does not feel that he is little; for, by virtue of this comprehension of the infinitude of nature, he is not little. The soul is not abashed by greatness; it is kindled by it. The soul is affected by that with which it is brought into contact; great with the great; little with the little. In divine light it radiates consanguineously beyond the stars. How and where it contracts God knows. It is a very remarkable property of man, that of feeling himself all centre, as it were. Does the man who, alone at night, with no living creature near, gazes upwards, feel other than his own intense consciousness assuring him of the presence of the Creator with himself?

"All laws are certain; and had we sufficient delicacy of perception, those of morals, from which political rule is inseparable, would be found to be as sure as those of the physical world. It is in morals will be found to lie the science of history for which we are all seeking. If ever it be attained, its truth may be tested by a Cuvier writing beforehand the history of some terrible cataclysm like that of the French Revolution, as deduced from preceding facts. That which reformations condemn are condemned by the very fact of the triumph of such reformations, and according to the measure of their triumph. Now what is prophecy, if it be not this very science of history illuminated by the divine mind? The woes that befall man, by reason of wickedness—his helplessness from persistence becoming the more helpless from continuance—the necessity of divine aid from the divine love—the feebleness to recognise the incarnate love, because of the dimmed eye, and because of the respected freedom of will retarding through its abuse the eventual but sure victory—such is the prospective history spoken of in perfect science."—*The Instrument and the Agent*, pp. 240, 250, 251.

"At length, however, the most distant point is reached, beyond which science cannot advance. Experiment is inadequate to do more. Discovery, although she may have reached the ultimate elementary particles of matter, organic and inorganic, acknowledges herself incompetent to meet the inevitable question, Who breathed into these particles the breath of life? Who bade ye to expand here into something finer than air, and hold as iron there—to rise as continents and foam as seas—to clothe all forms

of life—to build up the outer fashion of man, and minister to his senses? Baffled by the 'Who,' science shifts the question to the "What,"—asking what set all agoing? But the answer, be it gravitation, or any other impersonality, only pushes the question back and back into the arms of intelligible because intelligent cause—of thought with act, and act by thought manifest through will.

"This declared adequacy flashes through the thickness of mystery. The cloud parts not, but it is no longer the chilling blackness of darkness—it is bright with the insupportable splendour upon which eyes to look must be cleansed in the very infinite beam. And now adhering to the restraint of language which our appeal to reasonable good sense imposes on us, we offer a concluding word of grave sobriety about prayer, which is a stumbling-block to the logic of the immutability of the divine will."—*"Mysteries of Nature,"* p. 273.

"Instincts being given to the animal for its preservation, and the soul being of higher price, we are led to ask, Has the latter no guardian instincts wakening up in moments of surprise and peril? The question finds its answer in the spontaneous readiness with which men in danger make appeal to higher than human help, accompanied by a sense of certainty, as if a new revelation fell upon the soul itself. The deeper the necessity, the surer He is near; and to those who take exclusive views of the conditions of God's goodness, we would simply suggest that this instinct, true to the character of instinct, is universal. Thus vanishes the final difficulty, thus does it lose itself in the bosom of the Father. Philosophy itself may be regarded as the finger-post pointing to the way. The way itself is He who said, 'I am the Way, and the Truth, and the Life. No man cometh unto the Father, save through Me.'"—*"The Mysteries of Nature,"* p. 276.

"It is not without purpose that we point to Robertson's manifold powers; because to a man of a different stamp they would have proved manifold temptations. How great, for example, was the temptation to such a man to separate from the Church, and place himself at the head of some new sect! Had he chosen to have done so, there can be no doubt that he would have had numerous followers, and the alluring appearance of personal influence, so dear to every man's heart. He might have founded a system, and created disciples, charged with the perpetuation of his doctrines and the preservation of his memory. He had all advantages of person and manner. Young, graceful, ardent, accomplished, learned, and eloquent, how could he have failed, had he been merely ambitious? Nor were excuses wanting for his own self-justification. He stood very much apart. He, whose efforts were directed to unity and peace, found himself alone! His adversaries, too little agreed for combination against him, had each nevertheless his own separate fling, although not levelled, it must be confessed, with like asperity. High church disagreement was tempered with gentle respect for the man who had, in so manly a manner, testified to the deep devotional spirit and love of the sacredly beautiful which invest High Churchism with so much attractiveness. His intense estimate of and personal loving devotion to the Son of man, exceeding so far that of orthodox soundness of opinion, healed the sting of his condemnation of Unitarianism. Low Church repudiated him altogether. Even muscular Christianity, soldier as he was, loving to revel in the luxury of danger, would have had more admiration for than sympathy with a spirit so restrained by gentleness. He had hence no special following; and yet to have created it would have needed no more than that the general

influence which he did exercise should have been condensed in some separate chapel. The answer, as all answers touching the conduct of this man, is to be found in his character, which attained, as nearly as is attainable by mortal man, the perfection which he taught."—"Robertson of Brighton," pp. 323, 324.

"He was not a man to shirk statements because of apparent clashing with convictions already formed. He neither scorns the speculations of the metaphysician, nor denies the higher antiquity of man as rendered probable by the geologist, nor puts aside the proofs of older civilizations than would seem to be warranted by Bible history; nor did he affect to underrate the good things of this world. He went abroad, and saw the beauty of external nature, recording his impressions in language that revealed his sympathies with Wordsworth and Tennyson, and in words surpassed by none; nor did he ascetically call the goods of the world not goods. Wealth was wealth, with all its acknowledged advantages; comfort was comfort; only he was neither tempted by, nor deceived as to, their relative value. Nor did the worldliness, in which he took no share, blind his eye to the good acts of the man of the world. With Zacchæus the publican, it was, as he argues, liberality first, and grace afterwards. Frank admissions these, for which he has had to suffer much misconception. Worse again, in the eyes of the same class of adversaries, he respected doubt—nay, more, he sympathized with what he believed to be the agonies of a doubting spirit—in such wise as not, indeed, to betray that he had personally endured such suffering, but that he had known and felt for those who may have had recourse to his large, liberal mind and sympathetic heart. In one of those energetically condensed sentences, in which he sometimes resumes a world of meaning, he refers to some who have had enough of earnestness for doubt; for to him doubt did not necessarily mean vacillation, but anxiety for truth."—"Robertson of Brighton," pp. 301, 302.

"The fresh theology—we say fresh rather than new—fears not science, at which it looks with eyes too pure to behold iniquity therein. What is science but secondary law—the instrument of the great will? It is for man to seek out the Creator's means, under the conviction that any correction of his own previous misunderstandings thereupon are quite irrespective of the first unknowable cause, which is hidden, as is the principle of life. Until reason and conscience, until speculation and the moral sentiments, be proved to be functions of matter, the science that deals with material things and the spirit which moves in the deep sense of the infinite cannot clash. With matter God may have dealt once for all. He may have planted in the infinitude of space the seed of things for the untold ages to develop and unfold and break into ever-varying forms. It may be so. It would not, therefore, follow that He is to rest for evermore in placid, inert contemplation of the stupendous fruits of His once-for-all pronounced fiat. Hath He not reserved for Himself, in the order of spirit breathed by His own into creature companions, an eternal sphere of activity worthy of Himself? Matter is to man mere steps to the mansion not made with hands. Taking cognizance of it by his senses, he transcends it by his spirit. The endless star worlds are but the robe of His infinite majesty, the signs and ornaments of His power. Humanity is His love; in His own Son perfect, and through His own Son of divine possibilities."—"Robertson of Brighton," pp. 327, 328.

A Practical Treatise on Bright's Diseases of the Kidneys. By T. GRAINGER STEWART, M.D., F.R.S.E., &c. Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black.

It is not the habit of the *British Controversialist* to notice works that are purely medical. In the case of this work we make an exception, however, and mainly in consideration of its high literary merit. The curiosity of our enlightened classes now-a-days is not easily restrained by the barriers of the technical, and in many cases, as we know, would fain find food for itself even within the domain of medicine in matter physiological or pathological. In the latter department no disease has more occupied attention than that named of Bright; and we are glad to say that here is a book that every reader can understand—a book, too, that, in a scientific point of view, is the best on the subject in the English language. On that particular form of Bright's disease that is called the waxy kidney, as on the waxy degeneration in general, Dr. Grainger Stewart is notably an authority. And what is of most interest here, and most recommends itself to the general reader, is the fact that in this form of a disease which, while very common, is usually regarded as hopeless, Dr. Grainger Stewart has led strong evidence in favour of the efficacy of remedies.

In short, we can promise the general reader who seeks information, that he will find in the work of Dr. Grainger Stewart matter interesting, instructive, and of easy apprehension—matter of which he will never regret the acquisition. The very plates are singularly good, and well worth a glance from everybody. In the conduct of the work, Dr. Grainger Stewart, who by no means lays himself out for the praise of originality, shows great good sense in following the classification of the German pathologist Virchow.

Speeches by the Right Hon. John Bright, M.P. Edited by J. E. THEOBOLD ROGERS. London: Macmillan and Co.

Speeches by the Right Hon. John Bright, M.P. London: John Camden Hotten.

These two works, though they contain much matter in common, and are both valuable, are not by any means the same work. They differ in price, the latter being but a penny more than half the cost of the former, which is 3s. 6d. They differ again in that the former is *authorized*, and has been revised by the orator, though the selection has been made by the editor, who acknowledges responsibility for that, his preface, and the index. The latter is also selected by an editor (R. H. S.), who supplies a preface, but its contents are unauthorized. The latter contains twenty speeches in all, and the former fifty-six. The latter seem to be extracted from the best reports of the day, but the former, so far as they are parliamentary, are from Hansard. The index to the former is a most beneficial help. This notice is that of a book-guide merely. Of the speeches of Mr. Bright it is unnecessary to pen a critique here, but it is not unlikely that the character of Mr. Bright as an orator, may engage the attention of the reader at no distant date.

The Topic.

IS COMPULSORY VACCINATION MORALLY RIGHT, AND BENEFICIAL IN ITS SANITARY EFFECTS?

AFFIRMATIVE.

THOSE who have read of the fearful ravages of the small-pox, when it came like a pestilence sweeping over the country, and hurrying away thousands of those who were overtaken by it—those who know the loathsome deadliness of the virns of that contagious disease—cannot but rejoice that our legislators have been wise enough to insist on a preventive measure so simple, so efficacious, so much in accordance with the merciful law of Heaven, as compulsory vaccination. People sometimes affirm that compulsory vaccination is wrong, because it is an interference with the glorious privileges enjoyed by small-pox in the olden time. But I am no such conservative. Let all these remember that any vaccination at all is compulsory; that contagious vaccination or inoculation, the catching of the infection, is compulsory; and let them remember that vaccination in the healthy frame, when the tissues are fresh and vigorous, is far preferable to infection when the energies of life have got worn and weakened, and are unable to resist the attacks of the disease. If they do so, they will find reason to feel grateful to the Government for having used this providentially discovered preventative to lessen the horrors and terrors of this grievous and noxious eruption, and to be thankful that so much life has been spared, and pain saved, and disease dispensed with, and to be assured that compulsory vaccination is a beneficial measure. —G. V.

Salus populi suprema lex est, and hence it is proper that compulsory vaccination should be insisted on. Prevention is held to be the best

course in all cases; how much more so ought it to be with such a mortal scourge as small-pox? Men must not be allowed to plead their conscientious objections to using preventive measures on their children, in order that they may have the privilege of inflicting the pain and death of an epidemic upon the children of others in their neighbourhood. What sort of a conscience clause would satisfy the person who virtually avers, "I conscientiously object to the endurance of a small amount of suffering and of a slight risk by my child; but I do not object to my child's becoming a great risk to the neighbourhood in which I reside, as a centre of infection, and the cause of great suffering, by the spread of infection to many of the children of my neighbours"? The safety of the people demands the law for the compulsory vaccination of children as a safeguard for the children themselves, and as a preventative in regard to others, who would be exposed to infection from neglect to enforce it. The objection taken to the Act amounts briefly to this,—"I shall not run the risk of communicating infection to my child, but shall let matters take their course, and so compel my neighbours to run the risk of infection from my child when disease assails it." Is that right?—D. H. R.

It is difficult to define the limits of State control and individual liberty; but we believe that if the actions of any individual affect others besides himself, the State is justified in interfering for the public good. Therefore, no individual has a right to do anything likely to spread a contagious disease amongst his neighbours, for by so doing he causes

them much trouble and expense, besides placing their lives in great danger. And if any are so insensible of their duty to their neighbours and the State, as to neglect or refuse to take wise sanitary precautions, and thereby expose others to some disease, we say the State is justified in compelling them to take such precautions. It would be monstrously unjust that the lives of thousands should be endangered by the obstinacy, ignorance, or neglect of one individual. Hence compulsory vaccination is morally right, provided that it is beneficial in its sanitary effects, which we believe is the case. The best proof of this is to compare the number of deaths before, with the number since, the introduction of vaccination. Macaulay, in his "History," gives a graphic description of its fearful ravages before vaccination was resorted to, and at that time 3,000 in every million died annually of small-pox alone. Now, however, according to Dr. Seaton's "Handbook of Vaccination," but 200 in every million die annually of this disease. Dr. Seaton's book also gives statistics, which prove that in other countries vaccination has been equally a success. But, apart from statistics, what stronger proof could we have of the efficacy of vaccination than the fact that the nurses of the Small-Pox Hospital (who have, of course, been vaccinated) never suffer from the disease? Of course, vaccination is not always successful. What remedy is? And we admit that in some cases it may cause erysipelas, or other diseases; but this is the result of some individual peculiarity of constitution, and is not the fault of the vaccine matter. It is absurd to condemn vaccination because it has, on a few occasions, proved injurious, when it has, on the whole, been very beneficial in its sanitary effects.—GEORGE J. B. STONE.

1869,

NEGATIVE.

Compulsory legislation ought only to proceed and be based on scientific certainty, but great difference of opinion exists amongst medical men in regard to vaccination, and this is supported by facts, such as the advocacy of re-vaccination. This being the case, compulsory vaccination is wrong in itself, as well as injurious in its consequences.—T. C.

It is quite evident that the introduction of putrescent matter from one body into another produces very serious derangement to health, even in the most successful cases. We know, however, that a very large number of children inherit, or are brought under the influence of, serious diseases. As the tendency of disease is to concentrate itself in eruptive matter, the insertion of the vaccine virus, as it is called, is not a simple process of introducing a specific contagion into the blood and tissues of a child, but it may be a complicated and highly deleterious compound which is introduced into the system, and so the seeds of worse diseases than small-pox may be sown in the system. Empirical treatment ought not to be made compulsory; and the law exceeds its prerogative when it compels the running of such fearful risks as are often involved in the blood-poisoning induced in vaccination. Preventive sanitary measures ought to be founded on unquestionable scientific data and principles, of the safety and efficacy of which there can be no question, and vaccination is not free from grave doubts and serious evils. On these grounds we vote for the negative.—J. F.

Laws are made for the safety and happiness of the governed—at least ought to be. Contradictory laws are absurdities. Law says, Thou shalt not kill, and yet law compels a parent to allow his child to be poisoned with the virus at least of

one loathsome disease, possibly of many—but *such* killing is no murder, it is done so slowly! We seek to escape epidemics by manufacturing one wholesale, and keeping it constantly somewhere revitalized in the land. But then the doctors get fees by it, and lawyers get practice, and undertakers trade, and public officials business and credit for strict enforcement of the law; while parents get danger, distress, anguish, and care, and children have health ruined and the narrow chances of a happy life made still narrower. Wherefore compulsory vaccination appears to me to be legalized cruelty and poisoning, not seldom resulting in “death by the law.” Of such a law who can approve? Not,—L. A. D.

It is stated in the *Times*’ report of the British Medical Association, held at Leeds, “that in the opinion of those best qualified to judge there is much existing imperfection, and much room for improvement, in the arrangements for vaccination. Some sanitarians entertain an opinion that compulsory vaccination is, after all, a clumsy substitute for proper legislation.” Such being the opinion of the highest authorities on the subject, we claim that compulsory vaccination is wrong, if not tyrannous.—H. M. T.

It has been clearly ascertained that the humanized lymph employed in vaccination has so much degenerated that it is no longer effective—that resusceptibility to infection after vaccination is on the increase—and that, in fact, revaccination is in many cases necessary; so much so, that some have advocated septennial vaccination, like septennial parliaments, for security’s sake. This shows that the grounds upon which compulsory vaccination has been legalized have not been sufficiently certain. Yet the people have submitted to the law, even though it has thus been found to be, not only

inefficacious, but injurious and dangerous. Of late a justifiable resistance has been begun, and parents have hesitated, even in the majestic presence of the law, to let their children pass through the fire of vaccination, in sacrifice to the Moloch of an *effete* idea and a senseless law, and an anti-compulsory vaccination association has been rightly called into being.—J. Y.

In both aspects of the case we emphatically declare negatively. We, as Christian men and good citizens, are duly bound to be subject to the civil powers. Morally right! Nay; it is an iniquitous law that compels us to defy it; or God’s implanted instincts to preserve health, intellect, and even life itself, may perhaps be endangered by compulsory vaccination.

Experience leads me to declare against it as more injurious than beneficial as a sanitary measure. The doctor who attended our family for many years, having a daughter the same age as myself, proposed to my parents that she and I should be vaccinated at the same time, and from the same matter. Fortunately they refused; but he operated on his daughter; the result is she has suffered from fits and ill-health ever since. If such results follow when a tender father and a skilful doctor attends to a beloved one, how dire are the results we may anticipate when matter is obtained merely as a *matter* of business; where affection does not prompt the greatest anxiety to obtain it in its purest form? This is not an isolated case; but similar cases might be multiplied a thousandfold. Nor is it in consonance with allopathic principles. If all other diseases require various treatment, according to circumstances, is it not absurd to suppose that one operation, in all varieties of temperaments, and in the greatest diversity of circumstances, can be invariably efficacious?—C. J. C.

Our Collegiate Course.

THE BARD.

A PINDARIC ODE.

BY THOMAS GRAY.

I. 2.

ON a rock, whose haughty brow
Frowns o'er old Conway's foaming flood,

Standing upon a cliff, whose overhanging height throws a dark shadow
over the turbulent waters of the ancient Conway, wrapped in the black

(15) *Haughty*, from the old word *haught*, from French *haut*, high, from Latin *altus*, high, lofty.

(16) *Conway*, a river in North Wales, remarkable for the bold romantic scenery in which its upper reaches abound, and the beautiful landscapes which lie along its lower course. It rises at the point of junction of the counties of Merioneth, Denbigh, and Carnarvon, in a little mountain-tarn. In the first eighteen miles of its course it receives many rapid mountain affluents, and is itself turbulent and wild; for twelve miles thereafter it is a large, smooth, winding, navigable stream. *Frowns*, overhangs, as a brow (*Frons*) wrinkled in wrath.

(17—22) Sir Joshua Reynolds mentions, in his "Discourses on Painting" (xv.), that Gray was indebted to painting, in some measure at least, for his conception of the indignant Welsh bard, as here given. He acknowledged that the recollection of Permezziano's picture of Moses "Breaking the Tables," had kindled his imagination, and contributed to shape his own description. The elder Disraeli, however, states that "Gray tells us that the image of his 'Bard,'—

'Loose his beard, and hoary hair
Streamed like a METEOR to the troubled air,'

was taken from a picture of the Supreme Being [in the vision of Ezekiel], by Raphael. It is, however, remarkable, and somewhat ludicrous, that the *beard* of Hudibras is also compared to a *meteor*; and the accompanying observation of Butler almost induces one to think that Gray derived from it the whole plan of that sublime ode, since his *bard* precisely performs what the *beard* of Hudibras denounced. These are the verses:—

'This hairy meteor did denounce
The fall of sceptres and of crowns.'—*Hud.*, c. i.

I have been asked if I am serious in my conjecture, that 'the *meteor beard*

Robed in the sable garb of woe,
 With haggard eyes the poet stood
 (Loose his beard, and hoary hair
 Streamed, like a meteor to the troubled air),
 And with a master's hand, and prophet's fire,
 Struck the deep sorrows of his lyre.
 Hark, how each giant oak and desert cave
 Sighs to the torrent's awful voice beneath!
 O'er thee, O king, their hundred arms they wave,
 Revenge on thee in hoarser murmurs breathe;

raiment of mourning, with wildly gleaming eyes, the bard was seen (his beard was flowing, and his age-grey locks floated on the tempestuous breeze, like a comet's far-diffused streaks); and with a proficient's skill and a soothsayer's energy extracted from his harp a song expressive of intense grief. "Listen" (the lay so runs) "in what manner each mighty monarch of the wood, and each tenantless hollow heaves forth the sound of its sorrow in communion with the terrible murmurs of the floods below! They threaten above thy head, O sovereign, with the shaking of their Briarean branches, and invoke upon thee by their loud complainings; resounding—as they never may again, since the time of thy conquest, bring-

of Hudibras might have given birth to the 'bard' of Gray. I replied that the *burlesque* and the *sublime* are extremes, and extremes meet. How often does it merely depend on our own state of mind, and on our own taste, to consider the sublime as burlesque! Be this as it may, it has never, I believe, been remarked (to return to Gray,) that when he conceived the idea of the *beard* of his 'Bard,' he had in his mind the *language* of Milton, who describes Azazel sublimely unfurling—

"The imperial ensign which, full high advanced,
 Shone like a meteor streaming to the wind!"
 'Paradise Lost,' b. i., v. 535.

Very similar to Gray's—

'Streamed like a meteor to the troubled air.'
 "Curiosities of Literature" (Routledge's Ed.), p. 112.

Mr. Mitford quotes a remark from the "Walpoliana," in which it is stated that the accident of seeing a blind harper perform on a Welsh harp awoke the suspended action of the poet's fancy, and induced him to complete the poem which he had in contemplation.

(17) *Sable* now means *black*, but seems originally to have been derived from *Sabulo*, sand, dust, and to be connected with the old form of mourning, "sackcloth and *ashes*."

(18) *Haggard*, hag-like, and therefore *wild*, from *Saga*, a wise woman—*s* being softened into *h* as in *semi*, *hemi* half; *hex*, and *sex*, *six*, &c.

(24) *Torrent*, from Latin *Torreo*, to scorch, burn, as in *torrenti flumina* foaming (as if boiling) rivers.

Vocal no more, since Cambria's fatal day,
To high-born Hoel's harp, or soft Llewellyn's lay.

I. 3.

Cold is Cadwallo's tongue,
That hushed the stormy main :
Brave Urien sleeps upon his craggy bed ;
Mountains, ye mourn in vain
Modred, whose magic song
Made huge Plinlimmon bow his cloud-topped head.
On dreary Arvon's shore they lie,

ing destruction to Welsh nationality—to the noble Hoel's harp, or the tender song of Llewellyn."

Death-chilled is the voice of Cadwallon, which soothed the tempest-tost ocean into peace; high-hearted Urien is stretched in death upon his couch of cliffs; O hill-ranges, ye weep uselessly for Modred, whose enchanting melodies made mighty Plinlimmon bend his mist-clad peak; on the desolate coast of Carnarvon, they sleep the sleep that knows no waking, bedaubed

(28) Hoel (1140—1172) is called *high-born*, as being the son of Owen Gwynedd, prince of North Wales. He and his brother Madoc contested the right to the throne. In the fight Hoel fell, and Madoc emigrated from Wales; Hoel's poems are chiefly love-odes, and of these the finest is entitled "The Choice." *Llywarch ap*. Llewellyn's poetry (1160—1220) was characterized by his countrymen as soft and sweet, and the poet himself is styled the tender-hearted prince. He was the laureate of several of the princes, and perhaps an account of this was satirically called "the poet of the pigs." One of his most notable pieces is an "Invocation," while undergoing the ordeal of fire to which he was subjected in order that it might be ascertained if he knew anything of Madoc's fate. A line of Pope's in his "Dunciad," high-born "Howard," echoed in the ear of Gray, when he gave with all the artifice of alliteration,—

"High-born Hoel's harp."

Disraeli's "Curiosities of Literature," p. 212.

(29) Cadwallon was a Welsh prince of the seventh century, whom Edwin defeated in 622; he then fled over sea to Ireland, whence he at a later date returned, and thereafter waged constant war against the Saxons as oppressors. He patronized the bards of Powys, and gained their loving praise.

(31) Perhaps Aneurin, author of "The Gododin" (?).

(33) Brydydd (1200—1250) ?

(34) The range of Plinlimmon, which runs across the country from east to west, is the boundary between north and south Wales. Plinlimmon, its highest peak (2,500 feet), is thirty miles in circumference at its base. In it the sources of the Severn and the Wye are contained. Compare *cloud-topt* with Shakspeare's "cloud-capped."

(35) Arvon is Caernarvonshire, the fortified land opposite to *Von*, or *Mon*, i. e., Anglesea.

Compare *share*, *shear*, *shire* from Anglo-Saxon *scýran*, to divide, dispart, separate, with *shore*.

Smeared with gore and ghastly pale ;
 Far, far aloof the affrighted ravens sail :
 The famished eagle screams, and passes by.
 Dear lost companions of my tuneful art,
 Dear as the light that visits these sad eyes,
 Dear as the ruddy drops that warm my heart,
 Ye died amidst your dying country's cries.
 No more I weep. They do not sleep.
 On yonder cliff, a grisly band,
 I see them sit ; they linger yet,
 Avengers of their native land ;
 With me in dreadful harmony they join,
 And weave with bloody hands the tissue of my line.

II. 1.

Weave the warp, and weave the woof,
 with blood, and white as a spectre ; away to a distance from them the terrified ravens fly, and the hungry eagle shrieks and hurries off from the sight. Beloved, departed comrades in poetic skill, welcome to my soul as are the day-beams which enter by grief-worn eyes ; delightful to me as are the bright blood-globules which impart vital heat to my heart, ye expired in the times of your expiring land's groans. Not again shall I mourn. They are not dead ; on those mountain-peaks, a misty dark multitude, I notice them rest ; they hover around still to wreak the penalty of vengeance on the oppressors of the country of our sires. With me in terrible song-bursts they combine, and unroll with gore-dabbled hands the web of thy fate and that of thy posterity.

Intertwist the warp and intermingle the woof, to make the death-shroud of the whole lineage of Edward I.

Let there be sufficient scope, and a large margin, to write thereon the

(36) *Smeared*, bedabbled, as in *Macbeth*—

“Smear the sleepy grooms with blood,”

“Their hands and faces were all *badged* with blood,”

“Their daggers unmannerly *breeched* with gore,” &c.

Ghastly, from Anglo-Saxon *gast*, German *geist*, spirit, like a ghost in appearance, *deathly*.

(37) *Aloof*, all off, entirely off or away from, apart, remote, at a distance.

(38) *Famished*, hunger-sore, from Latin *Fames*, hunger.

(40—43) This repetition of the same word at the beginning of each of several clauses, is called *anaphora*.

(44) *Grisly*, from Anglo-Saxon *grislic*, terrible, as—

“So spake the grisly terror, and in shape

So speaking and so threatening, grew tenfold

More dreadful and deform.”—*Paradise Lost*, ii., 704—6.

(48) *Tissue*, from Latin *Texere*, to weave, as *issue* from *Esire* to go out ; —directly from French *tissu*, woven.

(49) “In the operation of weaving, the threads which are stretched on the frame are called the *warp* or *warps*, and the single thread which is

The winding-sheet of Edward's race.
 Give ample room, and verge enough,
 The characters of hell to trace.
 Mark the year, and mark the night,
 When Severn shall re-echo with affright
 The shrieks of death, through Berkley's roof that ring,
 Shrieks of an agonizing king!

weird letters of the infernal kingdom. Note on it the year, and fix therein the date of that night in which the Severn appalled shall resound with the shrill cries of one expiring, when, through the sounding chambers of Berkeley Castle, the scream of an intensely suffering king shall pass. Out of thee,

woven into it by means of the shuttle is called the woof; and the two combined in a texture is called the *web*."—*Dr. C. M. Ingleby*. "Can there be an image more just, apposite, and nobly imagined, than this tremendous tragical winding-sheet? In the rest of this stanza the wildness of thought, expression, and cadence, are admirably adapted to the character and situation of the speaker, and of the bloody spectres his assistants. It is not, indeed, peculiar to it alone, but a beauty that runs throughout the whole composition, that the historical events are briefly sketched out by a few striking circumstances, in which the poet's office of rather exciting and directing than satisfying the reader's imagination, is perfectly observed. Such abrupt hints, resembling the small fragments of a vast ruin, suffer not the mind to be raised to the utmost pitch by one image of horror, but that instantly a second and a third are presented to it, and the affection is still uniformly supported."—*An anonymous critic quoted by Mason*.

(51) "Gray has been severely censured by Johnson for the expression,—

'Give ample room and verge enough,
 The characters of hell to trace.'—*'The Bard.'*

On the authority of the most unpoetical of critics we must still hear that the poet *has no line so bad*. '*Ample room*' is feeble, but would have passed unobserved in any other poem but in the poetry of Gray, who has taught us to admit nothing but what is exquisite. '*Verge enough*' is poetical, since it conveys a material image to the imagination. No one appears to have detected the source from whence, probably, the *whole line* was derived. I am inclined to think it was from the following passage in Dryden:—

'Let Fortune empty her whole quiver on me,
 I have a soul that, like an AMPLE SHIELD,
 Can take in all, and VERGE ENOUGH for more.'

Dryden's 'Don Sebastian.'"

—*Disraeli's "Curiosities of Literature."*

(56) Edward II., eldest surviving son of Edward I., born at Carnarvon, 25th April, 1284, was in 1301 created Prince of Wales, and was recognised as king on his father's death, 7th July, 1307. At Boulogne, in Jan. 1308,

She-wolf of France, with unrelenting fangs,
 That tear'st the bowels of thy mangled mate,
 From thee be born, who o'er thy country hangs
 The scourge of Heaven! What terrors round him wait!
 Amazement in his van, with Flight combined,
 And Sorrow's faded form, and Solitude behind.

II. 2.

Mighty victor, mighty lord,

She-wolf of France, who, with slakeless jaw, rendest asunder the entrails of thy murdered husband, let him issue who shall overcloud thine own land like a pestilence—the retribution of the Most High. What fear-awakening fates engird him,—bewilderment before him! in union with Retreat, and the ghastly shape of Sorrow, while Desolation follows in the rear.

Magnificent conqueror, glorious tyrant, on his death-bed he rests humbly!

he married Isabella, daughter of Philip V., of France, to whom he had been affianced since 1299. His reign was troubled greatly on account of his own remissness, and of his engrossment with favourites, in whose hands he left the exercise of the royal prerogatives. Isabella became, in league with Mortimer, the head of a party against him, and they gained possession of the heir-apparent, who was betrothed to Philippa, of Hainault. England was invaded by the conspirators, and the king was deserted by the chief men in the kingdom. Edward fled to Bristol, then shut himself up in Neath Abbey. Edward III. was proclaimed king, his father was dragged from his concealment, and taken in custody to Monmouth, and thence to Kenilworth. He was hurried from prison to prison, while Isabella and her paramour Mortimer ruled in the name of the prince. After having had him incarcerated in the castles of Corfe and Bristol, and finding that insult could not kill, he was taken to Berkeley castle, and there, with the connivance of his wife, on 20th September, 1327, by his keepers, Sir Thomas Gournay and Sir John Maltravers, he was murdered. His body was shown at Bristol, and he was buried privately in Gloucester cathedral. Tradition says that fearful shrieks broke the quietude of one terrible night, and that next morning it was known the king was dead.

(57) Isabella, of France, so called for her relentless cruelty. The same phrase is applied by Shakspeare to Queen Margaret.—*Henry VI.*, part iii., act i., s. 4.

(62) Edward III., eldest son of Edward II., and of Isabella, born 1312, crowned on the deposition of his father, 25th January, 1327, and married Philippa, of Hainault, 1328. He claimed the crown of France, and eagerly prosecuted his claim. At Orecy, Calais, and Poitiers, as well as in Guienne, he became "the scourge" of France. He had many sorrows in his family life. The last fortnight of his existence was passed at the manor of Shene (Richmond), attended only by his paramour, Alice Perrers. But she deserted him on the morning of the day on which he died, and no one, except a single priest, was by his death-bed, or even in the house, when, on 21st June, 1377, in his 65th year, he expired.

Low on his funeral couch he lies !
 No pitying heart, no eye afford
 A tear to grace his obsequies.
 Is the sable warrior fled ?
 Thy son is gone, he rests among the dead.
 The swarm that in thy noontide beam were born,—

Neither a sorrowing spirit nor a grieving eye yields a teardrop to give the customary solemnity to his burial-rites ! Has the heroic "Black Prince" departed ? Thy son is dead. He reposes among the slain. Where is the eager crowd that had been brought into being during thy prosperity ? They have set off to greet the new "expectancy of nations." The sun shines gaily, the western breezes fan the cheek gently, while the richly adorned bark, in flaunting style, sweeps grandly through the deep blue sea ;

(67) Edward, the Black Prince, born at Woodstock, 15th June, 1330, who, in his sixteenth year, on the field of Crecy, slew the blind king of Bohemia, John of Luxemburg, at Poitiers, took John, king of France, prisoner, who had fought bravely in Spain, and governed Guienne as a province, under the government of his father, but who died 8th June, 1376. He was, in popular estimation, the first hero of the age, remarkable alike for personal bravery and military skill. He had headed the rebellions which, in the closing years of his life, disturbed and amazed Edward III. He predeceased his father by somewhat more than a year.

(69) Gray, in his "Ode to Adversity," has—

"Light THEY DISPERSE, and with them go
 The SUMMER FRIEND."

Fond of his image, he has it again in his Bard,—

"The SWARM that in thy NOONTIDE BEAM are born,
 Gone."

Perhaps the germ of this beautiful image may be found in Shakspeare—

—"For men, like BUTTERFLIES,
 Show not their mealy wings but to THE SUMMER."
"Troilus and Cressida," act iii., s. 7.,

and two similar passages in Timon of Athens,—

"The swallow follows not the summer
 More willingly than we your lordship.
 Tim. Nor more willingly leaves winter ;
 Such summer birds are men."—Act iii.

Again in the same—

—"One cloud of winter showers
 These flies are couched."—Act ii.
Disraeli's "Curiosities of Literature."

Milton also speaks of—

"Summer's noontide air."—"Paradise Lost," ii., 809 ; and of a—
 "Swarm of flies in Vintage time."—"Paradise Regained," iv., 15.

Gone to salute the rising morn.
 Fair laughs the morn, and soft the zephyr blows,
 While proudly riding o'er the azure realm,
 In gallant trim the gilded vessel goes ;
 Youth on the prow, and pleasure at the helm ;
 Regardless of the sweeping whirlwind's sway,
 That, hushed in grim repose, expects his evening prey.

Youth on the outlook at the forefront, and Pleasure having the guidance of its course ; heedless of the careering tempest's might, which, couching like a wild beast, in gloomy silence lurkingly awaits its booty when the shades of night begin to fall.

(70) "The rising morn" refers to Richard II., only surviving son of Edward the Black Prince, who succeeded Edward III., in his eleventh year. The extravagance, magnificence, and exactions of his reign, and the terrible storms of rebellion and murder in which it closed, are denoted in six succeeding lines.—See Shakspeare's *Richard II.*

(76) "This representation of the *whirlwind*, under the image of a *beast of prey*, lying in ambush in the *day time*, expectant of the *night*, is not only perfectly just and natural, but incomparably sublime."—*Wakefield*.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

843. Who and what was "Christopher North?"—*Youth*.

844. What is the best edition of the works of Alexander Pope?—*Youth*.

845. Will any one kindly furnish an opinion in regard to the nature and value of "the Works of Thomas De Quincey?"—R. H. B.

846. Can any of your obliging correspondents inform me where I can purchase a copy of the late Mr. Toulmin Smith's work, entitled "The Parish, its Obligations and Powers; its Officers, and their Duties." I shall be glad to know

the name of the publishers and the price.—R. N.

847. I think I have read that the House of Lords has abolished the right of voting by proxy, which formerly existed amongst the Peers. Is this correct? If so when did the Lords do it? Where can I get information on the subject?—GEORGIUS.

848. While reading, one often notices things mentioned as if they were quite familiar to everybody. Such, for instance, is the mention, as if quite casually, but as a matter of course, assumed to be known "to every schoolboy," as the phrase goes,

of "the Mulberry Club," which I met in the course of an old magazine article. Of such a club one might form ever so many ideas *a priori*, but would they tally with the fact? Let me then ask if any of your readers, wiser than I upon this point, can describe for me "the Mulberry Club?"—W. J. J.

849. In the excellent and informing article on Dr. C. M. Ingleby, it is stated (p. 87), that "he studied Paley's *Natural Theology*, and this, in its own form, he, in his opinion, found to be equally unsatisfactory" with the argument of Clarke's *Demonstration a priori*; but no indication of the grounds of unsatisfactoriness is given. I have always been of opinion that the *Natural Theology* was a work uniquely satisfactory, as Lord Brougham called it, "a close, logical, and practical argument, level to all comprehensions." I am aware that certain objections have been taken to the incidence and the course, but not the force of the argument. Would it be too much to ask the writer of that article, or, through you, the learned Doctor himself, to give a brief exposition of the reasons inducing him to regard the argument of Paley unsatisfactory?—R. J. G. B.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

840. Than Donald Cargill's few names are more fondly cherished in the memories of the Scottish people. He was born near the town of Blairgowrie, in Perthshire, on a small estate, of which his father was proprietor, in or about the year 1610. The schools of Aberdeen having furnished his earlier education, the usual course at St. Andrews University prepared him for ordination to the ministry in the Barony Church of Glasgow. This was as a Presbyterian, and on the enforcement of Prelacy on Scotland in 1662, he preferred to surrender his charge

rather than his principles; he instituted at that time a course of violent and uncompromising preaching against the King and his Church, his name bulks largely in Scottish history for a period of subsequent nineteen years. He was outlawed, a price being set upon his head, and his life became a prolonged series of sore vicissitudes and miraculous escapades. Many are the narrations of remarkable incidents in his life to be found scattered throughout the pages of contemporaneous fellow-Presbyterian chroniclers. He was one of the gallant handful who fought against the royal forces at Bothwell Bridge, and was there seriously wounded. But perhaps the crowning act of this daring spirit was to utter the "extreme sentence of excommunication against the King and most of the Scottish Council," which he did in 1680,—a proceeding however in which he wanted the sympathy of many of the best of his fellow-religionists,—Wodrow the historian amongst them. The next year witnessed his removal from the scene of his sufferings, for, falling into the enemy's hands, he was tried for high treason, convicted, and condemned, and was hanged at the Cross of Edinburgh, leaving a name to be treasured among those of the many saints, as we might say, of saintless Presbyterianism.—J. F. B.

842. Hugh Miller committed suicide in a paroxysm of madness. It is generally thought that he had a constitutional tendency to insanity, and it is certain that any predisposition that he may have had to madness was increased by intense exertion, in preparing his last book, the "Testimony of the Rocks," for publication. For some time before his death he was subject to strange hallucinations, which indicated that his over-taxed mind was giving way under the weight of his literary

labours. He imagined that he would be robbed and murdered, and always had loaded firearms by his side when at rest. On the twenty-sixth of December, 1856, he retired to bed early, and on the next morning was found dead, having shot himself through the heart.—GEORGIUS.

845. The writings of Thomas De Quincey are in no sense *works*. Gleams, glimpses, essays, overtures, prelusions, side-lights, roving, ramblings, excursions, dissertations, apologues, epilogues, fancies and fondlings—they may be any or all of these, but not works; that is a misnomer. De Quincey wanted the two great elements which go to make up a worker—persistency and consistency. Nearly all the writings of De Quincey partake of the nature of improvisations. Even when tasked to and by hack-work he seldom composed unless under the unavoidable spur of necessity; and then his thoughts veered, and tacked, and circumambulated, rather than went on. His MS, which the writer at one time had frequently in his hands, was finely written, with frequent interlineations, and all sorts of addenda in the shape of notes, insertions, and inter additions, with signs of haste, and marks of having been done anywhere that offered opportunity. He was a great master artist in the use of words. His thoughts are neither so profound nor so original as he thought them, or as many think. He had a receptive and absorbent intellect, and not unfrequently the ideas of others came into his mind through the plain glass of memory, to be by him refracted through his cathedral-window-like imagination, which coloured them so that they seemed his own. He had a lively, but not a discreet intellect; his mind was subtle rather than honest, and, though originally capable of

high thought, had lost the habit of thinking out. He intuited more frequently than reasoned, and he was often delighted at achieving a cleverness when he ought to have elicited a truth. He was continually constructing bridges of paradox to bring the heterodox and the orthodox within hail, and he contrived cunning distinctions of terms better than he originated knowing exhibitions of thought. He had a large and varied experience, and he had seen and known many singular men as well as read many out of the way books; he had a rich vocabulary, learned, literary, and conversational; he had ripened all the passions of his nature into oriental luxuriance, and he had little of that reticence which seals up in the heart the experiences of many men. He was singular, and delighted in being so. On all these accounts he had a large surplus of his mind exposed to view as well as employed in receiving the materials of thought. Above all things else his intellect was interpretative. Hence he was a good translator, critic, and essayist; in exposition he excelled, and in expository narrative he delighted. On metaphysical and religious topics his ideas were suggestive, because restive. He was a varied rather than a profound man. He was a Lakeist without the poetical faculty, a sort of rhetorical scholastic, a philosophising rhapsodist, and a living cyclopædia of notes and emendations, memoranda and corrigenda.

I do not set much value on the alternate glow and gloom which opium threw upon his thoughts. This was a singularity, and as such was to be made much of, and it did give him experiences which, as being singular, gratified this longing of his spirit; but it was a fastness into which he could retreat on occasion requiring it, as well as a

fascination to whose allurements he was sometimes won. It may have had something to do with making his intellect effective, and it certainly had something to do with making not only his consciousness but his conscientiousness defective; but it lent no subtlety to his thoughts, and gave no insight to his perceptive faculties. Sometimes it gave a delirious insensibility to the nature of what he was writing that occasionally, because of the uncommonness of the result, led men to think it the inspiration of genius. All this admitted, however, he is a wonderful writer, and a thinker worthy of attention—a phenomenon, in some respects unique in life, and in literature, a Kantian Goldsmith or a Sheridanized Hamilton, or, if we might vary the figure, a singular compound of the owl, the ostrich, the cuckoo, and the lark. While I do not think him a good guide, or a fine example to “a young man whose education has been neglected,” I am yet of opinion that he is a writer whose compositions ought not to be neglected by those who would know what style can effect and subtlety accomplish.—S. N.

848. London is the capital of clubs as Paris is that of cafés. Covent Garden is the heart of clubs. Taking that as a centre a strong *posse* of clubs might be enumerated. Many of these clubs flourish and fade, decay and die like other things of which this vain world is proud, and, among the clubs of other days, the Mulberry Club has become only a memory. It was formed by a few young men drawn together by their love for, and reverence of the great name of Shakspeare—“a knot of wise and jocund men then unknown but gaily struggling.” It is an association worthy of more than a passing notice. I am glad to be able to furnish W. J. J. with a reminiscence of this club from the

lips of one of its earliest members, the popular actor, Mr. J. B. Buckstone, jotted down some years ago at a Shaksperian festival at Stratford-upon-Avon, when he was chairman of a dinner party of nearly 200, assembled under the roof of Mr. Henry Hartley, mine host of The Golden Lion. Among other remarks made from the chair the following referred to the matter of W. J. J.’s query:—

“It was not then a very prominent one, as its meetings were held at a certain house of entertainment in Vinegar Yard, Drury Lane. The club assembled there once a week; they dined together on Shakspeare’s birthday; and in the mulberry season there was another dinner and a mulberry feast, at which the chairman sat enthroned under a canopy of mulberry branches, with the fruit on them: Shaksperian songs were sung; members would read original papers or poems relating only to Shakspeare; and as many artists belonged to this club, they would exhibit sketches of some event connected with our poet’s life; and I once had the honour of submitting a paper to be read, called “Shakspeare’s Drinking Bout,” an imaginary story illustrating the traditional event when the chivalry of Stratford went forth to carouse with—

Piping Peabworth, dancing Marston,
Haunted Hillborough, hungry
Grafton,
Dudging Exhall, Papist Wexford,
Beggarly Broom, and drunken
Bedford.

All these papers and pictures were collected together in a book, which was called ‘Mulberry-leaves,’ and you will believe me, in spite of our lowly place of meeting, that the club was not intellectually insignificant, when amongst its members, then in their youth, were Douglas

Jerrold, Laman Blanchard, the Landseers (Charles and Thomas), Frank Stone, Cattermole, Robert Keeley, Kenny Meadows, and subsequently, though at another and more important place of meeting, Macready, Talfourd the judge, Charles Dickens, John Foster, and many other celebrities. You will very naturally wish to know what became of this club. Death thinned the number of its members; important pursuits in life took some one way and some another, and, after twenty years of much enjoyment, the club ceased to exist, and the mulberry leaves disappeared no one ever knew whither."

To this I may add the following account of the same convivio-intellectual assembly, from the "Life of Douglas Jerrold," by his son, W. B. Jerrold:—

"Some young men met, the spirit that brought them together being Shakspeare! Very young, not rich, working with patient earnestness towards a future of which they had great dreams. They had a simple room in an humble tavern (the Wreckin), where they talked and read. Shakspeare was the common idol; and it was a regulation of this club that some paper, or poem, or conceit, bearing upon Shakspeare, should be contributed by each member. A fair-haired, boyish-looking young man was introduced to the company about the end of 1824. He was soon joined by an intimate friend of his. The fair were Douglas Jerrold and Laman Blanchard. They had their enthusiasm for the great bard, and they could make their offering. Douglas Jerrold had even a name for the club. It should be called The Mulberries. Agreed! The book of contributions to be written by members should be called Mulberry Leaves. Agreed again! In the list

of ayes were the names of William Godwin, Kenny Meadows, the future illustrator of Shakspeare; William H. Elton, the Shaksperian actor; and Edward Chatfield, the artist. The Mulberry Club lived many years, and gathered a valuable crop of leaves—contributions from its members. These contributions were kept in a book, and it was arranged that the last member who attended should have it. It fell into Mr. Elton's hands, and is now in possession of his family—a relic that may be precious presently. The Leaves were to have been published; but the club dead, it was nobody's business to see them through the press, and to this hour they remain chiefly in manuscript. The club did not die easily, however. It was changed and grafted before it gave up the ghost. In times nearer the present, when it was called the Shakspeare Club, Charles Dickens, Mr. Justice Talfourd, Daniel Maclise, Mr. Macready, Frank Stone, &c., belonged to it. Respectability killed it. Sumptuous quarters were sought; Shakspeare was to be admired in a most elegant manner—to be edited specially for the club by the author of the Book of Etiquette. But the new atmosphere had not the vigour of the old, and so, after a long struggle, all the mulberries fell from the old tree, and now it is a green memory only to a few old members."

I do not know that anything more need be said on this subject, except that we should like well if even yet the Shaksperian Mulberry Leaves could be put forth in full freshness for the benefit of those who would willingly receive any such commemorative volume of notable men, brought and kept together by the noblest spirit of a noble age—the living essence of the Elizabethan time.—S. N.

Literary Notes.

LORD VERNON has presented to the Manchester Free Library a copy of the "Inferno of Dante, literally paraphrased, with documents and album," privately printed, in three volumes, folio, by his father, the late George John Warren, Lord Vernon.

J. H. Fichte has issued two volumes of "Miscellaneous Essays, on Philosophy, Theology, and Ethics"—one of which contains an autobiographical account of the author's philosophical studies, and the effect produced on his mind by the several thinkers from Kant onwards.

Julius Frauenstadt has issued "Short Studies on the Intellectual, Moral, and Physical World."

"The Religious Sentiment in Greece," by J. Girard traces the connection between morals and religion in the poems of Homer, Hesiod, and Æschylus.

"The Poem of Lucretius," by C. Martha, is a study of the "De Naturâ Rerum" in its scientific, moral, and religious aspects, according to the best modern criticism.

In his eightieth year H. König has just completed the superintendence of a complete series of his writings in twenty volumes of excellent fiction, closing with a new romance of much merit.

Dr. Francis Ueberweg, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Königsberg, where Kant prelected, has issued a translation of Berkeley's "Treatise Concerning the Principles of Knowledge" into German, with notes. It is remarkable for the skill and clearness of the rendering, and as the first endeavour to make the Teutonic philosophers acquainted with the text of Berkeley.

M. Th. Henri Martin (b. 1813) Professor of Ancient Literature at Rennes, author of "History of the Physical Sciences in Antiquity," has extended and revised the paper on Science contributed by him to the *Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques* along with other five essays, having it for their aim to show that science does not lead to materialism;—under the title *Les Science et La Philosophie*.

M. Louis Ferri, lecturer on philosophy, Florence, has issued "A Sketch of the Progress of Metaphysics in Italy during the Nineteenth Century."

A Biography of Lord Palmerston, by Sir Henry Bulwer, is in preparation, and will include extracts from a diary and letters begun in 1827 and continued on to the close of his political career.

Is William Tell a *myth*? has been the topic of historical consideration by Henry S. Bordier and M. Rilliet, author of "The Origin of the Swiss Confederation," in two monographs.

Prof. Huber, author of a work on "English Universities," a popular advocate of co-operation, and a leader in Germany among the Christian Socialists, died at Weringerode, among the Hartz mountains, where he spent his days in philanthropic effort, on July 19th.

E. M. Cope, Senior Fellow and Tutor of Trin. Coll., Cam., has in progress an edition of the Greek text of Aristotle's "Rhetoric," an introduction to which he has already issued.

Mrs. Clough has undertaken the editorship of the writings and poems of A. H. Clough, and has prefixed an interesting memoir.

T. Fowler, of Lincoln Coll., Oxon., has in the press "The Elements of Inductive Logic," the complement of his "Elements of Deductive Logic."

Prof. J. Beete Jukes, geologist, died July 29th.

Rev. F. Elwin's edition of Pope's Works is not yet, after a dozen years' promise, forthcoming; but Messrs. Macmillan have issued his *Poems* in a Globe edition, superintended by Professor Ward: Manchester; and Spenser's Poetical Works, edited by R. Morris, are promised in the same admirable series.

Alexander Dyce, editor of Shakspeare, and many of the Elizabethan dramatists, &c., died 18th May.

Robert Leighton, one of our minor poets, died 20th May.

An interesting MS. of the Elizabethan age, apparently a note book of a student of Gray's Inn, containing notes of lectures delivered by Bacon, while he was a bencher of that society, has recently been found. It contains many of those thoughts in outline, which appear fully in Lord Bacon's published writings. The curious thing is that in this note-book there is scribbled here and there the name of William Shakspeare (so spelled) in the handwriting of that age. It has fallen into the hands of the Historical MSS. Commission, and may probably be published or more fully described.

Professor Bosworth's quarto Anglo-Saxon Dictionary, though far on in progress, is likely to require the further labour of three or four years.

On the day that Victor Hugo's novel, "L'Homme Qui Rit," was published in Paris, the following translations appeared:—three in English, viz., one in London, one at Leipsic, and the other in New York; one in German, at Berlin; four in Spanish, viz., two in Madrid, one at the Havannah, and one in Paris; two in Portuguese, viz., one in Lis-

bon, and the other at Rio Janeiro; one in Russian, at St. Petersburg; one in Polish, at Warsaw; one in Dutch, at Rotterdam; and two in Greek, viz., one at Athens, and the other at Constantinople; one in Hungarian, at Pesth; one in Swedish, at Stockholm, and one in the Czechian language at Prague.

Anne Hathaway's cottage and gardens are offered for sale.

A History of the University of Cambridge is in preparation by J. B. Mullinger, of St. John's.

A History of Shakspeare Literature has been begun by Genée, the German dramatist.

Peter, son of Allan Cunningham, the poet, who had won a literary name for himself as biographer of Drummond of Hawthornden, Inigo Jones, &c., died 18th May, aged fifty-three.

Gerald Massey has *A Tale of Eternity, and other Poems*, in the press.

George Gilfillan has a new work in the press, and another, on which he has been engaged for several years, nearly ready for publication.

In a copy of the works of Ovid, issued at Amsterdam in 1630, there was found pasted in on the ninth page, the closing part apparently of a letter containing the words, "thyne sweeteste, W. Shakspeare, Stratforde, March 16," which is supposed to be an autograph of the dramatist's. It also contained pasted in it on the fifth page, apparent autographs of Hugh Middleton and John Dryden.

A Life of Alfred the Great, by Thomas Hughes, M.P., is announced.

Mrs. Stowe's "Old Folks" has excited five German translators to undertake its reproduction.

A Statue of Goethe is to be inaugurated at Munich.

Sir Edward Creasy has nearly ready a Greek classical novel,

Modern Historians.

JAMES ANTHONY FROUDE, M.A., LL.D.,

Lord Rector of the University of St. Andrew's, &c.

ETHICAL history—the composition of the records of events and their authors from the point of view afforded by the moral standard of the time with which the story is concerned—is a development of the narrative art peculiar to our age. It owes its origin, in a great measure, to the influence exerted by Edward Coplestone, while tutor, fellow and provost of Oriel, in the revival of the study of Aristotle at Oxford. The careful, patient, and thoughtful perusal of the writings of that early but deeply penetrating thinker, which he induced among the higher and nobler spirits of his own college, and, radiating thence, among the brighter and more considerate students in the whole university, has had a most powerful effect upon the progress of thought in our century. For the mighty Stagirite had possessed himself of so many of the secrets of human nature on the practical side and of the governing principles of men as they are; had looked with such a keen and curious eye into the realities of man's life, on the motives to action that prevailed with men, and of the manner and style in which disposition, habit, motive, reason, event, and passion, interact in mortals, that those who studied his chief works felt themselves subdued to acquiescent discipleship, and acknowledged him as a master-mind, not only as a successful theorist of the olden time, but as a most trustworthy practical guide in regard to the every-day character and conduct of men, and as a safe expositor of the elementary principles of moral character and moral action—the very roots of life and history.

From the Oriel Common Room, in which Coplestone, as Aristotelian-in-chief, awakened the intellects of so many active promoters of reflective thought, there have been most singular divergencies of men and movements. The broad churchism of Whately, Arnold, Hinde, and Hampden; the high churchism of Keble, Newman, and Pusey; the rationalism of Baden-Powell, Foxton, and William Newman; and the indeterminism of Froude, Clough, &c., had in their starting point in Oriel. By all these the ethics and rhetoric of Aristotle were enthusiastically studied and highly esteemed. One writer has gone so far as to affirm of the *Ethics*—of which the best edition on the whole as yet published, we have from an Oriel man, Sir Alexander Grant, now Principal of the 1869.

University of Edinburgh—that “the book has been made a sort of second Bible.”

We scarcely wonder that the marvellous power of discernment, analysis, discrimination, comparison, and combination which Aristotle possessed, should have led him to a series of opinions which, though not going so deep into the moral nature of man as Christianity, should yet display a considerable harmony with the principles made known to us through it, and that, as a basis for judgment and as a guide in merely practical life, this notable thinker of old should have been received as the best elucidator of the powers and laws of human thought and action. But we are surprised that men, having such an initiative, should have so far digressed in aim and object, in opinion and practice, in hopes and efforts. However, so it has been; and one of the results of this Aristotelianism has been the origination of a school of ethical historians, of whom Arnold has illustrated the annals of ancient Rome, and Froude is expounding the story of modern England.

We know that it is esteemed one of the great qualifications of Mr. Froude as an interpreter of the past, that he possesses an intimate knowledge of the motives and passions which actuate man, derived originally from an intent study of the “*ethics*,” but subsequently enlarged and verified by converse with books and men. His wide and hearty moral sympathy enables him as a critic to conceive and reconstruct the inner character of the individuals who have acted on the stage of time, and so to put himself “into the place of each and every character, and not only feel for them, but feel with them.” By the patient unravelment of “the tangled skein of good and evil, of which his thoughts are composed,” he discovers the chief elements of each given character, and so finds the dramatic centre of each individual. There can be no doubt that ethical history is a most important development in literature; that it possesses recommendations to our regard very superior to the vivid pictorialism of some, and of the colourless philosophicality of others. It is a step nearer the true interpretation of the life of men which does not naturally fall into tableaux, and is seldom governed by the mere dogmas of the doctrinaires. Still, we are far from recognising it as the one main element which conduces to, or establishes the claims of a historian of the first class. For this, many qualifications must be united, and many powers must combine. Some of these we may here note in a few brief sentences.

The author who re-explores the sources and re-examines the facts of history requires special qualifications. He must be patient in research, tireless in investigation, rapid yet cautious in seizing upon the point which gives importance to a document or relevancy to a quotation, logically accurate in estimating exactly what weight any new piece of evidence may supply to either side of a disputed subject, and scrupulously conscientious, not only in collecting all possible information, but in collecting it so as to exhibit precisely the ultimate result. He must have so much familiarity with the

general events of the time as to see clearly the incidence of statements, the force of allusions, the worth of incidental and collateral matter, and the inferences which may be justly deducible from the silence of one, the garrulity of another, the blunt assertions made by one party, the cautious reserve exercised by their opponents, and the various rumours which float about in regard to the causes of events and the authors of change. He must possess eminent critical acuteness to determine on and assay the authenticity, authority, and interpretation of documents, however various, admissions, however ingeniously expressed, or denials however peremptorily given. Not only must he possess a sensitive moral nature of his own, but he must also have a keen insight into the ordinary standards of morality and their influences, and a lively sympathy with the mental changes induced by intents and events in the lives of extraordinary persons. While he must proceed in his researches with some tentative hypothesis, he must not be fondly wedded to his own scheme of interpretation, or bent upon eliciting any ultimate result of a strictly predetermined tendency. He must not merely adjudicate on the purity and excellence of the discoveries made in the original mine of historic evidence, he must preserve and guarantee their standard worth and their tested truthfulness, as they are passed through the mint of his mind and made current as history. He has to dig and delve, to amass and classify, to interpret and infer, to collate and compare, to test and attest, to see with imaginative accuracy, and to exhibit with reproductive skill, to know completely and expound lucidly, to narrate, and to impress. He is to sum up evidence and summarize it; he is to condense for us the long results of tedious labours, and amid all his diggings, delvings, and determinations he is to show us only the finished work without indication of the toil undergone, or trace of the fatigue endured. He is not to tell everything, for that would be wearisome, yet he must relate the whole in order to impart compendious completeness to the narrative. To all these restrictive conditions he must assent, and under them all he must labour, who would truly earn for himself the title of paragon of historians; yet over and above all he must possess a clear and lucid style of exposition, a pictorially vivid power of description, a dignified and eloquent sweep of narration, a profound sense of moral causation, and the art of weaving the coarse threads of reality into a tissue as closely as possible resembling the pleasing attractions of romance.

Of these qualifications of the complete and perfect historian Mr. Froude displays many; he is patient and self-restrained, diligent in comparison of conflicting authorities, and acute in checking them, and thorough in his grasp of the materials which he has been able to gather. He is wise in the perception of causes, and careful in the tracing of results; he is generous in his reverence for character, and moderate in his judgments of most of those who require to come into his presence as *dramatis personæ* in the realities of his-

tory. But we must confess that he is often predominated over by his theory of the essential trustworthiness of public documents and records, and of the scepticism with which, what may be called, the secret history of events, should be received. We all know that complex human nature is often operated upon in its determinations by motives, inclinations, and inducements, which we are unwilling to acknowledge to ourselves, and that it is a common failing of men to strive to put a fair face upon their doings, especially when these have been dubious; and therefore we ought to be prepared to recognise the action of this same tendency in public history, in which diplomacy has reigned so long, and particularly in times when genuine publicity was almost unknown, when intrigue was rife, and concealment plausible and possible.

There are in all public movements two forces active, the grand sweeping general tendency and public force of an age, which operate upon all men, more or less, and urge them to acquiescence, resistance, or helpfulness; but these mighty currents of power, acting on the general mind and forming public opinion, require to exert their force upon human desires and the feelings and failings of men. Of these feelings and failings men are themselves conscious, but they desire to conceal these and their influences and effects from observation, so that however individual the passion which actuates them may be, they always like to conceal it behind some general principle or public profession. The former constitutes the real, the latter the apparent motive to action, and we believe that it is by checking off the personal and private interests as against the professed and public purposes assigned by those who manage the affairs of men and nations that the most accurate estimate of the real intents of the actors may be gained. The public statements are, of course, good and trustworthy so far as they go, but they seldom contain the whole truth, and often give only such a phase of it as it seems desirable to present at the time and in the circumstances. To omit consideration of these minor but potent elements in deference to and in dependence upon the greater and more generally diffused certainly makes possible grave errors in judgment of men and their actions.

Mr. Froude is too individual in his conceptions, and therefore fails in the grouping and massing of his characters in dramatic interactivity and the subtle interplay of motion and emotion amid the stir and turmoil of human change seems scarcely to have been seized upon by him in all its significance. In fact, the essential plotfulness of history has not affected him enough in his conception of individual characters.

Perhaps the gravity he attaches to general principles and the power he grants them to affect "human creatures' lives," may have some share in this too thorough subordination of individuals to the outworking of general schemes, instead of individual interests. The high-minded papalism of Wolsey was undoubtedly exceedingly effective in his own spirit, and imparted a sort of Epic unity to his

public life, but there can be little doubt that the intense personality of the great dictator of the Church had a great deal of influence in causing him to adopt the position he did as affording the best footing for his "vaulting ambition." So in the case of Henry VIII., the prevailing dynasticism, while it was in some sense the cause of his matrimonial involvements, formed in a great measure to himself and others an excuse for them. Is it not, in fact, because these personal considerations weigh with us too strongly and act so powerfully in inducing us to forsake the proper paths of rectitude that so many of our "best laid schemes" fail in the attainment of their ultimate object?—and may we not see in the failure of papalism and the fall of Wolsey the rebuke of selfishness and the might of Providence; and in the ruin of dynasticism not only a token of Henry VIII.'s wrongfulness, but an assertion of the majesty of righteousness in the earth? What an inapt and worthless thing did dynasticism prove to England in the reign of Edward, and how grievous a burden did it show itself to be in the succeeding sovereignty of Mary, which form the subject of Mr. Froude's next two volumes issued in 1860.

Before proceeding to give an account of the matter of these continuations of the records of the Tudors, we think it will help us to understand and esteem their writer if we bring into the foreground of our thoughts an extract from his writings, which will prove that he is not dazzled by outward glory, nor dizzied by external difficulties in his views of progress and in his judgment on circumstances. We take it from a paper on "The Book of Job," which appeared in the *Westminster Review*, and has since been re-issued in a separate pamphlet, and again in "Short Studies on Great Subjects," pp. 226—320.

"In two things there are progress—progress in knowledge of the outer world, and progress in material wealth. This last, for the present, creates perhaps more evils than it relieves; but suppose this difficulty solved—suppose the wealth distributed, and every peasant living like a peer—what then? If this is all, one noble soul outweighs the whole of it. Let us follow knowledge to the outer circle of the universe—the eye will not be satisfied with seeing, nor the ear with hearing. Let us build our streets of gold, and they will hide as many aching hearts as hovels of straw. The wellbeing of mankind is not advanced a single step. Knowledge is power; and wealth is power; harnessed, as in Plato's fable, to the chariot of the soul, and guided by wisdom, they may bear it through the circle of the stars; but left to their own guidance, or reined by a fool's hand, the wild horses may bring the poor fool to Phaeton's end, and set a world on fire."

It certainly will not make Mr. Froude less dear to the souls of our readers to know that he thinks that all topics of thought, all forms of life, "all objects of devotion" even, not only should be, but are inevitably intended to be, "liable to perpetual revision, if only that belief shall not petrify into habit, but remain the reasonable conviction of a reasonable soul;" and that, in *Fraser's Magazine*,

1863. he has issued "A Plea for the Free Discussion of Theological Difficulties," of which we regret we can only quote the merest scrap.

"The time is past for repression. Despotism has done its work; but the day of despotism is gone, and the only remedy is a full and fair investigation. Things will never right themselves if they are let alone. It is idle to say peace when there is no peace; and the concealed imposthume is more dangerous than an open wound. The law in this country has postponed our trial, but cannot save us from it, and the questions which have agitated the Continent are agitating us at last. The student who twenty years ago was contented with the Greek and Latin fathers and the Anglican divines, now reads Ewald and Renan. The Church authorities still refuse to look their difficulties in the face: they prescribe for mental troubles the established doses of Paley and Pearson; they refuse dangerous questions as sinful, and tread the round of commonplace in placid comfort. But it will not avail. Their pupils grow up to manhood, and fight the battle for themselves, unaided by those who ought to have stood by them in their trial, and could not, or would not; and the bitterness of those conflicts, and the end of most of them in heart-broken uncertainty or careless indifference, is too notorious to all who care to know about such things."

To this extract we must subjoin, not only in justice to the writer, but for the behoof of the reader too, the following two passages on the prevalent scepticism of our day and of the nature and spirit of historic truth. These will not only aid us in comprehending the cast of his mind, but will have a tendency to keep us from believing that doubt is the normal condition of man, instead of being only the means of attaining the soul's highest state—earnest conviction.

"In the records of all human affairs it cannot be too often insisted on that two kinds of truth run for ever side by side, or rather, crossing in and out with each other, form the warp and the woof of the coloured web which we call history: the one, the literal and external truths corresponding to the eternal, and as yet undiscovered laws of fact; the other, the truths of feeling and of thought, which embody themselves either in distorted pictures of outward things or in some entirely new creation—sometimes moulding and shaping real history; sometimes taking the form of heroic biography, of tradition, or popular legend; sometimes appearing as recognised fiction in the epic, the drama, or the novel. It is useless to tell us that this is to confuse truth and falsehood. We are stating a fact, not a theory; and if it makes truth and falsehood difficult to distinguish, that is nature's fault, not ours. Fiction is only false when it is false, not to fact, else how could it be fiction? but when it is to *law*. To try it by its correspondence to the real is pedantry. Imagination creates as nature creates, by the force which is in man, which refuses to be restrained: we cannot help it, and we are only false when we make monsters, or when we pretend that our inventions are facts; when we substitute truths of one kind for truths of another; when we substitute,—and again we must say when we *intentionally* substitute,—whenever persons and whenever facts seize strongly on the imagination (and of course when there is anything remarkable in them they must and will do so), invention glides into the images which form in our minds; so it must be, and so it ever has been from the first, from the legends of a

cosmogony to the written life of the great man who died last year or century, or to the latest scientific magazine. We cannot relate facts as they are; they must first push through ourselves, and we are more or less than mortal if they gather nothing in the transit." *

"Facts, it was once said, were 'stubborn things,' but in our days we have changed all that; a fact, under the knife of a critic, splits in pieces, and is dissected out of belief with incredible readiness. The helpless thing lies under his hand, like a foolish witness in a law-court, when browbeaten by an unscrupulous advocate, and is turned about and twisted this way and that way, till in its distraction it contradicts itself, and bears witness against itself; and to escape from torture, at last flies utterly away, itself half doubting its own existence." †

In 1860, the fifth and sixth volumes of Mr. Froude's *History* appeared. They included, as we have said, a record of the reigns of Edward VI. and Mary, "the bloody." Interesting as the succession of events which occurred during the nominal kingship of Henry's unlucky and precocious, nurse-trained and three-step-mothered boy are, they fit in but ill with the theory of dynasticism. So far as they were imperial, they were rather a following out of the traditions of his father's reign, under the dominancy of the party in power, than initiative. They received no unity of design from the personality of the lad who wore the circlet of sovereignty. Of the young king there is an amiable portrait drawn, and great pains seem to have been expended on the character of Edward Seymour, Earl of Hertford, Lord Protector of the Kingdom. The manner in which Protestantism was urged on by the king's uncle, and the various modes employed to convince rival truant bishops of the advantage of concurring in the changes proposed, are carefully detailed and described. The invasion of Scotland, and the energy with which Seymour (now Somerset) contended for the implementing of the treaty-rights conceded to Henry VIII.; the sharp decision with which he quelled the several insurrections of his brother and of Kett the tanner; the contest between Somerset and Dudley, Earl of Warwick, for (or rather over) supremacy in the King's Council, and the fatal consummation which brought Somerset to the block, 22nd Jan. 1522, are told with fulness and with interest. So also are the accounts of the doings and intrigues of the worse and weaker master of England, Dudley (now Northumberland), and of their entire frustration in the sequence of events. Of the state of the kingdom during the woeful period of these regencies, in which the worst pains of revolution were endured in fidelity to the dynastic theory of the Tudor time, we have an especially careful *résumé*. Of the brief tragic (intercalated) pseudo-reign of Lady Jane Grey under Northumberland, and the total collapse of the dream of dominion in which Dudley had indulged, a vivid and

* *The Lives of the Saints*, in "Short Studies on Great Subjects," vol. ii. pp. 207-209.

† *Homer*, in "Short Studies," &c., vol. ii., p. 161.

graphic sketch is given. Then comes the short and unhappy reign of reaction—a season of gloomy asceticism and stern enthusiastic obstinacy, in which two untowardly ungenial and uncongenial natures, brought together by political and ecclesiastical motives, formed a union of singularly unblest results. How sad and sparse were the moments of repose of the fanatical, loveless, and unlovable queen, whose strangely contradictory *malaise* of body and of mind worked,

“Out of the shot and danger of desire,”

woe to herself and wretchedness to others. Of all the interdetails of Spanish and English politics Mr. Froude is master; and he throws a weird, personal interest into the story of the frantic, fanatic daughter of the haughty Catherine and bluff King Hal, in her difficulties, dangers, disappointments, and despairs. Of these no analysis can convey any adequate idea. The conjunction of the two reigns in one series gives the highest artistic contrast to the development of the drama of dynasty and destiny.

Here is a delicately touched and excellently toned description of the “twelfth-day queen”:

“Who sat with Plato’s Phædo on her knee,
And, when the blithe hunt was on foot for her,
When horns were clamorous and the woods astir,
And echoes of the noon-day joyaunce fell
On the sweet stillness of her oriel,
Just looked up once to see the merry men,
Then bent her frail neck o’er the page again;
And though she loved the forest—dared prefer
To talk with Life’s and Death’s Interpreter.”

[Lady] “Jane Grey, eldest daughter of the Duke of Suffolk, was nearly the same age with Edward. Edward had been precocious to a disease; the activity of his mind had been a symptom, or a cause, of the weakness of his body. Jane Grey’s accomplishments were as extensive as Edward’s; she had acquired a degree of learning rare to matured men, which she could use gracefully, and could permit to be seen by others without vanity or consciousness. Her character had developed with her talents. At fifteen she had learned Hebrew, and could write Greek; at sixteen she corresponded with Bullinger in Latin at least equal with his own; but the matter of her letters is more striking than the language, and speaks more for her than the most elaborate panegyrics of admiring courtiers. She has left a portrait of herself drawn by her own hand; a portrait of piety, purity, and free noble innocence, uncoloured, even to a fault, with the emotional feelings of humanity. While the effects of the Reformation in England had been chiefly visible in the outward dominion of scoundrels and in the eclipse of the hereditary virtues of the national character, Lady Jane Grey had lived to show that the defect was not in the reformed faith, but in the absence of all faith,—that the graces of St. Elizabeth could be rivalled by the pupil of Cranmer and Ridley. The Catholic saint had no excellence of which Jane Grey was without the promise; the distinction was in the freedom of the Protestant from the hysterical ambition for an un-

earthly nature, and in the presence, through a more intelligent creed; of a vigorous and practical understanding."

The notices of Queen Mary are all excellently harmonized in tone and colouring to the wayward changingness of the events in which she acts. Perhaps the two most artistically managed portions are those of the period immediately preceding her marriage and the account of her death. We quote two passages, written with poetic power as well as insight. The first refers to her love-hopes, where her heart beats with the pulses of passion for her first meeting with Philip as her (dilatatory) husband; the second to her forsaken years, when Philip had left her, and dangers and difficulties were thickening round her:—

"The hope, if hope there had been, died in its birth; before sunset, with drenched garments and dragged plume, the object of so many anxieties arrived within the walls of Winchester. To the cathedral he went first, wet as he was. Whatever Philip of Spain was entering upon, whether it was a marriage or a massacre, a state intrigue or a midnight murder, his opening step was ever to seek a blessing from the holy wafer. He entered, kissed the crucifix, and knelt and prayed before the altar; then, taking his seat in the choir, he remained till the choristers sang a *Te Deum laudamus*, till the long aisles grew dim in the summer twilight, and he was conducted by torchlight to the deanery. The queen was at the bishop's palace, but a few hundred yards distant. Philip, doubtless, could have endured the postponement of an interview till morning, but Mary could not wait; and the same night he was conducted into the presence of his haggard bride, who now, after a life of misery, believed herself to be at the open gate of Paradise. Let the curtain fall over the meeting; let it close also over the marriage solemnities which followed with due splendour two days later. There are scenes in life which we regard with pity too deep for words. The unhappy queen, unloved and unloveable, yet with her parched heart thirsting for affection, was flinging herself upon a breast to which an iceberg was warm; upon a man to whom love was an unmeaning word, except as the most brutal of passions. For a few months she created for herself an atmosphere of unreality. She saw in Philip the ideal of her imagination, and in Philip's feelings the reflex of her own; but the dream passed away—her love for her husband remained; but remained only to be a torture to her."

"Nothing now was left for Mary but to make such use as she was able of the few years of life which remained to her. If Elizabeth, the hated Anne Boleyn's hated daughter, was to succeed her on the throne, and there was no remedy, it was for her to work so vigorously in the restoration of the Church, that her labours could not afterwards be all undone. At her own expense she began to rebuild and refound the religious houses. The Grey Friars were replaced at Greenwich, the Carthusians at Sheene, the Brigittines at Sion. The house of the Knights of St. John in London was restored; the dean and chapter of Westminster gave way to Abbot Teckenham and a college of monks. Yet these touching efforts might soften her sorrow, but could not remove it. Philip was more anxious than ever about the marriage of Elizabeth; and as Mary could not overcome her unwillingness to sanction by act of hers Elizabeth's pretensions, Philip wrote her

cruel letters, and sent his confessor to lecture her upon her duties as a wife. These letters she chiefly spent her time in answering, shut up almost alone, trusting to no one but Pole, and seeing no one but her women. If she was compelled to appear in public, she had lost her power of self-control; she would burst into fits of violent and uncontrollable passion; she believed every one about her to be a spy in the interest of the Lords. So disastrously miserable were all the consequences of her marriage that it was said, the Pope, who had granted the dispensation for the contract of it, had better grant another for its dissolution."

Here, too, are a few words of estimate and of summary which deserve quotation:—

"No sovereign ever ascended the throne with larger popularity than Mary Tudor. The country was eager to atone to her for her mother's injuries; and the instinctive loyalty of the English towards their natural sovereign was enhanced by the abortive efforts of Northumberland to rob her of her inheritance. She had reigned little more than five years, and she descended into the grave amidst curses deeper than the acclamations which had welcomed her accession. In that brief time she had swathed her name in the horrid epithet which will cling to it for ever; and yet from the passions which in general tempt sovereigns into crime she was entirely free; to the time of her accession she had lived a blameless, and in many respects a noble life; and few men or women have lived less capable of doing knowingly a wrong thing. Philip's conduct, which could not extinguish her passion for him, and the collapse of the inflated imaginations which had surrounded her supposed pregnancy, it can hardly be doubted affected her sanity."

Cranmer was one of the great spirits of this age. He was sorely tempted, and he sorrowfully fell. Of the state of his mind, while tortured with the agonies of soul which weighed on him, this is a wise and discriminating notice:—

"Cranmer had dared death bravely while it was distant; but he was physically timid; the near approach of the agony which he had witnessed in others unnerved him; and in a moment of mental and moral prostration Cranmer may well have looked into the mirror which Pole held up to him, and asked himself whether, after all, the being there described was his true image—whether it was himself as others saw him. A faith which had existed for centuries; a faith in which generation after generation have lived happy and virtuous lives; a faith in which all good men are agreed, and only the bad dispute—such a faith carries an evidence and a weight with it beyond what can be looked for in a creed reasoned out by individuals—a creed which had the ban upon it of inherited execration; which had been held in abhorrence once by him who was now called upon to die for it. Only fools and fanatics believe they cannot be mistaken. Sick misgivings may have taken hold upon him in moments of despondency, whether, after all, the millions who received the Roman supremacy might not be more right than the thousands who denied it; whether the argument on the real presence, which had satisfied him for fifty years, might not be better founded than his recent doubts. It is not possible for a man of gentle and modest nature to feel himself the object of intense detestation without

uneasy pangs; and as such thoughts came and went a window might seem to open, through which there was a return to life and freedom. His trial was not greater than hundreds of others had borne, and would bear with constancy; but the temperaments of men are unequally constituted, and a subtle intellect and a pensive organization are not qualifications which make martyrdom easy. Life, by the law of the church, by justice, by precedent, was given to all who would accept it on terms of submission. That the archbishop should be tempted to recant, with the resolution formed, notwithstanding, that he should still suffer, whether he yielded or whether he was obstinate, was a suspicion which his experience of the legate had not taught him to entertain. So it was that Cranmer's spirit gave way, and he who had disdained to fly when flight was open to him, because he considered that, having done the most in establishing the Reformation, he was bound to face the responsibility of it, fell at last under the protraction of the trial."

In the autumn of 1863 Mr. Froude presented the public with two farther volumes of his historic task; but, as the accession of Elizabeth constituted a new epoch in the history of the Reformation, and as there might be persons who having gone so far with the author did not care to accompany him farther, and some who might desire to begin their companionship in his course through the records of that past age, when it had brightened and settled, he somewhat altered the form of his work, and resolved to close up the period of history extending from the fall of Wolsey to the loss of Calais by the English as one substantive work; and, though telling the story without interruption, made these volumes the commencement of a new work. To each of these divisions of his great labour he assigned six volumes, and the issue of 1863 appeared as "The Reign of Elizabeth," Vols. I. and II.

During the preparation of these important volumes Mr. Froude made several summer sojourns in Spain, and engaged in diligent researches, for matter suitable to his undertaking, among the Spanish archives, which are preserved in admirable order in the castle of Simancas, a state fortress eight miles from the city of Valladolid, formerly the capital of Spain, and now the chief city in Castile. There, by the courtesy of the Government, and with the assistance of the archivero, Don Manuel Gonzalez, unrestricted access was given to every document which could elucidate the history of the Tudor dynasty. He has thus been enabled to enrich his volumes with large extracts from the despatches of the Spanish ambassadors residing at the court of Elizabeth, and he has been able, besides, to furnish a few glimpses of English history seen through Spanish windows, either supplementary to or complementary of his former volumes. Many of these, some of them rather hastily, were given to the public in *Fraser's Magazine*. The archives of France were also freely opened to him, and the keepers of the MSS. of that empire afforded him every facility. Our own Record Office supplied all requisite help, and several private repositories of papers were placed at his service. Thus the materials brought together in these volumes, illustrative of Eliza-

beth's England, are for the most part new and highly important, including, as they do, not only valuable selections from foreign sources, but considerable passages from the papers of Cecil, Lord Burleigh.

The story of these volumes opens with the events attendant on the accession of Elizabeth, the proposals made for ecclesiastical reform, the revision of Edward's prayer-book, the protests of Convocation against changes in religion, the opening of parliament, the speech from the throne, the statesmen of the time and their characters, the schemes proposed for the queen's marriage and the intrigues connected with it, and the controversy at Westminster on the supremacy of the Crown.

In the second chapter we are informed that—

"The Reformation was again the law of England. The Catholics sat still, paralyzed by the rival interests of France and Spain, while the work of Mary and Pole faded away. The nuns and monks were scattered once more; the crucifixes came down from the rood-lofts, the Marias and Johns from their niches, and in Smithfield market, at the crossways and street corners, blazed into bonfires as in the old days of Cromwell. Amidst bear-baitings, and bull-baitings, May-day games, and river pageants, London kept its feast of recovered liberty."

The Reformation in Scotland, and the plan for uniting the crowns of England and Scotland, together with the marriage proposals connected with the names of the Earl of Arran and the Duke of Austria, succeed in making a stirring story. In the third chapter we have an account of the disasters which affected the French forces in Scotland; of the conspiracy of Amboise, and of the invasion of Scotland by England, leading to the treaty of Edinburgh. Lord Dudley next comes prominently on the scene, and the dramatic incidents of the novel of "Kenilworth Castle" reappear as history. The Catholic League and its objects are described, and the circumstances attending the refusal of Mary Queen of Scots to ratify the treaty of Edinburgh, are recounted. Then there arise the claims of Mary to the crown of England. The English troops are seen disembarking at Havre and besieging Rouen successfully; and we have thereafter an account of the penal laws against the Catholics, and the various schemes for the marriage of Mary Queen of Scots. What a singular tragi-comedy was that played in Europe then, which might have been entitled "Two Queens to Marry!"

The next volume concerns itself pretty much with Ireland, opening with a view of the condition of that unhappy country, giving an account of Shan O'Neil's visit to London, and of the English campaign in Ulster. The record reverts to Scotland and Mary, and her marriage, now fixed to be with Darnley, as well as relates the doings of the Ecclesiastical Commission at Lambeth, and describes the discipline of the Church of England;—of Elizabeth's instigation of the Scotch Protestants to rebellion, of the rupture that ensued, the flight of the Lords of the Congregation into

England, the diplomatic embassy of Murray to the court of Elizabeth, Mary of Scotland's appeal to Spain for help against Elizabeth and the rebel subjects who would have a reform in religion;—the murder of Rizzio and the history of Darnley till his sudden and vengeful death by murder, with letters intended to show the extent of Queen Mary's participancy in the terrible tragedy of Kirk o' Fields. We return to Ireland and are present at the death of the "drunken ruffian," yet "keen and fiery patriot," Shan O'Neil. In the closing chapter we have an epitome of the history of maritime enterprize and the achievements of English navigators, which is of much interest and is well told. We present a few extracts from these volumes, chiefly relating to matters involving principles, as the narrative portions do not so well submit to detachment. The first of these refers to Elizabeth's religious opinions and the Logic of the Reformation.

"Personally and individually, the dogmatism of Calvin was as distasteful to Elizabeth as the despotism of Rome. The practical complexion of her genius gave her a dislike and a distrust of speculation; she was herself in her own opinions studiously vague, and she could have been well contented with a tolerant orthodoxy, which would have left to Catholics their ritual, deprived only of its extravagances; and to the more moderate of their opponents free scope to feel their way towards a larger creed.

"Yet revolution cannot be controlled with the logic of moderation; and toleration of those who are themselves intolerant is possible only when the common sense of mankind compels them to an inconsistency with their theories. The Lutheran might seem nearer to the Romanist than he was to Beza or Zuingle; but the vital differences were not the apparent differences; and the distinctions between the Reformers were, after all, but insignificant shades of variety compared with the principle which parted all of them from the orthodox Catholic. The Catholic believed in the authority of the Church; the Reformers in the authority of reason. Where the Church had spoken, the Catholic obeyed. His duty was to accept without question the laws which councils had decreed, which popes and bishops administered, and, so far as in him lay, to enforce on others the same submission to an outward rule which he regarded as divine. All shades of Protestants, on the other hand, agreed that authority might err; that Christ had left no visible representative whom individually they were bound to obey; that religion was the operation of the Spirit on the mind and conscience; that the Bible was God's word, which each Christian was to read, and which, with God's help and his natural intelligence, he could not fail to understand. The Catholic left his Bible to the learned. The Protestant translated the Bible, and brought it to the door of every Christian family. The Catholic prayed in Latin, and whether he understood his words, or repeated them as a form, the effect was the same; for it was magical. The Protestant prayed with his mind, as an act of faith, in a language intelligible to him, or he could not pray at all. The Catholic bowed in awe before his wonder-working image, adored his relics, and gave his life into the guidance of his spiritual director. The Protestant tore open the machinery of the miracles, flung the bones and ragged garments into the fire, and treated priests as men like himself. The Catholic was intolerant upon principle; persecution was the corollary of his creed.

The intolerance of the Protestant was in spite of his creed. In denying the right of the Church to define his own belief, he had forfeited the privilege of punishing the errors of others who chose to differ from him.

"Liberty, as opposed to submission; the natural intelligence of the living man, as opposed to the corporate sovereignty of the outward and visible Church: these were the sharp antitheses which were dividing Christian Europe; and between them, and not between any special and detailed conclusions lay the essential and irreconcilable antagonism. A *via media* might be found for opinion: words could be used which admitted of uncertain interpretation, so long as there was no authority to invest them with a definite meaning. On the question of authority itself, it was as little possible to hesitate as between rival claimants of the same throne. The pope was a reality, or he was nothing; and no government could seem to acknowledge him without consenting, sooner or later, to enforce his decrees."

Here is a fine delicate politico-ethical balance and estimate of the state and condition of the two queens, in their personal and political relations when Government had got into a sort of deadlock on account of the whims and wishes of the chief personages, and the changes which time was bringing about while they were hesitating to make up their minds:—

"The two queens were again standing in the same relative positions which had led to the crisis of 1560. Mary Stuart was once more stretching out her hand to grasp Elizabeth's crown. From her recognition as heir presumptive, the step to a Catholic revolution was immediate and certain; and Elizabeth's affectation of Catholic practices would avail little to save her. Again, as before, the stability of the English Government appeared to depend on the maintenance of the Protestants in Scotland; and again the Protestants were too weak to protect themselves without help from abroad. The house of Hamilton was in danger from the restitution of Lennox and the approaching elevation of Darnley; the Earl of Lennox claimed the second place in the Scotch succession, in opposition to the Duke of Chatelherault, and the Queen of Scots had avowed her intention of entailing her crown in the line of the Stuarts. Thus there were the same parties and the same divisions. But the Protestants were split among themselves among the counter influences of hereditary alliance and passion. The cession of her claims on the earldom of Angus by Lady Margaret had won to Darnley's side the powerful and dangerous Earl of Morton, and had alienated from Murray the kindred houses of Ruthven and Lindsay. There was no longer an Arran marriage to cajole the patriotism of the many noblemen to whom the glory of Scotland was dearer than their creed; and all those whose hearts were set on winning for a Scotch prince or princess the English succession were now devoted to their queen. Thus the Duke of Chatelherault, with the original group who had formed the nucleus of the congregation—Murray, Argyle, Glencairn, Boyd, and Ochiltree—found themselves alone against the whole power of their country.

"Secure on the side of France, Elizabeth would have been less uneasy at the weakness of the Protestants had the loyalty of her own subjects been open to no suspicion; but the state of England was hardly more satisfactory than that of Scotland. In 1560 the recent loss of Calais and the danger of foreign invasion had united the nation in defence of its independence. Two-thirds of the peers were opposed at heart to Cecil's

policy; but the menaces of France had roused the patriotism of the nation. Spain was then perplexed and neutral; and the Catholics had for a time been paralyzed by the recent memories of the Marian persecution.

"Now, although the dangers were the same, Elizabeth's embarrassments were incomparably greater. The studied trifling with which she had disregarded the general anxiety for her marriage had created a party for the Queen of Scots amidst the most influential classes of the people. The settlement of the succession was a passion among them which amounted to a disease, while the union of the crowns was an object of rational desire to every thoughtful English statesman. The Protestants were disheartened; they had gained no wisdom by suffering; the most sincere among them were as wild and intolerant as those who had made the reign of Edward a byword of mismanagement; the Queen was as unreasonable with them on her side as they were extravagant on theirs; while Catholicism, recovering from its temporary paralysis, was reasserting the superiority which the matured creed of centuries has a right to claim over the half-shaped theories of revolution. Had Mary Stuart followed the advice which Alva gave to her messenger at Bayonne, had she been prudent and forbearing, and trusted her cause to time till Philip had disposed of the Turks and was at leisure to give her his avowed support, the game was in her hands. Her choice of Darnley, sanctioned as it was by Spain, had united in her favour the Conservative strength of England; and either Elizabeth must have allowed the marriage and accepted the Queen of Scots as her successor, or she must have herself yielded to pressure, fulfilled her promises at last, and married the archduke Charles. This possibility, and this alone, created Mary's difficulties. She knew what Philip's engagements meant; she knew that Spain desired as little as France to see England and Scotland a united and powerful kingdom; and that if Elizabeth could be recalled out of her evil ways by a Catholic alliance, the cabinet of Madrid would think no more of Darnley or herself. She would have to exchange an immediate and splendid triumph for the doubtful prospect of the eventual succession should her rival die without a child.

"Nor did Elizabeth herself misunderstand the necessity to which she would be driven unless Mary Stuart saved her by some false move. She had played so often with the archduke's name, that her words had ceased to command belief; but at last she was thinking of him seriously—the more seriously, perhaps, because many Englishmen who had before been most eager to provide her with a husband were now as well or better satisfied with the prospect of the succession of the Queen of Scots."

The sudden notoriety attained by H. T. Buckle, by his application of positivism to "The History of Civilization in England," 1857, (a favourable opinion not much lessened by his *Civilization in Spain and Scotland*, 1861) and the attention called to his theory by his early and unexpected death; the appointment, by Lord Derby, in 1858, of Goldwin Smith, in preference to J. A. Froude, as successor to Professor Vaughan, to the chair of modern history in Oxford; the interest excited by G. Smith's "Two Lectures on the Study of History, with a Supplementary Lecture on the Doctrine of Historical Progress;" and the appointment of Charles Kingsley to the professorship of modern history in the University of Cambridge, in succession to Sir James Stephen, 1860, whose

inaugural lecture on "The Limits of Exact Science as applied to History," received much criticism—all these, operating together on the minds of men, led to much debate and disquisition on history in its scientific aspects. At the Royal Institution, 5th Feb. 1864, Mr. Froude delivered a lecture on "The Science of History," from which we have already made a few quotations, but from which this one more will be welcome to the reader:—

"For history to be written with the complete form of a drama, doubtless is impossible; but there are periods, and these the periods for the most part, of greatest interest to mankind, the history of which may be so written that the actors shall reveal their characters in their own words; where mind can be seen matched against mind, and the great passions of the epoch not simply be described as existing, but be exhibited at their white heat in the souls and hearts possessed by them. There are all the elements of drama—drama of the highest order—where the huge forces of the times are as the Grecian destiny, and the power of the man is seen either stemming the stream till it overwhelms him, or ruling while he seems to yield to it."

In Nov. 1865 Mr. Froude, at the request of the directors of the Philosophical Institution, Edinburgh—established in 1847, and placed successively under the presidency of John Wilson, Lord Macaulay, Lord Brougham, and Thomas Carlyle—opened the lecture season with a discourse on "The Influence of the Reformation on Scottish Character;" a trying and a touching subject before an Edinburgh audience—an audience which, perhaps, contains more of the animus of prejudice than any other which could be collected anywhere. The lecture excited much interest and a good deal of discussion. For though "the blazing passions of those stormy sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are no longer, happily, at their old temperature," yet "the traditions of the struggle survive in strong opinions and sentiments which it is easy to wound." It is a fine broadly outlined sketch, with the fine ethical perception of Mr. Froude irradiating it everywhere, and much more pronounced on the opinion that practical living religiousness is an essential ingredient in the character of a happy man or nation than any thing he had previously written; and it, perhaps, approaches more nearly to the moral truth of that great movement than any modern production, though, perhaps, because the writer's "conviction with respect to all great social and religious convulsions, is the extremely commonplace one that much may be said on both sides."

The Literary and Philosophical Institute of Newcastle-upon-Tyne has of late years cultured the field on which it is engaged with more energy and devotion, and at least as much credit and success, as any association for the promotion of intellectual improvement and the stimulation of an endeavour to acquire knowledge in the United Kingdom. With a keen northern eye for attractiveness and worth, the "canny" directors of the chief society

in the capital of Northumbria invited the historian of England to deliver, in 1867, a course of lectures on such a subject as might to him appear most pleasing and to them afford a likelihood of intellectual profit. He chose for his theme "The Times of Erasmus and Luther,"—on which he pre-lected in three discourses of admirable pith and substance; and these lectures he delivered in several of the larger centres of population. These discourses have been published in his "Short Studies on Great Subjects," and may there be perused at large. They will be found to be valuable for their information, interesting from their style, admirable for their genial catholicity, and sound in the philosophy employed to interpret the ways of the men in the circumstances of their times. But they will be esteemed by the thoughtful for the fine sympathy they display with the spiritual progress of man, and the thorough trust he reposes on the sound sense of nations on matters of morality and life.

An interval of nearly three years elapsed before the issue, in 1868, of the next two volumes—the ninth and tenth of "The History of England, from the Fall of Wolsey to the Death of Elizabeth," but the third and fourth of the "History of the Reign of Elizabeth." This section of the records of the Tudor dynasty concerns itself, for the most part, with the inter-relations of Scotland and England, with the State difficulties arising from the action and reaction of Romanism and Protestantism, and with the manner in which "the great religious drama of the sixteenth century was played out between (the) five countries who held the lead in it—England, Scotland, France, Spain, and the Netherlands"—from the time when the tragedy at the Kirk o' Field (the murder of Darnley) dismayed and disarranged the plans of the Romanists in regard to the English succession, till the massacre of St. Bartholomew thrilled the heart of Europe with the portent which it bore of evil discord and religious dissension, and on account of the magnitude and the atrocity of the scheme by which Catholicism was to have been re-enthroned in its dominion over the minds of men. Irish affairs, complicated by this great event, assume new tragicality of aspect, and the temporary overthrow of England's power under Essex is detailed in the closing chapter of this instalment of Mr. Froude's life-work.

In the following passages we have the question of the murder of Darnley set forth, and public ethics of the time in regard to such events stated:—

"The death of the husband of the Queen of Scots belongs to that rare class of incidents which, like the murder of Cæsar, have touched the interests of the entire educated world. Perhaps there is no single recorded act, arising merely out of private or personal passions, of which the public consequences have been so considerable. The revolution through which Scotland and England were passing was visibly modified by it; it perplexed the counsels and complicated the policy of the great Catholic powers of the 1869.

Continent; while the ultimate verdict of history on the character of the greatest English statesmen of the age must depend upon the opinion which the eventual consent of mankind shall accept on the share of the Queen of Scots herself in that transaction. . . . Yet the difficulty of the investigation has been occasioned only by the causes which make it necessary. Had the question been no more than personal, it would long ago have been decided; but we have to do with a case on which men have formed their opinions, not on the merits of the evidence, but through the passions and traditions of the party to which they have belonged. . . . It is therefore of the highest importance to ascertain the immediate belief of the time at which the murder took place, while party opinions were still unshaped, and party action undetermined. The reader is invited to follow the story as it unfolded itself from day to day. He will be shown each event as it occurred, with the impressions which it formed upon the minds of those who had the best means of knowing the truth. He will see the judgment passed upon the conduct of the Queen of Scots, both by friend and foe, before the explanations and interpretations which form her general defence had as yet been put forward by her advocates; and thus, when he comes to the circumstances under which these explanations were laid before the world, he will be in a position to judge for himself the degree of credibility which attaches to them. . . . Mary Stuart and her proceedings were of exceptional importance, far beyond the limits of her own kingdom. Whether the Huguenots should maintain themselves in France—whether the Netherlands were to preserve their liberties in the wrestling match which was about to open with Spain—whether, in fact, the Pope and the Catholics were to succeed or fail in the great effort now to be made to trample out the Reformation—these vast matters depended on whether England should be Catholic or Protestant; and whether England, for that generation or that century, should be Catholic or Protestant, depended on whether Mary Stuart was or was not to be looked to as the heir-presumptive to Elizabeth's crown.

"The doctrine of the responsibility of princes to their subjects had been preached thirty years before by Reginald Pole, when the Catholics were at issue with Henry VIII.; but kings and queens, when they had committed crimes, had been brought to justice so far, by the wild method of assassination; and the establishment of a formal court, in which a prince-regnant could be indicted, was a new feature in European history.

"If the Scotch noblemen, supported by the nearest relatives of the queen, had brought her to trial for her crimes, and publicly executed her, she at least would have ceased to be an element of European discord. Her claims on England and the question of her guilt would have, at once and for ever, been disposed of. The French Government would have insensibly committed themselves on the side of the Reformation, by uniting with a party who had been its great promoters in another country. Their dependence on the Guises would have been weakened; their connection with the Huguenots would have been drawn closer; the smouldering remnant of the Catholic faction in Scotland would have been extinguished, and England and France, no longer divided by creed, might have been drawn together, with Scotland as a connecting link, and hand in hand have upheld in Europe the great interests of freedom. Other consequences, it is true, might have followed. Mary Stuart, in life or death, was the pivot of many possibilities; and speculations 'as to what might have been,' are usually

worthless; yet this particular result, looked at by the light of after events, appears so much more likely than any, that the loss of an opportunity, which, if caught and used, might have prevented such tremendous misfortunes, cannot be passed over without some expressions of regret."

The stirring events of Scottish history, its intrigues, its law processes, its conspiracies, the queen's imprisonment, resignation, escape, fight and flight, are told with spirit and vigour; and here is an account of Queen Mary's flight to England:—

"With an impulse which appeared sudden, yet which commended itself to her deliberate judgment, she resolved to throw herself on the generosity of her sister of England,—of that Elizabeth whose crown she had claimed, whose policy she had thwarted, whose subjects she had tampered with; whom, till her love for Bothwell had for a time suspended her political passion, the most intense desire of her heart had been to humble into the dust.

"Their relative positions would not at first have seemed to advise a step of such importance; yet, the arguments which told against the venture, told also on the other side. Elizabeth had every reason to fear and dislike her; yet Elizabeth, before her troubles, had been in favour of her succession, and had since been her most conspicuous friend. Elizabeth had threatened that if a hair of her head were touched, she would harry Scotland with fire and sword. Elizabeth had refused to recognise the Regent's government. To the last day of her imprisonment, Elizabeth had repeated her promises of help, and with money as well as words had kept alive the spirits of her party. She had neglected her obvious interests; she had quarrelled with her most trusted ministers, because they would not go along with her. Whatever had been her motives—whether pity for the sufferings of a sister queen, or a disbelief in the charges brought against her, or a dread of countenancing an example of rebellion which might be turned against herself—she alone, of all the European powers, had interfered to prevent the Lords from going to the extremities to which they were inclined.

"Mary Stuart had not received the message sent through Leighton, and Elizabeth's second letter of admonition, like the first, unfortunately never reached its destination. But that, too, would have made but little difference; her attitude towards her remained substantially favourable. She probably but half understood Elizabeth's character; she underrated her ability, and she misconstrued her eccentricities into weakness; and with a just confidence in her own extraordinary powers, she might think that she had but to appear at the English court to carry all before her. The English Catholics had ever been devoted to her, and she could still count her adherents among them by thousands. More than half the Peers, and two-thirds of the country gentlemen, had long determined on her as Elizabeth's successor; and though her late misdoings had shaken and divided them, yet the mystery which had been observed in keeping back the proofs of her guilt had created doubts where none existed; and Elizabeth's repeated trifling with their desire for her marriage, had driven them back, in spite of themselves, towards the person on whom they had before united. Mary Stuart knew all this; she knew political and spiritual interests which were involved in her well-doing, and she might easily believe, that once present among persons who were so anxious to think

favourably of her, with her passionate eloquence she could convert her faults into virtues, and represent herself as an innocent sufferer for others' crimes.

"It might seem too, that while she had all to gain, she could lose nothing. Elizabeth, at worst, could but refuse to receive her, and allow her a free passage to the Continent. She was, or believed herself to be, in present danger of capture and death; while across the border she would be in absolute security. The very boldness of the hazard suited her daring temperament. She saw herself in imagination kneeling at Elizabeth's feet before the assembled barons of England, an injured and beautiful suppliant, flying for protection against her rebellious subjects; a few passionate words would dispel the calumnies which clouded her fame; a thousand swords would leap from their scabbards to avenge her, and she would return in triumph to Scotland, escorted by the English chivalry."

The following extract contains some remarks of importance on the state of Europe in the reign of Elizabeth, and involves views of the philosophy of history of great value; and to it we subjoin a further quotation on the influence of Christianity in European history:—

'The impunity with which Elizabeth's Government was able to insult and provoke the Catholic powers of Europe, is the most anomalous phenomenon in modern history. The population of England was less than half the population either of France or Spain. The nation was divided against itself, and three-quarters of the Peers and half the gentlemen were disaffected. Yet the intricacies of the political situation protected the Queen not only against active resentment from abroad, but from the conspiracies of her own subjects. Everywhere, indeed, there was paradox; everywhere contradiction and inconsistency. In the struggle for existence, men snatch at the first weapon that comes to hand, and cannot look too nicely at the armoury where it has been forged. Catholics and Protestants, where they were a suffering minority, clamoured alike for liberty of conscience; alike where they were in power they proscribed every creed but their own. The obligations of loyalty varied with the creed of the Sovereign. The English Bishops, who composed the 'Homily on Wilful Rebellion,' fed the armies of the Huguenots and the Prince of Orange with contributions collected in the English churches. The Catholics, who on the Continent preached the divine right of kings, believed in England that they might lawfully be deposed by their subjects. Princes were not more consistent than their peoples. Elizabeth was half a Catholic in theory, in practice she was the most vigorous of Protestants. The Court of France was one month the ally of the Papacy, and the irreconcilable enemy of heresy; in the next it was seeking alliance with England, stretching out its hands to the princes of the religion, and thinking only how best to take advantage of the distraction of the Low Countries, and annex Brabant and Flanders to the French crown. But phenomena like these occasion no surprise. They explain themselves on the common principles of human nature, or in the divisions of opinions and parties. The anomalies in the position of the English Queen were so singular as to be without precedent or parallel.

"From Philip, the most orthodox of princes, and the Spanish nation,

the most passionately Catholic in the world, some kind of principle, some uniformity of action, might have been looked for with certainty, yet Philip was compelled to be the chief supporter of a heretic power, by which he was himself insulted and despised. If he attempted to interfere to change the government in England, France stepped to Elizabeth's side and threatened him with war.

"If he stood aside to let the Catholics rebel, the Catholic element in France was ready with its offers to help to secure the profits of the anticipated revolution, and Philip, through fear for his Netherlands, was forced back upon his sister-in-law's side, was obliged to stand between her and the Pope, and to perplex the whole Catholic world by an irresolution not less marked and far more mischievous than the vacillation of Elizabeth herself. Again and again he had tried to extricate himself from his dilemma; but the strange eddy was always too strong for him. Had there been no France, the English Catholics would have found an instant ally in Spain, and Mary Stuart would have found a champion. Had Mary Stuart been unconnected with France the difficulty would have been greater, but still not insurmountable. And again, had there been no Spain, the French would never have submitted to be driven out of Scotland, or would have found an easy means to revenge themselves in the intestine divisions of England. But as with the claims in the northern latitudes, which are caused by the conflict and counterpoise of opposed atmospheric currents, the mutual jealousies of the two powers left Elizabeth more free to settle her own difficulties than if the 'ditch' which divided England from the Continent had been the Atlantic itself. She had the advantage of the neighbourhood without its evil; for her disaffected subjects, instead of trusting to their own energies, built their hopes on assistance from abroad, which never came. She had robbed Philip of his money, imprisoned his ambassador, destroyed his commerce, assisted his subjects in rebellion, and invaded his Indian colonies, yet to keep her on the throne continued the same necessity to him as when ten years before he had rejected the entreaties of De Feria and De Quadra to make himself master of England by force.

"The immunity could not last for ever. If the Reformers were finally crushed on the Continent, the turn of England would come in the end; and had Elizabeth understood it she might have struck boldly into the quarrel, and perhaps turned the scale conclusively over all Western Europe. But for such a policy she wanted courage, and probably she wanted inclination. She dipped into the whirlpool and drew out of it, she hung on the edge and promised, and broke her promises, and sent help to France and Flanders, and denied having sent it, and did all those things which in common times would have most exposed her to danger with least profit to herself. Yet here, too, strangely her star was on her side. This very conduct answered best for her own purposes, since it enabled Philip to hope to the last that she would go back to the principles of the old alliance and the old faith, and so furnish him with an excuse to himself for his own inaction. Thus time was gained, and time was everything for the consolidation of English freedom. Catholicism in England was still to appearance large and imposing, but its strength was the strength of age, which, when it is bowed or broken, cannot lift itself again. Protestantism, on the other hand, was exuberant in the freshness of youth; if a branch was lopped away another more vigorous shot from the stem; the sap was in its veins; it would bend to the storm, and gather strength from the blasts which

tossed its branches. The Catholic rested upon order and tradition, stately in the habits of thought, mechanical and regular in his mode of action. His party depended on its leaders, and the leaders looked for guidance to the Pope and the European princes. The Protestant was self-dependent, confident, careless of life, believing in the future, not the past, irrepressible by authority, eager to grapple with his adversary wherever he could find him, and rushing into piracy, metaphorical or literal, when regular warfare was denied him. Life and energy were on the side of the Queen, and every year that she could gain was a fresh security for her, while the convenient season for which Philip waited, though it arrived at last, arrived too late, when the hand which should execute its behests was shaking in decrepitude."

"The Founder of Christianity, when He sent the Apostles into the world to preach the gospel, gave them a singular warning. They were to be the bearers of good news to mankind, and yet He said He was not come to send peace on earth, but a sword—He was come to set house against house, and kindred against kindred—the son would deliver up his father to death, the brother his sister, the mother the child; the strongest ties of natural affection would wither in the fire of hate which His words were about to kindle. The prophecy, which referred, in the first instance, to the struggle between the new religion and Judaic bigotry, has fulfilled itself continuously in the history of the church. Whenever the doctrinal aspect of Christianity has been prominent above the practical, whenever the first duty of the believer has been held to consist in holding particular opinions on the functions and nature of his Master, and only the second in obeying his Master's commands, then always, with a uniformity more remarkable than is obtained in any other historical phenomena, there have followed dissension, animosity, and, in the latter ages, bloodshed.

"Christianity, as a principle of life, has been the most powerful check upon the passions of mankind. Christianity, as a speculative system of opinion, has converted them into monsters of cruelty. Higher than the angels, lower than the demons, these are the two aspects in which the religious man presents himself in all times and countries.

"The first burst of the Revolution had taken the Catholic powers by surprise. It had spread like an epidemic from town to town, and nation to nation. No conscientious man could pretend that the Church was what it ought to be. Indiscriminate resistance to all change was no longer possible; and with no clear perception where to stand or where to yield, half the educated world had been swept away by the stream. But the first force had spent itself. The Reformers had quarrelled among themselves; the Catholics had recovered heart from their divisions; the Council of Trent had given them ground to stand upon; and with clear conviction, and a unity of creed and purpose, they had set themselves steadily, with voice and pen and sword, to recover their lost ground. The enthusiasm overcame for a time the distinctions of nations and languages. The Englishman, the Frenchman, the Spaniard, the Italian, the German, remembered only that he was a son of the Church, that he had one master the Pope, and one enemy the heretic and the schismatic. In secular convulsions the natural distress at the sight of human suffering is seldom entirely extinguished. In the great spiritual struggle of the sixteenth century religion made humanity a crime, and the most horrible atrocities were sanctified by the belief that they were approved and commanded by Heaven. The

fathers of the church at Trent had enjoined the extirpation of heresy, and the evil army of priests thundered the accursed message from every pulpit which they were allowed to enter, or breathed it with yet more fatal potency in the confessional. Nor were the other side slow in learning the lesson of hatred. The Lutheran and the Anglican, hovering between the two extremes, might attempt forbearance; but as the persecuting spirit grew among the Catholics, European Protestantism assumed a stronger and a sterner type. The Catholic on the authority of the Church made war upon spiritual rebellion. The Protestant believed himself commissioned, like the Israelites, to extinguish the worshippers of images. 'No mercy to the heretics,' was the watchword of the Inquisition; 'the idolaters shall die' was the answering thunder of the disciples of Calvin; and as the death-wrestle spread from land to land, each party strove to outbid the other for Heaven's favour by the ruthlessness with which they carried out its imagined behests. Kings and statesmen in some degree retained the balance of their reason. Coligny, Orange, Philip, even Alva himself, endeavoured at times to check the frenzy of their followers; but the multitude was held back by no responsibilities; their creeds were untampered by their knowledge; and they could indulge the brutality of their natural appetites without dread of the Divine displeasure; while alike in priests' stole or Geneva gown, the clergy, like a legion of furies, lashed them into wilder madness."

What a marvellous life and reign was that of Elizabeth! What a labyrinth of romance, vicissitude, difficulty, intrigue, conspiracy, glory, admiration, and adoration was her scarcely-completed three-score years and ten, from the period of her early mother-loss, till that when, friendless, forsaken, and alone, she yielded her sceptre to King Death. It has indeed been well said of Elizabeth,—

"There was, in plain palpable fact, something about her, her history, her policy, the times, the glorious part which England—and she as the incarnation of the then English spirit—were playing upon earth, which raised imaginative and heroic souls into a permanent exaltation—a 'fairy-land,' as they called it themselves, which seems to us fantastic, and would be fantastic in us, because we are not at their work, or in their days. There can be no doubt that a number of as noble men as ever stood together on the earth, did worship that woman, fight for her, toil for her, risk all for her, with a pure chivalrous affection, which has furnished one of the most beautiful pages in all the books of history. Blots there must needs have been, and inconsistencies, selfishness, follies; for they, too, were men of like passions with ourselves; but let us look at their fair vision as a whole, and thank God that such a thing has for once existed, even imperfectly, on this sinful earth." *

It has been announced that the concluding volumes of Mr. Froude's notable work will be brought out in the autumn, probably when the long nights of November fall upon us. From the slight guess at its contents we have been privileged to gain, it would seem that the author is not to carry us with the same particularity as before, through all the shifting scenes of Elizabeth's history; but having taken on the narrative to the close of the Spanish Armada,

* Kingsley's "Sir Walter Raleigh and His Time," in *Miscellanies*. Vol. I., p. 86.

when English Protestantism became safe, and the end of the Tudor Dynasty had closely come—a brief *résumé* will bring the history to an end. So soon as this sequel comes into our hands we shall endeavour to present to our readers an outline and a criticism. We shall then also indicate the debatable topics which the history brings prominently before thinkers. It cannot be too earnestly insisted on that every record of the past should be read critically, with an eye not only to the facts related, but to the principles which govern the relation. It is a sign of the value and interest of Mr. Froude's history that it has given rise to a large amount of controversial writing, as well as elicited many discussions on the soundness of his opinions. We promise ourselves the pleasure of summing up in epitome on a few of these discussions, with an indication of the sources in which the different opinions are to be found fully exhibited. At present we must close our notice of James Anthony Froude as a modern historian.

On the 26th November, 1868, J. A. Froude was chosen Lord Rector of the University of St. Andrews, Scotland, in succession to John Stuart Mill; and on 19th March, 1869, in the library hall of the College of St. Mary there, he took the rector's oath and donned the robe of office prior to delivering his inaugural address. At a meeting of the *Senatus Academicus*, it had been resolved to enrol his name on the list of the graduates of the oldest university in Scotland, by conferring on him the decree of Doctor of Laws, and Principal John Tulloch, D.D. (author of "The Leaders of the Reformation"), presented him with the diploma of graduation. On this occasion the Lord Rector delivered an able and profound address to the students, who formed the constituency to whom he owed his election, on the objects of true education, and some of the faults which beset modern schemes of culture in their relation to practical life, the formation of character, and the prosperity of individuals and nations. This excellent and important inaugural address has been published, and merits well the perusal of all those who desire to know something of the ideal of a noble mind as to the "vocation of the scholar." If it wants the fervour and glow, the fine philosophy and noble force of Fichte's prelection, it has a broader base in common sense, and a closer relation to practical life, more thorough acknowledgment of the realities of things, and clearer conception of the nobility of mere unadorned and unflattering duty. It might have been called the practical ethics of a scholar's life. We subjoin a few sentences:—

"When we begin our work in this world, we value most the approbation of those older than ourselves. To be regarded favourably by those who have obtained distinction, bids us hope, that we too, by-and-by, may come to be distinguished in turn. As we advance in life, we learn the limits of our abilities. Our expectations for the future shrink to modest dimensions. The question with us is no longer what we shall do, but what we have done. We call ourselves to account for the time and talents which we have used or misused and then it is that the good opinion of those

who are coming after us become so peculiarly agreeable. If we have been roughly handled by our contemporaries, it flatters our self-conceit to have interested another generation. If we feel that we have before long to pass away, we can dream of a second future for ourselves in the thoughts of those who are about to take their turn upon the stage. . . .

"To make us know our duty and do it, to make us upright in act and true in thought and word, is the aim of all instruction which deserves the name, the epitome of all purposes for which education exists. Duty changes, truth expands, one age cannot teach another either the details of its obligations or the matter of its knowledge, but the principle of obligation is everlasting. The consciousness of duty, whatever its origin, is to the moral nature of man what life is in the seed-cells of all organized creatures—the condition of its coherence, the elementary force in virtue of which it grows. . . .

"Times are changed; we are still surrounded by temptations, but they no longer appear in the shape of stake and gallows. They come rather as intellectual perplexities, on the largest and gravest questions which concern us as human creatures; perplexities with regard to which self-interest is perpetually tempting us to be false to our real convictions. The best thing that we can do for one another is to exchange our thoughts freely; and that, after all, is but little. Experience is no more transferable in morals than in art. Action is the real teacher. Instruction does but prevent waste of time or mistakes; and mistakes themselves are often the best teachers of all. In every accomplishment, every mastery of truth, moral, spiritual, or mechanical,

'Necesse est—

Multa diu concreta modis inolescere miris.

our acquirements must grow into us in marvellous ways—marvellous—as anything connected with man has been, is, and will be. . . .

"There are two ways of being independent. If you require much, you must produce much. If you produce little, you must require little. Those whose studies added nothing to the material wealth of the world, were taught to be content to be poor. They were a burden on others, and the burden was made as light as possible. The scholar was held in high honour; but his contributions to the commonwealth were not appreciable in money, and were not rewarded with money. He went without what he could not produce, that he might keep his independence and his self-respect unharmed. Neither scholarship nor science starved under his treatment. More noble souls have been smothered in luxury than were ever killed by hunger.

"I ask a modern march-of-intellect man what education is for, and he tells me it is to make educated men. I ask what an educated man is: he tells me it is a man whose intelligence has been cultivated, who knows something of the world he lives in—the different races of men, their languages, their histories, and the books that they have written; and again, modern science, astronomy, geology, physiology, political economy, mathematics, mechanics—everything, in fact, which an educated man ought to know. Education according to this means instruction in everything which human beings have done, thought, or discovered: all history, all languages, all sciences. The demands which intelligent people imagine that they can make on the minds of students in this way is something amazing. Under this system teaching becomes cramming; an enormous

accumulation of propositions of all sorts and kinds is thrust down the students' throats, to be poured out again—I might say vomited out—into examiners' laps; and this when it is notorious that the sole condition of making progress in any branch of art or knowledge is to leave on one side everything irrelevant to it, and to throw your undivided energy on the special thing you have in hand. . . .

"I accept without qualification the first principle of our forefathers, that every boy born into the world should be put in the way of maintaining himself in honest independence. No education which does not make this its first aim is worth anything at all. There are but three ways of living, as some one has said—by working, by begging, or by stealing. Those who do not work, disguise it in whatever pretty language we please, are doing one of the other two. . . . The old apprenticeship therefore, was, in my opinion an excellent system, as the world used to be. The Ten Commandments and a handicraft made a good and wholesome equipment to commence life with. . . . Yet the original necessities remain unchanged. The Ten Commandments are as obligatory as ever; and practical ability, the being able to do something and not merely to answer questions, must still be the backbone of the education of every boy who has to earn his bread by manual labour. Add knowledge afterwards as much as you will, but let it be knowledge which will lead to the doing better each particular work which a boy is practising, and every fraction of it will thus be useful to him; and if he has it in him to rise, there is no fear but he will find opportunity. Every honest occupation to which a man sets his hand would raise him into a philosopher if he mastered all the knowledge that belonged to his craft. . . . The principle that I advocate is of the earth earthy. I am quite aware of it. We are ourselves made of earth; our work is on the earth, and most of us are commonplace people, who are obliged to make the most of our time. History, poetry, logic, moral philosophy, classical literature, are excellent as ornaments. If you care for such things, they may be the amusement of your leisure hereafter; but they will not help you to stand on your feet and walk alone; and no one is properly a man till he can do that. You cannot learn everything; the objects of knowledge have multiplied beyond the powers of the strongest mind to keep pace with them all. You must choose among them, and the only reasonable guide to choice in such matters is utility. The old saying, *Non multa, sed multum*, becomes every day more pressingly true. If we mean to thrive, we must take one line, and rigidly and sternly confine our energies to it. Am I told that it will make men into machines? I answer that no men are machines who are doing good work conscientiously and honestly, with the fear of their Maker before them. . . . I shall be asked whether, after all, this earning our living, this getting on in the world, are not low objects for human beings to set before themselves? Is not spirit more than matter? Is there no such thing as pure intellectual culture? "Philosophy," says Novalis, "will bake no bread but it gives us our souls; it gives us heaven: it gives us knowledge of those grand truths which concern us as immortal beings." Was it not said, 'Take no thought what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink, or wherewithal ye shall be clothed? Your Heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of these things. Behold the lilies of the field, they toil not, neither do they spin. Yet Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these.' Is this a dream? No, indeed! But such directions as

these are addressed only to few; and perhaps fewer still have heart to follow them. If you choose the counsels of perfection, count the cost and understand what they mean. . . .

"High above all occupations which have their beginning and end in the seventy years of mortal life stand undoubtedly the unproductive callings which belong to spiritual culture. Only let not those who say we will devote ourselves to truth, to wisdom, to science, to art, expect to be rewarded with the wages of the other professions. . . . If any of you choose this mode of spending your existence, choose it deliberately, with a full knowledge of what you are doing. Reconcile yourselves to the condition of the old scholars. Make up your minds to be poor—care only for what is true and right and good. . . .

"We live in times of change—political change, intellectual change, change of all kinds. You whose minds are active, especially such of you as give yourselves much to speculation, will be drawn inevitably into profoundly interesting yet perplexing questions, of which our fathers and grandfathers knew nothing. Practical men engaged in business take formulas for granted. They cannot be for ever running to first principles. They hate to see established opinions disturbed. Opinions, however, will and must be disturbed from time to time. There is no help for it. . . .

"Things are changing, and have to change; but they change very slowly. The established authorities are in possession of the field, and are naturally desirous to keep it. . . . No one can thrive upon denials: positive truth of some kind is essential as food both for mind and character. Depend upon it that in all long-established practices or spiritual formulas there has been some living truth; and if you have not discovered and learned to respect it, you do not yet understand the questions which you are in a hurry to solve. . . . We cannot make true things false, or false things true, by choosing to think them so. We cannot vote right into wrong, or wrong into right. The eternal truths and rights of things exist, fortunately independent of our thoughts or wishes, fixed as mathematics, inherent in the nature of man and the world. They are no more to be trifled with than gravitation. If we discover and obey them, it is well with us; but that is all we can do. You can no more make a social regulation work well which is not just than you can make water run uphill. I tell you, therefore, who take up with plausibilities, not to trust your weight too far upon them, and not to condemn others for having misgivings which at the bottom of your own minds, if you look so deep, you will find that you yourselves share with them. You, who believe that you have hold of newer and wider truths, show it, as you may and must show it, unless you are misled, by your own dreams, in leading wider, simpler, and nobler lives. Assert your own freedom if you will, but assert it modestly and quietly; respecting others as you wish to be respected yourselves. Only and especially I would say this: be honest with yourselves, whatever the temptation: say nothing to others that you do not think, and play no tricks with your own minds. Of all the evil spirits abroad at this hour in the world, humbug is the most dangerous.

'This above all: To your own selves be true,
And it will follow, as the night the day,
You cannot then be false to any man.'

Religion.

DO THE SCRIPTURES FAVOUR OR OPPOSE THE IDEA OF THE NATURAL IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—VI.

THERE are, and there necessarily must be, many difficulties and apparent contradictions in Holy Scripture, and between it and human reason. It could not be in reality a revelation if there was not a difficulty in reason regarding the discovery of its message as a truth, and as the infinite truth of God requires urging with much emphasis on all sides, we are apt to construe this vehemency of urging into a contradiction between one passage of scripture and another. By the very condition of this question God's word is made the final appeal on the subject; but God's word taken as a whole and in harmony with reason, not in isolated passages and in mere harmony with a creed; "Let God be true, and every man a liar" who attempts to oppose the truth as it is in Jesus.

Now what is the truth as it is in Jesus? Is it not that all mankind were ruined by sin, and that He came to save to the very uttermost all such as come unto Him and receive His spirit? He becomes to those who accept of Him salvation, glory, and life everlasting—because they are made partakers with Him in His resurrection. Man was created in honour, but being in honour he did not abide in it, hence death passed upon him and the earthly, physical, man-derived life alone remained his. The life of God had departed from Him, and until that was restored no man could inherit eternal life. Jesus came to give this life, to make men again the children of God, and to confer upon them no continuance of an old function but a new gift.

It seems to us that a consideration of the nature of sin would lead a good way towards the proper understanding of this question. Sin is disobedience to God's law. The law of God is ordained unto life. Every violation of it tends towards death; and the same law holds in all things. So long as there is hope in the tree there is life; and by judicious digging and pruning that life may be preserved and extended. But uselessness is always paid by death. So with the human frame, there is always life while there is the power of performing so much of the duty of man as gives usefulness to his existence; but when man is about to become a burden to himself and others, without corresponding advantage, death ensues. Everywhere that law is, it acts to promote and protect life so far as that

Life is employed in accordance with law, everywhere that life is engaged in neglecting law, it is extinguished. So law is life and sin is death. Christ came to save us by death from death, but that we may be saved from death we must be in it and be taken from it. To those who are not in Christ death is rightly the king of terrors, and the fear of death holds them in bondage all their lives; but to those who are in Christ, death is no more death, it is a new life; for He brings the believer again from death even as He came from death—not shunning death, but overcoming it by the force of His own glorious life. We have not as sinners any true life in our souls, we are dead in trespasses and sins, and this death shall hold us unless its power is taken away by Christ.

S. S. lays great stress on our Lord's discourse in Matt. xxv. 41—46 (p. 346 *ante*), and his grace the Archbishop of York is quoted in his article as supporting the same view of this marvellous passage. The same word in the original is employed in the phrase, though it appears (something suggestively?) with two significations in the English translation—"everlasting" and "eternal." It is argued from this sameness of phrase that whatever is the extent of unhappiness implied in the words *everlasting* punishment in the one case, is precisely the extent of the happiness implied in the life *eternal* in the other. This is an argument that *looks* much stronger than it is. In the first place, the word here translated "everlasting" and "eternal" is, in other places, though translated similarly, applied to what is not eternal in the sense of everlasting, but in the sense of age-enduring; and if we were to apply the same reasoning to all the places in which words of similar import occur, the apparent contradictions of Scripture would be increased tenfold. But, again, here obviously the reasoning does not apply, for the bliss of God is conferred on those who are redeemed through their participation in the life of Christ, that is, they live in God's life, not through any *natural* immortality possessed by them, while the death of those who die in their sins and with their souls un-sanctified by Christ's spirit die, and so do endure the everlasting punishment of exclusion from God's presence and favour. With the redeemed it is different, they die only the death of the body. "Neither do they die any more; for they are equal unto the angels; and are the children of God, *being the children of the resurrection*," Luke xx. 36.

Let me refer S. S. to the passage in Mark ix. 44—48, and ask him to read it again in connection with the passage to which Jesus in his quotation alludes, Lev. vi. 13, in the law of offerings, where it is said, "The fire shall ever be burning upon the altar; it shall never go out." Here the words do not convey the idea of endlessness; and in any reference Bible S. S. will find numerous other passages which may serve to show that he is building his theory on an unsure foundation. Can he explain his view of sinners living a life of everlasting punishment in accordance with the word of Christ, John iii. 36. "He that believeth on the Son hath ever-

lasting life: and he that believeth not the Son *shall not see life*; but the wrath of God abideth on him." "We are by nature the children of wrath," and as such we cannot see life so long as God's wrath abides on us; but by grace we are renewed in the whole man after the image of God, His wrath is taken away, and we gain a portion among the beloved children of God. S. S. interprets the abiding of God's wrath to refer to future and everlasting punishment; we believe that it signifies the state of man so long as he is out of grace and is an unbeliever. When a man becomes a believer he passes out of this abiding wrath into life and blessedness, a life which through death is transmuted into being for ever with the Lord as His. In the gospel mere natural life is death; it is only the spiritual life which counts for anything—the spirit giveth life.

It may be seen from these passages and the considerations founded upon them, that man cannot be said to be doomed to everlasting punishment in the sense of an everliving, conscious receiving of punishment; for punishment from which discipline and the hope of the reform of the criminal is excluded is revenge. All the laws of God contain in themselves discipline; in them alone is reward provided for the well-doing and obedient, and punishment for the wrong-doing and disobedient. So long as good may prevail discipline continues, but so soon as evil gains sway the hour and power of discipline has passed away, and to such "God is a consuming fire"—destruction seizes them, and they depart from the presence and the joy of life in God.

Has S. S. ever reflected that the everlasting punishment of the wicked in the ever-continuing flames of the lake of fire, which he calls hell, could only be secured by the everlasting continuance of evil in the universe, and that God's word is pledged that all evil shall be overcome, and good alone prevail?

So far we have followed S. S. in the question of the everlasting punishment of sinners; but we ought to remember that this is only a side digression, and not the main one. *That is*, Do the Scriptures favour or oppose the idea of the natural immortality of the soul? Now the Scriptures distinctly claim all power for God. S. S. would deny this power, and affirm that God has so constituted man that, however evil he might be, he must and will exist for ever. This is a very absurd opinion, and certainly cannot be substantiated by reasoning from the Scriptures. The *natural* man is enmity against God, but against God no enemy can stand. He will put all his enemies under foot. Hence, every man who exists in his unredeemed state, and continues a natural man, instead of becoming a child of grace, must disappear from among existing things. The only life that is eternal is holy life, because that alone accords with the law of God. God is angry with the wicked every day, but His anger will not last for ever; He will not chide continually. When His chiding has been so rebelliously neglected by man, that he will not of his own choice come to God through Christ Jesus as the Saviour of sinners, then shall he say, 'Depart from me!' and

death must overtake him. But so pure and holy must the universe become when evil has worked out the good for which it has been permitted and has passed away, that even death itself shall die, all shall be life, and death and hell shall be cast into the lake of fire, which is the wrath of God, and they shall be utterly destroyed. Then shall the Son of man reign in glory, then shall life everlasting be enjoyed, when the ransomed of the Lord shall praise Him as the life-giver. Sin, and death, and evil, and ungodliness shall be clean gone, and only life in God, life according to God's will, shall prevail. There is no *natural* immortality for man, but Christ, of His free grace and favour, offers spiritual immortality to us. Let us not spurn His offered mercy, but in Him gain—glory, honour, and immortality—eternal life.

E. E. C.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—VII.

Is this discussion really one on the eternity of punishment, or one regarding the immortality of the soul? I have been reading with—shall I say? *impatience*—the contributions on this subject, and am quite confused as to the relevancy of much that has been written upon it. I would like to call attention to the main point, and not to the side issues or implied consequences of any of the opinions held. It is indeed one of the chief reasons for feeling controversy to be unsatisfactory, that the disputants so often argue the erroneousness of any principle, not *in* itself, but *from* the consequences which they infer would flow from its acceptance. This is clearly an easy way of arguing; but it is always open to the rejoinder—no such consequences are acknowledged by us as likely to result from the adoption of the principle. But moreover, we are to search for truth, and to embrace it independently of its consequences. If any principle is indeed true, we must not hesitate to accept of it, for all the results of truth in the long run are good and beneficial. *The* point is the favouring or opposing of an idea—a matter of interpretation, and not of doctrine. Do the Scriptures favour or oppose that idea? Not the idea of the immortality of the soul, but of its immortality by nature. Is the soul possessed of an inherent and inextinguishable life, which can neither be lost nor taken away, imparted to it by creation, and incapable of being withdrawn from it, if that, on any account, should seem desirable or requisite, advisable or necessary?

We have got certain views of late of the indestructibility of matter, or rather of force. We find that force can neither be increased by any means known to us nor diminished; it can only be transformed. Have we any ground for believing that mind, spirit, the soul, is indestructible as a personal centre and unity, or are we compelled to believe that it is destructible as a personal centre of life, and is transformable into new manifestations, like matter. Can it cease to be? not in the philosophic sense of, Can it undergo annihilation? but, Can it cease to be as a living being, with all its personal qualifications, characteristics, and experiences,

all the associations that are wrapped up in it, incorporated, if we may so speak, into its very nature by experience and reflection? Does Scripture teaching warrant us to believe that any soul of man can thus cease to be? and if so, what are the Scripture proofs on which we may rely in our belief upon this matter? This is the real question, and not that one which has usurped its place too much, we think, in this debate. Shall the souls of the wicked be exposed to an everlasting conscious punishment by being kept in endless penal suffering, in order that Deity may show His eternal hatred of sin? This is the question on which we think light requires to be cast. Whatever is the truth upon the matter we must accept, however much it may oppose our wishes or excite our fears. Let us really try to get at the proper settlement of this point, and we may derive some good from the debate now going on.

In order that the way may be cleared for the proper consideration of this question I would respectfully call upon our opponents to remember, that Scripture reveals to us a God whose prerogative it is to be almighty, one to whom nothing is impossible. *A priori*, therefore, so far as Scripture is concerned, there is no opposition between it and the possibility, at the very least, of the soul's being, by an exercise of the almighty power of the Creator, annihilated. It is a possible thing with God that He may unmake what He has made. This postulate shows that there is a probability that the soul is not naturally immortal, for if it were so, God would—so to speak—have restricted his omnipotence, and voluntarily made something impossible to Himself.

But again, the Scriptures declare that God is jealous of His glory, that He has made all things for Himself, that He has created man to do all things for His glory, and that He demands, as the very condition of life at all, obedience to His will. Here, then, we see that the Scriptures do not favour the idea of the natural immortality of the soul, inasmuch as it makes life a thing determinable in certain circumstances. Scripture clearly shows, then, that it is a probable and a possible thing that the soul may die. If it could not, the very purpose of man's existence might be contravened and set at naught, and yet he would live; live, not to the glory but to the disparagement of his Maker, and in resistance to His will.

When God had created man he insisted on a sign of obedience and a proof of love, that he should not eat of the fruit of a particular tree, and covenanted that the reward of obedience would be "life," the punishment of disobedience, death. Did God threaten to perform against man that which it was impossible for Him to do? If the soul is naturally immortal, He did so; but the Scriptures affirm that the soul is only conditionally immortal—that is, that it is capable of life so long as it delights in the law of the Lord and observes it. It seems that the plain teaching of Scripture is this, "The soul that sinneth, it shall die." Life shall be his who promotes God's glory.

Again, when man had sinned God spoke specifically upon this

point,—“Dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return.” Here then is a direct assertion that man, having sinned, had ceased to possess the immortality which our opponents say he naturally possessed. There is here, then, a plain statement made in Scripture that man, because of his sins, “goeth down to the dust,” and precautions are taken, as has been pointed out by a previous writer, lest, contrary to the desire of God, sinful creatures should put forth their hands and take of the tree of life, and so frustrate the design of Deity, that death should be the punishment of sin.

At this point several references to the course of the discussion would help to elucidate this part of my subject; but as the previous numbers of the *British Controversialist* belonging to me have been lent among those whom I am trying to interest in its perusal, I am unable to specify pages, and require to trust to memory.

One strives to get over the argument by affirming that the death spoken of was only the *first* death—the death of the body; that the *second* death was introduced into the soul by sin, so that men are dead in trespasses and sins, but that eternal death is to follow unrepentant guilt and unforgiven sin. This, I take it, is not the scriptural statement of these things, but a theological deduction or inference made for purposes belonging to creeds, whereas we are restricted to the Scriptures. To make this plain, then, the maintainers of the assertion that the Scriptures favour the idea of the natural immortality of the soul must make out a list of passages showing clearly that man is exposed to a threefold death, and yet must maintain that man is not subject to death at all, but is naturally immortal! In fact, they contrive to give a new definition of death, and to make it not a case of going out of existence, but of going out of the way of a happy life; but then, if this is the meaning of mortality, what does natural immortality signify? naturally unable to go out of the way of a happy life? Something like this it must be, for if we change the main idea of death we must also alter the chief notion of life, and we must have a threefold life possible; and if we have a threefold life, we must also possess all these three forms of life naturally. But if so, how is spiritual life communicated, naturally or supernaturally? What shall our opponents say?

“The *natural* man,” it is said, “is enmity against God, neither is subject to the law of God.” Scripture also affirms that God will destroy every enemy, and will put all things under the feet of Jesus, and that the last enemy that shall be destroyed is death. It appears pretty evident then that the Scriptures do not favour the idea of the soul of man being naturally immortal.

Are our opponents prepared to prove the eternity of evil? for if they are not, and all are not holy at death, evil must be eternal. “As the tree falleth, so must it lie.” But if the soul is naturally immortal, and it is possible—as too truly it is—for men to die in their sins, evil must be eternal, and all evil cannot be put away out of the universe. God will not have subdued all things to Himself. Even if our opponents take the view of the Universalist, and affirm

that after the lapse, it may be, of ages, God will restore all the souls of men to His favour, it will not avail them in regard to argument for the natural immortality of the soul, for that would be the conferring on the soul of an immortality it did not possess.

On all these considerations, then, it may be fairly asserted that the Scriptures oppose the idea of the natural immortality of the soul. It by no means follows, however, that it does not favour the idea of the immortality of the soul. It holds out eternal life as worthy of acceptance; it offers to give it to all those who come unto God through Christ. It unites life and righteousness together, and opens to the soul the very supply which it most earnestly desires—life.

Our opponents say that by advocating such views we are lessening the hold of Christianity upon the people, and that if men do not believe that their souls will be for ever lost they will not fear the Lord. But is it wise to fix the faith of the people, even for good purposes, upon false grounds of fear? Is it not rather wise to get at the truth, to show the worth and pleasure of life, to demonstrate that, if desire be felt to prolong life and to see good, one way to secure that end is alone open—trust in God and faith in Christ.

I have often noticed how much more frequent the fear of hell is held up by popular preachers than the love of God, and this has forced on me the comparison between the calls of the gospel unto *newness* of life, which are so frequently the calls of love. How seldom, indeed, are the terrors of the law invoked in the Scriptures. The infrequency in Scripture of the appeal to fear is one of its holiest signs; it proves its divineness, for it shows that it is an issue from the heart of a God of love. Had it been a human book, it could not have been so free from what is calculated to excite fear, and so full of what is likely to encourage love.

I hope our opponents will allow that there is some force in these remarks, and that they will endeavour to see the point where the force strikes, and give that consideration. We may be assured that God so loved the world as to give His only begotten Son, that men might have the gift of eternal life given unto them as a reward of faith, love, and patient continuance in well doing.

J. V. H.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—VIII.

THERE are few fallacies upon which readers of controversy, especially if young, ought to be so much upon their guard as the fallacy of great names. It was an acute piece of controversial tactics in S. F., just after the readers of *The British Controversialist* had been having their attention called to the merits and ability of James Anthony Froude, to lay before them a lengthy quotation from his writings in support of the negative of this question. I do not write to present any argument of my own, but only to counter-vail the force of the fallacious use made of J. A. Froude's paper by S. F. If weight of character and repute is to be brought into the

discussion, then I apprehend that it will be quite legitimate to place a counter quotation before your readers,—one which has a better position in the literary world than an extract from an old newspaper, devoted to free thought in the infidel sense, for such surely the old *Leader* was, whatever the new *Leader* may be. I am not able to give the name of the author of the passage which I intend to quote, but it is derived from the gravest, best, and most philosophical Review which Scotland possesses,—a Review which, in its *hundredth* number, takes higher ground than that with which it started and a new initiative. Let this quotation be read as a full reply to the opinions advanced by J. A. Froude, and let the reader decide on which is in the right :—

“The great central doctrine of Christianity was the revelation of future life. This doctrine was placed in the head and front of all Christian preaching. The faith of the gospel was taught in public discourses weekly and daily; and every Christian sermon insisted upon this great doctrine as the cardinal point of all Christian instruction. Christianity had its mysteries, more or less, like other religions of the day; and there were various points of faith which its teachers unfolded gradually and with reserve; but upon this one point, at least, there was no reserve and no hesitation. The future life was an exoteric doctrine, made known to every one from the first, held forth as a common boon for all mankind, maintained as the indefeasible right and possession of every son of Adam. In these respects the Christian doctrine of immortality differed essentially from the speculations of the philosophers, who, in the highest flights of their imagination, ventured only to regard it as the prize of a few superior spirits, as a reward extorted from nature by the little band of god-like men who had been endowed from their birth with a portion of the divine essence. Nor did the mysteries in their most popular interpretation go further. But, besides the universality of the Christian doctrine on this head, the unwavering confidence with which its certainty was proclaimed constituted an important element in the acceptance which it naturally met with. Undoubtedly, the hope of a future existence is one to which the human mind naturally clings, and with all the waverings and doubts and despondency so painfully apparent in the utterances of the wisest of the heathens about it, we are inclined to believe that this hope, blind and naked as it was, exercised no slight dominion over the thoughts and actions of great numbers of all classes among them. But none of the heathens ventured to assert it as a positive fact, susceptible of proof from actual experience, of which an instance could be drawn from veritable history. The resurrection of Jesus, and his subsequent residence among men in the body, professed to be the revelation of a great psychological fact, appealing to sensible proof in itself. This typical resurrection once admitted, upon what professed to be conclusive evidence, the universal resurrection of all men followed as a logical consequence, and admitted, in the breasts of the believers, of no dispute or hesitation. No limitation could henceforth be put upon the doctrine; no shade of doubt could fall upon it. Here was a standing-point of certainty in metaphysical things amidst the shifting sands of mere human speculation, which could not fail to arrest the attention, attract the sympathy, and sustain the belief of all who were not repelled

from it by unconquerable prejudices,—for into a critical examination of the facts alleged there was little disposition among the ancients to enter. . . . And of this assured conviction of future life it is to be remarked that it was emphatically the aspiration and the despair of the age. . . . The disenchantment of the world from the promises of material civilisation, and from the charms of a degrading sensuality, turned men's minds in the direction of a spiritual futurity. As the miseries of mankind and the degradation of class upon class increased, the vehement cry for a higher and more enduring blessing than any this life could offer rose more generally and more constantly. Philosophers and hierophants answered it to the best of their power, and vied with one another in suggesting the possibility of that blessed immortality which all the world sighed for; but their efforts, in spite of every prepossession in their favour, were almost utterly frustrated, simply because they had no objective evidence to offer of the fact; they could not do more than affirm upon conjecture what the Christian preachers proposed to demonstrate by proof. It was not till every other means had been exhausted to satisfy the universal craving, that men accepted the consolations of Christianity; it was not till the pride of man was thoroughly abased by defeat and disappointment that he consented to throw his last prejudices to the winds, and embrace, as he believed, the certainty of the Christian doctrine, together with the dishonour of the cross of Christ.*

This extract, it will be seen, carries great weight. It is earnest, vigorous, reasonable, and is not written with any intentional bias towards the question we are engaged in discussing.

I may be allowed, in conclusion, to advert to a phase in this controversy which the writers on the negative side do not seem to consider sufficiently,—What evidence is there for the immortality of the soul at all, if the soul is not naturally immortal? Is there any distinct evidence of the new eternal life with which they say believing men are gifted? I do not mean any change of manner of life, but any point, special and observable, by which we can know those who, as their phrase is, “have passed from death unto life”? Do we not then give our vote in reality against belief in the immortality of the soul and an after state at all, when we seek to deny immortality to one man and ascribe it to another? I commend reflection on this to the negative writers and those who incline to believe their assertions.

J. H. K.

DOES FREE THOUGHT LEAD TO INFIDELITY?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

FREE thought is not quite the same as freedom of thought; though most of those who take the negative on this question seem to argue as if the two were so nearly alike as not to require attention to the difference.

Free thought is generally employed to signify thought free from moral restraint; thought, that is, which is not regulated by con-

* Article on W. H. Lecky's “History of European Morals,” in *North British Review*, No. C., July, 1869, pp. 391—3.

siderations of morality or religion. In our opinion such thought cannot but lead to infidelity, for it is unfaithful to the very first purposes of thought, which are to regulate the life and conduct by the attainment of truth. Thought allowed to range unrestrainedly in any way it pleases, without fixed purpose and proper aim, can scarcely fail to wander in forbidden places, and to indulge in prohibited delights, whether these are to be found in superstition or in infidelity. For the purposes of this debate superstition and infidelity are all but synonymous, for both are the opposites of fidelity to truth and right. We have no word of favour to say for superstition as a form of faith—over-credulity is in our opinion incredulity,—both go to the side of falsehood instead of adhering to the truth.

Freedom of thought is entirely different. That walks in the way of the laws of thought, seeks the supreme end of thinking—truth, and truth is ever worthy of faith and credence. Those who seek it honestly, are among the faithless many, truly faithful found. They seek truth and pursue it earnestly, not with the desire of being free in thought, but of so gaining truth wherever it is to be found that they may be faithful to that. So truth makes a man free, but it restrains his thoughts; the man who has acquired truth has got a faith, and he holds to that faith, and keeps himself within the limits of that truth; but he who in the exercise of free thought is inspired by restlessness and weariness of the bondage which truth imposes, and seeks “in wandering mazes lost” to gratify a propensity rather than to fulfil a duty; to make anything supreme in our desire, except truth, which is the earthly representative and regent of the mighty God of truth, is infidelity—infidelity to our own better nature—infidelity to the holiness of truth and righteousness—infidelity to the God who gave us the power and the duty to search after truth.

Free thought is selfish and greedy of gratification; it seeks activity for itself rather than activity for the sake of attaining a true faith. In fact, the attainment of any true faith, as it tends to restrain thought and to forbid it to wander beyond the limits this faith assigns, is rather an opponent to free thought. With freedom of thought it is different. True freedom exists best under the best laws. All the laws of thought and nature are the best that can be, for they are the laws of an all-wise and infinitely good Being, who, knowing all truth, knows also in the following of what paths truth may be found. So that with full freedom of thought we have also the best laws of thought; and the obedience we yield to the laws of the Divine Being, which constitute the true logic of nature and the soul, is rewarded by the acquisition of truth; while free thought, taking us away from the loving obedience we owe to this divine logic of our own nature and the qualities of the things which surround us, mislead and cause our very aims to miscarry by our indifference to anything else than the pleasure to be found in the exercise of our free thought.

Free thought is in reality purposeless thought. So soon as we give ourselves a purpose we destroy the chance of exerting free thought. But purpose does not destroy freedom of thought. Free thought is a whizzing rocket, whirling, as it hurls through the air, the bright and specious sparks of light, but it is only momentarily dazzling, and instantly all is darker than before. Freedom of thought incorporates and makes substantial the light it has in a lamp which it can carry into whatsoever places it pleases, and so discover what is to be seen and known. What is seen and known by this lamp of reason cannot be doubted, but what is rather fancied than seen to be by the lurid light of the inconstant and trustless sparks of the rocket must be doubtful, and is likely to be doubted. What is wanted is fidelity—fidelity to convictions, and to the truths on which convictions rest. What is to be avoided is infidelity to thought, nature, and God. By freedom of thought we gain convictions, but by free thought we lose them, and therefore it is that we affirm that free thought leads to infidelity.

Infidelity is, of course, creedless, for if there is nothing to be believed in, there can be no creed or statement of faith. It is quite true that infidels, as a rule, have a very definite creed, but it is a creed that consists of negatives. This creed they are always laying down with emphasis as the very truth of the matter of thought. But it is a peculiarity of thinking that negatives cannot be proved—nay, that they cannot be believed, still less can they be trusted in as everything that is true can be. To make a creed of negations would be impossible, but by the legerdemain of thought the infidel, or one who has no faith, transforms all his negatives into affirmatives in practice, and while he says "there is *no* God," he lives as though God were not in all his thoughts, and as if His law had no influence over his actions. He keeps his thoughts, apparently, unsettled that they may be free, but in reality he is compelled to settle them, and he imprisons himself in a creed of disbeliefs, which is much more fatal than any kind of creed attainable by freedom of thought.

I hope these few observations may help to put this question in a new light before the readers of the *British Controversialist*, and that, when the negative reply is penned, there may be some light thrown upon the relation between free thought and creeds. For instance, to what beliefs does free thought lead; why is free thought so usually connected in ordinary language with those who have not only cast away the bondage of creeds, but the restraints of a moral life? Why are those restless and unsettled thinkers who have no grounded faith and no rooted principle always those who have most to say about free thought; and more especially how comes it to pass that it is only those who have had a faith, who have made and kept up those movements on which the freedom of thought depends,—Lutherans in Germany, Quakers and Puritans in England, Covenanters in Scotland, Waldensians in France, and so on? Is it not singular that man should confound two such different things as free thought and freedom of thought?

B. B. B.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

"The man who quits the beaten track of opinion is, no doubt, in the great majority of cases, quite mistaken; but still, if nobody is ever allowed to quit the beaten track of opinion, it is clear that we shall make no discoveries."—*Edinburgh Review*.

THE uses of discussion are manifold. It does not at all deserve the reprehension so frequently bestowed on it by the theological world. It is quite possible to examine the foundations of the faith in the most critical manner, and yet preserve the graces of humility and devotion; indeed, any belief entered into without reason and without reasoning cannot be much else than a dead faith. The mere acceptance of any set of dogmas as our creed is no great homage to an Infinite Mind. I cannot imagine how it can be supposed to be gratifying to one who is the centre and source of life and truth. The man who thinks and reasons, listens to arguments and weighs them, notes the evidence for and against the opinions presented to him, and does his best to find on which side the main weight of the evidence rests, may err; but it is hard to conceive how the man who does not think and reflect can manage to get possession of the truth, or how, holding the form of sound words according to the manner in which truth may be best expressed, how it can be truth to him. Truth cannot be laid as it must be received into the mind. Words are its signs only; it is in thought it must live, it must be spiritually discerned; but the thoughtless receiver of a creed does not display any spiritual discernment in its acceptance.

I cannot believe that it is doing God service to hesitate to employ his most precious endowment in striving to ascertain the truth. The Scriptures are to every fresh mind only a tradition of the elders. They have been handed down to him by his fellows from his fellows, in the same manner as the religion and beliefs of other lands are handed down by tradition or in books. They only cease to be tradition when we have taken the evidence our fellows present of their divine inspiration, and, by a testing of that evidence, satisfy our spirits that they bring us into contact with the living God. This cannot be done if thought is not free—if we are prohibited from questioning and testing, examining and criticising.

It is often said that mathematics admit of no doubts, that they yield demonstrative truth; but it deserves notice that Euclid always insists on doubt. He is seldom contented with showing that a given fact or principle is correct, but that it must be so. He insists on the student taking some other point of view, in order that by bringing out the contradiction of any incorrect idea, assumption, or supposition, he may more firmly fix the truth of what he has affirmed and proved in the mind of the mathematician. Even in mathematics, the place, utility, and advantage of discussion is admitted. Not only is truth demonstrated, but untruth is exhibited. It is not only shown us what the truth is, but we are shown besides that what we are by nature inclined to think should, or might, or

may be true, cannot possibly be so. If you hesitate to admit that a given proposition is absolutely and unmistakeably correct, Euclid does not fall foul of you for a heretic, he admires your thoughtfulness and courage; and he encourages you to take any other plan, method, or form of the idea, to see what you can make of it, and, following vigorously the proposed style of making the thing out, he brings the idea to a test from which the false cannot conceal its existence, and by which it must stand forth convicted of being quite incapable of holding its place beside the genuine fact or principle which he had enounced or asserted. Is not this one of the very reasons why we have so much confidence in mathematics, because it so frankly invites us to co-operate in the discovery of the truth, and allows us to seek, by effort of our own, to discover any flaw in the fact or the form which it proposes? Thus even in mathematics truth and falsehood grapple, and, as is always the case, falsehood is discomfited.

The truth is only to be discovered by research. It is a more important matter than most people seem to think, that any form of words in which truth may be expressed, however accurately, is not truth to the mind which accepts the statement. It is only an unmeaning symbol, and it may easily be so used as to have all the evil effects of a falsehood. An uninquiring faith is not a holy faith; there is no benefit conferred on the mind which takes it in, there is no praise to the person from whom it is received in its acceptance. If we are to have faith in truth, it must be because of its being truth, but how are we to "know the truth" if thought is not free to search into the reasons for belief in, or disbelief of that which affirms of itself that it is a truth?

To believe a lie because of the reverence one feels towards the person who tells it would be to be foolishly fond; for love is not a guide to or a test of truth. We know that men love lies, delight in and uphold them; but their love does not change the nature of that which they believe in. We can only know truth through the intellect, not through the affections; hence it is folly to argue that we ought to believe the revelation of God in order that we may show our love to Him. We most truly show our love when we take every possible means within our power to believe nothing that we do not absolutely know to be His will.

These ideas on the benefit of free thought as a good, even an essential activity of man, and of the evil results of having the mind merely in a receiving state, will lead the reader to see that we do not believe that free thought leads to infidelity.

We have been profoundly disappointed at the way in which S. S. has begun the discussion of this subject. He seems to us to have led the debate in a wrong way altogether. He affirms that the activity of our minds "gives rise to infidel thoughts, creates doubts, and doubtful speculations." Here he mistakes "activity of mind" for "free thought"—a great confusion of things different. Activity of mind may be restless, aimless, and curiously inquisitive, but

without any fixed purpose or plan ; but thought is a distinct, fixed, pressing forward of the mind towards the attainment of a settled reliable result. It is an exertion of the mind with the intention of coming to a conclusion and summing up upon a subject. Thought always endeavours to get at something definite ; but doubt is not definite, it is a see-saw state of mind which is quite undetermined, and therefore can never afford the mind rest. So that this ambiguity completely destroys the first argument S. S. presents on the affirmative.

It is quite evident that the greater the number of ideas that engage the mind, and the wider the course and circle of a man's thoughts go, the greater his exposure to defeat in completely understanding so many ; while the man of few ideas and narrow range, can get his few arranged and assorted, labelled and put together, with less difficulty and more ease. He doubts little because he thinks little, and the other, because he thinks much, is uncertain about many things ; yet his faith may be more certain and unwavering on what he believes, than the man who is restricted in thought, and his faith may include too, a much wider range of doctrines just because he has gone farther to get them, and been more enthusiastic in pursuing after them. So that argument number two is self-defeating.

If superstition and infidelity are contraries, we must either be doubters or devotees. I should myself, if this were the case, prefer infidelity to superstition ; but I am not by any means shut up to that alternative. The very fact that I doubt on some points proves that I can believe on others, or else I could not have the two feelings. The more I examine the more I am likely to find out, and, therefore, the more I am likely to believe, as well as the more I am likely to be compelled to disbelieve ; for every discovery of truth compels the disbelief of an error, sometimes of many errors. In argument fourth S. S. seems to argue as if the inquiries which have been excited in men's minds had reached their final stage. This is by no means the case. Search is not always favoured with success at its first outset, or there would be no great difficulty in either science or religion. So that the modern development of doubt is not an argument that free thought leads to infidelity, so much as that it leads through infidelity to truth. Besides search does not always simply doubt : it is not necessarily the result of or accompanied by distrust. It may be both reverent and critical, and it can be so, as is proved by the example of the Bereans.

Of the fifth argument I need only say, that an unreasoning faith would, in my opinion, be the highest as well as the most deplorable infidelity. But L. L. has on this topic surpassed all my expectations, and I shall not attempt any rivalry with him. Truth is always acquired by man through opposition to error, and every error must be doubted that it may be tried. Truth, being tried, has nothing to fear ; error, exposed to the same test, shrinks away. Free thought is the discoverer of truth and the detector of error.—M. E.

Politics.

IS AN HEREDITARY HOUSE OF LEGISLATURE DESIRABLE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

“My lord, I dare not make myself guilty,
To give up willingly that noble title
Your master wed to me; nothing but death
Shall e'er divorce my dignities.”

Shakspeare, Henry VIII.

“THE government of the people by the people and for the people” is a proverb which Georgius has quoted, not only as he thinks in support of his views, but as “the motto of his paper,” and he is so impressed with its teaching that he maintains it should be the fundamental principle of all government. Georgius says, “the proverb quoted should be a supreme canon in the constitution of all states, and that no government which is not based upon it is just, nor can be permanently prosperous and powerful” (p. 208). I cannot tell how Georgius interpreted the meaning of the proverb; I only know I *cannot* bring the meaning of the proverb to agree with the main purport of his paper. I have no doubt the word *people* being repeated three times influenced Georgius to select it as the motto of his democratical views. I should advise Georgius to look to the *little* words, more especially when they are *italicised*. Now, strange to say, the very principles contained in the proverb, and to which Georgius says “hereditary legislation opposes,” are accepted by it, and form the very principles on which the British constitution is founded. (1) We have—“The government of the people,” in the first estate of our constitution—the Monarch; (2) “*by* the people,” in the third estate—the House of Commons; (3) “*for* the people,” in the second estate—the Lords. So that our hereditary legislation, tested by our opponent’s standard, is found to have every requisite necessary to “be permanently prosperous and powerful.”

I shall now state the following propositions in support of the affirmative side of the question,—“Is an Hereditary House of Legislature desirable?”—

1. Our constitution being founded on the best principles of Government, it would neither be expedient nor wise, but highly revolutionary, to abolish the second estate of the realm—the House of Lords.

The British constitution is founded on the principles of national

security and personal liberty. Its power being derived from the people, and, to make it subservient to the best interests of the whole body of the people, is confided to the care of the three estates, as before mentioned; which are so constructed as to be a mutual support and a mutual check to each other. In short, the principles on which our constitution is formed, are based on a union of the monarchical, aristocratical, and democratical forms of government, producing nearly all the advantages of each without the inconveniences of any. It will be seen from this that our constitution consists of three parts, each division not only being closely connected, but keeping the other two in check; and when the Monarch, the Lords, and the Commons work in harmony, they form one of the grandest, safest, and most to be admired constitutions of the world. So that when we question the desirability of maintaining or upholding any of these three strongholds of our constitution, it becomes a matter of the deepest importance, and needs our very careful deliberation and judgment. For whether we question the desirability of upholding the hereditary system of our constitution, either in its relation to the Monarch or the House of Lords, it will involve us in the question of "Republic *v.* Monarchy" on the one hand, and "Democracy *v.* Aristocracy" on the other, and would, I think, be very detrimental to the welfare of this country, its safety and its glory.

2. The House of Lords, as a deliberative and independent assembly, is far superior *to that of the* House of Commons.

I do not wish to maintain that the House of Commons is not a deliberative institution. The *minor* bills receive an attentive hearing, a cool deliberation, and some of the most practical and sound arguments are set forth, which soon make their influence felt in "the division." The speeches on our "Financial Policy" or "the Budget," as regards eloquence, power, and ability, show that we have some of the finest arithmeticians of the day. In either case, whether it be our "Financial statements" or *minor* bills, the division list is very different *to the one* on our "great debates," such as the "Irish Church Bill,"—in the *former* we find, by the general distribution of men of the several shades of opinion, that the debate has had the desired effect; in the *latter*, after a "great debate," (P) where party spirit has run so high that the speeches have virtually been made to the benches, and on the morrow the division list is very nicely arrayed on one side with *Liberals*, on the other with *Conservatives*; should, however, there be one or two Liberals who vote with the Conservatives, or *vice versa*, it is accounted for by their being pledged previously to their entering "the House." What was the spirit in which the "Irish Church Bill" passed the Commons? Was it not this,—"The bill, the whole bill, and nothing but the bill? But when "The bill" reached the Lords, in what a different spirit was it received. Every vital point was argued and calmly deliberated; there were no biased feelings or prejudices against it; and when the Lords

"divided" we find men of different shades of opinion on either side, showing that they had given their best hearing to the bill, ~~misses~~ the party spirit of the "Lower House." How is this? Why! because the Lords are free and independent; not pledged to vote with or support any party; are not influenced by the fear of being rejected at the "next election." As both C. F. A. S. and Georgius question the independence of the House of Lords, it would be as well for us to explain our meaning of the word. Georgius states,— "it is absurd to say that our House of Lords is independent when history affords us so many examples of their passing laws which they believed to be bad, and even opposed to their own interests" (p. 208). If independence only consisted in their "throwing out" the bills, "which they believed to be bad, and even opposed to their own interest," I must say it would be independence with a vengeance. I have no doubt that Georgius and C. F. A. S. (who use the same style) think their way of arguing is very skilful and pointed; if they could by any means nullify the independence of the Lords, we, the defenders of the Hereditary House of Legislature, would be defeated. I not only affirm, but am ready to prove, that a weaker argument against independence could not be used. We will reverse the argument. Suppose the Lords "had thrown out" the bills. What would our opponents have said? Would they not at once exclaim,— "the Lords have misused their independence, they wish to oppose the people, they are a preventive against all reform;" or, in the language of Georgius, "that independence amongst legislators is undesirable?" I would remind Georgius and his friend that the House of Lords as an institution is *not* an independent estate, but *dependent* on the other two estates of the realm; consequently every consideration, more especially on any vital point, must be made before the passing or rejecting of a bill. At the same time, it is an estate which is *independent* as regards membership, and therefore the individuals comprising it can give an impartial consideration to all questions of policy, without any counterbalancing influence, such as an elective assembly is subject to.

3. The abolition of our Hereditary House of Legislature is not necessary.

The writers on the negative side of the question are unanimous in their opinion that the House of Lords should be abolished, at least so far as an hereditary legislature is concerned. Many are the suggestions proposed for the new chamber; Neanias would have an "Elective house," B. M. "Life peerages," and E. L. B. is so considerate as to "have peerages which should extend to three lives." The captain of the opposition, E. L. B., however, would only "reform it;" at the same time, he thinks that no defence can be effectively made, "unless it can be proved that wisdom, patriotism, worth, and nobleness of character are hereditary;" and to make this more difficult, he includes "defiance of the accidents of succession." It would be impossible for me to state as a fact what an Hereditary House of Legislature (or even a life peerage extending to

three lives) would be a hundred years hence; but it can be proved by *analogy*. If the present Lords, the descendants of the Barons of whom Akenside writes:—

“This is the place
Where England's ancient barons, clad in arms,
And stern with conquest, from their tyrant king
(Then render'd tame) did challenge and secure
The charter of thy freedom.”

—have lost none of those qualities necessary to make a man a good politician and statesman,—in support of which I quote the following extract from a daily Liberal paper on the recent “Irish Church debates” :—

“The speeches delivered on one side and the other in the debate of last night (June 15th) fully maintained the ancient reputation of the House of Lords for oratorical power and dialectic versatility.”

—is it not reasonable to suppose that their heirs will also be possessed with “wisdom, patriotism, worth, and nobleness of character?” Then why, I would ask, do our opponents wish to exchange the present House of Lords for a House of Life Peers, when everything necessary for the welfare of the people has been provided for? More especially as the change would be thwarted by many difficulties, and might end in a revolution,—a revolution of which none could estimate or foresee the end.

4. If the House of Lords was abolished, the influence of the former members of it would be bad for the country.

The House of Commons as at present is really what it was intended to be, a “House of Representatives of the People.” It is founded on democratical principles; it is, as the proverb upholds, “the government by the people;” and, as a House of Representatives, is second to none, whether it be monarchical or republic. The people, constituting the power of the land, it is perfectly consistent, right, and just that they should have a voice in the government, and that they should be represented by men from their own ranks, inasmuch as they would know the desires and feelings of their fellow-citizens and neighbours better than any others. Should, however, the Lords, as a legislative assembly, be abolished, or even a House of Life Peers established, I am inclined to think that the Lords would use their influence and wealth in such a way: that the House of Commons would no longer be a House of Representatives of the people, but a House representing the aristocracy; so that our most democratical opponents' object would be frustrated.

GEORGIUS D. E.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—VI.

E. L. B. affirms that while reform has been going on in the Lower House, "the Upper House has been left in a terribly unreformed state." Never was there a greater or graver misstatement made. The House of Lords is continually undergoing reform.

"The old order changes, giving place to new." The best and choicest men of both parties, as occasion offers, those who have been foremost in working out the great political movements of modern times, are being continually addressed by the Sovereign and the ministry as the representatives of the people,—*"Come up hither!"* This is a reformation continually going on; not a mere external change of conditions, but a genuine internal reform. It is not at all a stagnant reservoir of residuaries; it is a constantly stirred and agitated house of change, gaining always tried and tested and approved new blood into itself. By constant transfusion it acquires perpetuity, and is yet, like the human body, ever the same yet always new.

The above argument does away with the demand of E. L. B. that we should prove that character is hereditary. A Hereditary House of Legislature in which character was hereditary would be a grievance which could not be borne. It is just because character is not hereditary that a House of Lords is a good and excellent institution, for it provides a succession of men who have been specially trained by inheritance and by example to do the best for the country that they can.

E. L. B. objects to hereditary honours and powers. He might just as well say that no splendid profits gained by one man in a given age can possibly be of such great and inestimable value as to justify the elevation of its inheritors into any position for which that wealth fits them, no matter what they may turn out to be, as indulge in the grandiose declamation of which this is a mild reproduction, but which the reader will see, and perhaps smile at, on page 43.

If we were to take fitness, and fitness only, as the qualification for being a legislator, as E. L. B. proposes (p. 44), no Irish eviction could create such consternation among the wilds of Erin than such a clearance as E. L. B.'s proposal would induce in both Houses, but especially in the Lower House. It is very well known that the real legislation of the country is done by a few fit spirits, and is merely sanctioned by a crowd of men who trust to them for doing the fit thing at the fit time in the proper way. Besides, it is a fact that for the last two centuries the House of Commons has been almost as hereditary as the House of Lords—the same families as the governing families of England filling the vacancies from time to time with almost as much invariability as the eldest sons of peers step into their fathers' place; and it tends always to

become more so, for these men are trained to fitness for public life, like lords.

E. L. B. has a new project to reform the Lords. He would have an *Advocatus Diaboli* appointed to oppose every new inheritor to a place in the Upper Chamber until he had enumerated all the good deeds of his past life, and atoned for all the evil, and satisfied the bench of judges, or bishops, or somebody or body, or another of his worthiness to inherit the honours as well as the estate of his forefathers. Would he go a step further and make it necessary that every shoemaker's son and tailor's boy should before apprenticeship prove that he is as good a workman as his father, as a preliminary for his taking last in hand, or occupying the shop-board! Do cheesemongers and grocers enter into succession in their father's business only after proving themselves possessed of an hereditary fitness for their peculiar office? Why then nobles? They take their position first, and qualify themselves for it, just as ten thousand ordinary men do—taking in hand the duty that lies nearest to them, which, Carlyle says, is the chief duty of man.

B. M. anticipated that the House of Lords was on its trial. It has stood it wonderfully well. The country has seen its good sense and admired its moderation; and even John Bright has taken it into his head that there may be good in a House of Lords in a country where restless men are always endeavouring to work change for change's sake. B. M. objects to the influence the House of Lords exerts upon the Lower Chamber. It makes the Lower House reflect and discuss, examine and prove, make sure of its footing as the representative of the will of the nation, and explain carefully the reasons which incline it to propose, and, if need be, insist on change! It has even the hardihood to doubt at times the expediency of measures proposed in and carried by the Lower House, and to cast out the bills by which it is designed to enforce the decision of the Commons' House of Parliament! But he surely must see that this is highly advantageous to the country, because it prevents hasty and injudicious legislation, and secures the proper consideration of the question, not only by the Commons but the Crown and the country, for the hesitation of such a body is an evidence that a full case has not been clearly made out.

C. F. A. S. thinks that the Life Peerage would be an improvement. But he surely forgets that the man who has only his own small tenure of life and circumstance, and honour and power to care for, is much more likely being in the House to be an obstructive than one who has the interest and honour of a race to care for. Do not our Bishops and our Law Lords, almost always Life Peers, form its very worst element.

Such are some of the objections to the objections urged by the opponents of the House of Lords, and these being found untenable, prove that a Hereditary House of Legislature is desirable.

A. A. R.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—VI.

It would ill become so useful a magazine as the *British Controversialist* to allow in its debates anything like abuse; and I don't for one moment believe that the Editor would countenance anything of the kind. Consequently, the only natural conclusion one can come to is, that the former part of M. C. N.'s article in the affirmative was allowed to remain unaltered, because the Editor supposed it was the best argument that M. C. N. could adduce. If he had thoroughly thought over the second sentence he has there written, we should not have been troubled with a part, at all events, of his article.

The question seems to me to have been turned topsy-turvy by the writers in the affirmative. They have considered the question as though the people belonged to the Lords, like so many slaves to their slave-masters. No one can doubt the fact, that God made man to live in a state of equality; and those who have risen higher than others in the social scale, can only have done so through being helped up the ascendant ladder by men, whose very offspring have been very often treated with contempt. That a supreme power is requisite in a State is not to be contradicted; but every superior must be chosen by the people, and should act in accordance with their wishes. What such superior authority consists of, and how it is to be formed also rests with the people, and can only continue during their pleasure. At a period in our history it doubtless was considered a prudent thing to have a House of Lords, and that such House should be an hereditary one. With the enlightenment of the age, the opinion has been gaining ground for many years that this was a mistaken notion; and now, every sensible person can understand that the hereditary principle is an erroneous one. People care no longer to be governed by an authority whose origin is traced in the feudal system; whose legislative powers are used more vigorously to serve their own purposes than that of their country; and whose very foundation rests on the maxim of being "sons of their fathers." Such a notion is preposterous, for, as "Georgius" tells us, we might as well expect a man to be a cobbler because his father was a shoemaker, as a peer to be a statesman because his parent was a law-maker. To talk of education and example is all very well; but unfortunately it is no reason for a man being a genius, that his father could put his hands in his pockets all day, or a poet because he went to college. The very men who turn out best at college, are, as a rule, those from the lower classes. Look at the Wranglers' list at Cambridge, and who but hard-working men are year after year at the head. Sometimes it does happen that the son of a peer is a Senior Wrangler; but I believe more often the son of a shoemaker. Then we look at our great poets, prose-writers, &c.:—just glance at the history of a Shakspeare, a Milton, a Cowper, a Johnson, a Burke, a Byron, a

Goldsmith, and many others too numerous to mention; does it follow that their sons were poets, historians, or dramatists? No! I should think it does not follow in any one instance; indeed, it is as a rule far otherwise. The proverb "like father like son," must not be interpreted in this way. Then the hereditary rule is not desirable, but much otherwise; nor is an Hereditary House of Legislature desirable. I cannot think that S. S. was in earnest, when he penned his argument in favour of hereditary engineers, navigators, and newspaper editors. The idea, if used in earnest, is too puerile to be noticed. S. S. boldly strikes out with the assertion, "That an Hereditary House of Legislature is a restraint on the popular love of change, and on the progress of revolutionary principles;" and he goes on to say, that "this restraint is especially valuable at the present time," &c. The popular love of change has produced all the benefits that have arisen from legislation, ever since there has been a parliament. And in how few instances has the populace been wrong in their desire for change? When it has been most strong, then it has been most in the right. This we find especially so in the case of the Anti-Slavery, the Corn Law Repeal, and the Reform agitations. How opposed to all these measures were the House of Lords, but they could not withstand the voice and opinion of the people; they had to disgrace their position by voting under pressure; and although they predicted that evil would be the result, they lived to see the marvellous good which every one of these changes wrought. Although the House of Lords may stop the House of Commons in measures of minor importance, it cannot act as a check on the greater questions of the day. It has boldly thrown out the "Abolition of University Tests Bill," which is a measure of minor importance, but it tottered under an "Irish Church Dis-establishment Bill." Where then is the restraint on the popular love of change?

Then S. S. proceeds with the argument—"If we can succeed—as we believe we can—in showing that our own House of Lords has its important uses, we shall at the same time show that an Hereditary House of Legislature is desirable!" Without noticing the futility of the argument itself, I would just ask whether the arguments on the negative side of this question do not prove that its disadvantages far outweigh its important uses? That it is not an effectual check on the House of Commons has been proved. Looking at this argument, and at another, viz., that it never takes part in making law of a measure that is of vital importance to the country, unless under pressure, I am at a loss to conceive where S. S. will find its important uses so great as its disadvantages.

Then S. S. proceeds to say, that the recent extension of the suffrage renders an Hereditary House of Legislature more and more desirable. But, unfortunately, with the extension of the suffrage, the House of Lords seems to lose its dignity. The first act of an extended franchise is to compel the House to play with its honour by passing a measure to which it is utterly opposed. Another

argument with S. S. and I have done. In reply to E. L. B.'s queries as to eminent men in both Houses, he (S. S.) brings forward an array of great names, and says, "that in the House of Lords, abilities, worth, genius, and patriotism are to be found in as large a measure as in the House of Commons." Did he not see that this argument went against him, for these men were not hereditary peers ; S. S. has chosen the best men he could, and they are not hereditarily entitled to their seats, but owe their eminence to the fact of their having been sent by the people to the House of Commons, and thus gained the first step towards their honourable distinction.

Ph. M. begins with the assertion, that intelligence and power are the governors of nations, and then goes on to say, that the House of Commons, which is really the power of our nation, is not an executive power. If the people are not to rule, who are ? Does Ph. M. think that men are our rulers who owe such title to the fancies and freaks of a King, never respected by his subjects ? We might as well suppose that the descendants of the Twelve Apostles had power to forgive sins. Then Ph. M. goes into the bribery and intimidation question. Overlooking the disgrace that redounds to the House of Lords by this argument, I would just remind Ph. M., that the majority of voters are men who would not sacrifice conscience to any amount of money. Bribery does, undoubtedly, exist in a great degree ; but it has in all probability no member to represent it in the House of Commons, nor would it have however inexhaustible the fund to back it up. Power and wealth could undoubtedly procure representation at one time, but it cannot now, and the dawning of the day is not far distant when purity and honour shall grace our elections, and laws for the prevention of bribery and intimidation shall no longer be required. Every agitation of the people only helps to forward the day, and every opposition by the House of Lords, although it may retard the measures in legislation, will only be counted against it hereafter. By its checking the House of Commons in the disgraceful way that it now does, it does not gain for itself the honour spoken of by the writers in the affirmative, but only opens the eyes of the people to the fact of its cumbersome uselessness, and is gradually educating them in a most effectual way, and in unmistakeable language, to a knowledge of the fact that the House of Lords is an anomaly, and that an Hereditary House of Legislature is not desirable !

S. R. G.

The Essayist.

THE BENEFITS OF OVERCOMING DIFFICULTIES.

ALL men have difficulties, but, generally, each individual has difficulties possessing a distinctive character. It is a stubborn fact, and one which the page of Revelation and the history of every life confirms, that "Man is born to trouble as the sparks fly upwards." No man sails down the river of life and meets with nothing but sunshine and fair weather. There is a tendency in the minds of most men to dislike difficulties of almost every kind, and this dislike often causes him to imagine their existence when there is none. There are many things through which man has to pass; many works which man has to do; many words which man has to say, to which, before he engages in, he applies the name "difficulties," and which he really believes are difficulties; but their seeming difficulty vanishes at the touch of action. Instead of viewing difficulties with the eye of Reason, we are very apt to take their dimensions as seen through the magnifying glass of Fear. The mountain appears impassable, and its ascent impossible, until we begin to tread its steepes, and then we are astonished to find how soon and easily we are at the top. We often look at something we must pass through, which appears exceedingly difficult, but which, though it is a difficulty, is not nearly so great a one as we at first supposed it to be. We can never realize the magnitude of a difficulty, until we have passed through it.

Life, we assert, would not be pleasant without difficulties. A road may be graced with trees that wave over it, and almost meet above our heads; it may be smooth and even, and the most beautiful flowers may breathe their perfume around us, but if it had no bend, in a short time it would become monotonous, and would not be nearly so pleasant as one with a few turnings.

Difficulties make life feel more real. The finest characters are they who are brought out, and who are brightened by difficulties. Men there are who never would have known of what they were capable, nor what powers they possessed, had they not felt the storms of life, and learned to meet and defy difficulties. It is often a great misfortune to be "born with a silver spoon in one's mouth," for those who are so, seldom know what real difficulties are until they have no strength of mind left to cope with them.

That man has difficulties none deny: but we aver that there are

benefits in overcoming them. Do benefits result from them, actual benefits, in any circumstances? Yes, when overcome, benefits accrue from difficulties which scarcely can be valued. We have already glanced at some of the objective benefits, we will now examine some of the subjective ones, the benefits to our character, which arise from difficulties overcome. We speak, of course, of the difficulties which occur to prevent progress in all that is great and good, individually or socially, mentally or morally, and not of difficulties which stand in the way of progress in folly, evil, or sin, which are indeed, although so many, yet too few.

If we allow difficulties to pass, and do not strive to overcome them, we lose not only the benefits that follow from our having overcome them, but also those benefits which tend to improve our minds. To a certain class of minds difficulties are productive of pleasure perhaps, to all minds that are in the habit of overcoming them they are so.

Difficulties are thrown in man's way, physically, intellectually, socially, morally, and religiously,—not to deter him from perseverance in the right direction, not to suffuse his heart with fear and cowardice, but to strengthen him to overcome them, that he may realize the sense of power in his mind and heart. In what other way could man obtain the benefits which difficulties overcome produce? These benefits are of incomparable importance to man, for without them his character would be far from perfect. There are difficulties surrounding man everywhere. Difficulties in business, difficulties in study, difficulties in churches, difficulties in nations, difficulties personal, and difficulties social. Now every peculiar difficulty overcome brings its peculiar benefits. Difficulties in the way of religious progress, when overcome, result in benefits superior to all others; benefits to the mind, considered intellectually, as well as to the soul, and its spiritual aspects. Wherever we find a difficulty, we find the ability, if exercised, of overcoming it. As all have peculiar difficulties, so all have special resources for overcoming them. Every christian knows he has a besetting sin, and that he has a peculiar gift. This besetting sin is a besetting difficulty. If difficulties are allowed to pass without being overcome, the evil effects upon the character are great, if not irreparable, permeating the whole character, greatly detrimental to advance in anything great or good, and giving it a flaccidity and weakness unworthy of man. Whilst a cowardly cringing before difficulties is inimical to all advancement; the man who loves to overcome difficulties has a mind in close propinquity with nobility and greatness. Difficulties overcome produce the formation of the habit of greater concentration and harmony among the mental powers. In general, the same qualities are necessary to overcome all difficulties. Wisdom, strength of mind, courage, hope, and perseverance are required for overcoming a difficulty. Wisdom and knowledge are necessary to understand the difficulty, to see where and how to apply the other qualities; strength of mind to act in the right

way; courage to overcome opposition; hope to cause us to commence and carry on our efforts against them; and perseverance, that we may finish what we have begun. These five qualities when applied to a difficulty, are powerful enough to overcome it. When a difficulty arises, we invariably and involuntarily summon these mental qualities to our aid, and cause them each to act with all its power, coetaneously and harmoniously with the rest. Each quality assists the others; strength is assisted by courage, courage by hope, and hope by perseverance. These five qualities must be indissolubly associated in their attempts, or they never will overcome a difficulty. When a difficulty is being manfully grappled with, we have a fine exhibition of the working of these qualities with spontaneity, harmony, and power. Each quality acting alone could produce but little effect on a difficulty, strength might be applied, but for want of knowledge could never effect anything, so knowledge is useless without strength to act according to its directions; true courage cannot exist without hope, and hope is useless without perseverance. In close study the powers of the mind are called forth simultaneously and harmoniously, and when a difficulty occurs we apply them to it. Now some would have a man study moderately for a long time, but this cannot fail to enervate the mind, but *close* study for a shorter period would tend most decidedly to strengthen it, because all its powers would be exercised at once and concentratedly.

If man had no difficulties, when, it may be asked, would man energetically fix the powers of his mind upon one object, and continue to do so till those powers gained strength? Never; for on what could he so well concentrate his mental powers as on difficulties? Here, then, is one great benefit they afford the mind.

Again, difficulties overcome yield an increase of the strength of the qualities of mind employed. The more any power of the mind is exercised, the stronger it becomes, whether that power be a good or a bad one. As the arm that is often used becomes stronger, so with every element of character and power of mind engaged in overcoming difficulties. The more they are called forth and exercised, all the more powerful they become. As the living body in exposure to the air, and whilst being exercised, strengthens, and as the dead body, the more it is exposed to the air, the more corrupt it becomes; so, the more our minds are used, the stronger they become, and the less they are employed, the weaker.

Having overcome one difficulty, it is easier to overcome the next, still easier to overcome the next, and so on; because the qualities of mind gain strength each time. Knowledge increases; we see the bearings of each difficulty, we see why it is difficult, we remember how we overcame the last difficulty, and can at once apply the knowledge gained. Strength of mind increases the more fully and frequently it is used. It is applied and called forth in, perhaps, its natural way when encountering difficulties. Courage increases very naturally each time a difficulty is overcome, the mind gains

confidence in itself, feels its power, knows its wisdom, and determines that this difficulty also shall be overcome. The greater the number of difficulties that we have overcome, the greater is the hope that this one also will be overcome. This is an imperfect recension of the benefits of overcoming difficulties, and if these be benefits resulting from a seemingly unpleasant companion in the journey of life, we cannot but behold the wisdom and goodness of God in preventing us from walking through the world in a plain and easy path, and in here and there allowing a few obstructions and asperities to be passed, that we may enjoy with greater relish the fruits we may seize when we have passed them. Difficulties fill puny man with true humility; difficulties tend to draw our minds from earth to heaven; difficulties, when overcome, produce habits of mental concentration, and improve some of the noblest qualities of mind. Difficulties are the supports of the mind. Imbecile and weak, nay, perhaps idiotic, would that man become, who either never had, or never overcame difficulties. But to have no difficulties never occurs in the life of any. Many and encouraging are the precedents which the archives of history—history sacred, ancient and modern, as well as personal history—afford of men who have nobly and valiantly overcome difficulties. Let us never allow a difficulty to pass without overcoming it, that we fail not to reap its benefits. It was said in old times that if the gods ever looked down with pleasure on man, it was when they beheld him manfully grappling with difficulties. Many other good and great qualities are often subjunctive to those of the mind that are employed in overcoming difficulties; such have a close relationship to all that is dignified.

Difficulties manfully striven with involve a mind on the environs of nobility, and is generally inceptive of greatness. When we have left this world and gone to another and better one, we will, probably, looking back through the perspective of our lives, raise eternal paeans over the difficulties we have here overcome; for the benefits of overcoming difficulties can only be appreciated fully, as well as enjoyed properly, in that better state.

Liverpool.

J. W. A.

THE *New York Star* has these personals on the New York press: Mr. Bennett is the tallest editor, Mr. Dana the fattest, Mr. Greeley the slouchiest, Mr. Erastus Brooks the solemnest, Mr. Tilton the Shankmarest, Mr. De Nyse the shortest, Mr. Van Buren the reddest, Mr. Roosevelt the politest, Mr. Oakey Hall the wittiest, Mr. Winter the touchiest, Mrs. Stanton the pretties, Miss Anthony the prettiest, Mrs. Sheppard the prettiest, Elnora Kirk the prettiest, Nellie Hutchinson the prettiest.

The Reviewer.

Memoir of Sir William Hamilton, Bart. By JOHN VEITCH, M.A.,
Professor of Logic and Rhetoric in the University of Glasgow.
Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons.

THE battle of the logics has yet to be fought. George Jardine's careful practical training, fitted to awaken thoughtfulness and to discipline the mind by the culture of exercise, although spoken of with considerable disparagement by Whately in his youth,* had yet much to commend it, and had not lost all its acceptance under his successor, Prof. R. Buchanan; nor has it even ceased to influence the traditions and work of the class-room of Buchanan's successor, the author of this memoir of Hamilton. Whately's Aristotelization of common sense, by displacing Aldrich and his herd of imitators, was serviceable, and did a good deal to recall the interests of men to a sense of the existence and possibility of a science of thought. John Stuart Mill's gigantic effort to complete the work of Bacon by producing a logic of induction, capable of doing for science what deduction had done for thought, possesses great and distinct merits. Coleridge's semi-Platonic philosophical dreams of a logic, equally suitable for the guidance and culture of scientific foresight as for expository insight by the inauguration of a mighty method, was suggestive if not productive. Kant's formalizing of all the activities of the intellect and Hegel's all-involving logic both require consideration, and the admission of most of their tenets into a proper and thorough science of the laws of thought. Besides these there are the mathematical formulists, whose claims to recognition under their two great leaders, De Morgan and Boole, are indisputable, and whose competency to add vigour to the logical training of

* "It is said that Sir W. Raleigh gave his bailiff some potatoes, with directions to sow them, having heard of their being cultivated with advantage in America. At the time appointed in his memorandum-book he sent him to collect the produce, and received a handful of the berries. 'Ah, well,' he said, 'I feared they would not do here; go, plough the field and sow wheat.' Now, if this ploughing had not casually turned up the potatoes, he might have written a treatise on the inexpediency of cultivating them. For 'potatoes' read 'logic,' and, *mutatis mutandis*, you have Dr. Jardine's book. He was doubtless right, on being appointed lecturer on a subject on which he was totally and profoundly ignorant, to teach something which he *did* understand; thence, according to the common plan of measuring other men's corn by his own bushel, he concludes that what he cannot understand, or cannot teach, no one else can—that whatever plan he has hit upon was untried before, &c. But he seems, on the whole, to have been a good tutor considering, and though his lectures were likely to give his pupils an extensive superficial and vanity-feeding smattering, they had probably less of this fault than most of those in Scotland."—*Whately*.

thought is, in our day, at any rate, regarded as undeniable. The relations, connections, and oppositions of these with each other, and with the doctrines of Sir William Hamilton, would have made a chapter of most interesting scientific and philosophic matter, which probably no author could so wisely and carefully write as Professor Veitch, whose learning is so thorough, and whose caution in judgment is so remarkable. Then, again, the conflicts between the Aristotelic and Baconian logic; the Cartesian and the Hegelian methods of making thought the interpreter of nature, man, and Deity; the Conservative logic of Waddington-Kastus and of Krause, in contrast with the innovations of the Archbishop of York and of William Spalding, both of the latter holding close relations to the system of Sir William Hamilton, and derived in great part from him, require readjustment. St. Hilaire's Aristotelianism and Lewes's positivism, and indeed the whole relations of the various schools of logic are now much in need of an interpreter and an arbitrator. Few men, we presume, are more competent than Professor Veitch to interpret wisely and arbitrate well. Once more we would say that our times require some exposition of the means by which the science of logic may be made available as a logic of science, and we suggest to Professor Veitch whether he might not supply this deeply felt want.

Among his students and admirers Sir William Hamilton is credited with having laid the philosophical world, in regard to logic alone, under a fourfold obligation:—I. He was the earliest writer who in this country expressly and distinctly determined the precise nature and the exact formal character of logic; and who rigorously constructed his science of the formal laws of inference in entire independence of the matter reasoned about. II. He first specified and explained the precise range, and explicitly stated the principles of logical induction as distinguished from, and yet the counterpart and correlative of, scientific induction. III. He imparted to the syllogistic inference its fullest development by the explicit quantification of the predication (although it will be found, we believe, that independently and contemporaneously Professor De Morgan also elaborated a scheme for the "thorough-going" quantification of the predicate). IV. He was the first who drew out to the most effective and salutary results the law of the necessary correlation of the extension and the comprehension of common terms as determinative of their respective totalities; and so made it possible to harmonize into one logic the inductive and the deductive forms of reasoning. It would have been a good and serviceable thing had Professor Veitch shown in distinct statement what were the actual additions made to logical science by the labours of Sir William Hamilton, and how far they were strictly original additions.

It is well known that Sir William Hamilton's intellect was intensely controversial; so controversial indeed that he almost erected the principle of non-contradiction as the prime factor of his organon of thought. That the intellect should be able to receive

any idea as a truth it seemed to him that it should be incontradictable even in thought, and then when two thoughts were equally contradicible the mind was compelled to accept one as true, and to reject the other as false; for there was, in this case, no *via media*. This, as we apprehend it, is making logic in essence a guide in controversy more than a director in the search for truth. But this exhibits, as we think, his manner of looking at things. He required the spur of opposition to bring him out. His mind acted chiefly under the impulse and influence of contradictoriness. We see this in his determination to outdo the dons in Oxford, in his choice of subjects for his lectures on history, in his critical papers, and even in that which forms the chief attraction in his lectures on metaphysics and logic—his discussions of principles and opinions, no less than his dislike of De Morganism, his estimate of Luther, his opposition to the Free Church, and his contests with the City Council of Edinburgh. Even in the correspondence between himself and Cousin there is constantly present the *ardor controversialis*:—

“They first shake hands before they box,
Then give each other plaguey knocks,
With all the love and kindness of a brother.”

We learn from Professor Veitch far less than we would like to know of that great tournament of athletes—strong, rough, vigorous Professor William Cunningham's controversy with the learned, sinewy, fenceful, and dexterous Sir William Hamilton; the debate on the character of Luther with Archdeacon Hare, and the controversy on the quantification of the predicate with Professor De Morgan, who, in our opinion, had just grounds for animadverting, with a rebuking earnestness, on the tone adopted towards him by Sir William Hamilton. But the keen causticity of the illustrious mathematician gave full return for the warm adroitness of the metaphysician, and a good account of the whole questions between the two strong combatants would be excellent reading. As a biographer, we think that the author would have had a good apology for taking up a capital theme if he had found space for a chapter on “The Controversies of Sir William Hamilton.” The *Mill v. Hamilton*, *Stirling v. Hamilton*, *Benecke v. Hamilton*, *Simon v. Hamilton*, *Fraser v. Hamilton*, *Ferrier v. Hamilton*, are all of later date, and might have been passed over, as they have indeed for the most part been by his biographer; but the cases in which he himself was a combatant might have had a sketch of their nature and results allotted to them.

The narrative given by Professor Veitch of Hamilton's researches is of great interest, and we cannot regret too much that a great controversial nature like that of Hamilton has not given us his portrait of the mighty controversialist of the Reformation.

“Contributions towards a true History of Luther and the Lutherans. Part first: Containing notice of Archdeacon Hare and his Polemic.” . . . At first Sir William appears to have designed, as is manifest from the pro-

pectus already noticed, to go fully into the whole subject of Luther and his opinions, and from 1847, for some years, he resumed his Lutheran studies, which had long had an interest for him, and devoted a great deal of his time to the subject. As usual, however, with him, in formally attempting a systematic work, the subject widened out before him so greatly, and his research became so extended, that it was not brought to an end. He has left a large mass of papers on the subject of Luther and his opinions, carefully arranged under different heads,—the fruit of long and elaborate research. . . . The subject of Luther occupied Sir William's time very much during years. . . . He had a strong impression that the character of Luther had been unfairly represented—that its excellences had been exclusively emphasised and idealized by his admirers, while its defects had been kept in the background. In dealing with the subject, Sir William's honest and ardent desire was to present a picture of Luther that should be historically accurate. And as the balance of exaggeration seemed to him to lie with the admirers of the Reformer, he thought himself called upon, in the interests of historical truth, to present chiefly the other side of the picture. There can be no doubt that any representation of an historical character, such as Luther, that Sir William might present would be distinguished by completeness and great literal accuracy. It is doubtful, however, whether he would make due allowance for exaggeration of statement arising from intensity of conviction; and be able quite to put himself in the position of one whose nature was so little as Luther's, that of the mere scholar and man of thought, and so much that of the ardent worker and practical innovator. The passionate nature of Luther was not one to tarry to weigh statements or balance periods, or reconcile contradictory opinions; it overleaped the barriers of theory, scorned speculative limitations, and found satisfaction only in the substitution of what appeared to be the true and real, for the false and insincere. His work was a moral, not a speculative one, and it was wider and better than any theory he himself ever gave of it. Luther's positions, if occasionally extreme, were adopted, not under the calm inspiration of mere reflective thought, but under the pressure of an antagonistic power, the struggle with which was an issue of life or death. But we shall allow Sir William to speak for himself. The following is an extract from what he appears to have been designed as a preface to the work on Luther. The purpose which Sir William had in view, and his general feeling towards Luther, are at least indicated.

"Under every changeful phasis of opinion, in every country of Germany, Catholic and Protestant, Luther is still the man of the nation. His general intellectual ascendancy is decided. All endeavour, if not to enlist, at least to discern, his authority. In theology, rationalist and supernaturalist both adduce his declarations. In philosophy he is regarded as the emblem of regulated, as of independent, thought. In politics, the conservative and revolutionary appeal, the one to his precept, the other to his example. Nor is his surpassing greatness unacknowledged even in those countries of the empire which have remained constant to the faith which he assailed; and in the Valhalla of Munich, Luther and Arminius stand as the two liberators of Germany from the two dominations of Rome. The painter, in fine, and sculptor venerate in the friend of Cranach, the protector of art, against the iconoclasm of his followers; whilst the Reformer has bequeathed to the musical of all nations, not only its most celebrated religious hymn, but also its most popular convivial catch. Luther, in short, is

to his countrymen what no countryman has been to any other people of Europe. He alone is a one concrete reality, living in the heart of every German; whilst other nations have only at best the precarious memories of dead and jostling abstractions. Luther, in fact, supplies to the people of other countries what they want among themselves; his coarse but characteristic features are familiar to every European; and there is no observer of the Reformation, Catholic or Protestant, from Erasmus to Carlyle, who has not recognised in Luther the veritable hero. Of Luther, indeed, pre-eminently may it be said, with St. Paul, that 'he being dead yet speaketh;' or in the language of Homer,—

'He, he alone from Pluto's silent glades,
Warns wisely back, the others flit as shades.'

Yet it is not so much the doctrine as the doctor that survives and teaches; for of Luther's letters and Luther's spirit we may too truly say, that 'the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.'

"With all his faults and frailties, Luther stands alone in this; he exercised a greater influence over a greater number of his fellowmen than any human agent in the history of the world. . . . No one, indeed, in modern times has ever established so extensive and permanent a glory. . . . No other name is so popular as Luther's, not in Germany only, but in Europe. In Germany, even where the doctrine of the theologian has faded or never flourished, the fame of the man is perennial.

"If the real Luther be lost in a flood of panegyric, he is equally lost in a counter-flood of invective. I know a hundred portraits of Luther the Angel, and a hundred pendants of Luther the Devil; but I know not a single true likeness of Luther the Man. One party seemed to have ignored his real features, another to have been ignorant of them; and yet there they stand, painted in all the vivacity of truth by his own powerful pencil—a pencil more graphic for the inner man than that of his friend Cranach for the outer. No one can know Luther who does not know him in his writings—writings, however, hardly more deserving of study, as reflecting their illustrious author, than as interesting and instructive in themselves. All in all, they are the most engaging of works; and whilst the rapidity with which they were thrown off by Luther, in writing or in speech, is adverse to condensation, a full and fair selection would prove an invaluable contribution to the history of human strength and weakness, that is, to the true history of man. . . . Luther I not merely admire, but love. My love is, however, limited to the real Luther, and him I love with all his faults and weaknesses—nay more, perhaps, that he is no 'monster of perfection.' As to the ideal Luther, angel or devil, for such I care no more than for any other fancy which folly, ignorance, prejudice, or perfidy may engender. I look to truth alone.

"A great deal of time and research was spent by Sir William on Luther. There was much reading, and not a little thinking. The results are given in some thirty parcels of papers, which, if published, would occupy a large volume."

Another labour of love on which Sir William Hamilton toiled, and which we deeply miss, was that of the scholar-poet of the reformation, George Buchanan, the tutor of Montaigne, the friend of Knox, the historian of Scotland, the translator of the Psalms, the castigator of the friars, the master of the Scottish Solomon, and one of

the leaders in the stirring times of Mary; a man whose entire life was a controversy, and whose very nature was that of a debater. We have from Professor Veitch an outline of what he had aimed at and in part done in regard to the character of this gladiatorial scholar, which is enough of itself to grieve us that the constitutional indolence of the great hero of his work had not been further stimulated by a challenge to bring forward something to mark him out as a man of the age.

"The study of Buchanan, which he prosecuted with so much interest at St. Andrews, had begun even in his Oxford days, and was continued during his lifetime. Buchanan was indeed the only favourite author in a line of reading to which he was enthusiastically devoted, and to which, about this time especially, he gave much attention. This was the Latin poetry of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries. Sir William's collection of the poets of this period was both ample and rare, and his acquaintance with them very thorough. There are in the library upwards of two hundred volumes of the modern Latin poets, including individual authors and collected editions. With Buchanan he was particularly conversant. He has left an annotated copy of Ruddiman's quarto edition of his works, which, for the number and quality of the illustrated quotations and references to ancient and modern Latin poetry, is a monument worthy of a classical scholar of the highest distinction. The materials which he gathered, with a view to the life of the poet, were also very ample. These labours were expended in pursuance of the scheme of a complete edition of Buchanan's poems. This work was never finished, but the portion overtaken is very great, and with a little careful revision and superintendence, would, if published, form a valuable contribution to the poetic literature of the period."

"Besides modern Latin poetry, the various points in the theory of Greek and Latin grammar had especial attraction for Sir William; and this study he prosecuted, as usual, with great historical thoroughness. A special nook of the library contains his collection of grammarians, ancient and modern—an exceedingly rare and curious one. His interest in the subject was quickened about 1823, by the ingenious speculations of the late learned Principal Hunter of St. Andrews, which was communicated to the Royal Society of Edinburgh (20th January of that year), and published in its Transactions, under the title of 'Conjectures on the Analogy observed in the Formation of some of the Tenses of the Greek Verb.' Sir William, in two papers read before the same body, reviewed the grounds of Dr. Hunter's opinion, under the title of 'A Theory in regard to the original Approximation of the First and Second Aorists of the Greek Verb.' Coinciding generally in Dr. Hunter's view, he yet criticised, with great learning and acuteness, the steps of the doctor's reasoning in refutation of the hypotheses of other grammarians, and in support of his own doctrine. The papers are characterised by the author's usual nicety of refinement of distinction, and prodigality of reference to authorities."

The following outline of Sir William Hamilton's lectures on history will supply a brief outline of the course of events, and be informing to our readers:—

"The subject which he discussed, after an introduction on the sphere of history and the advantages of its study, was the modern history of Europe down to the outbreak of the French Revolution. This he viewed as commencing with the formation of a system of states connected with each other, on the principle of the balance of power. Accordingly he devoted several preliminary lectures to developing the causes through which, about the close of the fifteenth century, the previously isolated states of Europe came to constitute such a system. Among the causes specified were the decline of feudalism, and the simultaneous rise of towns and of a middle class, the decline of the Papal power, and the concentration of national authority in the hands of the kings. He next proceeded to give an account of the fundamental principles and historical origin of the system of the balance of power, which he compared with two other plans for adjusting international relations, viz:—the theory of a universal monarchy, and the theory of an international confederation and congress. He then entered upon the history which formed the proper subject of his lectures. This he divided into two periods—the first extending from the end of the fifteenth century to the majority of Louis XIV. (1492—1661); the second from the latter date to the commencement of the French Revolution (1661—1789). Regarding the general system of the European states as consisting of a northern and a southern system, during the first period, into four intervals. Under the second of these there were lengthened remarks on the Reformation and its influence. In showing how it acted as a powerful stimulus to the energies of Europe, he stated its effects on the organization of society as follows:—1. A change in the condition of the clergy, and in the relation of the ecclesiastical to the civil authority; (2) That religion now became formally established as a basis of the political constitutions; (3) The extension and consolidation of monarchical authority. He took a general survey of the history of the northern system of states during the first period; and then, proceeding to the second, carried on the history of both systems separately, till about the middle of the eighteenth century, when, by the rise of Prussia, under Frederick the Great, he regarded them as blended into one. The course terminated with an account of Maria Theresa and Frederick the Great, and of the partition of Poland. To the history of each period was annexed an account of the colonies of the different European states. In addition to the above, Sir William was in the habit of giving a short course on the history of European literature, which embraced the following topics:—General characteristics of modern literature as compared with that of antiquity; influence of events on its course; remarks on national literature; history of the literature (chiefly poetry) of Italy, Spain and Portugal, France, England and Scotland, Germany.

"Occasionally, also, he delivered detached lectures on the political economy of the ancients, Aristotle's analysis of the forms of government, the theory of an original civil contract, the political institutions of the ancient Germans, the feudal system, the Papal supremacy; also on the literature of the Middle Ages," &c.

Sir William Hamilton was a discursive, even an omnivorous student,—he had wide interests towards everything that could be known; but he was not, for all that, a model student in his manner of acquiring his conquests over the knowable, still less in his manner of buckling to the doable. His ideas were too persistent, his

intellect was a very sleuthhound in pursuing error, but it was rather the joy of the hunt than the delight of striking down the quarry, and leaving the fields of truth uninfested with the errors he had stricken down, which incited him. Into every nook and recess of thought he peeped and peered, through the brakes and jungles of conflicting opinions he pressed, over the mountain-tops of intellectual life he pursued his way, into the dim caverns of consciousness he descended, and both explored their obscurities and deciphered the characters which experience had written on their walls. He had in truth a "sacred greed" of knowledge, a sateless spirit of inquiry, a special joy in the very means which lead to the accomplishments of ends. His soul was a "curiosity shop" of erudition as well as a magazine of learning. He could attain, and contain, and retain; he could arrange and re-arrange; but to give a final and formal exposition of his knowledge was always a saddening measure with him, as if that had been placing the matter of thought beyond his reach and future activity. He could brood with a miser's care, but did not exhibit with a poet's zeal. The author's account of the repository in which he kept an account of his treasures of reference and thought is tantalizing:—

"Sir William's Large Commonplace Book, the treasure-house of his stores of learning, is a folio of some twelve hundred pages, of which about eight hundred are devoted to psychological and metaphysical topics, and four hundred to logical, to say nothing of the numerous slips inserted between the paged leaves. He had also several smaller commonplace books arranged on less rigid principles. The entries in the large volume are brief statements of general and special heads, with the names of authorities who had maintained the various opinions, and references to their works. There are also pretty frequently statements, more or less extended, of personal opinions. The divisions and subdivisions are planned on principles of exact logical order; so much so, that in the portion devoted to logic itself, we have the skeleton outline of a thoroughgoing and exhaustive logical treatise, with most of the points illustrated by an ample array of opinions and authorities. The book was made up, and bound in black leather, with his own hands; the arrangement, divisions, and subdivisions of the topics were entirely the contrivance of his active and methodical intellect.

. . . This *opus magnum* was his constant companion; in the end it became to him almost an object of affection. It was part of the man, as far as any object that did not participate in his own sentiency could be. Is there any wonder that he prized the old folio, and prized it increasingly as life waned? It was to him the symbol of the unresting energy of his whole life; of physical and mental powers such as are seldom granted to man, spent nobly, ungrudgingly, self-sacrificingly, delightedly. Days, nights, years had poured their contributions into this treasure-house. It was with him when he was young, and his powers went forth in the abounding delight of their first fresh vigour; it carried with it the memories and associations of youth and of manhood down through the declining years of life. Its pages bear the record of a course of reading as varied, inquisitive, and resolute as was ever accomplished by any man in the history of literature or philosophy. There are indications in this folio of the thoughts of

the men of nearly all times and nations, who have risen above the common routine of life to an interest in the great questions of speculative philosophy. In a true, though not a literal sense we may say of him :—

“There is no part of the world of speculation which seems to have been unvisited; no height of Greek or German metaphysics is unscaled; no forest-brake of tangled mediæval logic untrod. Self-reliant, unwavering courage, belief in his work, had sustained him in many a solitary arid track where he had gone, beyond the sight and sympathy of men, in search of the far away fountain-heads of knowledge—as little known or visited as the sources of the Niger or the Nile. And here he had before him the tracings of his explorations. Magician-like, he had but to turn the wizard page of his “Book of Might,” and the forms of the dead of two thousand years rose before his vision; he heard their words and read their thoughts; and what to most men were simply names—the mere shadows of the past—entered with him into living and intelligent communion on every high problem of human interest, on every point of subtle questioning which human thought had pursued for the sake of effort, or had wrestled with for the sake of truth, from the formal niceties of logic to the realities of psychology and metaphysics, the mind, the world, and God.”

Here, however, is our greatest grief just hinted at. What an inestimable treasure would the work proposed have been we can partly guess by the prospectus and the relative extracts contained in the appendices to the “Lectures on Logic.” Had the author nothing more to tell us of this great work and its method, and why it was left in the indefinite magnificence of dreamland, like so many of the schemes of Coleridge.

“In 1846, appended to the edition of Reid’s ‘Works,’ appeared the prospectus of ‘Essay towards a new Analytic of Logical Forms.’ This essay was designed to contain the author’s new logical doctrines, especially the theory of the Quantification of the Predicate, with its developments and results. The prospectus contains the principal heads of the essay. It is to be regretted that Sir William did not carry out his promise, and give a complete and systematic view of his proper logical theory. As it is, we have only fragmentary discussions of certain of the heads indicated in the prospectus, and these, scattered through his various writings,—the appendices to the ‘Lectures on Logic,’ his ‘Letter’ to Professor De Morgan, and the appendices to the ‘Discussions.’”

We have quoted thus largely from these pages from their intrinsic interest, and have in our notice hitherto quite subordinated the author to his hero. This is an injustice which we shall endeavour to repair in a few observations on the character and matter of the work before us, in which we shall direct attention to the skilful touch of the author, and endeavour to show his clear claim to be regarded as a learned and judicious, a sound and an accurate thinker. But this we must adjourn, through considerations of space, till our next. Meantime, let us say emphatically to every book society, young men’s association, and public librarian, as well as to every student of logic—Buy the book; it is readable, reliable, and valuable.

Poetic Critique.

THOUGH a poet is "born, not made," art has almost as much to do in decorating as genius has in creating poetry. Though one of the main ingredients employed in the divine alchemy of the beautiful is passion, yet one of its chief instruments is expression. We must place the genuine gold of thought into the crucible, but we must possess and exercise the artist's patiently acquired skill and carefully trained adroitness before we can produce the pictured poesy which not only glitters like but really is gold. The matter and the form of poetry must be made one. Grandeur of idea must not glare at us through a dull, thin, hazy mist of words, nor can many-coloured vaporous phraseology, through and in which nothing is seen, be regarded as true poetry. Even in clay, of course, the sculptor can display the forms that take being in his imagination, but however fine and exquisite the chiselling may be, in *that* he cannot secure permanency, beauty, and persistent evidence in his skill. Fit genius working fitly on, fit matter alone supplies the true perfectedness of art. And the poet who desires to win the laurel wreath of a permanent fame must, in faith, simplicity, and independence, out of a fervid heart, select and train into a fresh, harmonious, and delightfully new product—

"Thoughts that breathe and words that burn."

The education of a poet may not be conscious; but he must be, however uneducated else, educated to see and feel beauty, to link the inward associations it excites with the expressive phrase which happily brings into being in the soul of another the full, deep, flowing tides of emotive thought. There is a poem written where phrase and idea are so wedded into oneness that you could almost fancy the thought had grown of itself into words possessed of warbling charms. We insist on it, as a prime fact in poetry, that the eye to see, insight, must be possessed and exercised; then comes into operation the realizing imagination, which, under the dominance of the feeling heart, gathers together all the associations which analogy can reach, and moulds, and forms, and fashions the living air into a soul-entrancing "joy for ever," possessed of the "continuance of enduring thought."

This is the high idea of poetry—poetry which, like the sculpture of the Greeks, is god-like in its matter and form. But poetry, like beauty, is an omnipresent thing. All the feelings of humanity bloom into poetry when earnest and enrapt. "The vision and the faculty divine" is with all and in all, and it is by that very pleasure which we have felt in our own lives, being recalled to and

reproduced in us that we love poetry, and delight in the perusal of those masters of emotive thought who have acquired "the accomplishment of verse," our deficiency in which has prevented or withheld us from registering in words of fit beauty the more exquisite of the experiences of life. We believe that the recognition of the true poetry of human feeling, and the constant use of the purifying influences of imagination in every-day existence, would greatly increase the permanent happiness of man, and hence it is that we are ready to aid, by any small critical skill we may possess, those who are endeavouring to add to the perishable delights of experience the nobler fact of poetic expression. We do not claim for those whose verses we lay before our readers the *venerable nomen* of poet, nor do we desire to flatter them, by our publication of those pieces which have been brought under our notice, that they merit the blessings and eternal praise of those who have made us heirs of beauty and of truth in heavenly lays—the poets. We look on our endeavours far more humbly than this. We regard the *Poetic Critique* as an effort to promote the culture of the heart. The heart is the centre and source of poetry. Emotion is its very essence. When, however, we wish to give this emotion an outward being, we must supply it with embodiment, and that must be organized with due regard to the poise and symmetry which shall express, suggest, and communicate the spiritual impulse and emotive power for which we desire to give it existence. We must have sound emotion in sound words if the vital principle of our poetry be healthy:—

"Look how the father's face
Lives in his issue; even so the race
Of Shakspeare's mind and manners brightly shines
In his well-turned and true-filed lines."

So it is with all poetry; it must be the outcome of the mind as a natural product; it may be fostered, but it cannot be forced.

There is a fine full-flowing freedom in the verses we quote first; and although we think that, with greater care, the sameness of the rhythm might have been preserved in the three sections into which the poem falls, the fluency of verse is in excellent harmony with the ideas. We suggest, however, that after the word "*reprieve*" we ought to have two lines explanatory, somewhat to this effect:—

"From the deep-falling forgetfulness that comes on man at last,
When after the weary work of life he is under the grave-clouds cast."

SPRING FLOWERS—HEART'S-EASE.

There's a spirit in each daisy here that whispers songs to me,
Of a robe so pure and a life so sweet that angels smile to see.
There's a glory glowing on each rose, a smile on each bluebell,
That tells to human hearts a tale of Eden ere Eve fell;
And sighs steal softly from the dell, and murmur from the stream,
That break the city-woven spell, the mad gold-gleaming dream:

And the fragrance of each flower that sends to heaven its perfumed praise,
Speaks more of bliss and ecstasy than laurel wreaths or bays,
Or rarest poems of flattery that man to man can give;
For high achievements reap but dust, and short is fame's reprieve.

Is there not a worm at the heart of the flower, and a something that
speaks of decay,
That heightens the blush on the rose's fair leaf, and that brightens the
bleoms on the May?
A sadness that breaks on the beauty of life, and robs from the heart half
its glea,
Like the sham on the wavelet that breaks on the shore, as it tells of the
wrath of the sea?
There is! oh! there is; and no life but can tell of a trouble that holds it in
thrall,
And of gladness that grows from the conscious defeat of a sadness that
preys on the soul;
Of the beauty of life, and the holy resolves that come to the heart's ear-
nest call;
Of the spirit of love that can make earth again like an Eden before the
Fall. [at

There's a flower more fair than violets here, here in the midst of our strife;
And the heart knows its name as Contentment, the flower of the Tree of
Life;
And passion may not come near to *breathe*, and avarice cannot buy [blight
One breath of its priceless perfume, or one hope from its purity;
But little children come and play around *the* tree, and sing [that
Their baby songs about the love of a meek and lowly King.
Humility and penitence come with the *baby* throng. [infant
And feel the heavenly healing power, and hear the spirit song;
And a thankful heart now takes the place of the two-edged sword, to sever
The pangs of the curse of discontent from the soul of true endeavour.
F. G.

The next verses are on a commonplace theme, which from time to time has exercised the pen of the thinker who can scarcely fail to see the analogy in the lapse of a river's waters, and the passing away of that ever-fleeting thing called life. A few touches here and there give evidence of this being a lyric of the heart, and we think that as a minor strain in the holy poetry of common life, it contains some lines of more than ordinary attractiveness and interest. We jot on the margin a few suggestions in emendation of the phraseology employed.

TO MY NATIVE RIVER IN KENT DALE.

In days of happy infancy
Upon *thy* banks I strayed;
With happy spirits, like my own,
Our chains of daisies made.

[Kent's

We sometimes danced upon *thy* marge, [its
Or with some pebbles smooth
Made "ducks and drakes" upon *thy* stream, [its
And tried our skill to prove.
We plucked the *leaves* from hawthorn bush, [fruit
And did for earth-nuts delve,
Or watched to see the stone turn round
When it heard the clock strike twelve.*

In youth I wandered on *thy* banks,
Thou bright and shining river, [O
And little thought how rough the path.
That I should tread—oh, never! [Ah
The scene was bright, and all was fair,
The sun in brilliance played,
And many a ripple on *thy* stream
A *swath* of diamonds made: [wealth
I painted with a magic brush,
In rainbow tints, life's course,
Ne'er thought of falsehood in a friend,
Of sorrow or remorse. [Man's

But years passed by, and I once more
Beheld thee, shining river;
Thou wert the same, but I was changed,
Alas! how changed! for ever.
The fairy visions of my youth
Hath faded from my view, [Had
And memory but too sadly told
How *all* had proved untrue. [hope

More years had fled when I again
Upon *thy* margin strayed,
My step was slow, my hair turned grey;
I these reflections made:—
Thou in the mighty ocean pour'st
Thy tributary stream,
Unconscious *thou* of time or tide, [all
Or of life's fitful dream;
For thou hast no account to give
If *in* a useless rill [as
Thy wasted waters flow away,
And follow wayward will.
But man must answer for each word,
For all his misspent time,
His wasted talents, evil thoughts,
His *folly* and his crime. [follics, sins, and

* A Westmoreland superstition about a stone in Kent Dale.

Now, aged matron, ask thyself [Kentsman

"What then may be thy doom,
When the shrill trumpet's awful blast
Awakes thee from the tomb?"

My answer is—I humbly trust

To approach God's glorious throne,
With millions of redeemed souls

As guilty as my own.

[Christ-saved to see God's
Midst
Once

In *Olaf's* "Summer Holiday" we have a semi-ballad of exceedingly fair plot, scope, and interest. Simple, plain, yet possessing the charm of expressiveness as well as the delight of passion; it is a well-worked incident, and is of the best school of modern poetry—that which seeks to adorn the common life of man with the pure essence of emotion as poetry. We think the verses are worth polishing, and we hope *Olaf* will not think that we have been exercising any unkindly thought towards him, though we have here made marginal suggestions, of which it is scarcely likely he will approve. He may rest assured that if we had not wished to show our good-will and admiration, we should only have passed the verses with praise; and so at once have gratified him, saved ourselves trouble and thought, and left our readers without a lesson in regard to a critic's obtuseness and a poet's skill.

A SUMMER HOLIDAY.

Oh, she was fairer than a poet's dream,
To flowers and stars akin;

I was a toiler where the giant, Steam,
Sweats 'mid the city's din.

Behind a crowd of suitors I, fond fool,
Adored her from afar;

My heart contained her, as contains a pool
The image of a star.

One holiday a steamer's deck I paced,
With fevered, burning brow;

She, in a simpering rival's arm encased,
Sat whispering at the prow.

Quick smiles and blushes told me she believed
The flatterer by her side,

As if with sighs of deep despairings heaved
The bosom of the Clyde.

His love, a tiny brook 'mid blooming heath,
Breathed out its murmurous hum;

Mine, like the lordly stream that flowed beneath,
In its great depth was dumb.

There rose a cry, "A lady overboard!"
 I knew that floating hair;
 I gazed into the bright eyes of *her* lord, [sought—her bosom's
 And nought but fear was there.

Thinking how passing sweet it were to die
 For her dear sake, I leapt
 Into the foam. A mighty wind, her cry
 Through all my being swept.

Oh, never diver fetched so rich a pearl;
 Oh, fair drenched form divine!
 The beauty of the wild sea-nymphs, my girl,
 Is all eclipsed by thine.

I gave her up—her glorious hair a-drip;
 But not before I pressed
 One lingering kiss upon her *briny* lip. [brine-moist
 I scarce *can* tell the rest. [dare

She said she never could me fully thank
 (One smile would have sufficed!)
 Murmured that manhood more than wealth or rank
 Was what she loved and prized.

I swore I'd range the deep, although it were
 A sea of boiling fire,
 If only it would tend to further her [that
 Most trivial desire.

Like gleams of sunshine o'er an April sky
 Her colour came and went;
 In thunder-showers of passionate pleadings my
 Long-stifed love found vent.

I won the softest "Yes," and then there gleamed
 A dew in downcast eyes:
 The sun, low on the western waters, seemed
 The gate of paradise.

* * * * *

And since that day when first I called her "wife,"
 We two have sailed one way;
 The world has been a quiet stream, and life
 A summer holiday.

OLAF.

(To be continued.)

Our Collegiate Course.

THE BARD.

A PLEASANT ODE.

BY THOMAS GRAY.

II. 3.

Fill high the sparkling bowl,
The rich repast prepare;
Reft of a crown, he yet may share the feast!
Close by the regal chair,
Fell Thirst and Famine scowl

80

Fill to the brim the glowing wine-cup, make ready the costly convivial entertainment; though the sovereign has been forcibly deprived of his power, yet may he still delight his soul with the dainties of life. Beside him on the kingly seat terrible Thirst and fearful Hunger lower upon their

(77) "This stanza (as an ingenious friend remarks) has exceeding merit. It breathes, in a lesser compass, what the ode breathes at large, the high spirit of lyric enthusiasm. The transitions are sudden and impetuous; the language full of fire and force; and the imagery carried without impropriety to the most daring height. The manner of Richard's death by famine exhibits such beauties of personification as only the richest and most vivid imagination could supply. From thence we are hurried with the wildest rapidity into the midst of battle; and the epithet *hundred* places at once before our eyes all the peculiar horrors of civil war. Immediately, by a transition most striking and unexpected, the poet falls into a tender and pathetic address; which, from the sentiments, and also from the numbers, has all the melancholy flow, and breathes all the plaintive softness of elegy. Again the scene changes; again the Bard rises into an allegorical description of carnage, to which the metre is admirably adapted; and the concluding sentence of personal punishment on Edward is denounced with a solemnity that chills and terrifies."—*Mason*.

(80) "Close by" meaning *near to*, as "fast by" does in Milton's "Paradise Lost," i., 12.

(81) *Scowl* is generally an intransitive verb, signifying to look frowningly at, but it is employed here as a transitive one, and governs *smile* in the objective case; compare—

"The lowering element
Scowls o'er the darkened landscape, *snow* or *shower*."

"Paradise Lost," ii., 490.

The only instance in which that word is used by the poet.

A baleful smile upon their baffled guest.
 Heard ye the din of battle bray,
 Lance to lance, and horse to horse ?
 Long years of havoc urge their destined course,
 And through the kindred squadrons mow their way.

85

defeated companion at the table with a deadly sign of contemptuous joy. Did ye hear the resounding noise of war burst clamorously upon the air ? saw ye spear set in rest against spear, steed driven hotly against steed, and a great number of years of dismal contentions and deadly fight pass along their foreordained pathway before your eyes ; and cut down, as with a scythe, battalions of men of one nation, and of the same blood ?

(82) Compare Milton's "Paradise Lost," ii., 845 :—

"Death
 Grinned horrible a *ghastly smile* ;"

and i., 56—58 :—

"Round he throws his *baleful eyes*,
 That witnessed huge affliction and dismay,
 Mixed with obdurate pride and steadfast hate."

"Baffled," from French *bafouer*, to *befool*, jeer, overcome.

(83) Compare Milton's "Paradise Lost," vi., 406—408 :—

"Now Night o'er heaven
 Inducing darkness, grateful truce imposed,
 And silence on the odious *din of war*."

So Milton, "Paradise Lost," vi., 209 :—

"Arms on armour clashing, brayed
 Horrible discord."

(85) Havoc, from Welsh *hafog*, destruction.

(86) These four lines refer to the Wars of the Roses between the houses of York and Lancaster, during which the following battles were fought, viz., St. Alban's, 22nd May, 1455, Henry VI. and Richard Plantagenet ; Blore Heath, 23rd September, 1459, Earl of Salisbury and Lord Audley ; Northampton, 10th July, 1460, Henry VI. and the Earl of Warwick ; Wakefield Green, 30th December, 1460, Queen Margaret and Richard Plantagenet ; Mortimer's Cross, 2nd February, 1461, Jasper Tudor, Earl of Pembroke, and Edward, eldest son of Richard Plantagenet ; St. Alban's, 19th February, 1461, Queen Margaret and the Earl of Warwick ; Tewkesbury, 29th March, 1461, Warwick (along with Queen Margaret and Henry VI.) and Edward IV. ; Hedgely Moor, 25th April, 1464, Queen Margaret and Lord Montague ; Hexham, 15th May, Queen Margaret and Lord Montague ; Barnet, 14th April, 1471, Warwick and Edward IV. ; Tewkesbury, 4th May, 1471, Queen Margaret and Edward IV. ; Bosworth Field, 22nd August, 1485, Henry Tudor, afterwards Henry VII., and Richard III. This fatal struggle for supremacy between the Houses of York and Lancaster, which lasted thirty years, was signal-

Ye towers of Julius, London's lasting shame,

O ye stately prison-palace fortresses, which have been for ages a disgrace

ized by the twelve pitched battles noted above, besides several minor encounters. It has been stated that these wars almost annihilated the old nobility, and that they cost the lives of two kings, one prince, ten dukes, two marquises, twenty-one earls, twenty-seven lords, two viscounts, one lord prior, one judge, one hundred and twenty-three knights, four hundred and fifty-one esquires, and eighty-four thousand nine hundred and ninety-eight private soldiers.

Squadrons, from Latin *quadratus*, square, Italian *squadra*, a body of troops drawn up in a square.

(87) To this line Gray appended the following note :—"Henry the Sixth, George, Duke of Clarence, Edward the Fifth, Richard, Duke of York, &c., believed to be murdered secretly in the Tower of London. The oldest part of that structure is vulgarly attributed to Julius Cæsar." While referring for full information on this subject to Mr. Hepworth Dixon's work, "*Her Majesty's Tower*," the following citation will be found corroborative of the sentiment of the Bard :—"The Tower is the very germ of London. How many shadowy recollections arise as we contemplate the timeworn walls, the slight elevation of the ground, and the modern reparations! Here, at least, tradition informs us, was a stronghold of the Britons; here have been found traces of the Romans; here, no doubt, was a Saxon broch or castle; and here yet exist the fortifications of the early Normans. . . . From the earthen mound with its timber palisades of Trinobantium, or Troynovant, have alike extended the city of Kingland, and the endless miles of streets which now form the immense town of London, while the Tower remains the oldest monument of the kingdom. The earliest historical description of the Tower, that of Fitz-Stephen, who died in 1191, has something striking amidst its brevity. 'It (London) hath on the east part a Tower Palatine, very large and very strong, whose court and walls rise up from a deep foundation. The mortar is tempered with the blood of beasts.' There is no real connection between the fabulous blood-tempered mortar of the old monkish writer and the subsequent history of the Tower of London. Yet when we think of that history, how appropriate does it seem that the very foundations of those walls should be laid in blood! Fitz-Stephen was nearer than we are to the period when those foundations were laid, by almost seven centuries; and yet he tells us not *who* laid them. Tradition says Julius Cæsar; and poetry is the step-nurse of the children of tradition :—

'Ye towers of Julius, London's lasting shame.'

Why does the poet himself tell us, in a note on his well-known line, that the oldest part of the tower is *vulgarly* attributed to Julius Cæsar? He had authority enough for his apostrophe to the towers of Julius, even if the belief of the vulgar were not sufficient basis. Stow, who endeavours to depreciate the value of its traditional history, tells us, 'It hath been the common opinion, and some have written (but of none assured ground) that Julius Cæsar, the first conqueror of the Britons, was the original

With many a foul and midnight murder fed,
 Revere his consort's faith, his father's fame,
 And spare the meek usurper's holy head!

90

to London (the great metropolis), gorged with a plenteous feast of dark and dreadful crimes against human life, have respect to the fidelity of a sovereign's wife, the renown of his father, and show mercy to the sacred head

author as well thereof as also of many other towers, castles, and great buildings within this realm.' 'Deeply interesting as the Tower appears from whatever point of view we look upon it, all other matters sink into comparative insignificance, besides its pre-eminently distinctive feature, the state prison of England. Were it possible, indeed, to strip it of every other association, not the less would it remain one of the most interesting buildings in the world. It is useless to speak of single names and single incidents. The tower could spare a score of these each important enough to immortalize any locality, without sensible diminution of its wealth. Kings, queens, statesmen, patriots, philosophers, poets, martyrs, form the almost unbroken line of illustrious captives for some five or six centuries. There is scarcely a single great event of our history wherein this terrible edifice does not appear looming in the distance. It would be hardly possible to find one ancient family of distinction to which the Tower had not bequeathed some fearful and ghastly memories. But these remarks refer only to the known, the recorded history. If we could learn the unknown! When we reflect on the partial and occasional glimpses which have been afforded into the depths of those gloomy dungeons which still meet the eye of the stranger, tell their fearful secret in their lowering aspect, when we read the plainest matter-of-fact descriptions of such places as the Little Hell, or the Rat's Dungeon, the imagination recoils with horror at the thought of what must have met the eye, at almost any period of the earlier history of the Tower, could the entire building have been suddenly unroofed, and its secret recesses laid open to the broad day! No refinement of physical cruelty ever devised by fiction, but has here had its prototype in reality; no mode of mental suffering that has not here exhibited itself; and, we may add, no heights of human fortitude that have not been reached by the occupants of those earth-buried cells.'—*Knight's Pictorial Cyclopædia of London*, pp. 147, 165.

(90) "The meek usurper" is Henry VI., whom Gray in his "Installation Ode" speaks of as a *murdered saint*, and whose "holy shade," he states in his "Ode on a Distant Prospect of Eton College," "grateful science still adores." This epithet, which is also applied to him by Shakspeare, in "Richard III.," i, 2,—

"Poor key-cold figure of a holy king,
 Pale ashes of the House of Lancaster!"

is peculiarly suitable to a monarch who (though never actually canonized) "would," it has been said, "have adorned a cloister though he disgraced a crown." "Constitutional writers are agreed that though Richard's hereditary right was preferable to that of Henry, the latter was, unquestionably, lawful monarch of England, seeing that he held the crown by virtue of repeated parliamentary enactments, confirmed by the general consent of the

Above, below, the rose of snow,
Twined with her blushing foe, we spread ;

of the unassuming wearer of the crown, even though his right to it might be doubted. We place on either side of our web the pale rose of the Lan-

nation, and by the oaths of allegiance taken by the members of the rival family."—*J. C. Curtis's "Chronological and Genealogical Tables illustrative of English History,"* p. 4.

In the preceding line reference is made to his "father," Henry V., the victor at Agincourt, to whose "fame" Shakspeare devoted a noble play ; and to his "consort," Margaret of Anjou, whose "faith" was tried in so many contests, and of whom, as well as of "the meek usurper," Shakspeare has given us such a continuous chronicle in the three parts of Henry VI.

Usurper, from Latin *usurpo*, one who seizes upon and holds anything which belongs of right to another, by public acquiescence, law, or custom.

(92) "The wars of the roses were so called because the heraldic badges of the rival Houses of Lancaster and York were respectively a red and a white rose. On the dethronement of Richard II., Edmund, Earl of March, great-grandson of Lionel, Duke of Clarence, third son of Edward III., was entitled to the crown ; but his pretensions were passed over in silence, and Henry IV., son of John of Gaunt, fourth son of the same monarch, was acknowledged king. He, as well as Henry V., swayed the sceptre without opposition ; and the Lancastrian dynasty was so well established, that the accession of Henry VI., an infant of a few months old, was fully acquiesced in ; and though this prince, on reaching manhood, proved to be very feeble in character, it was not till his reign had lasted for nearly thirty years that his right was called in question."—*J. C. Curtis's "Chronological and Genealogical Tables of English History,"* p. 5.

Shakspeare has most felicitously created a scene interpretative of the origin of these badges. In the Temple Gardens, London, it is proposed that those who were loath to speak upon the nice sharp quillots of the law, should, "in dumb significants," proclaim their thoughts. Richard Plantagenet says,—

"Let him that is a true-born gentleman,
And stands upon the honour of his birth,
If he suppose that I have pleaded truth,
From off this briar pluck a white rose with me."

Then Somerset instantly rejoins,—

"Let him that is no coward nor no flatterer,
But dare maintain the party of the truth,
Pluck a red rose from off this thorn with me ;"

and after an able acrimonious strife of tongues, Warwink foretells,—

"This brawl to-day,
Grown to this faction in the Temple garden,
Shall send, between the red rose and the white,
A thousand souls to death and deadly night."

The bristled boar in infant gore
Wallows beneath the thorny shade.

Now, brothers, bending o'er the accursed loom, 95
Stamp we our vengeance deep, and ratify his doom.

III. 1.

Edward, lo! to sudden fate
(Weave we the woof. The thread is spun)

Half of thy heart we consecrate.
(The web is wove. The work is done.) 100

"Stay, oh stay! nor thus forlorn
Leave me unblessed, unpitied here to mourn;

castrians, and the crimson one of the Yorkists, while we represent the hirsute wild hog rolling itself about in the blood of children under the briar bush on which these roses grew. At this moment, comrades, crouching round the fated loom, let us impress on its product our souls' harshest desires for retaliation, and bind ourselves by a mutual oath to this as king Edward's destiny.

Behold, Edward! (the web is ready, and we are working it into a tissue), we devote the wife of thy love to an early death. (The texture is ready, our labour is ended.)

Stop, O stop, nor so sadly forsaken as this, desert me, uncomforted and sorrowful to lament in this place my luckless fate; in that far-off resplen-

(93) "The bristled boar" refers to Richard III., whose badge was a silver boar; and the "infant gore" alludes to—

"The tyrannous and blood act, . . .
The most arch-deed of piteous massacre,
That ever yet this land was guilty of,"—

the murder in the Tower of his two nephews, Edward V. and Richard,—

"The most replenished sweet works of Nature
That from the prime creation e'er she framed."

(94) Wallow, from Saxon *wealowan*, German *weizen*, to roll the body about. Jer. vi. 26, "Wallow thyself in ashes."

(96) Ratify, from French *ratifier*, Latin *ratum* and *facio*, to confirm by solemn oath.

(99) "Half of thy heart." Horace has "*animæ dimidium meæ*." Eleanor of Castile, first consort of Edward I., who, on her husband having been stabbed with the poisoned dagger of a Mahometan assassin, had sucked, according to a Spanish writer's statement, the venom from the wound. She died at Hornby, in Lincolnshire, 28th November, 1291, and Edward ordered a cross to be erected to her memory wherever her corpse had rested thence on its way to Westminster to burial,—Waltham, St. Alban's, Dunstable, &c., and lastly at Charing Cross (*la chère reine*), in the centre of what was then a rustic hamlet between London and Westminster.

In yon bright track, that fires the western skies,
 They melt, they vanish from my eyes.
 But oh! what solemn scenes, on Snowdon's height 106
 Descending slow, their glittering skirts unroll?
 Visions of glory, spare my aching sight!
 Ye unborn ages, crowd not on my soul!
 No more our long-lost Arthur we bewail.
 All hail, ye genuine Kings! Britannia's issue, hail! 110

dent pathway which causes the heavens where the sun is setting to flame out so brilliantly, they fade away, and disappear from before my sense of vision. But, ah me! how sadly serious are the revelations of the future, which, as they gently fall upon the cliffy peaks of Snowdon, their bright flowing garments disclose to view! Scenes of brilliancy, have mercy upon my eyeballs stretched to painfulness. Ye revelations of the future, gather not thus rapidly together upon my spirit. We shall not hereafter lament our king Arthur for such a period concealed from us. O ye true monarchs, offspring of the Cymry, welcome, welcome!

(109) Arthur, a British chieftain and hero, who opposed the Saxon invasion of Wales in the fifth and sixth centuries, one of the most celebrated personages of the semi-fabulous period, extending from the departure of the Romans to the institution of the Heptarchy, whose fame is embodied in popular traditions and early romances. The Arthurian legends are manifold. One prevalent among the Welsh was that king Arthur was still alive in Fairy-land, and would return thence to reign again over Britain; and this fond hope long served to soothe the pains of exile or the degradation of bondage. A complete list of Arthurian romance forms an appendix to Sharon Turner's "History of the Anglo-Saxons."

Henry VII. named his eldest son Arthur, in deference to the legends of the Welsh concerning the hero of the Round Table.

(110) The Tudors, that family of Welsh extraction which occupied the throne of England 1485—1603, descended from Owen Tudor (the Welsh for Theodore), who ingratiated himself with Catherine of Valois (widow of Henry V.), who, after a private marriage, bore two sons to him. Henry VI. acknowledged these sons, Edmund and Jasper, as legitimate, and conferred on the former the earldom of Richmond, on the latter the earldom of Pembroke. Richmond married Margaret Beaufort, daughter and heiress of the Earl of Somerset, and they had issue a son, Henry, whom the Lancastrians invited to oppose Richard III. He married Elizabeth of York, and so united in "fair conjunction" "the white rose with the red."

Both Merlin and Taliessin had prophesied that the race of—

"Uether's son (Arthur),
 Begirt with British and Armoric knights,"

should re-achieve the sovereignty of Britain, and this appeared to have received accomplishment by the accession of the House of Tudor.

The Societies' Section.

NATIONAL EDUCATION.

A MEETING of the St. George's Reform League was held Sept. 9th, in the rooms of the Mutual Improvement Society, Great Russell Street, Birmingham. The subject discussed was "National Education." The chair was taken by Mr. James Whateley, who opened by remarking that the question before them was the most important that could occupy their minds at this moment. The working classes had now immense power in their hands; and that they might be able to use it justly, wisely, and beneficially for themselves and others, they should be educated.—Mr. Barnett made a telling speech, in which he advocated a national education, free, unsectarian, and compulsory.—Mr. A. Taylor, a working man, said the question of primary education is one of the foremost that will be submitted to Parliament. A man has two distinct relationships to the State,—one comprehends his duties as a citizen, and in that relation he ought to be wholly subordinate to the State. The other comprehends all his functions as a producer and enjoyer of wealth, and in that the State should leave him at perfect liberty. It is the duty of the State to provide education to fit a man for citizenship. Now a man might be summoned to sit on a jury, and to give an opinion upon a difficult point of law, while he could not properly understand the nature of an oath, or read any printed matter that might be set before him. The object of the State should be to maintain the great principle that the will of the majority declared in the form prescribed by the Consti-

tution is the rule which all must obey. It was then clearly the duty, as well as the interest of the State, to take care that that will should be intelligent. It was a lamentable thing that in this country there were so many instances of enormous individual wealth opposed to the most abject poverty, the highest intellectual cultivation side by side with the grossest ignorance and the darkest superstition. The only cure for those evils was education, and the only way to make education universal was for the Government to provide the rudiments of knowledge and make it compulsory on the people to acquire them. But here they were met by an outcry against interference with the liberty of the subject. He would answer that our whole existence was a series of compulsions. Not only the eternal law, but human law, worked by compulsion; we are fenced in by it on all sides. Individual liberty must in all cases be made subordinate to the good of the community. Ignorance deprived the country of a vast amount of that intellectual power which lay latent in its citizens. In the words of a great Englishman—"That there should one man die ignorant who had capacity for knowledge, that I call a tragedy, were it to happen more than twenty times in the minute, as by some computation it does." Thousands of children are now brought up under such conditions, that to be unhealthy, vicious, criminal, and unhappy are the only results which can follow. Let them look at the reports of the Birmingham Education Aid Society; they

ought to be known to every intelligent man. After reading the facts there disclosed, it was impossible to avoid coming to the conclusion that compulsory education was the only method which could be applied with success. The religious bodies, so far from opposing this, should be the first to uphold it, for if religion was worth anything, it would be better received by an intelligent people than by a coarse and ignorant rabble. He would say that any system of religion that had to fear education was altogether worthless, and the sooner it was swept away the better. Did God rest His great truths upon so frail a basis that the intellect of man could disturb them? Godless education! Of all rubbish ever uttered in the world surely that was the greatest. True religion would never suffer from the spread of education; but there was danger that priestly power and parsonic pretensions would not remain unquestioned; that much ecclesiastical rubbish and spiritual cobwebbing would be swept away, because men would come to understand that middlemen and foggers were not at all necessary in religious matters. He had been much struck with the following passage from the speech of the King of Prussia on the opening of the Prussian Parliament:—"My Government devotes unceasing care to the development of the popular schools, and confidently expects your approval of the bills which relate to the position of those schools and their teachers." He hoped that he might live to see some such words form part of the Queen's speech at the opening of the British Parliament. We had now noble free libraries and news-rooms, and opportunities for the acquirement and extension of knowledge such as never existed before. Why, then, should one-half of our people grovel in the darkness of

ignorance? He would appeal to those present who were parents to resolve that their children should not be suffered to grow up without the means of instruction, or to become in their turn parents of children who like ~~the~~ would have to wallow in the mire of ignorance. Let them be determined to battle as manfully for their social and moral as for their political regeneration, and take no rest until it was accomplished, so that none, however destitute, shall be forced to drudge through weary life without the aid of intellectual implements and tools—a savage horde among the civilized—a servile band amidst the lordly free. This address was listened to with the greatest interest and frequent expressions of approval, and at its conclusion a hearty vote of thanks was passed to Mr. Taylor and Mr. Basnett.—Mr. Taylor, in responding, took occasion to recommend strongly that those present who desired a national system of education should support the National Education League—whose programme was bold yet moderate, and seemed well calculated to effect the object in view.

Whitworth Scholarships.—The following is a list of the successful candidates, with their ages, occupations, and the number of marks they obtained, who have been reported to the Science and Art Department as entitled to the ten Whitworth scholarships of £100 a year each:—William H. Greenwood, aged 23, engineer, student at the Mechanics' Institution, Manchester, 143 marks; Thomas A. Hearson, aged 23, engineer, student, Royal Naval School of Architecture, 137 marks; John Hopkinson, B.Sc., aged 19, student at Cambridge University, 134 marks; Thomas S. Elgood, aged 24, me-

chemical engineer, Leicester, and Owen's College, Manchester, 127 marks; George A. Greenhill, aged 21, student at Christ's Hospital School and Cambridge University, 116 marks; John E. Brittle, aged 23, engineer, student at Sir Walter St. John's School, Battersea, 113 marks; Thomas W. Philips, aged 23, student at British School, Mill-

wall, and Royal College of Science, Dublin, 100 marks; Richard Bennett, aged 21, engineer, student at the Royal School of Naval Architecture, 98 marks; Robert B. Buckley, aged 21, engineer, student at Merchant Taylors' School, 97 marks; Charles E. Leeds, aged 23, B.A. (Oxon.), student at Oxford University, 96 marks.

Literary Notes.

J. P. COLLIER announces the discovery of an edition of Marlowe's "Hero and Leander," containing an additional *scotiad*, and an earlier imprint than has hitherto been known of Chapman's continuation.

Charles Dickens is writing a memoir on the religious opinions of the late Rev. C. H. Townsend.

A new literary chronicle and review, to be named *Les Bleus*, is advertised.

Of Darwin's "Origin of Species" there have appeared 10 English editions, 5 German, 2 French, 2 Russian, 2 American, 1 Italian, and 1 Dutch—amounting to about 38,000 copies.

Edwin Arnold has issued a new work on "The Poets of Greece."

The founders, augmenters, and benefactors of the British Museum are to be celebrated by Edward Edwards.

George Harris, author of "Civilization as a Science," has nearly ready a "Theory of the Arts."

Readers who delight in the curiosities of literature and can read French will be glad to hear M^{rs}. Brunet and Jannet are issuing a Dictionary of Anonymous Productions, and, as far as possible, revelations of the writers.

M. Alaux, in his "Progressive

Religion," has given some excellent sketches of men and matters connected with the development of Catholic Christianity.

A biography of Cobden has appeared at Bremen.

Adolf Strodtmann has finished his provisional biography of H. Heine.

General T. Ferronet Thompson, one of the leaders of free thought in politics, author of "The Corn Law Catechism," and many other contributions to Political and Social Reform, died 11th inst.

James Watts, keeper of the printed books in the British Museum, and author of several works of merit in relation to the literature of the north of Europe, died 9th ult.

W. O. Hazlitt is preparing for the Roxburgh Library editions of "The Poems of George Gascoigne" and the works of his own name-predecessor, "Carew."

A literary undertaking of vast extent has been projected by a society of *savans* in Paris, having for its object the reproduction of all the masterpieces of literature which have appeared in ancient and modern times among the various leading nations of the world. The title of the work is the "Bibliothèque Internationale Universelle," and it is to consist of some 200 volumes in

large octavo, to be issued at the rate of two volumes each month, at an unprecedentedly low price to subscribers. The works reprinted are to be in the best French translations, and are to appear on a prescribed plan, in order to show how primitive ideas have been developed into organised forms, and how these have undergone transformations and produced reactions upon spheres beyond their own. The French Government has recognised the importance of the work, and has approved its publication, and men of the highest standing in science, literature, and art have promised their co-operation.

Mary Russell Mitford is to have her interesting life and her extensive correspondence brought before the public by A. L'Estrange.

Wm. Jerdan, the veteran of literature, has in preparation a memoir, to be prefixed to an edition of "The Remains of Samuel Lover."

Principal Tulloch's contributions to the *Contemporary Review*, &c., are to be reproduced as "Sketches of the History of Religious Thought in England in the Seventeenth Century."

"The Relations of the Sciences to one another, and to Philosophy, Religion, and Morality," by Professor R. Flint, is promised at an early date.

"A Life of George Puttenham, to whom the authorship of 'The Arte of English Poesie' (1589?)", recently issued among Edward Arber's excellent English Reprints, has been attributed without much satisfactory evidence, is employing the attention of Mr. Yeowell.

Mr. Edward Viles is about to reprint "The Historie of Macbeth" from the first edition of Holingshead's "Chronicle," with the parallel paragraphs from Shakespeare's *Macbeth*, and other notes; but we think W. S. Dalglish has ahead; published *Macbeth* with

Holingshead's "Historie" prefixed, which is surely a better idea.

A professorship of the History of Poland has been instituted at Cracow by the Emperor of Austria.

Toulmin Smith, writer on Economics, Social Science, &c., died 1st May.

A Life of Father Paul Serpi, historian of the Council of Trent, from original sources and MSS., is promised by A. G. Campbell.

A complete cheap edition of "The Works of Thomas Hood," the humorist, in a handy form, with the author's original illustrations, is in progress.

Charles Lamb has not lost his hold on the reading public; Messrs. Bell and Daldy have sold over 45,000 of their complete edition of "Elia and Eliana."

In the "Life of Keble," by Sir John Coleridge, regret is expressed that the important letters which had passed between the poet and his friend, Richard Hurrell Froude, had disappeared, and, though a rigid search had been instituted, could not be found. The *John Bull* says that the letters have unexpectedly been discovered.

What had been thought to be Timour's library has not, after all, been discovered in the India House. Professor Amouney reports that they were part of the library at Beejapoor, and fell to us on the lapse of the Sattara State. They consist of 490 volumes, of which twenty-five are in Persian and the rest in Arabic, twenty being poetry, seventy history, and most of the rest theology. Several of them are author's copies of old Mohammedan works, the oldest bearing date 1183; and one, the "Talwih of Taftāsani," dated 1356, is believed to be the author's manuscript. They are a valuable addition to the great India Office Library, but of far less interest than was believed.

Modern Metaphysicians.

THE LATE

RIGHT REV. RENN DICKSON HAMPDEN, D.D.,
LORD BISHOP OF HEREFORD.

The Relations of Scholastic Philosophy and of Christian Theology.

"It is a piece of negligence to stop short of convincing ourselves, by the aid of thought, of that to which we have given credence."—*Anselm*.

"Truth can never be confirmed enough,
Though doubts did ever sleep."—*Shakspeare*.

THE pursuit of Truth is not only one of the chief duties, but also one of the highest interests of man. Only as he attains to truth does he gain the power of being happy, or of bestowing happiness. The whole progress of man depends on his discovery of and his attention to the truth of things and thoughts. The deeper, the more profound, and the more intense man's faith is in that which is untrustworthy, the more exposed is he to pain and wretchedness. New beliefs arise along with every improvement man aspires to accomplish, and however closely and lovingly error may be clasped to the heart it must be a betrayer, and the possibilities of being undeceived regarding the falsity of our enchantress surround us always. Error must shrink from investigation and research, but truth should ever rejoice in and encourage them. The more thoroughly criticism is applied to fact or statement, the more firmly is the throne of truth established. Of all forms of association the Church ought to be most sedulous in its endeavours to "seize upon truth where'er 'tis found." God is "the God of truth;" Christian faith reveals "the way, the truth, and the life;" and the Book on which we rely commands us to "buy the truth and sell it not." In the early ages the saints of the Church were privileged to be witnesses for truth, even unto death. But in these latter days a weight of authority has been pressed upon believers, and in the fetters of creeds it has been attempted to imprison thought. Creeds are only expressed forms of credence. They come to us with the authority of their framers as thinkers; their expositors, as of those who have thought and reasoned on them, with the result of finding them true; and their assertors, as of those who have satisfied their souls of the sufficiency of these forms for them. But no weight of authority, excellence of form, or multitude of witnesses, can excuse us from the duty of strict inquiry, or lessen the vital interest we have in searching into "whether these things are so." As truth need fear no test, why should we fear to apply any? "Anything, on any subject, that is really sound, cannot be inimical to a religion founded on truth;" and hence, any attempt to control investiga-

tion, and to restrain research, by mere force of law or agitation, prosecution, or persecution is not only injurious to the highest rights of man, but also unwise in regard to the holiest interests of the Church and the world.

The history of modern times does not, perhaps, afford a more striking instance of the evil results of persecution for opinion's sake, not only to the individual, to the Church, or to society, but to Truth, than that supplied in the life of Bishop Hampden. A man of original thought, immense learning, thorough integrity of understanding, true Christian feeling, sympathy and faith, capable, in no small degree, of increasing the sum of human knowledge and interest in matters pertaining to religion; a clergyman of earnest aspirations and sincere endeavours, of clear intellect and fervent devotionality; and a philosophical thinker of mature mind, extensive scholarship, tested culture, and notable familiarity with the best thoughts of the best minds in their relations one to another, and in their connections with the truths with which they concerned themselves, was put to silence and withheld from farther publication by the opposition raised against him for the free utterance of independent thought, and the frank expression of opinions which some of his enemies chose to regard as heterodox, or tending to heterodoxy. If a doubt had been possible of the need of such works as Samuel Bailey's "Essays on the Formation and Publication of Opinion" in 1821, and of his "Essays on the Pursuit of Truth and the Progress of Knowledge" in 1829, the University of Oxford, in its dealings with Renn Dickson Hampden, would have undeceived the sceptic; and that such books as John Stuart Mill's "On Liberty" are urgently required in the present day to redargue the propriety of the total enfranchisement of human thought in the speculative sphere may be felt from the small sympathy with, and slight notice of the Bishop of Hereford which the press and the Church have at any time vouchsafed; as well as from the somewhat analogous stir now agitating the diocese of Exeter, and the High and Low parties in the Church. It is certainly singular that in the land of Milton, whose "Areopagitica" (1644) has been declared to be a masterpiece at once of reasoning, rhetoric, and religion, Truth should be so distrusted to maintain and sustain herself against Thought, that speculation should be pinioned, reflection fettered, and all the activities of the mind should be restrained, in deference to creeds, confessions, and articles—themselves only in reality the results of such thoughtful research as was possible in the days when they were first framed and confirmed.

Bishop Hampden had no love for, no faith in, Controversy. To him it appeared to be a destructive engine, not an instructive agent, because he had never seen or known impartial controversy engaged in through the love of, and with the desire to attain to, the truth. He was, "by natural disposition, utterly averse to polemical disputation." "The temporary aid of argumentative defence" he did not desire; he believed that the force of truth to persuade and con-

vince was sufficient of itself. It distressed him "to see questions of truth, of religious truth above all, arbitrated, like measures of political expediency, by personal and party influences, by appeals to feelings and prejudices, by the gathering of numbers, and the loudest cry;" and so he became a silent and reverent worshipper of and seeker for truth, who might have been a teacher of her choice secrets. The virulence of religious debate in this case overcame the vivacity of speculative expression, and closed the lips of one of the intended instructors of the age. It is, perhaps, to be regretted that Dr. Hampden—having in no way gone beyond his lawful liberty as a member of the Church—did not oppose and vanquish the antagonists, who sought not only to degrade him but to enchain conscience and injure truth. "Unhappily all men have not nerves strong enough to bear the tumult of controversy concerning matters which to their hearts ought to be sheltered in deep tranquillity, and, by the rending asunder of friendships and marvellous cruelties which bigotry develops, their sensitiveness is quite overpowered." The Bishop of Hereford seems to us to have been such a pure, mild, gentle spirit as could not endure to be a willing disturber of the Church. His very soul appears to have been blighted within him by the terrible series of attacks to which he was subjected. His active, vigorous, earnest mind, which, in the twenty years immediately after his graduation, produced so many works of high erudition, acute thought, extensive research, and clear reasoning, having for their aim the improvement of man, the spread of good philosophy, and the promotion of genuine belief in Christian doctrine, during a period of nearly a quarter of a century, in which he held high office in the Church, has issued nothing which his friends commend as worthy of his prime, his promise, and his powers, while he has sedulously withheld—we speak of this fact from knowledge—his previous writings, so far as he was able, from republication, either in their earliest shape or in an improved form.

Because, as Milton affirms, "books are not absolutely dead things, but do contain a potency of life in them, to be active as that soul whose progeny they are; nay, they do preserve, as in a vial, the purest efficacy and extraction of that living intellect that bred them," this concession to the outcry of opponents, or suppression for the peace of the Church, or self-denial from a conviction of the certainty of the progress of truth without his active personal aid, is, as we think, greatly to be regretted:

"For if our virtues
Go not forth of us; 'tis all alike
As if we had them not."

Though this gentle and conciliatory passiveness cannot be looked upon as a tacit recantation, yet it did in reality withdraw from the forces of thought the efforts of a vital mind, and so lessened the effective might of those who aimed at stimulating men to a sense of the right and the duty of private judgment in all the concerns of human life.

"No age," says Milton, "can restore a life, whereof perhaps there is no great loss; and revolutions of ages do not oft recover the loss of a rejected truth, for the want of which whole nations fare the worse. We should be wary, therefore, what persecution we raise against the living labours of public men; how we spill that seasoned life of men, preserved and stored up in books, since we see a kind of homicide may be thus committed, sometimes a martyrdom; and if it extend to the whole impression, a kind of massacre, whereof the execution ends not in the slaying of an elemental life, but strikes at the ethereal and sift-essence, the breath of reason itself; it slays an immortality rather than a life." We have to regret, in the case of the Bishop of Hereford, not only the withholding from effective operation among the forces of thought of good and excellent works; we have to regret, too, the putting to silence of a teacher of ability, and the impoverization of the world by the loss of the results of his learning, reflection, intellect, and worth, in regard to the questions and events of our own day, as well as in respect to those higher truths which have a bearing upon human existence throughout ages beyond the ken and calculation of men.

We think this stifling of free speculation is one of the most pernicious of the influences of persecution for opinion's sake—equally pernicious to mankind in either way—"if the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth presented by its collision with error," as well as in the definite knowledge obtained, that in the direction already explored the truth is not to be found. We proceed to illustrate these views by presenting to our readers such a sketch of the life and thoughts of Renn Dickson Hampden as we have been able to gather the materials of, after much reading, some research, and a good deal of inquiry.

Renn Dickson Hampden—though belonging to that old English family which numbers amongst its ancestors the resolute opposer of Charles I.'s alleged right to levy ship-money, who died by a wound received from the hands of Prince Rupert on Chalgrove Field—was born in 1792, at Barbadoes, whither his progenitors had emigrated in the early part of the seventeenth century, and where his father, Renn Hampden, held an official position. In this, the most easterly of the Caribbee Islands, he received a good home-education, and he had likewise some scholastic training at Coddington College. He was subsequently sent to England to pursue that university course which is regarded as an essential preparation for a public, professional, or clerical life. In 1809 he entered Oriel College, Oxford, then under the Mastership of John Eveleigh, D.D., a man of weight, solidity, and reflectiveness, a sound reasoner, a dispassionate controversialist, and a learned though not an ostentatiously erudite scholar, who had been Bampton Lecturer in the year of R. D. Hampden's birth. Hampden had for his college-tutor Edward Coplestone, afterwards Principal of Oriel and Bishop

of Llandaff—a man who had the power of moving minds, an acute thinker, and a serviceable stimulator of scholarly research. At Oriel he was surrounded with fellow-students whose spirits had been thoroughly embued with the desire of speculative inquiry, personal fervour of thought, and eager originality. Among these may be named Samuel Hinds, afterwards Bishop of Norwich, E. Hawkins, Bampton Lecturer in 1840, and Principal of Oriel, Richard Whately, Archbishop of Dublin, &c., men who made the Ethics, the Rhetoric, and the Organon of Aristotle, leading class books in the University, and who greatly aided in the development of the spirit of reasoning inquiry, not only by their writings but by their example. In this Aristotelian movement Hampden took his full share, and on him it perhaps made the strongest impression, as it seems to have affected the whole nature of his subsequent speculations not only in their form but in their matter. He was not only a distinguished but a successful student. At the Examination, in Michaelmas Term, 1813, R. D. Hampden took a double-first Bachelor's degree. Along with him, at the same time, from the same college (Oriel) there went up Thomas Cooke, Allan Cooper, Joseph Cummings, S. J. Gardiner, T. A. Richards, and John P. Potter, author of 'Characteristics of the Greek Philosophers,' 'Socrates and Plato,' &c., but Hampden alone stood in the first class both in classics and in mathematics. In 1814 he gained the Chancellor's prize of £20 for the best Latin prose essay—*De Ephorum apud Lacedaemonios Magistratu*, (Concerning the Magistracy of the Ephors among the Lacedaemonians). This was a subject of great importance at the time, not only from its interest as a question in scholarship demanding ample research and careful inference, but also from its side-bearings upon the political controversies of the period. To one party the Ephoralty of Lacedaemon, like the Tribune of Rome, appeared to be a Democratic Institution, while to the other it seemed an Oligarchical one. Hence the question was one in which political animus, as much as zeal for historic truth, was excited. Nor did that excitement readily die away, as the reader may see by referring to K. O. Muller's "Dorians;" a "Dissertation on the History and Nature of the Spartan Constitution," prefixed to the first volume of Dr. Arnold's *Thucydides*, 1830; Grote's *Greece*, chap. iv. vol. ii., pp. 455—566, and an erudite paper by Sir George Cornewall Lewis, on "The Spartan Constitution," in the *Philological Museum*, vol. ii. pp. 38—71. R. D. Hampden in his Essay maintained that through the Ephori—or Overseers—the *Demos* of Doric Greece enjoyed a representative participation in the higher magistracies of the State. The Essay was published in a pamphlet of twenty-two pages, royal octavo, as a "Disputatio Chancellarii præmiodonata et in Theatro Sheldoniano recitata die Jun. XXII. a. d. 1814." Having graduated M.A., he subsequently became Fellow of and Tutor in Oriel College along with Arnold, Coplestone, Davison, Hawkins, Hinds, Keble, Baden Powell, and Whately—to whom were subsequently added

Newman, Pusey, R. H. Froude, Sir A. Grant, and William A. P. Ward.*

Even at this early date R. D. Hampden was distinguished among scholars for his acquaintance with the Philosophy of the Ancient

* It is not a little strange, and is perhaps deserving of some consideration that the revival of logical studies in Oxford led also to a renewed endeavour to set forth the "Evidences of Christianity" in a fresh form, and one more applicable to the time, and the opinions then current. Dr. Edward Hawkins, Provost of Oriel, in 1819, issued a sermon on "Unauthoritative Tradition," and, in 1840, as Bampton Lecturer, discoursed on The Substance and Evidence of "Christian Truth." Richard Whately's earliest work, "Historic Doubts Relative to Napoleon Bonaparte," 1819, had for its object the reduction of scepticism; many of his "Essays on the Peculiarities of the Christian Religion," "Essays on St. Paul," "Annotations on Paley's Evidence," &c., have the same object, and his "Introductory Lessons on the Evidences of Christianity," bring the subject within reach of the weakest capacity. Samuel Hinde not only wrote a "History of Christianity" of great ability and erudition, but published a frank and liberal compend of the evidences in his "Inspiration and Authority of Scripture," 1831. Several of the published "Sermons" of Arnold relate to the evidences; the volume issued in 1832 has an "Essay on the Interpretation of Scripture;" in another volume, 1834, there are two appendices on Atheism, and a posthumous volume consists almost entirely of sermons devoted to the interpretation of Scripture. To Dr. Newman we owe an able "Essay on Miracles," and an "Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine." From Dr. Hampden we have received the "Bampton Lectures" and the "Philosophic Evidences of Christianity."

Neither is it incurious to remark how thoroughly identified with singularities—if we dare not say freedom of thoughts—Oriel had become in the minds of the defenders of Orthodoxy in *status quo*. Here is a passage vituperative. "By some unhappy conjuncture, not a few of those individuals, who, whether as dignitaries of the church, heads of colleges, or masters of our public schools, have, to say least of the feeling, astonished the public sense of Christianity of late years, have issued from Oriel College. Thus one (Whately) figures as a denier of the sacredness of the Lord's-day; another (Arnold) gives us notions of the Sacrament equally new and startling; a third (Hampden) propounds that Scripture gives us little more than a string of *naked facts*, and that all the *doctrines* which our blindness conceived that the facts were given merely to enforce and substantiate, are little better than *theories*, conclusions of man; propositions so unsubstantial, that it is impossible for any man justly to pronounce the denier of every one among them to be in the wrong, if he believes himself to be in the right. That even Oriel College may harbour within its walls many individuals utterly incapable of those daring fooleries, we have no doubt. But the public experience on the subject has been so unfortunate, that when we see "Fellow of Oriel" annexed to the title of a publication, we instinctively expect it to be some frothy, presumptuous, giddy performance; some indigested residuum of its commonplace books, some flattering impostance of coxcomb professorship elated with its station, and in sheer ignorance imagining itself qualified to throw new light on matters which scorn its meagre illumination."—*Blackwood's Magazine*.

World and of the Scholastic Ages, so that when the celebrated *Encyclopædia Metropolitana*, suggested by Samuel Taylor Coleridge was commenced, he was requested by the Rev. Edward Smedley, under whose editorial superintendence the work was placed, to give his aid to make it a full and complete view of the state of knowledge up to the period of its issue, 1815—1845. The department which was by common consent allotted to him, as the man best fitted to do justice to the subject, was that period of speculation which falls within the Middle Ages to which the general name of Scholasticism has been given. Besides several minor contributions to the Historical and Literary divisions of that "Universal Dictionary of Science, History, Philosophy, and Art," he specially prepared "A Dissertation on Scholastic Philosophy," and an account of "The Life and Speculations of Thomas Aquinas"—both of which are to be found in the third volume of the Historical Division of the work. Again, when, in 1830, the *Encyclopædia Britannica* passed into the hands of Messrs. Adam and Charles Black, Edinburgh, and, under the editorship of Mr. Macvey Napier, was reissued in an improved form, 1830—42, R. D. Hampden was requested to collaborate in the work. This he did, and furnished to that rich repertory of learning, an article on Aristotle and the Aristotelian Philosophy to vol. iii., another on Plato and Platonism to vol. xviii., and a third on Socrates to vol. xx. These contributions to the seventh edition, have been republished in the eighth, and they have since been reissued in a separate volume, bearing the title of "The Fathers of Greek Philosophy,"—Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, in 1863.

Of the ability displayed in these productions the highest opinions were, in general, entertained and expressed. They were said to have "enriched" the works in which they appeared, to show that "their author was possessed of splendid endowments," "undoubted ability, and the highest attainments," and to be "of great importance in a philosophical point of view." More specifically we may quote the published opinion of the learned and trustworthy Hallam: that "Dr. Hampden in his 'Life of Thomas Aquinas,' and view of 'The Scholastic Philosophy'"—published in *The Encyclopædia Metropolitana*—"has the merit of being the only Englishman, past or present, so far as I know, since the revival of Letters, who has penetrated far into the wilderness of Scholasticism."*

Sir William Hamilton, who had passed his notable Aristotelian examination in 1810, while Hampden was yet a fresh-man, while proclaiming the ability of the "Aristotelian Exposition" in *The Encyclopædia Britannica*, conceives that its author is in error regarding the Induction of which Aristotle speaks, and devotes several pages to the confutation of "Hampden's perversion of Aristotle's doctrine," and in controversion of his exposition of the logic of the Stagyrte. That Sir W. Hamilton should have so laboriously employed himself in undoing the impression likely to be

* "Literature of Europe in the Middle Ages," vol. i. p. 14.

made on the readers of Hampden's article, may be taken as evidence of the importance he attached to the reputation its writer had acquired as an Aristotelian, although, as he then supposed, of the Whatelyan school. Despite of the weight of Sir William Hamilton's authority, we are inclined to maintain that the true nature and extent of the Aristotelian Induction might justly be made a matter of controversy as between the interpretation of Hamilton and Hampden. This will be admitted most readily by those who know most of the Inductive Logic of Aristotle, Bacon, and Mill; but those who desire to inform themselves upon this topic, may advantageously study "The Logic of Science: a Translation of the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle," with notes and an introduction, by Edward Poste, M.A.

We happen to possess a rare copy of "The Life of Thomas Aquinas: a Dissertation on the Scholastic Philosophy of the Middle Ages, by the Rev. Benn Dickson Hampden, D.D., Regius Prof. of Divinity in the University of Oxford, reprinted from *The Encyclopædia Metropolitana*" (we quote the title entire.) This work was printed in 1847, when the agitation concerning its author's elevation to the see of Hereford was going on, but was restrained from publication by Bishop Hampden, because he did not wish any publication of his to appear, which was likely to jeopardize the peace of the Church, or to inflame the enmity of party. From this copy of an interesting tract, of 156 pages, which came into our hands under peculiar circumstances we select the following extracts to place before our readers. We must, however, premise, that the reader may comprehend the quotations, that, in the author's opinion, "the whole of scholastic disputation, relative to the doctrines of Theology is grounded on two things, *Faith* and *Reason*." "Where does the one end, and the other begin?—this is the question on which all the contentions of the Schoolmen rested. The distinctive principles of Reason had necessarily to be recognised and illustrated, and this gave rise to all the metaphysical discussion with which we meet in their voluminous writings. This application of the science of mind to theology, became a necessary thing, because without the union of the two there could have been no system of doctrinal faith whatever, considered, that is, as a regular elaborated dogmatical system." Philosophy was necessary to methodize and classify religious truths into creeds and articles: in our first extract we have Thomas Aquinas, born 1224, died 1274, shown as pre-eminent among the schoolmen.

"The life of Aquinas may be particularly selected as a type of scholastic biography. His name is familiar to every one, as the representative of the class to which he belongs. That very familiarity is an evidence of the conspicuous place which he holds among the theological philosophers of the Middle Age. But we have been taught at the same time to associate his name with all that is dark in religion or in philosophy, and we are apt, therefore, to think of him with some degree of ridicule and contempt, as unworthy of the serious inquiry of enlightened times. In truth, however,

Aquinas, when impartially examined, will be found not to shrink from a comparison with the philosophers of the brightest period of literature. If we are to judge of the philosopher from the intrinsic powers of mind displayed, independently of the results attained by him, which chiefly depend on the concurrence of favourable circumstances, then may Aquinas be placed in the first rank of philosophy. If penetration of thought, comprehensiveness of views, exactness the most minute, an ardour of inquiry the most keen, a patience of pursuit the most unwearied, are among the merits of the philosopher, then may Aquinas dispute the first place among the candidates for the supremacy in speculative science."

Here are some wise sentences on the social importance of the Church:—

"The Church in fact, as it then was constituted, was the great centre of power. Men who looked on what passed around them with any shrewdness of discernment, could not but observe that, while kings and armies were the ostensible agents in the affairs of the world, it was the power of the Church which actuated the whole machine, and guided, if it did not always originate, the complex movements of the social mass. If there was an ambition then in the breast of any one, here was the theatre on which it might act; if there was the love of literature, here it might find opportunities for its gratification; if there was concern for the public good, the high-born wish to be among the benefactors of the human race, here were the means provided by which either good or evil might be achieved on the greatest scale. Nor was the simple circumstance of the fellowship subsisting between members of the Church as such, and more particularly of that intimate connection between individuals of the same religious fraternity, an inconsiderable attraction to men of sensibility and refinement in those days, when society scarcely existed in the world at large. In these associations, the artificial distinctions which separated man from man, disappeared. Men met together on one principle, independent of the passions or the vicissitudes of the world, the principle of equality in the sight of Him who is no respecter of persons."

Here follows a sketch of Albert of Cologne:—

"The school of Albert, indeed, like that of Plato, at Athens (if we may venture to compare the degenerate philosophy of the Middle Age with the high thoughts and animated eloquence of the classic age of science), appears to have been the great seminary from which the chief philosophers of the subsequent years were propagated. Plato combined the traditions of ancient wisdom, extant at his time, and moulded them into a whole force by his genius; and it is to that spirit which he breathed over the whole, and which his disciples imbibed, that we may trace both the acute vigour of the Aristotelic logic, and the masculine dignity of the Stoic ethics. So to Albert of Cologne the epithet of "the great" appears to be not unworthily attached, if we look to the effects of his influence on the philosophy of the schools of the Middle Age. Before him there hardly existed any philosophy that might properly be called scholastic. There had been many who had taught the like principles, and had reasoned in the same manner, particularly we may notice Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, who, in the century preceding, composed several treatises, which display an astonishing power of metaphysical reasoning. So again, Abelard, though far inferior

to Anselm, might be mentioned as an eminent instance at the same period, of the same kind of metaphysical sentences. And perhaps, but for him—but for that popularity which Abelard attained, and for the disciples of his school, who afterwards filled influential stations in the Church,—the school of Albert would not have been frequented, or his method of philosophising have been so generally adopted. Still Albert must have the praise of having systematized the scholastic discussions; of having perfectly accomplished what Anselm had only partially executed; the drawing to one point the mass of reasonings which had hitherto existed in dispersed portions, and combining the various principles employed in these reasonings into one peculiar philosophy, to which we give the peculiar name of scholasticism."

We next quote Dr. Hampden's account of the works and personal appearance of Thomas Aquinas:—

"The printed edition of his works extend to eighteen volumes in folio. Of these, the first five consist of commentaries on Aristotle, the remaining volumes being occupied by his "Sum of Theology," his principal work, which fills three of the volumes, his commentary on the "Book of the Sentences," commentaries on various Books of Scripture, Sermons, and some smaller Theological tracts. Nor are these the whole of his writings. If we may believe his panegyrists, his faculty of composition was so great that he constantly employed four persons to write by his dictation, which was even too rapid for their united labours.

"There was in him the gentleness, the modesty, the piety of the Christian character; but these graceful outlines were dashed with the hard touches of monastic austerity. He stands forth to our view like the sculptured image of the form of Christianity, executed after the true model, but by some rude hand, ignorant of the principles of taste, and unable to subdue the stubborn marble to a conformity with the living original. His mental endowments and character are not ineaptly represented by the description given of his person. His body, it is said, was 'almost vast, tall and massy in the bones, to which the spare flesh scarcely gave a complete covering.' For so was there something gigantic in his mind and his schemes of life, whilst there was a nakedness and dreariness in his studies and contemplative pursuits—a want of substance and vitality,—truly characteristic of the scholastic theologian and philosopher. Nor is the remainder of the portrait out of keeping with the above. 'The expression of his eyes,' continues his biographer, 'was most modest; his face oblong; his complexion inclined to sallowness; his forehead more depressed than the profoundness of his intellect might seem to require; his head large and round, and partly bald; his person erect.'"

From the Dissertation on Scholastic Philosophy we obtain this paragraph, on the effects of studies confined to books:—

"The Roman literature, indeed, was essentially derivative. The spirit of the Republic in the busy period, when it was occupied in the acquisition of its Empire, was averse to the soft influence of letters; and a great people found itself the mistress of the world, and in a high state of civilization, with no domestic philosophy, and scarcely any domestic literature. In this state of the case, when the leisure of the people demanded the gratification of literature, recourse was necessarily had to the stores of a foreign tongue: and the learned Greek was sought by the studious Romans as the

interpreter of the language and philosophy of Greece. Thus the learning from books was the expedient to which the literary Roman was necessarily driven. And this led further to the rise and employment of commentators; to the study, in short, of the instrument of knowledge in combination with the subject explored, and at length to the use of the mere books as an end of study in themselves.

"Where a people passes through the regular transitions from an infancy to a maturity of intellectual cultivation, poetry and the fine arts at first engage their attention; the taste is formed before the powers of judgment and reasoning are wrought to their severe perfection. This appears from the case of Greece, where we have the instance of a people forming for themselves, by successive original efforts, their own intellectual character. Their genius threw itself forth in its native poetry; and their temples, their statues, and their pictures, proclaimed its graceful vigour, before the bowers of Academus or the Lyceum resounded with the hum of their philosophy. This, then, is the natural progress of things; the natural course of the education of a people. But in the case of the Latin world, as we here designate that part of the Roman Empire which was united into a social mass by Roman civilization, the intellectual character first developed itself in philosophy; the first great movement was to that which is the last properly in the order of nature. But the fact explains itself when we look into it more closely. The schools of the Middle Age received in a mass the accumulated treasures of antiquity. They invented nothing for themselves; the riches of poetry, eloquence, and philosophy, were poured out on them in lavish profusion. At the same time there was no capacity for appreciating the relative value of the several acquisitions of knowledge. At this crisis, however, polemical disputation called upon the heads of the Christian Church, to acquaint themselves with the theories of that philosophy, from which the infidel or the heretic drew his attacks on Christianity. The necessity was felt of opposing philosophy with philosophy. Hence from the earliest ages, Christianity is spoken of by the fathers as a philosophy; and is strenuously maintained to be the only true philosophy of life as contrasted with that of heathen sages. Whilst the poetry thereof, and history, and eloquence of the classic authors were held in contempt, as comparatively unworthy of attention from the Christian, the pages of the philosopher were eagerly explored, in order to an acquaintance with those principles which were brought into competition with Christianity. And thus, unhappily, the Christian schools reversed the natural order of the education of the human mind, rushing all at once to an end, legitimately attainable only by the fruit of matured habits of thought, and the discipline of all the faculties of the mind. Their philosophy consequently was an insincere, unreal system, a collection of principles, the data not of investigation and experience, but of a prescriptive authority; the results of the labour and ingenuity of others taken in their concrete form, without analysis, and applied as oracular texts for the deduction of truths."

The following estimate of the respective influences of Plato and Aristotle, on the scholastic philosophy, is interesting and instructive:—

"Platonism was the established philosophy of the Church in the Primitive Ages of Christianity. The first converts to the gospel from the class of philosophers appear to have been of that sect; and those brought with

them into their new professions, a predilection for the theories which they had only formally renounced in embracing the gospel. . . . Still that philosophy did not suffice for the whole state of the case. It presented, indeed, the means of speculating on the truths of Christianity, and explaining them to the satisfaction of speculative men; but it was deficient as a *method* of investigation and argument. It was only a vast collection of theories. Such, however, was not the case with the philosophy of Aristotle. This was essentially a science of methods. Aristotle had analyzed the principles of human knowledge, examining into the nature of language, as the instrument of communicating knowledge, and delivering with accuracy and fulness the means of producing persuasion and conviction. This was observed to be eminently the characteristic of a large portion of Aristotle's works, that collection of logical treatises to which moderns have given the name of the *Organon*; whilst throughout his works a methodical character marks them in contrast with the rhetorical diffuseness and irregularity of Plato. Thus was the Christian student invited to the study of the logic of Aristotle; and thus, too, has the name of Aristotle been identified with that of logical philosopher. . . .

"Thus were the two systems, the Platonic and the Aristotelic imperceptibly blended together. The Aristotelic, repulsive in its dryness of methodical discussion, and disappointing to the religious feelings of the heart, obtained a support in the enthusiasm of Platonism; whilst Platonism, too imaginative in its own unmixed nature, too evanescent in its abstractions for the herd of philosophers, descended to conversation with men of humble genius, and combated the religious disputant with reasonings drawn from the practical philosophy of the Peripatetic school. . . . In examining into any philosophy, there are two leading points to which we naturally advert; 1, the substance itself of the philosophy; or the principles in the different departments of human knowledge, of which it actually consists; 2, the method on which it proceeds; what data it assumes, and in what order it applies these for the construction of its system. Now in the philosophy of the schoolmen these two points of view meet in one. We have shown how the method of Aristotle was gradually superinduced on the established Platonism of the Church. . . . But Platonism was the strong undercurrent. The Aristotelic philosophy was the tide that flowed on the surface, propelled by every wind and storm that vexed the Church. The Aristotelic philosophy, accordingly, being cultivated only as a science of defence, and consequently established as a logical philosophy, what was in its proper nature simply a method of discussion, became in the result an organ of investigation, and a science also of the first principles of every other science. This was in direct opposition to the views of Aristotle himself; for the great service rendered by him to the cause of scientific truth was, that he separated logic from the metaphysics with which it had been confounded in all former systems."

The further effects of this double influence are thus traced and explained:—

"The scholastic philosophy is the only system in which idealism and realism have completely coincided. Plato gave the name indeed of dialectic to the supreme science; for the train of thought by which he arrived at his theory of ideas, naturally suggested that name as the designation of the

science of ideas. But still the ideal or metaphysical character predominates over his whole philosophy. . . . In Aristotle there is a great deal of realism, especially in his physical philosophy, which is for the most part, an assumed science of nature, deduced from the abstractions of language. At the same time his general views are entirely adverse to idealism, and no philosopher of antiquity has displayed so fully throughout his writings the scientific value of experience and observation. But in the schoolmen, idealism and realism go hand in hand. In them there is no proper direct appeal to experience and observation. The visible world is to them only a shadow and type of the metaphysical; a writing as it were in cipher, to be read by the key of those recondite truths which exist in the secret chambers of the intellect. But their very business is argumentation. And thus conclusions, indicating nothing more than connections of thought in the mind, are continually realized in their mode of speculation; applied, that is, as if they were indications of real connections in nature. . . . We find, indeed, the different schoolmen, especially after the thirteenth century, distinguished from each other as nominalists or realists. . . . These two classes included under them a great variety of shades of opinion, of which we may state the two extremes to be—on the one hand, the opinion that regarded abstract terms as mere sounds; on the other hand, that which supposed a physical being corresponding to every abstract term. Still nominalism, as it existed in the scholastic ages, was rather a modification of realism, or the exception from the general system. . . . The scholastic nominalists were practically realists, so far as they pursued the same mode of establishing truths by syllogistic processes, as those who were realists in theory. . . . In the scholastic system, the object was, not to rise from individuals to general principles, but to descend from the highest abstractions to individual beings. The only certain real existences given in the system were the natures of matter and form.

“The problem then was to find the principle of individuation; to show how these infinite natures were circumscribed and limited in the various individual objects which the sensible universe presents. . . . As the ideas of the purely intellectual region were assumed to be the primary elements of all truth—the principles from which the constitution and order of the sensible universe were derived—they were evidently to be explored in those types and representations of them which the universe presents to our observation. The world of sense and observation, according to their view, lay between the divine mind and the human. The mind by the study of the forms impressed in that world, under the guidance of the natural sciences, penetrates the interposing mass; and thus, at length, rising by the steps of sublime contemplation, is brought more immediately into the Divine presence, and enabled more and more to see God as He is. . . . The doctrine of final causes is the master principle of the whole inquiry. Instead of looking at phenomena, and examining things in themselves, the schoolman, following Aristotle, is employed in considering the tendencies or designs of nature, and constructing a hypothetical system on assumptions of what is best and most perfect in nature. The whole drift of his inquiry is the *idea* or abstract *form* which nature is supposed to be endeavouring to realize. Thus, therefore, in the pursuit of his lofty science, his own mind, as the mirror of the divine,—the philosophical synopsis of all that exists without it in the universe,—becomes the only field of study; whilst

he neglects that actual form which things present to external observation as accidental, and unreal, and unscientific. . . . The schoolmen must undoubtedly be reckoned among the precursors of the reformation both of religion and philosophy. By the temerity of their speculations they inured the minds of men to think boldly: and they raised doubts and difficulties which sustained the inquisitive spirit until at least a better day should dawn upon its efforts. . . . The spirit which they had nurtured survived beyond them, to fight against the system within which it had grown up; as the system itself had fought against the arbitrary authority of the church, within whose bosom it had been cherished. . . . The same writers live as authorities in theological speculation to the Roman Church who, as the advocates of reason against the church system, have raised up its most formidable antagonists, both in religion and philosophy."

While acting as Tutor in Oriel, Hampden published in 1827, his "Philosophical Evidences of Christianity," a work which has been spoken of as "an appropriate and worthy companion to Butler's Analogy." In 1829 and 1831 he was Examiner in Classics, and in the latter year he was chosen by the heads of the Colleges of Oxford, Bampton Lecturer for 1832. These consist of a series of eight Divinity Lecture Sermons, preached before the University in St. Mary's, Oxford, on some point of Christian theology, "and when the preacher is a man"—as he generally is—"of any ability or expectations, the sermons, from their elaborate character, and from being delivered during a period of several weeks, always attract considerable attention. In this case they were very noteworthy. The author, although he had taken "holy orders" early, had not solicited ecclesiastical preferment, but devoted himself sedulously to teaching and to the acquisition of knowledge. His reputation for ability was great, and his liberality of sentiment, opinion, and political creed was very marked. He was known to have taken a keen interest in the movements of mind taking place in Oxford under Keble, Froude, Ward, Newman, &c.; and to have kept a strict watch over the tendencies to which their opinions gave an impetus. With a clear eye he had marked the inception of Patristism, and its development into Tractism, and he had fixed in his own mind the prime point at which the fallacy of the Newmanites had its origin. He had in his "Evidences" striven to show how reason and faith may be reconciled without the prostration of reason to faith, and without the elevation of reason to a tyranny over faith, but in a co-ordinate activity and hearty harmony of effort, a mental examination of fundamental facts and principles, and a proper conscientiousness in the conducting of critical inquiry into the credibility of credentials as well as creed, whether the claimant of our trust was faith or reason. He had now to exhibit and expound, as well as examine, and expose the distinction between the divine facts and the human form of creeds, and so to dissociate in men's minds the human and the divine elements of religious conviction that Ritualism might be seen to be clearly different from, however much it might be incorporated with Spiritualism. Patristic

theology seemed to him to infringe upon and to subvert individual faith and personal responsibility in regard to the proper search for truth; and he wished to scale off from the creeds of Christendom the incrustations of scholasticism, and to set apart in its crystalline, or rather, Christlike purity "the faith once delivered to the saints." These sermons went down to the very basis of the controversy of the times. They show scholasticism as "a human section of the complex history of Christianity," and while they presuppose "a divine origin to the Christian revelation, and a superintending providence over its whole course," they endeavour "to take some account of that resistance which the human agent has opposed to the diffusion of the truth as it was purely inspired," in conveyance of which "the Lord's vineyard has been overrun with thorns and weeds." Not only, therefore, as a valuable contribution to philosophy and theology, to English controversy and the history of the church, but as now being somewhat rare and scarce, we believe we shall do our readers a service by giving considerable space to an epitomized account of the Bampton Lectures of 1832.

I. "Christianity had its beginnings amidst obstructions of a two-fold character; the self-righteousness of the human heart and the presumption of the human understanding. The history of infidelity and heresy affords abundant instances of this two-fold counteraction to the truths of the gospel. There is a resistance simply moral, and another simply intellectual,—the force of vice and the force of theory; both of which have played a considerable part in the drama of religion. In considering 'the effect of opinion as such on the doctrines of Christianity,' it is the purpose of the first lecture to 'show how the intellect of man has insinuated its own conclusions into the body of the revelation in the course of its transmission, and modified the expressions by which the truth is conveyed—especially in regard to 'the effect of the scholastic philosophy,' that vast theoretic system which has educated the human intellect in the West for the larger views, the more elevated thoughts, and more masculine vigour of modern science and modern theology.

"The scholastic method is nothing more than a view of the philosophy of Aristotle, as it was moulded by the state of civilization and learning, and by the existing relations between the civil and ecclesiastical powers in the course of the Middle Ages. It is what the cherished study of this place was at a period, when it was pursued with an excessive intensity of devotion to the combined authority of the philosopher and the gifted commentator on his doctrines. The erection of this and other universities was the great external means by which the scholastic philosophy was constituted into that form which it ultimately attained. The chairs of theology and philosophy, established here and elsewhere, were the oracular seats, as the rationale of theological and moral truth. The collection of these several authoritative decisions at length rose into a peculiar system of philosophy in itself; of which Aristotle, indeed, was the foundation and cement, but the structure itself, commentary piled upon commentary, and conclusion on conclusion.

"The scholastic philosophy, indeed, is pre-eminently a record of the struggle which has subsisted, between the efforts of human reason on the one hand, to assert its own freedom and independence; and, on the other

hand, the coercion exercised over it by the civil or ecclesiastical powers. In the general survey of it it will be observed to be distinguished by two very opposite characteristics ; an unbounded liberty of discussion, that advances with unawed step into the most startling curiosities of minute inquiry ; and a servile addiction to the previous determinations and sanctions of the venerated doctors of the church.

"The course of events in the early history of the church seemed to be eminently favourable towards the preponderance of the Greeks. Theirs were the churches immediately founded by the apostles. Theirs was the language of the sacred books and of philosophy. Theirs, with a few exceptions, were the apologies by which Christianity defended itself against the assaults of the Jew or the Pagan in the first centuries. It was their writers who took the lead in systematizing the doctrines of the faith, and allied them with philosophy. It was their bishops who took the ostensible part in the great councils of the first four centuries, and the first half of the fifth. In the course of that period, too, occur the names of all the most illustrious fathers of the Greek church ; Justin Martyr, Origen, Eusebius of Cæsarea, Athanasius, Basil, the two Gregories, Chrysostom, men of acute and eloquent genius, as well as of intrepid energy. Still, the efforts of the Greeks may all be characterized as eminently literary ; as philosophical defences and expositions of the faith, more than practical energies in its behalf. . . . The Greek was by education a sophist, in the proper sense of that term. His business was philosophy. . . . The Greek, indeed, shows himself also a rhetorician ; rhetoric being a branch of his universal philosophy. But he is principally engaged in illustrating some tenet of philosophy, and applying it to Christian doctrine. He is more logical than the Latin, in this sense, that he is intent rather on proving that something which he maintains is true, than of enforcing a belief in it.

"The Latins have not that splendid array of philosophical writings which the catalogue of the Greek fathers exhibits ; but they had sagacious political leaders, popular advocates of the sacred cause, men of extensive knowledge of the world combined with a nervous enthusiasm of thought and feeling. In Tertullian, for instance, we see the art of the rhetorician united with the obstinacy and rude vehemence of the practical enthusiast ; in Cyprian, amidst the placid flow of his style, the resoluteness of moral feeling, which at length carried him to martyrdom ; in Lactantius and Arnobius, the persuasiveness of advocates, intent more on the effect of their arguments than on their philosophical accuracy or logical cogency ; in Jerome and Augustine, at once the rigour of logicians, the comprehensive views of philosophers, the persuasiveness of orators, the command of political leaders. . . . The Latin divines of the early centuries were chiefly of the class of orators, or rhetoricians, by profession. . . . The Latin flows on more diffusively, more irregularly, more rhetorically, in a word, in his style of argumentation ; dwells on a point which he thinks strong, without scrupling to recur to it, and insist on it ; and is far less exact in the meaning which he annexes to the terms employed."

II. "The scholastic system was one which 'naturally grew out of the struggle subsisting in the west between reason and authority,' and it is now the author's purpose to 'explain the nature of that philosophy itself when it became the acknowledged system of the church ; to 'give some account of its formation and of the general character resulting from it,' thus 'tracing to its origin that speculative logical Christianity which survives among us at this day,' in order that we may see the evil of a logical theology.

"The scholastic philosophy was, in its fundamental character, a logical theology. . . . The combination and analysis of words which the logical theology has produced, have given occasion to the passions of men, to arm themselves in defence of the phantoms thus called into being. Not only have professed theologians, but private Christians, been imposed on, by the specious religion of terms of theology. . . . It is enough to give a name to any matter of objection, for the many to join in the clamour against what they have not examined, or have no disposition to examine. . . . Logic, consequently, becomes more than a mere instrument of disputation. It was converted into a method of philosophy, an instrument for investigating truth. As one of the seven arts, it was neglected, no less, perhaps, than the rest. There was no searching into its principles, with the view of ascertaining a just theory of argumentation. Its exaltation to the rank of the science of investigation, left the fields of its proper region uncultivated amidst the vain ambition of conquest over the empire of science. As an organ of philosophy it was explored only in its connection with metaphysical truth; as it serves, that is, to unravel those associations of thought, of which it is the key, so far as it is the result of them—an effect produced by the mind's operation within itself. . . . It was only indeed at the time of Cicero that Aristotle's writings were brought to light, from the long obscurity in which they were buried. And it is not asserting too much to say, that, even had the Romans been disposed to encourage a speculative philosophy, there was then no one competent, either justly to value, or fully to explain, his logical doctrines. An art of logic had long been current in use, the dialectic of the Stoics, which, so far from opening the mind to the reception of a truly philosophical method, had prejudiced them with wrong notions of the science. If Aristotle, therefore, were studied, it would naturally be such portions of his logic as coincided, or seemed to coincide, most with the existing imperfect views. Hence the almost exclusive study, among the Latins, of his treatise, entitled, 'The Categories or Predicaments.' Though other treatises of his logic were translated into Latin, these soon fell into disuse. A compendium of Dialectic, founded on the Categories of Aristotle, and passed under the name of Augustine, became the ordinary text-book, from which the whole science was professed to be taught in the Latin school, down to the end of the twelfth century. Other abstracts of logic, drawn from Boethius, Cassiodorus, and Capella, appear also to have been used; and each distinguished master, probably, composed his own treatise of the art. But all were confined to the same meagre technicalities, which alone accorded with the corrupt theological taste of the times. . . . The very professors of science fell into a decrepitude of learning which needed every auxiliary to its feebleness. It was the noble conception of the admirable Boethius to have repaired this loss to the Latin world, and to have transfused, into their own tongue, the principal documents of Greek philosophy; not only by translations, but by his own writings. He applied himself to this vast undertaking with a spirit worthy of the best days of Rome, and a talent for philosophy, cultivated by hearing the last successors of Plato and Aristotle, on the classic ground itself where those philosophers had taught. . . . It is not with a logical philosophy, as with any other system. A particular theory in metaphysics, or physics, may have its day and pass away. But a science, which is an universal method—which is carried into every subject, particularly one like this entering into the very vitals of religion, and en-

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twining itself with a parasitical fondness around the majestic body of sacred truth, cannot be dispelled altogether by any reformation. It becomes part not only of the scientific language of a people, but an idiom in which they express their ordinary ideas. This has been eminently the case with the philosophy of Aristotle, in its transition through the schools of the Middle Ages. It is in the very air of our social life. Its legend, though worn, is not effaced from the current coin of our philosophy and our theology.

. . . The object accordingly of the scholastic theology was to detect and draw forth from the Scripture, by aid of the subtle analysis of the philosophy of Aristotle, the mystical truths of God, on which the Scripture revelation was conceived to be founded. . . . Logical distinctions and conclusions amount only to an analysis of the notions involved in general terms; and when employed, therefore, to ascertain the nature of a thing, terminate in giving a more exact notion of the term by which it is signified. Such, in fact, was the science of forms in Aristotle's philosophy. They were strictly the logical definitions of the species of things; limits fixed in the region of the mind alone; and so far coincident with the ideas of the Platonists. . . . The whole philosophy of Aristotle readily accommodated itself to such a theology. His physical science is throughout logical, being, indeed, a body of conclusions from his metaphysical doctrines. His ethical science, though in its principles founded on fact and observation, is thrown, in its didactic form, into the same logical mould. So that, upon the whole, his philosophy, in its written form at least, may justly be regarded as a deduction of given principles, to the particulars implied in them; as a method of establishing truth, by processes of reasoning, by discussions of questions on points of speculation, rather than by interrogation of nature. The method of logical philosophy must consist, chiefly, of discussion of opinions. Argument and not evidence, will be the object of its pursuit. It will be concerned in finding out what may be unanswerably affirmed, rather than what is the fact and the truth of things. . . . The subject of the rhetorical nature of the Scriptures is of large compass; and one that, from its real importance, deserves a more distinguished consideration than it has yet obtained. I feel convinced that, were due weight given to it in our theological studies, it would tend more than anything else to dissipate the wild theories of speculative religionists, and bring men to the true way of finding out Truth."

III. "Questions on the Trinity naturally first engaged the attention of disputants.' On these scholasticism has 'amply exercised its keen and inexhaustible research.' 'The disputations of the schoolmen accordingly are at once an historical sketch of the Trinitarian question, and an establishment of the theory of the Trinity by a course of logical investigation.' 'The principal, if not *the only difficulties* on the doctrine of the Trinity arise from metaphysical considerations.' 'Perplexities from the nature of Number, of Time, and of Being' 'are our real stumblingblocks, causing the wisdom of God to be received as the foolishness of men.' 'There is a real mystery of God revealed in the Christian dispensation.' 'But'—'there is a mystery attached to the subject which is not a mystery of God,' but which is the result of 'theories couched under a logical phraseology.'"

IV. "We have now to 'review another class of controversies'—those 'relating to divine and human agency,' grace and predestination, exhibiting the scholastic philosophy as 'a subtle instrument of spiritual power,'—'an application of processes in the mind to processes in nature,' a method of

reasoning which is very fallacious, out of which on these questions nothing can come but the confidence of mere reason, and a false enthusiasm that fashions the idol before which it prostrates itself."

V. "We 'now come to those views of human agency which are contained in the doctrines of original sin, faith, merit, repentance'—in one word, justification in its implications, operations, and consequents, and the several 'theories involved in their expression.' 'They stand forth to the view of our Speculative Reason with a point and precision given to them by the action of disputation. They excite in us the idea of accuracy of thought, of definiteness of conception; and we contemplate them with a fearful suspicion, lest we should err to the right hand or to the left in our mode of embracing them.' 'Disputation has not suffered the plain methods of religion to take its course.' Speculative statements have been made, and from these certain consequences have been deduced; and the Scriptures have been searched to verify these deductions. In the pursuit of these discussions a technical phraseology has been introduced; and to systematize the whole, definitions and explanations have been drawn from the physical and moral sciences, and woven into theology by the subtleties of logic, and we ought not to feel over confident that these theories contain either the whole of, or nothing less, than the whole truth of God.

VI. "We are brought in this survey of scholastic philosophy to notice 'its mode of treating the law written in our hearts, and the influence which it has exercised on the frame and the language of morals.' 'The truths of revelation were to be steeped into the heart,' 'and the philosophy of human life' is made a 'moral theology.' 'It is the life of God in the soul of man that is presented to our notice.' But 'theology and ethics are entirely distinct in their nature, in the principles on which they are based.' In theology human nature is 'regarded under a single point of view, that of its relation to the Author of its existence.' 'Moral philosophy, on the other hand, surveys human nature in its moral and intellectual constituents, as they are related and combined principles of action. Every action that we see outwardly—every judgment that we exercise within ourselves—every feeling as we indulge or control it, presents a moral phenomenon demanding explanation.' 'Christianity, in fact, leaves ethical science, *as such*, precisely where it found it; all the duties which ethical science prescribes remain on their own footing; not altered or weakened, but affirmed and strengthened by the association of religion'—both are indispensable to the perfection and happiness of human nature."

VII. "'The preceding views of the scholastic system have presented the action of a subtle system of materialism, commencing with the divine grace infused into the soul, and working itself out by the various principles of human nature. The will of God, regarded as the primary cause of all activity, has been traced, as it takes effect in the operations of the Christian soul, and raises up the fallen child of Adam to the perfection of the sons of God.' 'The grace of God repairs the natural defects of the soul, and brings it into union with Christ.' 'The theory of the sacraments' proceeds on the same view of human salvation. They are represented as 'the visible channels through which virtue was conveyed from Christ Himself to His mystical body, the Church.' 'The word sacrament itself' 'expressed, at first, very solemn mysterious truths of religion; and afterwards, by the usage of the schools, was appropriated to those acts in particular by which grace was conceived to be imparted to the soul under outward and visible

—again. 'The seven sacraments of the Church of Rome' 'are applications of the passion or the priesthood of Christ' 'to Christians, either individually or as members of the Christian society.' 'Baptism confers the grace of regeneration, the new spiritual life by which man becomes the child of God.' Confirmation gives the increase of that life. By the Eucharist it is strengthened and vivified; by Penance recruited from the effects of sin; Extreme Unction removes the last relics of the sinful nature, preparing the soul for its departure. These, then, are the influences of Christ's passion on Christians in their personal capacity. But the Christian society needs to be supported both in its natural and in its spiritual existence. The grace annexed to matrimony supports the natural life in order to the spiritual; since the Christian must first be born into the world that he may afterwards be regenerated in Christ. The sacrament of orders, analogous to matrimony in the spiritual community, is the grace of Christ's passion, continuing the vital succession of ministers, the living instruments through whom all grace is imparted to the Church.' 'The simplicity of Scripture truth has been altogether abandoned, in the endeavour to raise up, on the solemn ordinances appointed by our Lord for the edification, and charity, and comfort of the Church, an elaborate artificial system of mystical theurgy.'"

VIII. "The nature and use of dogmatic theology comes next into consideration, and we are led to ask it 'a technical statement of the sacred truth necessarily involves so much of human theory,' 'how far are all human summaries of faith to be admitted?'

"The discussion on which I am now entering is an arbitration of the point where divine truth ends and human truth commences; or, where the certainty of divine fact ceases, and the probability of opinion takes its rise, in matters of religious belief and conduct. For it is the confusion of the limits of these two things that brings perplexity into the subject, occasioning fallacious inductions from one ground of assent to the other. . . . Hence it is that writers, in different ages of the Church, have been so often employed in debating the respective provinces of faith and reason. A confusion of thought has been constantly prevalent on the subject. The very circumstance of treating faith and reason as *distinct principles* is an evidence of this confusion: as if the assent to divine truth could be an act of *faith*, in any way *distinct* from an act of reason. The mischief of such a statement of the case is, indeed, too apparent from experience. The indolent, or the sensitive mind, readily seizes on a distinction, which, to the one, saves the trouble of thought and diligent examination,—to the other, supplies a pious sentiment for the acceptance of any wild or even repulsive doctrines of religion. To say this is of faith—that is of reason—peremptorily silences all suspicions and misgivings of the judgment and the heart. Persons are thus led to overlook the analogy of God's dealings with *His* creatures; and to imagine that the truths of the world of grace are to be received and judged by a *different* set of principles from those which are applied to the ordinary providences of God. On this hypothesis there is nothing so extravagant that may not be admitted as part of divine truth. . . . Many a devout and excellent mind, I fear, has been seduced from sober religion by this speculative distinction between faith and reason. . . . It is sometimes stated that reason is concerned about the *evidence* of religion, faith about the *things revealed*;—a distinction which leaves the real matter of dispute altogether untouched; since it is about the various

things themselves proposed to our belief that we want a criterion. . . . We may be thus led to ascribe to tradition the authority of Scripture, and to receive the truth of man with the deference due only to the truth of God.

"The Scriptures supply us with *divine* truth, but creeds give us *human* statements of that truth. 'In the history of doctrines, when we look to their scriptural source, we may affirm that *whatever is first is true, whatever is of a subsequent period is corrupt*; but at the moment that we step out of this sacred enclosure the maxim proves to us a most fallacious guide.' 'In fact the reverse of it is much nearer to the truth.' 'The earlier fathers are, in reality, much less *instructive* than the later.'

"Equally fallacious is the idea of the advocates of *Patristism*:—that whatever is logically deducible in the way of consequence from any given divine truth must also be true.' Here 'the cogency and perspicuity of logic are mistaken for the certain and clear discovery of religious truth,' 'and the conclusions of human reason will naturally be intruded on the sacred truth.' 'The Church-leaders, in the endeavour to maintain at once an authoritative and an argumentative theology, incurred the error of confounding truth of fact with truth of opinion;' the former of which admits 'no additional certainty from the progress of discussion,' the latter of which is 'of a nature to be modified and improved, and established by the course of time, by the progress of civilization and arts and knowledge, by accessions of experience, by the conflict of judgments.'

"'In the Scripture itself there are no *doctrines*.' 'Dogmas of theology; these, *as such*, are human authorities.' 'They assume their form by the successive impressions of controversy.' Dogmatic theology is 'a collection of negations; of negations of all ideas imported into religion beyond the express sanction of revelation.' Hence 'those entirely pervert its nature who reason on the Terms of Doctrines as if they were the proper ideas belonging to religion.' 'We must not suppose that the same immutability belongs to articles of religion which we ascribe properly to Scripture facts alone.'

"Scholasticism, indeed, has passed away as to its actual rude form, in which it appeared in the Middle Age. But its 'dominion has endured;' and 'though we do not acknowledge submission to its empire, we yet feel its influence.' To emancipate ourselves we need not cast away our faith, nor need we fear 'any ultimate shock to the real truths of Christianity by the most searching investigation,' for that properly pursued 'will inculcate on us candour, forbearance, charitable construction of the views of others, an humble and teachable disposition towards God.'"

It is easy to see how the exposition of opinions like these, when earnest men were eager to bring the Church back nearer to the age of acquiescent faith and patristic submissiveness, brought down on the head of their advocate the terrible accusation of latitudinarianism; it laid so bare the roots of ritualism; it proved so fully the essential worthlessness of the perusal of the library of the fathers, as a means of getting nearer to the truth of God on matters of faith and practice; it exposed so thoroughly the futility of those who believed that they were guarding and defending the true faith of a Christian, by hedging him in with a barrier and fortress of creeds and articles to which, if he did not yield his assent and consent, he

was to be held beyond the pale of the Church, the University, and the active life of the State in its parliamentary and municipal fields; and it supplied a foundation so philosophically and theologically investigated and tested for the advocacy of the opening of the Church, the University, and civil life to Dissenters, that it is scarcely to be wondered at that High Churchmen stood up against these views and their advocate as assailants of the very fortress of the Most High, when they had time to see the influence and effect they had on the changes in progress, in society, and the church.

In 1833 Hampden succeeded John Dean in the principalship of St. Mary's Hall, on the nomination of William Wyndham, Lord Grenville, chancellor of the university, and with the assent and consent of the heads of houses, by their formal acquiescence in the nomination and their real confirmation of the appointment. In 1834, while still holding this preferment within the university, he was elected, in succession to William Mills, B.D., to be professor of moral philosophy, on the foundation of Dr. White. The electors were the vice-chancellor (George Rawley, D.D., master of University); the proctors for the time being (J. H. Dyer of Trinity, and William Harding of Wadham); the Dean of Christ Church, (Thomas Gaisford, D.D.), and the presidents of Magdalen's and St. John's (Dr. M. J. Routh and Dr. Ph. Wynter.) One of the qualifications for holding this professorship is that the person "should be commended for the purity of his faith." Some of the lectures which he delivered from this chair have been published, and have approved themselves to the most competent critics as meritorious expositions of the principles of duty, and have been for a long time accepted and employed as a text-book in the university. In this same year Hampden published a pamphlet containing "Observations on Religious Dissent," with particular reference to the use of religious tests in the university; and following up the liberal and enlightened programme of this pamphlet, he became, in 1835, a most enthusiastic supporter of a measure which had received, it is said, the concurrence of the new chancellor of the university (the Duke of Wellington), for the substitution of a declaration of agreement with the doctrines of the Church, as far as the knowledge of the declarant went, instead of the unqualified assent and consent to all that is contained and even implied in the thirty-nine articles, which was then required of all who entered Oxford University. This liberality provoked the growing party of the Tractarians, and all those who tended to High Church principles; and the political defenders of Church and State saw that Dr. Hampden had placed himself in opposition to the good old standard fashion of retaining things as they are, especially in such a place of influence and power as the university. Philosophical, political, and religious animosities thus thickened around him, and partizanship, sectarianism, and scholastic feud and warfare were prepared for him. Dr. Pusey had joined Newman, Froude, Wilberforce, and

Ward. The "Tracts for the Times" had been begun, the "Library of the Fathers" had been projected, and the conservative forces in favour of Church and State were knitting themselves against the liberal aggression in which Hampden was taking a prominent place. It was determined to attack the leaders and so discomfit the host.

On the death of Edward Burton, D.D. (1794-1836),—a man of great ability, of candid disposition, and of extensive acquirements, especially concerning Christian antiquities, who had been Bampton Lecturer in 1829, and read sermons under that appointment, which unitedly form "An Inquiry into the Heresies of the Apostolic Age;" displaying such an acquaintance with Patristic lore as led to his being elected regius professor of divinity immediately after their delivery—the principal of St. Mary's Hall was chosen to succeed him. Thus the expositor of the evil effects of scholasticism—the later philosophy of the Church—became the professorial successor of the opponent of Gnosticism and the errors of the early philosophers of the Church. It was an appointment on many grounds most fitting. In ability and desire to make history, criticism, and philosophy the handmaids of religion; in learning, thoughtfulness, and fervency, Hampden was not the inferior of Burton, while, in reference to the more peculiar tendencies of Oxford thought at the time, his special acquirements made him a far more valuable leader of the minds of a student throng. But Newmanism demanded the ascendancy of the scholastic spirit, and conservatism required that freedom of speculative thought should receive a check; and an agitation which stirred the land—in which the bishops of Oxford and of Exeter took the lead—was begun in opposition to the regius professor of divinity who had been so gazetted 20th February, 1836.

A party in the University petitioned the King to rescind the appointment made by the advice of the ministry of the day, and so to denude Dr. Hampden of the office of regius professor of divinity, on a charge of being a setter forth of the theory of Rationalism. To this petition no attention was paid. This party next met in the Common Room of Corpus Christi College, and appointed a committee to manage the opposition to Hampden's professoriate. This committee drew up a declaratory protest, in which the members affirmed that Dr. Hampden systematically taught Rationalism, and that it would be detrimental to the interests of religion that he should prelect on divinity in this high academic office. This declaration, drawn up by a committee of five, was adhered to by seventy-six graduates, fellows, and tutors. This party next petitioned the Board of Heads of Colleges to propose two measures to the Convocation. 1st. That an address should be presented to the Board of Bishops requesting them not to require from candidates for orders certificates of attendance on the lectures of the regius professor of divinity, and to accept of those referring to the class of the Margaret professor of divinity—Dr. Godfrey Faussett—Bampton Lecturer on "The Claims of the Established

Church, 1820." 2nd. That a statute should be passed by the University to divest the regius professor of divinity of certain powers attached to his office, such as a vote in the nomination of the select preachers, and an adjudicating voice in cases referring to heretical preaching, &c. The Heads of Houses refused at first their assent to these proposals, but after considerable pressure they were prevailed on to propose the statute for relieving Dr. Hampden from certain duties, and official notice was given that such a proposal should be considered on the 22nd of March, 1836. A perfect whirlwind of pamphlets, *pro* and *con.*, ensued. *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine* and the *Edinburgh Review*, the Church serials, and the newspaper press took part in the affray; and the library of controversy had quite a load of material laid upon its shelves. Many of these are now scarce and rare, several are curious, and not a few have now lost all, if they ever had any, importance. A list of these would but encumber our pages, and an epitome of them would be tedious, and would unduly lengthen this paper. We may, however, note that one of these pamphleteers—a man of undoubted gifts and powers, Wm. Joseph Irons, D.D., author of "An Epitome of the Bampton Lectures of Dr. Hampden,"—has been appointed to deliver the 1870 Bampton Lecture, and may soon know the perils of that great eminence. In the midst of this discord the time came for the "Inaugural Lecture" of the regius professor of divinity to be read before the University. This was done on 17th March, 1836, before an immense crowd of excited hearers gathered together from all quarters. We quote the following from Dr. Arnold's article in the *Edinburgh Review*, April, 1836, written, however, it should be remembered, in the very heat and turmoil of the strife:—

"It was a trying moment; for as the professor looked round upon his audience he saw the well-known faces of his persecutors, who had already shown abundantly that they were of those who make a man an offender for a word, and who were come to his lecture, not to be convinced, not to be softened, not to listen and to judge with fairness and truth, but to lay hold upon every expression, to misunderstand or misrepresent his matter, and to pervert his tone and manner; ready to call conciliation, cowardice; and firmness, pride. Yet from this fiery ordeal Dr. Hampden came forth nobly triumphant. It was touching to observe the subdued emotion of his countenance, and the unequalled and unexcited dignity of his voice. It was beautiful to mark how he had triumphed over opposite temptations—how meekly and patiently he laboured to remove misunderstanding—how honestly he abstained from one word of unworthy compromise—yet how heroically he forbore from every expression of resentment or contempt towards the faction of his unworthy calumniators."

From the same source also, we quote some of the closing words of this famous "Inaugural," which went into many editions in a few weeks:—

"I appeal from an excited spirit to a spirit of soberness and candour; I demand not to be tried by the conclusions of an adverse school, but by the calm and gentle reason of men disposed to give me credit for no less love of the truth and the faith than themselves, and who will openly contend with me by argument, not by censure and intimidation, and the array of hostile numbers. . . . I am at all times ready to meet fair and free discussion, but to misrepresentation, and clamour, and violence, with God's help, I will never yield. I pray God to forgive those who may have employed such weapons against me, and to turn their hearts, and to grant them more of that mind which was in Christ Jesus. It is a great grief to me, I acknowledge, to know that there are any whose honest though mistaken zeal I have offended. Such are, I trust, open to conviction and kinder feelings; I should, however, unless experience had furnished ample instances of it, wonder that Christian zeal should in any individual have carried him to proceedings destructive of Christian purity and peace. A sense of Christian duty and the kind feelings of the heart will never, I believe, be found apart from each other, and least of all, in doing 'the work of the Lord.' . . . After all, however, I appear not here as a functionary of the University, or of the Church alone, but as the servant of a Master in Heaven, by whose judgment I must stand or fall."

The appeal was unavailing. The common sense school of Christianity, those who were willing to give and to get *evidence* for the faith that was in them, must be subdued, if possible, before Tractarianism; those who looked upon faith, no matter how attained, as the highest Christian virtue. The most active and urgent measures were used to influence those who had votes to pass the Statute of Attainder, which was to come before Convocation on the 22nd of March. Broadsides, placards, squibs, circulars, statements, explanations, elucidations, hortations were multiplied and abounded.

Condemnation, not by public trial, but by public vote—the lynch law of a packed meeting seemed all but imminent. A dexterous feat in collegiate tactics gave pause to the foregone vote of censure. "By the constitution of Oxford, if the two proctors are agreed, they can interpose a *veto* upon any measure brought forward by the Heads of Houses, and thus prevent it from being submitted at all to the votes of the Convocation." The proctors on 19th March gave official notification that they would negative the statute. The protector proctors were Edmund Geo. Bayly, of Pembroke College, and Henry Reynolds, of Jesus College. Convocation passed a resolution, by 500 to 30, condemnatory of the doctrines of the divinity-professor, and notified their indignation at the exercise of their statutory right by the proctors; thereafter the majority adjourned to Brazenoze Hall, to indulge still further in the luxury of denunciation, and the eloquence of disappointed religious hate. Among the speakers were Lords Kenyon and Encombe, Mr. A. Trevor, and Dr. Pusey.

We quote the following remarks by Archbishop Whately, on the Hampden persecution:—

"In Hampden's case it must be owned I did not anticipate any outbreak so monstrous as did ensue; and what is more, if I had remained head of

Alban Hall, it would never have taken place. This is quite certain, for my successor [Dr. Edward Cardwell] was one of the most violent of the persecutors, and the measure passed the Board of Heads by *one* vote. There have been, perhaps, other persecutions as unjust and as cruel (none more so, if we take into account the times and circumstances of each,) for burning of heretics is unsuited to the present age, and, moreover, was not in the power of the Hampden persecutors; they did all they could and dared, and so did Bonner; but for impudence I never knew the like. To find out, three years after the Bampton Lectures had been delivered, and two years after they had been published, that they were dangerously heterodox, though they had passed at the time not only unanswered, but with high applause. There never was a more lame and palpably false pretence so shamefully brought forward."

It is worthy of note that these Orielists,—Arnold, Whately, Hawkins, and Hinds, stood nobly by Hampden, and strove mightily to prevent the party with which Keble, Newman, and Pusey (also Orielists) acted, from succeeding in this vigorous endeavour to crush modern thought under patristic fanaticism.

We subjoin also extracts from Dr. Arnold on Hampden, his lectures and his labours:—

"Hampden's Bampton Lectures are a great work, entirely true in their main points. I think the scholastic philosophy has obscured and excited a prejudice against the divinity of Christ as the great point in Christian theology." "I am rather thankful myself for having been enabled to receive Scripture truth in spite of the wrapping which has been put around it." "Hampden is a good man and an able one; a lover of truth and fairness; and I should think that the wholesome air of such a man's lectures would tend to freshen men's faith, and assure them that it had a foundation to rest upon."*

"Hampden is doing what real Christian reformers have ever done; what the Protestants did with Catholicism, and the apostles with Judaism. He upholds the articles as true in substance; he maintains their usefulness, and the truth and importance of their doctrines; but he sees that the time is come when their phraseology requires to be protested against as having, in fact, obstructed and embarrassed the reception of the very truths which they intend to inculcate. He is engaged in that same battle against technical theological language to which you and I have, I believe, an equal dislike; while he would join us thoroughly in condemning the errors against which the articles were directed, and holds exactly the language and sentiments which Cranmer and Ridley, I believe, would hold if they were alive now."†

Lord Holland set himself in opposition to "the impudence of the intolerants of Oxford." Blanco White felt the utmost sympathy with Hampden. Bunsen held that the opposition was malignant, and must be futile. F. D. Maurice and John Sterling both exerted themselves to affect opinion in Hampden's favour. Whately and Arnold were among the most indignant of those who upheld Hamp-

* Arnold's "Life," vol. ii., p. 29.

† Letter to Rev. J. Hearn, Arnold's "Life," vol. ii., p. 31.

den's claim to independence of thought, and resisted those who would have made it a crime to debate questions of moment with a zeal for truth. But it is quite evident that these men did not so co-operate in their opposition to this ecclesiastical persecution from any doctrinal unity among them, or any devotion to dogmas common to them all, but from a sincere belief in the worthiness of inquiry, in the prevalence of truth, and in the conviction that by the enlargement of speculation faith would be brought into harmony with reason. They were men of diverse views in matters of detail and measures of reform, in regard both to doctrines and to forms; but they were at one in their desire to achieve for man that intellectual freedom which places conviction above authority, which resists the imposition of restraints on the faculties of the soul in their efforts after the attainment of a knowledge of truth and righteousness, and which prefers subjective principles of faith to the objective adherence of men to creeds and articles.

Fourteen years before this period of party polemics, Whately had, with a prescient sense of the evil and danger of letting loose the passions of men on topics of such a serious nature, chosen for the subject of his Bampton Lecture, 1822, "The Use and Abuse of Party Feeling in Religion." But Oxford was not to be so preached out of its evil inclinations. Partisanship grew stronger and stronger, both in politics and in ecclesiasticism. Conservatism seemed to have settled itself down into obstructiveness. Against every man who moved off the beaten tracks of previous thought, and gave the reins to what was original within him, the statutory forms were opposed as a barrier, and terrorism became the safeguard against errorism. Political power was passing away; all the more requisite was it, therefore, to strengthen ecclesiasticism, and maintain the leadership of the clergy. High Churchism came into vogue on the one hand, and Evangelicism on the other, both truly believing that patience and faith form the strength of the Church, and both ignoring the need of a "reasonable faith," as a proper ground whereon to let patience have her perfect work, and both arraying the forces of party, rather than of conviction, against each other. A contest of interdicts, suspensions, prosecutions, and petty persecutions was begun—now one side gaining, then another; technicalism all the while accumulating round the interpretations of Scripture, and weaving a network of legal phraseology around the Word of the living God, and Oxfordism was meanwhile glorifying herself as *defensor fidei*, though Peter himself was rebuked for touching the sword, even *in extremis*, as a defence.

To have established it as a fact that any clergyman who, in the course of critical, historical, or philosophical investigations, had been led to entertain opinions different from those which prevailed among his colleagues in the Church prior to these investigations having been undertaken, or their results having become known, should be prohibited from holding any official position in the Church, or exercising any ecclesiastical function, and should be

compelled to relinquish any and every form of public ministrations, as a suggestor of schism and doubt, or a follower of divisive courses, would have been excessively disastrous to the Church, not only as a national institution, but as an incorporation of fellow-workers and worshippers. It would have severed inquiry and faith, and would have exposed the honesty of every holder of office in the Church to suspicion. The suppression of the expression of opinion is no guarantee of the retraction of a clear conviction of the reason, and it has long been accepted as a proverbial truth that—

“He who complies against his will,
Is of the same opinion still.”

To have labelled and libelled the Church as an organized hypocrisy would have been a sad result of her ecclesiastical and legal machinery, and this, we fear, is all that success, in this case, would have accomplished.

The regius professor of divinity protested against the finding of Convocation, by which he was denuded of certain rights and privileges conferred on him *ex officio* as occupant of the chair, and he performed with exemplary zeal the duties of the canonry of Christ Church, which was attached to that professoriate. In 1836 he issued “Parochial and other Sermons.” In 1837 he republished his Bampton Lectures, with an Introduction, explanatory and exculpatory; in 1839, a work “On Tradition;” in 1840 and in 1844 other volumes of sermons were issued; and in 1847 he published a treatise on “The Work of Christ and the Spirit.” He subsequently, we believe, regained the legal right of sitting as an examiner in Divinity.

The furious controversial storm through which he had passed, and over which he had so far ridden triumphantly, though assuaged by time, was not exhausted. On the contrary, it was renewed with fresh virulence and violence when, in 1847, he was raised to episcopal honours as Bishop of Hereford. Though his appointment employed the pens of many of the ablest members of the Church of England, and attracted the attention of men of all parties, and gave rise to quite a library of pamphlets, it failed to excite or move public opinion, to appal the bishop-designate, or to coerce the Government into rescinding the nomination.

The arguments which were chiefly relied on by the opponents of the elevation of Dr. Hampden to the prelacy were chiefly these,—that he was heterodox in his theological opinions, that he was formal, pedantic, and scholastic in his personal habits, and that, while his sphere of duty seemed to be that of a collegiate hall, or some other confined and peculiar scholarly charge, he was unsuitable, by habits, training, and sympathy, for the management of a diocese, which required singular tact and qualifications in its spiritual overseer. But the main exciting cause of the hostility was the heterodoxy of Hampden. Thirteen bishops protested against

the appointment; petitions against it were presented to Lord John Russell from clergy, writing from every part of England; the Bishop of Oxford instituted a suit against Hampden for heresy before the Archbishop of Canterbury; and the "Young England" sonneteers set the muse in harness to oppose the appointment of, as Lord John Manners in his verses phrased it, the second "John Hoadley." The Ministry remained firm under this fire of pamphlets and petitions, of lawsuits and sonnets. While the bishop-designate remained passive, many of the most eminent men in the Church espoused his cause, and politicians differed and debated. In the diocese of Hereford the opposition, fanned by the Tractarian party, rose to an intense height, resistance was counselled and contemplated in every form and fashion, and not a stone was left unturned to prevent his filling the throne in Hereford cathedral. Dean Merewether even went so far as to inform the Prime Minister that, on the presentation of the *congé d'elire* and the accompanying letter-missive from the Sovereign, containing the nomination to him as the Dean, and to the Chapter, he would, despite the penalties of *præmunire*, refuse to vote for Dr. Hampden. To this letter Lord John Russell returned the following suggestive reply—much more concise than his Lordship's epistles usually were:—"Sir,—I have the honour to receive your letter of the 22nd inst., in which you intimate your intention of violating the law. J. RUSSELL. Dec. 25th." On 28th December Dr. Hampden was elected to the see of Hereford, in the chapter-house, by fifteen votes against two. Among the bishop's opponents were Dean Merewether, Canon Huntingford, Canon Powell, vicar of Cirencester, Dr. Jebb, rector of Peterstow, Rev. W. H. Huntley, vicar of Alderbury. When the great chapter was held, seventeen members attended; when the *congé d'elire*, which had passed under the Great Seal on 11th December, was read, Dean Merewether and Canon Huntingford protested against proceeding with the election while the suit against Hampden for heresy was pending, and subsequently moved the postponement of any division. These fifteen voted for obeying the *congé d'elire*:—Archdeacon Weatherall, Canon Morgan, Lord Saye and Sele, Canon Musgrave, dean of St. Asaph, Hon. and Rev. J. S. Cooks, Revs. J. Jonson, R. Briscoe, Waities Corbett, Canon Evans, J. B. Webbe, Sir G. F. Lewis, Right Hon. and Rev. O. W. W. Forrester, Rev. R. M. Pemberton, and the Venerable Archdeacon Frere. The opposition, however, did not end here; it was renewed by protest, and in every other possible form, at every step. He was pursued into the Archbishop's Court, which was, as is customary, held for the nominal purpose of confirming the choice made by the Dean and Chapter of the Bishop-elect. On the usual question being put as to whether any objection was offered to the life, faith, or election of the presentee as a cause why election should not be confirmed and consecration be ordered to follow, an objector appeared. He was, however, summarily silenced, and an appeal was taken that the objection should be received and recorded. The

case was argued in the Court of Queen's Bench, and it was decided that the objector had no right to interrupt the procedure of the Archbishopial Court. The case was thereafter referred to the long drawn out proceedings to be taken in regard to a charge of heresy, but the affair never came to a definite conclusion in the ecclesiastical court. The proceedings requisite for installation were, however, proceeded with, and opposition practically ceased. At length Renn Dickson Hampden was duly consecrated ninety-fourth bishop of Hereford, Dr. Samuel Hinds, afterwards Bishop of Norwich, having been selected to preach the consecration sermon—an office which he performed in a vigorous, thoughtful, and appropriate discourse, on the preparation of which great care had been expended, and which was published. An account of the legal and official proceedings connected with the appointment of Dr. Hampden to the see of Hereford, which, however, we have been unable to procure, was published immediately after the consecration. It contained extracts from the canonists, collated with the original authorities and translated, with notes, with an appendix, and all things seemed to have settled down for a persistent paper warfare and pamphleteering controversy.

A rather singular circumstance, however, caused the excitement to subside somewhat suddenly. Within a few weeks of each other no fewer than five bishops were put under "fell arrest" by death; thus Bristol, Lichfield, Ripon, Ely, and Clonfert became vacant, and the Government had a considerable amount of patronage to dispose of. To wage war against Dr. Hampden might offend the Melbourne ministry, whose nominee he was, and so avert a mitre from a desiring if not a deserving brow. A salutary lull in the agitation occurred, and an expectant calm fell upon the Church, as it was hard to tell to whom the elevating hand of the prime minister might be extended. After this experience of the intense bitterness of the *odium theologicum*, Bishop Hampden resolved on simple devotion to his episcopal duties, sacred and administrative; he sedulously avoided disputations and publications, except such as were brought about in the course of his political life in the Upper House, or were rendered necessary by his official position. Except his "charges," no fresh publication has been added by him to the stores of English theology—such as our bishops were wont to make, and as he might above most have been expected to do who united in himself the learning of a Bentley, the intellectuality of a Butler, the independence of a Whately, and the spirituality of a Bickersteth. This twenty years of silence may be clearly attributed to the eager persecution in the Church of diversity of opinion as a crime.

Hampden was exceedingly chary of putting the force of the Church in operation against opinion; and chose rather to suffer the voice of adverse criticism to be raised against himself, than to promote persecution for opinion's sake. He, for instance, resisted taunts, menaces, and strong insinuations against his personal uprightness,

in preference to instituting a suit against F. J. Foxton, curate of Stoke Prior and Decklow, in his diocese, when, in 1849, he published his "Popular Christianity: its Transition, State, and Probable Development." In his outward demeanour Bishop Hampden was, we have been assured, unassuming and urbane, not only courteous but kind. In his official capacity he was attentive to duty, and earnest in well-doing. In private life he was affectionate and friendly. He enjoyed the respect and esteem of all who were brought into contact with him, lowly or lofty in rank or attainments, and by his clergy he was both beloved and honoured. Even his enemies learned to appreciate his purity of character, the self-sacrificingness of his disposition and his zeal for the peace and progress of the Church. His political opponents treated him with the admiration due to a worthy antagonist, whose honest faith in his principles was indubitable. For a prelate who held such bold opinions he was a man of most exemplary moderation and reticence.

Bishop Hampden married Mary, only daughter of Edward Lovell, Esq. of Felton, York; and of his family four survived him, the Rev. Edward Renn Hampden, M.A., rector of Cradley; Charles John Hampden, Esq., barrister; Grenville Hampden, Esq.; and Miss Henrietta Hampden. During the latter years of his life he suffered from serious illness—an illness which, during two years, incapacitated him from performing the duties of his bishopric. These were undertaken for him by the Bishop of Worcester. While he was unwell he met with an accident through the upsetting of a chair, upon which he was leaning in his weak state; the fall had such a serious effect upon him that he never rallied after taking his bed. He lingered about a fortnight, and on Thursday, 23rd April, 1868, he expired at his city residence, 107, Eaton Place. He passed away, after his stormy life, in peace; and as he had somewhat fallen out of notice from his lengthened illness, as well as his determined silence in theology, little attention was paid to the circumstance that a great, good, cultured, and earnest spirit had passed away from what was truly to him the church militant into the church triumphant, and had heard the voice of One saying,—

"Welcome to a land of rest."

Religion.

DO THE SCRIPTURES FAVOUR OR OPPOSE THE IDEA OF THE NATURAL IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—VIII.

It is a very important thing that men should hold nothing as a faith which is irreconcilable with the character of God as revealed in nature and in revelation, or inconsistent with the spirit and scope of the implications and declarations of the Scriptures.

It is believed by many to be quite an orthodox view of matters that the Scriptures teach that the soul of man is naturally immortal, and that this imperishability is such that, in regard alike to the souls of the repentant and the unrepentant, "death itself shall die"—"life everlasting" being conferred upon the elect, and "misery unending," as the vengeance of the Lord, being apportioned to those who are not among the chosen. According to this belief—

"Soon we must through darkness go
To inherit bliss unending
Or eternity of woe."

Some facts, however, appear to justify us in holding the idea that there is good reason for supposing that the Scriptures do not favour the idea that the soul is naturally immortal.

One sect which had, in the days of Jesus Christ, become the majority in the nation, doubted of the resurrection—the Sadducees. They evidently did not think that the Scriptures favoured the idea that the soul was naturally immortal. An able thinker has justly remarked that—"Although we find language in the Psalms indicative of a future state, yet the Jewish notion in regard to it was dim, and one sect denied it altogether."* Bishop Warburton too has contended that in the whole Old Testament, at least, there is no proof that the Jews believed in a future state of immortality as a natural endowment of man.

Neither the Apostles' Creed nor the Nicene Creed affirm the endlessness of the torment of the wicked; and hence they may be assumed to be proofs that the doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul did not appear to their authors to be favoured in the Bible. Even the Athanasian Creed does not necessarily imply this doctrine—unless it be first determined that the Scripture passages from which the expressions of that creed are adapted involve that doctrine. The same remark holds good of "The Book of Common Prayer." Even the Thirty-nine Articles contain no

* Science and Faith. By Gilbert Sutton, p. 5.

statement in regard to the natural immortality of the soul, or the endless misery of the unregenerate; and this must undoubtedly be held to signify that the idea is not favoured in Scripture, for such a doctrine was affirmed in the articles of 1552, of which these are a revival. Even the Catechism, issued by the Westminster Assembly of Divines—consisting of 121 divines, 30 laymen, and 5 commissioners from the Church of Scotland—in 1643, minute and particular as it is, does not attempt to affirm that the Bible favours the idea of the natural immortality of the soul. It contents itself with affirming that “Every sin *deserveth* God’s wrath and curse, both in this life and that which is to come;” but not that it *receives* that wrath and curse. Besides, though it has queries to the effect as follows:—What benefits do believers receive from Christ (1) at death and (2) at the resurrection? it has no complementary question, such as—To what miseries are unbelievers exposed (1) at death and (2) at the resurrection? I cannot help thinking that those are very remarkable facts in regard to the opinions entertained by these churches in their official representatives of the implications or affirmations of the Scriptures, that they have altogether felt it impossible, or all but impossible, to do any more than leave this a dark and doubtful unsolved point. We may justly, therefore, conclude that these are witnesses to the fact that the Scriptures do not favour, if indeed they do not oppose, the idea of the natural immortality of the human soul. If these official documents hesitate to affirm such a doctrine, many will hesitate to believe it.

A story is told of the life and times of Robert Burns, the Scottish Cowper—in genius, I mean, not in religiosity—which somewhat illustrates this subject. A stanza in a wicked witty poem, by the Ayrshire ploughman, entitled “The Holy Fair,” as he profanely styles the period of the celebration of the Holy Eucharist, stood thus in the first, or, as it was called, the Kilmarnock edition of his poems:—

“Now a’ the congregation o’er
Is silent expectation,
For Moodie spiels the holy door
With tidings of salvation.”

Moodie was a great preacher of the terrors of the law; of very curious appearance, as he is described by the poet. It was felt that the lines of the poem were not characteristic, because he so seldom dwelt on that side of the gospel scheme; and in a meeting of clergymen, when the poems were revised for a second or Edinburgh edition, it was suggested by the Rev. Hugh Blair, D.D., author of “Lectures on Rhetoric and the Belles Lettres,” and one of the most elegant preachers of the day, and carried unanimously, that the word “salvation” should be replaced by “damnation.” This would not have been “wit,” but “profanity,” had the tenet of the necessary immortality of the wicked after death been an article in the creed of their church.

I shall not presume to argue the question from any point of view
1869.

of my own. These facts weigh with me, and doubtless they have some relevancy to the matter in dispute. I recall them here that they may be taken into account by the debaters and their readers. I think the argument on the affirmative side is not strongly supported by argument, and that the preceding facts go very strongly against the reception of it as an orthodox truth that the soul is naturally immortal. Having regard to the impressive silence, or at least reticence of Scripture itself, and to the avoidance of explicit statements on the subject in the several standards of faith and doctrine referred to, I am inclined to throw in my vote with those who support the negative, and to assert that the Scriptures oppose, or at least do not favour the idea of the natural immortality of the soul—else how could life and immortality be *brought to light* by Jesus Christ in the Gospel? L. G. W.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IX.

IN the September number of the *British Controversialist*, a new disputant has appeared under the signature of Th. N., and with him a new theory. All who had previously written on the negative side of this question had, more or less distinctly, admitted that the soul of man, as it came from the hand of its Creator, was naturally immortal, and that, in the case of the wicked, its destruction would be the result of a punitive, judicial act of God. All this Th. N. denies; thus taking new ground, introducing new elements into the debate, and exposing himself, not only to the attacks of his enemies, but to the cross-fire of his friends. "The doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul," he says, "is a Platonic corruption of Scripture teaching," and that "There is no promise of soul-life after death," to ungodly men.

On reading his paper, one of the first things on which we felt disposed to comment was the strange idea he must have formed of the natural immortality of the soul.

First, he seems to suppose that it must involve that of the body; for he asks, "If man's soul was naturally immortal, why did God plant in the garden of Eden 'a tree of life,' having such power, that those who ate of it should live for ever?" Such a question sounds strange to one not under the influence of the theory of Th. N. He appears not to know that the "tree of life" has a provision to secure the life and health of man's body as long as he observed the divine prohibition; and that exclusion from it left man exposed to the action of those causes, both external and internal, which were certain to work his physical dissolution. And hence he, strangely enough, assumes that a medicinal provision for the continuance of the life and health of the body must be inconsistent with the supposition that the soul was naturally immortal. A palpable *non sequitur*.

Secondly, He seems to suppose that the natural immortality of the soul means that men possess such natural powers and proper-

ties as to render death an *impossibility*; and to have made it absurd for the Deity to say to Adam, "In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die;" for he goes on to ask, "How could Deity so represent matters, if death were an impossibility on account of the immortality granted to him at his creation, and inherent in his nature?" The wonder is, how Th. N. could ask such a question. Who says that death was an *impossibility*? Not those who maintain the natural immortality of the soul. We make a distinction between soul and body, if Th. N. does not. And we maintain that man is both mortal and immortal at the same time, though not in the same sense. And that, "In the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die," or,

"Dust thou art, to dust returnest;
Was not spoken of the soul."

And that if there had been any absurdity about the matter, it would have consisted in making provision for the *possible, everlasting* existence of a body, occupied by a naturally mortal, and hence, without a miracle, necessarily perishable soul. No one supposes that the natural immortality of the soul *would, or ought, to render death an impossibility now*; on what ground, then, does Th. N. assume that it either *would or ought* to have done so in the case of Adam?

Thirdly, He evidently supposes that by the natural immortality of the soul we mean that it *must* live for ever, and that even the Deity himself cannot destroy it. For, in addition to the foregoing about death being an "impossibility," he says, "If God did not take pleasure in His work, it would be to rob Him of His omnipotence to suppose that He could not bid it cease to exist." Now every intelligent defender of the natural immortality of the soul admits, first, that it is a derived immortality; secondly, that God can take it away and deprive the soul of existence, if He think fit; thirdly, that the natural immortality of the soul is simply its natural adaptation for endless existence. We predicate the absence of all natural causes in the soul itself to bring about its dissolution. We say, that it is naturally constituted to live for ever. We do not say that God cannot "bid it cease to exist;" but we do say that He has no where intimated that He *will* bid it cease to exist;—that not a passage in the Bible, when fairly interpreted, authorizes such an assertion, and Th. N. has adduced none.

The next remarkable thing in his paper is, "The dilemma into which we get by accepting the doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul." And what is this dilemma? Why, "If God can destroy evil and will not, can He be the God of love, even of everlasting love? And if He will and cannot, is He the Almighty?" And Th. N. thinks "We avoid any such incongruity of thought," *i. e.*, we escape this dilemma by denying this doctrine. But he is mistaken; for he is himself as fast between its horns as any one of his opponents; and we have only to vary the terms a little to make

this appear. "If God *could prevent* evil and would not, can He be the God of love, even of everlasting love? And if He would *prevent* evil and cannot, can He be the Almighty?" Were evil *prevented* there would be no need for its *destruction*, and every man would then be immortal, even upon the theory of Th. N. If *prevention* is better than cure, it certainly would have been in this case—and tenfold better than the cure Th. N. proposes; for *destruction* is no cure at all. How came divine love and divine power to *permit* evil to exist? If Th. N. will tell us that, we may perhaps afterwards find little difficulty in breaking the horns of his dilemma; until then, he is as certain of impalement as any one of his opponents. Such dilemmas, however, savour much more of irreverence than they do of wisdom. God has seen fit to permit evil to exist; there are fallen angels as well as wicked men. It was evidently consistent with His divine attributes not to prevent this; and where did Th. N. learn that it will be inconsistent with those attributes to allow these sinners to exist for ever and suffer the consequences of their sins? He must have got wise above what is written when he discovered that God is bound, in order to vindicate His character, to *destroy* what He was not, for the same reason, bound to *prevent*.

And what does Th. N. expect to gain by the following:—"If the opinions of S. S. were to prevail?" viz., that the punishment of wicked men would be everlasting. "What could men think of the Deity? Evil would be declared to be eternal, God would not be all in all; the spirits of evil would vanquish divine love; sin would be eternal; it would no longer be an accident of humanity, but an essential and integral portion of the universe of God." Now to all this I answer, first, that the opinions which Th. N. considers to be fraught with such disastrous consequences to the character of God *have* prevailed, and *do* prevail; they are not novelties in the earth; and the men amongst whom they have prevailed have thought as highly of the character of God as Th. N. It is his opinions that have not *prevailed* in the Christian Church. Secondly, *Sin* is not an *entity*, but an *act*; and the existence of sin means the existence of *sinners*. Are sinners *now* an "essential and integral portion of the universe of God?" If *not*, could their everlasting existence make them so? And if they *are*, then what more could they become by existing for ever? Thirdly, Is the devil to die and all his angels; are they mortal too? Because Th. N. gets over only a part of his difficulty by supposing that wicked men will perish. The annihilation of them would not be the destruction of evil from "the universe of God." Fourthly, Why would not "God be all in all?" If Th. N. will study these words in their connection, uninfluenced by his theory, he will see that they mean, as Dean Alford puts it, that God shall be "recognised as sole Lord and King" in *this* world—His will being done on *earth* as it is in heaven. And cannot this be the case unless the souls of wicked men be put out of existence, and fallen angels too? Fifthly, But

"the spirits of evil would vanquish divine love." Yes, just about the same as the prisoner vanquishes the police when he finds himself lodged in the cell of a prison. But perhaps Th. N. means that evil spirits would frustrate the purposes of divine love by perpetuating, in the persons of the lost, their own evil work. But how does he know that it is not a part of the purpose of divine love to permit this very thing? The *present* existence of both wicked men and evil spirits is not inconsistent with this purpose; why should their everlasting existence in hell, suffering the penal consequences of their evil doings, be inconsistent with it? But suppose the souls of wicked men destroyed, then would not the spirits of evil *vanquish* divine love when they had caused it to *destroy a part of its own work*? What greater success could they desire? If that would not be a triumph, what would? Nothing, then, is gained by the theory of Th. N. He only shifts the difficulty a little,—he neither removes it nor diminishes it; yet, out of deference to such a lame theory as this, he abandons the doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul!

The next point is his statements respecting the *life* and *death* of the soul. On this point he is vacillating and contradictory: the trumpet gives no certain sound. He says, "The laws of God are ordained unto life, and are only found to be unto death unto those who break them. Bodily death to those who do not observe the laws of bodily sanity, and spiritual death to those who neglect the laws of the spirit's life." The first part of this statement is misleading; for no man can live for ever by any observance of the "laws of bodily sanity." Death is as certain to the obedient as it is to the disobedient. There is no need now to break any law of God to bring about bodily death; death results from the very laws themselves. But what are "the laws of the spirit's life?" Th. N. answers, "If we do not accept that doctrine of philosophy, but the plain scriptural statement that holiness is the life of the soul, and while possibilities of holiness exist the soul is spared; that sin is death, and that when the soul is wholly given over to sin, it perishes," &c. Now it should be borne in mind that the life and death in question are not the *moral* life and death, but the *physical* life and death of the soul. Here, then, Th. N. asserts that *holiness* is this life, and *sin* is this death, and palms this doctrine upon the Scriptures! Holiness, however, is a moral quality, and not being a natural attribute of man must, if possessed, be acquired by a certain course of action; and it pre-supposes the existence of physical life in the soul in order to the performance of the actions and the acquisition of the quality. The same may be said respecting sin. If the soul did not possess physical life—if it had not the use of its natural powers and faculties—it could not commit sin. Holiness, then, is not the physical life of the soul; neither is sin its physical death. Men are *dead* to God when they feel no love to Him and render Him no obedience, but the physical life of their souls is not extinct; were that the case, their state would be a

celanity, not a fault; having no natural powers, how could they use them? If the theory of Th. N. were correct, then the soul of every ungodly man is now physically dead, and he has no soul. For Th. N. says, "But the spirit was allotted life so long as it remained free from sin," and, of course, no longer. But if a soul may now be "dead in trespasses and sins," and, at the same time, physically alive, then, it is evident, the death spoken of is not its physical death—not the extinction of its consciousness and natural powers; and hence not the death Th. N. asserts it to be.

But he varies his statements and shifts his ground with respect to both life and death. First, "Holiness is the life of the soul." Then, "Love to God in Christ Jesus is the very life of the soul." Again, "The Scriptures represent men as dead in their sins, and as made alive again through the righteousness of Christ." And yet again, "The principle of spiritual life is faith." Such varied statements show the crudeness of the theory, and how little logic has had to do with its construction. *Holiness* is an acquired quality, *faith* is an act of the soul, *love* is a feeling. And the *righteousness of Christ* is something altogether external to the soul. If any one of these be *the* life of the soul, then it *excludes* the rest from such relation; *they* cannot be its life. But we deny that any one of them, or all of them, is the life of the soul, in the sense in which that life is a subject of debate.

Respecting death, he says, "Sin is death." "The Scriptures represent men as dead in their sins," &c. Thus, in the case of every wicked man, death is an accomplished fact. He is *now* dead. But immediately afterwards death is represented as a *gradual* and *progressive* thing." Every soul by sinfulness becomes dead in proportion to its power over, or its dominion in the soul." Then death is represented as the natural termination of the soul's existence, like that of the body. "Of every such soul the doom is 'dying, thou shalt die,' no more life shall be granted to failures in God's vineyard." "Having ceased to be, no after life shall be vouchsafed." Then it is spoken of as a punitive infliction—a *judicial* termination of the soul's existence—a *public execution*. "So it is that the wicked is reserved for the day of destruction; they shall be brought forth to the day of wrath." What are we to make of such a Janus-faced theory? The logic and the theology of Th. N. seem equally at fault.

And now a word in reference to the position taken in his paper that "The doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul is a Platonic corruption of Scripture teaching." I am aware that he has not proved it, and I am satisfied that he cannot. The natural mortality of the human soul is a doctrine contrary to the whole tenor of the Bible; while its natural immortality, though not dogmatically asserted, is nevertheless assumed and implied in scores of places. As samples, I refer—

First. To the fact that man was made in the *image* and after the

likeness of God. Can a being not naturally immortal be in God's image, any more than a being not naturally rational, or not possessed of a moral nature? If intelligence and a moral nature are necessary to the image of God, then, certainly, a natural adaptation to endless existence is equally so. A soul naturally mortal cannot be in the image of the Immortal, any more than one naturally non-rational can be in the image of the All-Wise and Omniscient.

Secondly. To all those passages of Scripture which speak of men as being in *Sheol* or *Hades*; for these words scarcely ever mean simply the grave. *Sheol* and *Hades* are not places for men's bodies, but for men in a disembodied state. Thus Jacob says, speaking of Joseph, "For I will go down into *Sheol* unto my son mourning." Now Jacob did not believe his son to be in the grave, but "That an evil beast had devoured him;" yet this did not prevent him being in *Sheol*, and Jacob going down to him there, and finding him, and recognising him; for such the statement implies. All this would be absurd on the theory of Th. N.

Thirdly. To the case of the rich man in the parable:—"In *Hades* he lift up his eyes being in torments." Here is a proof that the souls of ungodly men survive the dissolution of their bodies, and hence, that they are naturally adapted to live for ever.

Fourthly. The statement of our Saviour in answer to the Sadducees—Luke xx. 38, "For he is not a God of the dead, but of the living; for all live unto him." We are told, Acts xxiii. 8, that the Sadducees denied not only a resurrection, but the existence of either *angel* or *spirit*; hence our Saviour's answer touches the three points of their unbelief. In respect to the last he asserts, "All live to Him." Hence none are annihilated, none cease to exist at death, and therefore all are naturally immortal.

Fifthly. To our Saviour's exhortation, Luke xii. 4, 5, "Be not afraid of them that kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do," &c. This shows that there is a soul that man *cannot* kill, and which, therefore, survives the body, and hence has a life not dependent on the life of the body, and which, even in the case of wicked men, does not terminate with their bodies; for if it did, then they who killed *their* bodies would kill their *souls*; and it would not require the power of God to kill a soul.

C. P. B.'s paper reached us too late to secure insertion; from it, however, we quote the following in regard to the scriptural argument for immortality here pressed by J. C. :—

"The first and chief authority on this subject must be the voice of our Lord and Saviour. What does He say on this subject? I turn to the Gospel of St. John, v. 28, 29, and read, 'Marvel not at this, for the hour is coming when *all that are in the grave* shall hear His voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good unto the resurrection of life, and *they that have done evil to the resurrection of damnation.*' I read also in Matt. xxv. 46, 'And these [*i. e.*, the wicked] shall go away into everlasting punishment; but the righteous into life eternal.' Of the rich man who cared

nought for Lazarus, we read in the words of Jesus, 'And in hell he lift up his eyes, being in torment, and seeth Abraham afar off, and Lazarus in his bosom,' &c., Luke xvi. 22, which could not have been the case if the soul of man was not naturally immortal, and if those who died in their sins died once for all. Plain as these passages from the lips of the supreme authority of this topic are, they are also supported by implication in the quotation made by John Baptist from the prophet Isaiah,—'*All flesh shall see the salvation of God,*' Luke iii. 6; though it by no means follows—let us hint to our Universalist friends—that they shall enjoy it.

"In exact conformity with this declaration St. Paul affirms, 'We must *all* appear before the judgment seat of Christ; that *every man* may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it is good or bad,' 2 Cor. v. 10. On this account the apostle of the Gentiles threatens the Romans that God will render 'unto them that are contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that doeth evil,' Rom. ii. 7, 8; for 'he that doeth wrong shall receive for the wrong which he hath done,' Col. iii. 25. The same view is enforced in the Old Testament, in which Solomon affirms that 'God requireth that which is just,' Eccles. iii. 15; and that 'God shall judge the righteous and the wicked,' Eccles. iii. 17. Again he affirms in regard to indulgences in sin, 'That for all these things God will bring thee into judgment,' Eccles. xi. 9; and he closes this remarkable book with the assurance that 'God shall bring every work into judgment, with every secret thing, whether it be good or whether it be evil,' Eccles. xii. 14. Here are the express declarations of Holy Writ; they show us that Jesus claims to be the Judge of all after death, and the awarder of punishment as well as the rewarder of righteousness. St. Paul affirms and Solomon confirms the same truth, a truth which implies that the soul of man is naturally immortal."

Sixthly. To the sentence that will be passed upon the wicked,—*"These shall go away into everlasting punishment."* This sentence shows that they will live for ever, and therefore proves to a demonstration their natural immortality.

One is amused at the absurdities into which P. W. B. falls (in the number for June) in endeavouring to escape this conclusion. He writes, "The duration of the fire of God's wrath and fiery indignation is, as indeed it must be, everlasting, the powers which he has endowed with efficacy to destroy sin, whether worm or fire, exert themselves for ever, but neither the bodies nor the souls of those who sin can endure burning everlastingly; and everlasting punishment can no more mean a punishment continually renewed and never ending, than eternal redemption can mean a redemption continually repeated and everlastingly carried on."

Now this singular sentence gives rise to the following among other absurdities:—First, that the fire of God's wrath and indignation against sin will continue when there is *no sin* to provoke it, and *no sinners* against which to direct it. Secondly, that the *worm* will continue *for ever*, though there will be nothing for it to feed upon; and the *fire*, though there will be nothing for it to burn—sin and sinners being destroyed. Thirdly, that punishment can be ever-

lasting, though there be no conscious being to suffer it—all such existence in the punished having ceased. Fourthly, that everlasting *wrath* and everlasting *punishment* will not be of the same duration. The wrath will never end, the punishment will. And may I not call a fifth absurdity the supposition that there can be any resemblance between everlasting punishment and eternal redemption? Is not *redemption* a work, or an act, which, when once performed, is *completed* for ever? But can a punishment which terminates—a punishment which ceases to be inflicted, and which ceases to be felt, be an everlasting punishment? If so, *all* punishment is everlasting, even whipping or the treadmill. And now, where did P. W. B. learn that “Neither the bodies nor the souls of those who sin can endure burning everlastingly?” How came he to be so well-informed on this point? And why did he not give us the reason, and thus escape the charge of dogmatizing? And now, suppose the souls of wicked men put out of existence by *fire*, or *worm*, or any positive, or special act of God; does not that very act of destruction prove their natural immortality? since, without such act, they would not have ceased to exist. Thus our opponents grant the very point they deny, viz., that in the soul itself there is no natural cause at work to produce its dissolution, and that it is, therefore, naturally immortal. J. C.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IX.

MAN cannot be happy in seeking his own happiness. It is the instinct of his nature as it is to do so; but it is the law of his nature that he should act otherwise. It is certain that those only fulfil the end of their being who love, serve, and glorify God. It is almost equally certain that those who do not fulfil this purpose of life fail in happiness. Many believe that to be happy is the duty of man. That is only his desire. His destiny is to glorify God. If he does not do this he fails to be what he was designed for, and Deity does not immortalize failures.

The idea that any being which has persistently defied the law of life, and gone on in presumptuous sin, may yet exist in alienation and offensiveness, and that during the endless date of eternity is surely not quite so honouring to God as many people suppose. Holiness is essential to the happiness (I say it not profanely) of the Deity. Evil is an abomination in his sight. Yet we are told that he who delights in holiness and hates sin will perpetuate that which he hates, and cause the pangs of never-ending woe to be felt by all who have forsaken the way of holiness. Is there an idea of the Lord of life more thoroughly opposed to all loveliness and loving-kindness than that? To grant free-will with the reward of life attached to its holy action, and to affix death as a punishment for wilful ungodliness is wholly proper; but to put life and death before man, and yet make death impossible to man, what is that but to make a riddle of divinity and a mockery of the Holiest One.

We fear that rhetoric has got the better of logic in this case. Men are so eager to excite horror and instil fear, men are so fond of high-sounding words that these two desires acting together have made theologians attach to their creed a meaning never intended. The longing of the soul for life, which is a witness of its nobleness, they have taken and made, by a rhetorical artifice, a commonplace for eloquence, and have drawn so vivid a contrast between the soul in its glorious endowments, and its fate as interpreted by them that they have come to think it a fact, though in its origin it was only a pious fiction. Man's feeling of immortality and desire for everlasting life only indicate the possibilities within him. These possibilities, if nurtured by holiness, will produce fruit unto eternal life; but if left unnourished and uncared for will certainly fade, wither, decay, and die.

It seems to be the very nature of sin to produce death; that he who prefers sin to holiness prefers death to life, and that he gains that which he labours for. The joys of this life are manifold; there are even pleasures in sin for a season, but the man who loves and practises these cannot lay claim to—I should say cannot in the least degree attain unto—eternal life, and must, by the inevitable process of his preference go down to an unceasing death.

This view of the matter is very simple if properly considered. Sin exists in the soul. It is a feeling of enmity against God, an indisposition to fulfil his will and obey his law. Out of the heart proceed evil thoughts and acts; the sin must therefore be in the heart, and the indwelling sinfulness of human nature may so manifest itself in the heart, even though it does not break out into open transgression. Indeed, theologians cautiously distinguish sin into two kinds, one in the heart being "want of conformity to God's law," and actual transgression or violation of God's law. Sin is not crime or vice, though vice and crime are sin. We cannot therefore say that children have never sinned; not even that they have never consciously sinned. That sinfulness is as them we know, as we know of all other occult qualities, from the manifestations in which they result; but we are not warranted to reason that the quality is not present, because we have seen no manifestation of its existence. We might as well affirm that explosiveness did not inhere in gunpowder, because we had never seen that which we were examining going off, as say that sinfulness was not present in a child, because we had observed no symptoms of its presence and power. Sin worketh death, and the soul that sinneth shall die, unless its life be renewed within it by Jesus the Lord. Physical death is the result of physical causes and physical disease; but the death of the soul proceeds from spiritual causes, and can only be averted by the gift of the Spirit, the grace and favour of God in Christ in pardon, adoption, and sanctification, in restoration from death in sin to life in holiness.

Here it is that my opinions come into conflict with those who support the affirmative of this question; but on the matter I reason

thus :—A cause does not cease to act because it has once acted. Though all men die through Adam's sin, either by consequence or by covenant, that does not intimate the operation of the constant law of God the soul that sinneth it shall die. When therefore H. K. says that if we assign the sin of Adam as the cause at once efficient and sufficient, we cannot assign without contradiction and confusion our own sinfulness, and the wicked acts which proceed from it as causes of the soul's death. He seems to mistake causation as one single shock and stroke, whereas it is a continuously operating power. Every law of God tends to life, every opposition to it tends to death; there is no vindictiveness in the operation of the law, it is all love. As surely as law is a law of life, so surely to the breakers of it does it become a law of death. It is punitive that it may be protective, and destructive that it may be disciplinary. Hence it is that we may be sure our sins will find us out; every sin works woe by the very nature of things, because it interferes with the working of the law of life, love, and happiness. While therefore we affirm that as an occasioning cause giving the first wrong bias to the soul, Adam's sin was efficient in bringing death upon all men, yet our own sins by continuing and increasing the power of the cause of death is an intensifying condition of death. The Adamic sin gives the first exertion of causation; but by our individual sins the cause is continued in efficacy and destructiveness.

E. S. D.

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

ALTHOUGH an unusually large number of articles have been written on the other side, yet, on glancing through the various pages, it may easily be perceived that they do not on the whole come really to the point, and that the great body of argument on the affirmative side still remains untouched.

It may be remarked that at the present time there is a large amount of theological contest on the subject of "annihilation," "duration of the punishment of the wicked," &c. Now one and all of these disputants admit that a portion, although a small portion, of mankind are immortal, although they attribute the possession of immortality only to the saved. But they do not even stop here, for they give the last a kind of semi-immortality, inasmuch as they say that even the lost will be raised again, and will be condemned, according to some, to eternal punishment, and, as others affirm, to punishment for ages on ages in the world to come, but that such punishment will cease, and the wicked be consumed; while there are others who assert that this punishment; shall endure until they are purified by it and made righteous.

Let us for a moment look at the article of P. O. S., and in so doing I should with all respect recommend him, in writing any future article, to be less dogmatic, and more argumentative. P. O. S. admits that man was created not only immortal, but to be

immortal, and he goes on to state that man sinned and forfeited this immortality. In plain language, that the Omniscient and Omnipresent God, having carried out His purpose in creating an immortal being, whom he purposed should continue immortal, allowed his purpose to be frustrated by his creature. And not only so, but P. O. S. affirms (in which I agree with him) that God made life dependent on obedience and submission. This is true; He made mortality dependent on obedience, but not immortality. The command was conveyed in these words:—"But by the tree of knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it; for in the day that thou eatest thereof *thou* shalt surely die." This is explained by the subsequent conversation, which God held with Adam after his fall,—"And unto Adam He said, Because thou hast hearkened unto the voice of thy wife and hast eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded thee saying, Thou shalt not eat of it; cursed is the ground for thy sake; in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life; thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee; and thou shalt eat the herb of the field; in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground; for out of it wast thou taken; for *dust thou art and unto dust shalt thou return.*"

It cannot but be observed that P. O. S., in saying that man is originally gifted and endowed *with the immortal soul which God breathed into him*, admits our whole case, and leaves in dispute only the question whether, in consequence of sin, mankind were deprived of mortal life, or of immortal life as well, which question does not come within the scope of the present controversy. P. O. S. endeavours to introduce the subject of the perpetuation of sin, but to do so would be equally as useless as to endeavour to solve the mystery why God allowed the introduction of evil or sin at all.

The life which is bestowed by regeneration is that life by virtue of which the regenerated man enjoys eternal happiness. The consequence of his natural immortality to the wicked is, that at the judgment day he is condemned to an eternity of punishment. Looking at the subject from this point of view, which is evidently the only view reconcilable with the destiny of the wicked as delineated in the New Testament, the whole of the remarks of P. O. S. on this part of the subject fall to the ground.

P. O. S. puts forth the theory that, "as evil shall not dwell in the sight of the Lord Jehovah for ever," it must be vanquished and extinguished." Now let me ask him to consider where this theory will lead him? He will find himself forced to believe either that the wicked are annihilated at their death, which is certainly in direct opposition to the teachings of Christ and the apostles, by whom they are certainly represented as being subjects of the resurrection and the judgment, or that their punishment will be limited, which is also opposed to his plan; for be the punishment limited or unlimited, God being Omniscient and Omnipresent, their exist-

ence and punishment must be within his sight and knowledge, and therefore the wicked must be more than mortal : or, he must adopt the further theory that the immortality of the regenerated consists in their being the first called to enjoy eternal happiness, and that the result of the punishment of the unregenerate will be their ultimate purification when they must, in virtue of Christ's merits, take their place at the throne of God ; and, should he adopt this theory, it is evident that it would be conceding that even those who were wicked at their deaths, and at the first judgment still retained their immortality. P. W. B.'s article is almost beyond criticism ; he tells us so many things which are unconnected with the subject. He says, " Destruction cannot be everlastingly inflicted, but being *once* inflicted on the *soul* (the italics are his own), it is eternal in its effects, results, and consequences—conscious personal being and existence will not be revouchsafed to those who have continued impenitently in sin—even in the hope that grace would abound. The unquenchable fire of God's wrath is an everlasting fire, but though its smoke is to go up forever, it is not asserted or implied that the sufferers in that burning lake shall endure its torments for ever, for even Death is to be swallowed up in the victory of Christ ; and hence, even if we were to grant that this second death of the soul did mean a being literally turned into a very and real lake of fire, even this fire of death must be swallowed up before all the enemies of Jesus can be put under Him, for even Death is to be destroyed."

From this theological chaos and amalgamation of different doctrines, it would seem at the first glance difficult to educe one coherent sentence. But let us endeavour to do so. P. W. B. evidently forgets that the essence and nature of the soul (if such a phrase may be used of a being which was never born) is immateriality and indestructibility, and therefore to talk of inflicting destruction on that which cannot be destroyed is simply absurd. But his next idea is, if possible, still more preposterous. He supposes that a portion of the human race will continue impenitent in their sins, " in the hope that grace would abound." Now I undertake to say, that if any man continue impenitent, it cannot be in the hope that grace will abound, for if the man be convinced (as he must be to maintain P. W. B.'s supposition) that he is a sinner, then that conviction will have produced the abounding of grace in his heart.

But P. W. B. further assumes that although the fire of God's wrath is to burn for ever, yet that such burning is to be continued but as a mask after all the condemned have been consumed. He challenges the admission, and I do admit most cheerfully, that this fire of death will be swallowed up before all the enemies of Jesus can be put under him, and that even death will be destroyed. The mode in which P. W. B. puts his argument places him in this inevitable dilemma, viz. :—either that a portion of the human race is created without souls, for he does not challenge the eternity of

the glory of the blessed, and that such portion is annihilated at their material death, or, if not annihilated, they are resuscitated to endure the fire of God's wrath for a period, and then annihilated; or, if we are to take into consideration his reference to the destruction of death, then that after enduring a purifying punishment they will join the ranks of the blessed, and so form a part of that "Restitution of all things" of which we are told by Paul—"God hath spoken by the mouth of all His holy prophets since the world began."

F. W.'s theory is somewhat peculiar. He admits that God created Adam with an immortal soul, but says that because he fell, the Almighty killed the soul, from which I suppose he concludes that mankind have since been born with dead souls. He winds up his article with a small sermon which is not by any means to be despised; but I will now examine the article itself for a few moments.

It bears the marks of ingenuity throughout, and especially in his mode of interpolating his own opinions in the midst of a quotation, so as to make it appear as if the text he quotes contains his own theory, *e. g.*, "If a man die shall he live again?" is a text he quotes, but he makes it read thus:—"If a man die"—unrenewedly and unregenerate, without being a partaker of grace, and without receiving the gift of God in Christ—"shall he live again?" by this means perverting to his own foregone conclusions the meaning of the passage quoted, which conclusions I do not hesitate to say have not been drawn from the Scriptures.

I do not stop to answer all F. W.'s assertions, and am glad that I can agree with him in, at any rate, one statement, viz:—that in which he says that the life spoken of as being condemned to death was "the life we live on earth;" but I ask how is that reconcilable with his next assertion that "it was in the *essential nature* of man's being that "the soul that sinneth it shall die," for then it no longer bore the 'image of God.'"

He thus puts forward to the world this heinous proposition, viz:—that God, being in himself pure, created Adam, and gave him as His *very essence*—*sin*, with the express purpose that that essence should make itself evident, and so force Adam to disobey. Why should God, if it were impossible to resist sin, command him *not* to sin, and point out to him what would be the consequence of sinning. In making these statements F. W. cannot have thought of their logical consequences. In this he attempts to sully the purity of the Almighty, by making *Him* and not Adam the author of sin. No, rather than that give me the belief of John Milton, which he thus beautifully expresses:—

"And now

Through all restraints broke loose, he (Satan) wings his way
Not far off heaven, in the precincts of light,
Directly towards the new created world,
And man there placed, with purpose to essay

If him by force he can destroy, or, worse,
 By some false guile pervert; and shall pervert:
 For man will hearken to his glozing lies,
 And easily transgress the sole command;
 Sole pledge of his obedience: so will fall
 He and his faithless progeny. Whose fault?
 Whose but his own? Ingrate, he had of me
 All he could have; I made him just and right,
Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall.

Not free, what proof could they have given sincere
 Of true allegiance, constant faith, or love,
 Where only what they *needs must* do appeared,
 Not what they would?

They themselves decreed

Their own revolt, not I. If I foreknew,
 Foreknowledge had no influence on their fault,
 Which had no less proved certain, unforeknown.
 So without least impulse, or shadow of fate,
 Or aught of me immutably foreseen,
 They trespass, *authors to themselves* in all
 Both what they judge and what they choose; for so
I formed them free: and free they must remain,
Fill they int'ral themselves: I else must change
Their nature, and revoke their high decree
 Unchangeable, eternal, which ordained
 Their freedom: *they themselves ordained their fall."*

Paradise Lost.

It is true that "by the very fact of sin death passed on all, for that all have sinned," but the death which P. W. alleges to have passed upon the soul, was a death of a very different description from that which passed on the body, the latter being the mere cessation of physical being, and the former being that death by which the souls of all are separated from the presence of God, and eternally doomed to eternal punishment, unless, through the grace of God, their souls are regenerated and appointed to eternal glory.

The little admonition which F. W. administers to S. S., as to the latter's having "greatly erred, not knowing the Scriptures," has nothing to do with the subject; but F. W. must allow me to remind him that the new life which Christ gives, and the eternal life which is the gift of God, are neither of them a new physical life from physical death, but the saturation of their immortal souls with that righteousness which takes them to heaven; the absence of which from the equally deathless souls of the other portion of mankind sends them to hell.

Meeting by anticipation the quotation which F. W. makes from Job, and which I will give as in the Scriptures presently, but which does not, as he alleges, support his theory, I do not hesitate

to say at once that there is no such thing as death or perishing for ever, nor does the passage he quotes point in that direction.

"There is no death! what seems so is transition;
This life of mortal breath
Is but a suburb of the life Elysian,
Whose portal we call death."

The passage referred to is from Job iv. 20, 21, being a part of the reproof administered by Eliphaz to Job. "They (*i. e.*, men) are destroyed from morning to evening: they perish for ever without any regarding it. Doth not their excellency which is in them go away? they die, even without wisdom."

It is evident (and will be more so on a perusal of the whole of the chapter) that this passage points only to the natural physical death of all men, and I challenge F. W. to point out in what way it relates to the destruction of that indestructible principle, *viz.*, man's soul. The passage he quotes, "By grace are ye saved, through faith, and that not of yourselves, it is the gift of God," does not in the least refer to the soul of man, but to the eternal salvation of the blessed.

I give F. W. credit for having brought together a mass of the most unconnected passages, and for his courage in attempting to found upon them a conclusion favourable to his own foregone theory.

But F. W.'s concluding paragraph is perhaps the most illogical of all. He lays down as a premise that sin and death are to be conquered by the Saviour, and yet his intention is to show that man has nothing inherently immortal, and if there be, as he admits there must be, some who are not saved and who are to be subject to bodily corruption and so for ever to remain, let me ask him how he makes out this purpose (the conquering of sin and death) is fulfilled, while he in the same sentence states that the purpose of the Almighty is not carried out.

The writer's interpretation of the passage, "and man became a *living* soul," is, still I contend, a proof of his immortality, and is not overstrained (as S. F. would have us believe) when it is taken as representing "an *ever* living soul" because, be it observed, that although the soul of man may be naturally immortal, yet it is always subject to the will of God who could in a moment crush the immortality of the soul, but if he did so, the declared purposes of the gospel could not be carried out.

Another fault S. F. finds with H. K., is H. K.'s statement that "God created Adam in His own image, or, in other words, exactly as He Himself was." My statement, of course, applied to the subject then under discussion, *viz.*, his immortality, and I am justified in the statement I then made and now repeat, by the context both before and after the words quoted. But had the subject of discussion been, for instance, whether man was naturally omni-

scient, I should have replied in the negative, and for the same reason, viz., that the context did *not* justify that conclusion.

I cannot express too much dissatisfaction—if I may not use the stronger word disgust—at S. F.'s flippancy in likening the effect of the words quoted by me into having a photograph taken of the Almighty; and I will only further say, that if I wanted an *image* of myself I certainly should not go to a photographer's, and least of all, if I wanted to create (supposing for the moment, to carry out his bad logic to its legitimate conclusion, and that I had the power to do so) a being who professed to use the language of Scripture, a "living soul."

It is scarcely advisable to notice the article of S. F. further, but I may add, in reference to the long quotation from Froude, with which he favours us, that however much we might accept Mr. Froude as an apologist for Henry VIII. and his daughter Mary, I should be very far indeed from accepting his interpretation of the Scriptures.

A few words will dispose of the article of Th. N., whose remarks upon what the "Westminster divines said" is simply wide of the point; and as the present discussion does not at all turn upon the love of God, but simply upon the natural immortality of the soul, his remarks that "If God can destroy evil and will not, can He be the God of love, even of everlasting love?" "If He will and cannot, is He the Almighty?" And others of a similar character do not bear on the subject in any way. The most remarkable characteristic is his egotism in the way in which he tells of "The intermixture of the speculations of philosophy with the vital doctrines of the Christian faith, has worked much evil among men, has given rise to philosophical, not Christian but anti-Christian, *speculations on predestination and election*," &c. Surely, now that the great originator and leaders of the Christian Church, from St. Paul to Augustine, Calvin, Luther, and others have become mere philosophical "speculators" on Christianity, it is time that the infallible creed of Th. N. should be given to the world, in order that we may not be longer in the dark.

I beg to tender my thanks to J. H. K. for his quotation from the *North British Review*, which is an ample answer to S. F.'s quotation from Froude; and as the papers of E. E. C. and J. V. H. take no new ground, the discussion may here be concluded on this side of the question.

The articles of the opposition have certainly strengthened, instead of weakened, the opinion with which I started, as I then imagined that much more could have been put forward on their behalf.

It is admitted, by nearly if not quite all the writers on the other side, that the Creator gave man an immortal soul, but instead of admitting the direct consequence that this immortal soul descended to Adam's progeny, subject to the consequences of Adam's sin, they indulge in the fantastic theory that when Adam sinned, his im-

mortal soul was taken from him, and that it can only be restored to his descendants on their accepting a something, which, as their quotations prove, is not offered to all, and which is consequently beyond their power of acceptance, than which a more illogical theory could not possibly have been constructed. H. K.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

"Taking men in the mass, and regarding more their habitual feelings than their mere outward professions, I find much fewer than we should at first imagine, who either with firm faith believe or with bold scepticism, deny a future life. There are few who venture absolutely to deny it; for this would at once take away, as it were, the pivot on which the present life moves, and deprives it of all unity, completeness, and hope. There are few who are bold enough to habitually believe it; for they have no eyes to look upon their own transfiguration, and the diminished earth turns pale for fear. But most men seem to me to be moved by the impulse of alternating feelings in the mid-space between the two opinions."—*Jean Paul Richter*.

THE above opinion, from the writings of glorious Jean Paul, the author of "*The Campaner Thal*," a discourse on immortality, which its great-hearted author, blind and ailing, died while enlarging and remodelling, and the unfinished MS. of which was carried to the burial vault upon his coffin—shows sufficiently well that this topic is one which may be regarded as debatable—debatable both on the philosophical and the theological side. In this present debate we are concerned with it as a scriptural question, and from that point of view alone are we justly entitled to regard it.

I read the able philosophical article by D. U. M., with which this debate was opened on the affirmative side, with pleasure, because it seemed to me calm, thoughtful, and judicious, well-written, and likely to lead to a thorough consideration of the question; and I felt that if the discussion was to be carried on in the spirit which that paper indicated, we should have reason to congratulate ourselves on the interest the question would be sure to excite. But the article of S. S. dispelled this hope, for he led the debate into the quagmire of sectarian theology, and we foresaw that, instead of a genuine controversy, on the signification of Scripture in its declarations on this important subject, we should have a wrangle on the eternity of future punishments, a topic which had already been discussed very elaborately in the sixth volume of this serial, in this form, namely, "*Do the Scriptures teach that the punishment of the wicked will be eternal?*" The question which we have had to discuss, though it does bear upon that subject, inasmuch as if it is decided in the negative, the non-eternity of actual punishment to be endured consciously by the sinner on account of the wrath of God would be affirmed; yet it is entirely different, being rather a debate on the philosophy than the theology of the Bible.

In all cases, I think, in which questions are set down for discussion, some of whose phases have already been debated in this

Magazine, it ought to be a recognised thing, that the debate ought not to be forced into the same groove again. That it has been discussed previously in that connection should be held as *prima facie* evidence, that it is not in that form or to a similar issue the latter question is to be considered. In leading the debate astray thus S. S. is greatly to blame ; and as it appears to us all the more so, because he evidently opens his paper in such a way as to turn off the discussion from the calm and philosophical manner in which D. U. M. opened on his side into the very mid-stream of a sectarian question, and into the full tide of the *odium theologicum*. Hear how oracularly he begins :—"The positive and repeated declarations of Scripture that the wicked shall eternally suffer, and that the righteous shall partake of everlasting bliss, *demonstrate* the natural immortality of the soul." Do they, indeed ! May it not have been that as the gift of God is eternal life, so the punishment of the wicked was the addition made by God's wrath on account of the sins committed in a probation state ?

Man was placed in a state of probation S. S. will grant. If he sinned he should die—as we assert the Scripture teaches and affirms ; and if he remained holy he should live. He sinned, and so became liable to death. If the sentence of death were executed on the spot and at the moment, the probationary race is a failure. If, however, a new chance is opened up, and offered to him ; if it is said life shall be his who through faith in Christ craves forgiveness from God, the probation continues, the soul is now not naturally but supernaturally endowed with immortality ; and the condition of that immortality is definite and fixed. If we were to concede, for argument's sake, to S. S. that the Scriptures make "positive and repeated declarations" "that the wicked shall eternally suffer," might we not maintain that this eternal suffering is threatened just as the eternal bliss is promised, as an additional inducement to consider our ways and be wise ; and so is as supernatural in its origin as eternal life. So long as any other equally valid hypothesis is possible an opinion cannot be said to be demonstrated, and hence S. S.'s over-confident opening fades and fails. But we deny his assertion that Scripture makes any such positive and repeated declarations, as he affirms it does ; and we appeal for proof to the simple fact that we are discussing, as a question in this Magazine, this very matter. Do the Scriptures favour or oppose the idea of the natural immortality of the soul ? which we assuredly would not be doing if the Scriptures had made "positive and repeated declarations" on the subject ; because that in the very terms of the debate such declarations of Scripture are considered to be final and conclusive on the topic. He assumes, therefore, in the very opening of his paper that which he was bound to substantiate. Thus his whole paper is vitiated, first, by his forcing the debate from a question in the interpretation of Scripture into one of sectarian theology ; second, by his assumption of the things to be proved or denied as positively and repeatedly declared.

H. K.'s article is not quite so able as some of those in which he deals with secular matters. For instance, in his closing paragraph he quotes the translation of Enoch and Elijah as having a bearing on this question. But this it has not. In these cases it is clear that a conferred favour was granted to them, and that they were exceptions to "the common lot." Besides they, as partakers in the faith of which St. Paul speaks in Hebrews, received eternal life, not as a natural immortality, but as "a gift of God."

H. K. asserts that "immortality is of the essence of the soul," but this is the question at issue. Immortality is a possibility in the soul, on condition that it delights in glorifying and obeying God during the life of probation assigned to it on earth. It is quite evident that to verify H. K.'s assumption, that all the posterity of Adam likewise possess a soul similar to his own; to be able to affirm that every child born into the world is holy and spotless as the very breath of God, which we presume he would hesitate to do. If life was to be a concomitant of holiness and obedience, and man, being in honour, did not abide in his first estate, the immortality of the soul could not be continued when the essential condition of its continuance was lost or forfeited.

Most of the quotations from Scripture which H. K. has used to support his view of the immortality of the soul, are only capable of being so construed when we depart from "the first intention" of the language used, and take "the second intention" of the theologians. In one of the passages it is expressly stated that man is not able to kill the soul, but that God is able to destroy it: and in that same passage it is implied that He will do so to all those who do not turn from their sins in fear of Him, and of His holy law. Hence his assertion that "the Scriptures show that the soul cannot die," is unsupported by the very quotation he makes in his own favour.

A. S. does not bring much matter for debate before us. When he says, "We believe firmly the soul will not be liable to be dissolved at the dissolution of the body, and therefore it will be naturally immortal;" we need only reply that his belief is no argument. He believes that "the wicked will never cease to exist," but God has affirmed that "sin shall be no more," either therefore sinners must all be turned from their sins and so be saved at last, or they must cease to exist, at least as "the wicked," for so long as they are the wicked sin must exist. Both A. S. and H. K. adduce the passage from St. Jude, about Sodom and Gomorrah being "set forth for an example, suffering the punishment of eternal fire." But Sodom and Gomorrah do not suffer the punishment of eternal fire—at least not that we know of, nor have any of the Palestine explorers brought back words of such a strange combustion being in progress.

The evident piety and good intentions of A. S. approve themselves to us, but we do not think that he has the special qualifications which go to the discussion of theological questions—a free,

fair mind not unduly biassed by education, in a seemingly very strait and narrow creed.

I submit for consideration the fact that the everlasting life conferred on the redeemed, is not a natural but a supernatural immortality. On this St. Paul is very explicit: "Likewise reckon ye also yourselves to be dead indeed unto sin, but alive unto God through Jesus Christ our Lord" (Rom. viii. 11). "I am crucified with Christ; nevertheless I live: yet not I, but Christ liveth in me; and the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me" (Gal. ii. 20). "For ye are dead, and your life is hid with Christ in God. When Christ, who is our life, shall appear, then shall we also appear with him in glory" (Col. iii. 2, 3). This entirely accords with what our Saviour says of Himself, "I am the resurrection and the life, he that believeth in Me, though he were dead, yet shall he live (John xi. 25): and again, "I am the way, the truth, and the life, ~~no man~~ *cometh* unto the Father *but* by me" (John xiv. 7). "God hath given to us eternal life, and this life is in His Son. He that hath the Son hath life, and he that hath not the Son of God hath not life" (1 John v. 11, 12). "These are written that ye may believe that Jesus is the Christ and the Son of God, and that believing ye might have life through His name" (John xx. 31). The eternal life of the Spirit is here distinctly proved to be a supernatural, not a natural immortality.

Were man naturally immortal, Jesus would not require to give, as the gift of God, eternal life. It is because death has passed upon all men that this gift is necessary; this new life is required, this being born again is essential, this regeneration is indispensable. Conversely, if we being dead do not receive the gift of God, we have no life in us; or if there be life in us it must be as peculiarly and specially given unto us for a punishment, as eternal life is bestowed upon the elect as a reward and a blessing. I do not think S. S. is wise, therefore, in maintaining that if the life of the saved is eternal, the life of those who die in their sin is also and equally one of continued duration spent in misery. Let me call the attention of S. S. to a passage which becomes important in this connection. "Death and hell were cast into the lake of fire. This is the second death. And whatsoever was not found written in the book of life was cast into the lake of fire" (Rev. xx. 14, 15). Here we see the complete destruction of all that was not written in the book of life accomplished, so that even death is swallowed up in the victory in which Christ puts all things under God's feet. Death and sin must, alike, die in the consuming fire of God's wrath against and before the blaze of which nothing can stand eternally.

P. O. S.

DOES FREE THOUGHT LEAD TO INFIDELITY?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

"To ask men to believe is to call on them for the very greatest act of which they are capable, and the most tremendous for which they will have to account."—*Maskell*.

"The temper of our age will let us take nothing for granted which in the nature of things is capable of absolute proof or disproof."

"It is not *truth* against which we close our eyes, but wild and virtually destructive theories; each of which may seem for a brief moment to assume the fair semblance of truth."—*Christian Remembrancer*.

THE word "infidelity," as it has been used in general by the writers in this debate, is equivocal at least, if it is not fraudulent. In one form of its signification it implies disbelief in, or carelessness about God, morality, and immortality; in the other, it suggests dissatisfaction with, or disinclination to creeds, confessions, and articles of faith, imposed by churches on their members, as statements of the whole truth of God, essential to membership at least, if not absolutely essential to salvation. Between these two things, there is obviously a great difference, and the argument which is founded on, or involves this ambiguity, cannot be held to be satisfactory. Is doubt of the creed of a church infidelity? Then we are all infidels, more or less; for there are churches which hold to beliefs to which we deny our credence; we cannot possibly have faith in all the articles and confessions of all the churches; and, therefore, infidelity is an inevitable state of human existence. It makes little matter in this case whether we think or not, still less whether we are free to think, and less still, whether we exercise freedom of thought, we cannot be among the faithful few of all churches; in so far as our faith inclines towards one, it disinclines towards another, and we are infidels to that church. This is evidently not the kind of infidelity meant in this debate. The infidelity, in regard to which inquiry is made, must be doubt of God, morality, and immortality.

Free thought must lead to doubt of the being of a God. Free thought delights in distrusting and denying the instincts of our nature, and it is in part right to do so, for many of our instincts, along with our general nature, are depraved. The duty of reason or free thought, in relation to our instincts, is to educate and refine them, so as to bring them back to their normal use and state; it is not to ignore or deny them. But the critical reason on finding that, in man's depraved state, some few human instincts have all but become obliterated; or else, have been so sophisticated that there scarcely remains any traces of their active moral agency, is apt to deny their existence altogether, or to resolve them by analysis into other instincts or forms of intelligence.

Again, reason or free thought is intellectual only, and in its analysis of man's nature it requires to confine itself to intelligence; whereas, man is a moral and responsible creature, possessed of affections, desire, and will; whose operations Reason may comprehend, but whose motives and purposes it cannot understand. Thus, a doubt of God's being often arises through trusting too much to reason's power, when it steps beyond its proper province.

The belief in God is an instinct, an ultimate fact in human life. To attempt to analyse and prove it, is to begin on a false assumption, namely, that it is analysable and capable of reasoned proof, independent of an inherent impossibility of believing otherwise. Reason, or free thought, finding that it can attain to no true and valid proof of the existence of the Deity in an independent manner, and feeling itself foiled in its endeavour to gain reasons of an original and indefeasible sort, reverts to intellectual atheism; while instinctive theism remains and retains its hold on man, not now as a faith, but as a feeling or a superstition.

It is very much the same with morality. We can acquire a sense of the benefits, or the utilitarianism of morality, but we cannot get at any evidence of its power and necessity, independent of an innate principle or moral sense. Reason, or free thought, will have morality derived in logical sequence from intellectually perceived facts, as premises; and will not accept of innate or instinctive requirements of nature. She revolts against the very idea of accepting as the basis of morals, the inborn nature of humanity; and so it cannot reach for itself a philosophy of morals, and, therefore, it becomes doubtful if such a thing may be.

There is this undoubted evil in free thought—that it will be satisfied only with *reasoning*, whereas logic is powerless to arrive at the firstlings of thought. It must accept of premises, and it concerns itself with processes. Logic is bound to begin with faith, but free thought will not be contented with a faith assumed; it must have one proved. As morality cannot be proved to be a derivative result of human doings and dealings, impulses and feelings, ideas and desires, reason inclines to deny to it an independent and binding existence, and so, free thought results in a doubt of morality.

Of immortality again we find reason quite incompetent to supply us with logical proof. It may heap probability on probability, but it cannot supply irrefragable evidence. We see this in a controversy now being carried on in these pages, in which reason is disturbed and distressed to discover whether the "Scriptures favour or oppose the idea of the natural immortality of the soul?" Man's superiority to death is not discoverable by any process of reasoning. It is an innate, personal feeling of the soul, which is as natural to it as hunger and thirst to the body, and quite as unaccountable. We can reason about it, but we cannot so reason as to make it evident as a logical result.

Here then we lay, as we think, our finger on the fallacy of free

thought, and find the ground of its failure to become an efficient aid to faith. It aims to do what it cannot, in the nature of things, accomplish, and then, failing in this, men's faith fails them in regard to the truths of creeds, when it ought to fail them in their trust in logic—in logic that is applied beyond its province and exercised in attempting impossibilities. When logic accepts the principles given in our nature and explains them, showing their concurrence with known facts or fair probabilities, then we have a true use of reasoning, and logic is an aid to faith; but when logic refuses to rest on the premises nature furnishes, and endeavours to go beyond all premises for the roots of its faith, it cannot result in the attainment of truth; and hence men come to doubt the truths which reasoning cannot reveal, though they may explain them or demonstrate their accordance with the whole body of believable truth. I beg leave to contribute this hint at a solution of the question now before the readers of *The British Controversialist*, in the hope that it may meet with such consideration as it may merit.

CATHOLICS.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

"For where the principles of reason have not evidenced a proposition to be certainly true or false, there clear revelation, as another principle of truth and ground of assent, may determine. . . . Whatever God hath revealed is certainly true, no doubt can be made of it. This is the proper object of faith: but whether it be a divine revelation or not, reason must judge, which can never permit the mind to reject a greater evidence to embrace what is less evident, nor allow it to entertain probability in opposition to knowledge and certainty."—*Locke*.

THE human mind is so constituted, that our knowledge of the laws and facts of nature can only be acquired by a continuous and progressive process of inquiry and investigation. The absolute and invariable condition of the attainment of knowledge, is the exercise of our reasoning and observing faculties. It is by them that we discriminate between truth and error, and estimate the relative force of conflicting arguments on all disputed questions. Reason is the only ground of certitude, and the only source of real and intelligent faith or belief. This, the "discursive faculty," as it has been called, is the determining and regulating principle in human affairs—the active and operating power in man in his loftiest speculations, as well as in the most insignificant minutiae of life. The Creator, it is evident, endowed man with the faculty of reason, and made it subject to certain logical laws, which appear to be immanent in its development and expansion, and termed by logicians "laws of thought." The Bible purports to be a revelation of the Divine mind, embodying truths and principles, the acceptance of which is essential to the salvation of man. It is clear, then, that God is both the author of reason, and the author of revelation; and, it being impossible that God should contradict himself, the two should be found in agreement. The truths of the Bible should

not be contradictory of reason, and, *vice versa*, the truths of reason should not be contradictory of the Bible. Free and legitimate thought cannot result in the rejection of, or disbelief in, *Divine* revelation, because it is inconceivable that God should contradict himself. Nothing can tell more conclusively against the Bible being a revelation of divine truth, than to suppose that it cannot bear the test of the severest critical examination to which the intellect of man can subject it. If the Bible be found to collide with the teachings of reason, we frankly avow that we do not see the possibility of escaping the conclusion that it is not a *Divine* revelation. Because, our certainty that God is the author of reason, must of necessity be greater than our certainty that any principles or doctrines propounded in a book written at different and remote periods, are infallible expressions of the Divine will. Locke has unfolded this point with his usual acuteness and lucidity, and we will, therefore, venture to quote him again:—

“There can be no evidence that any traditional revelation is of divine origin in the words we receive it, and in the sense we understand, so clear and so certain, as that of the principles of reason; and therefore nothing that is contrary to, and inconsistent with, the clear and self-evident dictates of reason, has a right to be urged or assented to, as a matter of faith, wherein reason hath nothing to do.”

We think it is plain that those who place reason and revelation in opposition to each other, are the greatest enemies of the Bible; and are the advocates of a mode of thought which must inevitably lead to the conclusion that the Bible is false.

In the opening article of this debate, S. S. confesses that the scope of his paper is to prove “that free thought leads to a disbelief of the assertions of Scripture;” and he also desiderates “a becoming feeling of awe towards the Bible as the inspired word of God—of its being which,” he says, “there are incontrovertible proofs.” Now, it seems to us, that these two declarations betray an incongruity of thought that requires some elucidation. Did it not occur to S. S. that the “incontrovertible proofs” by which the divine origin of the Bible is established, cannot be discovered except by a free exercise of thought. The freer the thought, the greater is the probability that the “incontrovertible proofs” will manifest themselves to the inquiring intellect; and, consequently, free thought must lead to a belief in, not a disbelief (*infidelity*) of, Christianity. How free thought, which is assuredly favourable to the discovery of truth, can result in a disbelief of that which is sustained by “incontrovertible proofs,” surpasses our powers of comprehension; yet such is the corollary to be drawn from the two declarations of S. S. In the outset of his essay, S. S. asserts that he is the “friend, and not the enemy, of free thought”—an assertion which, when considered in relation to his other opinions, has occasioned us some surprise. He believes that free thought must issue in infidelity, and, consequently, in confessing himself to be

the friend of free thought, he confesses himself to be the friend of that which produces a disbelief in what he believes is true, and supported by incontrovertible proofs—the Bible. It is difficult to conceive how a process of thought so self-contradictory as this can have commanded the credence of a writer of such undoubted intelligence as S. S.; and we think that, on reconsidering his statements, he will discover that he is really the exponent of opinions which are quite irreconcilable. As to the argument deduced from the fact that Hume, Spinoza, Hobbes, &c. held sceptical opinions, we consider that if this proves that free thought leads to infidelity, then the fact that such profound and fearless thinkers as Locke, Berkeley, Butler, and McCosh, must equally prove that free and philosophic inquiry leads to the reception of Christianity.

There may be mysteries which the mere "logical faculty" cannot fully grasp and explain in any religion that shall satisfy the ardent aspirations, and deep necessities of man's spiritual nature. The mysteries of a religion, however, need not prevent its acceptance, provided there be such evidences of its truth as to induce the conviction that it proceeds from God. If we are convinced that the evidences of the Christian religion prove it to be divine, then for this reason, we may reasonably accept its inexplicable doctrines, if not contradictory to the fundamental intuitions of the human mind. Doctrines in themselves palpably irrational, cannot possibly command the assent of reason; but doctrines which are not palpably irrational, but which the intellect does not fully comprehend, cannot be rejected as absurd and incredible, except on the gratuitous assumption that whatever is incapable of being distinctly comprehended by, is, therefore, contrary to the human reason. Now we apprehend that the inexplicable doctrines of the Bible are of this latter kind, and we are therefore of opinion that free thought—which we take to mean a legitimate exercise of the reasoning faculties—does not lead to infidelity.

The present age is one of keen, critical, and philosophic thought, and any system of religion, the distinctive principles of which are the products of human error and superstition, and not of a Divine Intelligence, must inevitably crumble into dust before the rationalistic spirit in which men are now pursuing their investigations. The religion which, in its salient truths and tendencies, is compatible with the elevation of humanity, must be the creed of the future, and in the words of Emerson, "the religion which is to guide and fulfil the present and coming ages, whatever else it be, must be intellectual." Science is intense in its eagerness to unravel the secret laws of the universe, and its conclusions, if religion is to retain its hold on the minds of men, must not be at variance with the dictates of revelation. It is impossible that the inductions of reason should be set aside by a stereotyped interpretation of the Scriptures; and if the truths of science should not comport with the received exposition of the Bible, there is a very strong probability that the received exposition is not the true one.

Some, we are aware, fear science, and deprecate the introduction of reason into the region of religion. With such we have no sympathy. For the clear perception and discovery of truth, the intellect must be active, and at this point of the world's history, men have come to believe that in religion, as in other subjects—

'Tis a base
Abandonment of reason to resign
Our right of thought—our last and only place of refuge.

SIMONA.

IS PROTESTANTISM FAILING AND ROMANISM GAINING?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

THE interest felt in the immediate and pressing question of the year—the Disestablishment of the Irish Church—undoubtedly tended to keep the minds of men from minutely considering the question brought before us in the early part of the year in these terms, “Is Protestantism failing and Romanism gaining?” For this there were probably two reasons; 1st, Some of those who would have taken part in this debate unquestionably restrained themselves from the feeling that if the affirmative on this subject was clearly and strongly enforced, it might have the effect of lessening the desire felt for the reformation in the Irish Church, on which, as Protestant Dissenters, they had set their hearts; while, 2nd, not a few of those who would have supported the negative must have felt that the more thoroughly they made out their case the more would they weaken one of the great arguments used in favour of the disunion of the Church and State in Ireland, that it would inspirit the Church in its contest with Romanism and keep the Irish from feeling antagonism to Protestantism. In both ways, therefore, there seems to have been an interest in keeping silence upon this question pending the determination of the Irish Church proposals of the Government.

1st. The State has virtually admitted and sanctioned the claim of Papal supremacy over those who adhere to and profess the Roman Catholic faith. This has been done (1) by the abeyance into which the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill has been allowed to fall; (2) by the official recognition of Roman Catholic priests in workhouses, gaols, colonies, &c.; (3) by the endowment of Maynooth, and the grants to Roman Catholic schools, &c.; (4) by the disestablishment of the Irish Church—a definite concession to Romanism; and (5) by the admission of Roman Catholics into Parliament, and into places of power, influence, and trust, in which they exercise an influence over the ministry which wields the *power* of sovereignty, and so

forms a means of freeing the personality of the Sovereign from an actual open surrender of sovereign supremacy to papal supremacy. It is no part of our task to affirm or prove that this is wrong in itself. It is only our duty to show, from potent and reliable facts, that "Protestantism is failing" to hold its old power as against Romanism, and that "Romanism is gaining" by just so much as Protestantism fails to hold and exercise. So far as the Sovereign ceases to be supreme in religious matters the papal supremacy is conceded.

2nd. Opinions in the Church have been gradually nearing the points of view entertained by the Romanist communion. This has led to many going over to Romanism by conversion on the inclined plane—up or down, as the reader may choose—set by Newman and Faber, Froulkes and Manning; while, by the origination of a hybrid Romanism within the Church in Puseyism, and the High Church Ritualists, it has brought many to desire an *Irenicon*, or union of the churches, a movement quite in favour of Rome and Romanism. These opinions are growing more and more intense as the bitterness of parties increases, and the matters with which they are concerned are by this partisanship taken out of the category of topics for reasonable discussion, and brought into that of the tenets of a sect. Ecclesiasticism has been growing stronger day by day; controversies about apostolical succession have been making great way in all churches, as if it were a succession dependent on actual imposition of hands, instead of being a communication of God's Spirit. Jesuitism has taken a large hold upon the clerical mind, and it has become quite a professional peculiarity to assume priestliness of function, and to claim recognition, as if forming a class apart from the residue of the members of the Church of Christ.

3rd. Conversions to Rome have been frequent, and the missionary power of the Roman Catholics has been put forth in all countries, but especially in England, with extraordinary vigour. While our churches have been engaged in an internecine warfare of sects—not only church against church, but of subsects with the various Protestant churches, the Catholic Church has been using its utmost power to bring in a high unity of faith, doctrine, worship, and practice. The nobility of the sacrifices which the members of the Romish Churches have shown themselves willing to make for unity of spirit has won great sympathy; and many of the most earnest men of all communions are yearning for some means of securing peace in the churches. It is an undoubted fact that Protestant sectarianism is becoming more bitter and exasperating, and that this is affecting the minds of men very much against Protestantism cannot be doubted. It may not be a good reason for the effect noted, but it is patent that men sighing for the unity of Christendom can find no satisfaction in the sects of Protestantism, and are going over to Rome, in the earnest hope of securing that peace of conscience which Protestantism does not afford.

When these wholesale defections from Protestantism are going

on; when the power of the Roman Church has made itself felt in the defeat of the United Educational Scheme of Ireland, after a trial of more than the third of a century; when the Irish Church has disappeared as a political force from before its rival; when the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, passed amidst national rejoicing by the Parliament of England, has become a dead letter; when Cullen and Manning proclaim the Pope's supremacy and infallibility in despite of the laws of *Præmunire*; when Roman Catholic chaplains gain public provision from Poor Rates and Prison Rates; when chapels rise around us in every hamlet; while convents and nunneries are established in our midst, and find imitators among our Churchmen in Retreats and Sisterhoods; when priests are welcomed on public platforms in their public character, and when statistics tell us day by day of the numerical increase of the adherents to Rome, it is vain for us to come to any other conclusion than that Romanism is gaining and that Protestantism is failing. Such facts are stubborn things: they can neither be doubted nor denied. O. C.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

THE one great claim of the Church is, Faith. But the Christian Church demands that that faith which actuates its members should be a *reasonable* faith, so consciously entertained that each should be "able to give a reason" for the hope which he entertains that his faith is a saving faith. The Churches of the Reformation have given forth no doubtful sound on this matter; they have emblazoned it on their escutcheon in the words "the right of private judgment." The Church of Rome, on the other hand, claims a blind faith—a faith in doctrines independently of the grounds or reasons for holding them, except that they have been authoritatively pronounced by the head of the Church to be binding on the faithful. If we take along with us this statement we shall easily see that Romanism, or the claim for blind faith on the part of the members of a Church, is fast failing, while Protestantism, or the claim of every individual to the right of being fully persuaded in his own mind, is fast increasing.

On this head it is impossible to entertain a doubt, and, therefore, we rest more on this than on mere statistics and odd incidents; and we shall proceed to show several unmistakable points in which this advancement of the Protestant spirit and decadence of the Romanist one are manifest.

Never has there been in any age so strong and earnest, so vigorous and so thoroughgoing an opposition to the main claims of the Papacy, even within the Roman Catholic Church. The nationalism of Italy rises against its temporal power, and "right divine to govern wrong." The science and philosophy of Germany revolt against its authoritative dogmas on the beliefs of men, all which involve references to nature and mind. The Liberal politicians of France see in it an ideal despotism which feels its interest in aiding and abetting every other sort of despotism as a means of

bolstering up its own claims, and creating a sense of brotherhood among the tyrants of the earth. In England, too, the strongest school of Romanists—because the most intellectual and reasonable—the Newmanites base their theory of Romanism on a foundation to which the Papacy cannot in reality assent, and on which it dare not rely, the development of doctrine. The Jesuits, by their distinct determination to keep the Pope in vassalage and personal subserviency, while they shelter their selfishness behind the shield of his infallibility, are virtually working for the downfall of that Church which relies on such a dogma. Hence we see that Romanism is a house divided against itself, and we know, on really infallible evidence, that such a “house cannot stand.”

In our day there is a distinct and definite determination among men to possess and exercise freedom of conscience, freedom of speech, and freedom of social action. These three forms of mental force are opposed to the whole scheme of Romanism, which is the rulership of authority.

The claims which Archbishop Manning has put forth, in England, on behalf of the Pope, as the supreme and ultimate judge in the last resort of righteousness in life, of justice in law, of policy in the State, of truth in the Church, of honour in the family, and of faith in the individual, has been looked upon everywhere as preposterous and nonsensical. To claims of that sort neither persons nor nations will bend. Authority is now recognised to be not the paramount decision of one supreme and infallible claimant of lordship over the fold and flock and heritage of Christ, but the common sense and moral determination of the whole people, registered in law and enforced by public agencies for public ends. Neither Casuistry nor Jesuitry can quench the ardour of inquiry in the minds of men, and in so far as the mind insists on inquiry for itself and to satisfy itself, Romanism, which depends on authority, is failing and Protestantism is gaining.

The despotism of the Pope in spiritual and temporal affairs, in matters civil and ecclesiastical, is opposed to all the tendencies of modern thought and life, State craft and Church management. Human freedom is opposed to any institution which consecrates despotism and would establish a mere make-believe theocracy. Against such a strong feeling, such an enthusiastic conviction, the fable of Papal supremacy and the myth of the holy father's infallibility cannot stand. The right of private judgment must be conceded now as a palpable fact; and even when conversions to Romanism are announced, they are asserted to have taken place through the exercise of this very uncatholic right of private judgment. Even in this fact we see the failure of the dogma of infallibility; for if the private judgment is to be exerted in testing the truth of the Romanistic infallibility, the submission is really, if at all, made to the conscience and not to the Papacy. It thus comes, it seems to us, to be proved that the very base of the superstructure of Romanism is undermined, and that the failure of Romanism,

however concealed for a time, is imminent. In the same proportion the spirit of Protestantism is flourishing in every extension of freedom, in every aspiration for the downfall of despotism, in every sigh for the liberation of man from the thralldom of priestcraft.

The collision of faith and reason, religion and science, priestly power and personal freedom cannot now be settled by any declaration of any council concerning what it believes or decrees. No decree can reimprison enfranchised thought. It may be that the human mind has not yet attained unto the "liberty with which Christ makes His people free," but it is plain that it has a sort of liberty, and it is pretty clear that it will not readily relinquish that. "Nation after nation breaks away from the fetters of the canon law." The terrors of excommunication have perished like those of many another bugbear, and that weapon is powerless as the flint-head spear of the stone ages. It would be much more easy to mould an imperishable marble statue out of mist than out of the ardent aspirations after freedom, to elicit a consentaneous adherence to the doctrine of the supreme power of the Church over soul and body, life and faith, habits and salvation. The nations have rejected Romanism and run some risk of rejecting Christianity itself, because Christianity has had the misfortune to have been so long associated in the general mind with the faith of Rome.

The very calling of the council which is this month to assemble at the summons of the chief of the Vatican, is proof positive that Romanism is failing. This is a gathering together of the forces of Rome—the whole forces of Rome—such as has not been paralleled for centuries, that it may take counsel for safety, and take into consideration how defeat and disaster may be avoided.

But the place and conditions of this meeting give farther proof that failure is looked on as imminent. In the sixteenth century it was held as a condition of impartiality in the consideration of affairs, that no council should be held in Rome, not even in Italy, lest it should be too much overawed by the Pope; and it was also regarded as requisite that every delegate should be freed from his oath of canonical obedience. But this council is to meet at Rome, and its members are pledged threefold to submission to the Pope. This shows a foregone sense of weakness, and is the judgment of the Popedom itself that Romanism is failing. Honest endeavours to obtain light connected themselves to men, but we know from the times of old that those who seek darkness have a special reason for their love of that darkness—because their deeds are evil.

"Public opinion has now become a constraining force, as often directing as following those whose hand turns the wheels of society and the State." "The will of the strong checked by the plots of the wise" no longer constitute history. The people and the people's will is now an appreciable power in the course of events. "He who would be chief among you let him be your servant," is now spoken with force and power to the priesthood, and

men are quite resolved upon obedience to the exhortation, "Call no man master; for one is your Master, even Christ."

The spirit of the age, the tendency of events, the course of history, the very principles of life, the faith of the Church and the commands of Christ, are opposed to Romanism. It is as surely doomed as the civil power whose traditions it inherited and seeks to propagate. Individualism, personality, independence, thoughtfulness, and discussion prevail more and more in leading men to protest against the enslavements advocated by Rome. The growing disunion in the Roman Church, and the gradual uprising in the centre of all the Churches of the Reformation, of a desire to relinquish the attempt to secure unity by the bondage of the latter, and to endeavour after the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace, in righteousness of life, show manifestly that Romanism is failing and Protestantism is gaining.

G. F. B.

Politics.

IS AN HEREDITARY HOUSE OF LEGISLATURE DESIRABLE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—VII.

To a certain extent the combatants in this debate have not been engaged in a fair hand-to-hand contest, for they have not joined issue upon precisely the same points. Those who maintain the negative of this question have admitted that it would not be desirable to vest legislative power in one assembly alone, and that it is advisable that there should be a second house, charged with deliberative and legislative duties. On the other hand, those who have written upon the affirmative side of this question have chiefly endeavoured to prove that a second legislative assembly is desirable, a point conceded by their antagonists in this debate, and have but little exerted themselves to show that that assembly should consist of hereditary magnates, which is the main point contested by their opponents.

If there is to be a second House in the Legislature, it must be so constituted that its reasonings, resolutions, and protests shall, as a rule, have a weight in the administration of affairs, and an influence with the people at large, else it will be a useless, cumbrous, and mischievous assembly. Now we think that an hereditary assembly, placed in the position of a second House in the Legislature, will have more weight in the administration of affairs than an assembly composed of persons invested with a life peerage placed in the same position would have. The votes of the House of Commons, being the voice of the majority of that assembly, may be considered as the utterances of the majority of those whom they represent, and

as such have an authority which cannot be possessed by the decisions of any other assembly. Now, if there is to be a second House in the Legislature which shall have the power of modifying and rejecting measures sanctioned by the representatives of the people, and of introducing measures which have not been adopted by the House of Commons, it must have a pre-eminence of some kind which shall entitle it to the appreciative consideration of the people and their representatives. An assembly of persons invested with life-peerages, or an elected chamber of a more select class of representatives, might have a pre-eminence of ability, but that would be disputable. An hereditary house, however, has an indisputable pre-eminence of rank. The pre-eminence of rank is one which justly exerts an influence with all people but those swayed by revolutionary passions, and this universality of the influence exerted by a pre-eminence of rank, and the indisputability of that pre-eminence in an Hereditary House of Legislature, gives to such a house a weight in the administration of affairs, combined with an influence upon the people, which could not be exerted by a second Legislative House which was not hereditary. A second Legislative Assembly composed of the Sovereign's nominees would not have so much influence with the people; a second Legislative Chamber elected by the people at large would have no value as a distinct assembly; and a second Legislative House, chosen by a restricted section of the people, would neither have so great a weight in the administration of affairs, nor so much influence with the people.

Independence and stability are also requisite in a Legislative Chamber placed in the position of our House of Peers. The members of an Hereditary House have a right to their position; they do not owe it to the votes of any electoral body, nor do they, except in the case of newly created peers, owe it to the will of the sovereign. They have not been called upon to sacrifice their independence to attain to that position, neither are they called upon to sacrifice their independence in order to retain it. This extreme independence and irresponsibility would not be appropriate in the Representatives of the People, for they are to express the voice of the nation, but it is necessary to that body of men who are called together to reconsider, to revise, and, if required, to modify the acts of the House of Commons. It is also desirable that this second House in the Legislature should have as much stability as possible. If it did not occupy an independent position, and if the *personnel* of this House were subject to frequent change, it would not be fitted for the performance of its duties. It is right that the members of the House of Commons should be removable from their position, when their views are no longer in conformity with those of the majority of their constituents; but the Upper House occupies the position of a permanent board of supervision over the measures brought before them from the Lower House, and it is most desirable that its members should feel that, while speaking and acting conscientiously, according to the best of their judgment, they are not thereby

endangering the position either of themselves or of their descendants.

The Upper House does not retain its place in the constitution that it may overthrow all the decisions of the Lower House which are distasteful to itself, especially when those decisions are supported by the great body of the people, but rather to act as a restraint, to check hasty legislation, and so lessen the inconveniences which necessarily attend the introduction of reforms. Without a second House of a Conservative tendency, the progress of the Representatives of the People in the path of change would be like an express train rushing unrestrained down a steep decline; they would both need something as a brake to restrain them from dashing onwards to ruin. On this point two of our opponents strangely contradict each other. B. M. complains, because the House of Peers acts as a restraint upon the House of Commons; whilst "Neanias" says that the Upper House cannot effectually check the deliberations of the Lower House. We believe that B. M. is right in saying that the House of Peers does act as a restraint upon the House of Commons, and we also believe that such a restraint is desirable. Sometimes the Upper House carries its opposition to the changes sanctioned by the Representatives of the People too far; and though this is at times much to be regretted, as in the case of "The University Tests' Bill," &c., yet we must maintain that, as a rule, it is better for wise and just legislation to be delayed, than for unjust and unwise measures to be passed through hasty legislation; it is better that good legislation should be retarded, through being subjected to an additional test, than that mischievous legislation should be admitted for want of this additional test. It is extremely desirable that every radical change proposed by the Representatives of the People should be tested by a body of men naturally attached to Conservative principles.

Macaulay says that "Everywhere there is a class of men who cling with fondness to whatever is ancient, and who, even when convinced by overpowering reasons that innovation would be beneficial, consent to it with many misgivings and forebodings. We find also everywhere another class of men, sanguine in hope, bold in speculation, always pressing forward, quick to discern the imperfections of whatever exists, disposed to think lightly of the risks and inconveniences which attend improvements, and disposed to give every change credit for being an improvement." These two classes clearly exist among British legislators, the former being called Conservatives and the latter Liberals. The majority of an Hereditary House of Peers will always belong to the former class, and the majority of a Representative Assembly, elected by an extended franchise in such a highly civilized and refined country as ours, will always belong to the latter class. It is natural that we should look to the latter for the initiation of measures that would introduce changes into the laws of the land, and it is desirable that the former should have the power of revising those measures, and

of checking their progress. A strife and a contest will often arise between these two parties; the inherent nature of their principles, so radically differing from each other, will often necessarily induce warm controversies, hard strugglings for the mastery, and violent debates, but this strife and these controversies are highly beneficial to the State. Macaulay, speaking of these two parties, says, "Though both parties have often seriously erred, England could have spared neither. If, in her institutions, freedom and order, the advantages arising from innovation and the advantages arising from prescription, have been combined to an extent elsewhere unknown, we may attribute this happy peculiarity to the strenuous conflicts and alternate victories of two rival confederacies of statesmen—a confederacy zealous for authority and antiquity, and a confederacy zealous for liberty and progress." The House of Lords represents those who are zealous for authority and antiquity, and the third paragraph in Ph. M.'s article in the August number of this magazine gives a powerful reason why this party, consisting chiefly of the aristocracy of wealth and the aristocracy of ancestral dignity, should be represented in a House distinct from that which contains the Representatives of the People, and we would also add that it is when placed in a second Legislative Assembly that this party can most efficiently carry out its legitimate functions in revising and checking the measures of those who are so zealous for liberty and progress. If it be conceded that a second Legislative Assembly is desirable, we think that the history of foreign countries during the present century will clearly prove that, in such a position, an Hereditary Assembly is the most efficient. For instance, how little is the respect accorded to, and the influence upon the people exerted by, the Second Chamber in the French Legislature, compared with the respect accorded by the people to, and the influence upon them exerted by, our House of Peers. Prince Napoleon, in his recent speech on the *Senatus Consultum*, said, "I should like to see the Senate a Second Chamber with full powers. I do not think a single Chamber a good thing. I dread a Convention face to face with a Cæsar." Here we have the words of a liberal and enlightened orator, expressing his desire for a Second Legislative Chamber, and at the same time expressing an opinion that the French Senate is not properly constituted to occupy the position of a Second Legislative Chamber. He did not, it is true, demand that the Senate should be composed of hereditary magnates; but why did he not do so? We answer, because the Revolution of '89 annihilated ancestral dignity, and we believe that it is undoubtedly because the French Senate is not an hereditary house that it is so unsatisfactory as a Second Legislative Chamber.

Much of the reasoning brought forward to show that an Hereditary House of Legislature is not desirable might also be brought forward to prove that an Hereditary Monarchy is not desirable. E. L. B. argues that because wisdom, patriotism, worth, and nobleness of character are not hereditary in the peerage, therefore an

Hereditary House of Legislature is not desirable. If this reasoning were once admitted as conclusive, the next step would be to assert that because wisdom, patriotism, worth, and nobleness of character are not always hereditary in the royal family, therefore an hereditary monarchy is not desirable. So long as the peerage continues to be hereditary, it affords a strong support to an hereditary monarchy; but if the hereditary character of the House of Peers in this country were once destroyed, the position of hereditary sovereignty would receive such a blow that, in all probability, it would eventually fall under the pressure of revolutionary principles. We therefore maintain that an Hereditary House of Legislature is desirable as a support to an Hereditary Monarchy.

A great deal is said about the unfitness of an Hereditary Peerage to take part in legislating for the people, because of its want of sympathy with the people, because of its being shut up within the barriers of a class, and so separated from the other classes of the people, and because of its being thus brought up to consider the interests of its own class alone. On this point we will again quote Macaulay, who, in speaking of English society during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, says, "There was a strong hereditary aristocracy, but it was of all hereditary aristocracies the least insolent and exclusive. *It had none of the invidious character of a caste.* It was constantly receiving members from the people, and constantly sending down members to mingle with the people. Any gentleman might become a peer; the younger son of a peer was but a gentleman." If this were true then, it is still more so now, and we must maintain that although the majority of the peers certainly are decidedly allied to that party which is zealous for antiquity and authority, yet they have not that invidious nature of a caste which would disqualify them for the work of legislation.

SAMUEL.

Poetic Critique.

(Continued from page 309).

It has been made plain to us by one or two communications that our method of criticism is only partially understood. Some of our verse contributors, it is true, thank us for the pains taken to be suggestive and definite in advice of an instructive nature, and see that our style of reading their verses, and jotting thereon *marginalia* of what seems to us likely to improve them is, if not an evidence of our own poetical felicity of emendation, at least a proof that their productions have received genuine consideration—a consideration far superior to that implied in a few vague words of praise, which, however pleasing, are not improving; but others seem to suppose that these annotations of ours are the product of a

critic's eternal eagerness for fault-finding. One, indeed, has challenged his critic to a duelistic effort in capping verses. This challenge we hereby publicly decline to entertain, (1) because we have never professed ourselves to be verse-makers, as he has done by forwarding his for criticism; (2) because it is a maxim among all poets that the critics of poetry are themselves always bad versifiers, who revenge their own want of success by envious carping at the verses of others, and so we should be sure to be misjudged; and (3) because we have quite a different aim in our criticisms, than to establish a claim to being poets native and endued.

Our poetic critique has an educational aim. We profess to read the verses submitted to us as friends to the writers not as followers of them. But we have also a profession made towards our readers that we attach to these verses such suggestions as may make them, if not always agreeable, yet often profitable to read, by inducing reflection, are why the original writer has employed a given word, and the critic thinks another would improve the piece. In reader and writer alike we intend to induce reflective criticism in the best possible way, by putting the results of our reflective criticism before them. We do not, by the publication of the pieces selected, affirm of them that they are poetry, but we take them as exercises in poetical composition, and we act the part of private teacher to the composers, while we give our readers in general the benefit of the study called for by, and given to, the verses we quote.

For instance, here we have a sonnet,—we read it, and note that its ending is somewhat indefinite, and we write in the margin some words which may give greater point to the lines. They are not, probably, the best possible, but the narrowness of the limits of emendation must be considered, we do not reform it altogether, but only in part.

POETRY ETERNAL.

Ah, nobly hath HYPERION's poet said

A word which should be ever laid to heart!

"The poetry of earth is never dead;"

Nor ceaseth ever *the* divinest art

[that

To touch the soul to feeling and to thought:—

The blue sky bravely overarcheth all,

The green grass mantles many a pretty spot,

Sweet flowers spring up and star-beams gently fall,

Around us rise the many-peaked hills,

Smooth slope the valleys which dispart them wide,

Along these flow the sweetly murmuring rills,

And birds melodious wake the forest's pride,

While all-surrounding ocean's mighty tone

[ode

Lifts all the melodies of earth to ONE

[God

O. G.

It would be easy for us to say to C. G. that it would have been better to have named Keats; to have rallied him upon the fact that the line quoted can scarcely be called a *word*; to have objected to

his mixing of visible and audible elements together under the one title of poetry, &c., but we have chosen the humbler task of revisionist, and have accepted the sonnet for what it is, and have left C. G. at perfect liberty to accept of or reject our proposed new readings; and our readers to consider how far our proposal would or would not benefit and improve the composition.

Those poets who are chary of having such suggestions made, are usually those who profess most stoutly that they have thrown off their lines in one impulse of inspiration, without premeditation or revisionary care. As far as we know, few poets ever act so foolishly as to allow their first unrevised efforts to go before the public. Horace revised incessantly, and, in fact, though eminent classical scholars scarcely seem to know this fact, that is the reason of many of the *varia lectiones* found in MS. of his poems; Shakspeare, Milton, Cowper, Wordsworth, Campbell, and Rogers, all dealt largely in revision. Tennyson and Browning are diligent revisers. But we shall bring forward an instructive specimen from the writings of Byron. Lord Byron's Hebrew melodies, in the opinion of Lord Jeffrey, "displayed a skill in versification and a mastery of diction, which would have raised an inferior artist to the very summit of distinction." This was not, however, the result of the mere rush and impulse of poetic passion, and the superflux of lexicographic dexterity. It was clearly the result of painstaking and persevering endeavours to get at the right word for the meaning he intended to convey.

To illustrate this we shall quote twelve lines of a translation from Job iv. 15—21, entitled—

A SPIRIT PASSED BEFORE ME.

A spirit passed before me ; I beheld
The face of Immortality unveiled,
Deep sleep came down on every eye save mine,
And there it stood, all formless, but divine ;

- 1 [*Fear shook along my bones, each hair arose*]
- 2 [*Fear shook by bones, while heaven and earth grew still,*
each stiffening hair stood still,
each hair stood up and still,

A voice went forth and spoke the Eternal will]

- 3 [*Fear shook my bones, and stood in every hair,*
A voice went forth and cleared the silent air]

Along my bones the creeping flesh did quake,
And as my damp hair stiffened thus, it spake—

Is man more just than God ? Is man more pure
[*While mightier angels are not all secure*]
Than he who deems e'en seraphs insecure ?
Creatures of clay—vain dwellers in the dust !
The moth survives you, and are ye more just !

[*Born with the dawn and withered ere the night*]
 Things of a day! you wither ere the night
 [*Erring*]
 Heedless and blind to wisdom's wasted light!

In these lines we have the poet's own painstaking revision exemplified, and can note the growing definiteness his ideas acquired by pondering and reflection.

Taking such a case as this, we can see that a process of careful testing should be employed with regard to each word, each line and stanza, so as to secure expressiveness and consistency, vigour and beauty, the melody of verse along with the passion of poetry. We have revised the following sonnets somewhat after the manner in which we conceive Byron to have read and reread his verses, and we believe that R. D. will see in our *marginalia* the proof that we have bestowed somewhat more than a hasty perusal and consideration upon his lines.

THE PAST—THE NOBLE.

The old Greek life!—Oh, what a life was that,
 In which the real and the earnest held—
 In full communion never yet excelled—
 The ideal in its heart; our days are flat
 And stale: compared with those far times,
 When with the statue's form, the picture's hues,
 The epic's fable, and the drama's mimes,
 The soul's full ardours *ever* interfuse; [nobly,
 When life's responsibilities were felt.
 And good men sought for guidance and control.
 Worthy of those who knew a mighty soul,
 Must have great love for that to which it knelt,
 And linked together intellect and beauty, [Then
 In that Great One to whom it bent in duty. [they

SPRING.

Like a gay maiden, beautiful and young, [dameel.
 Came the thrice welcome SPRING with noiseless feet.
 As if she had assayed to come and greet [though
 Us unawares; and the unfledged birds sung.
 Their scarce artic'late notes, as though they thought [if
 They, with the elder birds, should join to hail
 The merry maiden; and the snow-clad vale [even
 Showed its bright face, with varied beauty fraught.
 None but the stern, grey-bearded mountains kept
 Their snowy caps on, (*remnants* of the cold, [relics
 Remorseless winter;) they were getting old!
 And needed it to clothe them while they slept. [these.
 But ah! the SPRING with all its beauties gay, [sweet . . . her.
 Stayed with us but a season,—and then passed away.
 [*Stayed but a season, short—then from us sped away.*]

The Reviewer.

The City of Night, and other Poems. By E. WILLIAMS. London: Murray and Co.

GREAT HOMER nods, and critics are sometimes forgetful. This is a grave truth, with a serious personal reference, which came livingly into effective force on our consciousness in reading a small tract, which we hope to review soon, from the pen of a Bristolian bookbinder, of whom we have several times expressed our admiration, and for whom we profess a friendship of the soul. The tract bears the title of "Inceptions," and the author is W. Ormond. On the tenth page of the said pamphlet we read the name of "Edward Williams," and thereunder found a genial and loving critique of the poems of this self-taught sweet singer of the muse-beloved city, which Burke represented, and in which Chatterton was born; and thereupon we did remember a transgression or omission of which we had been guilty. From W. Ormond we had received a copy of "The City of the Night, and other Poems," which we had read for review; but from some cause or other, not now rememberable by us, the writing of a critique was not done. We are desirous of remedying, as far as may be now, this act of neglect.

We learn from our friend's notice that Edward Williams belongs to the singularly gifted "fraternity of St. Crispin," born in a northern parish in "the olde citie" of Bristol. His father was a shoemaker of great natural shrewdness, and his mother, who died in the infancy of the author, was a woman of delicate sensibility. Edward Williams has served his time as an apprentice as a boot-closer, and is an active and trustworthy journeyman. He has contributed to the newspaper columns of the local press many sweet and quaint, able and thoughtful verses. He is, W. Ormond says, "a true and thorough Bristolian, and more, a true and thorough working man; and yet more, a true and thorough-born poet,—a completely representative working man poet." He is moreover leader of a local amateur band, is well versed in music, and plays deftly on the flute, even to the extent of discoursing thereon the choicest *morceaux* of the operas. He is merry, modest, sensible, and sociable, and, we believe, truly deserving in daily life of respectful recognition as a man who does life's duties.

In 1864, he collected a few of his pieces together into a small volume, which was published by subscription, and dedicated to Lord Brougham. That work was not only favourably reviewed by the local journals, but was even noticed with appreciation in some of the higher toned literary journals of the metropolis—among which the *Spectator* may be mentioned—as possessing merits of a

somewhat exceptional nature, when compared with the shoal of verse-books, which every autumnal season brings to the critic's table.

Power, variousness, insight, and descriptive skill are characteristics of the Asmodean view he gives of "The City at Night;" William's verses on "True Nobility," though less terse than Robert Nicol's on the same topic, yet can bear perusal after them; nor needs Williams to quake at the comparison that must arise. Cowper's verses on his Mother's Picture, and Aird's lines on "My Mother's Grave," are unmatchable by any power of poetic rapture; but there are in this little book some very fine verses entitled "My Mother's Dying Kiss;" six "Songs of the Heart" illustrate a fine idea, although the delicate turn of which such sets of verses are susceptible seems scarcely to have been given—the polish of the gem is not equal to its intrinsic desert. Some of his songs, as "Beautiful Bessie," "Jessie Dear," and "How I told my Love," would, we think, well bear to be wedded to music, and be attractive in many a home as household words. Sensitive dramatic skill, expressed in words of pathos and faith, of beauty and sensibility, is shown in the poem which we quote as a specimen of the author's power. And this poem we quote for the purpose of recommending it as a piece excellently adapted for recitation or reading at the winter meetings of young men's associations.

- "Farewell, sweet innocent!—for evermore,
Farewell!—since 'tis the great Creator's will;
Ere my return thy sorrows shall be o'er—
Thy breast be still.
- "Farewell, alas!—those pallid lips of thine
Failed to return the kiss mine own had given;
And yet, thine eyes with love's own lustre shine;
And light from heaven.
- "Farewell! I go to face 'the giddy throng,'
Full of the anguish of an aching heart
I go—to laugh, to jest, to swell the song
And 'play my part.'
- "I go to labour at the shrine of Mirth,
Mid pleasure's devotees who wait me there;
And there bright gladness will but shadow forth
My dark despair;
- "For I shall think of thee the live-long night;
Thy fading form will fill my tortured breast—
Even when my merriment is at its height
And sparkles best.
- "Amid the glare and glitter of the stage,
Where mimic slaves obey my tyrant will,
Thine image will my inmost thoughts engage
And haunt me still.

"Thy meane shall mingle with the crowd's applause
 And drown 'the shouts of laughter' as they rise.
 'To crown my efforts,' when I plead my cause
 In mirthful guise.

"Yet must my lips the smile of gladness wear,
 My cheek no sign of sorrow may reveal,
 Nor may mine eyelids lose the pent-up tear
 Whate'er I feel.

"No! I must lock the flood-gates of my wee,
 And with a smiling visage 'ply mine art,"
 Though 'I have that within which passeth show'—
 A breaking heart.

"And when my task is ended I shall dread
 To bend my footsteps to my saddened home;
 For thou wilt then be numbered with the dead,
 My worshipped one.

"How shall I miss thy 'pretty, prattling tongue,'
 Soft in its accents as the cooing dove,
 Whose words from founts of pure affection sprung
 In floods of love?

"What now to me professional renown?
 Henceforth I calmly wait each act between,
 Till death shall slowly 'drop the curtain' down
 And close life's scene."

The book is cheap (1s. 6d.), and may be had from the author, from whom we hope many of our readers will order it. We suppose that "Edward Williams, author of 'The City of the Night,' &c., Bristol," will reach its proper destination.

Topics for Teachers. By JAMES C. GRAY.

The Hive. Edited by J. C. GRAY. London: E. Stock.

No better works than these are attainable, so far as we know, by Sabbath school teachers. The former is a classified Encyclopædia of Biblical materials, issuing in eighteen monthly parts, at 3d., and the latter is a monthly penny magazine for working Sunday school teachers. They are full, suggestive, well-informed, and excellently arranged, while they are exceedingly concise and exquisitely handy.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

850. What are the peculiarities of the Lake School of Poetry? When, how, and with whom did it originate?—W. D.

851. Dr. Doran is frequently mentioned in magazines as a popular writer. Can you tell me anything about himself and his works?—M. G. L.

852. In the "Papers of an Undergraduate"—a posthumous volume, containing a selection from the manuscripts, &c., of the late William Threlkeld Edwards, of Pembroke College, Cambridge,—one of the early contributors to *The British Controversialist*, I notice, in a paper on poems, by Hankinson and Peat, the statement that "for nine years Mr. Hankinson carried off the Seatonian prize"—p. 145. I have to ask (1st) What is the "Seatonian Prize?" (2nd) Who is Mr. Hankinson, and what else has he done—especially, what mark has he made?—S. W. P.

853. In her "Guide to the Lakes," Miss H. Martineau mentions an Elizabeth Smith of some fame, who is buried in Hawkshead Church. Who was this Elizabeth Smith, and what made her notable?—S. S.

854. In what year was Napoleon Buonaparte born? Napoleon himself, to make it appear that he was born a French citizen, gave 1769 as the year of his birth, which fiction has been re-asserted by the centenary celebrations of the present year. A respectable newspaper, commenting on these fêtes, gave 1767 as the date of Napoleon's birth, and, if memory does not

greatly deceive, Alison, in his "History of Europe," gives 1768 as the year of his birth. Which is the correct date of Napoleon's birth—1767 or 1768?—SAMUEL.

855. Is the Rev. Edward H. Bickersteth, of Hampstead (mentioned in the valuable article on Dr. Ingleby in this magazine,) in any way related to Dr. Bickersteth, Bishop of Ripon? Having often seen mention made of the Rev. E. H. Bickersteth, but knowing nothing of his life, &c., any biographical particulars concerning him will be acceptable to—SAMUEL.

856. Many phrases in constant use are, *verbatim*, the language of Scripture, *e. g.*, "Make haste," "By any means," "They left off," "The heat of the day," "Shut the door after him," "As soon as he had left," with a multitude of others. What is the cause of this fact? Were these phrases first employed by the translators of the Bible, and thence came into common use from the hold which the Bible has taken on the minds of the people? Or were these phrases in use previous to the translation of the Bible in the reign of James I., and employed by the translators on account of their being idiomatic? An *early* reply to this query, with any information on the topic inquired about, will greatly oblige.—S. S.

857. In the 99th Canon of 1604 it is enacted that a table of degrees, set forth by authority, regarding the relationships within which, as prohibited by the laws of God, no marriage can legally take place, or be acknowledged, "Shall be in every church publicly set up and fixed at

the charge of the parish." Is this law of the Church still adhered to in other parts of the country,—it is not so in ours? What is the nature of this table?—L. C.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

849. My biographer has stated, very accurately, that at an early age I found Paley's argument for the existence of God "unsatisfactory, even in its own form." A quarter of a century has gone over my head since then; and its lapse has seen the lapse of many a cherished proof and many a fatal objection: but I think no better of Paley's philosophy now than I did then. His argument I deem not only unsatisfactory, but invalid. I wonder much that it should have approved itself to his own searching intellect: I wonder more that a succession of preceptors in our schools and colleges should have ever believed (if indeed they did believe) that the study of Paley's "Natural Theology" could convince ingenious and thoughtful students, who did not bring to its perusal "a foregone conclusion."

Paley's argument rests on the tremendous assumption that, in respect to our rational inference of their cause and origin, there is a strict analogy between mechanism and organism, between a watch and an animal or a plant, between an imaginary watch that by its mechanism produces watches exactly like itself, and a fertile or reproductive animal or plant. Now, whatever may be the analogy between them, the difference is vast. Let us consider two points of difference only. (a) Mechanism is the arrangement of given parts by external adaptation to a plan; organism is the transformation of matter by its internal energies. If we recognise mechanism in a watch, we necessarily infer the

plan or design; and we know of plan or design only as ideas in a human intellect: and thus we necessarily infer an artificer who was the author of the mechanism. But by recognising organisation in a plant or animal, we do not find ourselves driven, of course, to the same conclusion; since, for ought we know, organisation may not be a product based upon a persisting plan or design, but may be itself the plan or design of a finite spirit, sensuously expressed; just as the chemistry of light is expressed in the spectrum.* (b) A watch that produces watches exactly like itself, is indeed analogous to plants and animals that reproduce their own kind. But we have no right to assume the persistency of species in face of the facts recorded by Darwin, any more than we have the right to assume, as a secure and indubitable principle, the change of species by natural selection. Darwin's facts preclude such dogmatism on the side of his opponents, even if they fail to establish his own hypothesis. For aught we know, Paley's assertion (chap. i. § 4) that "nothing is gained by going back," may be false; and "going back" may be *simplification*. If that be the case, Paley's watch does not represent the reproduction of animal and vegetable species. We must

* Words are used as the counters of thoughts and things. In investigating the law of linguistics, we encounter the wonderful adaptation of mean words. But we do not talk of these adaptations as evidences of design. For aught we know, organization may be nothing but a sensible representation of an inner life, and its infinite complexity or seeming ingenuity may be no more than an expression in phenomenal form of spiritual life. If that view be correct, the organism is not a contrivance, but a speech.

then *in limine* disallow the assumed analogy between mechanism and organism; between his watch-producing watch, and a fertile plant or animal. But (seemingly) independently of this assumption, Paley's argument is further wrong two-fold.

1. Plants and animals exhibit evidences of contrivance; and contrivance necessarily implies a contriver.

2. This contriver must be the first cause of the living creation; since the *regressus*, from individual to individual, does not lead to an origin in the series, and since, as the only alternative, we must posit an origin out of the series.

I. It is a momentous but gratuitous assumption that a plant or an animal exhibits evidences of contrivance. It exhibits nothing of the kind. What it does exhibit, is means which do effectuate a certain end. If contrivance means nothing more than the relation of *condition and result* between the means and the end, then contrivance does not imply a contriver. If contrivance means more than this—means that the conditions were *designed* to produce the result,—then indeed is it a truism that where there is the evidence of design there must have been a *designer*. But whether the conditions were so designed is just what we don't know.

II. The *regressus* from effect to cause is indeed trifling if it do not lead us to the origin. I assert nothing either *pro* or *con*; but when Paley compares the geneutive series of specific plants, or that of specific animals, to a chain, and asserts that "a chain of an infinite length can no more support itself than a chain of a finite length," and therefore posits a self-existed being as the support of the chain,—I am indignant at the sophistry. The being he so posits lives from an infinite lapsed time up to, say, 4,004 B.C., supporting nothing,

or at least not supporting Paley's chain. But we are quite unable to conceive a Being occupying that infinite lapse of time, save under the notion of cause and effect, *i. e.*, that each moment determines him in the next moment. Accordingly, Paley's self-existent being is as an infinite rod, on which his chain is suspended; and an infinite rod can no more support itself than a finite rod—no more than a chain finite or infinite. But, Paley would reply, the chain is self-supporting, for God is self-existent. I reply, I see nothing but assertion in the proposition that God is self-existent. To a certain undetermined subject (God) you attach (analytically) the predicate (self-existent). You *assert* that your rod is self-supporting. Let me, on my side, assert that your infinite chain is self-supported. Why not? There is no necessity in the case excluding my predication, and yielding yours. Whether we contemplate an eternal God, or an eternal natural universe, we meet with exactly the same difficulty. To both, Kant's remarks apply:—"In this way, by continually requiring farther and farther conditions, the insight and satisfaction of reason are postponed. In this restless state reason is driven on the unconditionally necessary, and is forced upon it, although it cannot by any means comprehend such unconditional necessity, and deems itself happy when it infringes on an idea able to support the load of such a hypothesis." (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Ethics, translated by Semple.)

P.S.—Space, being infinite, affords a parallel to the infinite *regressus* from effect to cause. Just as Reason demands that there shall be no void time, but that phenomena shall be correlated in a continuity of cause and effect, so does Reason also demand that there shall be no void

space, but that phenomena shall be correlated (*in every moment of time*) in a continuity of reciprocal action and reaction. But, observe, the attempt to follow this out in space is fruitless, for we can never complete the reciprocal whole of action and reaction among phenomena. On the principles of Paley, we ought to assign this as a reason for positing a necessary substance—God—in space *i. e.*, occupying space, and limiting on all hands the finite universe, which required this *essence* of reaction. Such a *substance*, like the *cause* posited by Paley, is inconceivable. It is an infinite solid resistance, which we can only realize by making it phenomenon—and then all the difficulties attach to its conception, which attach to that of the universe as an infinite *plenum*; those very difficulties, in fact, which the divine substance is called in to relieve. A weak man, of very small weight, being placed in a basket with his hands tied to the handles of the basket, is unable to lift his own weight. To a person *wholly* ignorant of physiology and mechanics the case presents some difficulty. If a speculator were now to explain matters by insisting on the physiological defect as the solution of that difficulty, what would be the answer? Why, this: Endow man with the strength of a Berserker, and how much forwarder are you? The strength brought in brings in also the very difficulty which it was intended to explain away. Such is the argument of Paley.—O. M. INGLEBY.

851. Dr. John Doran, F.S.A., was born in London, 1807. He is descended from an old Irish family belonging originally to Drogheda. He spent the greater part of his boyhood and youth in Paris, where, as well as in Germany, under the care of his father, he was chiefly educated. He had scarcely com-

pleted his sixteenth year, when he wrote "The Wandering Jew," a melo-drama, which was first acted at the Surrey Theatre, in 1822, for T. Blanchard's benefit. He was successively and successfully private tutor in four of the noblest families in England, but subsequently formed a connection with literature and journalism, which has subsisted for many years. He was, we believe, editor of *The Press* for ten years. In 1832, he published "The History and Antiquities of the Town and Borough of Reading," the capital of Berkshire. This work procured for him the degree of M.A., and subsequently he received that of LL.D. from the University of Marburg. In 1846, he edited "Xenophon's Anabasis," with notes, and he has been, for upwards of a quarter of a century, a favourite and frequent contributor to the leading serials. In 1851, Mrs. Romer left incomplete at her death memoirs of the Laet Dauphine, under the title of "Filia Dolorosa." This work Dr. Doran completed in harmony with the original design, and in unity with the portions finished, so that the critics say, "a more touching picture was never presented to the mind."

To an edition of Young's Poems, he furnished a valuable memoir, which was made the groundwork of an elaborate critique in *The Westminster Review*. He edited "The Bentley Ballads," &c. consisting of a selection of choice songs, ballads, &c.; contributed to "Bentley's Miscellany," including the famous productions of Father Prout and Dr. Maginn, as well as several good things by the editor. "The Last Journals of Horace Walpole" were issued under his care. He is the author of a series of popular and readable works somewhat after the fashion of the Miscellanies of the elder Disraeli—among which we may mention

"Table Traits, and Something on Them," displaying a great amount of reading; an agreeable wit, and refined scholarship; "Habits and Men, with Remnants and Records touching the Makers of Both," which is not only amusing; but informing; "Knights and their Days," a quizzical, satirical, anecdotal book; "Monarchs Retired from Business," attractive both to the student and the general reader; "History of Court Fools," a quaint

yet genial production penetrated by subtle humour and surprising earnestness; "New Pictures and Old Panels"—sketches of character abounding in jest, repartee, and anecdote; "Saints and Sinners;" "Lives of the Queens of the House of Hanover;" "Lives of the Princes of Wales," &c., &c. He is known as one of our best humourists and story-tellers; and is a highly popular literary man and dramatic critic.—S.N.

The Societies' Section.

James Teare Prize Essays.—We are informed by circular subsigned, on behalf of the executors of the late James Teare, by Rev. Charles Garrett and Messrs. James Cowin and T. H. Barker, that the executors, in accordance with the testamentary instructions of the deceased, have decided to offer two prizes to the writers of the two best essays, declaring, illustrating, and enforcing the principle of total abstinence from all intoxicating liquors, as a social, moral, and Christian duty. To the writer of the best essay will be awarded seventy guineas, and to the writer of the second best essay, twenty-five guineas. The essays are to be founded upon and sustain the subjoined ten propositions, which were the bases of the advocacy and teaching of Mr. Teare. Each proposition may be made the basis of a separate chapter or section, and the entire argument must uphold and vindicate the doctrines of total abstinence, and the total prohibition of the liquor traffic, in harmony with the uncompromising spirit and teachings of the testator. The essays are not to exceed each 160 pages 8vo. in minion type, and are to be written in a legible hand, on one side of the paper only with mar-

ginal space for alterations. Each essay sent in for competition is to have a distinctive motto, and to be accompanied with a sealed letter, giving the name and address of the writer, with the motto of the essay, for identification, but which will not be opened until after the adjudication. The unsuccessful essays will be returned to the writers, if required. The others will be retained as the property of the trustees of the late James Teare. Essays intended for this competition must be sent in on or before the 31st March, 1870, addressed to the James Teare Prize Essay Committee, the Trevelyan Hotel, Manchester. The names of the adjudicators will be announced hereafter. James Teare's definition of the fundamental principles of teetotalism are—1. That the drinking system, including the manufacture, sale, and use of alcoholic liquors, as beverages, is the greatest evil in our land. 2. That all intoxicating liquors are perfectly useless, for every purpose of life, as articles of diet. 3. That social moderate drinking creates the unnatural demand for the poison, which is the principal cause of the wide-spread scourge of intemperance. 4. That all alcoholic drinks are injurious to the health of

the body and the mind, even when taken in great moderation, as it is called. 5. That it is contrary to the will of God, and consequently sinful and immoral, to convert the food of the people into liquid poison, and naturally destroys the bodies and souls of men. 6. That intoxicating wines or alcoholic drinks are nowhere recommended, sanctioned, or commanded in Scripture to be used as beverages. 7. That it is the supply of alcoholic liquors, furnished by the manufacturers and vendors of the poison, that creates the unnatural demand, but not the demand

the supply. 8. That as the traffic in alcoholic liquors is injurious to trade and commerce, and is the principal cause of poverty and crime, it is the duty of the Government to put it down by legislative enactment. 9. That total and universal abstinence from making, selling, and drinking intoxicating liquors is God's remedy for the intemperance of which we complain. 10. That teetotalism is not a mere matter of expediency, but is a scientific fact, based on chemistry, physiology, and Christian morality.

Literary Notes.

A REPRINT is announced of the most celebrated work of perhaps the most mystical and beautiful English mystics — "The Rise, Race, and Royalty of the Kingdom of God in the Soul of Man," by Peter Sterry, Fellow of Emanuel College, Cambridge.

The International Association of workmen has started a journal, at Vienna, called the *People's Voice*. It demands direct universal suffrage, unlimited right of meeting, and of association; unrestricted liberty of the press, the suppression of permanent armies and absolute religious freedom. The journal does not conceal its origin, and asserts the *solidarity* which unites it to the European Working Men's Society.

Captain Henry A. Wise, a prominent officer of the navy, died at Naples on the 2nd April. He was well known in England as an author, and as the chief of the Naval Ordnance Bureau at Washington. He was born on the 24th

of May, 1819. Captain Wise was the author of "Los Gringos," "Tales for the Marines," "Scampavias," and "Captain Brand," and was a contributor to *Blackwood's* and other British Magazines.

Dr. Pusey has published Part 2nd of his *Eireneon*, or Peace in the Church—chiefly in relation to what he calls "the ever-blessed *Theotokos*," or mother of God, and the immaculate conception.

"Miscellaneous Poems," by Rev. John Keble, uniform with the "Christian Year," are in the press; and the Memoir of that father of the Tractarian movement, by Sir J. T. Coleridge, has been reprinted.

The substance of Dr. J. H. Newman's *Apologia* has been reproduced in his "History of my Religious Opinions."

G. Tieckmüller is issuing a series of "Commentaries on the Writings of Aristotle," in sections.

The inedited works of Guiricardi have been published by the descendants of the historian.

Educational Reform.

A WORD ON THE QUESTION OF THE DAY.

EDUCATIONAL Reform is the question of questions. Civilization itself depends on the nature, quality, and diffusion of education. The tone, the temper, the strength, and the morals of social life are changed and varied, as man's mental, emotional, and industrial nature is cultured or neglected. To know what education should be in order that man may enjoy, with the greatest amount of certainty, the most intense and continuous happiness consistent with the position in life he may be called upon or be qualified to fill, is one of the most important requirements of our era. The public mind is getting, day by day, more busy in considering it. Under different forms it is receiving earnest attention, and the thoughts of our ablest men are exercised with diligence upon it; and the best means of advancing, promoting, and improving the education of the people, has become once more, as it was nearly forty years ago, the most frequently talked about topic of the time. The importance of the subject and the magnitude of the interests wrapped up in it, are immense.

Education is a great and a boundless benefit, if properly imparted, applied, and employed, but misused it can produce terrible and conspicuous evils. In the spirit of man there is emotive sensibility and activity, imaginative power and vigour, conscientiousness of desire and fact, as well as intellection. And this mixed being cannot rest in acts of mere intelligence; he purposes, plans, endeavours, and acts; and each of these processes is influenced by the attitude and inclination of the affections, the will, the imagination, and the thoughts which refer to them, or are associated with them. Education is not a matter which can readily be spoken of *pur et simple*. It is complicated by many considerations, arising out of the interests, real or supposed, of labour, leisure, arts, agriculture, power, pleasure, commerce, navigation, war, wealth, legislation, jurisprudence, political economy, social conditions, public morality and religion; and according as it is spoken of by those who feel or profess interest in these several matters, the word is employed with a modification of meaning or of association, which materially enhances the difficulty of forming correct opinions in regard not only to education itself, but also of proposals made for educational reform. For our own part we think that education will never be fully and faithfully dealt with until it is set before the thoughts of man, free from these embarrassing environments, and is considered in itself as the whole series of means

by which the nature of man may be developed in all its powers, and instructed in all the activities of which it is capable, so that it may do skilfully and well all that is requisite for its general healthy activity, as well as for its performance of some special life work as its contribution to the welfare of society.

It has been said by the Right Rev. the Archbishop of York, that "Education is the topic of the hour." It is, we affirm, a topic of perennial interest, of the mightiest concernment, even as a question of political economy, and still more as a subject for consideration in regard to social life, civil order, and religious liberty. Education is the means of developing manliness in man. Now manliness is dutifulness, efficiency in thought, word, and deed, nobility of character, aim, and effort, aspirative energy of disposition exerted in every possible mode and form to reach the tip-top dignity of our being—the full perfection of all that is in us of bodily strength and skill, of industrial aptitude and concentration, of intellectual faculty and ingenuity, of moral purity and impressiveness, of social influence and effectiveness, of political foresight and action, of religious vigour and self-control so combined and harmonized as to enable us to bear our part well in "the life which we now live in the flesh," and yet make it possible for us to entertain hopes which go beyond this life, and the mundane things with which it concerns itself. To become all that we may be in might and wisdom, in efficacy and earnestness, in ourselves and towards others ought to be our endeavour. By education all that is accomplishable by us is made possible to us; without it we are the living graves of all our own possibilities and hopes, our life is but a living death.

Manhood is a noble gift. The wealth of field and mine, of mill or pottery, of bank or mint, is as nought to the wealth in man. But we have hitherto, with all energy and might of our spirit, given our hearts to develop our minerals and field products, industries, trades, manufactures, &c., as so many enterprises of great "pith and moment," while we have neglected the supreme wealth of our own natures as workers and thinkers, as helpers and co-mates, as possessors of the mightiest of powers—the power of soul. Education is to our manhood what culture is to the fields, labour is to the tissues of the loom, commerce is to the moneyed wealth of nations—the condition of its productiveness and actual value. The intrinsic worth lies therein, but it is neither enjoyable nor exchangeable until education has made it both. In the undiscovered gold fields of Australia and California, what wealth lay hid and useless for ages, because unwrought. In the unwrought manhood of England how much energy, intelligence, inventiveness, skill, thought, excellence, and possible holiness, is lost and losing! Therefore it is well that a cry has gone forth "Educate the masses"—let them no longer be the Masses, and our Mebs, but Men. Educate them, lead forth what is within them, enable them to become all that they may be, emancipate the slaves of ignorance and vice, and sin and crime, set the soul free from the dark prison-house of thoughtlessness!

Man is a being of a wondrously complex nature. The possibilities laid up in every human being are numerous and varied. On the manner in which the powers and capacities of his body and mind are developed and exercised, a man's worth depends. There is a mightier wealth in humanity than figures can express, or gold can symbolize. In the body there are contained a might and a versatility, of which we can scarcely form a guess; and in his mind there are latent sagacity, inventiveness and thought, beyond calculation. Considered as a centre of reception and causation; as a being in whom doing and thinking exist as potencies, yet unmanifested but developable; as a force in which there lies coiled up an almost infinite variety of influences and effects: how wonderful is a new-born infant!—how thrice wonderful is a full grown person! "What a piece of work is man! How noble in reason! How infinite in faculty! In form and moving how express and admirable! In action how like an angel! In apprehension how like a god—the beauty of the world, the paragon of animals! . . . This quintessence of dust!"

This refers to man as a possibility not an actuality. We have not yet learned to make the most of ourselves. How many of the capacities of our nature do we suffer "to rust in us unused!" and how little do we frequently suspect the existence of special powers in us until the occasion calls them into exercise and conscious manifestation. We are thus "unprofitable" because we have neglected the old sage's precept,—*"Know thyself."* Indolent self-content evermasters us, and we live for the most part "halt and maimed," in body and in mind, from absolute incompetency to form a conception of the perfectness of which our nature is susceptible, were we to put our full powers out to proper usury. We are content to be ignorant of our contents. We lack the curious inquisitiveness concerning ourselves, which we exercise so frequently regarding others, or other matters. How frequently does it happen that a man knows less of himself in his inner qualities and disposition than of the cloth which he handles, the earth he delves, the metal he works, the engine he manages, or even the books he studies? and is he not often less conscious of the bent and tendencies of his own frame and intellect, than of the characteristics of flowers and plants, the properties of figures, the powers of mechanical combinations, or the rates of exchange? And wherefore is it so?—plainly because we have failed to estimate aright the essential value of man as man; nay even his worth as an instrument has been disregarded, and we have laboured more ardently to perfect mechanism than to culture, develop and educate man.

In regard to the working classes we believe that we have been far too anxious to have a supply of them as machines than as men. As mere machines, however, they have not been found to be so economical, so uncomplaining and manageable as might have been desired,—and that for this very reason they were not designed to be machines but men. The necessities of their nature continually antagonized

with the exigencies of their condition, and they were found to be made of rebellious stuff. But on a proper system of education, an education which recognised the manhood rather than the mechanism of man, which considered him as a being having a moral purpose for his being, while he is instrumentally a labourer; and which could look so far, below the apparent surface of facts, as to see that culture is capital, and that education is a multiplier of the utilities stored up in the human race, this would soon be changed—and Man, the worker, would increase in worth. If we could have every child in the country so trained and enlightened as to be healthy, moral, intelligent, industrious, sensible of responsibility and duty, and capable of acquiring skill in labour, and information by books, so that when they gradually arrived at manhood they knew the true nature of happiness, and the correct relations between duty and delight, how much holier would our civilization be—how much would the wealth of the world be increased? Who shall calculate the almost infinite capital which education would unlock?

New Potosis, Australias, and Californias, with their untold gold, would not be appreciable in comparison. Then considered as souls in relation to the churches,—and how infinitely more to be regarded!—to eternity, have we not been somewhat too narrow in our view of mankind? Might we not wisely ask ourselves if it can be possible that the Deity, who has formed so fearfully and wonderfully, this strange and awful compound—man—can have bestowed such bounteous endowments on him, given him such heavenly thirst and hunger of the spirit after knowledge and truth without conferring on him as well the capacity of receiving into his soul with delight such religious aliment as is most needful for him? Can it have been intended that a great game of church-chess should be played out in the world with men's souls to stimulate the eagerness with which the contenders checkmate each other? And what if, while we gain temporary numerical triumphs for our special sect, men's souls are really being lost in sensualism, sin, scoffings, and satanic serpentry? What if not only our brother's blood call out from the earth, accusing us of our sorry keepership, but if their very souls cry out in wails of irretrievable woe against us, for that, while we quarrelled among ourselves as to who should lead them heavenwards, they were floated or dragged too truly devilwards!

The education men require is not such as promises best, or most readily to change the sphere of their lives; it is one rather which will fit them to live well in any sphere in which their talents and acquirements find fit exercise, and make them capable of turning to the best account the whole powers and skill of their nature. It is quite a mistaken idea regarding education that the bribe of advancement from the ranks of labour, should be held out as an inducement to acquire it. Labour is a condition of healthy life, and is a duty incumbent on man. It is clearly and palpably unfair that any one should partake of the accumulated wealth of society, and neither replace nor increase the capital of the race. Each person

ought to leave the world richer and better, in and by something he has done or thought, than he found it. Each is a special being with special powers, gifts, and faculties, and this self ought to be developed and improved so as to work out effectively all the power that is in him of feeling, activity, thought, sociality, industry, civic interest, exemplariness and worshipful holiness. Then only is a man truly educated when his entire being is led forth to its highest, purest, wisest, best possibilities and effects, and so become the right and righteous individuality of which he is the single and only example in the collection of created things. Besides being lord, landowner, merchant, tradesman, scholar, statesman, or teacher, he has, above and beyond all, to be a *man*.

Our intention in the present paper, however, is to touch as little on debateable ground as possible. Our own views of this subject have been formed under influences pretty free from the stirring special church and state questions involved in it as a subject of political or sectarian agitation. We have been spectators of many of the contests of the great spirits in their endeavours to make the culture of the mind a part of the ordinary procedure of human life; and we have, in part, acted somewhat directly on public opinion to influence it in favour of the spread of intellectual light and of affording man the opportunity of shedding over the path of his life the illuminating power of reason, prudence, and thoughtfulness, and of repelling from the practical existence of humanity, as far as possible, the bounding and besieging forces of darkness and ignorance. We have studied the topic in the books of the past, in the legislation and morality of Moses, and in the speculations of Plato, in the writings of Alcuin and Aquinas, in the productions of Bacon and Hegel, Locke and Cousin, Baumgarten and Bentham, Kames and Edgeworth, Mill and Hamilton; and it takes its place before us not only as an historical question, but as a philosophical topic. In these two points we shall notice it in this paper. We may, hereafter, treat of it on the practical side, in regard to how we may best educate the people—a most important topic, ripe for discussion, and we should say nearly ready for settlement.

Educational reform has occupied much of the attention of men, and for a long time now has been a theme of the deepest interest. It is impossible to enter into the minute details of school training and discipline which have been, with varying success, adopted either to simulate or to stimulate progress. Nor can we notice and describe the different methods tried to secure success in the promotion of special topics of study. But a concise *resumé* of some of the chief facts in the history of education may not be unserviceable in our times when the subject has begun again to form a leading element in thought among statesmen, and a chief cry among agitators, as well as a centre of attraction for "Unions" and "Leagues."

It would only be pedantic nonsense to commence, in a popular paper like this, with a disquisition on education among the Hebrews, the Egyptians, the Greeks, and the Romans. Even the educative

systems of the Middle Ages could scarcely be treated of in a rough draft of an essay, such as this aims at being read as, without explanations about scholasticism, which would be much more wearisome than edifying, because having little or no bearing upon the question as it comes before our age,—How are the people to be so taught as to ensure the safety of society, and secure the personal independence of the individual?

The general statement may be hazarded that during the Middle Ages education was not only scholastic but ecclesiastical. The Church was the educator of the people. But the learning which had been stored up in the East was broadcast over the West, by the fall of Constantinople, the invention of printing, and the popular demand for knowledge consequent on the Reformation. The appeal of the Reformers was "to the Law and to the Testimony;" and as they had set up a claim for the right of private judgment in regard to truths deemed to be divine, they strenuously exerted themselves to diffuse the Scriptures among the people, and to extend the power of perusing them. The Reformation was the era of the first great stir in Europe for the popularization of education. Reading was regarded as an agent in salvation, and a means of applying the instructions of the Gospels closely to the soul, and learning was avidly sought as one of the modes of attaining unto the gift of God. The zeal of the Reformers on the one hand evoked the earnestness of the adherents to the firmly knit dominions of Hildebrand; and Rome became urgent to found and labour in schools and colleges. Luther and Loyola alike aimed at the ecclesiastical direction of education, or the subordination of the secular learning of the age to the purposes and progress of the church, and so securing the subordination of the state to the church, and maintaining the distinction between laity and clergy.

Among the historical incidents connected with the progress of education, we may note an Act passed by the Scottish Parliament, in 1494, making it compulsory on all barons and freeholders in the realm to send their children to school. In 1512 St. Paul's school was founded by Dean Colet. Cardinal Wolsey founded a school in Ipswich in 1528, and wrote a letter on education to the masters of that Institution. A number of schools were constituted and re-endowed under King Edward VI. The chartered City Companies devoted a considerable portion of their revenues to the institution of schools; and a great number of charitably disposed persons during the sixteenth century, placed educational endowments in the hands of trustees and official bodies for the restoration of old, or of founding of new schools. After the fervour of the Reformation had set in, it became the fashion to bequeath or appropriate money or lands for educational purposes. A few schools were encouraged by Mary; and Elizabeth also gave aid and influence to the promotion of education;—among other of her good acts, reconstituting Westminster. In 1615 and 1633 educational Acts were passed by the Parliament of Scotland, though no general or systematic attempt

to provide by legislative enactment for the general education of the people of England seems to have been made.

Roger Ascham's "Scholemaster" was issued in 1571, two years after the author's death, and this work forms one of our earliest modern systematic treatises "on the right method of educating children," of providing "a whetstone to sharpen a good wit, and encourage a will to learning," and of making a child what "aptness of nature, advice of friends, and God's disposition shall lead him" to be. Another endeavour was made by John Milton, in his "Tractate on Education," 1644, to point out the faulty methods prevalent in teaching, and to sketch out a scheme which would be more liberal, comprehensive, and suitable to man's estate than that common in his day. "That," said Milton, "I call a complete and generous education, which fits a man to perform justly, skilfully, and magnanimously all the offices, both public and private, of peace and war." Another step was taken in France by the publication, in 1688, of Fenelon's treatise "On the Education of Girls," in which he advocates a wide and judicious culture of the gentler sex, governed by good sense and discreet thoughtfulness, so as to give them the full use of their faculties, not only as a means of bringing about their own happiness, but of increasing their power of making others happy by their knowledge of all that is useful in their sphere, as well as all that is virtuous and elegant.

To make Christianity the basis of civilization was a noble and notable ambition, and had the entire interpenetration of personal and social life with the life of Christ been accomplished, Christendom would have been irreversible and impregnable. But external success, which is only apparent, was attempted, while internal success, which alone is real, was left unachieved. Unity more than community was sought, and education ceased to be regarded as the leading forth of man's nature into perfectness and effectiveness, and came to be thought of as a propaedeutic towards the old church or the new, as the case might be.

In England, the Reformation, by destroying the religious houses, brought about a considerable destitution in education, and several grants towards the endowment of schools were made by the Tudor sovereigns, and in their times a large number of wealthy persons founded educational endowments in several districts, towns, and parishes. But no systematic, general national scheme of forming the character and informing the minds of the people was instituted or attempted. Public schools, endowed schools, and charity schools, although pretty numerous, were not by any means co-extensive with the country or equal to the exigencies of a growing population. In Scotland the Church and State combined to inaugurate a better system. By Parliamentary enactments every parish in Scotland was compelled to erect a school and a house for the master, to provide a salary for a teacher, and to see that there should be no vacancy in any such school exceeding, at any one time, six months. The proprietors of land in each parish provided

the funds, and the Church undertook the testing of the qualifications of the teachers and the inspection of the schools. This admirable scheme wrought exceedingly well so long as the population was sparse, but when manufactures and commerce brought great masses of the people together into townships, the single scholastic institution required by law failed to provide means enough for education, and the territorial form of schools and churches broke down under the changes introduced by the centralisation needed effectually to carry on industrial pursuits and trading concerns. Acts of Parliament were too inflexible to permit of a change in the incidence of the burdens from the one species of wealth—*land*—to the other and more modern sort—*profits*. So country parish schools were half emptied by the draining off of the surplus rural population into towns, and yet for these crowded masses no adequate provision could be furnished as the law stood. Nor has the law been so amended yet as to make education a charge upon society in any equitable form. Voluntary effort and the absolute necessities of the people have done somewhat to supplement the supply, but these are both intermittent and precarious, and they do not harmonize with the ideal of the Scottish school system, which seeks to ensure the constant residence and dutiful attendance of a competent teacher in every centre of population, however small, so that a full and thorough school training may be within reach of the poorest, within a fair walking distance from his own home; an ideal which seems easy of fulfilment, were but the burden of the schools made to fall on the possessors of accumulated wealth. Notwithstanding that several Acts of Parliament have been passed for the amendment of this system, it has not yet been worked into harmony with the changed conditions of modern society. Yet it has several claims to attentive consideration if we wish to learn, from the history of the past, what may be profitable and advantageous in the present and beneficial in the future. Its theory, and in a great measure its result, was to cover the entire territory with available places of instruction, superintended by qualified and tested masters, whose independence was so far guarded as to make them free from the more pressing anxieties of life, and yet not so far as to induce or suffer them to relax their energies or sink into sloth. All the school buildings and the master's dwelling were peremptorily ordered to be kept in due repair and habitableness, while a periodical inspection of the premises, an examination of the work done by master and pupils, and a general superintendence of the character and conduct of the teacher were provided for, and a sense of responsibility in regard to education was diligently kept up. The system lacked the fullness and completeness, the thoroughness and *esprit* of our public schools, but it possessed a diffusiveness and comprehensiveness of which England has felt the want.

The Church, in the exercise of its inspectorship over these schools which Parliament had instituted in every part of the land, was for

a long time very effective. The fitness of the master for holding his position in regard to character and learning were tested by the Church before his appointment by the landed proprietors could be confirmed, and an annual visitation of each school was imperative. This inspection was not entrusted to one person, but required to be done by the Presbytery as a body, or by a committee of their number appointed for the purpose, who were bound to report to the Presbytery, or aggregate of officiating clergymen in a locality of considerable extent. Copies of the reports made on their schools were attainable by teachers, and a right of appeal against any strictures made was conceded. If any teacher was reported to be inefficient, or to have fallen into any gross immorality or censurable sin, he was put upon his trial before these clergy, who had power to examine witnesses on the matter and act judicially in the affair, while appeal was open against their decision to the supreme courts of the country. The State had thus provided ample security for fitness and efficiency by its machinery so long as it was properly worked, and the Church had pretty extensive powers over purity of life and orthodoxy of opinion.

The controversies between the Churches against heresy—in their different views of orthodoxy and heterodoxy—continued to influence education a good deal. At length a sort of armed truce was virtually, if not virtually, agreed upon, under the ominous term, *Tolerance*. Religious differences, as they could not be cured, were now looked upon as vagaries to be endured—to be borne with for the sake of civic peace, not through charity of spirit. In England the Revolution of 1688 made tolerance a principle and a right, and it seemed hopefully possible then to attempt “to promote everywhere that way of training up youth, with regard to their several conditions, which is the easiest, shortest, and likeliest to produce virtuous, useful, and able men in their distinct callings.” With the intent of aiding in this great public exigency, John Locke, in 1693, issued his “Thoughts on Education,” the motto of which is—

“Doctrina vires promovet insitas

Rectique cultus pectora roborant.

Ut cumque defecere mores

Dedecorant bene nata culpræ.”*

Horace (Odes) iv. 4.

This treatise was so effective that not only were a large number of schools founded in consequence of its able advocacy of good training, but many schoolmasters were incited to new efforts to improve the systems on which they taught. Even in Scotland, under its stimulant power, a new Act of Parliament was passed, in 1696, in favour of schools and schoolmasters.

The influence for good thus set in motion was augmented and

* Instruction improves our inborn faculties; and proper training strengthens our moral powers. Whosoever, indeed, good habits are wanting, faults may even the well-born.

reinforced by a noble and stirring "Sermon preached in the Parish Church of Christ Church, London, May 9th, 1745, by Joseph Butler, LL.D., Lord Bishop of Durham," (author of the "Analogy,")—"On Charity Schools," in which that great thinker affirms that the necessities of children in regard to education "are as truly a natural demand upon us to *train them up in the way they should go* as their bodily wants are a demand to provide their bodily nourishment," and maintains as a consequence "that children have as much right to some proper education as to have their lives preserved," and that "the public is as much interested in the education of poor children as in the preservation of their lives."

In looking over this rare tract we notice that, at this time, "The Society for the Promoting of Christian Knowledge"—established 1678—had set up some charity schools, and promoted others for the purpose of "educating them in the principles of religion as well as of civil life;" and was endeavouring to secure the attention of the clergy, gentry, and scholars to the necessity of letting the poor in their degrees share with their wealthier neighbours the blessings of living in an age when knowledge had been increased.

Rousseau's "Emile," published in 1762, an acute though visionary romance of education, by its absorbing interest and burning eloquence roused the interest of France in regard to the training of the mind. It gave prominence to the fact that ignorance, wretchedness, and vice are linked together as inevitable companions, and to the idea that the improvement of society could only be effected by a consistent and persistent warfare with ignorance as the mother of woes. Rousseau influenced on the one hand the Encyclopædists, and on the other Pestalozzi. The tenets of the Encyclopædia affected the Revolution, and the views of Pestalozzi changed the whole aspect of education in Switzerland, brought the talent and energy of Emmanuel De Fellenberg into operative activity in education, and ultimately stirred up an educational reform in Holland, Belgium, Germany, and France, which has been felt in England, and has stimulated America.

In 1782 Robert Raikes founded Sunday schools, and in 1786 the "Sunday School Union" was founded. Joseph Lancaster and Dr. Andrew Bell, in 1798, commenced the Monitorial system of teaching. Under the impulse of the former the "British and Foreign School Society" was established in 1805, and under the influence of the latter the "National School Society" took form in 1811. In 1815, James Buchanan, under the auspices of Robert Owen, inaugurated the Infant School system (which had, in 1780, under Oberlin, been attempted in the Ban de la Roche) at New Lanark; and about 1820, on the invitation of James Mill, Z. Macaulay, Lord Brougham, &c., he introduced it to Brewer's Green, London. Mr. Wildersmith followed Buchanan's lead, and the Church of England incorporated that system in the Home and Colonial Infant School Society.

In 1819, Lord (then Mr.) Brougham got a commission appointed to inquire into the management of public charities left for the edu-

cation of the poor, and in 1820 brought in a bill for the "National Education of the People." It failed through the jealousy of Church and Dissent—the former because they had too little power given them, the latter because they were so little recognised in and favoured by it. Then the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge was established, mechanic's institutes sprung up, London University was founded, and in 1831 the grand scheme for the joint education of Catholic and Protestant children in Ireland was inaugurated by the late Earl of Derby (then Lord Stanley).

In 1833, elementary, middle, and normal schools were founded in France by M. Guizot, under the pressure of M. Cousin, on highly liberal principles; and in the same year in Britain a grant of £20,000 on behalf of education was made by Parliament, and allotted by the Lords of the Treasury to the National and British School Societies. But the first Reformed Parliament, in which there were 509 Liberals and 149 Conservatives, was allowed to pass away without the enactment of any proper and effective scheme for the education of the people.

The Statistical Society of Manchester issued in 1835 some startling statements regarding the lamentable deficiencies in education of the working population of the manufacturing districts. These attracted the notice and awakened the interest of B. F. Duppa, whose active sympathy and energy of character led him to propose the institution of the "Central Society of Education," 1846. To this association Grote, De Morgan, Bulwer, Beckford, the Marquis of Lansdowne, Lord John Russell, the Earls of Radnor and Lovelace, Sir William Molesworth, &c., adhered. The object announced in its formation was "to collect, to classify, and to diffuse information concerning the education of all classes, in every department, in order to learn by what means individuals may be best fitted in health, in mind, and in morals, to fill the stations which they are destined to occupy in society." The main views on education advocated by this association were a compound of the opinions of Bishop Butler—that education is "a system of training the youthful being, whereby his various powers are developed and habituated to a healthful action, while his reflection is taught to maintain a dominion in accordance with his whole being,"—and of those entertained by James Mill, that "the end of education is to render the individual, as much as possible, an instrument of happiness, first to himself and next to other beings." By it, pamphlets were published, public meetings held, lecturers were sent out, prizes were offered for essays on the subject, and such an agitation was excited, that, in 1839, "The Privy Council of Education" was appointed. It consisted of five cabinet ministers, nominally, but was really, of course managed, controlled, and worked to its ends by the secretary, Dr. Kay (now Sir J. P. Kay Shuttleworth, Bart.). It was proposed to establish a normal school for the secular education of teachers, and for their instruction in religion, in two sections—*general* in regard to principles on which all sects agree, and *special*

so far as advanced latitudinarian and dissenting attendance on the latter of which was to be optional. Though £20,000 had been granted by Parliament for this purpose, the Bill for its regulation was opposed, and the money was divided between the opposing forces—the National School Society and the British and Foreign School Society. Mr. Duggan died, the Government became afraid of encouraging a settled holy warfare of sects. Mr. Wyse was sent to Greece, other members of the Central Society were induced to hush the voice of agitation, and the society was shut up with its mission only in part accomplished. Battersea Normal School was set up privately, but was soon made over to the Church, under the auspices of the National School Society. Under the patronage of the Committee of Council, lectures on the methods of instruction were delivered in Exeter Hall, by gentlemen carefully selected from those who had not committed themselves before the public as educational reformers. The principle of certification of masters and inspection of schools was adopted, and Kneller Hall was commenced, under the superintendence of Dr. Estlin, as the Government Training School for candidate teachers; and by these means considerable improvements in schools, teachers, and education have been effected.

After the success of the Anti-Corn Law League, Manchester bestirred itself to provide a supply of cheap food for the mind, as a sequence to having succeeded in bringing cheap bread to the homes of the people. In 1847 the Lancashire Public School Association, for promoting the establishment of a general system of national education, was founded by a number of gentlemen of various religious denominations, with the design of securing as much of secular education as was requisite for the proper performance of the duties of secular life, combined with "as much religious instruction as is compatible with religious freedom," upon the basis of local representation and non-interference with religious instruction. They prepared a plan which was received with a large amount of favour; and in April, 1850, the late Wm. J. Fox brought before the House of Commons, in a most effective speech, a modification of that plan, adapted to the country at large. A strong coalition of Church parties was formed against this Bill, and it was rejected by an overwhelming majority. In October of the same year the Lancashire Union determined on making theirs a national movement, and their Association was converted into "The National Public School Association, formed to promote the establishment by law in England and Wales of a system of free schools, which, supported by local rates, and managed by local committees, specially elected for that purpose by the ratepayers, shall impart secular instruction only, leaving to parents, guardians, and religious teachers the instruction of doctrinal religion; to afford opportunities for which it is proposed that the schools shall be closed [opened?] at stated times in each week."

The Lancashire movement owed much to the energy, enthusiasts,

perseverance, and skill of the late Samuel Lucas, who acted as chairman from the commencement of the movement, and even after he had removed from Manchester to London, edited a series of papers read at the meetings of the Association, for which he wrote a very excellent introduction. These papers were issued with the title "National Education not necessarily governmental, sectarian, or irreligious," in 1860. This extract from the introductory paper commends itself for quotation:—

"In order to diminish intemperance, misery, and crime, a large extension of education among the people is necessary; hence considerations of self-interest, if not of duty or of Christian charity, will prompt the nation, if it be wise, to provide an instant and effectual remedy. The interests (not only of society but) of religion are concerned in it. Ignorance may be a fit soil for the growth of superstition, but in it, true religion must perish."

Besides this work, Samuel Lucas was also the editor of "The Advocate of National Instruction, for promoting the Establishment of a General System of Schools for Secular Instruction, Supported by Local Rates, and under Local Superintendence," in 1854. A very important contribution had been made, in 1847, to this important question by the late Prof. G. L. Craik, one of the early workers in behalf of popular training when the diffusion of useful knowledge was agitated, in his pamphlet entitled "Not Schools, but Education"—a sort of invitation to "A Truce of God" upon the matter of management of schools, if education could, but, be got. William J. Fox at this time delivered many good speeches, orations, and lectures, on behalf of national education, not only in Parliament, but in public meetings, and in his course, on the elevation of the labouring classes. One of mark we remember well, in 1847, "On the Duties and Rights of Society as to Education." Much about the same time as we heard this splendid and powerful utterance of a mind of the first order, we read a pamphlet by Rev. Thomas Milner, "On the Elevation of the People—Moral, Instructional, and Social," in which he said, "Let us learn a lesson from the Athenians—their greatest men were schoolmasters." To the same period belongs a singularly lucid pamphlet by the late Professor J. Hoppus, of University College, on "The Crisis of Popular Education."

There has been growing in the public mind a feeling of resistance to the monopoly of education claimed by ecclesiastical bodies, and there has recently risen a class of thinkers who claim education as the birthright of man, as the means of enabling him to perform the various duties incumbent on him as an individual having duties to perform and responsibilities to bear, which are industrial, social, and civic, as well as those which devolve on him as a member of an ecclesiastical corporation. These, while they grant the importance of doctrinal religion, are desirous of securing, as a preliminary to instruction in that, such an instrumental education of the senses, the tastes, the habits, and the intellect, as may prepare men

for the practical and necessary, the indispensable and imperative duties of existence, and are not willing to defer the interests of individuals, families, municipalities, and communities, to the contentions of sects or the embroilments of theological corporations.

In 1854 a series of Lectures on Education were begun at the Royal Institution of Great Britain, under high auspices, and with the design of exciting an interest in these questions, which would be likely to permeate the country by impressing its best minds; and in the same year the Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures, and Commerce, having attained its hundredth session, determined to make that event memorable by "some prominent measures, indicating its settled conviction that it is to an improved education of all classes that the nation must principally look for a progressive improvement in its arts, manufactures, and commerce." It was regarded as very important to "exhibit, as far as possible, a representation of the means of education in France, Prussia, Belgium, Hanover, the German States, Holland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, and the United States of America, as well as in the United Kingdom and the Colonies." This exhibition (the first of the kind ever formed in any country) was regarded by all concerned with, or interested in education, as a most successful event. In connection with this exhibition, the council of the society organized a series of Lectures on subjects connected with education, from which religious and political topics were carefully excluded; and these lectures were delivered gratuitously by gentlemen, eminent not only for their talent, but for their zeal in the cause of popular instruction. Both these series of lectures led to considerable interest in the subject. Those carried on at the Royal Institution were issued as they were delivered separately, and those which were given at St. Martin's Hall, Long Acre, in a cheap form—so far as they were recoverable from the MSS. and notes, or the recollection of their authors—and both met with a good and ready sale.

It would, of course, be quite impossible to notice and estimate all the works which have been written with the design of aiding in educational reform. But we may note a few which we remember as, at least, specimens of what has been attempted in connection with this subject, and evidence of the continued and extensive agitations which have prevailed in regard to it, even within the present century. The celebrated essay by John Foster on "The Evils of Popular Ignorance," which originated in an address delivered at an anniversary meeting of the British and Foreign School Society, is a powerfully written argument for a comprehensive scheme of popular education, and deals most forcibly with the main questions which had arisen at that time. This was published in 1819, and the accident of time causes us next to mention a work of some ability, which advocates that the energies of man "should be continually directed towards this noble and lofty aim—the melioration of the state of man upon earth, the extension of his power

over nature, and the augmentation of his means of happiness." This work, issued in 1822, contains a philosophy of training which displays talent and ability. It bears the title of "The Art of Employing Time to the Greatest Advantage the True Source of Happiness;" but on reading it we found that it is a literal translation, without acknowledgment or intimation, of a work, issued in 1814, by M. Juffien, at Paris, "*L'Art d'employer le Temps, pour notre plus grand avantage veritable source de bonheur.*" In 1828 a volume was published by John Wood, Esq., containing an "Account of the Edinburgh Sessional School," which had been commenced in 1812, immediately after the evils of popular ignorance had been forcibly impressed on the inhabitants of the Northern Capital in the "atrocious scenes of riot and of bloodshed with which that year was there ushered in. This book contains strictures on education in general, and gives a vivid and vigorous outline of a scheme of teaching which was, in its own day and way, a wonderful success.

Between 1816 and 1821 Mr. David Stow, of Glasgow, gradually worked out a scheme of educational reform, which he denominated the *training system*; and in 1826 a number of gentlemen, anxious to do anything which bade fair to promote the best interests of the community, and impressed with the success attendant on this scheme, entertained and seconded the proposal of its founder, erected the first model and normal school in Britain, and opened it with 130 children. As a means of enlisting sympathy with, and interest in his plan, David Stow wrote on "National Education," and explained his system in several works on "The Training System," Bible Training, &c.; and, in 1834, "The Glasgow Education Society" was instituted to superintend and extend the schools established on Stow's system.

Stow's system was essentially a religious one, the whole tenor and tendency of which was to incorporate into the very character, practices and acts of children, the principles of Christian morality. An able work on the "Scripture Principles of Education" we owe to the pen of Caroline Fry, and a large library of pamphlets have been published on the same subject. But one book of more than common worth was issued by Isaac Taylor in 1837, on "Home Education," advocating and enforcing the kind of education which he had himself received, namely, a domestic one, in which moral, religious, and intellectual culture could be combined in the manner pursued in his own case, and explained in a work on "Self-Cultivation," published by his father Isaac Taylor, in 1817.

A great many systems of instruction came out in the midst of the great agitation which stirred the beginning of the century. "The Hamilton System" was for a long time popular, and has kept its place to some extent, even yet in a somewhat improved form, under the designation of "The Robertsonian Method." "The Jacotot Method" was adopted in many public schools, and the "Perryian System" of Education had its model schools and its "Principia" about 1830; but none of these numerous schemes have

incorporated themselves with the general education of the country, though there are good hints to be had from each.

In 1850 Mr. Hugo Reid published a treatise on "The Principles of Education," of considerable practical value, and containing not a few remarks of high interest on the general question. He was a man of rare and practised mind, whose talents did much to elevate several branches of instruction while rendering them more accurate and easy. We ought not to omit mention of the late Professor Sullivan's "Lectures on Popular Education," widely delivered and circulated in Ireland, to which was annexed a translation of M. Guizot's celebrated letter to the primary teachers of France. "An Outline of the General Regulations and Methods of Teaching in the Model Schools of the Commissioners of National Education," from the pen of the same gentleman, who at one time wielded almost all the influence and power of a minister of instruction in Ireland, contains some useful materials for thought and practice. Of great importance, and theoretical as well as practical value, are the works of R. Dawes, M.A., Dean of Hereford. Among these we may name "Suggestive Hints towards Improved Secular Education," "Suggestions for an Improved and Self-paying System of National Education," &c., while we may note his "Observations on the Working of the Government Scheme of Education, and his "Remarks on the Plans of the Committee of Council," as among the wise and judicious communications on this subject due to churchmen.

H. Dunn's "Principles of Teaching," Ross' "Manual of School Method," and a "Manual of Method" produced by the National School Society; the Rev. D. Smith's "Outlines of a System of Education for the People," the Rev. James Currie's "Early and Infant School Education," followed by his "Principles and Practice of Common School Education," Jelinger Symon's "School Economy," and T. Morrison's "Manual of School Management," contain a good many valuable practical remarks and instructive hints. J. E. Poynting's "Temple of Education," illustrating the philosophy, poetry, and religion of teaching, is deserving of perusal, as is also an Essay "On the best Means of making the Schoolmaster's Function more efficient than hitherto in Preventing Misery and Crime," by E. C. Tanish. Pycroft's "Course of English Reading" supplies some ideas on the methods to be pursued in study, and remarks on the best books to be read on given subjects.

Among other authors of note who have devoted their talents to the advocacy of educational reform, we ought to mention Dr. Andrew Combe, who, in 1831, published an able treatise on "The Principles of Physiology applied to the Preservation of Health and to the Improvement of Physical and Mental Education;" and his perhaps more noted brother, Dr. George Combe, who, in 1845, published "Notes on National Education and Common Schools," in which he gave an account of the educational systems of Germany and America; and in 1847, "Remarks on Education," in which he advocated the secularization of education, as given in schools, and the

throwing off the yoke of religious teaching on the churches. These two works showed that their author had become more thoroughly convinced, by time and reflection, of the accuracy of the principles which he had propounded in a course of lectures delivered in various parts of Great Britain, which were afterwards published, with the title of "Popular Education," in 1833, and were speedily translated into French, German, and Swedish, as well as republished and widely circulated in America.

The Factory Commission and the Poor Law Commission brought into light the extent and urgency of mental and moral education; and to aid in deepening the interest thus excited, Mrs. Sarah Austin, in 1836, published translations of the able reports on national education which Victor Cousin had presented to the Minister of Public Instruction in France—reports which attracted the attention of the senate, the pulpit, and the highest journals in this country. To that on Prussia, the translator prefixed a very excellent introductory discussion of several questions connected with schools, discipline, and the duty of the State. Still further to facilitate the union of all classes on a common basis, acknowledging the absolute necessity of secular education, but agreeing to an armistice or compromise in regard to religious instruction, she prepared "Selections from the Old Testament; or, the Religion, Morality, and Poetry of the Hebrew Scriptures," containing such portions of the Bible as appeared to her "own heart and mind as most persuasive, consolatory, or elevating."

A very excellent pamphlet was issued in 1847 by the Rev. James Booth, D.C.L., President of the Liverpool Literary and Philosophical Society, on "Examination the Province of the State; or the Outline of a Practical System for the Extension of National Education." The proposal made in this pamphlet to hold district examinations in every part of the country periodically, and that, on the receipt of a duly signed certificate, the bearers should be eligible for employment; and grades of certificate to be obtainable is worthy of more attention than it seems to have got, as thorough and economical, while leaving the education of the masses free to competition.

The late Professor J. P. Nichol, in 1847, published a translation of J. Willams' treatise on "The Education of the People," which had received the praise and prize of the French Academy in 1843, as a useful work of the first order, and prefixed to it a preliminary dissertation on the condition of education in this country, in which there are a great many noble thoughts and wise sayings. About the same time, and following out the line of thought pursued by Robert Owen, Andrew and George Combe, James Simpson of Edinburgh, &c., Charles Bray of Coventry, issued the early editions of his treatise on "The Education of the Feelings or Affections" on a phrenological basis and method.

Mr. Herbert Spencer, a thinker of deep and wide range, has given profound study to this topic as a philosophical subject in his 1869.

book on "Education, Intellectual, Moral, and Physical, 1850," and, in 1861, Dr. Neil Arnott, in his "Survey of Human Progress," has given an excellent and able mapping-out of the entire field of knowledge in its relation to education, and has showed his profound acquaintance with the powers of the mind, and its capacity for receiving, in due form and order, a full and trustworthy summary of the various sciences, arts, and intellectual studies. Between these two eminent books there were issued, with a more practical bearing, T. Tate's "Philosophy of Education; or, the Principles and Practice of Teaching," J. A. St. John's "Education of the People," and, at a slightly subsequent date, "The Educational Papers," of the veteran education reformer, Professor Pillans, a friend of Leonard Horner, and one of the strong and valiant advocates of a full and free education, were reissued, containing half a century's reflections on the topic. Simon S. Laurie, a sound and liberal thinker of philosophic and of practical mind, in his "Primary Instruction in Relation to Education," 1864, gave evidence of the powers required for a moral teacher in a prescient chair. In 1867 "Modern Culture: its True Aims and Requirements," was issued under the editorship of Edward L. Youniss, M.D. in a series of essays, lectures, and contributions by some of the most eminent thinkers of the day. These advocated the scientific side of education, as "Essays on Liberal Education," under the editorship of Rev. E. W. Farrer, did the side of literature and philosophy. Henry Fawcett, M.P., has just added to his "Manual of Political Economy" a chapter on "National Education." It would be a great omission in any notice of the various activities which have been employed in stimulating, directing, and advancing the agitation for educational reform, to have omitted the writings of Dr. Vaughan, the speeches of John Bright, the measured addresses of W. E. Gladstone, J. S. Mill, J. A. Froude, Sir A. Grant, and Archbishop Thomson. We are quite unable to specify the numerous and able speeches which were devoted to this subject during the electioneering contest of 1868, and those which were delivered in the House of Parliament in the early part of the present year. Still less are we able to make note of or comment upon the efforts made at congresses, associations, leagues, unions, county meetings, and council meetings. We have noted, we think, enough to show that a larger amount of intellectual effort has been expended on this subject during the present century than on almost any other topic. The man who can gather up all the several threads of thought and aspiration, and weave them into an effective and practical whole, and give an efficient unity and comprehensiveness to our national education, we shall be prepared to hail and welcome as the greatest reformer and the noblest liberator of our age. Of the recent attempts to legislate in behalf of educational reform it would be impossible to give even an effective bird's-eye view in the space at our disposal. The most salient points must be dismissed with mere mention. Queen's Scholarships for pupils

teachers were established about 1850; in 1853 the Capitation Grant was begun; in 1861 the Revised Code was introduced, and in 1863 made imperative; in 1864 a Royal Commission on Education in Scotland was issued; and during 1865 and 1866 select committees of the House of Commons inquired into the constitution of the Privy Council of Education, the system on which the business of the office is conducted, the conditions of inspection and of the distribution of parliamentary grants, by all which reports were presented to Parliament. In 1868 the introductory volume of the "Schools Inquiry Commission"—a work which is to extend to twenty-one vols.—was presented to Parliament. The commission for inquiring into the condition of education in the middle classes and in middle-class schools is still engaged in its investigations. The agitation regarding education in Ireland, the parliamentary endeavours to settle the education question for Scotland, and the agitation now going on under the auspices of the Birmingham National Educational League, and the Manchester National Educational Union, are too recent to require more than this passing allusion.

Slight and imperfect as the preceding sketch of the progress of thought and effort in connection with educational reform is, it has almost exhausted the space which can be occupied by this paper, and yet we have been compelled to omit any notice of the aids to education afforded by the institution of mechanics' institutes, schools of art, evening classes, reformatory, industrial, and technical schools, people's colleges, working-men's colleges, working-men's clubs, mutual improvement associations, Sunday-school training classes, village clubs and institutes, debating societies, band of hope unions, temperance evening classes, exhibitions of inventions, curiosities, and educational products or apparatus, cheap newspapers, educational periodicals, improved school books, reduced postage, circulating libraries, reading clubs, manuscript magazines, and all the literary agencies aiming at the diffusion of self-culture among the more thoughtful and earnest of all classes. The institution of the associateship in arts by the universities, the examinations of schools and scholars for certification and reward they have commended, and the very beneficial effects of the free and full access to collegiate honours rendered possible to studious men throughout the whole country by the London University matriculation and examination scheme, have not so much as been noted, and the general diffusion of the highest class of thought in the great institutions of the country by the lecturers who officiate as their public instructors, might well deserve more than mention.

We would fain have entered into some explanation of our own views of what education should be, not only as corrective of what we feel to be narrow and prudential notions based upon self-interest and utility, but also as promotive of higher views among our readers of what ought to be aimed at not merely to make an educated nation, but to constitute a truly educated individual. It is only by having an elevated ideal to work up to that anything great and

noble is ever accomplished, and though it may be important in a practical point of view to fix upon the minimum which lies within the possibility of present attainment, it is almost equally requisite to have present to our spirits a sense of the inadequacy of that which we do attempt to be permanently satisfactory, even to keep us working up to the small standard of the accomplishable. We must deny ourselves the space to define and illustrate our idea of education as a development of the entire being and nature of man to sentence, subtlety, discriminativeness, comprehensiveness, and skilful activity in all exertions of the physical, moral, social, or intellectual capacities, and to a wide, varied, and profound sympathy with all that can act or react on life, thought, and feeling, whether at work, during leisure, in reflection, in amusement, or in worship; in short, for we can now only present our scheme in outline, we affirm that a thorough, complete, and comprehensive

EDUCATION should be—

1. Physical. { Bodily training and gymnastic.
Sensational—the art of observing.
2. Instrumental. { Elementary. } Reading, writing, arithmetic, &c.
{ Technical. } Drawing, machinery, &c.
{ Professional. } Arts, business, office, &c.
3. Informational. { Grammar, geography, history, political economy, &c.
Elements of taxation, government, &c.
Conversation, public affairs, &c.
4. Culturing. { Logic, rhetoric, metaphysics.
Languages, literature.
Mathematics, statistics, sciences
5. Moral { 1. Personal duties.
2. Family " "
3. Social " "
4. Civil " "
6. Aesthetic. { Knowledge of the fine arts:
" poetry.
" natural scenery, &c.
7. Philosophical. { 1. Theory of legislation, life, &c.
2. Grounds of morals, society.
3. Systems of thought.
8. Political. { Duties as a citizen in private.
" in public.
" in official life.
9. Religious. { 1. In regard to personal piety
2. " fellow worshippers.
3. " sect, party, and official duty.
4. " social effort.
5. " missionary enterprises.
6. " example and State laws.
7. " to God.

Religion.

DOES FREE THOUGHT LEAD TO INFIDELITY?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—VI.

"It must be

The instinct of great spirits to be free,
And the sworn foes of cunning barbarism,
He who has searched the wide abyss
Of that life-giving soul which men call fate,
Knows that to put more faith in lies and hate
Than truth and love is the true *atheism*.
Upward the soul for ever turns her eyes;
The next hour always shames the hour before;
One beauty at its highest, prophecies
That by whose side it shall seem mean and poor,
No God-like thing knows aught of less and less,
But widens to the boundless perfectness."

Lowell.

THE highest aspiration of man is to attain wisdom. "Get wisdom, and with all thy getting, get understanding," is the advice of one whose chief prayer to God was, that the Giver of all good would bestow upon him an "understanding heart." Now the search after wisdom is synonymous with the search after truth, and with the search after God. To seek truth therefore, is to endeavour to obtain an intimate acquaintance with the nature of God. Truth is a thing, which, by many is but very imperfectly understood. Thus preachers and teachers frequently make use of the expression, "Christian truth," as though it was a duty to distinguish it from some other truth. Truth is one and indivisible. What is truth, as applied to the Bible is truth as applied to all other matters. Truth wherever found has emanated from Him alone who is Truth. Let us then in the words of the apostle, "Seek truth and ensue it." The question thus arises, where must the search be made? The answer cometh back clear as a trumpet, or as convincing as a still small voice. "Search the Scriptures, for in them ye think ye have eternal life, and they are they which testify of Me." Old Chaucer, in the song which he wrote upon his death-bed, appreciated the salve of applying truth to the heart. Thus he sings,—

"Earth is a desert,
Thou art a pilgrim:
Led by thy Spirit,
Grace from God crave,
Truth to thine own heart
Thy soul shall save."

In many hours of doubt and perplexity the student hath been led to mine ear: "Trust to thine own heart." "The soul shall save." "and the demons of darkness hath fled, for all hopes that are based on Truth, though their budding begin in doubt and darkness, through the genial sun-rays of the effulgent Father, come to a glorious fruitage. It is maintained by some that truth is comparative, yet this position appears to me untenable; with Heidegger the heart exclaims: "Half-truths are no truths." This instructs us in an important matter, namely, that in searching, the whole force of the intellect must be used to elicit the entire truth. Nothing of material use in art or science has been produced without great labour on the part of the producer. "What woman" exclaims our Lord, "shall lose a piece of silver, but will search diligently until she find it." If then earnestness in the utmost pursuit of knowledge be necessary, and the attempt praiseworthy when in quest of earthly subjects, shall it be said that this same desire, this same unflagging zeal for the attainment of the highest knowledge, "wisdom," not only lessens our wisdom, but leads us into infidelity? Must it be, that we stop short in our study of the living God; that He who has made man so wonderfully, so fearfully, hath chained him, hath doomed him to grope about within the precincts of error—that were rank infidelity to cherish such a belief. If error—as time rolls its ceaseless course, is still to father truth, "better the narrow brain, the stony heart, the staring eye glazed o'er with sapless days, the long mechanic paces to and fro, the set gray life, and apathetic end." But as one loving the Author of love, as one endowed with mind looking up to the God of mind, as one free, trusting in Him who hath made all free, such a possibility appears absolutely impossible.

The turning point in this discussion is without doubt "Faith." Does free thought weaken faith? On this point Goethe says, "In faith everything depends upon the fact of believing; what we believe is quite secondary. Faith is a profound sense of security springing from confidence in the All-powerful, Inscrutable Being. The strength of this confidence is the main point. But what we think of this Being depends on other faculties, or even on other circumstances, and is altogether indifferent. Faith is a holy vessel into which every man pours his feelings, his understanding, and his imagination, as entirely as he can." That is, faith may exist with the utmost liberty. Thought cannot be cooped up, or it is no longer worthy the name of thought, more than that state of society can be called free, where man may not give expression to the thoughts which arise in him. Is it for man to deny to his fellow-men the right of applying his intellect to the elucidation of truth as recorded in Holy Writ? The prophets explained and amplified those writings which were extant in their days; Christ expounded unto his disciples the Scriptures, and the apostles per-

formed the mechanics had towards the precious words of their divine Teacher. Thus from age to age the child has interpreted the intention of the father? Yet how can this be done if the freedom of thought is withheld? To stamp with the brand of infidel all those who have devoted the force of intellect to Biblical studies, that is, those who have applied free thought to the clearing up of difficulties imbedded in Scripture, would be to mark thus all the great fathers of the Church. Believe me,

slowly the Bible of the words writ,
 as in eu slow the Bible of the words writ,
 Backward, each hundred adds a verse to it,
 Beets of despair, or hope, of joy or moon,
 Still at the prophets' feet the nations sit.

The issue then lies between progress and retrogression, between angel of light, *free thought*, and the demon of darkness, *superstition*. The one is antagonistic to the other. A deadly struggle has been long waged between them; doubtful once, when the faggot fires burnt grimly, but now the power of good is rapidly closing with his adversary, and piercing with the sharp tongue of truth the thick dull armour of blind acquiescence; is putting to flight the deadly foe of man. Error, however, has so long held dominion over the mind of man, and superstition has for so many ages been imbedded in his nature, that "wisdom moves but slowly, slowly moving on from point to point." Thus it is that when change is spoken of, all the harpies of King Quite-content are let loose. The *credo* of a thousand years ago must still remain the *credo* of to-day. It is not seen (for bigots are purblind) that belief has changed, that religions sprung from a parent stock have multiplied. Yet, how could this have come to pass had not each individual possessed the right of free thought. Must those then who differ from us in the implied meaning of Scripture be branded with infidelity? In years gone by the councils of the Church stamped some books as canonical, some not; how could this have been decided upon, unless freedom of thought had been allowed. The reason assigned for the retention of some and rejection of others, was not, that such as were retained had been in use from the earliest times, but because they contained that which was essential to salvation, a matter which certainly could not be decided empirically. Are we to assert then, that the members of the council were infidels? If so, we are willing to bear the name with such a company.

A man's belief is worth nothing unless it is the result of an inward struggle. Call not that belief which is accepted, cut and dried, from another; 'tis but a skeleton, lifeless, wearing a solemn mark, but hiding a grinning nonentity. No, all our conceptions of the Deity must be individual conceptions, only valid for us in their entirety. Each soul must have its own religion, must, in face, make it as much as, ay, more so, than a man does his fortune.

To that he must be true, the which if he is, his religion will prove more efficacious than would be the case if he endeavoured to shape his devotional exercises to the pattern of another.

"There is a divinity which shapes our ends,
Rough-hew them as we will."

A man who has no reason for the faith which is in him, is to me of all men the most superstitious, a man to be pitied. Like a man walking in his sleep, the principle of life is in him, but he has no knowledge of the fact, nor is able to make any use of it whatever. The first question which Philip put to the eunuch, was, "Understandest thou what thou readest?" And this is the question which every man should put to his own heart. Belief must follow conviction; conviction must be the result of reason. Seeing is believing. Can a man see if his eye be darkened, or if he wilfully close it, or if he sit in utter darkness? Christ has taught us that He himself was lenient to doubters, and anxious that their inquiries should be satisfied. His reply to Thomas may be expressed shortly thus: first investigate, then believe. It follows, therefore, that superstition is not faith; yet S. S. would have us believe so, or else what is the meaning of his third paragraph? This simplified might be expressed thus:—

"Free thought overthrows superstition,
Free thought overthrows faith;
Therefore faith is superstition."

And so he appears full of admiration for those who are ignorant, forgetting that ignorance is the mother of all evil, or if he remembers it, he counterbalances it with the fact (for such he supposes it) that it imbibes faith freely. Yet it appears beside the question altogether, to point to the number of firm believers in the assertions of Scripture who are unacquainted with the facts brought to view by the light of modern criticism, as these would not doubt the truth of aught in physical science which was communicated, however false, by one who appears capable of knowing. Yet these are saints indeed. Well might the poet exclaim: "Where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise."

Religion is of the heart; must the heart then not be instructed? If whilst the body daily becomes stronger, and the mind expands, must the fruit of the soul be but "Dead Sea fruit?" Bitter to the taste and sweet to the eye are all the results of the free thinkings of the soul! Nay, every soul hath its Paraclete, and waiting for very life, it obtains a blessing. 'Tis not in the intellectual advancement of the multitude, nor the increased acumen of the learned, that the root of infidelity is to be found; the evil cause lies elsewhere. The infidelity into which latitudinarianism has expanded or ripened in the present age is due to the foolish attempts of men who would have the people priest-ridden, and be themselves the riders, and who daily endeavour to introduce some

new degree, startling and weakening the hold which pure religion hitherto has held on their souls. "The very ideal of the Christian life seems to have been dwarfed to a poor, a vulgar, and conventional standard."

The index to the whole of the argument against free thought, may, I think, be wrapped up in the line,—

"Unfaith in aught is want of faith in all."

This however will scarcely stand. Unless the 'aught' comprise a vital principle, many such would not comprise faithlessness. When a man says I have no faith in such and such an invention, he asserts that the principle of it is false; on the other hand, when he believes in it, he does not imply that he agrees with the whole of the accessories, but that that on which the whole hinges is essentially correct. What though he believes that some subordinate part is defective, and may be beneficially altered, it cannot be said that he is an unbeliever in its merits, rather, such a desire to improve would prove its faith.

"There is more faith in honest doubt,
Believe me, than in half the creeds;
He fought his doubts and gathered strength;
He would not make his judgment blind,
He faced the spectres of the mind,
And led them; thus he came at length
To find a stronger faith his own."

In every man ere he reach the haven of his rest, there must come a time, when, like Elijah, he will be tempest-tost; but all faith in his compass will not entirely cease, so that at the whispering of the still small voice, hope will return, and he will go on his way rejoicing. From youth to age, 'twould be strange if nought of doubt crossed life's horizon, but faith in Time is great, and that which shapes it to some perfect end. To few is it given to witness the close of life in the very faith of youth, and to many age and years bring a higher and holier faith.

A. J. G.

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

It is with swift wings that time moves! To us but a very brief period seems to have elapsed since the present year began, and but a much shorter space of time has transpired since the debate in which we are now taking part was commenced in the pages of this magazine. However, the month which closes the year 1869 must also conclude the present discussion, and, having the privilege of replying to our opponents, we now address ourselves to that work.

The first negative article by L. L. contains many sensible remarks, but, despite all his arguments, he has failed to prove to us that free thought does not lead to infidelity. L. L. himself tacitly allows that "licentious thought" leads thereto, and thus, however unintentionally, admits the correctness of our reasoning. For

usually licentious thought is free thought, though all free thoughts are not licentious. Dictionaries tell us that *license* signifies "as prescribed by law or morality, loose, unconfined." The same authorities show us that, among the various significations of license, the adjective, free is that of *license*. Therefore free thought includes *license* thought. As the class mammalia include in itself the various genera of animals, which speak their young, say, under this denomination freedom, all kinds of liberty are comprehended, and licentiousness among them. Consequently, to say that free thought leads to infidelity is to deny that *license* thought leads to it. Notwithstanding this, Dr. L. affirms that free thought does not lead to infidelity while he tacitly admits that *license* thought does lead to it. Yet, doubtless, Dr. L. will admit that freedom shows itself under a variety of forms, and that licentiousness is among them.

Dr. L. remarks, "The Scriptures do not oppose free thought," and quotes the Lord's direction, "Search the Scriptures diligently." But Dr. L. must be aware that much of the free thought which is so active in the present day, instead of searching the Scriptures for things to be believed, boldly avows that geological and other scientific discoveries prove that parts of the Scripture narrative are not reliable, and, so far, represent the Bible as a book not worthy of being searched and studied, thus making the practice which Dr. L. advocates appear to be profane.

J. O. professes to adduce evidence to negative the question now debated, but he in reality argues, not respecting free, but restrained thought, and says, "We maintain that the tendency of free thought is the very opposite of what it is here affirmed to be, and that free, unfettered, thought reverent inquiry always, or at least generally, tends, not in religious doubt, but in a stronger, because more enlightened faith." Here J. O. speaks of "free, unfettered, though reverent inquiry," which description is self-contradictory; for if inquiry be *reverent*, it is not *unfettered*, the very reverence of the inquiry is a fetter on its freedom, at once restricts its operation, and confines it within certain bounds. The kind of thought which is propounded for discussion is free thought, not thought which is free to a certain extent only, but also, thought which is free to the fullest extent; and surely J. O. must admit that there exists thought which is so free as to be divested of all reverence. It, therefore, is not the kind of inquiry which J. O. means, or should mean, in this debate.

Our opponent further writes, "Let it be noticed that free thought is not to be confounded with reckless thought." But all reckless thought is free, though all free thought is not reckless. The terms of the question are so comprehensive as to include both irreverent and reckless thought. The question is, not, Does free thought that is not irreverent or reckless lead to infidelity? But, Does free thought lead to infidelity? And we believe it must be admitted, even by J. O., that there is a species of thought which is so free as to be reckless. J. O. writes again, "There are yet some

restraints from which legitimate thoughts never can and never should be free? "Thus, B. O. continually qualifies thoughts by adjectives which are neither expressed nor implied in the question proposed for discussion. "Legitimate thought till We are now discussing legitimate, but free thought." And both thought, word, and deed are oftentimes no friends to be illegitimate. Most certainly freedom is not at all incompatible with illegitimacy. Obedience to law is in its very nature a restraint on freedom. But the kind of thought which is given for discussion is unrestrained or free thought. O. further writes; "We would therefore thank legitimate free thoughts tends not to error, but to truth." Here again J. O. brings in one of his own qualifications of thought, and one which is not found in the question now being debated. We beg to remind J. O. that we are not discussing "legitimate free thoughts" but free thought, whether it be legitimate or illegitimate. But after all J. O.'s attempts to establish the negative of the question by talking respecting one kind of thought, while the question gives no consideration to another kind of thought, he tacitly admits what we affirm, viz., that free thought does lead to infidelity. For he says, "Yet, after all, the fruits of the free thoughts of the age are not altogether on the side of infidelity," thus, by implication, acknowledging that some of the fruits of free thought are on the side of infidelity, and admitting all that we contend for; as we have not affirmed that free thought *always* leads to infidelity, but that it does lead to it. That is, we contend that infidelity is sometimes or frequently the issue of free thought. POWER VICTORIAL AND TRIUMPHANT. J. O. refers to our remarks that "infidelity and superstition are contradicted," and asserts that our paper assumes religion to be superstitious. This we deny, and say to remind J. O. that the fact of a man's asserting that a certain evil is counteracted by some other principle, does not show that he assumes this counteracting principle to be good; for the evil counteracts another. Pride counteracts covetousness. Covetousness checks pride. But both pride and covetousness are evils. So are infidelity and superstition. Religion lies between them as the right is generally to be found between two things which are the opposite of each other. Principles therefore may be the contrary of each other, yet both of them be evil. By O. F. A. S. our argument is not fairly stated. In our opening paper we wrote thus; "That which fosters superstition counteracts infidelity." The statement of O. F. A. S. is as follows:—"B. O. in a comparison of superstition and infidelity, takes the two extreme phases of thought, and argues that *whatever* counteracts the one fosters the other, and *vice versa*." Now, our statement was not *whatever* fosters superstition counteracts infidelity. There is a considerable difference between "that which" and "whatever," that which expands the volume of water converts it into steam, for heat expands water and converts it into steam, but *whatever* expands water does not convert it into steam; for a degree of cold which is below freezing point expands the volume of water, and

converts it, not into *steam*, but into *ice*. In our opening paper we spoke of one particular habit of mind and of one only as fostering superstition and counteracting infidelity, and we spoke of one other habit of mind, and of one only, as fostering infidelity and counteracting superstition. We made no such wide assertion respecting superstition and infidelity as this, that whatever counteracts the one fosters the other. A right understanding and belief of the Scriptures counteracts infidelity without fostering superstition.

C. F. A. S. writes again, speaking of ourselves, "He affirms that when superstition is in labour, instantly the issue, whatever it may be, breathes the spirit of infidelity. Instantly any person begins to think for himself, his thoughts are of infidel tendency. In other words, we all succumb to the yoke of superstition, or rise to the position of infidels." Now we may safely challenge C. F. A. S. to show where in our article we have either stated or implied that all are either superstitious or infidel, or that infidelity is the necessary alternative of not being superstitious, or that as soon as a person begins to think for himself his thoughts are of an infidel tendency. For the statements of C. F. A. S. to be correct we must have advanced the preposterous doctrine that there are none who are not either infidel or superstitious, a doctrine which our paper neither asserted nor implied. Surely there is a middle way between the two extreme states which we spoke of—unrestricted freedom of thought on the one hand, unreflectiveness on the other.

M. E. writes, "If superstition and infidelity are contraries, we must either be doubters or devotees." "If superstition and infidelity are contraries!" But are they not contraries? Are they resemblances? Where is their similarity? Will M. E. affirm that there is a likeness between them? Infidelity being a want of faith in that which is worthy of being believed, while superstition is a giving credence to that which is not deserving of belief. We imagine that these two things are rather opposite the one to the other. But, says M. E., "If superstition and infidelity are contraries we must either be doubters or devotees." Now we cannot at all see this. Is there not a state which lies between scepticism on the one hand, and blind zealotry on the other? Is it not possible to partake of an enlightened and well-grounded faith, and yet to be neither a doubter nor a devotee?

But M. E., like his coadjutor J. O., tacitly admits the correctness of our argument. His words are,—"the modern development of doubt is not an argument that free thought leads to infidelity, so much as that it leads through infidelity to truth." Here we have from M. E. the admission that the modern development of doubt leads through infidelity. Now that which leads through infidelity leads to infidelity. The Great Northern Railway takes us through Yorkshire to Scotland. But how could it ever take us through Yorkshire unless it first took us to Yorkshire. So that which leads through infidelity must first lead to infidelity. And as the Great Northern Railway takes many of its passengers to East-

shire without ever taking them *through* Yorkshire, leaving them there, so the modern development of doubt has led many to infidelity whom it has never led *through* it, having landed them in it. But whether this last assertion be granted or not, M. E. has, in admitting that the modern development of doubt leads through infidelity, allowed all that we contend for, viz., that free thought *does* lead to infidelity. We never maintained, or believed, that none who were led to it were lead through it.

Simons writes, "The Bible purports to be a revelation of the Divine mind, embodying truths and principles the acceptance of which is essential to the salvation of men. It is clear, then, that God is both the author of reason and the author of revelation; and it being impossible that God should contradict himself, the two should be found in agreement. The truths of the Bible should not be contradictory of reason, and *vice versa*, the truths of reason should not be contradictory of the Bible. Free and legitimate thought cannot result in the rejection of, or disbelief in, *Divine* revelation, because it is inconceivable that God should contradict himself. Nothing can tell more conclusively against the Bible being a revelation of Divine truth than to suppose that it cannot bear the test of the severest critical examination to which the intellect of man can subject it. If the Bible be found to collide with the teachings of reason, we frankly avow that we do not see the possibility of escaping the conclusion that it is not a *Divine* revelation." Divine revelation would always be found to be in agreement with *right* reason; that is, it would not be *contradictory* thereto, still it would be in many particulars *superior* thereto, and far out of the reach thereof. But it is not *right* reason but *fallen* reason which now exists in man, for will any who admit the fall of man as represented in the Scriptures affirm that the reason of human beings was in no way injured, darkened, or perverted thereby? And if it be admitted that human reason was either darkened or perverted by man's fall, how can it be expected that it and Divine revelation should be found to be always in agreement? And when reason and revelation are found to be contradictory of each other, is it fair and just that the conclusion should always be that the Bible in some of its statements is not a Divine revelation? And are not those who admit the Scriptural representation of man's fall inconsistent with themselves when finding that reason and revelation differ from each other, they conclude that it is revelation which is faulty? Simons says, "Free and legitimate thought cannot result in the rejection of, or disbelief in, *Divine* revelation." But we have already shown that *free* thought is not always *legitimate* thought. Libertinism and dissoluteness are *free*, but are they therefore *legitimate*? Simons "frankly avows" that if the Bible collide with the teachings of reason, his conclusion is that it is not a Divine revelation. The Bible does collide with the teachings of fallen reason, but is there no proof that the conclusions of reason are often faulty? Opinions which are now accepted as true were once re-

guarded as self-evident, that the expressions of them derive forth violent opposition. And every generation shows that many long-accepted opinions of a former generation were not true, even by parties then. The assertions of science have, before now, contradicted Divine revelation, yet subsequently these very assertions which were considered to be full proof of the infallibility of some parts of the Bible have been discovered by those who so considered them to be not founded on facts. Simona writes with the purpose of showing that free thought does not lead to infidelity, yet the very article written by him for this object shows that free thought leads himself to infidelity; that is, to a disbelief of the statements of the Bible when these statements collide with the teachings of reason. God is the author both of reason and of revelation, therefore the two should be found in agreement. In Bishop Colenso's reason contradicts the Bible. Which will Simona say is in this case? Is it Bishop Colenso's reason or the Bible? The bishop frankly avows his infidelity, that is, his want of faith in some of the statements of Scripture. Was it free or restrained thought which led Colenso to his infidelity? Will Simona tell us? And if it were free thought then does not free thought lead to infidelity?

Simona considers us to have been guilty of incongruities of thought. But if the expression free thought, in our opening article, be viewed as including thought that is law, and that apart from the restraints of all laws, our statements, which Simona views as contradictory, will be seen to be perfectly harmonious. We are the friend of free thought, yet we believe that thought may be sufficiently free to lead to infidelity. We are the friend of civilization, yet believe that certain evils necessarily accompany it. Cannot the use of meat and of almost every other article of diet be carried too far? But are we, because we admit this, to be viewed as enemies to those kinds of food? And has nothing obtained the friendship of Simona, with which, notwithstanding his friendship to it, he acknowledges some evil to be inseparably connected? And if Simona be friendly to aught which he confesses is necessarily accompanied with evil, why does he stumble at our being friendly to free thought, though we confess that it is attended with the evil of leading to infidelity? Simona further writes, "free thought, which we take to mean a legitimate exercise of the reasoning faculties, does not lead to infidelity." But is not an *illegitimate* exercise of the reasoning faculties free? And is not that which is *illegitimate* more free, in its very nature, than that which is *legitimate*? For aught to be legitimate it must be according to some law, its conformity to which constitutes its legitimacy, while that which is illegitimate is contrary to law, and therefore more free and unrestricted. Besides, the question we are debating is not, Does a *legitimate* exercise of the reasoning faculties lead to infidelity? but, Does *free* thought lead to infidelity?

Simona writes again, concerning science, "its conclusions, if religion is to retain its hold on the minds of men, must not be at

will frequently affect men's minds, and how careful we should be to see that our statements are not vitiated by such an assumed equipollency of words. My own idea is that this discussion was mainly meant to prove that there was a necessity for a divorce between such a phrase, and to bring promptly and prominently before the thoughts of the readers the fallacy thus given currency to that free thought is infidelity. We are sorry that the good intent and the good result of this discussion should have been thus to a certain extent made of none effect—but surely few of the intelligent readers of our magazine can be taken in by such a fallacy.

It must be seen at once, we should suppose, that "free thought" in this debate cannot mean *uncontrolled* thought; for that is an impossible state of thinking. Even madness is subject to laws, and even dreams are governed by laws; and fancy itself, vagrant as it may be, is regulated by associations and conditions. Again, it is equally evident that it is not *unlimited* thought, for that can only be exercised by an infinite nature; all the operations of the human mind are limited by the powers given and the laws apportioned to those. It cannot mean illogical thought, for all true thought is logical, and what is done by the mind, according to the principles of logic, is thought. "By" free thought we cannot mean, *fact*, in the sense of wicked or profane. Wickedness and profanity proceed from infidelity, and do not lead to it. Besides, this is really *lack of morality*, rather than freedom of thought. It is freedom of passion, and criminality, not of reason and intelligence. The free thought which the phrase suggests to our minds is thought free in its range, not obstructed in its course by any artificial barriers, and unimpeded in its acknowledgement and belief (or rather profession of belief) in any foregone set of opinions as irrevocable, infallible, and sacred from investigation; thought free to exert its energies in the fulness of the power which God has bestowed on it.

Dr. Bay in his first argument, misses the point, as we think, by affirming that "free thought leads to a disbelief in the *authority* of Scripture," when he really means interpretations of Scripture imposed by creeds. Our searching into the processes of our own minds reveal to us that certain deductions made by men in a former age from their reading of the Bible have been inappropriately impostments of belief by which the churches hold, we must now abide for ever; as, for instance, that, in six periods of twenty-four hours duration; God created and arranged the whole universe of space. But the exercise of "free thought" supplies us with a knowledge of the vastness and immensity of the creation; and we conclude that such a universe so arranged gives indications that this belief super-imposed upon our minds by early-learned catechisms, could scarcely be a correct statement of the great fact. Here we learn to doubt the creed in which we have been trained, not the *truthfulness* of the Scriptures. The Bible, on being re-perused with *freedom*, and unrestrained by the preconceptions formerly forced upon us, and we find that a higher glory is revealed to us by the *truthfulness*

texts so understood, as they are read in the light of a knowledge of the works of God than was capable of entering our minds while the obscuring catechism was held before our thoughts as infallibly true.

S. S. affirms that many of the most thoughtful men of our times "have openly avowed their disbelief of the records of Scripture," but they themselves only admit that they entertain a disbelief (*in the prevailing interpretations*) of the records of Scripture. They claim that they have, as a fact, not only discovered the errors of the men of science concerning nature, but that these discoveries have enabled them to see how men have been misled in their interpretations of, or their deductions from Scripture; and they demand the right of bringing these new readings of Scripture truths as freely and fearlessly forward as their new readings of the wonders of nature. While many of them assert that Scripture has been altogether misused when it was supposed to contain and to teach all truth. It has only, according to their view, revealed what men could not discover for themselves; their fallen state by nature, the true purpose of their being, the proper law of moral life, the means of restoration, the mercy of the Divine Father, and the work of Jesus; and so making known to the unlearned as well as to the learned that which lies beyond the powers of attainment, laid up in the unaided faculties of the wisest among the children of men. It is not a treatise on science but a guide to salvation.

In his paragraph numbered 3, S. S. has applied the law of contradictions to that of contraries; and any manual of logic will show him and his readers that that vitiates his whole argument.

S. S. laments that "men have cast off the trammels of authority," as if that were infidelity. Of no recorded denizen of this globe has it ever been so true that he "cast off the trammels of authority" as of Jesus, the Lord, but S. S. would surely not number Him among infidels!

Free thought continually exerts itself to lessen the amount of freedom possible to man by gaining faith, that which may be trusted—truth. It is distressed and exercised so long as certainty is unattained; it is gratified when it attains to true knowledge. Latitudinarianism is its special abhorrence. It endeavours to enclose all possible experience in the circle of truth, and it is therefore the ally of faith, not of infidelity. Free thought digs about knowledge, experience, dogma, and doctrine, and endeavours to find out which is fruitful and which barren, that it may learn on which to depend for fruit, from which to hope for nothing. Freedom of thought is exercised on the discovery of the believable, not the unbelievable, but it refuses to stereotype itself in the creed of a former age. It has its own vital function to maintain and exercise. It loves free life, not necessarily free living.

Georgius D. E. reiterates (p. 190) the old fallacy of calling one who exercises the right of free thought a free thinker, and dubbing the latter an infidel. The free thinker, as we have said, is so be-

cause he refuses to fetter his thought by anything else than that which the law of thought makes imperative—the truth. He sets before him the old question, which Jesus never refused to answer, however impatient men might fail to wait for a reply. What is truth? The credist says, Bind your limbs with these withies, place before your eyes these engraved spectacles, and go not beyond these palisades, which we have erected for your safety, and then seek and find what we have laid down in these maps of the whole area of the believable. But the inquirer rejects the bondage and the eye-blinds, the boundary-palings and the maps, and seeks to use all the faculties with which God has endowed him, to see and to search into what God has placed before him, as a responsible being, to look at and discern. He does not expect to know *all* the infinite aims, and plans, and purposes, and ways, and doings, and processes of God, but he endeavours to know *all* he can; for all that he can know is just what God has made him able to know and benefit by.

The same writer thinks that free thought often endeavours to fathom the unfathomable and to seek a knowledge of the infinite purposes of God foolhardily. We do not know how far the power of thought can go, nor how deep the plummet-line of finite intelligence can sound the ocean of mystery. But we do know very well that, unless we search we are not likely to find, and unless we exercise our minds we are not likely to improve them to their utmost, or learn through them all that God has made them capable of comprehending. The more man knows of the works and ways of the Most High the more he is likely to venerate the Almighty. Does not God himself demand to be inquired of and sought unto? Does he not ask us to bring our "strong reasons" to him for solution? How can man investigate any matter otherwise than by his own reason? He cannot do it with other men's minds, nor with angels' souls, nor with God's divine intelligence. He may accept of their solutions as satisfactory, but only by the employment of his own intelligence can he investigate. His instance of Eve's frailty and Adam's sin is not wisely chosen. Eve's was a moral, not an intellectual transgression: Adam's iniquity was one of thoughtless neglect of immense responsibilities rather than of free thought. Indeed, theologians do not admit that he used free thought, but accuse him of exercising free will.

B. B. B. recognises this distinction, when he says free thought signifies thought free from moral restraint (p. 276), and freedom of thought signifies thought used legitimately on every subject presented to the mind of man. His free thought is infidelity, and his freedom of thought is what is meant by us by free thought; so that when he affirms free thought is quite different from freedom of thought he is really arguing with us, not against us.

The article of "Catholicism" ought to make our opponents hesitate in their affirmation. How can they do otherwise than "draw up," before they go quite so far as he would lead them. His paper is a cunning endeavour to enlist our opponents in favour of the

Infallible Church. It has a good deal of the polish and policy of the Jesuits, though I would scruple to call its writer a Jesuit, in its usual acceptance among yourselves, for he has very candidly given us the key to his principles in his signature. This is commendable. But we think his paper rather tends to shew that the opinions of the affirmative writers are capable of a *reductio ad absurdum*. Free thought leads to infidelity; hence thought ought to be restrained. It can only be properly restrained when it yields to an infallible church, for then it has rest,—

"Will you come into my parlour, said the spider to the fly?"

A word to the wise is sufficient, and we just delicately put the question, Where will you have freedom of religion, i. e., genuine Protestantism, if you have not free thought? What is the right of private judgment, and what is personal responsibility, if free thought is to be inhibited?

It would be unfair in me to leave unacknowledged my compeers—dare I not say superiors—in this discussionary fight. "J. O.'s" paper is a calm, judicious, and pertinent contribution; "O. F. A. S." has joined the fray with his armour well put on, and effective; he wields his weapons agilely, and with the eager zeal of a young knight panting to strike home; and that he *does*. "M. B." makes some good points in debate, and contributes a fair amount of general interest to the question. I think S. S. can scarcely get over the example of the Bereans (p. 281). "Simona" gives the *coup de grace* to S. S. on the argument of activity of mind portion of the debate admirably (p. 378), when he brings four christian champions of free thought leading to Christianity against those, quoted by S. S. as samples of its leading to infidelity.

Altogether, this debate has been successful in showing that henceforth, if any one should use free thought as synonymous with infidelity, he is doing so sophistically—if not dishonestly; for free thought is not infidelity, neither does it lead to it. L. L.

IS PROTESTANTISM FAILING AND ROMANISM GAINING?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

"Popery in our land makes a rush as if it would overflow the country, then stands still, and then appears even to recede; but taking every tenth year for the last forty, its advance is not only unquestionable and steady, but vast; and in the midst of checks, delays, and retrogressions, must even be regarded as alarmingly rapid."—*Rev. A. M. Stuart, D.D.*

Would there be such an outcry against Romanism, would so many efforts be made to prejudice people against it, would pulpits resound with denunciations, magazines abound in inflammatory papers, newspapers make such a fuss in leading articles, and whole

religious coterie keep continually on the verge of screaming out in hysterics if there was no truth in the idea that Romanism is gaining. Either that is true, and Romanism is really making the advances, stealthily or avowedly, which she asserts she is making, or Protestants vote themselves fools and cowards, who need a bugbear to keep up their excitement, and who jerk the Guy Fawkes of Popery before their eyes to befool themselves, or to frighten and befool others. Unless Romanism is actually making great and notable progress, the anti-Romanists must be content to be written down knaves or fools; and if they are knaves or fools, Protestantism must be failing when it depends on knavish tricks, or on the folly of those who are the dupes of the terrible records of advancing Popery, with which their public organs strive to pile up the horrors on horrors, at which their hearers or readers raze aghast. Protestantism was once a noble, fearless, and holy thing; if it now cowers and trembles is it not failing, and if it really has cause for all the outcry made, must not Romanism be gaining.

If the reports of Protestant Evangelical Alliances, and Anti-Reformation Societies, and *Arks and Bulwarks, Records, and Watchmen*, are to be credited, Romanism is invading the land and overthrowing even the law; at the same time that it is creeping into houses and prisons, sisterhoods and chapters, city councils and school committees, political associations and charitable organizations. If they are not to be credited, and all (or many) of these allegations are false, what must the Protestantism be that thus requires to be buttressed with lies, and stimulated by false witness. Are there not numerous societies, institutions, &c., organised and subsidized to oppose and circumvent, to destroy and exterminate, to expose and to battle with Romanism? Do they not issue shoals of tracts and pamphlets, sensational novellettes, and prejudiced histories, against Romanism? Do they not keep an army of collectors and colporteurs, of secretaries and committeemen, in full pay and constant vigilance, to spy out its aggressions, and to defeat its machinations? Is not Exeter Hall a good many times in the year rampant and outrageous about the ever-increasing tide of Romanism, which is threatening to submerge and destroy our Protestant institutions, and our gospel teaching, and the very constitution which is (or ought to be) true blue Protestant to the core?

To this evidence afforded by Protestants as to the progress, or rather aggressions of Romanism, that is, the evidence of enemies, we have to add the assertions, or the boastfulness, if that expression is better liked, of the Romanists themselves. They affirm that disciples multiply at an extraordinary rate, and that wherever they are opened they thrive; that priests are greatly liked and gladly welcomed, and are constantly increasing; that sisters of mercy are favourably received everywhere; that monasteries, and convents, and retreats, are gladly entered; that a general desire is felt for some certain and infallible guide in matters of religion; that conversions are being made in all classes, but above all in the educated

and influential; that the lord and the labourer, the marchioness and the mill-girl, alike feel the benefit of a church which can bestow assured blessings; and that even the clergy of dissenting bodies envy the power which the priest possesses over the faith, the affection, and the submissive veneration of their people. This is the (uncontradicted) report they give of themselves, while we hear from Protestantism of empty churches, of decaying chapels, of crowds of creedless and of careless people in the very neighbourhood of offered ordinances, and of a church disestablished in a sister country in deference to the political action of Romanists.

No later than the 8th of November, in no less a town than Birmingham, under the presidency of C. N. Newdegate, at a meeting of the National Church Association, a resolution was unanimously passed, declaring that "the present circumstances of the Church of England call for the earnest and hearty co-operation of all who love Protestant truth to oppose the spirit of Romanism, Ritualism, and Rationalism," all of which hold together, Romanism and Ritualism being half-sisters, and Rationalism being the opposing litigant for the faith of the people.

Dr. Cumming, in a lecture delivered at Liverpool on 9th November, said that Archbishop Manning boasted that he had made 2,000 converts within two or three years, and that during the last two years he had received seventeen clergymen of the Church of England, 200 leading professional men, and two noblemen as converts to the Church of Rome. This is given as a specimen of what is going on, of course on a smaller scale, under other bishops and priests.

When to these facts we add that the Papacy now feels itself so strong as to take a step which has not been ventured upon since the Council of Trent was held,—to call a Council of the whole Church to consolidate measures for the stability, spread, and power of Romanism, we can scarcely doubt that she is gaining, and that just in proportion as she gains Protestantism fails. R. F. P.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

Rather Newman says, "The happiness of the soul consists in the exercise

* "Here was Popery springing up in the fresh soil of our own garden, and with every token of a most vigorous life. When it has advanced and seduced not a few of the highly educated sons and daughters of our noblemen, our gentlemen, our ministers, abiding within; or passing out from their ancient folds, some still maintain that it is a mere ripple on the surface; that it is the love of music, or the love of show, or the love of the world, or the love of friends; or that it is a transient reaction from a Protestant worship too cold, and its yoke too rigid. But while such things as these have their places and their manifold sway, they are but "old wives' fables" when offered as the true solution of the great mystery of our day. Beneath them, controlling and using them all, there is an unseen influence, far subtler, deeper, and more potent."—*Rev. Dr. A. Moody Stuart's "The Coward at Rome,"* p. 9.

of the affections, not in sensual pleasures, not in *activity*, not in *excitement*, not in self-esteem, not in the consciousness of power, not in knowledge, . . . This is our real and true bliss; not to know, or to effect, or to pursue; but to love, to hope, to joy, to admire, to revere, to adore. Our real and true bliss lies in the possession of these objects on which our hearts may rest and be satisfied."

"Protestantism is essentially mental activity."

"Popery, on the contrary, is essentially mental slavery."

Selected from Pastor Hood's "Self-Formation."

PROTESTANTISM is not only essentially antagonistic to Romanism, but is as old as the errors of the Church of Rome. Protestantism is a Catholic principle implanted in man, which demands investigation and inquiry regarding the cause and reason of things in general, and which more especially maintains that each individual has the right, in matters of religion, "to prove all things," by the Word of God, holding "fast that which is good," in short, that man has an individual responsibility, and that it is his own personal duty and privilege, in faith and doctrine, to settle between himself and God. Romanism, on the other hand, is a conservative system, which opposes investigation and fears liberalism. In matters of religion Romanism maintains that "the Church" is alone the authority, and man's personal thoughts and opinions are to be held in subjection to it; man having to bear this with "Christian fortitude," or, to use Father Newman's words, "to love, to hope, to joy, to admire, to revere, to adore." Having shown briefly the leading principles of Romanism and Protestantism, I think it will be seen clearly that the question which naturally arises, is, whether the free thought of Protestantism, or the infallibility of the Church of Rome is gaining? It is not so much the question:—Is the Protestant Church failing and the Romish Church gaining?—as it is—Are the principles of Protestantism failing, and the principles of Romanism gaining? I think every impartial observer of the current events in Europe will agree with me that the principles of Protestantism are rapidly advancing; even the spread of German philosophy and rationalism, however erroneous, are undeniable facts, which go to prove that the principles of Romanism are failing.

As regards the principles of Protestantism, Galileo, when he nobly advocated free and independent thought in the investigation of science,—and, although he was brought before the Romish Inquisition, still protested against the pernicious subtleties of the scholastic philosophy,—was as much a Protestant as the "solitary monk who shook the world." The influence of both these great men still remain in the study of religion and science, as a lasting monument of the glorious triumphs of Protestantism. The very advancement of liberalism, of learning in its several branches, literature, science, and art, among the working classes; the great importance which is placed on the publication of cheap literature for the people; the growing opinion concerning man's personal responsibility, his self-culture and education in politics and religion, are

strong proofs that that system, which upholds that man alone has to appeal to the written Word of God on all matters of faith and doctrine; and that the Scriptures, by the aid of the Holy Spirit, appealing to the conscience of man, is sufficient to make him "wise unto salvation"—is based on the most enlightened views of the liberal and deep-thinking men of the age, whether of the Romish Church or not. I think, therefore, that this is a sufficient proof that these glorious principles which Protestantism advocates, are gaining; consequently Romanism, which opposes man's individual free thought and investigation, is failing.

In support of the negative of the question, "Is Protestantism failing and Romanism gaining?" I shall give a brief review of the progress of Protestantism in the principal countries of Europe.

England. Before we can make an impartial review of the position of Protestantism, and the *apparent* encroachments of Romanism, it will be necessary for us to find out the cause of the latter; I think if we look deeply into the matter we shall come to the conclusion that it is founded on liberalism and independency. It is said by some, and affirmed by "O. C." (379), "that the disestablishment of the Irish Church, the abeyance into which the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill has been allowed to fall, and the admission of Roman Catholics into Parliament," show the decrease and weakness of Protestantism; whereas the policy which advocated these measures maintained that Protestantism was in a position to hold her own, without the assistance of Acts of Parliament; consequently 'it proves that the confidence in the strength of Protestantism is very much greater than when the Acts referring to Roman Catholics remained in force. Suppose, for instance, that the Government were to liberate the Fenian prisoners, would "O. C." conclude by this, that the Government were weak or intimidated; and that Fenianism was on the increase? Certainly not. Would he not rather consider it a sufficient proof that the Government was in a position to suppress all insurrection? So we, by the same line of argument,—and we are supported by the whole of Nonconformity in this country—maintain that the power of Protestantism is gaining. Although it cannot be denied that Ritualism is on the increase in the "Church of England;" yet still the "Establishment" cannot be taken as the criterion of the Christian Church in England. The present state of the "Church of England" is much to be regretted, and if she does not before long reform her internal government, it will be a blessing to her, and to the welfare of Protestantism, if the "Church of England" is disestablished.

France. Perhaps there is no other country in Europe at the present time where Protestantism is making so many glorious triumphs. We cannot estimate too highly the importance of the step taken by the most powerful and eloquent preacher of France, Pere Hyacinthe. His recent letters have caused the hearts of all true, noble, enlightened, and liberal minded men of all shades of opinion, to beat with joy and admiration. It has been well said, that the

letter, addressed to the general of his order in Rome, "I, but the more of the spirit of the true Reformer than anything that has appeared in recent times." Considering that Pius Hyacinth may be taken as a representative of many of the same opinions in Rome: I think it would be appropriate to quote a paragraph from the letter referred to:—"I raise, therefore, before the Holy Father and the Council, my protest, as a Christian and a priest, against those doctrines and those practices which are called Roman, but which are not Christian, and which, by their encroachments, always more audacious and more baneful, tend to change the constitution of the Church, the basis and the form of its teaching, and even the spirit of its piety."

Germany. The recent liberal expressions of dissent concerning the forthcoming Ecumenical Council at Rome, by the German Bishops; and the spread of Rationalism are strong proofs that the spirit of Protestantism is appealing to the consciences of many with every success; so much so, that it is reported that the Roman Catholic theologians of Germany "are resolved not to yield quietly to the imposition of new bonds, and may, it is not impossible, secede from the Romish Church, if it brings itself into violent collision with the liberal tendencies of the age."

Spain. A few months passed, and this country was the "faithful daughter of the Church." Here, when every other Roman Catholic country had protested against the temporal and civil power of the Church of Rome, the Pope reigned supremely; the Inquisition was ready to pass judgment on heretics; and many of the faithful preachers of the Gospel as it is in Jesus, like Manuel Matagorda, were cast into a dismal dungeon. But now a glorious reformation has taken place, Spain is the daughter of Liberty; her standard is "Freedom of worship," and her toleration is extended to all, of whatever creed or belief. The first Protestant Church has been established in Madrid; and Protestants, as well as Roman Catholics, are now permitted to be buried in the public cemeteries. Such has been the march of liberty, the success of Protestantism, the triumph over bigotry, in this lately benighted kingdom.

Austria and Italy. The civil power of the Pope, in these countries, has fallen. They have both passed through great ecclesiastical revolutions. The Austrian Protestants looked upon this political crisis as the most favourable opportunity for asserting their rights; and they were not slow in making known their grievances to the Government. The Romish Bishops, seeing that this state of affairs would be detrimental to the progress of Romanism, met in solemn conclave in Vienna, September 28th, 1867, for the purpose of advising the Emperor to secure the further existence of the Concordat beyond the possibility of Protestant interference. The Protestants, having been bending beneath the weight of the Concordat for twelve years, made vigorous efforts to do away with the oppression; and to the honour of the Emperor and his Parliament, the

Romish party was defeated; and a declaration of the Emperor's was issued, proclaiming that the policy of his Government is "religious liberty," so making another triumph for Protestantism and freedom. Italy, the former home of Romish priestcraft, has been the scene of many victories of Protestantism; her priests, by the law of the land, are allowed to break through their former bondage of celibacy. And she bids fair to become a shining light in Europe. Seeing that Romanism has signally failed in Europe, it behoves us as Protestants to be up and doing, for we are in a far more delusive and dangerous position than those who have escaped from the dungeons of darkness, or who have broken from the chains and mental bondage of Romanism. The Pope is availing himself of our toleration to all religious sects for a renewed attempt to establish Romanism as the religion of this country, but may we, by the help of God, give him and his system a final defeat.

GEORGIUS D. E.

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

I do not think this is a question of statistics. Indeed I very much fear that in nothing else is the fallacy of statistics so misleading as in topics connected with religion and religious opinion. Were we, for instance, to judge of the progress and prevailing success of religion from the number of cathedrals, churches, chapels, Bethels, Ebenezers, &c., which are to be found in our cities, towns, villages, and hamlets, we might be inclined to come to the conclusion that Christianity was an all-pervading energy in our common life. But we should be too readily forgetting the awful truth taught us by Defoe, and endorsed very frequently by our own experience, that—

"Wherever God erects a house of prayer,

The Devil always builds a chapel there;

And 'twill be found upon examination

The latter has the larger congregation."

We must turn our eyes on our many man-traps, called gin-palaces, our jails, and pauper-houses, our haunts of vice, the dwellings of the purveyors for sin, and then the soul sickens at the statistics of sanctity, which we had imagined our churches gave sanction for. Formalism is a fearful upsetter of the value of statistics regarding religion. Hence we do not really lay great stress in discussing this question—"Is Protestantism failing and Romanism gaining?" on statistics either of churches or membership, priests or people.

The question presents itself to us as one much more of tendencies than tenets. Protestantism is the name not of a mere historic sectarianism, but of a principle. That principle is, that the Word of God is the only true foundation of human faith as regards religion, but that the interpretation of the Word is to be found in the perusal of it with diligence, preparation, and prayer, under the guidance of God's Spirit, and a pure, honest endeavour to discover

the truth taught in it. Every advance (and it is called) made towards infidelity, positivism, secularism, is therefore a failure, in so far as Protestantism is concerned. If, as H. K. admits in his quotation from D'Aubigné, p. 41, "All human teaching should be subordinate to the oracles of God," is the prime principle of Protestantism, then every endeavour to place "human teaching" beside or above, equal or superior to, to prefer it or to make it independent of these "oracles," still more to employ it in doubt or denial of these "oracles," must involve a failure of Protestantism. Protestantism is, as H. K. defines it, "civil and religious liberty," but it is something more; it is civil and religious liberty, founded on, according to, and in subserviency to the Word of God. Every item of liberty, which also implies a liberty taken with the Scriptures, is an instance of Protestantism failing.

But, while Protestantism signifies freedom, or "the liberty wherewith Christ makes his people free," Romanism also implies a principle, and that principle is, that the Scriptures must be accepted as expounded by ecclesiastics; and all the forms of public worship must be regulated by the clergy. This is the principle of creeds as overpowering faith, and ritual as overlording practice. N. Y. M. affirms that "dogmas cannot flourish in our days." This is surely very expressly negatived by facts. Even infidelity is converting into dogma, and the delight of man in creeds and formal statements of truths is more and more evident every day. The Church is in quite a panic about its creeds and articles. Those who wish to bring the souls of men into closer contact with the Bible, as a revelation of God's will, and who declare against the stereotyping of the infinite wisdom of God in the creeds oferring men, are being persecuted and prosecuted, railed at, and exposed to contumely. The articles are hung down to impede their progress, and the dogmas of past ages are brought forward to prevent present progress. Not only the criticism of creeds is interdicted, but the criticism of the Scriptures, and many Churchmen transform the command of Christ, "Search the Scriptures," into "Learn to repeat your creed."

Not only is this the case in the Church, among Dissenters it is even more marked. They not unfrequently boast that the orthodoxy of the creeds is more truly maintained by them than by the clergy who have signed the Thirty-nine Articles. Among Dissenting clergy, too, there is a growing tendency to assume a distinctive position, as apart from the laity, and a great fondness for speaking of "my people," "my charge," "my benefice," &c., in terms which indicate that ecclesiasticism is making way among them. They too have been severe against the most industrious and devout of those who have striven to bring the Word of God into greater harmony with truth and righteousness, by the results of critical thought and the exercise of a courageous comparison of its parts with each other and with the histories, antiquities, philosophy, &c. of nations.

Ritualism and formalism are other developments of that ecclesiasticism—which H. K. is content to regard as Romanism in essence—is making among us. This Ritualism is not making progress only among the adherents of the Church of England, but, under the guise of Aesthetic worship, is making considerable and remarkable revolutions in the formerly staid, chaste, and sober forms of devotion practised by dissenting congregations.

This enforcement of creeds, and this advocacy of Ritualism,—this Sacramentarianism of the clerical order are, in our opinion, invasions of the grand Protestant right of private judgment, and we are inclined to ask—

“Who shall dispute

The thinking soul its high prerogative,

Too little claimed, of Reason? ’Tis a franchise

Which none should wrest, or limit, or corrupt.”

Whoever attempts to do so, on any pretence whatever, is Romanistic at heart, is taking to himself the supremacy of Conscience and Scripture—the two pillars of Protestantism.

H. K. may say “Protestantism *must* gain” (p. 43), and affirm that “Protestantism cannot fail;” but he should be reminded, at all events, that this is a debate in which these fine phrases really mean nothing—because they are nothing to the point. The question is not can it or must it fail, but is it absolutely undergoing decay, and is its opponents rising as it falls. S. S. has made it pretty plain that it is so; and we can scarcely think of any answer more complete and effective to the paper of H. K. than that which S. S. has given.

“Ireland,” says H. K., “may be quoted against us,” but he thinks he can easily get over that by introducing irrelevant remarks, intended to show that the recent reforms in Ireland should have been made, and to advocate that they are right in themselves.

We are not called upon here to approve or to disapprove of movements of a political character. We have to do in this debate with a consideration of facts. It is not necessary that we shall advocate “Protestant ascendancy,” or should defend it in our present endeavour. We know that this kingdom’s constitution was based upon the principle of Protestant ascendancy; and we knew that not only is Protestant ascendancy on the decline, but we know also that the ministry which holds power in the country is pledged to the destruction of Protestant ascendancy. We affirm that this is—whatever its merits may be on other considerations—a sign that “Romanism is gaining,” and therefore still more emphatically an evidence that “Protestantism is failing,” so far as the preserving of that ascendancy is concerned. This is a patent fact, which cannot bear denial. It may be glozed over by honeyed terms of concession of justice and equality to all; but it is a triumph of Romanism nevertheless. It has been looked upon by the Irish priesthood as such; and indeed by the whole Catholic population of the country; and it is flat nonsense to pooh-pooh it as no

victory. It is a clear gain to Romanism, even though it may be a releasing of Protestantism from a position of peril.

N. Y. M. explains many of the changes occurring in our day as only apparently unfavourable to his side of the argument. "Romanism," he says, "is itself quietly and covertly going over to Protestantism;" it now appeals to reason "and exerts the critical faculty." Our readers do not require to be told that it is an old habit with certain forms of force to transform themselves into angels of light to accomplish their ends. That such a course of conduct should deceive any one is surely in itself good proof that Romanism is gaining. How otherwise could it contrive to get man to be forgetful of its essence—the adoption by the laity of the creed of the clergy as taught to them;—its history of persecutions for independence of mind and opinion; and its actual adherence to an *index expurgatorius*?

O. C.'s paper contains matter for reflection, and that of his opponent, G. F. B. (p. 381—384), if properly read, will in reality be found to be greatly on the side of the affirmative of the question. We do not strenuously oppose what we do not feel to be advancing and encroaching. G. F. B. signifies the resistance Romanism is getting as a proof of its not making any progress. An enemy who is fought hard against is not usually one who is felt to be quite insignificant and on the point of giving in.

I am most thoroughly convinced that in both the departments into which the subject divides itself the affirmative is most nearly correct. 1. "Protestantism is failing" in its devotion to Scripture as the companion of the heart and as the guide of the life, and as the source of its creed—i. e., its trust in God; in its respect for the convictions of men, arrived at by the independent study of the Divine Word, and in its determination to resist formalism, deadness, and ecclesiasticism.

2. "Romanism is gaining" in its greedy grasp of power, in its quiet but stealthy sapping of the principles of home life and church-fellowship; in its adoption of the maxim that the end justifies the means; to set a pseudo-liberalism afloat to end in prostration to the priesthood; in its advocacy of opinions and forms of ritual, which are gradually bringing the ecclesiasticism of Rome into favour with the frequenters of the æsthetic worship carried on in professedly Protestant congregations, and in its power over the personal human heart, which loves ease, and will prefer any ecclesiastical machinery rather than adopt the Divine way, work and promise of salvation with fear and trembling. May it be indeed true that we are keeping our hearts open to the memory of God, and trusting in His Son alone as our Saviour.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

"You incendiary infidels, hold!" (say the orthodox). "You should be quiet infidels, and believe. Haven't we a church? Don't we keep a church this long while—best behaved of churches which meddles with nobody, assiduously grinding its organs, reading its liturgies, homiletics, and excellent old moral horn-books, so patiently as never church did? Can't we doff our hat to it; even look in upon it occasionally on a wet Sunday; and so, at the trifling charge of a few millions annually, serve both God and the Devil? Fools, you should be quiet infidels, and believe!" —*T. Carlyle "Latter-Day Pamphlets."*

D. Eng.'s article on this question is such a complication of errors and false reasoning that it will be necessary to unravel it, and to contrast it with the facts. To effect this, I cannot, in the first instance, do better than extract from his article his ideas of what Protestantism is, and cite, in opposition thereto, the real, genuine article, in the shape of the Protest itself, than which, I presume, no better standard of the Protestant faith can be had. I quote from the copy given by Dr. D'Aubigné, in his *History of the Reformation*.

The circumstances under which the Protest was made have already been detailed.

This important document was addressed to the representatives of the various states assembled at the Diet, as follows:—

"Dear Lords, Cousins, Uncles, and Friends!—Having repaired to this diet, at the summons of his Majesty, and for the common good of the empire and of Christendom, we have heard and learnt that the decisions of the last diet concerning our holy Christian faith are to be repeated, and that it is proposed to substitute for them certain restrictive and onerous resolutions."

"King Ferdinand and the other imperial commissioners, by affixing their seals to the last *Recess* of Spire, had promised, however, in the name of the Emperor, to carry out, sincerely and inviolably, all that it contained, and to permit nothing that was contrary to it. In like manner, also, you and we, electors, princes, prelates, lords, and deputies of the empire, bound ourselves to maintain always, and with our whole might, every article of that decree."

"We cannot, therefore, consent to its repeal:—

"Firstly, because we believe that his Imperial Majesty (as well as you) and we are called upon to maintain firmly what has been unanimously and solemnly resolved."

"Secondly, because it concerns the glory of God and the salvation of our souls, and that in such matters we ought to have regard, above all, to the commandments of God; who is King of Kings and Lord of Lords; each of us rendering Him account for himself without caring the least in the world about majority or minority."

"We form no judgment on that which concerns you, most dear lords; and we are content to pray God daily that he will bring us all to unity of faith, in truth, charity, and holiness, through Jesus Christ, our throne of grace, and our only Mediator."

"But in what concerns ourselves, adhesion to your resolution (and let

every honest man be judge!) would be acting against our conscience, condemning a doctrine that we maintain to be Christian, and pronouncing that it ought to be abolished in our States, if we could do so without trouble.

"This would be to deny our Lord Jesus Christ, to reject His Holy Word, and thus give him just reason to deny us in turn before his Father, as he has threatened.

"What! we ratify this edict! We assert that when Almighty God calls a man to His knowledge, this man cannot however receive the knowledge of God! Oh! of what deadly backslidings should we not thus become the accomplices, not only among our own subjects, but also among yours!

"For this reason we reject the yoke that is imposed on us, and, although it is universally known that in our States the holy sacrament of the body and blood of our Lord is becomingly administered, we cannot adhere to what the edict proposes against the Sacramentarians, seeing that the imperial edict did not speak of them, that they have not been heard, and that we cannot resolve upon such important points before the next Council.

"Moreover, as the new edict declares that the minister shall preach the gospel, explaining it according to the writings accepted by the Holy Christian Church, we think that, for this regulation to have any value, we should first agree on what is meant by the true and holy Church. Now, seeing that there is great diversity of opinion in this respect; that there is no sure doctrine but such as is conformable to the Word of God; that the Lord forbids the teaching of any other doctrine; that each text of the Holy Scripture sought to be explained by other and clearer texts; and that this holy book is, in all things necessary for the Christian, easy of understanding, and calculated to scatter the darkness: we are resolved; with the grace of God, to maintain the pure and exclusive preaching of His Holy Word, such as it is contained in the Biblical books of the Old and New Testament, without adding anything thereto that may be contrary to it. This Word is the only truth; it is the sure rule of all doctrine and of all life, and can never fail or deceive us. He who builds on this foundation shall stand against all the powers of hell, whilst all the human vanities that are set up against it shall fall before the face of God.

"For these reasons, most dear Lords, uncles, cousins, and friends, we earnestly entreat you to weigh carefully our grievances and our motives. If you do not yield to our request, we PROTEST by these presents, before God, our only Creator, Preserver, Redeemer, and Saviour, and who will one day be our Judge, as well as before all men and all creatures, that we, for us and for our people, neither consent nor adhere, in any manner whatsoever, to the proposed decree, in anything that is contrary to God, to His Holy Word, to our right conscience, to the salvation of our souls, and to the last decree of Spire.

"At the same time, we are in expectation that his Imperial Majesty will behave towards us like a Christian prince, who loves God above all things; and we declare ourselves ready to pay unto him, as well as unto you, gracious Lords, all the affection and obedience that our just and legitimate duty demands."

I now give D. Eng.'s ideas of Protestantism, almost verbatim, from his article in the January number of this magazine.

"The true faith of a Protestant is (1) that God, by his grace, bestows

salvation can believers in His Son; that belief in His Son is made possible by the diligent perusal of His Word, and the opening of the heart to receive His Spirit. (2) "All these" (i. e., various literary and other events mentioned by him) "are, and show departures from the true orthodox Protestant faith, which took the Bible as the standard of faith and rule of practice." (3) "It is a sad and doleful departure this from the blessed teaching of the Protestant faith, that God's eye rests on every human soul in love, and reciprocates every feeling which arises in the spirit after goodness and glory, every repentant thought, and every holy endeavour." (4) "Where is the Protestant feeling of responsibility of man for his neighbour; where is the interest for man's welfare and the glory of God, which Protestantism describes as being the principal purposes for which God has awarded being to man." (5) "No; Protestantism was earnest, with a holy zeal for God, to endeavour to make God's kingdom come, and His will be done on earth, as it is done in Heaven—what we do is mere pseudo-protestantism."

I have read with much attention D. Eng.'s version of the Protest and the Protest itself, but have failed to discover that the former corresponds with the latter, except in one particular, viz., in the fact that the Protest certainly takes "the Bible as the standard of faith, and rule of practice."

D. Eng. states that a saving belief in the Son of God is made possible by a diligent perusal of His Word, &c. This sentiment, I do not hesitate to say, was never taught by the fathers of Protestantism, by Luther or Calvin, or to go back to the founders of the early Christian Church, by St. Paul, St. Peter, and the other apostles.

Again, D. Eng. puts forth as a part of Protestantism, the sentiment that, "God's eye rests on every human soul in love," &c. Here also I can but repeat that neither Christ, nor the Gospels, nor the apostles, nor the fathers of the early Christian Church, nor the Protestants, teach any such doctrine. Their religion was of a much sterner material. Believing the Scriptures, they saw that vast numbers were doomed to perdition, and therefore it would have been impossible for them to have promulgated D. Eng.'s error that God loves—and as a necessary consequence, saves—all men.

Let me ask, how is it that, if what D. Eng. propounds as the unmistakeable basis of Protestantism, be so easily perceptible, that there are so many Protestant sects at the present time who differ on the point? The truth is that D. Eng. has mistaken the question. In order to make his paper applicable, the subject should have been, "Is Anglicanism failing, and Romanism gaining." D. Eng. has overlooked the real basis of Protestantism, which, under his hands, would speedily be perverted into Sectarianism.

The real basis of Protestantism is what Dr. D'Aubigné thus describes:—"The principles contained in this celebrated Protest, of 19th April, 1529, constitute the *very essence* of Protestantism. Now, this Protest opposes two abuses of man in matters of faith; the first is the intrusion of the civil magistrate, and the second the arbitrary authority of the Church. Instead of these abuses, Protest-

antism sets the power of conscience above the magistrate, and the authority of the Word of God above the visible Church. In the first place, it rejects the civil power in Divine things, and says, with the prophets and apostles, *We must obey God rather than man.*"

D. Eng. inveighs against what he terms the invasion of the spirit of scepticism, or, as he defines it, "rationalistic interpretations of the Scriptures," and denounces Drs. Hampden, Hinds, and Whately, whom he styles its "early advocates." But, to my mind, even such interpretations of the Scriptures as those he denounces, are far preferable to the sensational declamations made to large congregations, under the name of sermons, which are dished up, both on Sundays and week-days, which abound in error, and invite man to attempt that which it is utterly impossible for him to accomplish.

D. Eng. points to Strauss and Rénan, I presume, as supposed proofs of the failure of Protestantism, but in what way they can affect the question it is difficult to perceive, for, if neither of them be a Protestant, it is equally certain that neither is a Romanist.

But my opponent brings forward a still more remarkable evidence of the failure of Protestantism, and that is no less than the fact of the present controversy, which he adduces as one of his proofs, and the further fact that a controversy has recently transpired in this magazine on the question, "Can the Gospels be harmonised?" which he adduces as another.

Positivism, to the chastisement of which D. Eng. devotes a paragraph, does not indicate a defection from Protestantism, or an advance to Rome, but is simply wide of the question under discussion.

It is true, and to be lamented, that we have "masses of home heathen," that we have jails, hospitals, and workhouses, that we have an army of police and of magistrates, and that the poor and the destitute abound. But this is not the result of any failure of Protestantism. The latter does not undertake to convert heathen into Christians, that privilege belonging to a higher power. It cannot prevent crime, cure diseases, feed the hungry, give work to those who have none, enrich the poor, or give succour to the destitute. True, that Protestants are lethargic and inclined to let matters take their course; but the evils which D. Eng. sets forth are attributable, not to any failure of Protestantism or advance of Romanism, but, primarily and solely, to misgovernment and bad legislation. No extent of that Christian charity, at which D. Eng. sneers, could suffice to put an end to the crime and misery which abound.

D. Eng. says "Protestantism was earnest, with a holy zeal for God, to endeavour to make God's kingdom come, and His will be done on earth, as it is done in heaven,—*what we do is more pseudo-Protestantism.*" My opponent has evidently some fanciful opinions as to the complete doing of God's will on earth, but I ask what would D. Eng. have us do? Does he imagine that if Protest-

ism failed entirely, such failure could prevent God's will being done on earth? "D. Eng." seems to forget that it is impossible for Protestantism to make men Christians; and to carry out his views every Roman Catholic would have to be hunted out of Great Britain, as the fact of a man being a Roman Catholic ought, in his eyes, to prevent his being a British subject.

He forgets—and apparently wishes every one to fall into the same error—that every British subject, be he Catholic or not, has civil, political, and religious rights. Let him act upon this prescription:—Do not, because Catholics are zealous and evince a practical belief in their religion, attempt to deny their sincerity, but rather outrun them in the race of zeal. If they go among the people, and present their religion to them in such a manner as to make converts, let "D. Eng." and his friends go and do likewise. Instead of attempting to find out a stone in their eyes, they would do much better by taking away the beam from their own eyes.

What if there be a Roman Catholic hierarchy founded in England and Scotland? I care not if one be founded in each street. Numerous restraints are put on the Anglican hierarchy, which in effect render the Anglican Church powerless as a hierarchy; and if it were not for these restraints, the Anglican would become as intolerant and persecuting as any Roman Catholic hierarchy ever was, and "D. Eng.'s" article not only shows this, but it proves that whatever church—Anglican or Nonconformist—may have political supremacy, that church will soon cease to be Protestant in fact, although it may be so by name.

"D. Eng." indulges in the usual rant when he says (untruly, he it remarked; for I rejoice to say that it was the Protestants who have demanded it, and obtained what they righteously demanded) that the Catholics "demand that the great witness church of Protestantism should be swept away from Ireland as a State institution."

This event constitutes a strong point in my favour. No fact so strong as this could be adduced to show the great advance of true Protestantism; not that spurious article dealt out in "D. Eng.'s" paper, but the real principles advocated in and by the Protest. We have now cleared the theological field in Ireland of all the State lumber; and if there be anything vital in the Protestant Church of Ireland, it has now a fair opportunity to show itself; and if not, it proves that its foundation was rotten, and that it was quite time it should make way for a genuine church, based on true Protestantism. True, the Irish Church was a witness church, but a witness of what? Conquest, persecution, oppression, and theft. Surely it must be a subject for rejoicing to all that such an establishment has been swept away.

"D. Eng." is curious on the subject of Ritualism. I may say that people who are weak-headed enough to believe in the efficacy of the Ritualistic pantomimes of the present day, are not worthy of being Protestants, and we ought possibly, instead of censuring,

to thank those clergymen, actors who provide these amusements, and thus keep numbers of weak heads out of the gutter and schools into which they might fall, were they allowed to prowl the streets? But "D. Eng." inquires as to the cause of Ritualism; will tell him: It is not any failure of Protestantism; nor any gain of Romanism; but the erroneous system of Anglicanism which follows a man, who came, he has graduated and passed certain examinations, to set himself up as a teacher of religion, of which the large majority know about as much as a babe unborn; the morality of mankind.

While men are permitted to assume the office of God, and to change a mere literary student into a minister of the Gospel, which office should be the effect of a direct divine call from God, and long as this endures you will have Ritualism, and a minister of obscurity by thus refusing religion to a mere trade, you will insure that the most inviting, sensational shops will have the largest number of customers. These remarks apply with equal force to Nonconformists, some of whom, following in the steps of Anglicanism, make of his taken into their own hands the office of making ministers, to take out of the more material body endeavouring to create a new material spiritual being, and yet I know not of any such thing.

No amendment in this respect can be hoped for until the bands which bind the Church to the wheels of the State are cut and destroyed, and the Church ceases to be a political engine.

Dr. S's paper is, as a point of fact, a repetition of the substance of the paper of "D. Eng.," and it scarcely needs a separate notice. Its general guidance appears to be that Dr. S. cannot forbear his faith upon every one else; it denounces every act of good legislation, and its chief duty is to proclaim that every one who differs from himself should be treated as belonging to a lower order of creation. The contrast between this and a former part of his article in which he states the effect of the Protest, must, even to himself, appear striking. He complains at the appointment of Lord Chancellor O'Hagan because he is a Roman Catholic, and for the same reason, I presume, states that there were many others, both Catholic and Protestant, more able than he; but does Dr. S. demand any such thing? Now, and it is an admitted fact, that the present Irish Chancellor has discharged his duties conscientiously, and well. Dr. S. and his colleagues seem to think that if a man be a Catholic he must be a rascal, and they forget that Catholicism interposes no obstruction between any man and the conscientious fulfilment of his duties. This fact it would be well for them to remember.

Imitating his leader, "D. Eng.," Dr. S. concludes his article with a tirade against Romanism and Ritualism, and takes issue from the fact of the existence of the latter, to conclude with him that Protestantism is failing, when, in point of fact, Ritualism is a direct instance to Church of Englandism, and not to Romanism or Protestantism.

I now come to the article of O. O., which also follows in the wake of its two predecessors, while more broadly asserting that by the

were conceding to those of our fellow-subjects who happen to be Roman Catholics, those rights to which they are entitled, from the simple fact of their being fellow-subjects; the State recognises and sanctions the claim of papal supremacy. The State does no such thing. It simply recognises the claim of the supremacy of conscience over each individual, which recognition is of the very essence of true Protestantism. And no Catholic asserts, or would permit (as would the laws permit him, if he were inclined to do so), any claim of Romanism to place him above the laws, or absolve him from obedience to the laws, in their strictest sense. But O. C. is actually so rabid as to affirm, by implication if not in the precise words now used, that because there is a Roman Catholic he cannot be trusted with the administration of any office. Let O. C. poll the country, and he will find that half or more of its inhabitants make no profession of any kind of religion; thus, although nominally Protestant, being, for all practical purposes, Atheists. Now let me ask, who would be the more trustworthy, one of these nominal Protestants or a conscientious Catholic? The answer is plain and obvious, and yet O. C. would admit the first mentioned to all kinds of distinctions, places, &c., but would deny his just rights to any member of the last mentioned class, from the simple fact that the latter has listened to the voice of conscience. (A soft one, would it not?)

As O. C. proceeds he displays a lamentable ignorance of what Protestantism really is, inasmuch he seems to fancy that it merely consists of a code of certain theological dogmas. But that O. C. is really a Papist at heart will be seen from the following passages, which I quote from his article:—“So far as the sovereignty ceases to be supreme in religious matters, the papal supremacy is conceded.” Upon what he founds this remarkable conclusion it is impossible to conceive. He evidently ignores the Protestant principle of the non-supremacy of any man or church in matters of religion, and regards the sovereign as a Pope, and, placing her as an opposition Pope to the one at Rome, says that if the former's papal character be taken away, Protestantism—which, be it remembered, is the direct antagonist of Papacy in any shape—must be failing.

O. C. then, like his two colleagues, invites our attention to Puseyism and Ritualism, as proofs of the failure of Protestantism; but to him I repeat that the facts he names only show that the tendency of the Church of England, and of every other supreme sect, is papal, but they do not at all diminish the force of Protestantism, of which they are themselves infractions.

The conversions to which O. C. points, under his 3rd division, all prove, not that Protestantism is failing, but that any church depending on and connected with a State cannot succeed, and that the attempt in England to make Anglicanism a political State instrument has grievously failed.

The following further extract from O. C.'s paper will show the want of reasoning which marks it all through. He says, “It is an undoubted fact that Protestant sectarianism is becoming more

bitter and exasperating; and that this is affecting the minds of men very much against Protestantism cannot be doubted. It may not be a good reason for the effect noted, but it is patent that men, sighing for the unity of Christendom, can find no satisfaction in the sects of Protestantism, and are going over to Rome, in the earnest hope of securing that peace of conscience which Protestantism does not afford."

I assume, for the moment, that O. C.'s statements here are correct, but to what conclusion does that drive one? To this; that those who are really Protestants, being disgusted with sectarianism, but not with Protestantism, are, to secure an imaginary Christian unity and *peace of conscience*, doing that which they know to be wrong, and for which their consciences must of course ever after reproach them; and thus to gain this peace of conscience they are doing that which must for ever deprive them of it. The fact is, that O. C. is much behind his time. Had he written a century ago, his principles might have found an appreciative audience amidst the intolerance which then abounded; but now we are too firmly rooted in the principles of Protestantism to allow his theories to make us swerve from practising those principles, and from doing our duty so far as we can to the consciences of ourselves and our neighbours.

A few more words and I have done. Where are the "potent and reliable facts" which O. C. promised us? I have searched for them in vain; but I, in my turn, will state a few which are indisputable. O. C. and his coadjutors in this controversy (point, with a species of exultation, to the few individual converts which Romanism makes per annum, but I point to the great nations of the earth, and there show the great advances which Protestantism is making.

It will of course be admitted, that, without its temporal supremacy and papal infallibility, Romanism is no longer Romanism, and therefore wherever we find nations casting off these yokes, and giving free exercise to the voice of conscience, we can say with truth that these are real and substantial advances of Protestantism.

Austria, the quondam first son of the Church, has done this. Is not this a failure of Romanism?

Spain, till lately one of the most bigoted of papal countries, has not only done this, but also allows Protestant principles to be openly preached. Is not this another advance of Protestantism?

Italy, by subjecting priests to the State law, is treading in the same path; and France, in the person of Father Hyacinthe, has entered a striking and noble protest against the essential principles of Romanism. Are not these "potent and reliable" advances of Protestantism? The farce about to be played in Rome, in the shape of an Ecumenical Council, will prove to be another advance of Protestantism, if only from the fact that nearly, if not quite, one-half of the Romanist bishops have entered their protests against the holding of it, and repudiated those principles for the enunciation of which it is to be held.

With these facts before us we can come to no other conclusion than that Romanism is failing and Protestantism gaining; but if it be any satisfaction to O. C. and his colleagues, I leave to them the poor consolation of begrudging to the poor prisoner or pauper that right which correct legislation has accorded them, in protecting their consciences from being forced to acknowledge principles of which they do not approve, or to perform a system of so-called worship in which they have no faith.

H. K.

Politics.

IS AN HEREDITARY HOUSE OF LEGISLATURE DESIRABLE?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

THE word Aristocracy is derived, according to Lord Brougham, from two Greek words, signifying the power and prevalence of the best or highest classes—literally the best in respect of virtue, but practically the uppermost in point of authority. "The qualities of this sort of government," the same writer says, "are its firmness of purpose, resistance of violent change, discountenance of warlike policy, and encouragement of genius." It is quite obvious that one of the vices of democracy is its tendency to hasty change and rash legislation. Any governing body that is subject to popular election must be liable to influences from without, and must act so as to preserve its popularity or consent to be shelved. Whereupon the members would be sure to be replaced by those who were willing to carry out the wishes of the people. But if there is a body free from that popular controul, and independent of the passing whims and wishes of the times, they can resist action till due inquiry has been made; and until men's minds have had time to be aware of the full force of what is intended. Even a good thing is best got in the best state and manner, and an hereditary House of Legislature secures, in general, full investigation into, and full discussion of proposed changes. The difference of view taken by hereditary statesmen, and popularly elected lawmakers, must tend to make the fulness of the discussion pretty exhaustive, and lead to such setting of the matters under consideration in all different lights, as to cause much variousness of thought to be thrown on it. This is one of the main elements in profitable legislation—that the proposals shall be thoroughly considered from every possible point of view, and that any final decision should be retarded till full persuasion has actually taken possession of the majority of minds, whatever their position, that the cause proposed is that which, considering all circumstances, is best. Only an hereditary house can secure this; because it alone is independent of and free from the impulses and stir of popular opinion. We may suppose, as B. M. has done, an assembly "ele-

vated to the peerage by the voice of the nation or of the nation's representatives (p. 121), and constituting a second and superior house; but it is quite plain that such a house would be too dependent on the Ministry and the Nation to stand against both till Common Sense gained away in the councils of the people. A life peerage, as proposed by E. L. B., would be equally futile; a peer for life would have a higher stake in the personal popularity he could gain by following the general voice than in resisting it; and he would have, too, in all likelihood, desires almost equally eager for the success of such schemes; for life peers would in all probability be chosen only from among those who were favourable to the party in power.

But besides this, either a life peerage or a position in a superior chamber of legislation other than an hereditary one, would fail to secure the training and influence requisite in a higher house. The hereditary peerage affects and permeates the whole class, and leads to the preparation and proper education of that class to statesmanship as a part of their life-work. They are bound to acquire certain defined notions on legislation, and an acquaintance with the forms of public life; and they can form leisurely calm and comprehensive views of the wants of the times. Legislative power becomes a part and parcel of their nature, and they pass an apprenticeship in public business. Aspirants for honours, legislative or senatorial, must be, in general, decided and prominent partizans; he must mingle with, and cause, through his help, a good deal of the stir of popular agitations, and hence he gets marked by a partizan. But both custom and good sense have made it a practice for our hereditary legislators to abstain from active political agitation, because all such questions come before them in the last resort for settlement, and it is impolitic in them to commit themselves. The consequences on the political life of England would indeed be fearful if the present members of the House of Lords were all to begin to trade in politics by agitation for place, and power, and honour.

'We must have a house of deliberative legislation as well as a house of discusional legislation, and the Upper House must be of different materials, of another tenure, and of a different origin from the Lower Chamber. There is no way of securing this so certain, in the long run and on the whole, as to preserve our constitutionally hereditary house.'

'An hereditary House of Legislature is really a protection against tyranny—either the tyranny of the monarch, whom they alone are able to restrain, because they are possessed of an interest and a power, a position and an influence, which enables and excites them to resist his encroachments; or from the tyranny of the majority, for they have securities, and honours, and rights, and privileges which make it their interest to restrain and oppose mob law. Monarchy and majority alike they can defy, and hold their own against the House of Commons, opposed to the manipulations of a

clever and unscrupulous minister under an astute and tyrannically inclined sovereign would, it is to be feared, be too pliable under the temptations or threats which might be employed. Equally difficult would it be for our House of Commons to hold out against the ovations of the majority, and their claim to have their demands acceded to. We require something more stable and less liable to the changing and veering of the popular opinions of legislative topics.

These remarks will serve to show how far wrong are the opinions of "Neonias" (whose observations, by-the-by, are by some process or other suddenly cut short—p. 127) on this subject. He calls the House of Lords one of no practical value, and considers it to be unjust to have an hereditary house because we cannot ensure wisdom, probity, statesmanship, throughout any long descent of ages. In this argument E. L. B. agrees with him. But is it certain, that by election, or conscription, or any other human means we can secure for our Houses of Parliament with unerring certainty the possession of good sense, honesty, candour, impartiality, patriotism, and legislative skill? The infallibility of Parliaments, like that of the Popes, is a convenient fiction; but few who have visited the House of Commons, few who read the newspapers, few who come into contact with the average run of M.P.'s, can affirm that they are the cream of the cream of the social and civil society in which they move. S. R. G. must know that the people are not and ought not to rule (p. 29). They are to desire, and express their desires. It is for statesmen to shape the laws, so that these desires, so far as they are right and so far as is possible, with due consideration for practicability, may be granted. Thus it is that our legislators rule for the people; but the people are, as yet, at least quite incapable of doing more than they get doing—choosing men to do their best to bring about their desires.

An hereditary House of Legislature is very desirable as a mediatorial and arbitrating assembly. Hence it has a most beneficial tendency not only in lessening the heat of party contentions, but also of checking the multiplying of parties. Recognised as not requiring to fear the tendency of any proposal to oust one party and introduce another, as not mixed up openly with the brawls of agitation, and as not liable to the same eager personal besiegements as the more popular legislators, every party expects to draw from it reserves for its ranks, and to gain over, less or more, some of its members. Hence they form, as it were, a few and independent jury, before whom the different parties plead, and to whom the nation appeals for justice. To make a jury returnable, either by the judge or the criminals, would be equally absurd. So would it be to put the nomination of peerages into the hands of the nation, or into the hands of the monarch. Scylla must be avoided as well as Charybdis, and hence we affirm that a supreme House of Legislature ought to be hereditary; and that such an assembly as our House of Lords is a highly desirable and important portion of our

constitution, which it would be wrong to dispense with and disastrous to abolish.

M. G. N.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

"JOHN BULL dearly loves a lord!" and he generally gets paying dearly enough for the gratification of his love." True it is we are a people who love lords. Every day of his life does John Bull, like Caliban before the drunkard, go down upon his knees to the aristocracy, crying, Be thou my god, let me lick thy shoe! In this country "certain families have been born to government; there is an acknowledged *breed* of statesmen;" and Ph. M. avers that an hereditary House of Legislature is desirable because it has the same effect on the breed of men as the prizes at agricultural and horticultural shows have on cattle and flowers." And this he considers to be a compliment and an argument in excellent combination; like the Earl of Derby's game bantams, the aristocracy require to have their nobility preserved by inbreeding and good feeding. Darwin's "selections" is now to enter into a new phase of ability and it is to be quoted as a proof of the necessity and advantage of a House of Lords as a forcing house for humanity. Old radical Brasen Darwin would scarcely thank his grandson for this adaptation of the principles of the "Botanic Garden" to the defence and advocacy of hereditary legislators, and would most probably only agree that our House of Lords was a Green House.

We really are surprised to read some of the papers which have been written on the affirmative side of this question. Some of these are so sensible in their remarks and so well put together that one wonders at the hallucination which has turned the heads of so many otherwise apparently sane creatures, possessed of some education and power of thought. For instance, "Samuel," in the very last number, brings forward "preeminence of rank" as a ground for accepting and rejoicing in a House of Lords. Did "Samuel" never hear the words which Scottish Robin sang—

"The rank is but the guinea stamp,
The man's the gold for a' that."

Even this is too favourable an estimate of rank. How often, even in our own day, has rank been borne by those who have neglected all duties, and have set such examples of baseness before the people, as to show that though they might have the "stamp" of "rank," it was rather their offences that were rank and smelted to heaven, and that it would be wise in the aristocracy if they could devise some plan which would enable them to "stamp out" seducers, and bankrupts, and coseners from their numbers. "Law-makers," says the adage, "should not be lawbreakers," but to be "lawless as a lord" is nearly equally common. We do marvel that "Samuel" did not see that "preeminence of rank" is a mere fiction of law and property, and confers no "preeminence of manhood," which is what is required in a supreme House of Legislature.

If Aristocracy means "power or dominion of the best," how does our hereditary House of Legislature stand the test? Is Bestness hereditary? We trow not—either in wisdom, morality, statesmanship, industry, or war. We may, by a law of primogeniture, entail estates, honours, wealth, &c., on certain parties, and these will always exert an appreciable influence on others; but we cannot entail those qualities which are essential to statesmen and legislators. A. A. R. asserts that because continual additions and changes are making in the House of Lords, it is not incumbent on the advocates of the affirmation to prove that character is hereditary (p. 286). We beg to differ from him entirely. The question is one from which the element of hereditariness cannot be extracted. If hereditariness secures any special and otherwise unattainable advantages in the persons who compose our House of Lords that would show that an hereditary House of Legislature is desirable so far, always provided that it does not cause or tend to produce other special evils; if it does not conduce to the production of any special advantages why have it at all? A. A. R. does not argue fair; he evades the question, and replies, in fact, to it because the House of Lords is only nominally hereditary, and really elective through the Ministry for a limited (by nature) number of lives, therefore it is desirable to have it. We do not think so; if it is hereditary let us have reasons for approving of it as such, but do not argue that it is desirable to have it nominally hereditary because it is really not elective but selective.

A. A. R.'s query about cheesemongers and grocers (p. 287) is ingenious but not to the point; in fact its ingenuity consists in its going aside from the point. Cheesemongers and grocers who succeed to their fathers' business must either have or acquire "fitness for their peculiar office," or they will pretty soon be turned out of it into the Bankruptcy Court or the Queen's Bench. But hereditary legislators cannot fail either to legislate rightly or to conduct themselves rightly towards their creditors. They may ruin the country, but they cannot ruin themselves. If we had such a thing as an entrance examination in some form, or, what would perhaps be better, a moral and mental court of bankruptcy, we might manage to have an endurable House of Lords; but there is no way of getting rid of incapables and obstructives, except by the unlawful course of invoking King Death, and even then we are not quite sure that the son may not equal the sire in his incapacity and obstructiveness.

A. A. R. asserts that the House of Lords has stood its trial well—"wonderfully well." If it redounds to the honour of a "free"—from needing to care about anybody but themselves—"and independent, in means and of opinion, house of the supreme legislature to vapour and threaten, to spit fire and announce most extreme intentions; to bully, and browbeat, and braggadocio, and—then, to eat the leek most submissively, the House of Lords is a most honourable house. They did this in regard to the "Irish Church

Bill," and vowing they would ne'er consent—consented. Nay, did they not, too, take a poor, puny revenge by kicking out the Scotch Education Bill," merely to prove how bravely they could contravene the Commons. The policy of weakness—abrick and submit—is not usually held to be most honourable in dukes, earls, *et hoc genus omne*; but this A. A. R. thinks is the way to stand one's trial "wonderfully well." Well, well, how tastes differ, and opinions too, to be sure! We shall rouse the country! Zounds, we shall spend our last penny, utter our last cry, exhaust our last breath, and dare a thousand revolutions rather than yield to the passing of such a bill as that which the Commons have sent up! Hark ye, we are not to be daunted, so don't let us have that bill up again till you have made it fit for the nobility to handle, or—Od's thrumkins, is that it, gentlemen—returned as before! Well, well, gentlemen, as you please—like a carrion-dog—let it pass, and please you!

"Honour! Lord bless you, we have none to spare, sir." "Samuel" must surely see that if it is an argument *in favour of a hereditary house* that "any gentleman might become a peer, the younger son of a peer was but a gentleman," it must be a still greater one for an unhereditary one; for his argument is founded on the practical unhereditaryness of the present House. If it be unadvantageous that the House, now nominally hereditary, is in reality and practically only an elective and unhereditary House, let us by all means extend the advantage, so that it may give up hypocrisy, and become really what it really is. In that case, according to "Samuel," it will cease to be hereditary, and will yet not quite as well.

We really must have some House of Lords reform. We cannot have a privileged class which is unable to justify its existence by deeds of worth and acts of wisdom. It is no longer desirable to have an Hereditary House of Legislature. The era of caste is past.

E. L. R.

Toiling Upward.

DOUGLAS WILLIAM JERROLD.

(Concluded from page 154.)

"A witty man is a public benefactor. Every time one of his brilliant sayings is repeated a portion of pleasure is imparted, keen in proportion to the susceptibility of the hearer; a smile is called into tearful eyes, Soverity relaxes her brows, and Austerity forgets her carts. Social enjoyments are increased, the hearers like each other the better for the pleasure they have shared together. What an amount of enjoyment Jerrold has given to the world! raised for how many the leaden mantle of *ennui*, and eased them for a moment of its weight!"

JERROLD was a magician with words. His might over them was

supreme. Alike in their contrasts, their resemblances, and their suggestions, they were altogether known to him and submissive to his way. Every possible transformation of phrase or meaning presented itself to his mind at once, and the choice selectiveness of his mind made use of that at once which united together humour and humanity, wit and wisdom. He spoke in the suddenness and clearness of a lightning flash, the laugh-suggesting contrast had been spoken, the instantaneous surprise elicited a smile, and the pathos or the hidden meaning sank quietly and deeply into the heart. Ever effervescent and evanescent as wit is, his was always fresh and pure; quip and jest, sally and banter, were constantly ready with their bright laughter-causing preciousness to hearten and delight the social circle. He was always unstrained, often severely restrained, for he frequently stifled the winged word which threatened to bear with it a wound to the spirit. His wit was intended for the raising of that laughter which has a hearty ring in it, and which occasions such a *sussurus* as may blow away the cobwebs of sorrow and care from the dark corners of the mind. Unfortunately, from the very ill-nature of men, those jests which are best remembered, and most frequently repeated and reported, are those which sting rather than stir. But a few specimens must be given, however difficult may be the task of selection and narration, for without these no notice of Jerrold could be adequate.

The Nestor of the cheap press—Charles Knight—at club one evening, while talk was gloomy on account of some funerals that had in quick succession saddened literary circles, wondered what epitaph would be inscribed on his tombstone when he had "shuffled off life's mortal coil."

Jerrold, robe-gravels, and hewing said, "Good night!"
A writer, more famous for the intensity than the duration of his good feeling, was praised for the warmth of his friendships. "Yes," Jerrold said, "they are so warm that he no sooner takes them up than he drops them."

Going along the Strand one evening, a young gent, far gone in liquor, accosted him thus:—"I say! which is the way to 'The Judge and Jury.?'"
"Go on, my young man, as you're doing," Jerrold replied, "and you're sure to reach them."

A rhymester who had published by subscription, and who believed that his talents deserved more consideration than is given even to "men of mark" among poets, took his book to the editor of *Lloyd's Newspaper* to ask a review of it. Jerrold, who knew his man, turned up the list of subscribers, and while looking at it the author observed, "Oh, it's the contents you're looking at!" "No, it's the discontents." "Ah, Jerrold, I didn't expect that from you," remonstrated Poeticus. "What did you expect?" The mortified writer, tossing his head back, ejaculated, "Oh, nothing!" "H'm," was the reply, "I thought nothing was too good for you!"

Of a formal letter he received he spoke as "a piece of folded ice."

A lawyer's advice he said was "dirt cheap at six-and-eightpence."

At a dinner of artists "The Law" was proposed. The pompous barrister who rose to reply began by saying, "The Law—the Law—let me

see, I do not know to which art it belongs." "The black," Jerrold instantly suggested, to the immediate collapse of the inflated eloquence.

A fussy simpleton poured a long-winded complaint into Jerrold's ears about his immediate neighbour's disregard of the common civilities of life. "I don't wonder at it," said his confident, "he's next door to an idiot!"

A dull fellow, speaking of a certain tune, exclaims, "Oh that tune, it carries me away whenever I hear it!" Jerrold, looking round appealingly, queries, "Will anybody whistle it now?"

In the midst of a frothy speech, during a debate, the orator stopped, and after a pause resumed with the words, "I was thinking." "Oh, nonsense! impossible! I don't believe it!" said Douglas Jerrold; and laughter put the speaker down.

A celebrated lawyer, whose personal character was rather shady, on entering a room which Jerrold was crossing as he came in, exclaimed, "I'm late—I've just met a scoundrelly barrister!" "Oh," said Jerrold, "that's nothing strange! so have I."

Describing a celebrated delinquent, he remarked, "Six months since, sir, he had not a wrinkle, and now his face is as full of lines as the railway map of England."

A person, excusing his extravagance, said, apologetically, "But we must attend to *respectability*." "Respectability," was the retort, "is all very well for those who can have it for ready money; but to be compelled to run in debt for it—it's enough to break the heart of an angel."

Of an exceedingly ardent business man, Jerrold said, "His heart is all figures, like a ready reckoner."

Jerrold was informed that a lawyer's business "had all gone to the devil." "That's all right," said he; "he's now gone to get back to it again."

On being asked if a dog could beg, "Beg!" he exclaimed, "ay, like a prince of the blood."

A friend once applying for aid to make up a good round sum to free a literary gentleman—who had frequently had the hat sent round for him—out of oft-recurring difficulties, was asked impatiently by Jerrold, "Well, how much does he want this time?" The answer was, "Oh, a four, and two noughts will do." "Put me down for one of the noughts," said he. "Quite un-Shaksperian," said a bystander, a biographer of the dramatist. "Nothing extenuate, nor set down nought in malice." "Humph! well! hey! five guineas then," shows the result.

Peeping, with a literary stranger from the provinces, down the transept of Sydenham Palace, the companions came to an angle where a splendid copy of Reitschl's "Crucifixion" was placed. "What!" said Jerrold, "Christ was crucified between two thieves; I see only one there," pointing to the bust of Napoleon III. beside it. "Where's t'other?" "Gone to paradise, perhaps," suggested his friend. "That's it, so *this* is the unrepentant one."

A "new piece" was performed, and the curtain fell amid the applause of the audience, though Jerrold was silent. "Why," said a friend, "don't you greet the new drama with applause, to receive which it is so well adapted?" "Adapted, that's it; I am an Englishman and a patriot, and I cannot therefore rejoice at these frequent successes of the French."

"We row in the same boat, you know," said an occasional French contributor to Jerrold. "True, my good fellow," he replied, "but with very different skulls (skulls)."

A gentleman rose "to order" at a public meeting; the excited speaker objected to be put down, though the audience seemed unwilling to listen to him. "Gentlemen, patience," he exclaimed, "all I want on this subject is common sense!" "That's exactly what you do want," Jerrold cried out, and "order" was secured when the laughter abated.

Of a marked drunkard, Jerrold said that "his nose, like hothouse fruit, had been ripened under the glass."

The tax-gatherer, having been disappointed once or twice, being asked to call again, tartly rejoined, "Sir, I'm determined to put a man in the house." Jerrold replied, with a smile, "Couldn't you make it a woman, now?"

An extravagant literary man, who drove into the Row "a very fine pair," asked Jerrold what he thought of his greys. "To tell you the truth," said he, "I was thinking of your duns."

Two or three gentlemen of the road (commercial), slightly elevated, on a visit to the Zoological Gardens, met Jerrold before the giraffe compartment. "Beautiful colours these, aren't they?" said one to him. "Yes," said he, "and like you, they're fast."

Douglas Jerrold once said of a writer fond of strengthening his style by typographic eccentricities, that he put his ideas, like babies, into "small caps."

When the criminal novel had come into vogue, Jerrold said their writers "lived like birds, on hemp-seed."

At an evening party, an elderly lady was dancing with a young partner. A stranger approached Jerrold, who was looking on, and said, "Pray, sir, can you tell me who is the young gentleman dancing with that very elderly lady?" "One of the Humane Society, I should think," replied Jerrold.

Jerrold, however, was not a mere wit, nor did he love to be characterized by that curt, biting epithet. "Give," he remarks, "a dog a bad name and hang him, says the old saw; now certainly the worst and the shortest name to give him is Wit." With deep feeling, too, he once wrote to Charles Dickens, "I am convinced the world will get tired (at least, I *hope* so) of this eternal guffaw about all things. After all, life *has* something serious about it. It cannot all be a comic history of humanity. Some men would I believe write a comic Sermon on the Mount. Think of a comic history of England, the drollery of Alfred, the fun of Sir Thomas More, the farce of his daughter begging the dead head and clasp-
ing it in her coffin in her bosom. Surely the world will be sick of this blasphemy."

Well do we remember the kindly greeting of the author of "The Chronicles of Clovehoe," when one evening in Putney a mutual literary friend favoured us with an introduction to him. The first impression was disappointing. He was low statured, and stooped much, yet he was symmetrically formed, but for the disproportionate size of his head, which seemed larger too by the breadth of a whiskerless face, from which a well-pronounced nose jutted somewhat Wellingtonishly. His blue eyes sparkled under heavy eyebrows, and brown though grey streaked hair flaked copiously round his brow, which was lower and broader and smoother than

I had fancied. His talk was rapid, racy, anecdotal, brisk, and pleasing, though occasionally tart.

Several times thereafter we saw him, and enjoyed his humorous satires on the affairs of the day, the littleness of this and the folly of that passing event, his quick detection and criticism of imposture and craft, the drollery of his capricious fancy, and his lambency upon the foibles and fashions of the times, and the causticity of the reproving sternness with which he "saw upon" the bigot, the charlatan, the heartless pomp of wealth, and the shabby meanness of the toady of the upper classes. We observed, too, his large-hearted philanthropy, his genuine political patriotism, his sincere love of manliness and independence, his enthusiasm for the people, his truthful sympathy with the oppressed, and his kindly readiness to be a good Samaritan to his brethren of the quill, and we then learned to look on him as a nobler, braver, holier, greater man than a wit. There was in him a depth of feeling, an intensity of the emotive nature, a free, ferid, bounteous disposition, a sweet and lovable humanity, a solemn well of delightful poetry, which gifted him far above the jester, and made him to us the representative of a truer manliness than that possessed by an ordinary jangler of the cap and bells of mirth and jocularly. His serious purpose clothed itself humorously, and yet was serious.

We have given a few specimens of wit which would fill volumes (of a kind that was rare). Jerrold, however, was not only a wit, but a poetic humorist of a high-class character. Of this excellent faculty we may quote the following specimens:—

"The sky's blue again—blue as your precious eyes, and the raindrops hang upon the leaves as bright as the diamonds—I wish I was rich enough to give you." "The daisy is death's forget-me-not." "The gospel has a brighter light than that which gleams from bayonets—gunpowder is not the best frankincense." "Happiness grows at our own firesides, and is not to be picked up in strangers' gardens." "There are estates in this merry England held by single owners—estates which a good horseman could scarcely cover between sunrise and sunset. How glorious the scenes! What majestic woods—temples for time itself! What bright and bounteous waters! What hills, golden and glowing with the triumphs of the sower! What varying richness of hill and dale, forest and flood! And all this belongs to one man. But are there no other estates as true (albeit not as tangible) as the earthly domain of the earthly noble? Give him a few sheets of paper, and in a few days or weeks a noble of another sort will create a domain which neither sorcerer can bewitch nor pirate plunder. Here are woods never to be overthrown by gambler's dice, nor fields and meadows that defy the age of trumps, ay, all the ages, let them be packed and shuffled with the rarest delight. If a noble alone can foreclose them."

Speaking of Leverrier's and Adams' discovery of Neptune, he says, "A new star is discovered—another diamond upon the throne of

eternity, and unborn millions are inheritors of the glory of the knowledge."

Of a sculptor he remarks, "For two years his heart has been pulsating in that bit of marble, whence by degrees the wings of Cupid have unfolded themselves, and the crystal lamp of stone has warmed with his daily doings into winged life. The statue has leapt from the block—the body throbs from it—the clustering eyelids are a broken out, and the mould opens upon the Cupid's face as a light gleams upon a lily."

Here are a few miscellanea of poetic thought:—"Yes" and "No" are for good and evil the giants of life." "Hope is the poetry of daily life." "The day is closed. Evening has stolen like a pensive thought upon us; the moon hangs, a silver shield in heaven, and the nurse nightingale sings to the sleeping flowers." "Patience is the strongest of strong drinks, for it kills the giant Despair." "A garden is a beautiful book, writ by the finger of God; every flower, every leaf is a letter. You have only to learn them—and he is a poor dunce that cannot, if he will, do that—to learn them, and join them, and then go on reading and reading, and you will find yourself carried away from the earth to the skies by the beautiful story you are going through." "How few let their passions, their resentments, die before them! How few see their vices confined ere they fall themselves." "He kissed and promised—such beautiful lips! Man's usual fate—he was lost on the coral reef." "Shakespeare," Jerrold speaks of as "the great magician who has left immortal company for the spirit of man in its weary journey through this briny world—has bequeathed scenes of immortal loveliness for the human fancy to delight in—founts of eternal truth for the lips of man to drink, and for a age to be renovated with every draught."

Here is Jerrold's opinion of laughter:—"O glorious laughter! thou man-loving spirit that for a time dost take the burden from the weary back—that dost lay salve for the feet, bruised and cut by the flints and shards—that takest blood-baking melancholy by the nose, and makest it grin despite of itself—that all the sorrows of the past, the doubts of the future, confoundest in the present—that makest man truly philosophic, conqueror of himself and care."

We must revert now to the life of him who could ring down at once, and when wanted, the finest wit, the most genial philosophy, the most hearty politics, and the gayest humour, and best of all could joke and yet be loved—a test few wits can stand.

Under Jerrold's editorship *Lloyd's Newspaper* became a political power, and during the greater portion of his remaining years it absorbed much of his thoughts. It had attained a weekly circulation of nearly 200,000, and he felt that the responsibility of adequately appraising the social, moral, and political questions of the time for such a host of readers was a task demanding from him the most solemn devotedness—the most rigorous punctuality of pen, person, and paragraphing.

The eventfulness of his life was almost closed, though not its interest. He was a patriot, and an admirer of the might of nobility, shown in patriotism. He loved Kossuth, liked Mazzini, and thought much of Louis Blanc—they had all found welcome of a genial English sort in his house at Putney. At his suggestion a penny subscription was raised to present

Louis Kossuth—the *successful Washington of Hungary*—with a copy of Shakspeare, enclosed in a carved case—a model of Shakspeare's house. He was by acclamation appointed as representative of 9,215 pence and persons to present it. This was done on May 8th, 1852, in a noble and finely toned speech, delivered from a chair in the London Tavern, of which the following are some words:—"The day *will* come; for it is to doubt the solemn purposes and divine end of human nature to doubt it,—the day *will* come when the darkness that now benights the greater part of continental Europe will be rolled away, dispersed by the light of liberty like some suffocating fog. The day *will* come, when in France men shall re-inherit the right of speech. The day *will* come when Austrian men shall take some other lesson from their rulers than the stick; and the day *will* come when in Italy the temporal power of the Pope—that red plague upon the brightest spot of God's earth—will have passed away like a spent pestilence."

In the same year Jerrold was invited to become Member of Parliament for Finsbury, along with the renowned Tom Duncombe; but this he declined, as a position to which he was inadequate. It was in this year, too, that he first rode in a carriage of his own—and followed *duns* instead of being followed by them.

In 1854 he passed through France and Switzerland, returning by the Rhine. Before setting out, as he intended to visit Italy—Hepworth Dixon, editor of the *Athenæum*, was his companion—he called at the Austrian consul's to get a passport. "I am instructed not to admit Mr. Douglas Jerrold within the Austrian territory," was the response. "That shows your weakness, not my strength," said he, and departed. It was perhaps as well that he did not get whither he was *bound*; he might have been retained there in that plight. In 1855 he visited L'Exposition Universelle, and enjoyed his trip much, and becoming better acquainted with *sapoleons* than *Napoleon*, became a convert to the decimal coinage, or, as he said, an advocate for *decimation*.

From Putney he had removed to Circus Road, and afterwards, when Robson, the Crystal Palace rogue, met his deserts, he purchased Kilburn Priory. He removed there in 1856, and amid ongoing improvements prepared himself to settle—little weeting the settlement that actually awaited him. As he once himself said, "What a mole-eyed thing is man! How he crucifies himself with vain thoughts! How he stands upon tip-toe, straining his eye-strings, trying to look into the future, when at that moment the play is over, the show is done."

His garden, aviary, library, stables, &c., occupied much of his care. The winter evenings he spent in it were gladsome, gay. The New Year festivities of 1857 were blithely got through, but a singular solemnity mingled itself with the jocosity of the time, and a strange foreboding crept—like the dark of a charnel-house—into his discourse. His birthday celebration found him full of thoughts of death, and the wine seemed only to suggest "the lees of life."

Once before, ten years ago, he had overmastered death. Dr. Wigan tells the story. He was told that all hope was over, and he must prepare to die. "What! die! and leave my wife and five helpless children. By heaven I won't." The recording angel blotted the entry with his tear. He recovered; but for years he was a martyr to sciatica and rheumatism, and bore within himself a full share of the aches and ills which flesh is heir to, sometimes feeling "as if the devil's demons were twisting his nerve-strings in a solution of scorpion's stings." His heart had been undergoing a slow process of deterioration in its tissues, and the secret feeling of the oncome of death was fluttering about in his mind. He strove to rally himself from the sort of graveness which was settling on him; but he grew less and less able to exert mind or body. Towards the end of May he began to be evidently ailing, and on 1st June he was laid down. He got up the next day and got his newspapers about him, and tried to work, but in vain. Once or twice during the week he felt the hunger of the heart for work, and rose from his bed to attempt it. The doctors gave hope, but he declared the sun was setting. He looked Death calmly in the face now, and he seemed welcomer than before. He felt as one who is waited for. In his paroxysm of agony he exclaimed, "Christ! Christ!" On a beautiful Sunday morning, June 8th, 1857, with all his family round him, eagerly seeking to fan the breath-thirsting frame into a soothed state, saying, "This is all as it should be," he went into the unstruggling sleep of the departed. Here after struggle and toil, in the hour of triumph, when he had gained "competence, position, mutual affection"—"all that makes the happier man," Death insisted on the execution of his "fell arrest," and these were "all now within four boards." He had become earth and a memory here, and he had gone with a good hope into the hereafter. In Norwood Cemetery, on 15th June, he was laid in the grave, and mournful friends said a sorrowing good-bye to the human and humane, the genial and the gentle, the wise and the witty, the strong-hearted and the subtle-spirited, the meek and the mighty, the mirthful and the merciful, the various-minded Douglas William Jerrold—wit, novelist, dramatist, journalist, essayist, critic, thinker, toiler,—one of the exemplars of the power of endeavour to achieve duty, and of the way in which men may dare, do, and endure.

Her eye proclaims her of the Briton line;
 Her lion-port, her awe-commanding face,
 Attempted sweet to win him grace.
 What strings symphonious tremble in the air!
 What strains of music fill the ear!

proves that she desires him to win her from the Tower and her majesty of the Tower. What strings symphonious tremble in the air! and what transcendent beauty of music fill the ear!

A FINEBAG ONE

malapert orator, no less than a philosopher, than with the features of her face. —

"Girt with many a baron bold,
 Sublime their starry fronts they rear;
 And gorgeous dames, and statesmen old
 In bearded majesty, appear
 In the midst a form divine!"

115

Surrounded by a numerous retinue of brave nobles, they raise their crowned heads in grandeur, and ladies in rich costumes, and statesmen in policy, are seen in their courts in the sobered maturity of life. Among them may be seen a goddess-looking person, whose keen glance

(111) "The title of baron is the oldest in point of antiquity, although the lowest in point of rank, of any of the nobility." — *How we are Governed*, Letter 4th.

(112) "His starry front, low-roofed, beneath the eaves." — *Milton's "The Passion"*, 18.

Sublime—loftily, proudly—is, in Horace's *Ode*, 1, 96, —

"Sublimi feriam sidera vertice."

(My honoured head I to the stars will rear.)

(113) Gorgeous, magnificently arrayed; from French *gorg*, the throat; gorged, a defensive armour worn round the neck, then a ruff worn by females in the Elizabethan time.

(114) Bearded is equivalent to manly. Beatrice, in *"Much Ado about Nothing"*, says "He that hath a beard is more than a youth, and he that hath no beard is less than a man" (iii, 1). In the time of Elizabeth beards were of the most varied and fantastic cut, so as Taylor the water poet sings, —

"That heights, depths, breadths, in form square, oval, and round,
 And rules geometrical in beards are found."

(115) Elizabeth, Shakespeare's "fair west end crowned by the West," of *Spoken*, in relating an audience given by Queen Elizabeth to *Paul Raskin*, a messenger of Roland, says, "And thus she, blithe like a rising glimmer of the

Her eye proclaims her of the Briton line;
Her lion-port, her awe-commanding face,
Attempered sweet to virgin grace.

What strings symphonious tremble in the air!

What strains of vocal triumph and her play! 120

proves that she derives her descent from the Tudors, her bold demeanour and her majesty of feature are so exquisitely mixed with the pleasing beauty of maidenhood. What pleasing harmonious music stirs the court, and what transcendent poëms are heard in her presence (on the stage)!

malapert orator, no less with her stately port and majestical deporture, than with the tartness of her princelike cheekes." Spenser says,—

"O goddess, heavenly bright,
Mirror of grace and majesty divine!
Great lady of the greatest isle, whose light
Like Phoebus' lamp throughout the world doth shine,"
(*Imitation of "The Faerie Queene," Book I.*)

and makes her the Gloriana, Belphebe, and Britomart of his great theme. (116) In the tenth canto of the Second Book of "The Faerie Queene," Spenser supplies a metrical epitome of the history of Geoffrey of Monmouth, giving the chronicle of the old British kings, from Brutus to Uther Pendragon, father of Arthur, and exclaims of Elizabeth,—

"Thy name, O sovereign queen, thy realm and race
From this renowned prince derived are,
Who mightily upheld that royal state
Which now thou bear'st; to thee descended far
From mighty kings and conquerors in war,
Thy fathers and great-grandfathers of old,
Whose noble deeds above the northern star
Immortal fame for ever hath enrolled,
As in that old man's book they were in order told."

(119) "The poets of Spenser's age, including the first fifty years of the seventeenth century, are very numerous. Ellis reckons a hundred as belonging to the reign of Elizabeth alone; and Drake has made a list of more than two hundred, though many of these have written only short pieces."—*Anglo-Saxon Handbook of English Literature*, p. 188.

(120) "The age of Elizabeth was distinguished beyond, perhaps, any other in our history, by a number of great men, famous in different ways, and whose names have come down to us with unblemished honours—statesmen, warriors, divines, scholars, poets, and philosophers. Raleigh, Drake, Coke, Hooker, and higher and more sounding still, and still more frequent in our mouths, Shakespeare, Spenser, Sidney, Bacon, Johnson, Beaumont, and Fletcher, men whom Fame has eternized in her long and lasting scroll, and who, by their words and acts, were benefactors of their country, and ornaments of human nature. Their attainments of different kinds bore the same general stamp, and were sterling. What they did had the mark

Hear from the grave, great Taliessin, hear!
 They breathe a soul to animate thy clay.
 Bright Rapture calls, and soaring as she sings,
 Waves in the eye of Heaven her many-coloured wings.

III. 3.

"The verses adorn again
 Fierce War, and faithful Love,

125

Listen from thy tomb, O mighty Taliessin, give ear! They exhale a spirit to renew the life within thy grave-dust. Glorious delight invites you, and uprising, while she carols out her joy, flutters in the clear sunlight her eternally dried pinion.

Deck out, once more, the poetry of old, in which furious battle and

of their age and country upon it. Perhaps the genius of Great Britain (if I may so speak without offence or flattery) never shone out fuller or brighter, or looked more like itself, than at this period. . . . The mind of their country was great in them, and it prevailed."—*Haslitt's "Lectures on the Dramatic Literature of the Age of Elizabeth,"* p. 1.

(121) Taliessin, the chief of the Welsh bards, flourished in the sixth century, and his memory is even yet venerated by the Cymry. He was the son of the bard Henry, to whose memory he dedicated the church of Llanbenwy, in Caerleon, in Monmouthshire. He became tutor to Euphyn, son of Urien Rheged, and was carried off by pirates. His adventures originating in this incident form the basis of a *mabinogi*, or child's story, current in Wales. Poems are said to be his, but they are generally thought to be as genuine as those of Ossian. Taliessin's grave is traditionally said to be near Aberystwith; he was endued with the spirit of prophecy, and had undergone metempsychosis.

(122) Compare Milton's "C. mus," 560—562:—

"I was all ear,
 And took in strains that might create a soul
 Under the ribs of death."

(123) How beautifully has this phrase been expanded by Shelley, in his ode "To a Skylark"! thus:—

"The blue deep thou wingest,
 And, singing still, dost soar, and soaring ever singest."

(124) Bardic awards are to this day affirmed, at the Eisteddfodan of our Cymric brethren, to be given in the terms of the bard's worthy motto,—

"Y-gwir yn erbyn y byd, yn ngwynab haul a llygad goleuni."

(The truth against the world, in the face of the sun, the eye of day.)

(125) "Fierce wars and faithful loves shall moralize my song."—*Innocentian. Spencer's "Fairy Queen."*

"The Fairy Queen" is to be considered as a Gothic, not a classical poem. As a Gothic poem it derives its method, as well as the other characters of its composition, from the established modes and ideas of chivalry. New

And Truth severe, by fairy Fiction drest.

In buskined measures move

Pale Grief, and pleasing Pain,

With Horror, Tyrant of the throbbing breast. 133

trustworthy affection and strict truth are in the robe of elfish romance arrayed. In the lofty step of the "well-trod stage" there pass before us White-faced Sorrow and Distress, wrought up into forms that give delight, and Fear then becomes the oppressor of the thrilled heart.

in the days of knight-errantry, at great annual feasts, throngs of knights and barons bold assembled, and thence sallied forth to succour the distressed, the noblest of all characters being that of deliverers. Such feasts were held for twelve days."—*Prof. J. Wilson (Christopher North), Blackwood's Magazine, 1838.*

—(127) Spenser's magnificent allegory, the "Fairy Queen," Milton's sage and serious Spenser, whose "great characteristic," says Leigh Hunt, "is poetic luxury;" whose "allegory itself is but one part allegory, and nine parts beauty and enjoyment; sometimes an excess of flesh and blood." How precious are "his visions of knights and nymphs, his gods and goddesses, whom he brought down again to earth in immortal beauty!"

"Sweet Spenser, sweetest bard, yet not more sweet
Than pure was he, and not more pure than wise,—
High priest of all the Muses' mysteries."

(128) The large luminary of Spenser's imagination had scarce mounted high enough above the horizon to kindle all it touched, when there arose the still more glorious shape of Shakspeare's genius, radiant like Milton's seraph—"another morn risen on mid-noon." This was the wonderful dramatic era in English letters. Within about fifty years, beginning in the latter part of the sixteenth century, there was a concourse of dramatic authors, the like of which is seen nowhere else in literary history. The central figure is Shakspeare, towering above them all; but there were there Ben Jonson, and Beaumont and Fletcher, and Ford, and a multitude of whom a poet has said,—

"They stood around

The throne of Shakspeare, sturdy, but unclean."

Henry Reed's "Introduction to English Literature," p. 97.

(129-30) Probably the plays of Shakspeare specially alluded to here are "Lear," "Cymbeline," and "Macbeth" respectively; pale Grief suggests "Cordeia," pleasing Pain "Imogen," and "Horror, tyrant of the throbbing breast," the murder-made queen, who, under "the pressure of an over-fraught heart,"—

"As tis thought, by self and violent hands
Took off her life;"

though the terms may really not imply any such specification, as they are applicable enough as a general statement to the Shaksperian drama taken as a whole.

"The world is wide, yet all the world must own
That England's Shakspeare fills its noblest throne;
That wisdom, wit, mirth, feeling, mind, and soul,
Rule, 'neath his sceptre-touch, from pole to pole."

A tax is consequently levied upon honest men. Again, the charters to the universities were bestowed at a time when dissent from the Church of England was not anticipated; if anticipated, was not expected to include a large and influential body of Englishmen.—C. H. A. PROBY

NEGATIVE SCIENCE

That the nation should have in a great measure departed from the principles of the faith and the practices that faith enforces, and have given over to secularism and selfishness, is no great reason why those who have held fast by the faith and maintained their adherence to the standard should be dealt with unjustly. Every citizen depends on its terms. The terms on which the two universities of Oxford and Cambridge were instituted were that they should be true to the faith of the State as by law established, that they should maintain and defend the faith of the State, and that they should hold their endowments so long as they held to these points; but large numbers of the people have withdrawn themselves from conformity, and yet they claim that they should receive the advantages which have been legally and intentionally instituted for the maintenance, encouragement, and promotion of conformity; which is as if a partnership had been instituted for certain purposes, and when one after another had given up aiding in the prosecution of the business, and gone even into opposition to it, those who had so acted should claim share of the profits and a division of the stock on their own terms. Such a thing would be manifestly unjust, as it always is unjust that any one should profit by his own breach of the law to the detriment of those who have obeyed it. Hence the universities ought not to be nationalized, though other universities endowed by other

parties may perhaps rightly enough be set up beside them.—JACOB.

The nation ought not to commit an injustice; even the tyranny of the majority ought to pause before it sanctions the obnoxious, injurious, and injudicious doctrine that those who obey the law should be exposed to confiscation, fine, and humiliation. This is exactly what is proposed under the euphemism of nationalizing the universities. All universities have obeyed the law under which they exist. They have conformed, and they confer their honours and emoluments on those who conform. They have no power to do otherwise. It was expressly to oppose and lessen Nonconformity that their laws were arranged, and they have acted consistently in abiding by the law. Many Nonconformists, having departed from the law and the gospel as interpreted by the law, yet claim that they should participate in the honours, emoluments, and advantages appropriated by law to discourage Nonconformity and to encourage Conformity; and they cry out that an injustice has been done to them, because "the loaves and fishes" have been withheld from them. But they by their own act resigned the enjoyment of them when they resigned the fulfilment of the conditions on which they were granted. They cannot claim as against the observance of the law, for that would be unjust; the law must hold that those who obey the conditions are those alone who can hold and enjoy the property involved in the contract, also. "the law is become of none effect."—Dr. O. W.

The State having established a religion, sets apart the universities of Oxford and Cambridge as training schools for the clergy, and for many generations they have been almost the only theological seminaries of the Anglican branch of the

the Church. The nation, however, is composed of men, many of whom do not believe in the teaching of the State-recognised creed; it would therefore be manifestly unfair for the Legislature to throw open these schools to the whole nation without providing the Church with adequate means (apart from them) to train those who are intended for her ministry. The scandal is sufficiently great at

present from those within her pale who do not believe her doctrinal teachings; but what could be expected if the men who taught her priests their theology could be of any creed, or creedless, as their fancies led them? Surely such a state of things would not be likely to increase either the morality or orthodoxy of the Established clergy. —H. DE ROSEMONT.

The Inquirer.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

849. Either by an oversight or by accident I did not receive a proof of the reply on Paley's "Natural Theology" contained in last month's *British Controversialist*; and it does not seem to have been read carefully to MS., as the following *errata*, several of which are important to the sense, occur in the course of it, viz.:—Page 396, column 1, line 21 (of critique), *for ingenious read ingenuous*; col. 2, line 26, *for i read ii*; also line 3 (of foot-note), *for law read laws*; and line 5 (of foot-note), *for mean words read means* to ends in the functions of words. P. 397, col. 1, line 11 from bottom, *for genitive read generative*. P. 397, col. 1, line 5 from bottom, *for self-existed read self-existent*. P. 397, col. 2, line 13, *for chain read rod*. P. 397, col. 2, line 13 from bottom, *for infringes read impinges*. P. 398, col. 1, line 7 from bottom, *for man read the man*. In answer to question 866 Paley's *à priori* argument, if logically constructed, is *not* existential. At most it shows the want of *something* to support the chain of cause and effect in the universe of phenomena. By the nature of the case this *something* is contingent, and is

therefore opposed to what Paley sought, a necessary being. But further, if it could be held that an infinite solid *existence* of the material world, maintaining the thorough reciprocity of action and reaction, existing moreover from eternity up to the time of the creation, and so affording an infinite "backward and abyss" of causality,—I say, if it could be held that such a thing were a necessary being, it would be no more for that the *ens necessarium*. On the contrary, the *ens necessarium* (which reason erects as its ideal) would still be infinitely separated from Paley's Being; and Reason would still "toil after it in vain," the ideal for ever provoking her pursuit, yet eluding her grasp, like a piece of meat tied to the stump of a dog's tail. The question resolves itself into this: if both the arguments of Paley, *à priori* and *à posteriori*, be untenable, what reason remains for Theism? To clear the way let us remember that direct knowledge, or cognition, is an affair of experience; but in the absence of direct knowledge we may have such knowledge as results from the coercion of intellectual proof. The last is all that is attempted by Paley in his *à priori* argument, which is known by the name *cosmo-*

logical. His *a posteriori* argument aims at still less. This, which is known by the name *physico-theological*, seeks only to raise a reasonable assurance of a first cause. Both these being found faulty and untenable, there still remain to us two other kinds of argument,—viz., the *ontological* argument of Anselm, and the *psychological* argument of Descartes. I cannot pronounce on these now. For myself I am quite sure that my Theism has nothing to do with either. I believe in a God because I find an *all-sufficient* reason for doing so in the moral reason, and in part because I find it laid on me as a *duty* to do so. Kant showed, and Coleridge wisely taught, that if God's existence were a certainty, i. e., an affair of knowledge, or, at least, capable of irresistible proof, the purity of the moral motive would be invaded by pathological elements. The same as to the freedom of the will, and as to the immortality of the soul. See Kant's "Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason," Book II., apot. I., section C. (Semple's translation, 1830, p. 87.) This work, and Kant's "Critique of Practical Reason," are in my judgment the most important of all his works. The former seems to me to render most subsequent didactic works on religion an impertinence.

—C. M. INGLEBY.

852. I do not know that I can do much to inform S. W. P., but so far as I am able to express it he is welcome to the knowledge I possess. Perhaps some one better informed may supplement, if not supplant, my reply to his query. First, the Rev. Thomas Seaton, M.A., late Fellow of Clare Hall, bequeathed to the university the rents of his estate at Kislisbury, in Northamptonshire, to be given yearly, without restriction, to the Master of Arts who should write the best English poem on a subject which shall be

judged by the Vice-Chancellor, the Master of Clare Hall, and the Regius Professor of Greek, to be most conducive to the honour of the Supreme Being and the recommendation of virtue. The subject is "given out" in June, and the poem is to be "sent in" to the Vice-Chancellor on or before the 29th of September following. The successful poem is to be printed, and the expense deducted out of the product of the estate; the remainder is given as a reward to the writer. The first prize poem was competed for in 1750. The rent of the estate in 1796 was £16; in 1811 it produced £40. In 1831 and 1838 a premium of £100 was announced by the examiners as adjudicable, should any poem appear to them of distinguished merit. Second, both of these extra premiums were gained by the Rev. Thomas E. Hankinson, M.A., of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge—"a man," as W. T. Edwards says, "of gentle and tender yet exalted soul," who died early, but who, so long as health was permitted to him, showed himself to be a devoted minister of the cross of Christ. Some of his "Sermons" were published in 1833-4. I possess six of his Seatonian Poems, viz., "David Playing the Harp before Saul," 1831; "The Plague Stayed," 1832; "St. Paul at Philippi," 1833; "Jacob," 1834; "Ishmael," 1835; "Ethiopia stretching out her Hands unto God," 1838. The first and the last of these gained the £100 premium; I do not know what other ones he gained, but I am told that there is a full list, with authors' names attached, under the head *Musa Seatoniana*, in Bohn's edition of Lowndes' "Bibliographers' Manual;" with this I am not acquainted, nor do I know anything more of the poet than is to be found in W. T. Edwards' brief notice of his poems.—R. M. A.

Literary Notes.

UNDER the auspices of the Cyclopaedia Club a volume of essays on "Land Tenure," written by various eminent British and foreign authors, is shortly to be issued.

A collected edition of the works of J. S. Mill, in twelve vols., under the superintendence of Dr. Thomas Gompertz, has just been commenced at Leipzig in Germany. Vol. I. contains "On Liberty," "Utilitarianism," and the "St. Andrew's Address." When are we likely to have this example imitated at home?

A collection of the speeches of Mr. Disraeli, to be issued in a popular form and at a cheap price, is in the press.

M. Eugène Forcade, journalist, author of "Historical Studies," &c., died 6th November.

The poetical works of Sir William Alexander, Earl of Stirling, and contemporary of Shakspeare, are to be now for the first time issued, with memoir and notes, by subscription.

A novel, entitled "Mary Hollis," by H. J. Schlennest, the Scott of Holland, has been translated into English.

Palacky, the Bohemian historiographer, has prepared "Documents illustrative of the Life of John Huss."

R. B. Raspe (1737—1794) was the author of "Baron Munchausen." He was a German antiquarian, held a place of trust in Hesse-Cassel, and in 1769 lectured on Volcanoes to the Royal Society of London.

The late Professor John Grote's "Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy" is to be edited by J. H. Mayor, M.A.

George Gillman has just issued an able work, "Modern Christian Heroes," and he has nearly ready "Men of Progress"—the heroes of English Dissent, the advanced thinkers in the Scottish Church, and the leaders of the Broad Church.

The Rev. T. Fowler's "Elements of Deductive Logic" has been translated into Hindustani. No library in America has yet reached 200,000 volumes, though in Europe there are more than twenty which have passed that figure. The Library of Congress, at Washington, contains 183,000 volumes; the Boston Public Library has 153,000; the Astor, at New York, 138,600; the Harvard College, Cambridge, 123,000; the Massachusetts, at New York, 109,500; the Athenaeum, Boston, 100,000; the Philadelphia, 85,000; the New York State Library, at Albany, 73,000; the New York Society, at New York, 55,000; and the Yale College, New Haven, 50,000. The Astor Library was founded by a bequest of 400,000 dolrs. by John Jacob Astor, and has been enriched by many supplementary gifts of money from his son, William B. Astor. It is perfectly free to all comers, but it is open only from 10 a.m. until 4 p.m. Dr. James Rush, of Philadelphia, recently left 1,000,000 dolrs. to the Philadelphia Library, but made it a condition that the library should not take in "mind-tainting reviews, controversial politics, and those teachers of disjointed thinking, the newspapers."

W. F. Donkin, Savilian Professor of Astronomy, Oxford, died 16th November.

gratification

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
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
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